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Corrections in Volume XXVI

The Editor of the BULLETIN wishes to call attention to the following errors:

January 14, page 48, right-hand column, 5th line from bottom. In place of on that date read December 20.

March 24, page 474, left-hand column, 2d line from bottom. In place of banks read hacks.

April 7, page 549, left-hand column, 10th line. In place of political read potential.

June 2, 1952, page 881, left-hand column. The title of Mr. Linder should read Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs.

June 9, page 902. In the second paragraph of the first note read Herrnburg not Horrenberg. On the same page the second note is dated May 29 not May 30.

*9353, 1 A 30

The Department of State

bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

*An Article*¹

The concept of a united Europe, which is many centuries old, gained renewed significance with the revival of interest in international and European organization after World War I. European unification was pressed by such private organizations as the Pan-European Union and also received support from some European statesmen such as Aristide Briand of France and Karl Renner of Austria. Briand's plan for a European union was carefully studied by the League of Nations but could not be put into operation because of the divisive effects of the world depression and the rise of totalitarian states.

During World War II interest in European union again revived. In 1944 the governments-in-exile of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed a treaty which provided for their eventual economic union. Immediately after the war numerous popular groups arose to rally public sentiment behind European unification. These groups, most of whom later united to form what was called the European Movement, claimed the support of such prominent political leaders as Paul-Henri Spaak, Winston Churchill, Carlo Sforza, Georges Bidault, and Paul Ramadier.

Economic dislocation in the war-torn countries and the fear of aggression brought increased cooperation among the nations of Europe in the economic and military fields. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe was organized soon after the war to assist rehabilitation and to further economic cooperation among European countries. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), formed in April 1948 among the Marshall Plan countries, worked toward European recovery and closer economic cooperation among the member states. The Brus-

sels Pact, signed in March 1948, laid the basis for military cooperation and for consultation on other major problems affecting the five participants, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

These developments were, however, insufficient to satisfy the supporters of European union. The French Parliament in March 1948 passed a resolution calling for a European constituent assembly to establish a European federation. In May 1948 a congress of the European Movement met at The Hague and passed a resolution supporting the formation of a European parliament. Although the European Movement was a nongovernmental organization composed of private groups, nearly every country sent all-party delegations sponsored by the political parties.

Creation of the Council of Europe

In August 1948 the French Government invited the other Brussels pact powers to meet for consideration of the formation of a European parliament. The British were reluctant to support the idea of an assembly, preferring rather a committee of ministers. However, after considerable negotiation, the Brussels pact powers agreed upon a compromise and decided to create a Council of Europe composed of two organs, a Committee of Ministers, which would make recommendations to the member governments upon unanimous agreement, and a Consultative Assembly, which would be a deliberative body empowered to discuss problems and make recommendations to the Committee of Ministers. In the spring of 1949 five other European countries were invited to join with these powers in working out final details for the creation of the Council of Europe. On May 5, 1949, the Statute of the Council of Europe was signed by the 10 original members.

¹ This article also appears as Foreign Affairs Outline, Department of State publication 4492, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C., for 5¢.

Membership

The original members of the Council of Europe were France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Italy, and Ireland. Greece and Turkey were invited to become members during the first session in 1949, and they joined immediately. Iceland, which had been invited at the same time, became a member in March 1950. A few months later, in 1950, the German Federal Republic and the Saar were given associate memberships, which entitled them to representation in the Consultative Assembly but not in the Committee of Ministers. On May 2, 1951, the German Federal Republic was admitted to full membership in the Council of Europe.

Purpose and Role

According to the Statute of the Council, the aim of the Council is to "achieve unity between its Members for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress." To this end it is to discuss questions of common concern and reach agreements for "common action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters and in the maintenance and further realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms." Defense is the only field in which the Statute precludes the Council from making recommendations to member governments.

At the time the Council of Europe was formed, other organizations many of whose functions were similar to those of the Council of Europe, such as UNESCO, the International Labor Organization (ILO), and OEEC, were already in existence. In order to avoid duplication of the work of these organizations, article 23 of the Statute provides that in planning its agenda the Assembly "shall have regard to the work of other European inter-governmental organizations to which some or all of the Members of the Council are parties." Agreements are now being worked out for cooperation between the Council of Europe and ILO and UNESCO. Representatives from OEEC and the Council of Europe form a liaison committee between OEEC and the Council, one of whose functions is to coordinate the activities of the two bodies.

The role of the Council of Europe is not limited to the specific projects which it originates and implements. Of equal importance is its role as a stimulus to unified action, a constructive critic, and a rallying point for European public opinion.

In its role as a stimulus to action, the Council of Europe may direct attention to the need for coordinated, expanded, or redirected action in a particular field such as that of refugees and surplus population. Although, as the problem is examined, it may sometimes develop that the Council of Europe is not the organization best equipped to carry out the particular program, the Council will have served its purpose by stimulating action.

The role of the Council of Europe as a constructive critic is increasing, and the Committee of Ministers is now considering means of further developing this side of the Council's work. OEEC now submits a report on its activities for discussion in the Assembly. The Schuman Plan treaty likewise provides that the High Authority of the proposed Coal and Steel Community shall submit its annual report to the Committee of Ministers and the Consultative Assembly and that the Common Assembly of the Community shall submit an annual report to the Consultative Assembly.

Paul-Henri Spaak has called the Consultative Assembly "the Tribune of Europe." Here 15 different European viewpoints can be focused on the major problems confronting Europe, and the spotlight of public opinion can be directed to these issues. In carrying out this function of rallying public opinion, the Consultative Assembly has a role unique among European organizations.

Organs and Procedures of the Council

THE ORGANS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THEIR FUNCTIONS

The major organs of the Council of Europe are the Consultative Assembly and the Committee of Ministers. In addition, a Joint Committee, composed of representatives from the Committee of Ministers and the Consultative Assembly, discusses mutual problems and seeks to eliminate any conflicts between the two organs. A secretariat, headed by Secretary General Jacques-Camille Paris, services these bodies.

The Committee of Ministers, the "upper body" of the Council, is composed of the Foreign Ministers of the member states or their deputies. The chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers

rotates among the members. Among the statesmen who have represented their countries in the Committee of Ministers are Dirk Stikker of the Netherlands, Count Carlo Sforza of Italy, Konrad Adenauer of Germany, and Robert Schuman of France.

All recommendations made by the Council of Europe to the member governments require the unanimous approval of the Committee of Ministers. Major substantive decisions require a unanimous vote, but certain minor matters can be settled by a two-thirds majority. Actually, most decisions are reached by unanimous agreement without the formality of a vote. The Ministers have recently adopted a procedure slightly modifying the unanimity rule, which will allow "partial agreements," i.e. agreements among certain members which do not bind those who abstain. Recommendations made by the Council of Europe are not legally binding on the member governments, but, of course, since they are made by high-level representatives they would normally be reflected in the policy of the governments.

Sessions of the Committee of Ministers are held before and after each session of the Assembly and on such other occasions as the Ministers may decide. Thus far, the Committee has met approximately four times a year. The meetings of the Committee of Ministers are held in private unless the Ministers unanimously decide otherwise.

The Consultative Assembly is a purely deliberative body in which each country is represented according to relative size. The delegations vary in number from 18 for France, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom to 3 for the Saar and Iceland. In the past delegations were selected by member governments by whatever means they chose. Delegates were almost always members of the national parliament and frequently were chosen by the political parties. Members of opposition parties, except the Communist, have been regularly included in the delegations. Under a new amendment to the Statute, delegates will henceforth be selected by parliaments or in a manner approved by parliaments rather than by the executive branch of the member governments. Among the European political leaders who have represented their countries in the Consultative Assembly are Georges Bidault, Winston Churchill, Finn Moe, and Carlo Schmid. Paul-Henri Spaak has served three terms as President of the Consultative Assembly.

Each member of the Consultative Assembly is seated and votes as an individual rather than as a member of a country bloc, an unusual procedure among international organizations. This has meant in practice that members of national delegations can usually be found on different sides of any issue.

The Assembly may debate any matter within the scope of the Council. Matters for debate may either originate in the Consultative Assembly or be referred to it by the Committee of Ministers. On the basis of such debates and the work of its committees, the Assembly adopts recommendations for consideration by the Committee of Ministers. A recommendation requires a two-thirds vote before it can be submitted to the Committee of Ministers.

Originally, the Consultative Assembly met once a year for one month at Strasbourg, France, the seat of the Council of Europe. The long time-lag between its yearly sessions retarded consideration of problems, particularly those of primary interest to the Assembly. Therefore in 1950 the Assembly split its one-month session and, after meeting first in August, reconvened in November to consider the action the Committee of Ministers had taken on its recommendations. This procedure was followed again in 1951 and will probably continue to be the practice.

The Standing Committee of the Consultative Assembly is responsible for Assembly activities during the period between sessions. It is composed of the Bureau of the Assembly, i.e. its President and Vice Presidents, and 23 representatives from the Assembly. Urgent problems requiring prompt consideration by the relevant Assembly committees are brought to their attention by this body. The Standing Committee also supervises the implementation of Assembly decisions and coordinates the activities of the various committees.

HOW A RECOMMENDATION IS CONSIDERED

A subject for consideration by the Council of Europe can originate in either of the two major organs. Although a proposal may originate in the Committee of Ministers and be submitted to member governments without reference to the Assembly, such a procedure would be rare. Most recommendations studied by the Council of Europe have originated in the Consultative Assembly. Upon presentation, a motion is ordinarily sent to

the appropriate Assembly committee for a report. The committees of the Assembly are political rather than technical bodies. If the motion raises complex social and economic questions, members of the committee may consult informally with experts in the field or members of interested organizations and sometimes will work out the formal details of a proposal in conjunction with another international group. For example, the Draft Convention on the Reciprocal Treatment of Nationals now under consideration was prepared in cooperation with the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law. A draft report on a motion usually must receive a two-thirds vote in committee before it is presented to the Assembly.

After a proposal has been approved in the Assembly, it is normally transmitted to the Committee of Ministers. In certain cases, however, where the Assembly has been anxious to bring parliamentary support to bear on the Committee of Ministers, representatives have first introduced recommendations in their own parliaments for debate, in the hope that public and parliamentary sentiment would be aroused in support of the proposal. When a proposal is presented to the Committee of Ministers, the Ministers may review the broad political implications of a proposal; but, if the general principle is acceptable, they usually prefer to have specific provisions studied by experts before taking any final decision.

In order to avoid duplication of effort, the Committee of Ministers may refer certain recommendations of the Assembly to other organizations such as OEEC and request a report on action already undertaken or contemplated.

After study by the secretariat or government experts the proposal is again considered by the Ministers. After general approval by the Committee of Ministers, the detailed or revised proposal may be returned to the Consultative Assembly or the Standing Committee for comment. If there is conflict over particular points, representatives from the Assembly and from the Committee of Ministers attempt to reach agreement in the Joint Committee.

A proposal agreed upon by the Council may be implemented in several different ways. It may be carried out by the member governments themselves, or action on it may be taken by the Council of Europe itself, either alone or in cooperation with other organizations. In certain cases other

organizations of which these countries are members may be asked to implement a recommendation.

Basic Problems and Activities of the Council

In the brief period since its formation in May 1949, the Council of Europe has led an existence marked by controversy. Even before the internal organization of the Council had been established, it was torn by conflict over its functions, its powers, and its purpose. Conflict over the method by which European cooperation could best be achieved was accompanied by differences of view between the Consultative Assembly and the Committee of Ministers. Spirited debates on these topics have centered primarily around the problem of revision of the Statute of the Council of Europe.

The differences in approach to the problem of European unity which were reflected in the organization of the Council of Europe are clearly evident in this controversy. In the Assembly, most of the representatives from the continental powers favor a federal approach, which would require certain sacrifices of national sovereignty. Although the majority of the federalists now accept the fact that a federation including all of Western Europe cannot be attained immediately, they consider that supranational powers can be given to bodies which will be empowered to administer particular segments or "functions" in the European economy. These are considered to be preliminary steps toward the long-range goal. This group has been especially active in pushing for amendments to enlarge the functions and powers of both the Council and the Consultative Assembly. The British and Scandinavians, sometimes called "functionalists," oppose plans which would call for sacrifices of sovereignty, preferring that specific problems be worked out on an intergovernmental basis.

The debate on the problem of European federation reached a climax in November 1950. During the first half of the session the previous summer, the British and Scandinavian delegates had told the others to go ahead with regional federation if they so desired. At the session in the fall of 1950, a proposal advocating regional federation was defeated in committee, although the British and the Scandinavians did not oppose it. Many of those who had previously supported federation were opposed to a federation in which the British would not participate.

Although the question of radical revision of the Statute was thus settled at least temporarily, pressure for other revisions continued to command the interest of the Assembly. Many of these recommendations for amendment had been pending since the first session of the Assembly, and the lack of action by the Ministers on this matter had proved a major irritant in the relations between the Assembly and the Ministers. Many representatives, eager to see concrete progress made, felt that their recommendations had been either ignored or dealt with in a perfunctory or dilatory fashion. On the occasions of the Ministers' regular reports to the Consultative Assembly, some representatives voiced bitter attacks against the Committee of Ministers and the states which they thought had taken particularly negative positions. The Joint Committee, established in mid-1950, however, brought greater understanding between the two organs.

At the sixth session of the Committee of Ministers in November 1950, the Ministers accepted the principle of specialized authorities and revision of the Statute. A committee of senior officials was then established to review the changes suggested by the Assembly.

During the interim between November and the session in May 1951, a series of steps were taken which were to result in decided improvement of relations between the Consultative Assembly and the Committee of Ministers at the spring session. Although not accepting the amendments regarding the abolition of veto or elimination of the restriction on defense, the Ministers did agree upon a number of amendments, which for the most part embodied the Assembly's wishes on such questions as agenda and selection of representatives. The Ministers also reached agreement on a number of other questions including the admission of new members and the conclusions of conventions. Advances were also made toward closer relations with other European organizations. In early spring, a liaison committee between the Council of Europe and OEEC was established to facilitate exchange of information and to assist in harmonizing the activities of the two organizations. A further step was taken when it was agreed that OEEC would present regular reports to the Assembly. When the Schuman Plan treaty was signed in April, a protocol relating to relationships between the Council of Europe and the Coal and Steel Community was appended which took fully into account

the recommendations of the Assembly regarding reports and common membership in the Consultative Assembly and the Common Assembly of the Community.

At the ninth session of the Committee of Ministers in August 1951 agreement was reached, as noted above, to allow partial agreements which would permit certain decisions to apply only to those members accepting them.

Although substantial progress was made during 1951 toward improving relations between the Ministers and the Assembly and certain troublesome questions were laid aside, at least temporarily, the problems regarding the role of the Council and particularly the Assembly, although narrowed in scope, still require serious attention. At the session in November 1951 the Assembly discussed plans for specialized authorities in transport and agriculture, but it has already become clear that the same problem which arose regarding European federation is arising again with respect to specialized authorities—the problem of sovereignty. These general problems were paramount in the mind of Paul-Henri Spaak when, in discussing the role of the Assembly at the end of the first half of its 1951 session, he stated:

"To sum up: the constitutional approach has been abandoned; the functional (or specialized authorities) approach offers only limited possibilities; and the consultative method is not working satisfactorily. . . . All this, I think, makes it necessary for those who believe in the paramount necessity of the Council of Europe to give thought to its future and to try and work out once and for all the road it ought to take."

Relation of United States to the Council

The Council of Europe is a purely European organization in which, as was indicated above, the United States does not participate. However, because the United States considers that the Council has an important role to play in furthering European unification, it has followed the activities of the Council with great interest. Since the inception of the European Recovery Program, the United States has emphasized the need for a closer integration of the free nations of Europe and has encouraged them to take steps toward this goal. The United States warmly welcomed the establishment of the Council as a further step in this direction.

On May 11, 1949, soon after the Statute of the Council of Europe was signed, Secretary Acheson stated:

"This act on the part of those nations is a welcome step forward toward the political integration of the free nations of Europe. The people of those nations are to be praised for their realization that a free Europe, to remain free and attain a higher degree of well-being, must be a united Europe."

Although the United States has no official relationship with the Council, members of Congress have met with representatives of the Assembly to discuss problems of concern to both the United States and the European countries. At its second session in the summer of 1950 the Assembly of the Council adopted a resolution expressing its wish that close cooperation between the countries of Europe and North America continue and requesting that close liaison be established between the European organizations and the nations of North America. In March 1951 the Committee of Ministers invited the Assembly to suggest ways in which this liaison might be established. Accordingly at its third session in May 1951 the Consultative Assembly invited a delegation from the Congress of the United States to meet with a delegation from the Assembly for a public discussion of problems of mutual interest. This invitation was accepted by the Congress, and, in November 1951, 7 members of the Senate and 7 members of the House of Representatives met with 18 delegates selected proportionately from among the various parliamentary delegations to the Assembly for an exchange of views on such problems as the development of European unity and the social and economic aspects of the current rearmament effort.

Major Accomplishments

Since the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve greater European unity, which is often a very intangible thing not measurable merely by the various activities or institutional forms undertaken, it is difficult to assess the importance of the Council in terms of its concrete accomplishments. The Council had no assigned task other than that of achieving greater unity, since defense matters are excluded and action on economic matters is primarily the responsibility of other organizations such as OEEC. The changes in the Statute, even

though not radical in form, reflect progress toward the goal of unity, as do the agreement on specialized authorities and the growing habit of cooperation and consultation.

One of the main functions of the Council is to provide a forum for the discussion of major European problems. How much a debate affects a given course of events is difficult, if not impossible, to determine. Certainly the Assembly has focused the spotlight of public attention on some of the crucial issues of our times, ranging from inflation to the threat of aggression, and by this means has stimulated action on many practical problems.

For example, although the Council of Europe has no power to act in the field of defense, the spirited debate on this issue in August 1950, according to the statements of French Foreign Minister Schuman, had considerable effect on the future course of events. In outlining the Plevin Plan for a European army to the Consultative Assembly at Strasbourg in November 1950, he stated:

"But there is no need to put these questions to you whose very presence here is a challenge to orthodoxy; to you who by the vote you took here have testified to your support of the basic idea of our plan, nay more, who are its originator. This plan is essentially the one which you recommended."

The vigorous debates in the first session of the Assembly brought wider public attention to the problem of European economic integration and focused interest on the activities of OEEC. Strong support was given to the Schuman Plan for a coal and steel community which was debated in the Assembly both before and after the signature of the treaty.

On a number of other questions more definite action has been taken within the framework of the Council of Europe. Among these are the questions of human rights, refugees and surplus population, social security, patents, standardization of passports and abolition of visas, and a wide range of cultural problems.

A convention on human rights which would reflect those concepts basic to the democratic way of life was proposed at the first session of the Council of Europe in 1949 and signed at Rome on November 4, 1950. At its ninth session in August 1951 the Committee of Ministers agreed upon a protocol to the convention embodying rights of free elections, education, and property which the

Assembly had been especially anxious to have included in the convention itself.

After recommendations from the Assembly on the problem of refugees and the decision of the Ministers that the problem of refugees and overpopulation was one of extreme urgency whose existence impeded the aims of the Council of Europe, a committee of high-level experts of member governments was convened to examine the problem and determine what action might be taken. Experts from IRO, ILO, OEEC, and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees have attended its meetings, and the United States, at the request of the Council, sent an observer to the second meeting of this group, held in September 1951.

In the social field the Council of Europe has agreed on the principle of framing a European code of social security in conjunction with ILO. The experts are now working out the general principles to be incorporated in the convention. They are also working on additional ratifications for ILO conventions, extension of the poor-law convention, and extension of social-security agreements concluded by the Brussels pact powers.

In the economic field, the Assembly has been studying the formation of specialized authorities concerned with transport and agriculture. Since these matters have been studied and debated in the Council of Europe, the interest of other Western European organizations in this field has increased. Other complex questions, such as the problem of full employment and cartels, have occupied the attention of working groups in the Council. A working party on patents has already brought to a successful conclusion its first task, that of unifying the procedures and formalities regarding the application for and the granting of patents among members of the Council. The group is now studying the creation of a European patents office and its integration with the International Patents Institute at The Hague.

The great expectations of the most ardent supporters of the Council of Europe who hoped that a European federation would quickly be created have clearly not been fulfilled. The Council has nevertheless played a useful role, in fact a unique role. Although it has taken only limited action on the most urgent problems of this period, it has demonstrated, through the Consultative Assembly, the power to arouse public opinion and stimulate

activity on a number of pressing issues. Through its efforts toward unified action on specific social, cultural, and economic problems, the Council is assisting in the effort to remove many real but unspectacular obstacles to European unity. Thus through public debate on broad issues and positive action on problems of narrower scope, the Council of Europe is providing a useful contribution to the growing sense of European unity.

Further Denial of Soviet "Germ Warfare" Allegations

[Released to the press March 26]

Statement by Secretary Acheson

At his news conference on March 26, Secretary Acheson was asked for comment on the statement, highly publicized by the Communists, of a group of jurists who claim to have "substantiated" the waging by United Nations forces in Korea of germ warfare.

Secretary Acheson made the following extemporaneous reply:

As I understand it, this group of very eminent jurists to which you refer are a group of Communists and former Nazis who have turned Communist, who have gone from East Germany into this area. That would not seem to imply any special impartiality or disinterest in their approach to it.

We have stated often, I have stated, General Ridgway has stated that there is not the slightest truth whatever in these statements.

We have asked the International Red Cross to make an investigation. We have offered all facilities to the Red Cross. The World Health Organization has proposed that it be used to make an investigation, also to attempt to deal with any epidemic if such an epidemic exists. We have supported that request. The Communists have never replied to either request.

It seems perfectly clear that the Communists are determined not to have any fair or impartial investigation made. They continue on the one hand to say there is no epidemic. On the other hand they say that we are engaged in these nefarious practices.

There is no truth in the statements. The fact that there is no truth is shown by the refusal of the Communists to permit any investigation by an impartial international body.

Reaffirmation of U.S. Policy Toward Germany

PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON¹

On March 10, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko handed to Elim O'Shaughnessy, United States Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow, a note containing proposals for a treaty of peace with Germany. Identical notes were handed to the British and French Ambassadors at Moscow. On March 25 the U.S., British, and French Embassies at Moscow delivered identical notes of reply to the Soviet Government. There follow texts of a statement by Secretary Acheson and of the U.S. and Soviet notes.

I should like to anticipate your questions and speak for a moment on the reply to the Soviet note of March 10 on Germany which the representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, and France in Moscow delivered yesterday to the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

One of the primary purposes of the reply is to seek clarification of Soviet intentions with respect to procedures and conditions which would permit all-German elections, under international supervision, and the establishment of a democratic and free Germany. The Soviet note has dealt with this subject in an unclear manner and all our efforts during the past several years to obtain Soviet acceptance of satisfactory procedures have been unsuccessful. As pointed out in our note, it has seemed to us that Soviet cooperation with the U.N. Commission of Investigation would be especially significant as a touchstone of Soviet intentions.

When the Soviet Union suggests that the four powers "discuss" a German peace treaty, the U.S. Government cannot but be reminded of the 7 fruitless years of discussions with Soviet representatives about an Austrian treaty. It would be an encouraging augury for any future discussion about a German treaty if the Soviet Government were to respond favorably to the proposals for an Austrian treaty contained in the note of the United States Government of March 13.

The Soviet note has led the United States to reaffirm in its reply its policies toward Germany and Europe. The peace and prosperity of Europe demand that unity among its people shall supersede the play of national interests and national forces which have brought so much distress to the European Continent.

Certain aspects of Soviet policy pursued since the close of the war have strongly tended to accent the need for a rapid development of a close European community. The U.S. Government has supported and will continue to support measures for the formation of a community in Europe designed to develop the economic strength and defensive capacity of the participating countries as a whole.

Germany must be allowed to play its part in building a strong European community capable of developing its freedoms and of defending itself from aggression or subversion. The U.S. Government is convinced that such a community is entirely defensive in character and purpose.

The Soviet proposal, with its emphasis on national forces, points to the past and away from the establishment of a new Europe in which national rivalries would be subordinated to the interests of the entire area. The U.S. Government firmly believes that the European approach represents the most constructive means of eliminating dangerous tensions. It has, accordingly, sought to make clear in its reply that it will not be deflected from pursuing this path of peace.

U.S. NOTE OF MARCH 25

The United States Government, in consultation with the Governments of the United Kingdom and France, has given the most careful consideration to the Soviet Government's note of March 10, 1952, which proposed the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. They have also consulted the Government of the German Federal Republic and the representatives of Berlin.

The conclusion of a just and lasting peace treaty which would end the division of Germany has always been and remains an essential objective of the United States Government. As the Soviet Government itself recognizes, the conclusion of such a treaty requires the formation of an all-German Government, expressing the will of the German people. Such a Government can only be set up on the basis of free elections in the Federal Republic, the Soviet zone of occupation and Berlin. Such elections can only be held in circumstances which safeguard the national and individual liberties of the German people. In order to ascertain whether this first essential condition exists, the

¹ Made on March 26.

Background References

The unification of Germany on the basis of free, democratic elections has always been strongly supported by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. In February 1950, John J. McCloy, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, proposed all-German elections for a constituent assembly. A chronological list of subsequent Allied proposals and of steps taken by the West German Government appeared in the BULLETIN of October 29, 1951, p. 695.

On October 4, 1951, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of West Germany requested the appointment of a U.N. commission to investigate whether conditions would permit the holding of nation-wide elections. A resolution establishing such a commission was introduced by the United States, United Kingdom, and France on December 1 during the sixth General Assembly session (BULLETIN of Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1019) and was adopted, with amendments, on December 20 (for text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 14, 1952, p. 55). The commission was constituted on February 11 and is to report to the Secretary-General not later than September 1, 1952.

Significant statements on the integration of Germany into the European community were made by the Western Foreign Ministers on May 14, 1950 (BULLETIN of May 22, 1950, p. 787); on September 19, 1950 (BULLETIN of Oct. 2, 1950, p. 530); on September 14, 1951 (BULLETIN of Sept. 24, 1951, p. 486); on November 22, 1951 (BULLETIN of Dec. 3, 1951, p. 891); and on February 19, 1952 (BULLETIN of Mar. 3, 1952, p. 325).

The Foreign Ministers announced in September 1950 their decision that the necessary steps should be taken to terminate the state of war with Germany. On October 19, 1951, the Congress resolved that the state of war between the United States and Germany was terminated, and the President on October 24 issued a proclamation to that effect (BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1951, p. 769).

General Assembly of the United Nations has appointed a Commission to carry out a simultaneous investigation in the Federal Republic, the Soviet zone and Berlin. The Commission of Investigation has been assured of the necessary facilities in the Federal Republic and in Western Berlin. The United States Government would be glad to learn that such facilities will also be afforded in the Soviet zone and in Eastern Berlin, to enable the Commission to carry out its task.

The Soviet Government's proposals do not indicate what the international position of an all-German Government would be before the conclusion of a peace treaty. The United States Government considers that the all-German Government should be free both before and after the conclusion of a peace treaty to enter into associations compatible with the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

In putting forward its proposal for a German peace treaty, the Soviet Government expressed its readiness also to discuss other proposals. The United States Government has taken due note of this statement. In its view, it will not be possible to engage in detailed discussion of a peace treaty until conditions have been created for free elec-

tions and until a free all-German Government which could participate in such discussion has been formed. There are several fundamental questions which would also have to be resolved.

For example, the United States Government notes that the Soviet Government makes the statement that the territory of Germany is determined by frontiers laid down by the decisions of the Potsdam conference. The United States Government would recall that in fact no definitive German frontiers were laid down by the Potsdam decisions, which clearly provided that the final determination of territorial questions must await the peace settlement.

The United States Government also observes that the Soviet Government now considers that the peace treaty should provide for the formation of German national land, air, and sea forces, while at the same time imposing limitations on Germany's freedom to enter into association with other countries. The United States Government considers that such provisions would be a step backwards and might jeopardize the emergence in Europe of a new era in which international relations would be based on cooperation and not on rivalry and distrust. Being convinced of the need of a policy of European unity, the United States Government is giving its full support to plans designed to secure the participation of Germany in a purely defensive European community which will preserve freedom, prevent aggression, and preclude the revival of militarism. The United States Government believes that the proposal of the Soviet Government for the formation of German national forces is inconsistent with the achievement of this objective. The United States Government remains convinced that this policy of European unity cannot threaten the interests of any country and represents the true path of peace.

SOVIET NOTE OF MARCH 10

[Unofficial Translation]

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to direct the attention of the Government of the United States of America to the fact that although about seven years have passed since the end of the war in Europe a peace treaty with Germany is not yet concluded.

With the aim of eliminating such an abnormal situation the Soviet Government, supporting the communication of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to the Four Powers requesting that conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany be expedited, on its part addresses itself to the Government of the United States and also to the Governments of Great Britain and France with the proposal to urgently discuss the question of a peace treaty with Germany with a view to preparing in the nearest future an agreed draft

peace treaty and present it for examination by an appropriate international conference with the participation of all interested governments. It is understood that such a peace treaty must be worked out with the direct participation of Germany in the form of an all-German Government. From this it follows that the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., England, and France who are fulfilling control functions in Germany must also consider the question of conditions favoring the earliest formation of an all-German Government expressing the will of the German people.

With the aim of facilitating the preparation of a draft peace treaty the Soviet Government on its part proposes for the consideration of the Governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France the attached draft as a basis of a peace treaty with Germany.

In proposing consideration of this draft the Soviet Government at the same time expressed its readiness also to consider other possible proposals on this question.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. expects to receive the reply of the Government of the U.S.A. to the mentioned proposal at the earliest possible time.

Similar notes have also been sent by the Soviet Government to the Governments of Great Britain and France.

ENCLOSURE

Draft of Soviet Government of Peace Treaty with Germany

Almost seven years have passed since the end of the war with Germany but Germany still does not have a peace treaty, finds itself divided, continues to remain in an unequal situation as regards other governments. It is necessary to end such an abnormal situation. This responds to the aspirations of all peace loving peoples. It is impossible to assure a just status to the legal national interests of the German people without the earliest conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

Conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany has an important significance for the strengthening of peace in Europe. A peace treaty with Germany will permit final decision of questions which have arisen as a consequence of the second world war. The European states which have suffered from German aggression, particularly the neighbors of Germany, have a vital interest in the solution of these questions. Conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany will aid improvement of the international situation as a whole and at the same time aid the establishment of a lasting peace.

The necessity of hastening the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany is required by the fact that the danger of re-establishment of German militarism which has twice unleashed world wars has not been eliminated in as much as appropriate provisions of the Potsdam conference still remain unfilled. A peace treaty with Germany must guarantee elimination of the possibility of a rebirth of German militarism and German aggression.

Conclusion of the peace treaty with Germany will establish for the German people permanent conditions of peace, will aid the development of Germany as a unified democratic and peace-loving government in accordance with the Potsdam provisions and will assure to the German people the possibility of peaceful cooperation with other peoples.

As a result of this, the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Great Britain and France have decided urgently to set about working out a peace treaty with Germany.

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America, Great Britain and France consider that preparations of the peace treaty should be accomplished with the participation of Germany in the form of an all-German Government and that the peace treaty with Germany should be formed on the following basis:

Basis of peace treaty with Germany.

Participants.

Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States of America, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland and other governments which participated with their armed forces in the war against Germany.

Political provisions.

(1) Germany is re-established as a unified state, thereby an end is put to the division of Germany and a unified Germany has a possibility of development as an independent democratic peace-loving state.

(2) All armed forces of the occupying powers must be withdrawn from Germany not later than one year from the date of entry into force of the peace treaty. Simultaneously all foreign military bases on the territory of Germany must be liquidated.

(3) Democratic rights must be guaranteed to the German people to the end that all persons under German jurisdiction without regard to race, sex, language or religion enjoy the rights of man and basic freedoms including freedom of speech, press, religious persuasion, political conviction and assembly.

(4) Free activity of democratic parties and organizations must be guaranteed in Germany with the right of freedom to decide their own internal affairs, to conduct meetings and assembly, to enjoy freedom of press and publication.

(5) The existence of organizations inimical to democracy and to the maintenance of peace must not be permitted on the territory of Germany.

(6) Civil and political rights equal to all other German citizens for participation in the building of peace-loving democratic Germany must be made available to all former members of the German army, including officers and generals, all former Nazis, excluding those who are serving court sentences for commission of crimes.

(7) Germany obligates itself not to enter into any kind of coalition or military alliance directed against any power which took part with its armed forces in the war against Germany.

Territory.

The territory of Germany is defined by the borders established by the provisions of the Potsdam Conference of the Great Powers.

Economic Provisions.

No kind of limitations are imposed on Germany as to development of its peaceful economy, which must contribute to the growth of the welfare of the German people.

Likewise, Germany will have no kind of limitation as regards trade with other countries, navigation and access to world markets.

Military Provisions.

(1) Germany will be permitted to have its own national armed forces (land, air, and sea) which are necessary for the defense of the country.

(2) Germany is permitted to produce war materials and equipment, the quantity and type of which must not exceed the limitations required for the armed forces established for Germany by the peace treaty.

Germany and the United Nations Organization.

The governments concluding a peace treaty with Germany will support the application of Germany for acceptance as a member of the United Nations Organization.

A Review of Political and Economic Conditions in France

by David K. E. Bruce¹

In spite of frequent Cabinet changes since the liberation, French foreign policy has remained remarkably constant. In fact during the last 7 years, there have been only two Foreign Ministers, Bidault and Schuman. By overwhelming majorities—even though the Communists have always voted in opposition—the French Parliament has approved all measures for the defense of the Western European community.

To implement this defense, the French Nation is currently making, in proportion to national income, the largest contribution of any NATO country except that of the United States, and prior to the outbreak of the Korean war the military effort of France was larger proportionately than our own.

Naturally, we have recently been deeply concerned over political developments in France. The interplay, the reaction between politics and economics is closely linked. There is an equal apprehension over the large, although reduced, Communist vote that expressed itself in the last general election.

Yet, these conditions should not be viewed with an excess of pessimism. It is quite evident that France could make a tremendous, and perhaps determining commitment to NATO defense if it were not for its involvement in Indochina, in that almost unknown war where French Union forces killed have now exceeded 30,000. This war at times seems a bottomless pit, for into it have been thrown the flower of the French professional army; almost 50 percent of the officers and non-commissioned officers so essential to the training and leadership of French NATO forces are engaged there, to say nothing of 25 percent of her naval contingents, as well as a most enterprising body of combat airmen.

As to communism in France, it no longer constitutes the threat that it once did to the integrity of the Atlantic community. With its parliamen-

tary representation reduced from 180 to 101 Assembly members, its newspapers circulating at less than half the momentum of a few years ago, its followers in the French Cgr Labor Union constituting only about 1/4 of their strength in 1946, its hold on the management of nationalized industries broken, its infiltration of the armed forces neutralized, its dominance in certain Government departments vitiated, its directors unable since 1948 to invoke a crippling strike, its demonstrations against Eisenhower and Adenauer public fiascoes, its propaganda beginning to be effectively countered, its submission to orders from Moscow increasingly arousing the patriotic suspicions of French workmen and farmers, its influence has diminished to a point where, though still dangerous, it presents no immediate impediment to the realization of policies conceived in the national interest.

Unhappily, the burden of armament, and the operation of a fierce and costly anti-Communist war in Indochina, superimposed upon the necessary demands of an economy prostrated by years of enemy occupation, and only recently convalescent, have accentuated the inflationary forces in France, and rendered its balance-of-payments problem, especially in relation to the dollar zone, unmanageable without substantial foreign assistance.

Although an admirable proportion exists between agriculture and industry in France, any slight disturbance in it is provocative of unfavorable reactions. Last year there was, due to climatic conditions, a shortage in bread-grain production, and, as a consequence, large imports of wheat became mandatory. Although the output of coal in 1951 was the largest in French history, as was the performance per miner, the dislocation in the movement of that commodity and of coke, due primarily to the falling off of traditional imports from Great Britain and Germany, forced the French Government to have recourse to the uneconomic expenditure of dollars to import coal from the United States—and even so supplies were not sufficient to enable the steel industry to operate at more than 85 percent of capacity.

French industry has staged a noteworthy recovery since 1944, with the details of which you are

¹Excerpts from a statement made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in support of the Mutual Security Program for fiscal year 1953 on Mar. 25 and released to the press on the same date. Mr. Bruce was U.S. Ambassador to France from May 1949 until his appointment as Under Secretary. He assumed the latter position on Apr. 1.

thoroughly familiar. But the continuance of its pace depends upon its ability to import those raw materials in which it is notably deficient. Even within the broad confines of the French Union, little petroleum, rubber, cotton, nonferrous metals, and many other indispensable ingredients of modern industrial production have been found. Before the last war, these commodities were freely obtained through the use of the substantial foreign assets, in dollars and other hard currencies, of the Metropole.

These assets no longer exist. They were looted by a skilled and unscrupulous invader, and what little remained was devoted to the reconstruction of an exhausted plant and depleted inventories.

Under the impulse of Marshall Plan grants and loans it seemed for a time that a stable recovery was within sight.

But when the dislocations, inevitably consequent upon NATO defense preparations, were added to the serious drain in Indochina, coupled with a world-wide rise in the price of raw materials, and an adjustment on the part of France's trading partners to meet this unwelcome situation by restrictions in external commerce, began to have their full effect there was a deterioration in public finances, both internal and external, of the gravest description.

These were amongst the basic reasons for the evils which have afflicted the French economy. But, in my personal view, I must say that the instability of French politics, the inability to create those social conditions that would lessen party dissensions, the optimism and national pride that influenced the undertaking of military programs beyond the real capacity of the national economy to support, have aggravated a situation that was intrinsically extremely difficult.

Retrenchment in expenditures is the usual remedy for such unhealthy manifestations. Unfortunately this specific was impracticable of application. The French Government was resolved to continue the effort in Indochina and at the same time to supply a number of divisions to NATO in excess of those scheduled for any other member.

The result of this resolution confronts us with the present dilemma. In spite of the inequities in the incidence of French taxation, the amount of taxes actually collected in proportion to national income has been for some years the highest, with the exception of Great Britain, of any major country in the non-Communist West.

Moreover, when the report of the Temporary Council Committee of NATO fixed the politico-economic capacity of France to make a defense contribution in the amount of 1,190 billion francs, the French Government not only accepted this figure but, after careful deliberation, decided to increase it to 1,400 billion francs.

The only controversy that has arisen over this decision is as to how it should be financed, either by tightening credit on private industry in order

to increase Government borrowing, or by increasing already high and in some cases nearly confiscatory tax rates on ascertained incomes, or by making up the difference, by what may prove to be impracticable, through the collection of delinquent taxes.

There must also be taken into account the leadership in foreign policy displayed by successive French Governments in continental affairs. The initiation of the Schuman Plan for a pooling of the steel and coal resources of Western Europe, the proposal of the Pleven Plan for a European Defense Community, both of them leading toward the realization of that age old dream of civilized man—the formation of a political federation of Europe—are perhaps the most significant undertakings in the political field that our own, or, for that matter, many preceding generations have witnessed.

These developments have already proven so disturbing to the Soviet Government that it has endeavored in every fashion to counteract these great policies, devoted to peace, that are aimed to draw Germany into the Western orbit and to coordinate and strengthen the defense of the free world.

VOA Uses New Filter Device To Combat Soviet Jamming

Voice of America stations overseas are using a new electronic weapon to combat Soviet jamming, the Department of State announced on March 28.

The new device, known as a heterodyne filter, has proven effective in filtering out certain types of jamming and other interference. Used at overseas relay bases, the heterodyne filter has increased the percentage of Voice of America programs which can be relayed.

The filter eliminates or appreciably reduces interfering signals without seriously affecting the intelligibility of the program being relayed. Crystal filters previously in use reduced program intelligibility when filtering out interference.

Inexpensive and small in size, the heterodyne filter was developed by Voice engineers under the direction of Chief Engineer George Q. Herrick. In a recent test at one relay base, the filter proved effective against 52 percent of the interference encountered. The filter saved or improved program reception 60 percent of the time during another test.

Commenting on the new filter, Wilson Compton, Administrator of the International Information Administration which heads the Voice, said, "The filter is by no means an answer to the Soviet jamming problem, but it does represent another important forward step in our increasingly successful efforts to pierce the electronic curtain erected by the Kremlin."

How Can We Defend Free Culture?

by *Howland H. Sargeant*,
*Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs*¹

A little more than 100 days ago, Assistant Secretary Edward W. Barrett, speaking before another group of prominent Americans meeting in this city, revealed for the first time that the Soviets had mounted a gigantic cultural offensive aimed principally at the United States.²

What he described is now clearly phase one of an all-out cultural campaign. While at first the Soviets devoted their attention principally to the vodka circuit, coming out from behind the Iron Curtain only at the most propitious moments, they are now waging a major cultural offensive in many large and strategic areas of the world which have previously escaped saturation treatment.

Today, I want to report on phase two of the Soviet propaganda campaign in which culture is used as the cutting tool. As we trace their efforts, let us bear in mind that what they are presenting, for the most part, is not Russian culture—but a Sovietized perversion of it. This perversion for political ends first took place in the Soviet Union and then was extended to the satellites, where they have sought to eradicate the history and cultural heritages of whole countries. Now they are penetrating new areas with the Party's brand of culture.

Let us look at what they are doing in India, for example. Right now the Soviets are making an all-out effort in the field of painting at an art exhibit which held its grand opening at New Delhi earlier this month.

I have followed with a great deal of interest the despatches from our Embassy there; they add up to the blunt fact that the Soviets have seized upon the field of art as a major tool in their intensified propaganda campaign. Described as a multi-million dollar modern art collection, the large Soviet exhibition of paintings plus other objects of art is the first Soviet display of its kind ever held outside the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Indians are being "treated" to the works of some

28 Stalin prize winning artists who have put on canvas the abundant life and peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union. They are seeing, for example, Geldberg's "Friends of Peace" which depicts Red soldiers feeding doves. They are being shown Nikioh's work which he calls "Election Canvassing," and Sorokin's masterpiece with the caption "Pepov Shows Admiral Makarov World's First Radio Set."

Now it is no mere accident that the Soviets have chosen South Asia, and more particularly India, as a priority target for their cultural offensive. India needs to develop itself and wants to live in peace. Most of its people want no part of what they mistakingly interpret as a struggle between two big powers. They do not recognize this struggle for what it is—a contest between freedom and totalitarianism, in which all free men have a stake. Some Indians fear that our build-up of military strength in defense of freedom might possibly be used for aggressive war—that we are warmongers. Others think that so-called decadent capitalism is materialistic, if not godless.

India, therefore, provides potentially fertile soil for planting the idea of Soviet interest in the arts. It is not difficult to understand why their major bid at the moment is through cultural infiltration. It is a bid which fits neatly into the pattern of their peace offensive. It is a bid which is being made with considerable mounting intensity. Let us examine what is taking place.

Methods of Cultural Infiltration in India

First of all, it would appear that the Communists are planning on increased use of motion pictures for propaganda, and the evidence shows that this medium has been assigned a high priority. Soviet film festivals have been held in Bombay and Calcutta; a three-man "Soviet Cine Art Delegation" was sent to India late in 1951; and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics sent the largest delegation of any country represented to the recent international film festival headed by its Deputy Minister of Cinematography, Semyonov. The large Soviet delegation might well have swamped U.S. participation had it not been for

¹ Address made before a Conference of the American Committee for Cultural Freedom at New York, N. Y., on Mar. 29 and released to the press on the same date.

² BULLETIN of Dec. 3, 1951, p. 903.

the personal popularity of Frank Capra and the good fortune that a group of American actors were on location in India and were thus able to attend the festival.

In addition to the direct approach, the Communists, of course, form and use "front" groups in their cultural campaign. Thus we have the All-India Peace Council, the All-India Progressive Writers Association, the All-India Friends of the Soviet Union, the Indian People's Theatre Association, and the India-China Friendship Association. These organizations are not only useful to the Kremlin in direct infiltration of the culture of another country but serve in presenting the Communist line through indigenous channels. This indirect approach is apparent in the cultural exchanges between Red China and India.

Last fall, for example, an unofficial Indian cultural mission toured Communist China for 6 weeks and a similar mission of Chinese Communists visited India. This interchange provided Indians with a rosy view of Communist achievements in China and emphasized the cultural ties between the two countries. The Indian delegation of 15 was invited by five prominent organizations in China to participate in the second anniversary celebrations of the People's Republic of China at Peiping on October 1.

Host organizations were the China Peace Committee, the All-China Federation of Labor, the All-China Federation of Democratic Women, the All-China Association of Writers and Artists, and the New Democratic Youth League. In China the good will mission visited villages, factories, universities, and schools in Peiping, Tientsin, Nanking, Shanghai, Canton, and Mukden.

Judging from their statements made in China and on their return to India, they were impressed with the "spectacle of a great and ancient country in the process of a glorious rebirth," with the devotion of the new government and government leaders to the cause of the people, with progress in national reconstruction after only 2 years, with the "liberation" of more than 300 million Chinese peasants from centuries-old serfdom, with the new marriage law insuring freedom and equality to the women of China, with the enthusiastic support of the Chinese for the new regime. Upon returning to India, members of the delegation made a number of speeches recounting their findings, but they pointedly ignored China's close ties with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

A primary element of this indirect or indigenous approach on the part of the Kremlin is the playing down of political connotations. It is therefore less irritating, far more subtle in effect, and potentially far more dangerous and difficult to cope with. The Soviets are making increased use of this technique in their current cultural offensive.

An all-out Communist cultural drive, reaching

down to provincial levels and making use of In-All-India Peace Council, the All-India Progressive Writers Association, the All-India Cultural Conference and Festival for Peace to be held in Calcutta, April 2 to 6. The plans, as described in *Crossroads*, organ of the Communist Party of India, furnish the most clear-cut blueprint so far available for involving in the Soviet "peace" offensive a broadly representative group and all aspects of Indian culture.

The program calls for the organization of provincial committees representing workers, artists, and cultural organizations "of various shades of opinion and of different schools" in preparation for the conference. These committees are to prepare exhaustive papers on all phases of Indian culture.

Since the All-India Peace Council, sponsor of the conference, is organized at district and even subdistrict levels, Communist cultural activities probably will be extended to these levels on a more highly organized basis as a result of the conference. The conference itself may be expected to produce a new plan for linking all cultural activities being carried on by various front organizations and individuals. It may possibly create a new cultural organization in line with World Peace Council directives of February and November 1951.

Their objectives are seen in the papers the Preparatory Committee has asked the provincial committees to prepare. I quote:

Culture in the Service of Peace: a review of the contribution to peace made by literature, art, films, dance, and music.

War Propaganda: a memorandum on the war propaganda carried on through films and literature, and its effect on the people and on education.

Peace and the Working Conditions of Cultural Workers: the effect of the rising cost of living as the result of war and war tension on cultural workers and cultural work; effects of high cost of paper on printing and literature; effects of non-availability of raw film and equipment on the film industry.

Imperialist Stranglehold Over People's Culture: how imperialism and its need for war has affected Indian culture.

Cultural Exchanges: how British imperialists have sought to cut off India from contact with the cultural achievements of other countries.

These are some of the highlights of the current phase of the Soviet cultural offensive as they have unfolded in one large and strategic area—India.

Moscow's Voice in Japan and Canada

One might logically inquire: Is the U.S.S.R. shifting its focus from Europe to Asia? The answer is "no." What the Kremlin commenced on a limited scale a year or more ago in the satellite countries and extended in sporadic cultural

activities in Europe was the first phase of a greatly intensified effort which is now unfolding—a saturation effort in large and strategic areas.

The intensified Soviet cultural offensive now being directed at India and other areas may next be turned on Japan and Southeast Asia. In fact, the suspicion that Japan has been earmarked for a Soviet cultural offensive is already proving correct, when only last month it came to light that the Soviet Union had placed orders for 40,000 Japanese matrices.

A survey this month among book dealers reveals that Soviet-published books in Japanese are “flooding the market . . . brand new books are being sold in second-hand stores as ‘clearance items’ at one-third the list price . . . they are selling like hot cakes. The dealers report that they hardly have time to keep them on the shelves.”

Until this year, Soviet-printed Japanese books were obtainable “at very low prices at the Soviet Mission reading room.” But the reading-room users were mostly the “intelligentsia,” so the circulation of the books was not wide. In January the Mission stopped selling. At the same time, “vast numbers of Soviet books began to appear at the old book stores in Tokyo’s Kanda district.” The current bestsellers among them are *History of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union* and *Selected Works of Lenin*. The demand is increasing for *Brief History of Stalin* and *Nation and Revolution*.

At present, the Soviet cultural offensive in Japan is limited chiefly to a book program, and this situation probably will continue until the diplomatic status of the Soviets in post-treaty Japan is certain. Moscow did manage recently, however, to bestow the Stalin Peace Prize on Ikuo Oyama, left-wing peace-front organizer and a person of some prestige.

Finally, if one takes some measure of comfort in the fiction that the Soviet cultural drive is an ocean away, he should be interested in reports emanating from just across the international border nearest us. Perhaps you saw the banner headline in a recent issue of the *Financial Post*, published in Toronto, Canada—“Culture: The New Smoke Screen for Canadian Reds”—(Jan. 19, 1952).

The six-column story under this banner cites dozens of examples of Moscow-mesmerized cultural activities and concludes:

The Communists have failed dismally to peddle their “peace” line to labor . . . now they are out to try to capture the people who consider themselves “intellectuals”—the teachers, scientists, clergy, musicians, composers, writers, actors, and art and music lovers.

At a Party conference in Toronto, the *Post* quotes leader Tim Buck as announcing:

Our party, locally and nationally, is going to extend its activities on the cultural front . . . the Labor Progressive Party must seek to encourage every activity and every trend toward the development of a People’s culture.

Again, the voice of Moscow—this time being mouthed by people a hemisphere removed.

Vulnerability of the Campaign

It’s always difficult to measure the relative success of attempts to influence men’s minds, but I do think in all honesty we can place some sort of evaluation on the Soviet cultural offensive as a major tool of their propaganda machine. I would tend to believe, also, that any such appraisal, piecemeal though it may be, should seek to give some indication of why they succeeded or why they failed.

Now what has been the story of their success when they rolled their cultural vehicle onto the open highway? Have they been able to maintain their line of Soviet superiority with the same 100 percent consistency?

Phase two of the Soviet cultural offensive shows clearly that while they have had their successes, they have also had their failures. This is true in India and it is equally true elsewhere.

There is no doubt, for example, that the several lavish exhibitions to which I referred earlier have had their effect on the Indian populace, particularly in bolstering the activities of the pro-Communist groups. The recent Chinese cultural mission to India, for instance, was well received by Indians. The reason, perhaps, is that the educated Indian public has a genuine curiosity about China and very little opportunity to satisfy it. For this reason it may be that the exhibit of Chinese photographs and art objects may have been successful. Probably for this reason also many people went to the meetings and listened attentively. This desire for information resulted in their activities receiving wide press coverage.

Despite the success of this event and others, there are definite signs that the intense campaign of the Soviets does not always meet with favor but at times actually backfires.

For example, at the International Industries Fair in Bombay the Soviets outdid themselves. In a spurt of cultural zeal they created what to many observers appeared to be a typical square in any Soviet city. Six huge red hammer and sickle flags shouted their cultural implication in contrast to the rather inconspicuous Indian national flag. It is reported to have drawn bitter comment from exasperated patriotic citizens and the Bombay Government subsequently refused to permit an extension of the fair on the grounds that it was being exploited by Communists for propaganda purposes.

Another bug dropped in the Soviet’s cultural ointment when the Communists complained that leaflets “blackguarding the People’s China” were distributed in front of the Chinese pavilion. To this the Bombay *National Standard* replied in part:

India is still a democracy, and no suggestions of a ban on nonviolent expression of opinion should be tolerated. If anti-Communist propaganda in front of the Fair is to be deterred officially, because the Russians and the Chinese are participating, the Indian Government may be asked by Mr. Truman with greater justification to suppress anti-American sentiments which the Russians and

the Chinese are inciting all the time, because America has given us economic aid and promises more.

The paper concluded, "The Russians and the Chinese are here not to help us, but (to help) themselves."

Official translators are supposed to interpret accurately but when N.S. Krishnan, famous south Indian comedian, toured Russia for 3 weeks he found that translators in the Soviet Union interpret the way the Kremlin wants them to.

During a dinner in Moscow he declared "Gandhi-ism and communism are equally great modern ideologies but . . . Gandhi's revolution was nonviolent while the Russian revolution was not peaceful."

The Russian interpreter refused to translate the sentences and created a scene saying he was sure that Gandhi-ism was not as great as communism.

The Soviet art exhibit now going on in India is meeting with a dull thud from the Bombay press. No favorable press comment has greeted the efforts of Moscow's politically minded artists. On the contrary, critical "debunking" articles are greeting their efforts. Such headlines as "Kremlin Attempt at Seduction" calls attention to the numerous Communist cultural raids on India since 1948, including the present exhibit.

Now we must not lay too much emphasis on these indications of the vulnerability of the Soviet cultural offensive. Although there are plainly evident some indications of weakness, we know that in this field as well as in the direct business of informing, the Communist propagandists are by no means weaklings. However, we have learned that the Communist propaganda techniques are vulnerable because they are founded upon "the big lie." We also have seen again and again that Communist propagandists bungle and make bad blunders. In the long run, the difference between words and deeds, between promises and performances, becomes evident to the very people the Kremlin propagandists are trying to beguile.

The Communist degradation of culture for political purposes exposes a comparable fundamental weakness. The more they come out into the open, the more they demonstrate this fact—the more they sharpen the focus on their fraud.

Coupled with their efforts to be best rather than honest in cultural interchange, the Soviets find it compelling to tear down and destroy, by all means at their command, the idea that any laudable culture can exist in Western civilization and particularly in the United States.

A rather striking example is found in a recent edition of a French magazine of Communist sponsorship. Here are pictures of spaghetti swooshing queens, of slums, of wrestlers in the mud, of jitterbugging, of the American cinema filled with degradation and violence, of our comic strips which have enriched the American language and culture with expressions such as: "crack, paf, honk, zok, bop, bang, wham."

It is all summed up neatly in the March 21 edition of the *Cominform Journal*, which concludes a piece titled: "Flowering of Science and Culture in the U.S.S.R." in these words:

As for the corrupt "culture" of imperialism, it mutilates man, depraves his mind, implants among people misanthropy, moral dissoluteness, appeals to the lowest instincts, cultivates criminal tendencies. . . . For this reason advanced and progressive people in all countries reject with disgust and hatred this "culture" of capitalism that is rotting alive.

The U.S. Response

What then should be the response of the United States to this vigorous prostitution of culture for Soviet political ends?

Not, surely, to scream "Anything you can do, I can do better!" Communists *have* to believe that every human activity is inexorably determined by the economic structure from which it grows. Thus they are under an endless compulsion to be first in everything in order to demonstrate the perfection of the Soviet paradise. Their athletic teams must win, even if they have to change the rules. Their inventors must have discovered everything, even if they have to change history. Their scientists *have* to be right, even if they have to change nature. Their musicians and artists and dancers must *always* be the best, or they won't play at all.³

Communists also *have* to believe that all human endeavor is to be chained to the support of their slave order. Science, art, literature, music can have no free ends of their own. The death-laden fog of Politburo domination has entered area after area of Russian scientific and cultural life, reducing to a grotesque and frightening puppetry the once-rich welling of genius from that brilliant and gifted people. After Pavlov Lysenko, after a Moussorgsky or Tchaikovsky, the stultification of a talented Shostakovich; after Tolstoi and Dostoyevsky and Turgenev, the strident whine of the propaganda novelists; after the rich, moving and symbolic religious art of Orthodox Russia, the wooden posturing of Soviet art. Only in those few areas in which apparent political unimportance has allowed chinks of freedom—such as ballet and musical performance, as opposed to composition—has the innate Russian creative genius been able to remain alive.

In the free world it is not so. Cultural vitality, we believe, grows only from the interaction of two elements. One is the free exploration of the sensitive, individual human spirit seeking clearer and more moving forms of expression. The other is the common fund of human experience and destiny which such creative spirits seek to express and the

³ For a series of articles on Soviet thought control as applied to the educational system, to science and scholarship, and to cultural activities, see BULLETIN of Nov. 5, 1951, p. 719, Nov. 26, 1951, p. 844, and Dec. 3, 1951, p. 895, respectively.

common heritage of cultural symbols and values that gives universal meaning to their work. This free and unimpelled union of the individual and the common heritage is, in our view, the essence of cultural life. It is what makes possible the contribution of the gifted creator to the common fund of human experience and aspiration everywhere; it is what makes it possible in turn for the individual everywhere to be enriched by sharing universal cultural insights.

And I think it is precisely toward the excellencies that may be peculiar to American culture that attention needs to be drawn. It is toward the common heritage that is shared and toward the common human experience which our culture and others alike express. We need to send abroad the very best that we have in literature, in art, in music, in the dance and in drama, not that we may boast its excellence but in order that we may show as clearly as we can the fullness and intensity with which we share a common human cultural heritage.

The great problems of human existence are, after all, common to all men. The deepest aspirations of the human spirit are the same everywhere. Birth and death, hunger and work, peace and freedom, brotherhood and love, are common to all men. Through this unity of human fears and needs and hopes can be communicated in its moving fullness and immediacy, the creative outpourings of free minds and spirits. Only through freely creative and freely shared cultural expression, we believe, can every people see its own values, its own fundamental humanity, mirrored in its neighbor. Only through such cultural expression can they arrive at that sense of identity and common purpose that must underlie all efforts at common political and economic action.

When these objectives are clearly understood by others to be our only objectives in presenting abroad examples of our cultural life in America, then the reasons for American participation in art exhibits, film festivals, and theatrical performances become evident. Then an American film becomes not an ideological weapon aimed at cultural penetration, but simply a vehicle for conveying the artistic intentions of a free and peaceful people. The performance of a theatrical troupe becomes not an appeal for a political ideology but simply entertainment put on for the enjoyment of an audience. An exhibition of paintings becomes not a strained and dull attempt to show the excellence of a political system but the honest efforts of artists to paint pictures which will create honest impressions.

Cultural Interchange Based on the Sharing Principle

That is why we believe that no effort we can make in this field can have a deeper or more lasting meaning than to throw open the doors for the fullest and freest sharing of cultural experience between ourselves and other peoples.

I hope you will forgive me if I have seemed excessively idealistic for a practical Government officer. I believe, however, that it is literally true that the kind of world-in-the-making to which the foreign policy of this country seeks to contribute can come into being only on the basis of a conviction of fundamental human unity underlying all our national differences—a conviction in turn that can arise only in the free sharing of the individual and national expressions of a universal cultural heritage.

It is my own personal experience over the period of the last 5 years in working with the programs of International Information and Educational Exchange that this is the basic conviction which we must have if these programs are to be successful.

At the present time, under the able direction of Wilson Compton, your Government has a program designed to give momentum to this cultural interchange between the United States and other countries of the world, based on this principle of sharing.

As a result of the close cooperation between our Government and private citizens and organizations, peoples abroad in the past have seen such examples of our national culture as the highly successful tour of Scandinavia by the Howard University players and the 4-month European tour of the American National Ballet Theatre. The outstanding performances of such groups as the Hall Johnson Choir and the Juilliard String Quartet, Judith Anderson's *Medea*, Astrid Varnay's *Isolde*, and the colorful show *Oklahoma* at the Berlin Cultural Festival were the results of the cooperation of your Government and private groups.

Right now, as you know, we are working with the American Committee for Cultural Freedom to arrange appearances of the Boston Symphony Orchestra, the New York City Ballet, and Virgil Thompson's opera *Four Saints in Three Acts* at the Paris Festival this spring. Not only will these American cultural achievements be seen by Parisian audiences but arrangements have recently been made for the New York City Ballet to appear in six other European countries, participating in festivals in Switzerland, Amsterdam, Florence, and Edinburgh.

Likewise, the Boston Symphony will tour other European cities. Plans are also under way between the Department and the American National Theatre and Academy to send a company to play Gershwin's opera *Porgy and Bess* in Great Britain this fall and to tour the continent early in 1953.

Another example of how your Government and private initiative work together in the cultural field are the exchanges of young musicians now being undertaken by the National Music League and the French organization *Jeunesse Musicale*. As a result, young violinists and pianists of prom-

ise from both nations are giving concerts in each other's countries.

Special collections of books including works in the field of the arts, literature, and the social and physical sciences have been and are being sent to many parts of the world.

This year, with funds from a private donor and with the aid of the American Government, an exhibit of American art is being organized by the American Federation of Arts, under the direction of David Finley of the National Gallery, to be exhibited as part of American participation at the summer-long Venice Biennale in Italy.

These are but a few of the international cultural projects we Americans have undertaken or plan to undertake. In all of them you find one priceless factor—the initiative of the private individual with a desire to create and to share. He is not directed to do so by his Government. His creation is not one of decree, it is one of desire. It is not a fraudulent attempt to win plaudits, it is an honest attempt to express his innermost ideas and feelings and to share these satisfactions with his fellow man. These are the elements of free culture.

I believe that you of the American Committee and all American artists, scientists, and musicians bear a transcending responsibility to yourselves, to America, and to free peoples everywhere to defend our free culture through the wisest and widest possible sharing of that culture.

The Communist Conference In Defense of Children

[Released to the press March 28]

The Department of State has received a number of inquiries from American citizens concerning the so-called "International Conference in Defense of Children" which now is scheduled to convene at Vienna, Austria, during the period April 12 to 16, 1952. Since it is apparent that the writers of these inquiries are unaware of the true nature of this meeting, their attention has been drawn to the Department's announcement of November 29, 1951, on this subject.¹

The Department at that time explained that this "conference" was planned, is being organized, and will be run by the Communist-dominated "World Federation of Democratic Women" with the active collaboration of the Cominform-run "World Federation of Trade Unions."

This latter body, the Department pointed out, was ejected from its headquarters at Paris by the French Government last year and immediately migrated to Vienna where it maintains its headquarters in a Soviet-requisitioned building. On October 11, 1951, the Austrian Government pub-

licly announced that the organization was in Vienna at no one's invitation and had repeatedly refused to comply with Austrian law.

It is fair to assume, the Department pointed out, that this "conference" is another device in the campaign to recruit unsuspecting and well-meaning people for the cynically hypocritical Communist "Peace Movement."

Hungary Nationalizes Real Estate

[Released to the press March 24]

The following is released as of interest to American owners of houses, apartments, stores, factories, and warehouses in Hungary.

The Department has now received the text of the Hungarian Nationalization Decree, dated February 17, 1952, affecting such property, together with the texts of other pertinent laws and regulations.

The American Legation at Budapest informed the Hungarian Government on February 19, 1952, that it reserves the right to make subsequent representations on behalf of any American citizen whose property may be affected by the decree.

Persons in the United States who have not been notified by their caretakers or agents in Hungary about the decree and the possibility of appeal from the act of nationalization on or before May 3, 1952, may obtain copies of the translation by writing to the Division of Protective Services, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

New Cuban Government Recognized

[Released to the press March 27]

The U.S. Ambassador at Habana on March 27 informed the Minister of State of Cuba of the recognition by the U.S. Government of the new Government of Cuba.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

- Defense Production Act. Progress Report—No. 14. World Supply, United States Production, Consumption, Imports and Exports of Steel, Copper and Aluminum, and Domestic Requirements and Allocations by the Joint Committee on Defense Production. S. Rept. 1310, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 34 pp.
- Suspension of Deportation of Certain Aliens. H. Rept. 1539, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 58] 2 pp.
- Suspension of Deportation of Certain Aliens. H. Rept. 1540, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 63] 2 pp.

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 10, 1951, p. 935.

A Common Responsibility for Achieving Health Security

by Willard L. Thorp
*Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

Today, about one-fifth of the world's population lives in economically developed areas where mortality rates are relatively low and health and sanitation conditions relatively advanced. These are the areas of greatest economic productivity and tend to be in the vanguard of economic and social progress. About another one-fifth of the world's population lives in areas fairly well advanced in the application of modern technology. About three-fifths of the world's population lives in technologically backward countries. Here the standard of living is miserably low, and bad health conditions are a major factor in this tragic situation. The cost of preventable disease, which is largely responsible for low health status in underdeveloped areas, represents a colossal burden. In the Philippines in a recent year, for example, in a total population of 20 million people there were 2 million victims of malaria, with 10,000 annual deaths, and 1,300,000 ill from tuberculosis with 35,000 annual deaths. Here is a tremendous economic loss from these two diseases alone.

The cost of premature death is also tremendous in these underdeveloped areas. In them, a much smaller proportion of healthy adults must support a much larger percentage of unproductive children and disabled grown-ups. For example, in various countries of Southeast Asia and the Middle East, only about one-half the children born reach the age of 15 and only 15 percent live to the age of 60. By contrast, in the United States, 90 percent become adults and two-thirds are still alive at 60. In the underdeveloped areas, the chain reactions are all clearly in evidence—poor health, low productivity, illiteracy, and poverty. All are holding back economic and social progress.

Let me give an example. In the fertile Terai district in India, malaria had become so serious that an area which had once sustained 350,000 population had been reduced to one-fifth that number. After only 3 years of malaria control in the Terai and neighboring areas, the population had increased by over 100,000, the agricultural area

under cultivation had been increased by 35,000 acres, and grain production increased by 35 percent. In relation to a country as highly populated as India, experts have debated whether public-health programs and efforts to reduce mortality do not accentuate economic and social problems. However, health programs such as this extend the working life of the population and the span of time during which they can serve as efficient producers. A healthy, productive farmer is always better than a sick one, and increased health contributed to increased food supply.

In 1951 the Iranian Ministry of Public Health started a campaign against malaria in an infected area near the Caspian Sea where 2½ million people live. Two hundred and twenty-four tons of DDT shipped from the United States as part of our Point Four Program reached Iran in time last May to spray half a million dwellings. Already the incidence of the disease has been cut from 88 percent to 35 percent—and 2 more years of anti-malaria warfare will, experts believe, completely wipe out malaria and greatly improve general health conditions as well as increase productivity.

Throughout the underdeveloped areas in Africa, the Near and Middle East, and South Asia, I think it would be fair to say that up to 90 percent of the rural population is sick much of the time or only half well. When limited human energies are concentrated on the day-to-day struggle for survival the possibilities of economic and social progress and democratic growth are almost nil.

It is clear that sickness, poverty, and lack of education form a vicious circle and the loss in economic terms alone resulting from these conditions is incalculable. Up until recent years the possibility of breaking this vicious circle seemed dim. Remedies for the control of preventable disease when they were available were beyond the financial means of poor countries. The peoples in these nations lived in a hopeless state of misery.

Controlling Debilitating Diseases

Recent discoveries in preventive medicine such as the antibiotics and powerful new insecticides

¹Excerpts from an address made before the National Health Council at New York, N. Y., on Mar. 13 and released to the press on the same date.

have made it possible to control several of the most debilitating diseases at very low cost. For example, with the availability of Ddr in India the cost of malaria control has been reduced to 12 cents per capita. This miraculous change from disease to health costs only the price of one bus ride in New York City.

It is easy enough to talk about the problem of health throughout the world, but the important question is what is being done and what should be done about improving health conditions. We do have a tremendous interest and concern about these other less fortunate countries. We have a humanitarian interest, but we also have a social, an economic, and a political interest. In much of the world today, economic development and political stability are interdependent. And, I need not remind you, the world today is 142 hours around.

Doing something helpful about health conditions in other countries is not a new experience for us. Up until a decade ago, nearly all of our contributions to world health have been made by private organizations and institutions, and their rich experience has contributed greatly to the developing program of international collaboration in health. For many years, remarkable work has been done under difficult conditions in many of the most needy countries by medical missionaries, and by missions for relief and reconstruction such as those sent by various religious groups. This people-to-people form of service has helped not alone to improve health conditions but to exemplify the great concept of brotherhood which has been the motivating force back of the individuals who went abroad, and the widespread support given them by millions of Americans.

As another illustration of private activity, since 1913 the Rockefeller Foundation has been pioneering in an outstanding way in the international health field. It has sponsored public-health demonstrations throughout the world. It has granted fellowships, organized institutes, carried on research, provided the knowledge and experience which has made far more productive the work of governments, including our own, and the World Health Organization. Without this pioneering, we would probably be at the experimental stage of demonstrations instead of actually improving the health of millions of people. Other organizations such as the Kellogg Foundation have followed in this path, notably with fellowships.

The work of the private agencies goes back many years. Today, our Government is also actively participating in the effort to improve health conditions in other countries. For over a decade the United States has been cooperating with the other American Republics through the Institute of Inter-American Affairs in a broad variety of cooperative health programs. The Institute is now the operating arm of our Point Four

Program in Latin America. This hemispheric program has had four chief points of emphasis: (1) the development of local health services through health centers; (2) sanitation of the environment with particular emphasis on water supply, sewage disposal, and insect control; (3) training and full-time employment of professional public health workers; and (4) education of the public in health matters. It has concentrated on complete community-health development with full-time trained direction and active community participation. Over 1,300 professionals from Latin America in the health field have been given advanced training in the United States in public health. Some 240 local training courses have already been given at subprofessional levels. Some 2,820 distinct projects have been undertaken jointly with the health ministries of these countries since 1942. They have included the construction and operation of health centers; building and administration of hospitals; construction of water supply systems, sewage systems, and other health facilities such as nursing schools, laboratories, markets, and public laundries. Out of this program improved public health has achieved the status of a national movement in many of the Latin American countries. The experience and knowledge gained there are of immeasurable value in health programs developing elsewhere in the world.

World Health Programs

Today the United States is carrying on programs not only in our own hemisphere, but in many other parts of the world—in Near Eastern countries and in Pacific islands, in northern Africa and in southern Asia. Various phases of these programs have had different bases—relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction of war-devastated areas, development of strategic resources, containment of communism, and long-range social and economic development. Whatever the initial reason for them, all of these programs have been designed to build toward a future secured by stronger national and local health services in the countries concerned. Each has had, or is making, a major contribution to building up a permanent world-wide health structure.

Any review of world health problems and progress would be incomplete without paying tribute to the role of the World Health Organization (WHO) whose 79 member nations are dedicated to the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health. Our participation in the World Health Organization represents our conviction that health security can effectively be achieved through international pooling of knowledge and skills under international direction. We shall all have an opportunity on World Health Day, April 7, to honor the WHO objective—"the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health."

The WHO during 1951 expended about 10 million dollars on its world-wide program, including 3.5 million dollars beyond its regular budget supplied by the Technical Assistance Program of the United Nations.

The sharing of knowledge, the training programs and fellowships, and the field operations of WHO are vital and effective weapons mobilizing a broad range of resources for a concerted attack on disease. During the past year the World Health Assembly adopted the International Sanitary Regulations which establish a single uniform health code in the world for all forms of international travel and trade. The WHO also issued the International Pharmacopoeia which sets uniform standards of strength and purity for a large number of drugs. Vitally important also is the WHO's role in the exchange of publications and information. Most important of all, of course, is its work directly with the many member governments, in aiding and encouraging them to move forward with public health and similar programs.

The various governments and the WHO are important instruments, but they are only instruments. They can be effective only by means of individuals. That is where you and the organizations you represent come so importantly into the picture. Certainly, a role of major importance must be played by the international professional societies, and their national affiliates. Some of these bodies as you know cover a whole profession, such as the World Medical Association, the International Council of Nurses, and the International Dental Association. Others deal with specific diseases—such as the International Union Against Cancer, the International Leprosy Association, and the International Union Against Venereal Diseases. Still others deal with problems reflected in their names—the International Union for Child Welfare, the World Federation for Mental Health, the International Hospital Federation, and the International Association for the Prevention of Blindness. A special position is held by the League of Red Cross Societies which was formed right after World War I to mobilize Red Cross societies to promote public health education to give popular support to public health work.

All these and a number of other associations have been admitted into formal relationship with the World Health Organization. But international nongovernmental organizations are still lacking in important fields such as those of malaria and other tropical diseases, environmental health, and sanitary engineering.

Role of Private Organizations

The private organizations can make significant and invaluable contributions to the world health program. The basic requirement is that they reduce their sensitivity to geographical boundary lines, and think of their problems in international

terms. Other countries share the same problems, often in a much more serious form. Individuals in other countries are working as you are to try to record progress. There is here a tremendous opportunity to give sympathy, encouragement, and help.

There are certain things which organizations as organizations can do. They can contribute to the planning and operation of the World Health Organization through their consultative arrangements. Furthermore, we are anxious to see coordinating committees in each country which will help to assure that there will be one integrated health program and not many local projects independently sponsored by various international agencies. If outside help is to have its full effect, it must not only aim at strengthening the national health service of the country but must also receive the full support of the medical and allied professions. This can only be assured if the professional organizations are willing to sit on the coordinating committee and share the responsibilities.

There are three fundamental types of contribution which organizations can make. First is in the field of professional knowledge—to continue to seek solutions to the problems not yet solved. Second, they can actively help in the transmission of our knowledge and experience to the other less fortunate countries. Not only is their help tremendously important in providing training and hospitality to the doctors, nurses, and other health workers visiting this country, but they and their colleagues as they travel abroad for professional or personal purposes can share their store of wisdom and experience with their conferees in other parts of the world.

Third, from the ranks of private organizations will come many of the skilled people who are needed in the world health program. For many of them, this may mean a substantial personal sacrifice. I hope that ways and means will be found to encourage them, particularly to provide professional assurances that these men and women going abroad will not be handicapped professionally because of their contributions to public health service. Moreover, they will be going, many of them, to face primitive conditions where human ingenuity must often substitute for modern equipment, and where the capacity to adjust to different languages, modes of thought, and traditions is as important as the technical knowledge they bring to their work. Organizations can assist them by keeping them in touch with professional thoughts and ideas as they develop and even in appropriate cases by contributions of needed equipment and materials.

Encouraging and Training Personnel

Looking at the picture in the longer run, we must find ways and means to encourage and to train personnel who are equipped for and capable

of undertaking health assignments for brief or long duration outside this country. Lack of trained personnel is the most serious bottleneck slowing up the world health campaign. Even here in the United States there is a serious shortage of public-health workers. At present 19 percent of the budgeted positions for physicians in state and local health services are vacant for want of qualified personnel; for sanitary engineers there is a similar 15 percent vacancy rate; and for graduate nurses 8 percent.

Our needs, serious as they are, look small compared to those in underdeveloped countries. While in the United States we have one physician for a little over 700 inhabitants, most Latin American countries have from 2,000 to 10,000 inhabitants per physician; Indonesia has about 80,000 inhabitants per physician. In most of these countries the shortage of trained nurses is even more serious. Iran, for example, has around 900 trained nurses in a population of 17 million, and Brazil has about 1,300 trained nurses in a nation of 52 million.

Despite these grave needs, the job must be and is being tackled with vigor and enthusiasm. New and more economical forms of treatment, more facilities, professional and subprofessional training programs, educational efforts—these are all helping to liquidate some of the infectious diseases. But despite the fantastic miracles in controlling and eradicating yaws, malaria, and the other plagues, tough and demanding work lies ahead. It is much easier to dust with DDT than it is to establish sanitary practices, and there are many parasites and diseases which still challenge our knowledge and our skill.

It is to be hoped that as the world campaign for public health develops, governments and private organizations together will be able to produce a real grassroot movement. A report on a Near Eastern project read as follows: "Personal hygiene was one of the first subjects in the new school and after a few days of seeing their boys and girls go in for washing their hands, faces and hair, the parents also began to adopt this new approach to health." The knowledge spread through these programs is almost as infectious as the diseases they are trying to control.

The possibility for building real international good will depends fundamentally upon what people do. The chance contact with people from another country—the comments made, the attitudes taken, the interest or lack of interest, the personal spirit—the establishment of a common enterprise—all these are things which count. One of the most effective instruments in the process of building physical, and mental and spiritual health is the sense of sharing, of cooperation, of common responsibility which has no geographical barriers.

Export-Import Bank Grants Housing Credit to Ecuador

The Export-Import Bank announced on March 25 approval of a credit of \$800,000 to the Republic of Ecuador to assist in housing reconstruction in the areas of Ecuador devastated by the earthquake of August 5, 1949.

The Government of Ecuador, with technical and financial assistance provided by the Pan-American Union, has made geological studies, which serve as the basis for the location of the various housing projects under which more than 4,500 single-family houses are to be built. The Government, with the assistance of U.S. technicians, also has adopted a building code providing for certain minimum standards of earthquake-resistant construction. The houses to be financed under this credit will comply with these standards.

The credit will be used to finance the purchase and transportation to Ecuador of U.S. equipment, materials, and supplies required for Ecuador's housing program in the Provinces of Tungurahua, Cotopaxi, and Chimborazo.

The local costs of materials and erection will be obtained in part from donations made to Ecuador by various governments, organizations, and individuals shortly after the earthquake and, in part, from the yield of special taxes, the revenue of which is distributed to the Reconstruction and Planning Boards of the three provinces. The U.S. Institute of Inter-American Affairs responsible for Point Four operations in Latin America has been requested by the Ecuadoran Government to assist in supervising the housing construction program. It is planned by the Ecuadoran Government that the completed houses will be sold to victims of the earthquake by the Reconstruction and Planning Boards on a 20-year purchase plan without down payment.

The credit will be repayable in quarterly installments over a 20-year period. Interest will be paid at the rate of 3½ percent per annum.

Filing Date Extended for Claims Under U.S., Panama Convention

[Released to the press March 26]

Josiah Marvel, Jr., chairman of the International Claims Commission of the United States, announced on March 26 that the Commission has extended the deadline date for filing claims under the United States-Panama Claims Convention of 1950, from February 29, 1952, to June 2, 1952. The Commission found it necessary to extend this deadline date for the reason that only a small percentage of persons entitled to share in a \$400,000 settlement fund have filed claims.

It appears from the old files of the State Department turned over to the Commission that there are approximately 300 potential claimants against the fund, but the Commission has been able to locate less than 100 of these. Notices to the others have been returned as undeliverable by the Post Office Department.

These claims have been outstanding since 1931 and arise from a decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of Panama on October 20, 1931, whereby certain lands called El Encanto, which certain U.S. citizens alleged they had acquired in good faith, were declared to be the property of Panama. These lands were originally purchased by American citizens during 1913-15 and were resold among small purchasers in the United States from 1915 to 1923. These small purchasers apparently were induced to make investments upon the representation by the land promoters that the lands were valuable for agricultural, timber, and cattle-raising purposes. However, no development ever followed. Most of the original purchasers resided in northern California, with some in Utah, Arizona, and surrounding States.

Many of the original purchasers of the lands have since died but their legal representatives are entitled to file claims against the \$400,000 fund. In many cases the only addresses on file with the Commission are those given by the original owners of the land to the State Department over 20 years ago.

Under the terms of the Claims Convention with Panama, any amount which remains undistributed from the \$400,000 fund, less expenses of adjudication, will be returned to the Government of the Republic of Panama.

Persons who feel that they may qualify for an award under the Panama Claims Agreement should communicate with the International Claims Commission, U.S. Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Facilities for International Motor Touring

[Released to the press March 25]

The Road Traffic Convention of 1949, a world treaty designed to facilitate and encourage international motor touring, came into force on March 25 in the United States and several other countries. United States motorists taking their cars abroad for travel purposes will benefit by liberal provisions on recognition of their home driving licenses and automobile registration. Similar facilities will be extended to foreign motorists traveling in the United States.

The Convention was declared in force by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, follow-

ing ratification by the requisite number of nations. The United States, France, Czechoslovakia, Monaco, and Sweden have ratified to date. The provisions of the treaty will automatically become effective in additional countries as they submit instruments of ratification.

The Convention, which was drawn up and signed by 21 countries at a U.N. conference held at Geneva in 1949, will simplify formalities and promote international motoring into and through all nations which become party thereto.

Motorists in participating countries will enjoy the convenience and safety of uniform privileges on such matters as motor vehicle registration certificates, drivers' licenses, and customs bonds; the identification of vehicles in international traffic; rules for safe driving; equipment requirements, including brakes, lights, and other technical characteristics; permissible maximum dimensions and weights of motor vehicles; and definitions. In brief, the Convention establishes the principle of international reciprocity for passenger automobiles and for their drivers to the same general end as the reciprocal privileges now existing among the several states of the United States. It is not applicable to commercial trucks and busses. The Convention will not require any changes in motor vehicle laws in this country.

The governors of all the States are being notified that the Convention is now in force in order that proper State agencies may be prepared to assist in the effective operation of its provisions. The American Automobile Association and the American Automobile Touring Alliance are being authorized to issue identification documents provided for in the Convention.

The new Convention is a combination and revision of two previous and obsolete agreements which were concluded at Paris in 1926—the Convention Relative to Motor Traffic and the Convention Relative to Road Traffic. The United States was not a party to either of these Conventions because of nonrecognition therein of the Federal-State relationship. The United States took an active part in the formulation of the 1949 Convention and in many respects it reflects United States practices and recommendations. The new Convention was ratified by the President of the United States on October 17, 1950, with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Czechoslovakia was one of the nations which participated in the U. N. conference in 1949, and its ratification was deposited with the United Nations on November 3, 1950. Under existing conditions, however, it is not expected any Czechoslovakian tourists will travel in the United States, nor any private U. S. citizens in Czechoslovakia. Passport and visa controls, which are not affected by the Convention on Road Traffic, will continue to govern the movement of individuals between the United States and all other countries.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings¹

Adjourned During March 1952

"Colombo Plan" Exhibition	Colombo	Feb. 15-Mar. 31
British Commonwealth Scientific Official Conference	Canberra and Melbourne	Feb. 18-Mar. 7
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Advisory Committee on Salaried Employees and Professional Workers: 2d Session.	Geneva	Feb. 18-Mar. 1
Governing Body: 118th Session	Geneva	Mar. 3-15
Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Committee of Experts on the.	Geneva	Mar. 17-29
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
3d European-Mediterranean Regional Air Navigation Meeting	Paris	Feb. 26-Mar. 25*
UN (United Nations):		
Trusteeship Council: 10th Session	New York	Feb. 27-Mar. 29*
Economic and Social Council:		
Economic Commission for Europe: 7th Session	Geneva	Mar. 3-15
Subcommission on Freedom of Information and of the Press: 5th Session.	New York	Mar. 3-21
Special Session of the Council	New York	Mar. 24 (1 day)
Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations	New York	Mar. 18-21
Technical Assistance Committee, Working Party	New York	Mar. 24-28
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):		
Executive Board: 28th Session	Paris	Mar. 3-22
Inter-American Seminar on Human Rights	Habana	Mar. 11-31
Special Committee Meeting of the International Sugar Council	London	Mar. 3-11
First General Assembly of the International Mathematical Union	Rome	Mar. 6-8
Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia, Consultative Committee on (Colombo Plan):		
Officials Meeting	Karachi	Mar. 10-23
Ministerial Meeting	Karachi	Mar. 24-28
Caribbean Fisheries Conference	Trinidad	Mar. 24-28

In Session as of March 31, 1952

International Materials Conference	Washington	Feb. 26, 1951-
Four Power Conference on Swiss-Allied Accord	Bern	Mar. 5, 1951-
West Point Sesquicentennial	West Point	Jan.-
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Air Navigation Commission: 9th Session	Montreal	Jan. 29-
Council: 15th Session	Montreal	Jan. 29-
Tripartite Conference on Aid to Yugoslavia: 2d Conference	Washington	Feb. 19-
International Conference on German Debts	London	Feb. 28-
2d Pakistan International Industries Fair	Karachi	Mar. 1-
Van Reibeeck Festival Fair	Capetown	Mar. 14-
UN (United Nations):		
General Assembly Interim Committee	New York	Mar. 17-
Economic and Social Council:		
Commission on the Status of Women: 6th Session	Geneva	Mar. 24-
Inter-American Conference on Social Security: 4th Session	México, D.F.	Mar. 24-
International Cattle Exposition	Habana	Mar.-

Scheduled April 1-June 30, 1952

ITU (International Telecommunication Union):		
CCIR International Radio Consultative Committee:		
Study Group I	The Hague	Apr. 1-*
Study Group III	The Hague	Apr. 1-*

¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Mar. 25, 1952.

* Tentative.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

Scheduled April 1–June 30, 1952—Continued

ITU (International Telecommunication Union)—Continued

CCIR International Radio Consultative Committee—Continued

Study Group V	Stockholm	May 15–
Study Group VI	Stockholm	May 15–
Study Group XI	Stockholm	May 19–
Administrative Council: 7th Session	Geneva	Apr. 21–

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):

Agriculture Extension Workers, 2d Training Course	San José	Apr. 6–
Working Party on Rice Breeding: 3d Meeting	Bandung, Indonesia	May 5–
Working Party on Fertilizers: 2d Meeting	Bandung, Indonesia	May 5–
International Rice Commission: 3d Meeting	Bandung, Indonesia	May 12–
Meeting on Fisheries Statistics	Copenhagen	May 26–
Committee on Commodity Problems	Rome	June 3–
European Forestry and Forest Products Commission: Meeting of Experts on Torrent Control	Rome	June 28–
Council: 15th Session	Rome	June 9–
FAO–Caribbean Commission, Meeting on Home Economics and Education in Nutrition	Port-of-Spain	June 30–

UN (United Nations):

International Children's Emergency Fund (ICEF):

Committee on Consultative Status for UNICEF Advisory Committee of Nongovernmental Organizations	New York	Apr. 8–
ICEF–WHO Joint Committee on Health Policy	New York	Apr. 9–
Working Party on the Creation of a General Fund Raising Committee	New York	Apr. 11–

Program Committee	New York	Apr. 14–
Committee on Administrative Budget	New York	Apr. 18–
Executive Board	New York	Apr. 22–

Economic and Social Council:

Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations	New York	Apr. 8–
Human Rights Commission: 8th Session	New York	Apr. 14–
Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 7th Session	New York	Apr. 15–
Social Commission: 8th Session	New York	May 12–
14th Session of the Council	New York	May 13–
Technical Assistance Committee	New York	June –

International Exhibition of Drawings and Engravings

Lugano, Switzerland Apr. 10–

Inter-American Indian Institute: Meeting of Governing Board

México, D.F. Apr. 10–

Milan International Trade Fair

Milan Apr. 12–

4th Inter-American Travel Congress

Lima Apr. 12–

ILO (International Labor Organization):

5th Regional Conference of American States Members of the ILO	Rio de Janeiro	Apr. 17–
Metal Trades Committee: 4th Session	Geneva	Apr. 21–
Iron and Steel Committee: 4th Session	Geneva	May 5–
Governing Body: 119th Session	Geneva	May 26–
35th International Labor Conference	Geneva	June 4–
Governing Body: 120th Session	Geneva	June 30–

South Pacific Commission: 9th Session

Nouméa Apr. 18–

Lyon International Trade Fair, 34th

Lyon Apr. 19–

Pan American Sanitary Organization Executive Committee: 16th Meeting

Washington Apr. 21–

Cannes International Film Festival

Cannes Apr. 23–

6th International Hydrographic Conference

Monaco Apr. 29–

Caribbean Commission: 14th Meeting

Guadeloupe May 5–

WHO (World Health Organization):

5th Assembly	Geneva	May 5–
Executive Board: 10th Session	Geneva	May 28–
Rubber Study Group: 9th Meeting	Ottawa	May 5–
Sample Fairs	Valencia	May 10–
	Barcelona	June 10–

UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):

Executive Board: 29th Session	Paris	May 10–
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NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization):

Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 4th Meeting	Washington	May 12–
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South Pacific Commission Fisheries Conference

Nouméa May 14–

UPU (Universal Postal Union):

13th Congress	Brussels	May 14–
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 11th Plenary Meeting	Rome	May 17–

ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):

Standing Committee on Aircraft Performance: 2d Meeting	Copenhagen	May 19–
6th Session of the Assembly	Montreal	May 27–

9th International Congress of Agricultural Industries

Rome May 23–

International Conference on Large Electric High-Tension Systems: 14th Session

Paris May 28–

International Symposium on Problems of Desert Research

Jerusalem May –

*Tentative.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

Scheduled for April 1–June 30, 1952—Continued

Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe: 3d Session.	Geneva	May –
Canadian International Trade Fair	Toronto	June 2–
International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property	Vienna	June 2–
International Commission for the Regulation of Whaling: 4th Meeting	London	June 3–
International Meeting of Tonnage Measurement Experts	The Hague	June 4–
Inter-American Commission of Women: 8th General Assembly	Rio de Janeiro	June 8–
21st Session of the International Criminal Police Commission	Stockholm	June 9–
26th Biennial International Exhibition of Art	Venice	June 14–
International Philatelic Exhibition	Utrecht	June 28–
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 2d Annual Meeting.	St. Andrews (New Brunswick)	June 30–*

*Tentative.

NATO Observes Third Anniversary

[Released to the press March 26]

Plans for a ceremony in observance of the third anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty were announced on March 26 by the Department of State. The ceremony will take place on April 4, as the defensive alliance enters its fourth year, from 10:30 a.m. to 12 m. in Constitution Hall at Washington, D.C.

Among the participants will be the President of the United States, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder, Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett, and Director for Mutual Security W. Averell Harriman.

Present at the ceremony will be His Royal Highness the Prince of the Netherlands, members of the diplomatic corps from nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the NATO military standing group, the NATO military representatives, and Members of Congress. Other leaders in public and private life will also be present.

Committee on Economic Development In South and Southeast Asia

[Released to the press March 24]

A ministerial level meeting of the Consultative Committee on Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia—the body which periodically examines the progress of the Colombo Plan—opened on March 24. At the invitation of the Government of Pakistan the meeting is being held at Karachi and is expected to last one week. The following countries are expected to attend the meeting: Australia, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, United Kingdom, United States, and Vietnam.

The U.S. representative to the meeting is Avra M. Warren, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan. Ambassador Warren's alternate, and U.S. representa-

tive at the preparatory meeting of officials which began on March 10, is Wilfred Malenbaum, Chief of the Investment and Economic Development Staff of the Department of State. Advisers to the U.S. representatives at both meetings are Myron L. Black of the American Embassy at Colombo, John A. Loftus of the Embassy at New Delhi, Henry W. Spielman of the Embassy at Karachi, and Alfred W. Wells of the Embassy at Rangoon. The United States participated as a member of the Committee in its meeting at Colombo in January 1951.

The Consultative Committee is to consider the progress of the Colombo Plan in the period since its formal inauguration in July 1951, any alterations in the 6-year programs in the light of changed circumstances, and detailed programs for the first 2 years.

The Consultative Committee functions in an advisory and consultative capacity. The 6-year economic development programs submitted by member countries in South and Southeast Asia and subsequent modifications of those plans are presented to the Committee for discussion. No international control is exercised upon the individual plans by the Committee. Among the advantages arising from the Committee discussion are the opportunities for each country to compare its development program with others and to exchange information on common problems. No funds are channeled through the Committee, all foreign assistance programs being arranged bilaterally between donor and recipient governments through normal diplomatic channels.

The United States welcomes these efforts to promote cooperative measures for economic development in the area.

The U.S. in the U.N.

will not appear in this issue

The U.S. Foreign Service—A Career for Young Americans

A number of Department and Foreign Service officers, in carrying out an intensive recruitment campaign, are addressing scores of college graduating classes on the subject of Foreign Service careers. At the same time, these officers are leaving with the students copies of a new booklet just issued by the Department of State called *The U.S. Foreign Service—A Career for Young Americans*.¹ The primary purpose of the booklet is to draw the interest of political candidates toward the Foreign Service. It tells them, for example, what the Foreign Service is all about, why it is as satisfying a career as any person can choose, what the Foreign Service expects of them, and what they can expect of the Foreign Service.

The following article is based on excerpts from the booklet.

A great deal has been written about the Foreign Service in the popular literature of today. At times, of course, working abroad has its difficulties and monotonies; at other times, there is sparkle and adventure. But at all times the Foreign Service provides a responsible job—with opportunities limited only by your own ability, ambition, and imagination.

You'll travel a lot in the Foreign Service. You'll see places and people you hardly knew existed. You'll learn much in the Foreign Service—not only about places and people but also about the great issues and world realities which we face in this latter half of the twentieth century.

You'll be paid well in the Foreign Service, but you won't get rich—not in money. You'll have stimulating work, a variety of interesting environments, and opportunities to move ahead, as you show ability to take on more responsible assignments, throughout your career. You will also have security, ample leave time, extra allowances when necessary, and a liberal retirement plan. You'll make good and lasting friendships and you'll collect an inestimable fund of general knowledge about the world.

Above all, you, as a Foreign Service officer, a representative of all the American people, will be serving your country in a position of trust, thus bringing a direction and a meaning into your life which cannot fail to be a source of deep personal satisfaction.

¹ Department of State publication 4559.

A Challenge

The typical Foreign Service officer today usually enters the Service soon after he finishes college. He and all his colleagues start in class 6, the bottom of the ladder—at about \$350 a month—and progress through the classes. He is the career man, the all-around Foreign Service man. He may—and probably will in the course of his career—be called upon to perform a variety of duties, from getting a fellow citizen out of jail to conducting highly important negotiations concerning top foreign-policy matters.

To become this person, you must be, as of July 1—

- . . . At least 20 and under 31 years of age
- . . . An American citizen (and have been one for at least 10 years)
- . . . If married, married to an American citizen

In addition, you will have to pass a written, an oral, and a physical examination. But if you are in good health, have the equivalent of a sound college education and a reasonable measure of general knowledge, and are not afraid of competition, then the tests are a challenge, not a trial.

Your Job as a Foreign Service Officer

The professional activities of a Foreign Service officer are varied. For example, he keeps his Government informed of the multitudinous developments abroad. He protects American citizens and American interests in foreign countries. He cultivates and maintains friendly relations with peoples of other nations. He negotiates treaties, conventions, and protocols regarding international trade, tariffs, shipping, commerce, and the preservation of peace according to the instructions of his Government.

Specifically, your assignments as a Foreign Service officer will include any or all of the following:

- . . . Negotiations with foreign officials
- . . . Political reporting
- . . . Economic reporting in the fields of labor, finance, transportation, communications, aviation, petroleum, etc.
- . . . Commercial reporting and trade promotion
- . . . Agricultural reporting
- . . . Issuance of visas and passports
- . . . Assistance to American shipping

- ... Protection of American citizens and property
- ... Dissemination of informational materials via press, radio, motion pictures, and publications
- ... Assistance in undertaking exchange-of-persons programs
- ... Distribution of educational, scientific, and cultural information and material via libraries and cultural centers
- ... Participation in technical-assistance programs

In addition, you will have numerous executive and administrative duties in connection with the maintenance and operation of offices abroad and may engage in specialized area and language activities.

To help you prepare for these duties, to develop your capacities to the maximum extent, and to broaden your professional knowledge and experience, you will find many opportunities afforded, including carefully designed programs of orientation and training prior to first assignment abroad; both "refresher" and advanced foreign-affairs instruction at intermediate levels in your career; a variety of functional and geographic assignments; and special career-development activities such as advanced training in economics, language and area specialization, or even assignments to the National War College.

The Examinations

You will find the Foreign Service examinations challenging. While you are taking them, somewhere along the line you will wish you had consulted your dictionary more often, that you had read just a little more on this or that subject, that you had paid somewhat more attention to Professor Doe.

But one thing we might say here: A painstaking accumulation of knowledge of foreign affairs and foreign languages will be of no avail to you if you do not impress the examiners as a man who can think and express himself clearly and logically, who has imagination and perceptive insights into human behavior, and who has the kind of intellectual balance and sound judgment which will carry him successfully through difficult situations.

Such a man, with a good general education, need have no fears concerning the Foreign Service examinations.

Where and When

The first step toward becoming a Foreign Service officer is to submit an application. You can do this any time after March 1 of the year in which the examination is held. To obtain the

application form, write to: *Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.*

The deadline for receipt of applications is July 1 of the year in which the examination is to be taken. This means that your application must actually be received by the Board of Examiners by July 1. It is not enough merely to mail the application by that date. It is up to you to get your application into the mail early enough to arrive in the Department of State by July 1; otherwise it cannot be considered.

The written examination will be held in September at Civil Service examination centers in about 15 cities in the continental United States. Ordinarily these include Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Dallas, Denver, Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, St. Louis, St. Paul, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, D.C. You can also take the examination in Honolulu, in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and at any American diplomatic post or consulate.

The oral examination is held in Washington in the spring of each year.

The physical examination is taken after a candidate has passed both the written and oral examinations.

A Closing Note

In a recent interview with a number of young Foreign Service officers—class 6—who had just returned to Washington after completing their first 2-year assignment abroad, one question put to each was, "Well, what do you think of the Foreign Service now?" Every one of these young Foreign Service officers agreed that, long before the first tour of duty was over, he was positive he had embarked on a unique and exciting career. As one of them summed it up:

"There are a number of reasons that draw us to the Foreign Service—the travel, visiting foreign lands and talking with different peoples, the adventure, the interest in international affairs and in America's role in them, and the desire to serve the Nation in a responsible and often quite difficult job.

"All these things are there. But once you're in the Foreign Service, there is something else you become aware of after a short time. It's more than *esprit de corps*. It's more like an awareness of the greatness of your country and its responsibilities to the world. You feel that even the routine things you do have great significance.

"This makes your job more than a job. It makes it a career in the full sense of the word. That's why, long before your leave is up, you are anxious to be on the way to your next post."

Legislation Requested To Handle Overpopulation Problem in Western Europe

*Message of the President to the Congress¹
To the Congress of the United States:*

One of the gravest problems arising from the present world crisis is created by the overpopulation in parts of Western Europe, aggravated by the flight and expulsion of people from the oppressed countries of Eastern Europe.

This problem is of great practical importance to us because it affects the peace and security of the free world. It is also of great concern to us, because of our long-established humanitarian traditions. The Congress has recognized the importance of this problem and has already enacted some legislation to help meet it. I ask the Congress to give early and favorable consideration to additional legislation to make more adequate provision for meeting this situation.

Specifically, I ask the Congress to authorize a program that will:

- (1) Provide aid for the unfortunate victims of oppression who are escaping from communist tyranny behind the Iron Curtain,
- (2) Continue our participation in the international effort now being made to assist in the migration and resettlement throughout the world of a substantial number of persons from the overpopulated areas of Western Europe, and
- (3) Authorize additional immigration into this country, on a limited basis, to aid in alleviating the problems created by communist tyranny and overpopulation in Western Europe.

The solution to these problems cannot, and should not, be the responsibility of any one nation. It is an international responsibility—an integral part of the world crisis which the free nations must meet together. It demands the cooperative efforts of all interested countries. But a real solution can be found only if the United States does its part. We have done our part in the past—we must not falter now.

World War II left in its wake a tremendous upheaval of populations in the countries of Europe. To meet the situation, this country took the lead in establishing the International Refugee Organization, which provided care and protection for displaced persons and made possible the migration

of more than one million of them to 48 countries throughout the free world.

As our own contribution to the common effort, the Congress in 1948 enacted the Displaced Persons Act and subsequently amended and extended it. Both the Congress and the American people have every right to be proud of the achievements made under this farsighted humanitarian legislation.

The Displaced Persons Act is now approaching the termination date fixed by the Congress. When operations under this law have been finished, almost 400,000 victims of tyranny will have been resettled in the United States. The first major phase of the program was completed with the issuance of practically all of the 341,000 visas authorized to be issued by midnight, December 31, 1951. In addition, the Congress authorized the admission of 54,744 Germans who had fled or been driven from areas east of the Iron Curtain. There is every likelihood that the remaining visas for these German expellees will be issued ahead of the June 30, 1952, deadline set by the Congress.

The job has been well done by the Displaced Persons Commission and other cooperating agencies of the Government. Much of the success of the program is due to the vital work accomplished by private voluntary agencies, representing our major religious faiths and nationality groups, and by the State Commissions appointed by the Governors of 34 States. These organizations of citizens have contributed their efforts and resources to resettling the greater part of the displaced persons admitted to this country. Without them, and without the goodwill and cooperative response of thousands of American families and church groups, this great program could never have been carried out.

Thus, by doing our own share and by acting together with the other countries of the free world, we have been dealing successfully with the major dislocations caused by Hitler's policies of brutality and aggression.

But the movement of large masses of distressed people across international boundaries is by no means over. Communist tyranny has taken up where Hitler's brutality left off. We are, therefore, now turning our attention to the innocent and unhappy victims of communist oppression.

¹ H. doc. 400; transmitted Mar. 24.

The Victims of Communist Tyranny

Throughout the Soviet dominated area of central and eastern Europe, the communist regimes are increasing their repressive measures. Some of the enslaved people are managing to escape to the West. Some fifteen to twenty thousand Germans are slipping over the border from the Soviet Zone of Germany and crossing into Western Germany every month. From the communist countries to the south and east the movement to free Europe is much smaller, but still they come, at the risk of their lives, past border guards and through mine fields. There are about 18,000 of these people already West of the Iron Curtain, and they are coming in at the rate of about 1,000 a month.

The people in all these groups come into areas where, for the most part, the local economy is unable to support the population already there. Western Germany, for example, is overcrowded with almost nine million people of German ethnic origin who were driven there from Eastern Europe after the war. Trieste, which is receiving many of those escaping from the satellites, is badly overcrowded. Italy is struggling with very serious problems of overpopulation and is urgently trying to resettle large numbers of its people overseas. Greece faces great difficulty in absorbing the refugees of Greek origin who are being driven out of the Balkan satellites by the communists. Thus, the brutal policies of Soviet tyranny are aggravating overcrowded conditions which are already a danger to the stability of these free nations.

This in general terms, is the nature of the problem that now confronts free Europe.

The Congress is aware of the importance of this problem for the free world and the security of the United States. Congressional enactments and appropriations recently enabled the United States to take the lead in establishing the Provisional Inter-Governmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe, which 17 governments have already joined. This organization is already at work providing overseas transportation for migrants from areas of overpopulation to lands where more people are needed.

We are taking part in the work of this organization and have contributed ten million dollars to its operation. The organization has taken over the fleet of ships formerly operated by the International Refugee Organization.

The legal authority to participate in this organization is contained in the Mutual Security Act of 1951. This authority should be extended, and the Congress should make provision for continuing our financial contribution to this work for the next fiscal year.

This is of great importance, but much more needs to be done.

In the first place, specific aid and assistance should be provided for the people who are fleeing at the risk of their lives from Southern and Eastern Europe. These people are Balts, Poles,

Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Albanians, Ukrainians, and Russians.

These people face a desperate situation. Not only do they arrive destitute, with only what they can carry on their backs, but they find themselves in totally strange lands among strange peoples speaking strange languages. The local authorities do not have adequate resources to care for them properly. These people need better care when they first arrive and they need assistance if they are to move on and resettle elsewhere.

The miserable conditions in which these fugitives from communism find themselves, and their present inability to emigrate to new homes and start new lives, lead inevitably to despair. Their disillusionment is being effectively exploited by communist propaganda. These men and women are friends of freedom. They include able and courageous fighters against communism. They ask only for an opportunity to play a useful role in the fight for freedom. It is the responsibility of the free world to afford them this opportunity.

The need is well recognized, both in Europe and in this country. Private welfare organizations of American citizens, Protestant, Catholic and Jewish, have been working hard to help these people. Last year, these organizations spent substantial amounts for their care and resettlement. These organizations will continue their efforts this year. But the need is greater than they can handle.

First of all, these fugitives from communism need supplemental care and maintenance after they arrive in Western Europe. Local governments and private relief organizations give a minimum amount of this type of aid, but their resources are inadequate. Additional food, better shelter, clothing, medical care, legal advice and other kinds of material assistance are needed.

These people also need assistance in financing overseas transportation. The new international migration organization and the American private relief agencies can and do help with this, but a concerted effort is needed to give these people an equal opportunity to share in the migration program. At present, because of inadequate resources, it is these fugitives from communism who have the greatest difficulty in arranging for overseas migration. If funds were provided, and an adequate administrative organization set up, these people would have a better chance to migrate.

Allocation of MSP Funds

I am convinced that we must help these people. Therefore, acting under the authority of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, I am authorizing the Director for Mutual Security to go forward with a limited program of assistance in this fiscal year. Four million three hundred thousand dollars will be allocated for this purpose. This program will help alleviate the condition of these people in the countries to which they escape and will enable many of them to move out of Europe.

The funds that are being made available will supplement—but not in any sense supersede—the efforts now being made both by the governments of the countries where these people have sought refuge and by private American organizations.

Supplemental care and overseas migration do not, however, constitute all that should be done for those who escape from Eastern Europe. A substantial number of them want to stay in Europe and should have the chance to do so. They should be welcomed in Western Europe and given the opportunity to make their individual contributions to the free world. Many of them will need further education or training so they can prepare themselves for useful and productive work in the North Atlantic community.

I urge the Congress, therefore, to provide clear and adequate authority for the coming fiscal year—together with the necessary funds—so that the program of assistance we are now starting for the refugees from communism can be carried forward and strengthened along the lines that I have mentioned here.

In addition to these types of aid, the opportunity for military service may provide an answer to the problems of a small number of these refugees. Some of these people will be able to enlist in the United States armed forces overseas, under Public Law 597, the so-called Lodge Act of 1950. So far, however, only a handful have been allowed to do this. Security screening requirements have necessarily been high, since each person under the provisions of the Lodge Act is a potential United States citizen. Another type of military service for these people is authorized under section 101 (A) (1) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which provides that they can be formed into elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The question of forming such units presents great administrative and political difficulties, but it has been receiving careful study. Even if it proves possible, however, to create such units, military service could utilize only a relatively small number of these people, and would not eliminate the need for additional measures to use their skills and energies in civilian life.

Such, in brief, are the measures that can help to alleviate the problems of these fugitives from Soviet terror. But these problems, important as they are, are overshadowed by the need for increasing migration from the overcrowded areas of Europe.

Overpopulation and NATO Nations

Overpopulation is one of the major factors preventing the fullest recovery of those countries where it exists. It is a serious drag on the economies of nations belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A solution to this problem, therefore, becomes vitally necessary to strengthen the defense of the North Atlantic Community.

Our common defense requires that we make the best possible use not only of the material resources of the free world but of our human resources as well. Men and women who cannot be productively employed in the free countries of Europe because of conditions there are a net loss to the strength of the free world. In other countries, where they are needed, these same people could add to the output and growing power of the free nations. But left in idleness as they now are, wasted and hopeless, they become an easy prey to the demagogues of totalitarianism, both right and left.

The bulk of the emigration needed will have to be taken care of by countries other than the United States. Some of the free nations, particularly those with large unsettled areas or undeveloped resources, have a pressing need for large numbers of immigrants to build up their countries and increase their production. Canada and Australia, for example, have already initiated substantial programs of immigration. The Australian immigration program calls for an annual immigration of at least 150,000 persons per year. Canadian absorption in the last year was at the rate of 180,000. Additional opportunities for migrants are opening up, although more slowly, in the Republics of Central and South America.

But the United States can and should take some of the migrants now available in Europe. One of the reasons we lead the free world today is that we are a nation of immigrants. We have been made strong and vigorous by the diverse skills and abilities of the different peoples who have migrated to this country and become American citizens. Past immigration has helped to build our tremendous industrial power. Today, our growing economy can make effective use of additional manpower in various areas and lines of work.

The rapid expansion of our industry and the enlargement of our defense forces have increased the demands on our available manpower reserves. Our industry can readily absorb a limited number of skilled and trained personnel in the years immediately ahead.

In our agriculture particularly, we have a need for additional people. Farm operators and farm workers are essential in our defense effort. Since 1949, there has again been a downward trend in the farm population of the United States. With the resumption of the movement from the farms to the cities, there is a real danger that in the years just ahead our agricultural production may be seriously hampered.

A rich pool of surplus farmers and farm workers exists in the overpopulated areas of Western Europe. Among the expellees in Western Germany there are many agricultural families with no opportunity for employment on the land. In Italy and the Netherlands, too, there are large groups of agricultural workers who cannot find productive employment on the limited arable land available.

Besides farm workers, our experience under the Displaced Persons Act has demonstrated that we can obtain from Europe some trained factory workers, engineers, scientific technicians, and other kinds of specially qualified people whose skills can be put to good use in our economy.

I am convinced that we should welcome to this country a number of those who now must emigrate from Europe. We should do this, not only in our own self-interest but also as a way to reaffirm the great tradition of freedom and opportunity which we have proved in our own experience to be the surest path of progress and prosperity.

In considering the steps to be taken, we should measure the needs of the distressed people in Europe against our own capacity to make good use of additional manpower, and the extent of our international responsibilities. The problem we face is in the nature of an emergency. This emergency can be of limited duration, if we of the free world act wisely and resolutely. The plight of the refugees in Europe and the demands of our national defense are both related to the threat of communist aggression. When that threat wanes, there will be less need for extraordinary measures. But while it persists, we should move promptly and effectively to meet it.

Inadequacy of Existing Immigration Laws

The existing immigration laws are inadequate—both in general and as regards this special problem. The Displaced Persons Act will end this year, and we will be thrown back on the quota system of immigration. So far as the people escaping from communism are concerned, many of them will be completely blocked from coming to this country because their quotas have been “mortgaged” under the Displaced Persons Act, for many years in the future. For example, half of the Latvian quota has been mortgaged ahead three centuries to the year 2274, the Estonian quota through the year 2146, the Lithuanian quota through the year 2087, and the Polish quota through the year 2000.

Furthermore, under present law we will be unable to make any substantial contribution to meeting the problem of overpopulation in Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, or Greece. In the latter countries, for example, where the need is particularly acute, we can admit annually only 5,677 Italians and 310 Greeks under the law as it now stands.

To meet the present emergency, we should enlarge the numbers of immigrants that can be taken in from all these critical areas. I ask the Congress to authorize the admission of some 300,000 additional persons over a three year period. This would include, on an annual basis:

- (1) 7,000 religious and political refugees from communism in eastern Europe;
- (2) 7,500 Greek nationals from Greece;
- (3) 7,500 Dutch from the Netherlands;

- (4) 39,000 Italians from Italy and Trieste; and
- (5) 39,000 Germans and persons of German ethnic origin.

Immigration in these amounts and from these sources could readily be absorbed in this country, and together with a far larger volume of immigration to other free countries, would go a long way toward solving the emergency problem in Europe.

While the admission of these particular groups should constitute a temporary program of limited duration, it could well be fitted into desirable permanent changes in our present immigration quota system if the Congress finds itself able to make such changes at this session.

Our present quota system is not only inadequate to meet present emergency needs, it is also an obstacle to the development of an enlightened and satisfactory immigration policy for the long-run future. If our quotas were revised and made more flexible, they could probably be utilized to take care of most or all of the immigration required to meet the present emergency situation. The balance, if any, could be admitted without reference to quota numbers. These are considerations that the Congress will wish to keep in mind when it takes up the question of improving our overall immigration laws.

It is most important to remember, however, that action to meet the emergency problem is needed this year. If the Congress cannot agree at this session on desirable improvements in our whole system of immigration that would take care of the emergency problem, it should act to take care of the emergency directly. In no event should this vital emergency program be tied to or associated with restrictive changes in our permanent immigration laws—changes which would in themselves hamper or nullify the operation of the emergency program.

Operation of Displaced Persons Act

In addition to this emergency three-year program, I recommend that steps be taken to alleviate an unfortunate situation arising under the operation of the Displaced Persons Act. Although all visas authorized for displaced persons were issued, some 7,500 of them were lost because the persons to whom they were granted did not actually come to the United States. On the other hand, a number of persons who were seeking admission under the Act, and whose applications were under consideration, were unable to obtain visas prior to the time the authority to issue such visas expired on December 31, 1951. A substantial portion of these applicants were admissible under the standards of the Act, and would have made as good immigrants as those already admitted. The voluntary agencies or individual citizens have given the assurances necessary for the admission of these persons. There is still place for them in the United States.

It seems unjust and unwise to deprive them of the opportunity for which they are qualified. Seven thousand five hundred visas should be ample to take care of the displaced persons in this category. I recommend that the Congress authorize up to that number of visas for them.

In carrying out this proposal, and the three-year emergency program as well, we should follow the lessons of the successful experience we have had under the Displaced Persons Act. The same kind of provision should be made, for example, for security safeguards with respect to those admitted to this country, for means to effect their settlement here on a wide geographic basis, and for safeguards against displacement of United States citizens from housing or employment. And similarly, as under the Displaced Persons Act, there should be no religious, racial or other discrimination in the selection of the immigrants.

With respect to the financing of the emergency three-year program, however, the situation is rather different from that under the Displaced Persons Act, where transportation was financed through Government funds.

Except for the refugees from communism, the people from the overpopulated areas, who constitute the bulk of the migrants to be admitted, are in a better financial position than the displaced persons of former years. They are not stateless,

or dependent wholly on charity. Their countries are interested in seeing them migrate and can be called on to help with the expense of getting them started. The migrants themselves can be asked to repay the cost of their overseas transportation, once they have resettled. Some of them have assets of their own which can be used. While it may be advisable to provide a source of funds to be loaned to these migrants to pay for their passage, the net additional cost to this Government of transporting the people from the overpopulated areas should be small.

The years through which we are passing are tragic years for many people. We are faced with extraordinary problems which demand extraordinary solutions. The problem of the refugees from communist tyranny and that of overpopulation in Western Europe are matters of practical concern to the entire free world. To us in America, whose most basic belief is in the inherent worth of the human individual, these problems present a challenge as well as a responsibility.

The programs I have here recommended are designed to meet the challenge and accept the responsibility. I hope that the Congress will give them prompt and favorable consideration.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 24, 1952.

Transfer of Responsibilities to Mutual Security Director

[Released to the press by the White House March 27]

The President, on March 27, sent identical letters concerning the duties of the Director for Mutual Security to Tom Connally, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and James P. Richards, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The text of the President's letter follows, together with the text of an appended report by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget:

LETTER TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

Pursuant to section 502 (c) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (P. L. 165, 82d Cong., 1st sess., approved October 10, 1951), I hereby inform the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate (Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives) that I have found that, except as hereinafter set forth, all of the powers, functions, and responsibilities transferred to the Director for Mutual Security by subsection (b) (2) of section 502 of said act are necessary to enable the Director for Mutual Security, after June 30, 1952, to carry out the duties conferred upon him by section 503 of said act.

Powers, functions, and responsibilities under the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, with respect to the following are not necessary to enable the said Director, after June 30, 1952, to carry out the duties so conferred upon him:

1. Creation of a corporation (section 104 (d)).
2. Consultation with the Secretary of State in the specific manner prescribed in section 105 (b).
3. Consultation between the chief of the special mission and the chief of the United States diplomatic mission in the specific manner prescribed in section 109 (b).
4. Guarantee of investments in enterprises producing or distributing informational media (section 111 (b) (3)).
5. Procurement and increased production in participating countries, and under sections 115 (i) (1) and 117 (a), of materials which are required by the United States as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in the resources within the United States; and purchase, under section 115 (i) (2), of strategic and critical materials in any participating country.

**REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF THE BUDGET**

MARCH 18, 1952

SUBJECT: *Continuation after June 30, 1952, of powers, functions, and responsibilities established by the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, and other laws*

I. Introduction and Recommendations

Introduction

Section 502 (c) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 provides as follows:

Not later than April 1, 1952, the President shall inform the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives which of the powers, functions, and responsibilities transferred to the Director by subsection (b) (2) are found by the President to be necessary to enable the Director after June 30, 1952, to carry out the duties conferred upon him by section 503. The termination provisions of section 122 of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, shall come into effect on June 30, 1952, and none of the powers, functions, and responsibilities conferred by that Act shall be exercised after that date, except those powers, functions, and responsibilities found necessary to enable the Director to carry out the duties conferred on him by section 503 of this Act, which powers, functions, and responsibilities unless otherwise provided by law shall continue in effect until June 30, 1954.

Section 503 provides:

After June 30, 1952, the Director, on behalf of the President and subject to his direction, shall, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, continue to have primary responsibility for—

(a) the development and administration of programs of assistance designed to sustain and increase military effort, including production, construction, equipment and matériel in each country or in groups of countries which receive United States military assistance;

(b) the provision of such equipment, materials, commodities, services, financial, or other assistance as he finds to be necessary for carrying out mutual defense programs; and

(c) the provision of limited economic assistance to foreign nations for which the United States has responsibility as a result of participation in joint control arrangements when the President finds that the provision of such economic assistance is in the interest of the security of the United States.

The Bureau of the Budget has examined the current and prospective programs and operations of the Mutual Security Agency to ascertain which of the various powers, functions and responsibilities established by the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, and related laws are necessary for the Director for Mutual Security to carry out after June 30, 1952, the responsibilities enumerated in section 503 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951. The following recommendations are concurred in by the Director for Mutual Security, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense.

Recommendation

It is recommended that the various powers, functions, and responsibilities previously vested in the Economic

6. Promotion and development of travel by citizens of the United States to and within participating countries (section 117 (b)).

7. Payment of ocean freight charges of relief supplies and packages (section 117 (d)).

The findings under section 502 (c) have been framed in terms of a specification of powers to be discontinued rather than powers to be continued. This approach has been adopted because by the enactment of section 503 the Congress has already limited the range of the Director's responsibilities with respect to the activities of the Mutual Security Agency, thereby anticipating the action which had originally been contemplated would result from the finding under section 502 (c).

The Congress, in the Mutual Security Act, reaffirmed the proposition that the mutual security efforts of the free world should not fail because some cooperating countries cannot now provide all the physical and final resources required for defense mobilization. The Mutual Security Agency already has adjusted its programs and organization, and has curtailed some functions and modified others in order to direct its full effort to the objectives of the mutual security program. Under section 502 (b) (2) of the act, however, the Mutual Security Agency now is using to support mutual defense the same major powers and functions which originally were needed to assist economic recovery. This experience has shown that the basic powers of the Economic Cooperation Act, appropriately redirected toward the new objectives, are necessary to enable the Director for Mutual Security after June 30, 1952, to carry out his responsibilities under section 503 of the Mutual Security Act. Those provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act which are not required for this purpose are set forth in the above finding.

Although the Mutual Security Agency's authority to subsidize relief shipments and to make guarantees of informational media investments will be discontinued, it is essential that these activities be carried on after June 30, 1952. There has been submitted for the consideration of the Congress as a part of the 1953 mutual security legislation a request for authority and funds which would permit the President to designate any department or agency of the Government to carry on the function of subsidizing relief shipments. At an early date there also will be submitted for the consideration of the Congress a request for authority to enable the Government to continue the work of guaranteeing investments in informational media enterprises.

I am enclosing for your information copies of a report relating to the foregoing prepared by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Cooperation Administrator and transferred to the Director by the Mutual Security Act, except for those noted below, be continued after June 30, 1952. The Bureau of the Budget has concluded that, although the purposes to which assistance is being directed have changed under the mutual security program, the major functions authorized under the Economic Cooperation Act must be utilized to accomplish the new goals.

The powers of the China Aid Act of 1948 and the China Area Aid Act of 1950 also will be needed by the Director after June 30, 1952, to carry out his responsibilities.

The Mutual Security Agency already has adjusted many of its operations and recast some of its functions in order to fulfill its new assignment. The performance of many of the functions which must be continued may be further modified. However, the following powers, functions, and responsibilities established by the Economic Cooperation Act do not appear to be necessary to enable the Director to carry out his duties after June 30: to create a corporation (section 104 (d)); to furnish informational media guarantees (section 111 (b) (3)); to promote travel by United States citizens in participating countries (section 117 (b)); to pay ocean freight charges of relief packages and supplies (section 117 (c)); to promote procurement and increased production in participating countries of materials in which the United States is deficient (sections 115 (i) and 117 (a)); to consult with the Secretary of State in the specific manner prescribed in section 105; and to participate in the consultation procedure between the chief of the special mission and the chief of the United States diplomatic mission in the specific manner prescribed in section 109 (b).

II. Discussion

A. PURPOSES OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE UNDER THE MUTUAL SECURITY ACT

By the middle of 1950, the goals of the European Recovery Program in many instances had been substantially achieved. Under new legislation, a start had been made to extend assistance by the United States to countries in the general area of China. The communist aggression in Korea that year, however, forced the free world to accept the additional burden of intensifying preparation to defend against other communist-armed threats. It was recognized, therefore, that our economic aid should be used to augment the security efforts of friendly nations. As rearmament plans were developed, it became apparent that while the purely recovery needs of these countries were diminishing, further economic assistance from the United States beyond the fixed expiration date of the Economic Cooperation Act would be necessary for them to achieve established defense goals. This need for continued assistance in order to achieve more specific security objectives was recognized by the Congress in passing the Mutual Security Act of 1951.

The programs of the Mutual Security Agency now are designed to provide the marginal assistance required to enable countries participating in mutual defense efforts to expand their financial and productive capacity to build their armed forces, to increase the production of military goods, to construct bases, air fields, and other necessary facilities, and to take related actions. By preserving recovery gains, the programs provide the economic base on which defenses are being built, and diminish the possibility that economic dislocations may lead to internal subversion. MSA programs contribute to the security of the Far East by supporting defense activities, and by attacking hunger, sickness, and other causes of the current civil unrest.

The size of our assistance programs in most countries now depends upon a given level of military effort. For European nations, the amount of United States aid planned under bilateral agreements is related to the commitments made by those countries to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization defense arrangements. As a general rule,

funds are released only as the agreed-upon plans are implemented.

The present and projected Mutual Security Agency programs differ markedly from the activities under the recovery program which were directed primarily toward closing the "dollar gap." Economic Cooperation Administration operations previously were designed to increase the production of export goods and to decrease the need for goods produced in the dollar areas. Aid was allotted principally on the basis of assurances to relax trade restrictions, to promote financial stability, to expand foreign trade, and to take other steps to reduce dollar deficits.

B. MODIFICATION OF FUNCTIONS UNDER THE ECONOMIC COOPERATION ACT TO CONFORM TO NEW PROGRAMS

Study of the revised Mutual Security Agency programs has shown that the basic functions which have been necessary to provide assistance for recovery are actually those required to further mutual security objectives. Certain other functions, however, now may be discontinued, and certain others modified in the manner in which they are exercised. The functions which should be continued, and the extent to which others now may be discontinued or modified, are discussed below.

1. All Major Functions Must Be Continued

The major powers and functions of the Economic Cooperation Act, though designed for recovery purposes, have proved through recent experience to be readily adaptable and essential to the new Mutual Security Agency programs directed to military support. They will be needed by the Director for Mutual Security to fulfill his assignment. The following paragraphs cover the principal functions, and briefly explain their changed uses.

Under the Economic Cooperation Act, for example, the Administrator is authorized to furnish aid in the form of commodities and services. Commodities and equipment from this country helped the Marshall Plan nations to recover their economic strength. Although the general composition of commodity aid remains much the same, its end uses have changed in many respects. Coal, machine tools, and other materials from this country now are enabling our allies to manufacture their share of the military weapons and facilities required to support our joint effort. Indeed, without this kind of help, the economic conditions making possible the required military efforts could not be maintained.

Under the authority of the act, technical assistance was provided to export industries and to capital goods manufacturers to increase the dollar earning power of the participating country economies. This identical authority has been used since the enactment of the Mutual Security Act to send American technicians abroad to assist manufacturers of such military goods as combat vehicles, artillery, electronics equipment, ships, weapons, and small arms. In addition, the Mutual Security Agency technical assistance program already has been directed to production problems in defense-supporting industries such as iron and steel, pipe and tube rolling and drawing, iron foundry, forging and stamping, coal mining, oil refining, electroplating, and so on. In the Far East, most kinds of technical assistance have a direct bearing on the security of the area.

The Administrator originally used his power to approve disposition of local currency accounts to guide these funds into channels of investment useful to the economic reconstruction and stability of participating countries. The Congress, in the Mutual Security Act, recognized the potential security uses of local currencies. Sizeable amounts of counterpart are now being released jointly by the United States and participating countries to finance military production, construction, equipment, and matériel. Decisions on the amount of counterpart to be released and its uses will have a direct impact on the size and content of national expenditures, including military budgets.

The Economic Cooperation Act authorizes the transfer

of funds to certain types of international institutions. The authority thus far has been used for contributions to the European Payments Union, which has contributed to the facilitation of trade between European countries. The use of this authority may be necessary in connection with arrangements to clear transactions for the exchange of military items among North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries. These efforts represent a major step toward regional unification.

2. Terms of Assistance

The Administrator is authorized to supply commodities and services in the form of grants, upon payment in cash, on credit terms, or on other terms of payment.

The continuation of the power to furnish assistance under several financial arrangements is essential. The largest part of the aid supplied necessarily must be in grants because many recipient countries are incapable of assuming substantial additional debt. Bankable enterprises in other participating countries are receiving loans from the Export-Import Bank of Washington, which has the funds and authority for foreign lending. To preserve flexibility, the power to provide assistance on other credit terms, including repayment in materials, will continue to be needed.

3. Supporting Functions to be Continued

The Economic Cooperation Act provides for other functions which influence the use of aid, or otherwise contribute to the objectives of economic assistance. Some of these supporting functions are necessary for mutual security purposes.

The act, for example, directs the Administrator to give full publicity regarding assistance including its purpose, source, and character, and Congress otherwise authorized Economic Cooperation Administration information activities of a broad kind to promote the objectives of the recovery program. Information activities supported by the use of counterpart funds will continue to be important to the objectives of the mutual security program and this authorization should be continued. These activities, however, are being geared to the more specific objectives of the mutual security program and are being integrated with related activities so that a single comprehensive United States program is achieved. Steps toward this objective will be continued under procedures established pursuant to section 507 of the Mutual Security Act.

The power to guarantee American investments in countries included in the mutual security program against expropriation and the inability to convert earnings underlies another supporting activity which should be continued. The guarantee program, although not now a major activity in the Mutual Security Agency, will assist in securing the participation of American private investment in the program abroad. Since the Mutual Security Act extends the guarantee authority to all areas of the world to which assistance is being furnished, additional plans to utilize this authority are being considered.

4. Supporting Functions to be Discontinued

Some supporting functions which contributed to the rehabilitation of weakened economies are not needed to achieve mutual defense plans. Therefore, these functions, which are discussed below, either should be terminated or be made a part of the long-range programs of permanent Government agencies.

The Administrator is authorized in the Economic Cooperation Act to work jointly with the Secretary of Commerce to promote travel by United States citizens abroad. Tourist trade for several years has been a major source of dollar earnings for countries in Europe. The dollar gap must, of course, continue to be a matter of profound concern to our national policy; European economic and political health will be jeopardized unless Europe can earn more dollars to buy from us military goods and goods vital to the functioning of its economy. Programs for increasing dollar earnings through promotion of Ameri-

can tourism, however, are remote from the defense support programs of the Mutual Security Agency.

The guarantee of investments in enterprises for the distribution of United States books, magazines, films, and other informational media has increased the supply of such materials abroad. The informational benefits of this program, however, have been of a general kind and are not, therefore, in direct support of the more specific objectives of the mutual security program. Accordingly, this function may now be discontinued in the Mutual Security Agency. There will be submitted for the consideration of the Congress a request for authority to enable the Government to carry on this function.

The Administrator is directed to pay ocean freight charges on relief packages to countries receiving aid. The Economic Cooperation Administration contributed to the shipment abroad of large quantities of private relief supplies which have earned much good will for the United States. In recent years there has been a marked decline in the use of this subsidy. Although this program is an effective auxiliary to our foreign policy, it does not contribute directly to the mutual security program and therefore should not be carried on by the Mutual Security Agency. There has been submitted for the consideration of the Congress as a part of the 1953 mutual security legislation a request for authority and funds to permit the President to designate any department or agency of the Government to carry out this function.

Sections 115 (i) and 117 (a) of the Economic Cooperation Act direct the Administrator to promote the procurement and increased production of materials in which the United States is deficient.

There can be no doubt about the importance of increased supplies of strategic and critical materials to the military production of the United States and its allies. The Mutual Security Agency, as part of its country programs, will continue to emphasize and support materials projects through use of direct assistance and counterpart funds. The functions assigned by the act, however, primarily involve increasing production for the United States stockpile. This task is more directly related to other United States programs than to overseas defense support activities.

The President has established a special agency, the Defense Materials Procurement Agency, to increase the production of essential materials both in this country and abroad for use in the United States. Under a recent agreement, DMPA, as agent for the Mutual Security Agency, is operating projects, previously supervised by the Economic Cooperation Administration, the production of which will go to the United States. The DMPA, in close coordination with MSA, but with its own funds and loan authority, can continue to initiate and develop projects of this type. The United States defense buildup will better be served if all the materials development projects primarily related to United States procurement are administered as part of a single, centralized program. The Director for Mutual Security, therefore, will not continue to require the powers contained in sections 115 (i) and 117 (a).

It should be pointed out that section 115 (b) (5) of the Economic Cooperation Act, requiring that bilateral agreements shall make appropriate provision for facilitating the transfer to the United States of deficiency materials, will be continued. Furthermore, through the continuance of section 115 (b), not less than five percent of each counterpart account will continue to be reserved for the use of the United States Government for the purchase of deficiency materials which are required by the United States, and for other purposes.

5. Administrative Functions to be Continued

The Economic Cooperation Administrator, was provided with operating flexibility which contributed substantially to the effective development and administration of a dynamic program of economic recovery. The Director for Mutual Security now is responsible for an equally

dynamic program, and he will continue to need similar administrative authority.

The internal structure of the Economic Cooperation Administration and Mutual Security Agency has been revised as economic assistance objectives and programs have changed. Reductions in MSA personnel have been made beyond the ten percent reduction required by the Mutual Security Act. The special country missions and the European office of the agency have undergone personnel changes in line with revised assignments. MSA staff overseas are engaged in reviewing country capabilities and commodity requirements. They assist European producers to eliminate "bottlenecks" in military production, and they assist United States armed services and their contractors to locate and develop European sources of items to minimize the drain on scarce United States supplies.

In addition to providing customary administrative powers, the Economic Cooperation Act empowers the Administrator to employ persons for overseas service at Foreign Service rates and to have overseas employees appointed to the Foreign Service.

With the exceptions cited below, the Director for Mutual Security will need all the administrative powers in the Economic Cooperation Act to carry on his functions and responsibilities under the Mutual Security Act.

The Economic Cooperation Act required countries to allocate to the use of the United States Government five percent of the counterpart deposited against the grant aid they receive. These funds have been used, under the review of the Bureau of the Budget, to meet administrative and other essential expenses, and the provisions should be continued.

6. Administrative Functions to be Discontinued

The power to create a corporation, with the approval of the President, has never been utilized, and does not seem necessary to the discharge of the Director's responsibilities.

Sections 105 (b) and 109 (b) of the act provide for coordination between the Administrator and the Secretary of State, and between the chief of the special mission and the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, respectively. These provisions have largely been superseded by the Mutual Security Act, but to eliminate possible confusion they should not be continued after June 30, 1952. Section 3 of Executive Order 10300 provides for coordination between the Secretary of State and the Director for Mutual Security in order that mutual security programs shall be carried out in conformity with the established foreign policy of the United States. Under section 507 of the Mutual Security Act, the President is providing for the country-level arrangements to govern the administration of the mutual security program.

C. OTHER LAWS

Several other laws confer powers, functions, and responsibilities on the Economic Cooperation Administrator which now have been transferred to the Director by the Mutual Security Act.

1. The China Aid Act of 1948

The China Aid Act of 1948 authorizes the Administrator to furnish aid to China under the applicable provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act. It also contains specific provision for the establishment of the Joint Committee on Rural Reconstruction in China. Title III of the Mutual Security Act now provides for aid to the general area of China. The China Aid Act, with the exception of the JCRR provision, does not, of itself, establish any new powers, functions, or responsibilities. The striking success of the JCRR in strengthening the economy of Formosa argues strongly for the retention of the act and its use in support of the mutual defense program now being carried on there. For this reason, it is recommended that the Administrator's functions under the act be continued after June 30, 1952.

2. The China Area Aid Act of 1950

The China Area Aid Act of 1950 assigns to the Administrator responsibility for furnishing aid to countries in the general area of China pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act. Aid to that area is now covered by title III of the Mutual Security Act, which similarly authorizes aid to be furnished under applicable provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act. The China Area Aid Act does not establish any new powers; aid furnished pursuant to its provisions depended upon the exercise of powers conferred by the Economic Cooperation Act. There are, however, some residual activities, such as the use of certain counterpart funds, which depend upon the authority originally contained in this act. For that reason, the powers, functions, and responsibilities established by the act need to be kept in legal force for the time being.

3. The Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act of 1950

The Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act of 1950, as amended, authorizes the Administrator for Economic Cooperation to furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act. The Mutual Security Act, in section 303, provides that the functions of the Administrator under that act shall be performed by such departments or agencies of the Government as the President shall direct.

4. The India Emergency Food Aid Act of 1951

The India Emergency Food Aid Act of 1951 authorizes and directs the Administrator to provide emergency food relief assistance to India on credit terms. The major part of this task will be accomplished by June 30, 1952. The remaining functions will be liquidated as appropriate under the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act.

F. J. LAWTON, Director

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The Struggle for German Unity

by Henry B. Cox

Postwar efforts to unify Germany may be divided into two general phases. The first encompassed the period 1945-48 in which German unification was sought on the basis of the economic and political principles of the Potsdam Agreement. These attempts came to a halt in 1948 with the imposition of the Berlin blockade and the breakdown of Four-Power control. The second phase is represented by the efforts during 1949 and 1950 to carry out the much more limited steps toward unification called for in the *modus vivendi* for Germany agreed upon at the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1949, and the Western Allied and West German initiative in 1951 and 1952 which culminated in the appointment by the General Assembly of the United Nations of a commission to investigate and determine whether conditions for free elections exist throughout Germany. This article deals primarily with the latter phase of developments relating to German unification.

At the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in May 1949, the delegations of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom offered a proposal for restoring the political and economic unity of Germany.¹ The Three-Power proposal called for the unification of Germany in accordance with the Bonn Constitution, which had been promulgated a short time before, by the making of appropriate arrangements enabling the states of the Soviet zone to accede to it. The proposal further stipulated a number of principles which would apply to such accession of the states of the eastern zone, such as freedom of person, freedom of speech, freedom for all democratic political parties, freedom of elections, and the independence of the judiciary. In addition, the proposal provided for the prohibition of "all police

formations exercising political activities." The proposal also included provisions for a Four-Power Occupation Statute with reserved powers, a quadripartite High Commission operating with majority vote, an agreement prohibiting certain industries and restricting production in others, provision for the delivery of reparations, and the return to German ownership of industrial enterprises acquired after May 8, 1945.

The Soviet proposal for economic and political unity called for the re-establishment of the quadripartite Allied Control Council on its former basis as the organ representing supreme authority in Germany, as well as the re-establishment of the Inter-Allied Kommandatura. The Soviet proposal also provided for (a) the creation of an all-German State council on the basis of the economic organs existing at the time in the eastern and western zones of Germany and (b) the re-establishment of the Magistrat of Berlin.

No agreement was reached at the Paris meeting on the question of German unity.

Intensified Soviet Propaganda

Following the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Soviets intensified their propaganda campaign designed to convince the German people that the U.S.S.R. and the Communist parties in East and West Germany were the only true proponents of German unification, the conclusion of a peace treaty, and the withdrawal of occupation forces. Through the persistent efforts of the "National Front" committees and the Soviet and Communist-controlled German press in both East and West Germany, the Soviets tried to keep the initiative on German unity. The Soviets have sought to gain popular support through appeals which follow the traditional lines of the policy of German-Russian

¹ BULLETIN of July 4, 1949, p. 857.

friendship of Bismarck, Gustav Stresemann's idea of Germany as a bridge between East and West, and attempts at German-Russian cooperation during the Weimar Republic.

Faced with these developments and impressed by the necessity for restating the position of the Western Allies on the reunification issue, the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany released a statement calling for the political reunification of Germany on the basis of free, all-German elections. Issued on February 28, 1950, the McCloy statement deprecated the Soviet device of "the so-called National Front" as a "means to democratic unity" and decried Soviet exploitation of the natural wish of the German people for unity while denying to them the free and democratic processes by which unity can be obtained. Mr. McCloy also emphasized the readiness of the United States to "assist the German people to achieve unity based on true democratic principles and reflecting the aspirations of the entire German nation."

Action for German Unity

On March 22 the Federal Republic of Germany issued a statement which supported the U.S. High Commissioner's proposal, and embodied a concrete program for the achievement of German unity.² This program called for: (1) all-German elections for a National Constituent Assembly to be proclaimed following the promulgation of an election law by the four occupying powers; (2) supervision of the elections to the National Assembly by election commissions established by the four occupation powers or representatives of the United Nations; and (3) preparation by this Assembly of a draft German constitution to be ratified or rejected in a free national referendum. To these proposals, the Bonn Government added four conditions which it considered as prerequisites for the conduct of free elections. Public reaction to the Bonn offer was generally favorable in West Germany, but as expected, the response of the Soviet zone government was to reject the Adenauer proposals.

On May 25, 1950, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, U.S. Commandant in Berlin, delivered a letter on behalf of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany to Gen. V. I. Chuikov, Soviet Commandant for Berlin, on the question of German unity and all-German elections.³ The letter referred to the

discussion of German unity by the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States at their London meeting and attached the text of their conclusions on German unification and the manner in which it might be accomplished. The letter also made reference to the public communiqué released by the three Western Foreign Ministers on May 14 which stated that the Western Powers did not contemplate the conclusion of a separate peace treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, in particular because such a move would involve continued partition of Germany—a concept with which the Western Powers did not wish to associate themselves.

The letter to Chuikov further called attention to paragraph I of the March 22 declaration of the Federal Republic suggesting that the four occupation powers should assume the responsibility for framing an electoral law under which all-German elections might be conducted. The U.S. Government, the letter indicated, was prepared to engage in conversations on the High Commission level for the purpose of framing such an electoral law, pointing toward the formation of an all-German Government "in conformity with the principles set forth in the attached statement of the Foreign Ministers."

No reply was ever made to this letter.

Addressing the Bundestag of the Federal Republic on September 14, 1950, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer condemned the elections to be held in the Soviet zone of Germany on October 15 and referred again to the Federal Republic's March 22 proposals for holding all-German elections along democratic lines. Immediately following Adenauer's speech, the Bundestag passed a resolution calling upon the Federal Government to make a formal request to the occupation powers to arrange in their zones of occupation for the holding of "free, universal, secret, and direct elections to an all-German parliament, under international control, and in which everyone will have an equal vote."

In accordance with the resolution of the Bundestag, the Federal Chancellor addressed separate letters to the four Commissioners on October 1, noting with satisfaction that the four Governments taking part in the occupation of Germany had repeatedly expressed their willingness to strive toward the goal of the restoration of the political and governmental unity of Germany.

² BULLETIN of June 5, 1950, p. 885.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 884.

Adenauer stated that "the first and indispensable step to achieve this end is the convocation of a constituent German national assembly," and suggested the following measures to achieve this end:

(1) All-German elections to a national constituent assembly shall be announced following enactment of an electoral law by the four occupying powers.

(2) Elections to the national constituent assembly shall in all parts of Germany take place under the supervision of commissions composed of representatives of the four occupying powers or of representatives of the U. N.

(3) The sole task of the national constituent assembly shall be the drafting of a German constitution. This draft constitution shall be submitted to the German people for approval.

In addition to the measures cited, the letter set forth certain guarantees of personal and political freedom of movement and activity as prerequisite for the holding of all-German elections.

After consultation, the U.S., U.K., and French High Commissioners dispatched separate communications dated October 9 to General Chuikov referring to their as yet unanswered letters of May 25 and enclosing copies of the Adenauer letter of October 1, the Bundestag resolution of September 14 and the Adenauer statement made in the Bundestag on the same date. The three High Commissioners indicated their endorsement of the Federal Republic as a "government freely elected by the people" and "entitled to speak for Germany" and commended to the attention of Chuikov and the Soviet Government the aforementioned documents as "pronouncements of the German people." In conclusion the three Western Powers indicated that they shared the views of the Federal Republic on the October 15 Soviet zone elections and informed the Soviet Government that it must bear full responsibility for obstructing the accomplishment of the reunification of Germany in accordance with its obligations under Potsdam.

Prague Communiqué

The next important development on the unity issue came with the release on October 21 of the Prague communiqué at the conclusion of the meeting of Soviet and satellite Foreign Ministers.⁴ In brief, the communiqué referred to the September 19 communiqué issued in New York by the three Western Foreign Ministers and charged that the

chief concern of the New York meeting was "the question of recreating the German Army, the question of the remilitarization of Western Germany." The communiqué also charged that the question of ending the state of war with Germany was being brought up "in order to postpone as long as possible the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and thus the unification of Germany." In conclusion the eastern Foreign Ministers stated that they regarded it as an immediate necessity that—

Firstly, the United States, British, French, and the Soviet Governments should publish a declaration that they will not permit the remilitarization of Germany or its inclusion in any sort of aggressive plans, and that they will determinedly endeavor to see that the Potsdam Agreement regarding the creation of prerequisites for the formation of a united, peace-loving, democratic German state is really carried out;

Secondly, all restrictions that are obstructing the development of peacetime German economy be removed, and the restoration of German war potential not be permitted;

Thirdly, a peace treaty with Germany be forthwith concluded, with a restoration of the unity of the German state in conformity with the Potsdam Agreement, and the occupation troops of all the great powers be withdrawn from Germany within a year of the conclusion of the peace treaty;

Fourthly, an all-German constituent council be formed from representatives of Eastern and Western Germany on the principle of parity, for the purpose of preparing the formation of provisional, democratic, peace-loving, all-German sovereign government, this council to submit the proper proposals for common approval by the Governments of the U.S.S.R., the United States, Great Britain, and France, and, until such time as an all-German Government is formed, to be included in discussions on the working out of a peace treaty. With regard to this proposal, the German people may, under given circumstances, be consulted directly.

On their side, the Governments of the U.S.S.R., Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Roumania, Hungary, and the German Democratic Republic will do everything possible to facilitate the solution of the immediate tasks in the interest of consolidating peace and international security.

The Prague meeting, convened for the announced purpose of discussing "the remilitarization of West Germany," followed closely on the heels of the delivery on October 19 of a Soviet note rejecting the protest made by the three Western Powers the preceding May against the existence in the Soviet zone of paramilitary police. In their reply, the Soviets charged that the Western Powers themselves were engaged in establishing a German army and concluded by stating that "the U.S.S.R. will not tolerate such measures."

⁴For Secretary Acheson's comment on the Prague communiqué, see BULLETIN of Nov. 6, 1950, p. 727.

As a logical follow-up to the Prague conference, the Soviets delivered notes to the U.S., U.K., and French Governments on November 3, enclosing copies of the Prague communiqué and calling for a four-power meeting to discuss the demilitarization provisions of the Potsdam Agreement. The Western Allied reply and the Soviet note of December 31 then followed.⁵

The Grotewohl-Adenauer Exchange

Meanwhile, on December 1, Otto Grotewohl, Minister-President of the "German Democratic Republic," had a letter delivered to Chancellor Adenauer at Bonn. Referring to the "national emergency brought about by the division of Germany, which is accentuated by the remilitarization and inclusion of West Germany in plans for preparation for war" and citing the need for a German solution to the German problem, Grotewohl proposed the formation of an all-German constituent council with participation on the basis of parity of representatives of East and West Germany. This council would prepare the formation of an "all-German, sovereign, democratic and peaceloving provisional government" and would submit proposals to the Governments of the U.S.S.R., U.S., Great Britain, and France for common ratification. At the same time it would consult with the named governments until the formation of an all-German government on the draft of a peace treaty. Grotewohl further suggested that a plebiscite of the German people on this proposal could be carried out.

On January 15, 1951, Chancellor Adenauer replied to the Grotewohl letter by issuing a public statement. In brief, Adenauer referred to the March 22, 1950, declaration of the Federal Republic which contained proposals for the achievement of German unity under conditions of freedom, pointed to the failure of the Soviets to respond to the Bundestag proposals for German unification forwarded to Chuikov on October 9, 1950, and stated clearly that the West German Government could enter into talks on German unity "only with those who are prepared to recognize and guarantee without reserve a constitutional order, a free form of government, protection of civil rights and preservation of freedom."

The Communist propaganda campaign on unity was continued when on January 30, 1951, the

People's Chamber of the East German Government passed a resolution addressed to the West German Bundestag, in which it indicated its willingness to conduct negotiations "concerning all questions connected with the creation and tasks of the all-German Constituent Council."

The Federal Republic issued a statement on the same date indignantly rejecting the right claimed by the East German parliament to speak "in the name of true democracy and of the whole German people." It further called upon the German people "not to allow themselves to be confused by actions of the kind contrived by the Soviet zone Government."

Having decided that it would not reply directly to the People's Chamber appeal, the Bundestag on March 9 passed a resolution which referred to "the contemplated conference of the four occupation powers" and called upon the Federal Government to submit to the Four Powers a petition for the preparation and execution of free, all-German elections. On the same date the Bundestag approved the text of a note addressed by Chancellor Adenauer to the Allied High Commission which echoed the Bundestag resolution, calling upon the Four Powers to arrange for all-German elections as soon as possible and emphasizing that genuinely free elections could only be held if "the indispensable freedoms" were guaranteed in the Soviet zone.

In a speech before the People's Chamber on March 14, 1951, East German Premier Grotewohl rejected the Federal Republic's proposals for free, all-German elections and accused Adenauer of ignoring the will of the German people.

Washington Foreign Ministers Conference

The next major development in East-West exchanges on the unity question resulted from the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States which was held in Washington from September 10 through September 15, 1951. At the conclusion of this conference, the three Ministers issued a communiqué⁶ in which they "noted with satisfaction the results already achieved by their three countries, together with the other free nations of the world, in order to insure their common security and to safeguard the peace." In addition, they indicated that they had agreed upon instruc-

⁵ *Ibid.*, Jan. 1, 1951, p. 11.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Sept. 24, 1951, p. 486.

tions to Allied High Commission for Germany for the negotiation of mutually acceptable agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany, the effect of which will be to transform that relationship completely. In this connection they also referred to their hope that current negotiations with the Federal Republic would result in Allied-German agreement on a German contribution to Western defense.

Reacting quickly, East German Premier Grotewohl denounced the Western communiqué at a special session of the People's Chamber on September 15 as "a gross deception of the German people" which should not be allowed to succeed. Reflecting obvious Communist concern over the results of the Washington conference, Grotewohl declared: "What San Francisco achieved for Japan, Washington is to accomplish for Germany."

On September 27 Chancellor Adenauer replied indirectly to the Grotewohl People's Chamber proposals in a speech before the Bundestag in which he stated that "the supreme aim of the policy of the Federal Government is and remains that of re-establishing German unity in a free and united Europe. This unity should be based on the free decision of the entire German people." Adenauer then referred to the repeated proposals of the Federal Government for free, general, equal, secret, and direct elections for a constituent national assembly and cited the rejection of these proposals by the Soviet zone authorities and failure of the Soviets to reply to any of these proposals. He then declared that the Bonn Government would submit an election procedure for all-German elections which would in its essential points embody safeguards to insure all the necessary freedoms. These points were then spelled out in detail by Adenauer.

He indicated that it was the position of the Federal Republic that really free elections were possible only if the prerequisites for the free expression of the will of the people are fulfilled in fact in the Soviet zone, and called for the creation of a "neutral international commission under the supervision of the United Nations" to examine, in the Soviet zone and in the territory of the Federal Republic, "in how far existing circumstances permit of free elections taking place."

The Adenauer statement was adopted by the Bundestag by an overwhelming majority, together with a motion by the opposition Social

Democratic Party (SPD) calling upon the Federal Government to forward to the four occupying powers a request "to provide the German people with the earliest opportunity to conduct free, general, equal, secret and direct elections under international control" for a constituent assembly. Another SPD motion called for free elections in Berlin.

On October 4, in accordance with the Bundestag resolutions, Chancellor Adenauer addressed a letter to the Tripartite Allied High Commission, requesting the governments of the four occupation powers to arrange for all-German elections. In this connection, Adenauer called upon the powers represented in the Allied High Commission to propose the establishment by the U.N. of a commission to carry out investigations in the Soviet zone and in the Federal Republic to ascertain to what extent prevailing circumstances permit the holding of free elections.

The Allied High Commission replied to the Adenauer letter on October 15 assuring him that the three Governments would, at the first suitable opportunity, place the views of the Federal Republic before the United Nations and would propose that the United Nations undertake an investigation over the whole area of Germany as suggested in the Adenauer letter.⁷ In fulfillment of this pledge, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France presented a resolution at the sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the appointment of "an impartial international commission to carry out a simultaneous investigation in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Berlin, and in the Soviet zone of Germany in order to determine whether existing conditions will make it possible to hold genuinely free elections throughout these areas." This resolution, which was adopted on December 20, 1951, by the overwhelming vote of 50 to 6, resulted in the appointment of a commission composed of representatives of Brazil, Iceland, the Netherlands, Pakistan, and Poland.⁸ The Polish Government declined to designate a representative.

Following its constitution, the Commission held its first meeting on February 11, 1952, at Paris. On February 23 from its permanent headquarters at Geneva it addressed communications⁹ to the Chairman of the Council of the Allied High Com-

⁷ *Ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1951, p. 694.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1019; Jan. 14, 1952, p. 55.

⁹ *Ibid.*, March 3, 1952, p. 350.

mission for Germany for transmittal to the authorities of the Federal Republic and to the authorities of West Berlin, and to the Soviet Control Commission for transmittal to the authorities of the Soviet zone of Germany and the authorities of East Berlin. Both the Western Allied and German authorities in West Germany and Berlin responded promptly, assuring the Commission of their complete cooperation in facilitating the task assigned to it, and subsequently welcomed the Commission's members at Bonn and Berlin. In sharp contrast to this reaction, neither the Soviets nor the East German authorities have responded to three requests on the part of the Commission for permission to enter the Soviet zone of Germany and the Soviet sector of Berlin. Moreover, through their various propaganda mouthpieces—both human and journalistic—the Soviets and their East German puppets have so far rejected

the Commission and sought to malign its members. It remains to be seen whether the Soviets will revise their attitude toward the Commission and permit it to fulfill its important mission which is so crucial to future progress toward the realization of German unity.

EDITOR'S NOTE: On March 10, 1952, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko handed to Elim O'Shaughnessy, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow, a note containing proposals for a treaty of peace with Germany. Identical notes were handed to the British and French Ambassadors at Moscow. On March 25, the U.S., British, and French Embassies at Moscow delivered identical notes of reply to the Soviet Government. For texts of these notes and for a statement by Secretary Acheson, see BULLETIN of Apr. 7, 1952, p. 530.

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Observance of Third Anniversary of the Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty

CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES

[Released to the press April 4]

Secretary Acheson has sent the following messages to Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada and Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, and to Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, on the occasion of the third anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty:

Message to Chairman of the North Atlantic Council

On this third anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, I wish to extend to you, as Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, the sincere greetings of the Government and people of the United States. Today, it is increasingly evident that our hopes for a peaceful and secure future depend largely upon the success achieved by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The last 3 years have been years of gratifying progress. We have made solid advances toward our goal of an effective mutual defense system, and have seen increasing cooperation among the NATO countries in many fields of activity. This progress has been the product of the effort, sacrifice, and determination of all NATO partners. With each of us contributing these same qualities in the fullest measure, there can be no doubt that we will continue to move forward steadily.

Permit me to add my personal appreciation of the contribution which your leadership has made to our success during recent months.

Message to Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

I want to extend my heartiest congratulations to you on assuming the position of Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. To the people of the United States, NATO is a living symbol of our deepest aspirations for peace, freedom, security, and international friendship. We are all comforted by the knowledge that the grave burdens of leadership in this organization will rest upon such capable shoulders. Under your guidance and inspiration, we can look forward confidently to a continued growth in the unity, maturity and strength of the Atlantic community.

PURPOSE OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Address by the President¹

[Released to the press by the White House April 4]

When 12 nations of Europe and North America came together 3 years ago to sign the North Atlantic Treaty, one purpose was foremost in our minds. That purpose was to preserve peace for ourselves and our children.

In the 3 years since April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic community has grown steadily in strength and in unity. Two more nations—Greece and Turkey—have joined the original twelve. But

¹ The President's address and those of Secretary Acheson and Mutual Security Director Harriman, which follow, were made at the ceremonies in commemoration of the third anniversary of the signing of NATO, Constitution Hall, Washington, D. C., on Apr. 4.

our purpose is exactly the same as it was 3 years ago.

The North Atlantic Treaty is an instrument of peace. All the lies and smears of hostile propaganda cannot conceal the fact that our nations have entered this treaty to preserve peace. The people of our countries don't want to fight another war; they want to prevent one. And they have gone about it in the only way that can possibly work: that is, by banding together for mutual self-protection.

In the past, many of the North Atlantic Treaty countries, at one time or another, have tried to find peace through neutrality and isolation. It didn't work. It never will work.

The people of the North Atlantic community know that if we are to preserve our independence, we must join our strength together.

We have come a long way in these 3 years. We have created a common defense organization and have begun to develop sizeable defense forces, trained and equipped to spring into action against aggression. If we continue the hard, sustained effort we have begun, we can clearly foresee the time when our common military defenses will be strong enough to defend us against any attack.

But we of the North Atlantic community are doing far more than simply building military defenses. We are also working together to build the solid social and economic foundations which are essential to our military defenses and to our entire future.

It is not our aim to turn the North Atlantic community into one huge garrison, concerned only with defense. Such an objective would be foolish and self-defeating. Our actual aim is far different. Our aim is to remove the threat of war and thus set free the forces of human progress and advancement. We want to get rid of poverty, to wipe out ill-health and disease, to provide better educations for all our people, to build finer cities and towns and improve conditions on farms. We want to open the way to spiritual and religious growth, and the continued development of the arts and sciences.

The North Atlantic Treaty has made a tremendous difference in the outlook of the people of our countries—especially in Europe. Three years ago, many people were very discouraged—they thought the next war was bound to come soon, nothing could be done about it, and successful defense was hopeless.

Today, there is a vast difference. Most people can now see that we are steadily increasing our chances of preventing another world war. And they can see that if we succeed, a great new future will open up for the human mind and spirit.

There are enormous possibilities of applying modern scientific advances to satisfy the needs and desires of men. There are immense opportunities to improve our social institutions, to bring about better living conditions, to achieve the free society men dream of.

The basic principles of the treaty are the same principles that underlie the United Nations: on the one hand, to prevent war, and on the other hand, to improve the conditions of life for men, women, and children everywhere. This is why the North Atlantic Treaty means so much to free men—not only in our own countries, but in other lands.

The struggle for peace is not easy, and it is not a struggle that can be won overnight. We shall have to continue to work for peace with all the determination and skill that we have. Every one of our countries has already accepted heavy burdens in this common struggle for peace, and there will be more burdens and sacrifices in the future.

But we can attain our goal. We are demonstrating in the North Atlantic community every day that the dangers and problems of the modern world can be successfully overcome by men of good will working together in mutual trust and confidence. And that is the way to peace with freedom and justice for all men everywhere.

AN ACHIEVEMENT OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

Address by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press April 4]

Today, we celebrate together the anniversary of an institution which is an achievement of democratic society in our day. Three years ago—on April 4, 1949—representatives of 12 countries of western Europe and North America signed the North Atlantic Treaty here in Washington.

Today, we again have with us representatives of all these countries. And on this anniversary, we are joined by representatives of Greece and Turkey—the two countries which only a few weeks ago were welcomed into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

We welcome to this ceremony young men from the armies, navies, and air forces of our NATO allies, who are now in this country to receive special training.

We welcome officials of the military agencies of NATO, officials of various agencies of the United States Government, and many outstanding members of the Congress of the United States, including Senator Connally, who, together with Senator Vandenberg, played a great part in the creation of this organization.

We not only commemorate the birth of NATO but mark the progress it has made from its inception. The extent of this progress is set forth in the recent report of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

When our 12 countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty 3 years ago, our major immediate purpose was to protect ourselves against armed attack and the threat of it. But the roots of the treaty go deeper than the providing of defense. They go to the values which we are defending—

to the common bonds of liberty, of religious freedom, of economic development, of military interdependence, and of political faith which have always united the free peoples of Europe to those of North America. And its promise for the future is the prospect of common work in many fields to gain a better life for all our peoples.

Today, the creation of defensive strength is still our most urgent task. Danger is still with us. There is not yet enough strength in the North Atlantic area to assure the maintenance of peace. The hopes of our peoples for peace, security, and prosperity demand greater strength for defense—and demand it without delay.

We are meeting this demand. During the past 2 years, our armies have grown. They will continue to grow. They are being trained and equipped. They are being organized effectively. This is not something which we hope to do or plan to do—it is something we are doing *now*.

At the same time, we all realize that the hardest part of the task lies ahead. Each of the 14 countries represented here today has played an important part in the progress we have already made. The full contribution of each will continue to be essential. NATO defense can be created only if each partner shoulders its full share of the common burden.

The burden is not light. During the past 3 years, the peoples of all our countries have made heavy sacrifices in order to give their agreed contribution. In many cases, the efforts made have approached closely the limits of their economic and physical capacities.

This is a problem which all of us have constantly in mind. The threat to our security is so great that none of us can afford to do too little. Yet, we also know that there would be little value in building armies unless we can preserve the economic foundations which support these armies and the society as a whole.

I am convinced that we can solve these problems, however difficult they may be. I am convinced that together we can attain both military strength and economic stability. This group of nations cannot be free and secure unless they have both. By exerting our utmost efforts to help ourselves and help one another, we *can* have both. Together, our countries have enough manpower, resources, skills, and faith to master the problem of transforming the necessary portion of our potential strength into strength in being.

As we do so, let us remember that we are constructing something more permanent than military formations. In a common enterprise of this kind, it is often true that there are consequences of our work together which will be more enduring than its immediate purpose. As we learn to work together to make ourselves strong, we are also learning to *think* together and to *live* together.

Already, one result of our efforts has taken form and substance. The nations of continental Europe have begun to develop unified political, economic,

and military institutions. When completed, these institutions can underpin the strength of Europe for generations to come. These countries have attacked the barriers to trade which in the past have limited the efficient use of their skills and resources. They have taken steps to add to the productivity of labor and to make sure that the labor force can be used to the best possible advantage. Some of them have developed arrangements for pooling vital raw materials such as coal and steel, and are working out plans for merging their military forces.

In all these undertakings, ancient national rivalries are being subordinated to the common determination of these peoples to maintain their freedom. The primary credit for these decisive steps toward unity must go to Europe's own statesmen and peoples. We may take pride that NATO has greatly encouraged and assisted this process.

Meanwhile, NATO itself has become a living and growing institution. Even while we are forced to concentrate on the problems of defense, we study possibilities of greater cooperation in the political, economic, and cultural fields. We have turned our eyes to the future—to the day when the peace and security we seek shall open a new era of human progress.

April 4, 1949, began a great experiment in international cooperation. It is an experiment in unity for strength, for peace, and for progress. The unity comes from ancient bonds which have long drawn us together.

May these bonds grow ever more firm and strong, for they will sustain an Atlantic community which shall be a source of strength to the United Nations and to all free peoples—to all peoples everywhere who wish to live in peace.

NEW CONCEPT OF NATO

by W. Averell Harriman

Director for Mutual Security

[Released to the press by Mutual Security Agency April 4]

Not the least remarkable thing about this anniversary we celebrate today is that it is only the third. It seems scarcely possible that the North Atlantic Treaty was signed only 3 years ago. The first meeting of the NATO Council took place only 2½ years ago. It was only 1 year ago that General Eisenhower assumed his command. Yet in so short a time, NATO has become one of the most powerful facts of international life. It is the foundation of the structure of security the free nations are building around the world.

We are participating in a new development in the history of nations. There have been other alliances in the past; in fact, there is another now. The Soviet Union has forced its satellites into an involuntary alliance held together by force and fear. This is the old system of domination and dictatorship.

NATO is the new concept. Twelve European countries with Canada and the United States have voluntarily come together as free and equal partners, eager to work out common solutions to common problems. It may be harder to find agreement among equal nations than it is to dictate agreement from the Kremlin, but the agreements we make will be strong and enduring, because they are the voluntary agreements of free men determined to preserve their freedom.

In the preservation of this freedom, our most pressing problem is to build a firm defense against aggression. It is to accomplish this that most of our energies are now bent. That job is not yet completed, but already, in 3 years, we see clearly that it can be done. We can look forward with confidence to the time when the free world is strong enough in arms to make aggression impractical. When that time comes, we can devote more of our energies to strengthening the world in other ways. It is then, as the Secretary of State has suggested, that NATO may serve as an instrument for the fulfillment of the great aspirations of mankind.

But in the meantime, our immediate task remains with us—to make ourselves secure. Just as no individual can find security unless his nation is secure, no free nation can find security unless the free world is secure. The NATO partners have joined their resources in building collective strength—not on the basis of narrow nationalism, but on the basis of an effective division of labor among partners, with each country contributing to a balanced, collective force.

The NATO idea is based upon the principle of mutual effort. It can be successful only if each nation does its part. The United States, as the strongest of the partners, is called upon to make the greatest contribution to the mutual security. This contribution would be useless if it were not matched by vigorous efforts on the part of other countries. The extraordinary progress that NATO has made is a demonstration that all partners are doing their part.

The United States gives strength to NATO. In turn we gain strength from it. This is the meaning of mutual security—the great modern answer to the age-old problem of how nations can preserve peace. It is on this principle that 14 nations have bound themselves together in NATO. It is on this principle that the United States has embarked upon a great world-wide program of mutual security.

The danger is world-wide and so is our response. The danger takes many forms. So does our effort to gain security. We have not accepted the fallacy that the only threat is a military one. The threat of communism does not come only from the sword. The threat of communism is strong where men are weak—weakened from hunger, injustice, or ignorance. We must build security by helping

people strengthen themselves in other than military ways. We know that the only world in which we can be secure is a world in which men are strong, healthy, and free.

This is the philosophy behind all our joint efforts in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Through NATO, we are working for the common defense against aggression. Through NATO, we are working for economic expansion and the prosperity of all our peoples. Through NATO, we are working to foster freedom. Through NATO, we are seeking to release the intellectual and spiritual forces which are our common heritage.

In joining together for these purposes, the nations of the North Atlantic community have had to shake off the weight of the historic prejudices which we all carry. We have had to develop new patterns of thought.

This is as true of the United States as it is of the other NATO partners. Perhaps it is even more true of us, for the United States has been singularly protected by its history and geography. When we were projected into a position of world leadership, there were those who questioned our ability to change our traditional outlook. But who today, reflecting on the history of the last few years, can doubt the capacity of the American people to play the role in which we have been cast? Who, today, reflecting upon the initiative shown in Europe, can doubt the capacity of the peoples of all the NATO countries to rise to the challenge?

The greatest single asset of the North Atlantic community is its human resources. Together we number some 400 million of the most creative and enlightened people in the world with by far the largest part of the world's industrial production. With all these resources, why should we live in fear? We need not live in fear. Another world war is not inevitable. Let no man say it is.

It is true that there are difficult tasks ahead. Let us not delude ourselves that because we have accomplished much in 3 years we may now relax our efforts.

The whole process of building mutual security is at a critical phase in all its aspects. Courageous political decisions must be made. Total production must continue to expand. The military build-up must go ahead rapidly. If any of us who are joined in this great endeavor slackens his efforts now, we will undermine what we have built. This is a critical moment in history when the future of mankind will be determined by the steadfastness, the vigor, and the speed with which we all press forward.

In our own lifetime we have seen the terrible results of hesitation. There is no time for hesitation now. The progress of the last 3 years shows what can be done when like-minded nations work together. Together, this great assembly of free men can surely obtain our common objectives of security and the opportunity for human progress.

First Anniversary of SHAPE as an Operational Headquarters

Report of General Dwight D. Eisenhower

*Supreme Allied Commander, Europe*¹

One year ago today, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe [SHAPE], assumed operational control of the forces dedicated to the defense of Western Europe. From that day onward, every member of this headquarters has been dedicated personally to the cause of peace and security.

This anniversary provides a vantage point to review progress during the initial year of our joint enterprise, to take stock of our needs, and to present to member nations certain views that have developed in my Headquarters concerning our present security position. Though these observations reach beyond the purely geographical limits of this command, we have found that no turbulence in the world scene fails to react directly on our common enterprise in Europe. The struggle against the threat of dictatorial aggression has no geographical bounds; it is all one.

It would be disastrous if the favorable signs and developments recorded in this report were to put any mind at ease, or to create a sense of adequate security, for there is no real security yet achieved in Europe; there is only a beginning.

Equally, it would be unfortunate if anyone were to find excuse for defeatism in the manifold difficulties and shortcomings of our joint effort to date. For we have made progress in all aspects of security. The momentum must be continued with renewed vigor, and since moral force is the genesis of all progress, especially progress toward security and peace, we must give primary attention to this vital element.

We are competing with an ideological force, communism, which has joined with the imperialistic ambitions of a group controlling all life and resources found between the Elbe and China Sea. Throughout this vast region, unity is achieved by the simple techniques of the police state. In this concert of action and power lies great danger for any single nation exposed directly or indirectly to the unrelenting never ending attacks of propaganda, subversion, force, and the threat of force.

¹ Released to the press by SHAPE, Public Information Division, Paris, France, on Apr. 2. The report is made to the Chairman of the Standing Group, North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

If the free nations are to remain secure, our peoples must march together, agreed on common goals, and win that cooperative unity possible only in a free society.

We want peace, we want freedom, too, and the individual rights to which our whole civilization is dedicated, but to want these things is not enough, we can keep them only by work, selflessness, constancy, and sacrifice. The enormity of the present threat will never be met by half-hearted measures or by any superficial military facade. Required is the full awakening of the free world and the pursuit of energetic, far reaching measures to insure our form of life, even our survival.

During the first 50 years of this century, the nations of the Atlantic community have spent their strength and heritage in great conflicts which began in Europe and spread over much of the world's surface. As in all wars, a costly number of the natural leaders were killed. Destruction was widespread; public treasuries were emptied and family savings wiped out through inflation; economic conditions inflicted such heavy punishment on the masses of citizens that social problems took on new and bitter prominence; in important areas of Africa and Asia, confidence in Western leadership was shaken.

As we look over these developments, it seems almost as if the nations of the West have been, for decades, blindly enacting parts in a drama that could have been written by Lenin, prophet of militant Communistic expansion. This pattern of events, which points so surely to ultimate disaster, can be changed if only the peoples of the West have the wisdom to make a complete break with many things of the past and show a willingness to do something new and challenging. NATO itself is a significant step to meet both the present danger of aggression and the tragic struggles and dissensions that have divided our peoples in the past, but NATO's development is not automatic: action is the test.

To advance this great effort, unified action is required, not only among but within our nations. Yet, it has seemed more than once within our countries that political factions hold their own immediate gain higher than the fate of their na-

tion or even that of civilization itself. Then there are elements striving to hold back the hands of the clock, and apparently placing profits above patriotism. At the same time, there are workers in our member countries still suffering the delusion that their interests are served by association with Communist-led labor groups. It is nightmarish that any free worker of the West could respond voluntarily to the same Kremlin voices that have dictated the elimination of free labor unions in Russia and satellite countries. In the free system, labor is a full-fledged partner and must share in responsibility as equally as it must share in productivity. We can thrive mightily in an era of good feeling. It can be brought into being by vibrant, selfless leadership at all levels of society.

The unity of NATO must rest ultimately on one thing—the enlightened self-interest of each participating nation. The United States, for example, is furnishing much of the material resources of this project during the current year because it believes that America's enlightened self-interest is served thereby; most American people agree as to the wisdom and necessity of this course. But they will continue to believe their own security interests are being served only as other participants show cooperation and enterprise in improving their own defenses. Consequently, it would be fatuous for anyone to assume that the taxpayers of America will continue to pour money and resources into Europe unless encouraged by steady progress toward mutual cooperation and full effectiveness. To be sure, the citizens of all NATO countries are carrying heavy tax burdens, but even if these are at optimum levels, there still are many steps possible in Europe which would cost little and yet bring rich returns through increased strength.

Fundamentally, and on a long-term basis, each important geographical area must be defended primarily by the people of that region. The average citizen must, therefore, feel that he has a vital stake in the fight for freedom, not that he is a bystander of a pawn in a struggle for power. There is so much talk of national and international arrangements and interests that basic issues are often obscured from view. Fundamentally, we are fighting the battle of individual freedom for all. Before all men and before the world, our policies must be such as to inspire confidence in our strength and determination, and trust in our fairness. This is the moral foundation without which any military effort, any expenditure in lives and treasure, is fruitless.

By our actions, too, we must demonstrate in convincing form that we are masters of our own destiny. Within the Atlantic community and in Europe, we have the opportunity to build a bulwark of peace—a central position of unity and strength for the free world. This, then, must be a first and fundamental consideration.

THE SITUATION ONE YEAR AGO

[Excerpts]

From all information presented, it was clear that the difficulties facing the new enterprise were manifold. Problems and the doubt they bred were on every side. It is common knowledge that peacetime coalitions throughout history have been weak and notoriously inefficient. Sovereign nations have always found it difficult to discover common ground on which they could stand together for any length of time. Nevertheless, we were expecting NATO members not only to agree on common objectives but to work and sacrifice together, over an indefinite period, in order to achieve common security.

THE MILITARY PROBLEM

[Excerpts]

To all these problems we now had to turn our minds. On the one hand, there was the problem of how to persuade the nations of the free West to allocate afresh their resources in production and manpower, so as to build between themselves and the East the required shield. On the other hand, was the strategic organization of the huge region, stretching from the Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea, which the forces of the West must defend. It is with the latter problem that I shall deal first.

Western Europe, from North Cape to Sicily, had to be surveyed as a whole. There is the main land mass, stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic—a peninsula, when viewed in perspective, of that greatest of all land masses, which is Europe and Asia combined. On the flanks of this long peninsula we have two main outcrops—apart from the Iberian Peninsula and the British Isles. The one is Denmark, almost touching the tip of Scandinavia, whose western half, Norway, is among our brotherhood of nations sworn to defend freedom. The southern outcrop is Italy, projecting into the Mediterranean, and affording us a strong position for flanking forces with valuable air and sea bases.

We therefore conceived of Western Europe as an ultimate stronghold flanked by two defended regions: One comprising Denmark and Norway, and the other comprising Italy. All three of these countries are blessed by certain dispensations in the way of natural defensive advantages. Norway has its rugged coast and hinterland; Denmark, its many internal water obstacles; Italy, her mountains with the narrow passes on the north and the Adriatic to the East. It seemed sound to divide the command of Western Europe into three main sectors; Norway and Denmark as the one buttress, Italy and adjacent waters as the other, and the central mass as the main structure.

Along these lines, the SHAPE command structure was fashioned. The bulk of ground and air strength would of necessity be in the center and a smaller number of land and air forces, together with naval support, would defend the northern and southern flanks. Accordingly, in the spring of 1951, there was announced the formation of a Northern Allied Command under Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, with Maj. Gen. Robert Taylor as his Air Commander, Lt. Gen. Wilhelm Hansteen, commanding Allied Land Forces, Norway, and Lt. Gen. Ebbe Gortz (later Lt. Gen. Erik Moller) commanding Allied Land Forces, Denmark.

In the center, Gen. Alphonse P. Juin was chosen to command Land Forces, with Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad in command of Air Forces. To insure the coordination of naval units operating in support of the center, Vice Admiral Robert Jaujard was appointed Flag Officer, Central Europe. These officers had the responsible duty of forging into single and redoubtable weapons the forces of the national contingents unified under their commands. There were to be units from France, Great Britain, the United States, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The air forces of the center were to be so developed and placed that they could operate with the central land forces and also be able to undertake any needed action on the flanks with the least possible delay.

At the time of activation of the central headquarters the organization for the command of the southern flank was still not designated. Our immediate need was the protection of this flank with land and air forces and an effective naval force, including carrier based aircraft. This need was intertwined with the problems of defense in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, which made for complexities that would take time to solve.

The solution to the military problem was no more than begun with the development of the command structure and the various headquarters. The big task of "forging the weapons" remained—that is, the recruiting, training, and equipping of the standing forces and reserves, and of providing their support in the war of airfields, signal communications, and supply lines. All these necessary elements in men and equipment, the North Atlantic Treaty nations were called upon to contribute to the common defense.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS

[Excerpts]

Everywhere we turned we ran into political and economic factors. One thing was clear—nothing would be gained and much lost through any substantial lowering of the already low standard of living in Europe. Our central problem was one of morale—the spirit of man. All human progress in the military or other fields has its source

in the heart. No man will fight unless he feels he has something worth fighting for. Next, then, is the factor of the strength of the supporting economy. Unless the economy can safely carry the military establishment, whatever force of this nature a nation might create is worse than useless in a crisis. Since behind it there is nothing, it will only disintegrate.

In the general rehabilitation of European economy, the Marshall Plan had achieved remarkable success in the years 1947–50. The measure of its contribution to the well-being and stability of Europe could be fully appreciated only by one who had seen the situation there before and after. Nevertheless, the starting point had been so close to rock bottom that only a minimum level of economic strength had been regained.

The Soviets, who wanted no recovery in Western Europe, had screamed that the Marshall Plan was a war measure, even though its terms offered economic assistance to the U.S.S.R. and its satellites on the same basis as that accepted by the free nations. In concept and application, the program was political and economic—to repair the chaos of war, to start industry on the road to health, and to raise production to a level consistent with minimum civil needs.

To assist free nations, in Europe, and elsewhere, to build their own defenses against the persistent threat of aggression, the United States inaugurated the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) late in 1949. The purpose of this program was to furnish items of military equipment which the other countries could not produce, and to assist in the training required for the effective use of those weapons. In the European area, the program also provided the countries some of the machine tools, materials and various components needed to get the production of munitions started.

The flow of materials to Europe was under way during 1951, consisting for the most part of tanks, vehicles, aircraft, and guns from existing stocks. A number of light naval vessels of combat and support types were also transferred to European navies.

For their part, recipient nations were to raise and maintain the forces and furnish the balance of equipment they needed. In addition, they were to prepare to cope with maintenance and replacement programs of the heavy equipment at the earliest practicable date. The United Kingdom, with her greater industrial capacity, was in the best position to furnish the bulk of her own needs in tanks, aircraft and communications equipment.

Despite this extensive aid, the rearmament program meant heavy budget increases in all European countries. Larger permanent establishments were required, and more extensive training programs. Facilities had to be created for new forces—airfields, depots, and all the requirements peculiar to military forces. Of these needs, airfields were by far the most critical and expensive

category. For the 1952 airfield program then being planned, real estate and construction costs amounted to the equivalent of one-half billion dollars.

The effect of defense spending on national economies was greatly magnified by sharp world-wide increases in the cost of raw materials. Food, coal, and other basic necessities soared to new heights, kindling antagonism against governmental defense programs and the whole rearmament effort. In the village where I live not far from Paris, ordinary laborers averaged the equivalent of \$70 a month; yet coal for their cook stoves ranged up to \$50 a ton. For the price of a pair of shoes, the average man in Italy was already working 8 times as long as the American worker; for a pound of butter the French worker toiled 5 times as long as his American counterpart.

It is recognized, of course, that such comparisons reflect many factors, including resources, management, tools, and efficiency. Nevertheless, they show that, heavy as defense costs were to the American taxpayer, far lesser burdens could be felt seriously by the average European. Understandably, European governments were inclined to move carefully in such a political climate. As a consequence, all recommendations for augmenting forces, building airfields, or increasing budget items were closely examined and frequently subject to lengthy negotiation within the various parliamentary factions.

However, the concerted effort toward greater strength made progress throughout the spring and summer months. The attitude of the governments was cooperative, but there did exist a general feeling that an accurate yardstick was needed within NATO to measure the scale and intensity of national effort. Obviously, this was an extremely complicated problem in view of the differences in national resources, financial position, industrial potential, and standards of living of various nations. Yet, failure to meet the situation would eventually lead to dissatisfaction and friction among our membership.

There were other problems as well. Our planning estimates of SHAPE forces to be created over the next few years had been prepared largely from the standpoint of military requirements. These programs now needed a feasibility test to insure that they were within the economic capabilities of member countries. However, no one knew the price tags. Presumably, some program would in time be evolved to coordinate NATO-wide production. But aside from the equipment pledged by the United States, no country knew at the moment what weapons it should plan on making for itself, what specialties it might make for other Allied nations, or what it should procure from others.

Concern was felt in many quarters over the apparent failure to put to full use existing production facilities of Europe. There had always been large munitions industries in France and

Belgium; the Netherlands possessed unused capacity in the electrical and other technical fields; several large aircraft factories were idle in Italy. The Defense Production Board of NATO had made extensive surveys of European production capabilities and had verified that considerable additional military production was possible. Nevertheless, financial limitations and the lack of firm national programs prolonged this distressing waste of facilities.

Recognition of the specific problems impeding progress led to the appointment of the Temporary Council Committee at the NATO meeting in Ottawa during September of 1951. Headed by W. Averell Harriman of the United States, this committee served NATO as an advisory group but, nevertheless, had power to investigate the broad military effort and the potential of each of the member nations.

The primary task of the Tcc was to develop a plan of action reconciling the issues arising from an acceptable military program with the actual capabilities of the member countries. It also considered ways and means of reducing the cost of building effective defensive forces. In the process, the Committee surveyed the political and economic capabilities of each NATO country, as well as problems requiring attention in order to develop these capabilities.

The efforts of the Tcc represent a monumental achievement—an achievement which could only have been accomplished with the thoroughgoing cooperation of the member nations. SHAPE was a principal beneficiary of its labors. The operation of the Committee was truly an innovation in that sovereign nations permitted an international group to examine their defense programs and their capacity—financial, economic, and military—of supporting heavier burdens.

As a result, the true dimensions of the rearmament task could be seen for the first time in terms of an integrated military, economic, and financial effort. For the first time, positive recommendations could be made for a more efficient pooling of production facilities and for a more equitable sharing of the burdens incident to the defense program. The recommendations of the Tcc were detailed and far going. They were not all acceptable to the governments of the participating nations, but in large part they were. The final report of the Tcc was approved at Lisbon and represented one of the great advances made at that meeting.

A NEW SOURCE OF STRENGTH

[Excerpts]

Even with the maximum potential realized through the collective efforts of member nations, there is little hope for the economical long-term attainment of security and stability in Europe

unless Western Germany can be counted on the side of the free nations. Here in the heart of Europe is an area of roughly 100,000 square miles, populated by nearly 50,000,000 industrious and highly skilled people. Rich in natural resources and production facilities, Western Germany alone produces one-half as much steel annually as the rest of Western Europe combined. The coal of the Ruhr, along with the industrial sinews it feeds, is a prime economic fact in Europe.

With Western Germany in our orbit, NATO forces would form a strong and unbroken line in central Europe from the Baltic to the Alps. Depth is always a desirable element in defense; in the restricted area of Western Europe it is mandatory. Defensive depth is indispensable in countering the striking power of mechanized armies, and the speed and range of modern aircraft.

At first glance, a military alliance between Germany and the European nations of NATO would seem to lose sight of history. Too recently has Germany been the destroyer of peace in the Western world. The thought of a rearmed Germany is a matter of grave concern to the nations of Western Europe, who have suffered much from the misuse of German power. Certainly, their anxiety is understandable.

However, the people of Western Germany have made substantial progress toward understanding and achieving self-government. This development should be further encouraged by bringing them into closer association with the freedoms of the West. Thus their contributions to the common defense must be made on the one possible basis, a voluntary one with equality of treatment for all.

Surely, it would be foolhardy to assume that a great country like Germany could long remain a vacuum. Unless Germany becomes a partner of the West, we might, eventually, see a repetition of the disaster of Czechoslovakia. Consider the glittering blandishments held out to the Germans by Moscow during recent months—promises of German unity, renewal of her old trade with Eastern Europe, a German national army, removal of occupation forces and restrictions. The sturdy determination of the German Federal Republic to ally itself with the freedoms of the West has been manifested by its refusal to be blinded by such tactics. For the good of the German people, this is certainly the only course. For them the choice is starkly clear—freedom or subjection.

As presently conceived, the European Defense Force calls for the pooling of forces into a common military organization for the defense of all. Initially, the forces to be unified would be those allocated by the participating nations to the defense of Europe. Troops required to meet commitments outside of Europe proper would be retained under national control. The direction, support, and administration of the unified defense

forces would be vested in a European Defense Community, including a European assembly, a council, a court of justice, and an executive group, along with agencies for military supply, procurement, and budget. Such integration of military forces, and particularly the integration of their supply and supporting agencies, would prevent any participating nation from embarking on a separate course of aggression.

The European Defense Force would include land, air, and naval units, and their supporting elements. Basic ground units would be called "groupements," of about 12,000 men. The air would be organized into wing-size units. At this level, troops would not be mixed as to nationality, thus preserving the language, customs, and *esprit* of the home peoples. These basic units would be combined in larger military formations such as army corps, made up of elements of different national origin. The practicality of such integration was proved many times during the last war and is currently being demonstrated by our United Nations troops in Korea.

When formed, the European Defense Force would be integrated under SHAPE in the same manner as purely national forces from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and other countries not members of the European Defense Community. The new grouping would not modify, conflict with, or in any way supersede the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The concept of a European Defense Force is the consolidation of military elements of five nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with forces from still another nation, Western Germany. It cannot fail to increase greatly the effectiveness of our collective security and to facilitate the achievement of NATO aims.

Success would be a long step also toward the unification of Europe. This is the central goal and the only possible way of creating reasonable security, and insuring at the same time, the improvement in living standards that characterizes Western civilization. Therein lies the real answer to the threat of Communistic inundation. It is not enough to know that our combined resources outweigh those of the Soviet dictators. What matters is our ability to use them in the best possible way for our security and well-being.

Such efficiency demands the closest kind of political and economic cooperation, particularly in the area of Western Europe. For if the free nations of this region were really a unit, tremendous benefits would accrue to them individually and to NATO. Few Europeans would quarrel with this concept: political and economic unity is a popular theme to millions who have suffered from past differences. Yet progress toward full cooperation has been limited by the intricate and artificial maze of national obstacles erected by man himself.

The advantages of political and economic unity can be demonstrated by such practical examples

as the European Defense Force and the Schuman Plan, which embrace the same six countries. The Schuman Plan calls for the pooling and production of steel and coal—vital commodities of life and defense.

In my opinion the two plans, the Schuman Plan and the European Defense Community, mark historic advances in European cooperation. If these could be supplemented by a Schuman Plan for electric power and for agriculture, along with a system for standardizing money values, the benefits would be profound and far reaching. These joint efforts would serve as practical laboratories for the development of that full political and economic unity which alone can make Europe self-sustaining and secure. Indeed, until this hope becomes an accomplished fact, or some miracle brings about a disappearance of the Soviet threat, there will be no confident peace and enlarging prosperity for any part of the free world.

Although it is my conviction that a unified Europe offers the best hope for permanent stability in this critical area, respectable strength can nevertheless be achieved within NATO by wholehearted effort and cooperation. Much has been done toward that end in the past 12 months. Viewed separately, as military, economic, and political achievements, these gains may not be spectacular; but taken as a whole, they have created a profound change in morale, the basic factor of all.

Already our active forces have increased to a point where they could give a vigorous account of themselves, should an attack be launched against us. In terms of army divisions, whether in service or quickly mobilizable, our forces in Western Europe have nearly doubled in numbers. The national units pledged to this command a year ago were for the most part poorly equipped, inadequately trained, and lacking essential support in both supplies and installations. Because of their weakness on all fronts, and the absence of central direction, they could have offered little more than token resistance to attack. Today, the combat readiness of our troops has improved markedly. Readjustments in their deployment have enhanced their potential effectiveness against the threat from the East. Behind them is a steadily expanding supply system, and a command organization to plan and direct their coordinated efforts. Still disappointingly far from sufficient for a determined defense, they nevertheless represent a fighting force in whose spirit and increasing fitness our nations can take considerable pride.

Pursuant to the recommendations of the Temporary Council Committee, our member countries have pledged to produce this year 50 divisions for European defense, exclusive of those to be provided by the two new NATO nations, Greece and Turkey. Roughly one-half of the 50 divisions will be standing forces; the remainder are planned as reserve divisions available for employment at periods varying from 3 to 30 days.

The number of divisions pledged does not fully represent the magnitude of the effort required from the various member nations. Along with the divisions furnished, each nation must produce a variety of combat and service support elements, such as engineers, heavy artillery, communications and transport, supply and maintenance units, to maintain these divisions in the field. When combined with other needs such as antiaircraft defenses, these requirements raise manpower and equipment totals to twice or three times those represented within the combat divisions.

The building of these priority reserve divisions and similar forces to follow them represents one of the most difficult and urgent problems now before us. Each nation must now organize its reservists so as to produce trained formations which will be fit to fight without a long period of training after mobilization. Air power is the dominant factor in war today. It cannot win a war alone, but without it no war can be won.

Our air arm has gradually progressed in strength and effectiveness during the past year. But the development of air power is a long and complex process.

There is still a long way to go in developing air strength in Western Europe. A major task has been and continues to be the provision of adequate air bases and communications to link them. A vast amount of new construction is needed to accommodate the air power necessary to the defense of the West.

One of the most heartening achievements of the Lisbon conference was the approval by member nations of a cost-sharing scheme to build a large number of additional airfields in Europe.

As presently scheduled, NATO's European air arm will include by the end of 1952 some 4,000 operational aircraft, a significant proportion of which will be modern jet fighters. When realized, this air strength will amount to a greatly improved situation over what we faced a year ago, but it will still be far from our ultimate requirements.

The naval equation in Western European waters is still weighted strongly in our favor. Deficiencies exist in minesweepers, antisubmarine craft, and harbor defense installations, but efforts are being made toward filling these needs. The main advance on the naval side has been realized in the excellent coordination and common procedures evolved by Allied navies in European waters.

These developments will bring to all European defense problems—sea, air, and land—the effective application of modern sea power and the wide range of weapons which its arsenal contains. This capability is of particular importance in the northern and southern regions of my command. With the extension of the southern defense area some 1,400 miles eastward a broad flanking position will be organized under Admiral Carney, combining SHAPE forces in Italy and the Central

Mediterranean with those of Greece and Turkey. The essential role of sea power here is to link and support the defense forces of these countries while working in close cooperation with other Allied forces in the Mediterranean area.

Recently I have had the stimulating experience of visiting our two new NATO members, Greece and Turkey. Knowing the courage they have shown in the face of direct Communist pressure, we are proud at SHAPE to welcome them as allies.

The growth of military strength reported during the past year has derived from various sources. Certainly it could not have been achieved without the arrival in the increasing numbers of tanks, aircraft, and heavy equipment from the United States and Canada. But arms are useless without trained manpower; and during the past 18 months every Western European nation represented in SHAPE has increased the length of its conscription period. Defense budgets were also raised; and among these continental members, military expenditures now average over twice the pre-Korean level.

Extensive field exercises, with air forces and ground troops representing eight nations, took place in Western Germany last fall. Naval exercises and operations have been conducted by Allied fleets in the Mediterranean, the Channel, and northern waters. With soldiers, sailors, and airmen from many nations working together, the sense of comradeship, unity and common destiny has been strengthened. The merging of diverse procedures and many tongues is not an easy task; but techniques have been designed to overcome the difficulties, and Allied commanders have been able not only to test them, but also to practice with valuable results the handling of international forces.

At this time, the forces assigned to SHAPE are not of themselves sufficient to stay the hand of an aggressor. Of some comfort in this bleak realization is the existence of other military forces of the NATO countries in adjacent areas.

Military strength is of little worth unless backed by healthy, expanding economies. In this truth is found the source of many of our bitterest problems. Yet, from the very beginning of our endeavor, we have been able to draw some confidence from the knowledge that NATO's economic potential is superior to that of the East. This potential springs from the productive peoples of the Atlantic community who hold in their grasp the greatest economic production, the most advanced technology the world has yet seen.

The process of channeling economic output into military ends, though rarely easy, has seemed particularly hard in the present circumstances. Scarcity in Europe has been prolonged and severe. To deny even a part of the increased production to civil demands has been difficult; to make such decisions effective has been burdensome. The changes in established patterns of consumption

and distribution, of trade and income, brought on by expanded military requirements, have encountered resistance of many kinds. Governmental decisions in this part of the world must be made in an atmosphere of extreme financial stringency and under heavy pressure from various groups who feel acutely the impact of new taxes, controls, and higher prices.

Increasing defense budgets have posed real problems of fiscal and financial management. Hanging over the NATO defense effort has been the menace of inflation, which if unchecked, could wipe out all gains. The picture is by no means bright, and we are far from being able to regard the success of the military budgetary programs as already assured. In some countries, the pressure of inflation has been effectively checked. In others, inflation is surging upward and endangering the whole defense program.

From relatively small beginnings, European production of the equipment and supplies for modern armies, navies, and air forces has increased during the past year and further increases will be undertaken. A significant and growing proportion of the military equipment being provided by the United States to its NATO partners is soon to be produced in European factories.

After necessary initial armaments have been produced, Europe must become self-sustaining in military manufactures at the earliest possible date. The United States is currently making a tremendous effort to furnish a great portion of the capital outlay in military equipment. Without this, there could be no effective forces on the Continent within the next 4 or 5 years. But America cannot continue to be the primary source of munitions for the entire free world. To do so would be militarily unsound. Moreover, the United States cannot long continue such expenditures without endangering her own economic structure. The soundness of that structure is of vital concern to the entire free world, for its collapse would be a world shaking tragedy.

There is no precedent in peacetime for the NATO concept. At SHAPE, the basic relationships and the sweep of interest of a peacetime international command have evolved from day to day. I can state accurately that a great many of the problems referred to me, and often the most difficult have been economic, political, and psychological rather than purely military. But even in the military field we have seen considerable change in the specific responsibilities and activities of this command.

The military forces we are building must be continually modified to keep pace with new weapons. To this end an annual review of the full nature and composition of our military programs should be accomplished.

Our goals are simple; they are honorable; they can be achieved. Why, therefore, should there be confusion in the minds of millions of our own

peoples as to the basic aims of our defense program, the necessity for it, and the urgent demand for their own individual efforts?

Once these facts are established in the minds of our Atlantic peoples, there will be less bickering in our councils, and it will become progressively more difficult for self-seeking individuals to delay our progress by exploiting internal national divisions or minor grievances between our members. Once the truth is understood, once the critical dangers present in the world situation are really known, there will be less complacency concerning our present military situation, and the harmful effects of delay will be clearly seen.

The Soviet Army casts its shadow over the length and breadth of Europe. The satellite countries have increased the size and combat effectiveness of their armed forces. Reports from behind the Iron Curtain indicate that the restiveness of these captive people has led to even tighter, tougher, more brutal measures of state control. The familiar technique of the purge, deliberate terror, and intimidation has forced a measure of unity—however unhappy—in this area.

The Soviet Air Force in Eastern Germany is currently replacing obsolescent aircraft with jet planes. Work on airfields, communications, and supply installations is being vigorously pursued in Eastern Europe. By the prolongation of the war in Korea and Indochina, by the constant attempts at erosion and subversion of effective government in the Far East and Middle East, heavy drains have been imposed upon the Western Powers, which reduce the resources available to establish a balance in Europe.

Nevertheless, the tide has begun to flow our way and the situation of the free world is brighter than it was a year ago. At Lisbon, our member nations made great headway on issues vital to our continued progress. They strengthened our eastern flank by bringing into NATO the stout-hearted peoples of Greece and Turkey. They agreed to the concept of a European Defense Community and a close relationship with the German Federal Republic. They approved a program to establish this year a force of 50 standing and reserve divisions and 4,000 aircraft.

When combined with the ready strength available in Greece and Turkey, this force—if properly armed and trained—should produce an encourag-

ing degree of security. Considering training, organization, matériel, vital installations, and all the various factors which go to make up military proficiency, I personally would look upon completion of this program as clear material evidence that the basic goals of our combined enterprise are going to be achieved.

Now our governments must convert the Lisbon program into actuality. It demands full and unstinting support, for only through positive action by all our nations can we ever achieve tranquility and security.

As we work together in the coming year, we are carrying out our pledge to each other. We are reaffirming our true beliefs in the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. We are one in our desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. But we are steadfast in our determination to safeguard the freedom, the common heritage, and the civilization of our member nations.

This is a great task—a noble charge. In a world where powerful forces are working tirelessly to destroy the freedom, individual liberty, and dignity of man, we cannot for one moment delay our advance toward security. The task will require constant watchfulness, hard work, cooperation, and sacrifice, but what we do now can grant us peace for generations.

It can be done, given the will to do it. There is power in our union—and resourcefulness on land, sea, and air. Visible and within grasp we have the capability of building such military, economic, and moral strength as the Communist world would never dare to challenge.

When that point is reached, the Iron Curtain rulers may finally be willing to participate seriously in disarmament negotiations. Then, we may see fulfilled the universal hope expressed in the United Nations Charter to reduce the “diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources.” Then the Atlantic community will have proved worthy of its history and its God-given endowments. We shall have proved our union the world’s most potent influence toward peace among men—the final security goal of humanity.

2 APRIL 1952

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Visit of Queen Juliana of the Netherlands

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON

[Released to the press April 2]

I want to take advantage of this opportunity to express the happiness of all Americans that Her Majesty The Queen of The Netherlands, His Royal Highness The Prince of The Netherlands, His Excellency The Foreign Minister, and the other members of Her Majesty's party will arrive in Washington in a few hours. This visit will further enhance the true friendship which exists between the Netherlands and this country. Everyone looks forward to making their tour of the United States a most happy and memorable time.

All of us are much aware of Dutch contributions to this country, to its growth, to its culture, to its material development. I doubt that there is a telephone directory for any major city in the United States in which there is less than a full page of names beginning with "van." The Netherlands Government was one of the first Governments to lend this country financial aid after the American Revolution. In these days when it has become necessary for the free world to stand closer together than ever before we appreciate this early instance of investment in freedom.

ADDRESS BY QUEEN JULIANA TO THE CONGRESS¹

I am grateful to be invited to speak to you—as once my mother did—to you, the elected Representatives of the American people, and I do so, first of all, because of the gratitude my husband and I and all of the Netherlands people feel for the wonderful welcome given to us by your country, which calls itself rightfully the land of the free and the home of the brave, in this its very sanctuary.

We feel we appear here in the name of a nation of your comrades in the recent war—that crusade against evil—in which each performed his particular part. A brotherhood was born there in the depth of distress and in the height of joy. The Dutch people hold in deep respect and grateful memory your brave men, who sacrificed their lives wherever we have been fighting side by side.

¹ Made on Apr. 3, and printed from *Cong. Rec.* of the same date, p. 3500.

Before you came to our aid we already had a comradeship, consisting of a close kinship of descent and of a similarity in our national history and growth as independent and democratic nations. We even also seem to share some of our virtues and vices. But, nevertheless, there is still always need to deepen our understanding for each other. Because it is this we need more than anything else, as contact among mankind is growing ever closer, we have never before been so keenly aware that in this world of ours we need cooperation as intimate as that among the cells of one body.

You have seen this, and have planned a program for aid to the countries robbed and ruined by totalitarian war—help on such a scale as has never been conceived before. We in the Netherlands were deeply impressed by your great plans and their execution. They enable us to stand once more on our own feet. We shall do so as soon as possible in ever sounder economic circumstances.

On this occasion again, and in this Hall especially, I want to express the thanks of the Netherlands for this proof of generous friendship, offered by your Government and by your people through the voice of Congress and by countless private voices. The call for transoceanic friendship then became very strong.

If America does not want to stand alone—and I know she does not—I feel that she not only likes to give her help to others but that she also counts on their support. The Netherlands can give you that support, in your eyes perhaps a small amount in the form of goods or money, but much in the form of good will.

That is not the indebted feeling of the beneficiary, or the feeling of the debtor toward the creditor; it is not the feeling of the small toward the great, or the feeling of the planned-for toward the planner; but the feeling of friendship and relationship of the free for the free, of those who can carry responsibility for those who can carry it, too, and of mutual respect for each other and for all, sprung from that general and very deep-rooted sense for the connection, brotherhood, and coexistence of all mankind.

One human race, under the law and the love of one God.

Our human legislations seek from afar to follow the divine law. They mostly fail, but they strive on.

We live in the dawn of a time when we must seek to do this as one human race.

Mankind should be one kind.

A split humanity is like a split personality; it is inclined to go from bad to worse, unless it recovers its unity of purpose, comes to coordinated thinking, and gains sanity and happiness.

The sane part of the mind of humanity must always remember it is responsible for the other part. The sound half is the one which is designated to save the other half.

The American people have entrusted you with the honor and the grave mandate of working out your great country's role in this important era.

I see any task of being a servant to the public interest, being one myself, as one of the finest, but also as the most difficult and responsible. You, as representatives of the people, carry this great responsibility both toward your voters and toward the general well-being of your country, and consequently, especially in our modern interwoven conditions, toward the world at large.

This places on each of you the full burden of a responsibility nobody will envy you, as your decisions have enormous repercussions all through the world.

It is my personal wish for you that each of you may experience individually the gratifying feeling of satisfaction that your decisions will have proved in the end to be essentially and ultimately the right ones.

I do not want to be so short-sighted as to ask you to bear in mind the interests of the Netherlands in particular, or even those of Europe. What I want to plead for, though, are the interests of the world as a whole.

With you, I realize keenly how any apparently trifling interest may represent a great principle and, on the other hand, how a necessary sacrifice in the local sphere may mean greater well-being for the greater community, to the ultimate good even of those who made the sacrifice.

Let me assure you that the Dutch people will accept, for a common cause, the full share of their burden.

We have been so fortunate as to live in social peace and stability, and so we feel we can be a reliable pillar of European unity, a unity which is growing by means of the Schuman plan, other economic and defensive and—perhaps eventually—political integration. Constitutional amendments have been voted lately by the Netherlands Parliament, in order to remove some remaining obstacles to our partnership in future supranational organizations.

The Growing Unity of Europe

There is a growing strength in this growing unity of free and democratic Europe, necessary for the very strength of the world.

Only such a vision can lead to that greater unity which the world yearns for.

Only a great vision will some day find the way out of the universal fear of war and annihilation.

Many of us believe we are in a downward spin.

How can the trend downward become the trend upward?

I think that the challenge of our time is to start a definite upward trend to a higher unity and well-being than we ever reached before. Judging from the results of all our endeavors, however, the right answer is still to be found.

I am not referring to idealism here. I am referring to practical solutions.

Most likely they will mean some sacrifices for us all. If we all could only really train our minds—and may I also say: Wake up our hearts—to this idea of sacrifice. Not only our financial, our economic and our political interests—worse, our sovereignty and prestige are involved in all this. We may succeed in working out plans for coordination which will at least make a closer cooperation possible between those countries which are aware of the overriding interest of integration. We still seem far away from this Utopia and yet it remains hard to understand why we do not achieve greater results with the magnificent tools with which modern science has equipped us and with the many superior minds which we have in our midst. If we could only use the tools properly and place the best minds in the most difficult posts we might be able to achieve results which would demonstrate that the sacrifices which were made in reality proved to be blessings in disguise.

I am not thinking of any particular form of coordination or organization. There are brilliant minds in abundance, to seek and find the right one.

The United Nations is still in its infancy and although it is encouragingly successful in some fields, it has to cope with the greatest difficulties. Yet, who would question the value of a world organization as the most essential form we need to serve this development?

But there is no avoiding the fact that the world is split into two parts, that there are two magnetic poles of which one is positive—the one called democracy—and the other is negative, indicating slavery. To my mind there is no doubt that if we could only increase the energy radiated by the positive pole of freedom and democracy, it would be impossible for the negative pole to withstand this force and it would in the end have to yield. All the doubting spirits in the world, in our western countries, in the old and young democracies, in the newly sovereign states on other continents, must be enabled to see clearly that only the free and democratic world can give them all which is considered worth while.

The U.S. Technical Assistance Program

That is why I must express a deep appreciation here for the far-sighted American policy concerning a project like the technical-assistance program.

Through this program the technically more advanced countries can extend assistance in a completely unbiased and unconditional manner to the overpopulated and technically less advanced areas in the world, which stand in urgent need of the skill and know-how of the western nations.

Our material resources in the Netherlands are not large enough to send important supplies or give financial assistance to underprivileged areas. We can and do participate in the export of skills, the sending of technical experts, which will show these countries how to help themselves. For students and scholars who wish to further develop their abilities in Europe we have founded the Netherlands Universities Foundation for International Cooperation with an Institute of Social Studies, which provides courses in a series of subjects of particular importance to foreign students.

It is my earnest hope that one memorable day the enormous increase of production now demanded by rearmament will be converted to meet the demands of these enormous development projects.

The circle of countries around the North Atlantic Ocean should avoid imitating the example set by the countries behind the iron curtain, which have focused their minds so much on their defense that they forget to focus as much attention on their economic, social, and cultural well-being, let alone the progress of the whole family of nations.

If they do neglect these aspects, someday they might find themselves isolated around their ocean before, for instance, technical assistance could get under way properly and link them with the world at large.

This one might call a cold war for peace.

The public-minded spirit of service to the world at large originates in the United States of America if anywhere.

If this spirit gets its chance, it will lead to good will among nations and men and good will leads to understanding and understanding leads to confidence. And confidence is the only workable basis for international cooperation. Without confidence it has no base, no efficiency, no success. It is a sheer waste of time and money, paper and ink, and, worse, of hope.

A Pax Atlantica

If it gets its chance, it will grow into a pax Atlantica—Atlantic peace.

I do not think that in a Pax Atlantica the Atlantic community could ever become an isolated group. Much less could it ever be a threat to other parts of the world, for even as an Atlantic community we cannot permit ourselves to withdraw in splendid isolation and give up our links with the rest of the world community.

The stones of the Atlantic structure which we

are building together are cemented by our affinity for one another, for otherwise they might easily fall apart once more.

It is true that a sea connects, but only when people want it so.

The uninhabited space of the water by nature separates.

For what purpose are we pulling together but to save freedom, the Atlantic freedoms?

Freedom is not only the absence of tyranny in whatever form; it is life itself. Life is the positive pole, as opposed to the negative one, which is slavery and death.

To accept freedom means to carry responsibility. Wherever this is recognized as a right and a duty for everybody, we call it democracy. It is the only form of fair government. In no other regime is human dignity respected so absolutely and an equal opportunity given to everybody regardless of his convictions. Democracies will naturally be inclined to be peaceful, as they represent the people. These principles were laid down in a matchless way in your Declaration of Independence. All these things are what we, as democratic peoples, have in common. This is our unity.

We all want the Atlantic peace to pioneer the peace of the world.

We cannot hope for better times unless mankind as a whole throws off its shackles—shackles of every kind—not only those of tyranny and totalitarianism but also those of self-interest, prejudice, lack of understanding, and lack of confidence.

It stands to reason that when those are abolished humanity might radiate the well-being of freedom, justice, and security, and might make a start for a better world and a full communal life.

Mankind in its distress has to trust largely to your good judgment for its deliverance.

Let us all do the best we can. Leave the rest to God. He will not forsake this poor world for the sake of all the good-willing and bravely striving souls living in it.

CORRECTION

In the BULLETIN of April 7, page 536, the second column should begin:

"down to provincial levels and making use of Indian art, literature, films, dance, music, and education is indicated in plans for the All-India Cultural Conference and Festival for Peace to be held in Calcutta, April 2 to 6."

In the same issue, page 549, first column, the sentence beginning in line 9 should read: "The primary purpose of the booklet is to draw the interest of potential candidates toward the Foreign Service."

Aims of "American Peace Crusade" Exposed

Statement by Francis H. Russell

*Director of the Office of Public Affairs*¹

The Department of State notes the statements which this delegation of the "American peace crusade" have just made and those which have been received in the past few days from other members. Your group urges (1) "a recognition of the right of colonial people to independence and self-government," (2) "an end to the rearming of the German Nazis," and (3) "peace in Korea immediately."

First of all, although you have not referred to it in your statements, it should be made plain that your organization is a counterpart in the United States of a world-wide Communist campaign which receives its direction from the Kremlin.

Not only is your "peace crusade" Communist directed, it also follows the standard Communist tactic of seeking to increase Communist power through public confusion. It is part of an effort to cover up the Communist goal of world domination by drawing over itself a cover of spurious ideals which simulate those to which honest and well-intentioned people subscribe.

In this connection it is useful to recall Stalin's words that if any foreign minister begins to defend "peace" to the death "you can be sure his government has already placed its order for new dreadnoughts and airplanes. A diplomat's words must have no relation to action—otherwise what kind of diplomacy is it? Words are one thing, actions another. Good words are a mask for the concealment of bad deeds."

You say that you want "a recognition of the right of colonial people to independence and self-government." Within the last 12 years the countries of the free world have given independence and self-government to 600 millions of people. This includes the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Burma, Libya, and Ceylon, and others are attaining their independence as rapidly as the conditions necessary for self-government are created. The policies which have resulted in this unprecedented series of steps toward popular independence still underlie the actions of the free world.

During approximately the same period the Soviet Union has deprived of their independence and liberties the peoples of Poland, Czechoslovakia,

East Germany, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The peoples of China are also suffering the horrors of Communist methods of control. These people total over 550 million.

This record speaks for itself.

You say that you desire "an end to the rearming of the German Nazis". In the parts of Germany that have been occupied by the American, British, and French Governments nazism has been supplanted by a genuinely democratic political system. The Government of Western Germany has indicated no intention of rebuilding German militarism. It has on the contrary indicated its intention of contributing to the European armed forces which will make secure the freedom and the independence of the peace-minded peoples of Europe. This is the best possible guarantee against any form of totalitarian aggression, Nazi or Communist.

At the same time, the Soviet Union in its note of March 10 has proposed to allow Germany a national army and to grant amnesty to Nazis.

You urge "peace in Korea immediately". From the time Korea was first liberated from the Japanese the efforts of this Government have been directed toward bringing about as quickly as possible a free, independent, and peaceful Korea. These efforts have been rendered ineffective by the refusal of the Kremlin to cooperate with the United Nations in accomplishing these objectives and by the Communist aggression against the Republic of Korea. The peace in Korea was broken by Communist aggression. It could be restored if there were any honest willingness on the part of the Communists to restore it.

The group to which you belong is a tool of communism and does not represent any significant element of the American people. It can be said with confidence that your effort to confuse the people of the free world is futile. The growing solidarity of the free world has been demonstrated at San Francisco, in the various meetings of the United Nations, in the progress of NATO and the European Defense Community, in the Organization of American States, and in the growing determination of free peoples everywhere to defend themselves against aggression. The free world is making progress in the only way in which progress is possible toward the goals which you falsely claim as your objectives.

¹Made before the delegation of the American Peace Crusade at the Department of State on Apr. 1 and released to the press on the same date.

Tenth Anniversary of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

[Released to the press by the White House March 31]

Today, March 31, 1952, the Institute of Inter-American Affairs celebrates its tenth anniversary.

Its 10 years of life have been 10 years of international cooperation in improving the living standards of the people of this hemisphere.

The climate of peace and prosperity among the American Republics is a great source of comfort and pride to us all. A real share of the credit for this achievement is due to the Institute of Inter-American Affairs.

The program of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs is one of the world's best examples of mutual effort by democratic nations to solve their most pressing economic and social problems. No other overseas government program better fulfills the historic good neighbor policy of the United States. The experience of the Institute shows us how technical assistance can be made available on a cooperative basis not only in the Western Hemisphere but also in other parts of the world under the Point Four concept.

The Institute undertakes its constructive work only at the invitation and with the participation of the countries concerned. Two-way cooperation is the reason for the Institute's success. Through the Institute our country works with the other American Republics as self-respecting nations, on an independent but cooperative basis.

Over the past decade, the Institute's cooperative programs have touched directly or indirectly the lives of millions of people in Latin America on the farms, in the small towns, and in the big cities. Malaria and other dread diseases are being conquered. The capital of a leading Latin American country for the first time now has a safe system of water supply and sewage. Another nation is diversifying its basic agriculture in the first major program to change an uneconomic one-crop pattern established centuries ago.

In the Andes region, industrial safety experts provided by the Institute are serving as advisers on safety methods in mining. In the vast Amazon River Valley, health centers established with the help of the Institute and staffed by doctors, nurses, and laboratory technicians are wiping out diseases and providing preventive medical services

for jungle dwellers who never before had medical attention.

These and other technical-assistance projects are a notable contribution to the unity of the hemisphere and to its common determination to prove that the way of freedom is better than the way of communism.

There is still a great deal to do. In one of the leading Latin American nations, for example, productivity is only one-eighth of what it is in the United States, life expectancy is only 40 years, compared to about 68 for the United States; and scarcely one out of three children in rural areas can go to school. The need for further work is evident. The activities of the Institute must continue so that we can expand our efforts to fight hunger, poverty, disease, and illiteracy throughout the American Republics.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON

[Released to the press March 31]

We in the Department take great pride in the activities of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IAAA) which, on March 31, 1952, will celebrate 10 years of technical cooperation with Latin America in the improvement on a hemispheric basis of food production, public health, and basic and vocational education. I take pleasure in adding my congratulations to those of thousands of other Americans throughout both continents.

As regional administrative office in Latin America for all Technical Cooperation Administration Point Four activities, the Institute is playing an important role in the attainment of mutual security. Today, it is carrying on programs of cooperation with 19 republics in Latin America. Its pioneer experience is being utilized in Point Four technical-assistance projects in many other areas of the free world.

As the operating and expediting agency in Latin America of President Truman's Point Four policy of technical assistance to friendly nations, the Institute has made a large contribution toward the atmosphere of friendship and security prevailing in this hemisphere. Its support of the good neighbor policy during the past 10 years has helped build the hemisphere into a neighborhood of self-respecting, self-reliant friends.

Historically, the Institute is a logical outgrowth of the basic aspects of our foreign policy. It has strengthened the already strong ties of respect and unity binding us together in the determination to reach goals of better living and economic advancement. It has helped contribute to the defense of the free world against aggression.

Defense can never be assured by military action or preparedness alone. To assist in building a strong economy among free and friendly people is a major objective of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. In this effort, the countries of this hemisphere—both large and small—played their part.

Fortunately, we have real friends and allies in this hemisphere. They stood by our side in World War II, and they are increasing their important contributions of strategic materials in the present emergency. This contribution is made possible by the very projects to which the United States is contributing technical assistance through the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. This assistance is not confined to the Institute's cooperative programs of agriculture, education, health and sanitation, and public services. It includes, under the expanded program of the Technical Cooperation Administration, the coordination by the Institute, as the Point Four regional office for Latin America, of the work of 44 other United States agencies in many other sound economic activities.

Five hundred Americans are now working with more than 9,000 local technicians in the closest collaboration. They have made progress. They have economic importance to the countries in which they operate and to us. They contribute toward providing us with strong, friendly neighbors and toward improving local economic conditions. These factors join to provide a favorable climate for local and foreign investments and the establishment of a large group of potential purchasers of American manufactured products.

The technical-assistance program in Latin America has been cooperative in every sense of the word. The average matching contributions by the Latin American host nations for carrying on the programs is approximately \$8 to \$1 from the United States. If all ILAA administrative expenses are included, the ratio is better than \$3 to each \$1 from the United States. Throughout the 10 years of the program a chief goal of U.S. technicians has been to train Latin American personnel to assume full responsibility for each project as soon as possible.

This spirit of cooperation toward common goals has been a source of inspiration and encouragement to all. We look forward to the continued contribution of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs in the future.

Austrian Federal Chancellor To Visit U.S.

The Department of State on March 31 announced that the American Embassy at Vienna issued the following announcement on March 31 concerning the invitation which has been extended by the Government of the United States to the Federal Chancellor of Austria, Dr. Leopold Figl, to visit the United States:

The Austrian Federal Chancellor has accepted an invitation of the American Government to visit the United States during the month of May. This visit will afford an opportunity for a personal exchange of views on questions of mutual interest between the Governments of Austria and the United States. It will provide occasion also for the American people to demonstrate their friendship and admiration for the Austrian people and their Government, which Chancellor Figl has headed since December 1945.

Discussions on Free Territory Of Trieste

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press April 2]

I should like to inform you that our representatives in the conversations to be held in London within the next few days with representatives of the British and Italian Governments to discuss matters pertaining to the administration of Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste will be Julius C. Holmes, Minister of our Embassy in London, and Joseph N. Greene, Jr., of the Office of Western European Affairs of the Department of State. They will be assisted by officers from the Allied Military Government in Trieste.

Obviously, it is impossible to anticipate the suggestions that will be offered for discussion, or to predict results. As for the purpose of the meeting, I should like to refer you to our announcement of several days ago which stated the desire of the three Governments to reach amongst themselves and with local authorities a closer collaboration in the zone.¹

¹ On Mar. 27 the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Michael J. McDermott, said that "The United States, United Kingdom, and Italy have decided to examine jointly the arrangements in Zone A of the free territory of Trieste with a view to reaching a closer collaboration in the zone amongst themselves and with the local authorities in the spirit of the friendly relations which unite them in the Atlantic alliance."

U.S. Proposals for Progressive and Continuing Disclosure And Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments

U. N. doc. DC/Comm. 2/1
Dated April 5, 1952

INTRODUCTION

The General Assembly resolution calling for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments directs that the Commission be guided by a number of principles, including the following:

(Operative paragraph 3)

"(a) In a system of guaranteed disarmament there must be progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces—including para-military, security and police forces—and all armaments including atomic;

"(b) Such verification must be based on effective international inspection to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the information disclosed; this inspection to be carried out in accordance with the decisions of the international control organ (or organs) to be established."

Operative paragraph 5 of the resolution reads as follows:

"5. *Directs* the Commission, in preparing the proposals referred to in paragraph 3 above, to consider from the outset plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, the implementation of which is recognized as a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament programme envisaged in the present resolution".

It is therefore apparent that the General Assembly resolution contemplates that the newly created Disarmament Commission should as a matter of priority deal with the problem of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments.

U.S. PROPOSALS

The United States herewith submits for consideration the following working paper on progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments.

A. Extent of Disclosure and Verification

1. The system of disclosure and verification must be on a continuing basis. Disclosure as of a particular date on a "one time basis" and subsequent verification of such disclosure would not meet the requirements of a continuing program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces. Therefore it is contemplated that the machinery which will be set up should be on a

permanent or at least a long term basis, since the disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments will be on a continuing basis.

2. The disclosure must cover all armed forces of every kind including para-military, security and police forces and all armaments including atomic.

3. The verification of armed forces and armaments must likewise cover all armed forces of every kind including para-military, security and police forces and all armaments including atomic.

4. The permanent machinery to be established must provide adequate safeguards under a competent international authority having appropriate status, rights and powers.

B. Stages of Disclosure and Verification

5. Disclosure and verification must be carried out step by step with appropriate provisions for proceeding to the next step when and only when previous steps have been satisfactorily completed. The reasons for proceeding by stages are two:

(a) In the existing state of international tensions all states must be protected in the event of a serious violation or collapse of the system of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armaments. The existence of stages gives all states the opportunity over a period of time to test the good faith of all other states. The mere agreement to enter into a system for disclosure and verification would give no assurance that the parties thereto would actually carry it out in full or at all. With disclosure and verification in several stages and with each step of one stage completed prior to the commencement of the next stage, all States have the opportunity at periodic intervals of checking the good faith of other States through review of the information theretofore disclosed.

(b) It is contemplated that the disclosure and verification would proceed from the less secret areas which would be disclosed and verified in early stages to the more secret areas. A phasing of this nature in addition to furnishing the best test of the good faith of all States would cause the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country, since the less sensitive information can in fact be more readily verified, and would, in cases of differences or delays, prevent premature disclosure of information which many States would like reserved until substantial cooperation and good faith has been demonstrated.

6. In considering the appropriate number of stages, the United States had as its objective the full implementation of the program of disclosure and verification as rapidly as feasible in the light of the existing state of international tensions. An excessive number of stages, each of which

must be completed prior to the commencement of the next stage, would unduly delay not only the program of disclosure and verification but also the entire program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments. With this in mind, the United States concluded and is proposing that the number of stages of disclosure and verification should be five—a figure which represents the minimum number consistent with the considerations set forth in the previous paragraph. In each stage, the disclosure and verification processes will go forward simultaneously on a wide variety of items in order to accelerate the successful completion of the program.

7. Annex I sets forth in outline the extent of armed forces and armaments (excluding atomic) to be disclosed in the respective stages and the manner of verification of the information required to be disclosed. Annex II sets forth the same information with respect to atomic armaments. The proposals with respect to atomic weapons are presented in a separate annex solely in the interests of clarity of presentation. Both the problems involved and the appropriate terminology with respect to atomic weapons differ so greatly from the problems and terminology with respect to other weapons that a single annex comprehending both might be confusing. It is contemplated that all stages of disclosure and verification cover both atomic and non-atomic weapons. In other words, the first stage includes the items set forth both in Annex I and in Annex II for disclosure and verification in that stage, and the same is true as to all succeeding stages.

8. Without commenting in detail at this point on the specific items subject to disclosure and verification in the respective stages, it should be noted that the armed forces and armaments to be disclosed in the first stage have three general characteristics:

(a) They should prove to be the least secret items.

(b) In the main, they are most susceptible of verification by periodic visits of inspection and through reference to statistical records—with the result that verification can take place with the minimum of interference in the internal life of the respective countries. Some resort would nevertheless be required to “on-the-spot” inspection, and aerial reconnaissance would be required in all stages to assist in checking the adequacy of the disclosure.

(c) At the same time, these items reveal so vast a segment of the military potential of all States that their disclosure and verification as provided in this stage in and of itself would act as an indication of good faith and would thus greatly facilitate progress towards the ultimate goals of the entire program of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments.

9. The armed forces and armaments to be disclosed in the second, third, fourth and fifth stages are progressively more secret and more difficult to verify except through “on-the-spot” investigations in conjunction with extensive aerial reconnaissance.

10. The character of the items to be disclosed and verified in the five stages as outlined in Annexes I and II can in general be summarized as follows:

Stage I. A quantitative count in the nature of a report on existing strength levels of all armed forces and of the location of installations and facilities concerned with armaments of all types including atomic.

Stage II. Detailed disclosure of organization of armed forces and of installations and facilities concerned with the basic materials required for production of all armaments including atomic.

Stage III. Detailed disclosure of armaments (except novel armaments) fissionable material and installations and facilities utilized in their production.

Stage IV. Detailed disclosure of installations and facilities utilized in the production of novel armaments including atomic (armaments not in

general use by the end of the second World War but in volume production today).

Stage V. Detailed disclosure of novel armaments including atomic.

11. The information to be disclosed and verified in all stages—and particularly in the early stages—is so vast that there appear to be advantages in disclosing material only at the rate at which it can be processed. Therefore, in general within each stage, disclosure should proceed progressively step by step in accordance with an agreed plan from the less sensitive information to that which is more sensitive.

C. Inspection

12. The system of disclosure and verification is an integral part of the system of safeguards which must be established to ensure observance of the overall program of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments so as to provide for the prompt detection of violations while at the same time causing the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country. It will not be adequate to provide merely for the verification of disclosed information. In addition provision must be made for determining the adequacy of the disclosed information, through broad general powers of “on-the-spot” inspection, through access to statistical data permitting independent confirmation of required reports and through aerial surveys.

13. Extensive aerial reconnaissance is obviously essential to the verification procedure in order completely to determine the adequacy of disclosed information. It will be obvious that aerial reconnaissance furnishes the easiest method of determining the existence of large undisclosed facilities and installations. Aerial survey will be essential in all stages of the disclosure and verification procedure.

14. It is contemplated that “on-the-spot” inspection will take place in all stages as a part of the verification procedure. Its use, however, will be less extensive in the first than in the latter stages because of the greater ease of verification through other methods of the items disclosed in the first stage. It will of course be necessary at each stage to regulate inspection in such a way as to prevent disclosure of information which is to be withheld from disclosure and verification during the particular stage. Certain principles governing limitations on the right of “on-the-spot” inspections in early stages are set forth in Annexes I and II.

15. Each state at the commencement of each stage should submit to the Commission a general description of the nature and location of facilities falling within the terms of reference for that stage. Access to such locations, reasonably sufficient to verify the information disclosed should be granted to inspectors. Inspection in each stage should proceed in accordance with a previously accepted plan.

16. It is essential to an effective system of verification that the international inspectors, in addition to examining declared installations and facilities be permitted in all stages to have access to the entire national territory in order that the Commission may determine within reasonable limits the accuracy and adequacy of the information disclosed. Accordingly, each State should be required during each stage of the process of disclosure and verification to permit the international inspectors such freedom of movement and to give them access to such installations and facilities, records and data as may reasonably be required, including the right to inspect physical dimensions of all facilities and installations wherever situated.

17. Each state should facilitate the activities of the international inspectors and furnish to them such assistance as they may reasonably require.

18. Procedure should be set up in order to permit a determination by the Commission of the necessity for in-

spection of any facilities or installations access to which is denied to the inspectors and where in the judgment of the inspectors such inspection is required.

19. The inspectors should report to the Commission any information indicating a major violation of any provisions of the treaties or agreements respecting disclosure and verification. In the event of a Commission determination confirmed by the Security Council, by the affirmative vote of any seven Members, of such a major violation during any stage and the failure of the state guilty of violation to repair the same within a reasonable specified period, other states should be free to suspend the operations of the disclosure and verification system.

20. The first stage of disclosure and verification should commence upon (a) the entry into force of the treaties dealing with the program of disclosure and verification and referred to in operative paragraph 3 of the General Assembly resolution, and (b) the establishment pursuant to such treaties of international machinery responsible for carrying out the program of disclosure and verification including the portion of such machinery located within the territory of states adhering to the program.

21. Disclosure and verification in all stages subsequent to the first stage could commence upon a Commission determination that the previous stage has been satisfactorily completed.

D. Miscellaneous

22. The United Nations should establish concurrently with and at the time of the adoption of the general principles governing this program the necessary inspection machinery to ensure effective verification of the armed forces and armaments, including those involving atomic energy, disclosed pursuant to the program. In establishing this machinery, consideration should be given to its subsequent utilization to supervise the program for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces. The machinery recommended in the United Nations Atomic Energy Plan would presumably be utilized in connection with the disclosure and verification of armaments involving atomic energy. The problem of appropriate United Nations machinery both for purposes of the system of disclosure and verification and for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments is the subject of a separate study.

23. It is contemplated that the disclosure and verification processes with respect to all adhering states should begin simultaneously and should go forward at approximately the same tempo.

24. The draft treaties or agreements bringing into effect the disclosure and verification system should specifically provide for adherence of states in accordance with the principles set forth in paragraph 5 of the Preamble and paragraph 3 (e) of the General Assembly Resolution of January 11, 1952, the relevant portions of which are as follows:

Paragraph 5 of Preamble

"Recognizing that a genuine system for disarmament . . . must be accepted by all nations whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system . . ."

Paragraph 3 (e)

"The treaty (or treaties) shall specifically be open to all states for signature and ratification or adherence. The treaty (or treaties) shall provide what states must become parties thereto before the treaty (or treaties) shall enter into force."

Annex I

Proposed Stages of Disclosure and Verification, Armed Forces and Non-Atomic Armaments

STAGE I

Disclose (a) Over-all manpower strength of regular and reserve military forces and para-military organizations, including training establishments and security and police forces, broken down into each category.
(b) Location of all operational military installations.

Verify (a) By examination and cross-checks of central records to include personnel, disbursement, medical and procurement supplemented by access to and spot checks of records at selected installations.
(b) By direct examination, location, manpower used, power input and physical dimensions of installations.

(a) and (b)—inspectors will have access to entire national territory to extent necessary to determine that all facilities and installations have been declared. Aerial surveys will be permitted for same purpose and to same extent.

STAGE II

Disclose (a) Organization, composition and disposition of units making up over-all strengths disclosed in Stage I.
(b) Over-all annual capacity of heavy industry relating to armaments to include coal, steel, aluminum and electricity.

Verify (a) By quantitative analysis of records pertaining to personnel, movement of units and administrative support supplemented by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.
(b) By cross checks of pertinent statistics and employment records, access to plants, and analysis of operation with respect to materials used.

(a) and (b) by aerial survey as stated in Stage I.

STAGE III

Disclose (a) Equipment (including reserve equipment of units making up over-all strengths disclosed in Stages I and II except units equipped with novel weapons.)
(b) Production facilities for manufacture of weapons and heavy equipment for units making up over-all strengths disclosed in Stages I and II (excluding novel weapons), giving location, type and capacity.

Verify (a) By quantitative analysis of records pertaining to table of organization and equipment, and repair and overhaul of equipment supplemented by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.
(b) By inspection of physical dimensions of plants and examination of records pertaining to consumption of power and raw materials, available labor force, and finances, and by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.

(a) and (b) by aerial survey as stated in Stage I.

STAGE IV

Disclose (a) Information as to equipment of units equipped with novel weapons to include

biological warfare, chemical warfare, radiological warfare and atomic weapons.

- (b) Installations and facilities devoted to manufacture of novel weapons.

- Verify* (a) By cross checks with Stages I and II and quantitative inspection of units disclosed.
- (b) By inspection of physical dimensions of plants and examination of records pertaining to consumption of power and raw materials, available labor force, and finances, and by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.
- (a) and (b) by aerial survey as set forth in Stage I.

STAGE V

- Disclose* (a) Quantities of novel weapons on hand by types.

- Verify* (a) By physical count of stockpiles of finished novel weapons cross checked with information disclosed in Stages I, II, III and IV.

Annex II

Proposed Stages of Disclosure and Verification, Atomic Armaments

STAGE I

- Disclose* (a) Location of all installations directly concerned with production of atomic energy, or the product of which is primarily useful in the production of atomic energy. Also manpower employed, physical dimensions, and power input of each installation. (Excluding weapon storage sites.)

- (b) Uses or functions of these installations. This should be confined to a statement giving the input material, the produce material and the process used in each instance.

- Verify* (a) By direct examination, location, manpower used, power input and physical dimensions of installations. (Inspectors will have access to entire national territory to the extent necessary to determine through such means as aerial survey, inspection of water and railways and power lines, that all atomic energy installations have been declared.)

- (b) Uses and functions insofar as revealed by external examination of all structures and unhoused equipment. Detailed interior inspection shall take place in subsequent stages, the particular stage in which it will take place depending upon the function of the plant. (Verification of (a) above will be of value as partial verification of plant use or function.)

- (a) and (b) by aerial survey in all stages for same purposes and to same extent as permitted with armed forces and non-atomic armaments. (See Annex I.)

STAGE II

- Disclose* (a) Details of design and operation, including present and past output, of all those installations or parts of installations concerned with preparation of atomic energy raw or feed materials (and such auxiliary materials as graphite, heavy water and beryllium), from mines up to but not including reactors, isotope separation plants, and similar nuclear conversion devices used to produce fissionable or fusionable material.

- Verify* (a) By direct and detailed inspection of all aspects the installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with Stage I.

STAGE III

- Disclose* (a) Details of design and operation, including present and past output of all those atomic energy installations, or parts of installations, concerned with the conversion of feed materials to fissionable or fusionable materials or with the preparation of radioactive materials in large quantities.

- (b) Amounts and types of fissionable or fusionable material on hand or in process; amounts and types of radioisotopes on hand or in process.

- (c) General design and operational characteristics of research laboratories involving reactors operating at a power level of 1 MW or more, including amounts of radioactive, or fissionable or fusionable materials produced.

- Verify* (a) By direct and detailed inspection of all aspects the installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with Stages I and II.

- (b) By direct and detailed inspection of fissionable or fusionable material, or radioactive materials, installations for production thereof, and appropriate records.

- (c) By survey of facilities associated with reported reactors, by detailed inspection of reactors themselves.

STAGE IV

- Disclose* (a) Details of design and operation, including past and present output of all those atomic energy establishments and installations concerned with the fabrication of atomic or radioactive weapons from fissionable or other materials.

- Verify* (a) By direct and detailed inspection of installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with Stages I, II and III.

STAGE V

- Disclose* (a) Location, numbers, and types of atomic and radioactive weapons on hand. Weapon storage sites.

- Verify* (b) By direct inspection. Cross checks with Stages I, II and III and (a) above.

IMC Allocations

Copper and Zinc

The Copper-Zinc-Lead Committee of the International Materials Conference on March 26 announced its recommended distribution of copper and zinc for the second quarter of 1952.¹ This is the third consecutive quarter that plans of distribution for these two metals have been agreed to through international cooperation.

The Governments of the 12 countries represented on the Committee have given notice of their acceptance of the plans of distribution. The countries are Australia, Belgium (representing Benelux), Canada, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Peru, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The

¹ For distribution plan, see IMC press release of Mar. 26.

Chilean Government accepted again the Committee's recommendations with respect to 80 percent of the copper production of its large mines. With respect to the remaining 20 percent and the production of its small and medium mines it reserves the right to dispose of this tonnage without reference to the allocation scheme. Notwithstanding this reservation, the Chilean Government restated that it will give careful consideration wherever possible to the Committee's recommendations.

The two distribution plans have also been forwarded to the governments of all countries not represented on the Committee for which allocations are recommended. The needs of nonmember countries were considered along with those of member countries.

Primary copper and zinc (blister and refined copper and slab zinc) are included in the schemes. While semifabricated products have not been allocated, all countries are urged to maintain their export of such semis at a level commensurate with the exporting country's allocation of primary metal, in accordance with normal patterns of trade.

Data submitted by Governments forecast an increase in the availabilities of zinc of approximately 20,000 metric tons in the second quarter of 1952 compared to the first quarter. The amount of zinc being distributed in the second quarter is 510,145 metric tons. The supply of zinc is expected to continue to improve during the second half of 1952 and the situation will be reviewed by the Committee at a later date.

725,000 metric tons of copper have been recommended for distribution in the second quarter compared with 746,180 metric tons in the first quarter. The estimate of production on which the first quarter distribution was based has since had to be revised downward in the light of new information. However, second quarter estimates of production do in fact show an increase over revised first quarter figures. Estimates for the second half of 1952 indicate that the rate of production is increasing, but the amount of copper available to consumers in each of the two following quarters is unlikely to be substantially greater than the tonnage which has been allocated during the second quarter of 1952.

The Committee is not yet in a position to recommend plans of distribution of copper and zinc for any period beyond the second quarter.

As in the fourth quarter of 1951 and the first quarter of 1952, the Committee is not recommending a distribution plan for lead.

As in the first quarter, no allocation has been recommended for strategic stockpiling either of copper or of zinc, without prejudice to the principle of making such provision in future distributions.

In order to conserve supplies of copper and zinc available to the free world, the Committee recommends that all countries do their utmost to elimi-

nate nonessential consumption and to encourage substitution by materials not in short supply.

Cobalt-Nickel

The Manganese-Nickel-Cobalt Committee of the International Materials Conference on March 31 announced its recommended plans for the distribution of cobalt for the first half of 1952 and of nickel for the second quarter of 1952.²

All the 11 governments represented on the Committee have accepted the plan of distribution of cobalt. Nine have accepted the plan of distribution of nickel with the Federal Republic of Germany dissenting and the reply of India still outstanding.

The member countries are Belgium (for Benelux), Brazil, Canada, Cuba, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The Committee's recommendations have been forwarded to all interested governments for implementation.

The half-yearly plan of distribution for cobalt absorbs the provisional distribution for the first quarter announced on December 28, 1951.

Estimated production of cobalt metal, oxides, and salts for the second quarter remains the same as for the first quarter of 1952. The amount available for distribution in the first half of the year is estimated at 4,413 metric tons of metal content.

The Committee, in preparing the semiannual plan for cobalt, based its conclusions on the various aspects of each country's position: The importance of its defense program, its previous level of consumption as well as its stated requirements. In some cases, a reduction was made in the light of stated requirements from the level of the provisional allocation for the first quarter.

The plan of distribution of nickel for the second quarter of 1952 includes all marketable forms of primary nickel and oxides as in the first quarter. Nickel salts remain excluded.

The availabilities of primary nickel and oxides for the second quarter have been estimated at 34,964 metric tons in terms of nickel content as against 33,583 metric tons for the first quarter. The additional amount available in the second quarter comes principally from the Nicaro plant in Cuba and from French New Caledonia. Canadian production remains unchanged.

The Nicaro smelter, constructed during World War II and shut down soon after, has been reactivated because of increasing military requirements. The U.S. Government has made considerable investment and undertaken large financial risks in order to bring the Cuban plant back into produc-

² For plans of distribution, see *Imc* press release of Mar. 31.

tion. In view of the particular nature of the project the Committee has accepted a U.S. proposal that the Nicaro yield should be used to meet direct defense needs only and that all free world countries having such requirements should benefit from this additional source of supply in proportion to their direct defense effort.

The increased marginal production in New Caledonia is in the form of Fonte, which is a directly smelted nickel cast iron of about 30 percent nickel content. France will make available for export a quantity of 125 metric tons (nickel content) of Fonte. The distribution of this material will also alleviate critical cases and will provide an opportunity for experimenting in a new form of nickel which may become available in larger quantities during forthcoming quarters.

Prospects of increased production are encouraging but the supply situation for both metals is expected to remain critical for some time.

Tungsten-Molybdenum

The Tungsten-Molybdenum Committee of the International Materials Conference on March 28 announced its recommended distribution of tungsten and molybdenum for the first 6 months of 1952.³ The provisional arrangements which had been made for the first quarter of 1952 are now incorporated in the 6 months plan.

The Governments of the countries represented on the Committee have accepted the recommended distribution, except the Government of Spain which has reserved its position. There are 13 members on this Committee: Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The distribution plans have also been forwarded to the governments of all countries not represented on the Committee for which allocations are recommended, with the request that they be implemented.

The needs of all countries, both member and nonmember, were equally considered. In this connection, the Committee intends to make a monthly review of the working of the plans, and it is hoped that any maladjustments in their implementation will then be brought to light and rectified.

Ores and concentrates and primary products of both metals are included in the plans. Primary products are defined, as in the case of previous distributions by the Committee, as ferro-tungsten, tungsten powder, tungstic acid and tungsten salts, and ferro-molybdenum, molybdic acid and molybdenum salts, including calcium-molybdate and molybdic oxide. Roasted molybdenum concentrates are regarded by the Committee as being included in ores and concentrates, as in the case of previous distribution plans.

³ For tables of distribution, see IMC press release of Mar. 28.

The Committee estimates that the production of tungsten in the free world during the first 6 months of 1952 will be 8,200 metric tons metal content, and that the production of molybdenum will be 10,016 metric tons metal content.

Tungsten and molybdenum have been under international allocation since July 1, 1951. Although availabilities of the two metals have been increasing, they continue to remain in short supply. Data recently made public shows that free world availabilities of tungsten will have increased by about 20 percent in the second, over the first quarter of 1952. As compared to the first quarter of 1951, estimated production for the second quarter of 1952 has increased by about 80 percent. Free world supplies of molybdenum have increased over 10 percent in relation to the previous quarter of 1952. Over the year the increase in production amounts to just over 20 percent. Despite these improvements, the defense requirements of the free world of these alloying materials are such as to make it imperative that all participating countries do their utmost to implement the recommendations recently submitted to them by the Committee on measures of conservation and substitution.

Existing contracts are to be respected, so far as is possible, in carrying out the allocation arrangements. If such contracts provide for the supply of tungsten or molybdenum to any one importing country in excess of the amounts allocated, it is proposed that the importing country should divert shipments to other importing countries which have not yet filled their import quotas, so far as is possible without upsetting the original contractual arrangements.

Frank L. Weil To Serve as 1952 Chairman for U.N. Day

Secretary Acheson announced on April 2 that Frank L. Weil of New York City had accepted an invitation to serve as the 1952 Chairman of the National Citizens' Committee for United Nations Day—October 24, 1952. Mr. Weil, prominent New York lawyer, has been actively engaged in civic activities for many years.

Mr. Weil has met with Howland H. Sargeant, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, to discuss plans for the 1952 observance of United Nations Day. Emphasizing the importance of the United Nations as our best hope for bringing about peace and well-being in the world, Mr. Sargeant commended the National Citizens' Committee for its efforts in bringing about wider knowledge and understanding of what the United Nations is doing. He noted that for the first time in history people in 60 countries are joining in an observance of the same day—October 24, United Nations Day—as a symbol of their common aspirations.

Commemorating the birth of the United Nations, United Nations Day was officially established in 1947 by the General Assembly in a unanimous resolution inviting the support of the member governments and stating that the day "shall be devoted to making known to the peoples of the world the aims and achievements of the United Nations and to gaining their support for the work of the United Nations." The first such observance on an international scale was held in 1948.

Some 90 national organizations representing civic, veterans', fraternal, women's, labor, and educational groups compose the membership of the Committee. Headquarters are at Washington.

Plans for Eighth Pan American Railway Congress

Membership of the Organizing Committee which will make the necessary arrangements for the eighth Pan American Railway Congress to be held in the United States at Washington, D.C., and Atlantic City, N.J., beginning on June 12, 1953, was announced on March 24 by the Department of State. The Congress is expected to bring to the United States several hundred delegates from the countries in Central and South America.

Headed by James G. Lyne, President of the Simmons-Boardman Publishing Corporation and Editor of *Railway Age*, as Chairman, Loyd J. Kiernan, Manager of Special Studies of the Association of American Railroads, as General Secretary, the Committee includes Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce; Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State; Edward G. Miller, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State; Clarke L. Willard, Associate Chief of the Division of International Conferences of the Department of State; and Charles D. Mahaffie, a member of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Others on the Committee are William T. Faricy, President of the Association of American Railroads; James M. Hood, President of the American Short Line Railroad Association; Arlon E. Lyon, Executive Secretary of the Railway Labor Executives Association; George P. Baker, Professor of Transportation of Harvard University's Graduate School of Business Administration; Emil E. Schnellbacher, Assistant Director of the Office of International Trade of the Department of Commerce; Herbert Ashton, Director of the Transportation, Communications, and

Utilities Division of the Office of International Trade of the Department of Commerce; and Walter S. Abernathy, Transportation Economist of the Office of International Trade of the Department of Commerce.

In addition, the Committee includes John W. Barriger, President of the Chicago, Indianapolis, and Louisville Railway, and Mrs. Barriger; C. McD. Davis, President of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad; Harry A. DeButts, President of the Southern System; J. D. Dodson, President and General Counsel of the Texas-Mexican Railway; J. A. Fisher, President of the Reading Company; Walter S. Franklin, President of the Pennsylvania Railroad; Donald V. Fraser, President of the Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad; Fred G. Gurley, President of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway; Clark Hungerford, President of the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway; Wayne A. Johnston, President of the Illinois Central Railroad; D. P. Loomis, Chairman of the Association of Western Railways; G. Metzman, President of the New York Central System; Paul J. Neff, Chief Executive Officer of the Missouri Pacific Lines; D. J. Russell, President of the Southern Pacific Company; Lewis K. Silcox, Executive Vice President of the New York Air Brake Company; J. W. Smith, President of the Seaboard Air Line Railroad; and R. B. White, President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railway.

Industrial advisers on the Committee include Manuel Alonso, Manager of Foreign Sales of the American Locomotive Company; George W. Baughman, Vice President of the Union Switch and Signal Company; Nelson C. Dezendorf, General Manager of the Electro-Motive Division of General Motors Corporation; S. M. Felton, President of the Shippers' Car Line Corporation; C. L. Heater, Vice President of the American Steel Foundries; Charles Kerr, Jr., Consulting Transportation Engineer of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation; and Max K. Ruppert, First Vice President of Poor and Company.

Congresses of the Pan American Railway Congress Association usually convene every 3 years, the last one being held at México, D.F., Mexico, in the fall of 1950. The Association, of which the United States became a member in 1948, is made up of national governments, railroad companies, and railway supply manufacturers. The purpose of the organization is to promote the development and progress of railroads in the Western Hemisphere.

A few additional members of the Organizing Committee will be named at a later date.

U. S. Delegations to International Conferences

NATO Petroleum Committee

The Department of State announced on April 1 that the following statement has been released to the press by the Secretariat of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization:

The first meeting of the newly established North Atlantic Petroleum Planning Committee will be held April 2 in the London headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The committee has been under consideration since last summer and is established pursuant to a resolution introduced in the North Atlantic Council deputies by the United Kingdom Government early last December.

Petroleum experts from most of the NATO countries will attend the conference which has been called to prepare studies on the subject of the petroleum requirements of North Atlantic Treaty members in the event of an emergency. The committee will not concern itself with any current international petroleum problems.

The Petroleum Planning Committee is composed of a representative and an alternate from each member country of NATO desiring to participate, plus such additional advisers as member countries may wish to designate. The committee is directed to establish and maintain close working relations with other appropriate agencies of NATO having an interest in the subject, such as the Standing Group, the Planning Board for Ocean Shipping and the defense production, financial, and economic elements of NATO's international Secretariat.

The United States delegation to the Petroleum Planning Committee meeting is composed of:

C. Stribling Snodgrass—Assistant Deputy Administrator of the Petroleum Administration for Defense, Chairman of the delegation and U. S. representative to the North Atlantic Petroleum Planning Committee
Oscar Bransky—Petroleum Adviser of the European Office of Mutual Security Agency, Alternate U. S. representative to the North Atlantic Petroleum Committee
Charles Hedland—Petroleum Administration for Defense, Adviser
Col. G. H. Montgomery—Department of Defense, Adviser
C. J. Dwyer—Mutual Security Agency, Adviser
Robert Eakens—Petroleum Policy Staff, Department of State, Adviser
James W. Swihart—Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, Adviser

The following NATO countries have so far indicated that they will send delegations to the Petroleum Committee meeting: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.

Status of Women

The Department of State announced on March 18 that Olive Remington Goldman, U.S. representative on the Commission on the Status of Women of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc), will attend the 6th session of the Commission, which will convene at Geneva, Switzerland, on March 24, 1952. She will be assisted by the following advisers:

Alice Angus Morrison, Women's Bureau, Department of Labor
Rachel C. Nason, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
Ruth Woodsmall, Chief of Women's Affairs, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, Frankfurt on the Main, Germany

Among the items on the provisional agenda for this session are political rights of women; nationality of married women; status of women in public law; status of women in private law; educational opportunities for women; participation of women in the work of the United Nations; technical-assistance program in relation to the status of women; and the report of the Inter-American Commission of Women. The findings of the 6th session will be summarized in a report which will be submitted to Ecosoc.

The Commission on the Status of Women, which was established in 1946, is one of the nine permanent functional commissions of Ecosoc. The Commission is responsible for the preparation of recommendations and reports to the Council on the promotion of women's rights in political, economic, social, educational, and civil fields. Eighteen governments, elected by the Council, comprise the membership of the Commission. The last (5th) session of the Commission was held at Lake Success, April 30–May 14, 1951.

Fisheries

The Department of State announced on March 18 that a conference on fisheries, sponsored by the Caribbean Commission, will convene at Port-of-

Spain, Trinidad, British West Indies, March 24-28, 1952. The U.S. delegation is as follows:

Chairman

Richard T. Whiteleather, Assistant Chief, Branch of Commercial Fisheries, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior

Delegates

Luis Bonnet, San Juan, Puerto Rico
Felix Inigo, San Juan, Puerto Rico

The Caribbean Commission is sponsoring a series of conferences for the purpose of increasing and disseminating the technical knowledge necessary to the development of the economic resources of the Caribbean area. The forthcoming Conference is considered particularly important in view

of the following factors: (1) fish is the principal protein in the diets of the Caribbean peoples; (2) the area is dependent upon the importation of fish; and (3) new techniques of fishing and marketing might make deep-sea fish from the Caribbean waters available at reasonable costs.

The provisional agenda for the Conference includes consideration of such matters as: occurrence and distribution of commercial fish species in the Caribbean; techniques practiced in the Caribbean for fish capture; types of fishing craft in use in the Caribbean; fish marketing, including storage and distribution; methods for conserving and processing fish in the Caribbean; cultivation of fish in ponds; application of recent technical knowledge to exploration and development of new fisheries; and various papers and reports.

Reports of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

THIRTY-SIXTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD DECEMBER 16-31, 1951¹

U.N. doc. S/2541
Transmitted February 6, 1952

I herewith submit report number 36 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-31 December, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiqués numbers 1114-1129, inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

The armistice negotiations continued on agenda item 3, concrete arrangements for carrying out the terms of the cease fire and armistice, and agenda item 4, prisoners of war, with some progress apparently being achieved on both items. The discussions were marked by the usual Communist intransigence including propaganda statements unrelated to a military armistice, evasive answers to pointed and pertinent questions, and puerile illogical arguments. This period, as in the past, was marked by an earnest and patient effort on the part of the United Nations Command delegation to reach a just and equitable agreement.

Agreement was reached on the following three principles for agenda item 3:

1. All armed forces under the control of either side, including all units and armed personnel of the ground, naval and air forces shall cease all hostilities within twenty-four hours after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective.

2. All armed forces under the control of either side shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone within seventy-two hours after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective. Except for such armed forces of a police nature as may be specifically agreed

to by both sides, no armed forces of either side shall thereafter enter the demilitarized zone; nor shall the armed forces of either side commit any acts of armed force against the demilitarized zone. Each side shall manage in accordance with the stipulations of the armistice agreement the administrative affairs of that portion of the demilitarized zone lying on its side of the military demarcation line.

3. All armed forces, ground, naval and air, under the control of either side shall be withdrawn, within five days after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective, from the rear and coastal islands and waters of the other side, meaning islands which were formerly controlled by the other side and any others specifically and mutually agreed to. If they are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for delaying the withdrawal, the other side shall have the right to take all necessary action against such armed personnel for the maintenance of security and order.

The major issues which remained to be solved under agenda item 3 were as follows:

1. Rehabilitation of airfields
2. Aerial observation and aerial photography
3. Rotation and replenishment

The United Nations Command has held from the beginning that no military advantage should accrue to either side during the period of an armistice. The rehabilitation of airfields in Korea would afford the enemy a tremendous military advantage which is at present denied to him. Mutual air inspection constitutes a safeguard for both sides, yet the Communists have summarily rejected it as being unnecessary.

The Communists oppose unlimited rotation and replenishment. The United Nations Command holds that both sides should have the right to replace their personnel on a man-for-man, unit-for-unit basis and their equipment on a piece-for-piece basis. Otherwise attrition would result in a *de facto* withdrawal of forces from Korea. Such a withdrawal could be agreed to only on a governmental level.

In an earnest endeavor to reach agreement the United Nations Command delegation has introduced three new

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on Feb. 6. Texts of the 30th, 31st, and 32d reports appear in the BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; the 33d report in the BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395; the 34th report in the BULLETIN of Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430; and the 35th report in the BULLETIN of Mar. 31, 1952, p. 512.

proposals. These new proposals would, if accepted, make the major concessions to the Communist side. They show the purposeful intent of the United Nations Command to secure an armistice on honorable and equitable terms.

These concessions involve:

1. Elimination of aerial observation and

2. Provision for the rehabilitation of a reasonable number of airfields for civil air operations. The proposed United Nations Command principles are as follows:

(a) In order to ensure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate a peaceful settlement by action at a political level, both sides undertake not to introduce into Korea any reinforcing military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective. Such rotation of military personnel as within the limit agreed upon by both sides shall be reported to the Military Armistice Commission so that the supervisory organ of non-combatant nations may be entrusted to conduct on-the-spot supervision and inspection, which shall be carried out at the ports of entry in rear agreed upon by both sides.

The rehabilitation of a limited number of airfields for civil air operations at specified points shall be agreed; such rehabilitation shall not include extension of runways. No other airfields shall be rehabilitated or constructed.

(b) Each side shall designate an equal number of members to form a Military Armistice Commission to be responsible for supervising the implementation of the armistice agreement and for settling through negotiation any violation of the armistice agreement. The functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armistice agreement shall be carried out in accordance with the following two provisions:

(1) Within the demilitarized zone, the Military Armistice Commission utilizing joint teams directly dispatched by it shall be responsible.

(2) Outside the demilitarized zone, at the ports of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides and at the places where violations of the armistice have been reported to have occurred, a supervisory organ of representatives of non-combatant nations shall be entrusted to be responsible. Upon the request to the supervisory organ of non-combatant nations by both sides, or either side on the Military Armistice Commission, for investigation of a violation of the armistice agreement, the supervisory organ of non-combatant nations shall carry out the inspection.

(c) Both sides agree to invite nations acceptable to both sides which have not participated in the Korean War, to send, upon their consent, an equal number of representatives to form a supervisory organ to be entrusted by the Military Armistice Commission to be responsible for carrying out the functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in paragraph (a) and paragraph (b) (2) of this agreement. Upon the request by both sides or either side on the Military Armistice Commission for carrying out these functions the supervisory organ of non-combatant nations shall dispatch immediately inspection teams to carry out the functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armistice agreement at ports of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides, and at places where violations of the armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred outside the demilitarized zone, and shall report on the results of supervision and inspection to the Military Armistice Commission. In performing their above-stated functions, the inspection teams of non-combatant nations shall be accorded full convenience by both sides over the main lines of communication and transportation as agreed upon by both sides.

In preliminary discussions on item 4, the United Nations Command insisted on two essential steps prior to reaching an agreement on the exchange of prisoners of war:

1. Exchange of prisoners of war data to include numbers, nationality, names and locations of prisoners of war held by both sides, and

2. Authority for the entry into Communist prisoner of war camps of International Committee of the Red Cross Delegates who were immediately available for prisoner of war relief work.

While initially the Communists resisted strongly any exchange of prisoner of war information prior to reaching final agreement on the exchange of prisoners of war, continued pressure by the United Nations Command delegation eventually forced from them an agreement to produce some of the required information. On 18 December 1951 they furnished a list of prisoners of war whom they alleged were available for exchange, including 3,198 United States, 1,216 other United Nations Command and 7,142 Republic of Korea, totalling 11,556. This total was immediately challenged by United Nations Command as being entirely disproportionate to the total number of missing in action suffered during the war and completely at variance with the information United Nations Command had obtained from a variety of sources which indicated many more prisoners of war should be alive in Communist custody. After insistent demands, the Communists have agreed to furnish additional evidence of the whereabouts of approximately 1,000 names furnished to them by United Nations Command which were not on the Communist lists. After much more discussion, they agreed reluctantly on 29 December 1951 to produce what they claim will be a full report on all prisoners taken by them since the start of the war. Even with this concession, the Communists delegates laid the basis for further excuses by claiming that any data they produce would be incomplete because of the absence of records allegedly due to destruction during the war.

The United Nations Command on the other hand, indicated its willingness to provide Communists with a complete accounting for all prisoners of war ever held, even though the United Nations Command had been regularly forwarding prisoner of war records through Washington to Geneva. The United Nations Command indicated that it had nothing to hide, and consistent with the completeness of the data furnished by the individual prisoner of war, would disclose to the Communists, as rapidly as the large number of prisoners of war involved permitted, any data they required.

Despite repeated efforts by the United Nations Command delegation to secure agreement on the entry of International Committee of the Red Cross delegates into North Korean prisoner of war camps to assist in relief work, the Communists would not acquiesce. The Communists, when faced with that wording of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to prisoners of war which related to visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross, were evasive; they virtually implied that they would observe such portions of the Geneva Convention as suited their purposes. They were immediately reminded by the United Nations Command of the official promise made by the North Korean Government in the early days of the war that the North Korean Army would abide by the Convention, even though they were not signatory to it. Refusal now to live up to their word reaffirms our belief that any agreement we may enter into with the Communist must include adequate safeguards which would not leave the matter of compliance dependent merely upon their good faith. Conversely, the United Nations Command has consistently supported the role of the International Committee of the Red Cross permitting free access to all its prisoners of war camps and lending every effort to assist the International Committee of the Red Cross wherever possible. The consistent unwillingness of the Communists to permit the International Committee of the Red Cross to accomplish the basic humanitarian purposes for which it was organized is beyond comprehension. In a further effort to secure agreement, the Commander-in-Chief, on 21 December 1951 addressed a personal communication to the Commanders of the North Korean and

Chinese Communists Forces in which he emphasized the desirability of permitting International Committee of the Red Cross to carry out its work in North Korean prisoner of war camps, pointing out that military forces in previous wars have always recognized the neutral position of this organization and have encouraged its assistance. In reply, on 24 December 1951, the Communists made a typically evasive answer, attempting to lay the blame for delay in armistice negotiations on the United Nations Command, claiming the prisoners of war they hold are getting excellent treatment and do not need outside assistance. The Communists suggested, however, that as a concession to the United Nations Command, they would have no objection to the formation of joint teams of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Red Cross of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Chinese People's Republic going to the prisoner of war camps of both sides to assist in supervising the prisoners of war exchange after the armistice agreement was signed. The obvious and understandable reaction of the senior delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross when this information was presented to him by the United Nations Command, was that this proposal was entirely untenable since it would violate completely the neutral position the International Committee of the Red Cross has continually maintained as its fundamental concept. Obviously the Communist intent was to attempt to identify the International Committee of the Red Cross as a United Nations Agent, thus providing them with propaganda material for their continued non-observance of the Geneva Convention.

In the hope that some sort of agreement might be eventually forced from the Communists, the United Nations Command requested from Geneva additional International Committee of the Red Cross delegates to be available for entry into North Korea should permission be secured, and to assist the United Nations Command in that part of the prisoner of war exchange which would occur in its area. On 27 December 1951, six delegates arrived in Tokyo. They will proceed to Eighth Army after a short period of orientation and will prepare their plans for future operations.

On 24 December 1951, the Communists suggested that Christmas letters from prisoners of war be exchanged via the sub-delegation on agenda item 4. This was immediately accepted by the United Nations Command delegation. Arrangements were expanded on the United Nations Command side to establish not only delivery facilities for United Nations Command and Republic of Korea prisoners of war in Communist hands and for Communist prisoners of war in United Nations Command custody; but action was also taken to establish a temporary postal service to handle incoming mail to United Nations Command and Republic of Korea prisoners of war. This information, complete with details on how mail should be addressed, was given world-wide publicity. In this connection, however, it is desired to point out that the United Nations Command has always given its prisoners of war free and unlimited mail privileges and encouraged their use. The provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention in this regard have always been strictly complied with.

The thirty-day period during which the armistice was to be negotiated (following the agreement on November 27 on the principles governing the establishment of a military demarcation line) passed on December 27 without any formal action being taken.

Action along the Korean battlefield remained minor in nature, constant United Nations Command patrolling served to reveal improvements in the enemy's defensive positions. Numerous hard-fought clashes reflected the enemy's determination not to be dislodged from his present entrenchments. Although the enemy did not initiate any major ground action, his patrols and small-scale probing attacks during the hours of darkness clearly showed his desire to obtain current combat intelligence. In only three instances did these efforts involve units larger than a company. The entire course of the enemy's forward battle positions, and especially his artillery positions, were

subjected to constant United Nations Command artillery bombardment. In addition to the resultant steady attrition of enemy manpower and matériel, incessant United Nations Command artillery fire continued to confine enemy movement and activities in the forward areas to hours of darkness and seriously restricted the firing of enemy artillery. Early in the period prisoners reported the dissolution of the major component elements of the VI North Korean Corps. Front lines remained unchanged during the period. In the United Nations Command rear areas the anti-guerrilla actions succeeded in drastically reducing the strength of these dissident elements.

On the western front United Nations Command patrols encountered strong opposition from forward Chinese Communist combat elements. Rapid and aggressive enemy counter-action resulted from attacks by United Nations Command raiding parties. Despite the resolute resistance offered to United Nations Command patrols these actions often resulted in the withdrawal of the enemy unit engaged. Most frequent patrol contacts on this front were effected in Sagimak area. On 18 December the Sagimak area was also the site of one of the heaviest enemy attacks of the period. An enemy battalion made two unsuccessful attempts to pierce United Nations Command outpost positions. A similar attack which met with only slight initial success occurred in the Punji area on 28 December.

Battle action on the central front resembled that of the western front. The Sutae area was the site of the most frequent patrol encounters. Anti-tank mines along the approaches to enemy positions at times hindered the movement of United Nations Command armored patrols. With the exception of a relief of an enemy division in the Pyonggang area by local reserves, the disposition of enemy units remained unchanged.

Except for the Mulguji area, action on the eastern front followed the same pattern of aggressive patrolling by both sides. Between 25 and 28 December enemy units up to battalion strength made repeated night attacks against United Nations Command positions in the Mulguji area. Initial slight enemy gains resulted in the stubbornly contested and successful counter-actions fought in rugged snow-covered terrain. During the previous period the I North Korean Corps followed the earlier movement of the VI North Korean Corps from the western to extreme eastern battle area. This redistribution resulted in the consolidation in the eastern sector of all major North Korean combat elements in the forward areas. This movement, apparently designed to bolster the effectiveness of the North Korean Army, was immediately followed by the apportionment of the three divisions of the VI North Korean Corps to increase the troops strength of other North Korean units. This action distinctly portrays the manpower shortage within North Korea resulting from heavy losses inflicted by the United Nations Command during the eighteen months of combat.

Republic of Korea security elements in the southwest-ern portion of the Korean Peninsula swept into the second phase of the anti-guerrilla campaign. The number of guerrilla units engaged showed a reduction from the previous period. This was due principally to the direction of all guerrilla resources toward self-preservation by evading contact with Republic of Korea elements. Nevertheless, the vigorous and well-planned actions of the Security Elements resulted in the further appreciable reduction of guerrilla strength within the Republic of Korea.

The practice of securing replacements for some units from other divisional units of the VI North Korean Corps slightly reduces the number of combat units available for employment by the enemy. With the exception of this diminution, the enemy's offensive capability remains unaltered. Although the enemy continues his efforts to maintain a high state of combat preparedness, he has not disclosed any intent to pass from defensive to offensive operations within the near future.

Snow, heavy seas and poor visibility characterized the Korean weather during the last two weeks of December.

In spite of unfavorable conditions United Nations Command surface and Naval Air Forces maintained a "steel curtain" along both coasts of North Korea concentrating the heaviest attacks in Central Korea. Shells and rockets were delivered around the clock in supporting fire at the battle line; interdiction firing at Kojo, Wonsan, Hungnam, Songjin, and Chongjin on the east coast; and harassment firing on enemy troops and supplies in the Chinnampo, Haeju and Han River areas on the west coast. Heavy damage and many personnel losses were inflicted on the enemy by these incessant bombardments.

Naval air strikes from the carriers and Marine air strikes from carrier and shore bases continued interdiction and close air support missions with excellent results. Numerous bridge and rail cuts, enemy munition and supply dumps, and hundreds of enemy personnel caught in exposed positions were added to the lists of damages and casualties imposed by United Nations Command Naval Air operations.

Helicopters furnishing rescue services, air spot, and liaison continued to play an important role in the Korean War. The loss of a Neptune patrol plane in the Sea of Japan on the stormy night after Christmas was dramatized by the destroyer rescue of six of the crew from a raft, an hour and forty minutes after the plane ditched because of engine trouble.

United Nations Command aircraft under the control of the Far East Air Forces, flying an average of 700 sorties per day continued to attack targets throughout Communist-dominated Korea although heavy weather, cloud cover and reduced visibility adversely affected the intensity of the attacks. The primary objectives of the United Nations Command air attacks, conducted both by day and by night, were the interdiction of enemy rail and highway traffic, neutralization of airfield in North Korea and the provision of close air support as called for by the United Nations Command ground forces. Although armed reconnaissance aircraft found few enemy troops in the open, they were able to detect and destroy many camouflaged supply buildings, military dumps and artillery positions with the aid of the contrast provided by winter landscapes.

Fighter-bombers and light bombers, during both day and night interdiction operations, reported rail lines cut in 1,030 places and the damage or destruction of 1,730 vehicles, twenty-two locomotives and 501 railroad cars as well as miscellaneous targets such as bridges, roads, supply carts, and tunnels.

The enemy air-to-air activity over northwest Korea showed a decided decline over the previous period due, in all probability, to snow cover and low ceilings at Communist bases in Manchuria, as well as multiple layers of clouds over Korea. Strong forces of MIG 15's were observed on seven days, with a new high of 360 enemy aircraft observed by the United Nations Command pilots on 29 December. The enemy proved to be generally non-aggressive and avoided combat on most occasions. As a result of the enemy's non-aggressiveness, United Nations Command pilots were able to account for only three MIGs destroyed and four damaged during this period. The recent commitment by United States Air Force of an additional group of F-86 fighter aircraft has improved appreciably the United Nations Command air-to-air and air defense capability in Korea.

Electronic aids to navigation and bombing permitted the Far East Air Force Bomber and Combat Cargo Commands to continue unrestricted operations, despite the inclement weather over Korea. A total of 9,800 tons of air cargo, including 44,000 passengers and air evacuation patients, were transported in support of United Nations Command units. A special phase of the cargo operations was the accelerated delivery of backlogged holiday mail and packages for United Nations Command personnel in the front lines. B-29's, with bombs and leaflets, were dispatched nightly against targets in North Korea.

The joint air ground operations center in Korea reported no air alerts. On two occasions United Nations Command aircraft operating over friendly areas reported night air-to-air encounters with unidentified aircraft.

A screening and investigation of individuals detained in the United Nations Command prisoner of war camps has disclosed the presence of approximately 37,500 civilian residents of the Republic of Korea. The detention of these civilians was attributable to various circumstances attendant upon the confusion inseparable from hostilities such as the displacement of large masses of the civilian population. A thorough rescreening of these civilians is now being conducted jointly by the Republic of Korea and the United Nations Command to insure that none are dangerous to security of the United Nations Command forces. The civilians, all citizens of the Republic of Korea, have now been segregated from the prisoners of war in separate camps and, following the rescreening, will gradually be released to return to their homes. The United Nations Command has furnished the International Committee of the Red Cross at Geneva with complete information concerning this group, including the names of all individuals concerned.

70,000,000 leaflets were airdropped over the principal cities of Northern Korea and the enemy forces in the front lines during the three day period of 24, 25 and 26 December. These leaflets emphasized the United Nations efforts towards establishing peace by reiterating the friendship of the United Nations for the Korean and Chinese people and expressing hope for a new year of peace and amity. The dissemination of these messages was a major step in the continuing drive to make clear to the soldiers and civilians throughout the Communist-occupied areas of Korea the duplicity of their leaders in advocating peace while practicing aggression. News sheets and radio broadcasts, as well as other leaflets, carried full reports of the armistice negotiations, explaining in detail the reasons for the United Nations stand on each question and the Communist tactics of obstruction and delay.

A memorandum of understanding has been consummated between the United Nations Command and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. Under the terms of this memorandum, the existing agreements governing relations between the United Nations Command and United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency have been interpreted and made effective. While military operations are in progress (known as phase 1), the United Nations Command has sole responsibility for the operation of all projects of relief and economic aid in Korea. During this phase, United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency planning teams will be maintained in Tokyo and Korea. Joint United Nations Command-United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency Committees are being established in Tokyo and in Korea for the resolution of mutual problems and responsibilities and for planning for phase two of the agreement, when United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency will assume operational responsibility in Korea. During the current phase, United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency civilian technical and staff personnel on the operating level in Korea, are attached to and integrated in the United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea.

RIDGWAY

THIRTY-SEVENTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1-15, 1952¹

U.N. doc. S/2550
Transmitted March 4, 1952

I herewith submit report number 37 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 January 1952 inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués numbers 1130-1144, provide detailed accounts of the operations.

¹Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U. S. representative in the Security Council, on Mar. 4.

The discussion of agenda item number 3 centered on the three principles proposed by the United Nations Command delegation and quoted in United Nations Command report number 36. Although some slight progress was made, the stand taken by the Communists causes increasing doubt as to their true intentions toward an armistice. They continue to oppose any restriction on the rehabilitation of airfields, their arguments centering on "Sovereign rights" and "interference in internal affairs". The United Nations Command considers these arguments to be illogical and contradictory. Any armistice agreement must necessarily concomitantly result in some abridgment of so-called sovereign rights. The significant fact is that such abridgment is voluntarily assumed and mutually agreed to by the nations concerned. The right to agree, as the United Nations Command delegation has stated to the Communist delegates, is the very essence of sovereignty. The Communists have already agreed to limitations on the introduction of personnel and equipment and to observation by non-combatant teams; and they admit that such provisions are required to insure against an increase in military capabilities. The United Nations Command holds that restriction on increase in military air capabilities is also a fundamental safeguard. Additional combat airfields closer to the battle line would permit additional sorties per day by the same aircraft. This would result in a definite increase in military air capability. For either side to construct combat airfields during an armistice, therefore, would cause tensions which would jeopardize the duration of the agreement. The United Nations Command has agreed to the rehabilitation of sufficient airfields in North Korea to insure the full conduct of North Korean civil affairs. Hence, the Communist insistence on unlimited airfield construction is obviously detrimental to the basic objectives of the armistice agreement. It is noteworthy that the United Nations Command delegation has repeatedly asked the question: "Do you agree that neither side should increase its military air capabilities during the period of the armistice?". This question has always met with an evasive, equivocal reply from the Communist side.

In an effort to reach a sound solution to the problem of exchanging prisoners of war which would be acceptable to both the United Nations Command and the Communists and at the same time preserve the most humanitarian aspects of repatriation, the United Nations Command armistice delegation introduced the following proposal, which incorporates provisions for all prisoners of war and civilians who have been involved in the conflict:

"Prisoners of war who elect repatriation shall be exchanged on a 1-for-1 basis until one side has exchanged all such prisoners of war held by it.

"The side which thereafter holds prisoners of war shall repatriate all those prisoners of war who elect to be repatriated in a 1-for-1 exchange for foreign civilians interned by the other side, and for civilians and other persons of the one side who are at the time of the signing of the armistice in the territory under control of the other side, and who elect to be repatriated. Prisoners of war thus exchanged shall be paroled to the opposing force, such parole to carry with it the condition that the individual shall not again bear arms against the side releasing him.

"All prisoners of war not electing repatriation shall be released from prisoner of war status and shall be paroled, such parole to carry with it the condition that the individual will not again bear arms in the Korean conflict.

"All remaining civilians of either side who are, at the time of the signing of the armistice, in territory under control of the other side, shall be repatriated if they so elect.

"In order to insure that the choice regarding repatriation is made without duress, delegates of the International Committee of The Red Cross shall be permitted to interview all prisoners of war at the points of exchange, and all civilians of either side who are at the time of the signing of the armistice in territory under the control of the other side."

In defining "civilians" as used in this proposal, the United Nations Command emphasized they were considered to be individuals of either side who on 25 June 1950 were bona-fide residents under the Republic of Korea or the Communist regime in North Korea.

In summary, the United Nations Command proposal provides for the release of all prisoners of war including soldiers of one side who may have been impressed into the armed forces of the other side. It was pointed out to the Communists that the United Nations Command proposal was consistent in every respect with the initial Communist claim that all prisoners of war of both sides should be released.

As regards repatriation, the proposal permits freedom of choice of the individual thus insuring that no duress or force will be exercised to influence him. It provides repatriation not only for prisoners of war, but for displaced persons and refugees as well, who can equally be considered as victims of war. Those who so desire are permitted to return to their homes as soon as possible. Finally, the United Nations Command proposal provides for a supervisory organ to interview the persons involved, to insure that, whatever their choice, it will be made freely and without fear.

The initial reaction of the Communists in protesting the United Nations Command proposal was characterized by a series of vicious and slanderous remarks, among which the United Nations Command was accused of attempting to keep prisoners of war in slavery, to hold them as hostages and prevent the civilian population in the United Nations Command zone from being repatriated. After continued and sometimes exasperating discussion, it became quite clear that the basic objection to the United Nations Command proposal was not that the Communists did not recognize its workability and humanitarian features, but that they were alarmed at the possibility that large numbers of the prisoners we held and of the North Korean refugee population now in Southern Korea, would refuse return to Communist control. It appeared most significant that, while supposedly arguing the right of impressed Republic of Korea Army soldiers to remain in the Communist forces, the Communists insisted that prisoners of war of both sides should be forcefully repatriated.

Throughout subsequent discussion, the Communists have attempted to play a variety of themes all aimed at discrediting the United Nations Command proposal. They have been completely unsuccessful in advancing one valid statement that can refute the United Nations Command proposal to extend the right to elect repatriation to every prisoner and civilian internee now in our custody and to every civilian who fled into South Korea at the start of the war. We have emphasized that the decision of each prisoner of war with reference to his repatriation would be openly and publicly expressed before a representative of the International Red Cross at the point of exchange, and that the United Nations Command proposal stands openly and conclusively as the most humanitarian, equitable approach to the exchange of prisoners of war, civilians and refugees, and entirely in consonance with the spirit of the Geneva Convention.

The enemy displayed only limited offensive tendencies in the battle area and confined his action mainly to night patrolling and probing attacks employing units up to the strength of a company. One exception to this pattern of activity occurred in the extreme Western sector of the battle line where advances gained by a limited United Nations Command attack were nullified by a successful counterattack by strong enemy forces. During daylight hours the enemy concentrated his efforts towards turning back the numerous United Nations Command patrols. The front lines remained unchanged during the period. Continued anti-guerrilla operations further impaired the dwindling strength of guerrilla forces within the Republic of Korea.

Fighting in the Punji area was heavy as contrasted to the patrol activity along the remainder of the Western front. United Nations Command elements attacked on 3 January to complete the restoration of outpost positions

which had been lost as a result of an enemy attack on 28 December. Five days of almost constant fighting were required to drive the numerically equal enemy defenders from these positions. The immediate commitment of two additional enemy regiments to a daylight counterattack forced the United Nations Command elements from the disputed positions. It is estimated that approximately 3,000 casualties were inflicted on the enemy units during the course of this action.

There were no major military developments on the Western or Eastern fronts, the battle scene being dominated by aggressive patrolling by both sides. On two successive nights, 3 and 4 January, strong enemy combat patrols forced the withdrawal of United Nations Command outpost positions in the Mulgufu area. On both occasions the positions were fully restored by immediate United Nations Command counter-action.

The second phase of the anti-guerrilla operation in the Southwestern portion of the Korean peninsula was completed on 5 January and the third phase was initiated the following day. As a consequence of earlier successes, the number and size of the dissident groups encountered is decreasing steadily. In February 1951 the effective guerrilla strength within the Republic of Korea was estimated at approximately 27,000. Despite the continuous recruitment of additional followers by the guerrillas, the Republic of Korea security forces held this sizeable threat in check and by November 1951 had reduced the dissident strength to an estimated 10,000. During the past six weeks an intensified anti-guerrilla operation has further reduced the guerrilla forces to a strength of about 6,000 effectives.

The enemy's offensive capability remains unaltered. Prisoners of war fail to profess any knowledge of plans for an early offensive. On the contrary, recent prisoners of war reports indicate only plans to continue the defense. The bulk of the available evidence supports the prisoners of war allegations which point to the enemy's maintenance of his present defensive attitude.

In the first weeks of 1952 United Nations Command naval forces and naval and marine air squadrons exerted strenuous efforts to help prevent an enemy build-up during the lull in ground operations. Sustained ground interdiction was continued along both coasts by the surface blockading forces in night and day attacks. Their harassing and supporting bombardments inflicted personnel and material losses on the enemy at the battleline and at major North Korean coastal communication centers.

Carrier and land-based naval and marine air squadrons continued the interdiction of enemy rail, highway and sea routes in spite of marginal weather conditions. Patrol squadrons maintained reconnaissance of enemy waters, and furnished anti-submarine patrols for friendly supply convoys.

Minesweeping and naval artillery support fire continued on a round-the-clock basis. The United States minesweeper *Dextrous*, operating near Wonsan, lost one killed and two wounded when she was hit several times by 75 millimeter gunfire from enemy shore-based batteries.

United Nations Command air attacks constituted the most aggressive type of action during the reporting period. The enemy continued to counter these attacks with active air defense forces and passive defense measures which made ground targets difficult to locate and destroy. The combination of small arms ground fire, anti-aircraft artillery concentrations and high performance interceptor aircraft accounted for the destruction of thirty-nine United Nations Command aircraft. Despite frequent air-to-air combat between MIG-15 and United Nations Command aircraft the losses on both sides have been comparatively light. Pilots report that many flights of the enemy interceptors are non-aggressive and tend to

avoid combat even when they have strong advantages in position and numbers. On other occasions United Nations Command pilots have engaged flights of MIGs which exhibited aggressive spirit, improved tactics and a high degree of pilot technique. On those occasions little advantage is enjoyed by either side and claims for kills and the number of damaged aircraft remains low. This trend in MIG operations is now quite pronounced and lends credence to the theory that Northwest Korea is being used by Communist forces for systematic advanced training of fighter pilots. United Nations Command pilots claim destruction of twelve MIGs and damage to twenty more in air-to-air combat.

The bulk of the fighter-bomber and medium bomber effort was again directed at interdiction of enemy railroad facilities. During daylight hours the principal targets were rail cuts along the open lines and attacks on locomotives, rail cars and supply stacks adjacent to the right of way. At night medium bombers attacked key bridges in the North Korean rail system. The extent of the unrepaired and damaged rail lines south of the Chong-Chon River has permitted the allocation of some rail interdiction effort to targets North of the previous rail interdiction boundary.

United Nations Command army requirements for close support sorties were furnished whenever lucrative targets were uncovered. Aircraft of the Republic of Korea Air Force provided close support for anti-guerrilla operations in rear areas.

Enemy or unidentified aircraft were reported over United Nations Command positions on three occasions. These were all night nuisance attacks with damage to friendly installations being reported as superficial. A typical example occurred during the pre-dawn hours on 1 January when low performance aircraft dropped mortar-shell type fragmentation bombs in the Seoul-Inchon area. There were no United Nations Command casualties, but one Korean farmer was killed and two others injured.

United Nations Command leaflets, loudspeaker broadcasts, and radio broadcasts reported to enemy soldiers, and to Korean civilians under Communist subjugation, the protraction of armistice negotiations by the continued stalling tactics of Communist spokesmen at Panmunjon. These United Nations Command media reiterated the determination of the Korean people and the United Nations Command forces to press for the early conclusion of a just and realistic armistice agreement despite continuing Communist obstruction of efforts to restore peace. Wide publicity was given to the United Nations Command proposal to allow prisoners of war to exercise freedom of choice in repatriation. Radio broadcasts and news sheets explained in detail the necessity for prohibiting construction or rehabilitation of military airfields during the period following an armistice.

Under the terms of the approved memorandum of understanding between the United Nations Command and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, the Joint United Nations Command-United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency Committee in Tokyo held its initial meeting on 5 January 1952. The meetings, leading towards initial understanding and agreement, dealt with the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency organization, committee membership, rules of procedure, United Nations Command and United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency joint operation, and the procurement of personnel for implementing the civil assistance and economic aid program. The mission of this joint committee is the resolution of mutual problems and responsibilities, during phase one when the United Nations Command has operational responsibility, and planning for phase two when the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency will assume operational responsibility.

RIDGWAY

The United States in the United Nations

March 28–April 10, 1952

General Assembly

United Nations Commission To Investigate Conditions for Free Elections in Germany—The Commission returned to its headquarters in Geneva on March 25 after consultations in Bonn with the Allied High Commission for Germany and with the Government officials of the Federal Republic of Germany, who agreed to grant the Commission all facilities it requested to enable it to undertake its work in the Federal Republic of Germany and western sectors of Berlin.

Mr. Kristjan Albertson (Iceland), Chairman of the Commission, stated that no reply had come from General Vassily Chuikov, Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission, to the two letters sent by the Commission on February 22 and March 10 expressing its wish to discuss arrangements with the authorities in the Soviet zone of Germany and in the eastern sector of Berlin. On March 26 a third letter was sent stating, *inter alia*:

The Commission's ability to undertake the work entrusted to it by the United Nations is now entirely dependent on the willingness of the responsible authorities in the Soviet zone of Germany and in the eastern sector of Berlin to conclude similarly satisfactory agreements with the Commission.

Security Council

Disarmament Commission—At the March 28 meeting, Chairman David M. Johnson (Canada), under Rule 23 of the Disarmament Commission's Rules of Procedure, ruled that specific charges of bacteriological warfare use or any other kind of warfare should not be raised in the Commission. Mr. Malik (U.S.S.R.) challenged this ruling, which was put to a vote and supported by all the members except the Soviet Union.

On April 2 by a vote of 10–1 (U.S.S.R.)–1 (China) two Working Committees were established, each consisting of all members, to be known as Committee I and Committee II. Committee I will be responsible for studying and reporting to the Commission on the matters which are mentioned under B in the Program of Work adopted on March 28, namely, "Regulation of all armaments and armed forces." Committee II will

be responsible for studying and reporting to the Commission on the matters covered by point A in the Program of Work, entitled "Disclosure and verification of all armaments, including atomic armaments, and of all armed forces." The Canadian proposal that the working committees should normally meet in closed session was rejected by 6–0–6 (Chile, China, France, Pakistan, the United States, U.S.S.R.).

At the first meeting of Committee I, April 4, Ambassador Benjamin V. Cohen (U.S.) stated:

The United States desires to find ways and means of devising safeguards which will insure that the obligations undertaken will be kept. . . . In my opening statement in the Disarmament Commission, I tried to outline some of the objectives and principles which we all must accept if we wish to do something about, and not merely talk about, disarmament. . . .

1. We should agree that the goal of disarmament is not to regulate but to prevent war, by making war inherently and constitutionally impossible as a means of adjusting disputes between nations. 2. . . . we must eliminate mass armies and all instruments of mass destruction. That means that no nation should be in such a state of armed preparedness as to be able to undertake a major war. We believe that armed forces and armaments should be reduced by international agreement to these levels (a) necessary for the maintenance of internal order; (b) necessary for the maintenance of peace through the United Nations collective-security system. 3. We all must agree and accept such foolproof safeguards so that we can all feel safe and sure that no nation is in a position to wage a successful war.

At the Committee II meeting, April 5, Ambassador Cohen submitted the U.S. proposals for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, in five stages, of armed forces and armaments, including atomic. The first stage, he noted, was neither small nor unimportant in scope. He said

It is a count of armed forces and of the locations and facilities concerned with armaments of all types, including atomic. We do feel that any progress that can be made in the field of disclosure and verification will greatly facilitate progress in the field of limitation, reduction and elimination of armed forces and armaments.

It was not true, he further pointed out, that the U.S. plan neglected atomic weapons in favor of conventional weapons. "Upon the successful completion of the first stage, all states will be in a position to calculate within measurable limits the potential strength in atomic weapons of all other states." Regarding the Soviet argument that

Commission discussions of disclosure and verification would get nowhere until it first made a decision to reduce armaments and prohibit atomic warfare, Ambassador Cohen pointed out that "Until we know more clearly what we are going to do, we can hardly decide in what time sequence we should do it."

Economic and Social Council

Commission on Status of Women—The Commission held its sixth session at Geneva March 24 through April 4. It rejected the usual Soviet motion to unseat the Chinese Nationalist representative as being unacceptable in view of the General Assembly resolution 396 providing that questions on representation of states be referred to the Assembly or its Interim Committee.

The Commission concluded examination of the Draft Convention on the Political Rights of Women and adopted a resolution, (13-0-3 (Soviet bloc)), recommending that Ecosoc open the Convention for signature. The Convention is designed to eliminate all discrimination against women in the field of political rights. Among other resolutions adopted were (1) Resolution (11-0-6) calling for effective implementation of the principle of equal pay for equal work for men and women workers. It recommends that all member states of the ILO introduce as soon as possible, by means of proper legislation and other measures, equal remuneration for equal work of men and women, urges adoption and implementation of this principle in all countries which are not members of the ILO, and requests the Commission on Human Rights to include in the Draft Covenant on Human Rights an article providing for the principle of equal remuneration. (2) Resolution (11-0-4) on participation of women in the work of the United Nations. It notes with disappointment that very few women occupy policy-making posts in the United Nations; urges the Secretary-General to continue appointing women to these posts in the Secretariat.

Trusteeship Council

The tenth session of the Trusteeship Council came to a close at U.N. Headquarters on April 1, 1952. During almost 5 weeks of the busy "winter session" which began on February 27, the Council devoted most of its time to consideration of annual reports on the administration of the four Trust Territories in the Pacific area. In addition to consideration of the written reports which were submitted prior to the opening of the session, the Council heard statements by the Special Representative of each of the Administering Authorities concerned: New Zealand for Western Samoa, Australia for New Guinea and Nauru, and the United States for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. During the question period follow-

ing the statement for each territory, special attention was given to questions of political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of that territory. The Council adopted specific recommendations on each territory, taking note of progress achieved, urging continued effort in certain fields, and, in some cases, requesting that additional information be furnished to the Council.

The special representative of the United States for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was Senator Elbert D. Thomas, High Commissioner of the Trust Territory. To supplement the written and oral information presented to the Council by the United States, a film on the Trust Territory was shown. Various members of the Council made generally commendatory statements on the U.S. administration of the Trust Territory. In addition, the Council adopted resolutions noting the progress achieved in several different fields and making suggestions and recommendations for future action. In the political and economic fields, for example, the United States was asked to continue its efforts to extend the electoral system and foster local initiative in the creation of regional representative bodies and to continue its efforts to develop the material resources and the transportation services of the Trust Territory. The Council also expressed hope that organic legislation for the Trust Territory would soon be enacted. In the social field, particular satisfaction was expressed at progress made in public health. In education, the Council suggested the possibility of an expanded scheme of scholarships to enable inhabitants to seek higher education outside the Trust Territory.

Acting on the reports of its newly established Standing Committee on Petitions, the Council during the latter part of its tenth session adopted resolutions on each of 35 petitions which had been examined. Additional arrangements for the forthcoming Visiting Mission to West Africa were made with the selection of Australia, Belgium, China, and El Salvador to nominate the individual members of the Mission. The Mission is to begin its visit to the four West African trust territories in August. The Council endorsed a report on the organization and functioning of visiting missions prepared by a committee of the Council and also approved a report by the Secretary-General on arrangements for administering offers of scholarships for inhabitants of Trust Territories. Final action on the revised Questionnaire to serve as the basis for future annual reports by the Administering Authorities was deferred until the next session. On another question, that of associating Trust Territory inhabitants more closely in its work, the Council established a six-member committee—El Salvador, France, Iraq, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the United States—to study the matter and report to the next session.

Presidential Mission to Korea

[Released to the press April 4]

A special Presidential mission headed by Clarence Meyer will depart for Pusan, Korea, on April 5, 1952, to discuss economic and financial problems of the Republic of Korea with officials of that Government.

Mr. Meyer, who is the Chief of the Special Mission for Economic Cooperation in Austria and was formerly Chief of the ECA Mission in Korea, has been made available especially for this mission on a temporary basis after which he will return to his post in Vienna. He will be assisted by Clarence Heer of the University of North Carolina and the following representatives of the Departments of Defense, Treasury, and State:

Maj. Gen. Stanley L. Scott, senior military representative
Col. W. S. Everett, Army
Col. L. M. Gosorn, Army
Lt. Col. L. J. Fuller, Jr., Army
1st Lt. H. A. Fisher, Army
Dr. R. W. E. Reid, Army
R. Hirshtritt, Treasury
William G. Jones, State

Mr. Meyer will discuss with officials of the Republic of Korea economic and financial problems, arising in connection with operations of the U.N. Command, and measures to help stabilize the economy of Korea.

THE CONGRESS

Initiation of New Refugee Resettlement Program

[Released to the press by the White House March 24]

The President, on March 22, sent identical letters to Tom Connally, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate; James P. Richards, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives; Richard B. Russell, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate; and Carl Vinson, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. The text of the letter follows:

In compliance with Section 101 (a) (1) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, I hereby notify you that I have today determined that it will contribute to the defense of the North Atlantic area and to the security of the United States to initiate a program to improve the reception and treatment and to secure the resettlement of qualified people who escape from the Iron Curtain area. This program will supplement, but in no sense supersede, the efforts now being made by the countries

bordering on the Iron Curtain area which carry the main responsibility for taking care of these people.

This program has been recommended to me by the Director for Mutual Security with the concurrence of the agencies concerned. It is their estimate that approximately \$4,300,000 of funds appropriated under Title I of the Mutual Security Act will be required for the calendar year 1952 to fund this program, which together with \$2,900,000 planned to be obtained from other sources including counterpart and privately contributed funds, will make possible the carrying out of this program.

Representatives of the Executive Branch are prepared, at your convenience, to provide you and your Committee colleagues personally with further information about this program if desired.

THE DEPARTMENT

John Foster Dulles Completes Assignment With Department

[Released to the press March 25]

*Following is an exchange of letters between Secretary Acheson and John Foster Dulles:*¹

MARCH 21, 1952

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have just written to the President that, the Senate having consented to the ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty and the three Pacific Security Treaties, I assume that my particular official responsibility ends.

I want to thank you for the complete support which you have given me throughout this matter and I am deeply grateful for the trust and confidence which you and the President reposed in me and which has enabled me to share in this great task of building peace and security in the Pacific area.

It is perhaps appropriate for me also to mention how happy it has been for me to have had this association, not only with you, but with the many in the State Department who, under you, are rendering devoted and sacrificial service and who have consistently given me their good will and support.

I am

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

¹ Mr. Dulles has served as Consultant to the Secretary since Apr. 6, 1950.

MARCH 24, 1952

DEAR FOSTER: Thank you for your note of March 21st. Your letter of the same date was forwarded to the President. He has voiced the thoughts and appreciation of all of us for your great service and achievement.

May I add a personal word in response to your kind statement regarding me and your associates here in the Department? It has been a joy to work with you over these past years. Your grasp of the problems, your resourcefulness in solving them and your dedication to the task has made our association a very happy one.

I am particularly grateful that after the signature of the treaties in San Francisco, you were willing at the request of the President and myself to defer your return to private life so that your unique knowledge of the treaties and the negotiations could be made available to the Senate during its consideration of them.

You take with you the high esteem and affectionate regard of your many friends and colleagues in the Department, a company in which I am happy to be included.

Most sincerely,

DEAN ACHESON

Appointment of Officers

Jack C. Corbett as director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy, effective March 28.

Point Four Appointments

Tracy R. Welling as director of technical cooperation in Jordan, effective March 26.

Marcus J. Gordon as director of technical cooperation in Ethiopia, effective March 27.

Paul Duncan as director of the Program Information and Reports Staff of TCA, effective April 2.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

First Instrument of Revision of the Occupation Statute for Germany. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2255. Pub. 4270. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States, United Kingdom, and France—Signed at Bonn Mar. 6, 1951; entered into force Mar. 7, 1951.

Health and Sanitation, Cooperative Program in Costa Rica. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2256. Pub. 4271. 16 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Costa Rica—Signed at San José Feb. 13, 1951; entered into force Feb. 13, 1951.

What is Point Four? Economic Cooperation Series 30. Pub. 4487. 12 pp. Free.

Address by Secretary of State Acheson Jan. 25, 1952.

Restitution of Monetary Gold: Submission to an Arbitrator of Certain Claims With Respect to Gold Looted by the Germans from Rome in 1943. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2252. Pub. 4283. 8 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States, United Kingdom, and France—Signed at Washington Apr. 25, 1951; entered into force Apr. 25, 1951.

Agricultural Mission in El Salvador. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2262. Pub. 4286. 11 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and El Salvador—Signed at San Salvador May 11, 1951; entered into force May 11, 1951.

Economic Cooperation With Italy Under Public Law 472, 80th Congress, as amended. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2263. Pub. 4292. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Italy—Signed at Rome May 21, 1951; entered into force May 21, 1951.

Economic Cooperation With France Under Public Law 472, 80th Congress, as amended. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2264. Pub. 4293. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and France—Signed at Paris May 22, 1951; entered into force May 22, 1951.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Mar. 31–Apr. 5, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

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bulletin

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April 21, 1952

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.

Point Four—A Revolution Against Hunger, Disease, And Human Misery

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN¹

I cannot tell you how much it means to me to come and meet with you tonight. You have come here from all parts of the country, and from all sorts of organizations—church groups, business groups, labor unions, and farm organizations. You have come to discuss ways and means of going ahead with our plans for Point Four.

Point Four takes its name from the last point of a fourfold program for peace in the world—the program I set forth in my Inaugural Address, 3 years ago last January.

We have been working on that program, and we have been making progress.

We have done well on the first three points.

First, we have supported the United Nations.

Second, we have carried forward our plans for world economic recovery.

Third, we have strengthened free nations against aggression.

But these three points by themselves will not bring us the permanent peace we desire. The fourth point, helping the free peoples of the world to help themselves—to produce more—to raise their living standards—and to achieve decent, satisfying lives—this fourth point is in the long run the most important of all. Without it we cannot reach the goal.

Through the measures we have taken in the last several years—aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, the Pacific treaties, the defense program, the resistance to aggression in Korea—through measures like these we are preventing conquest and world war. We have bought time—we have bought it at a great cost in lives and money.

Now it is up to us to use that time intelligently and courageously. We must use it to wipe out the root causes of war. We must use the time we are gaining by defense to campaign against hunger and disease and human misery.

¹Delivered by Secretary Acheson for the President before the National Conference on International Economic and Social Development at Washington on Apr. 8 and released to the press by the White House on the same date.

Mass suffering has been used by every dictatorship of our times as a stepping stone to power. It was used by the Japanese war lords. It was used by Hitler. Today it is the weapon of Soviet imperialism. Unless it is wiped out it may be used in the future by some new dictatorship more terrible even than the Soviet.

To have peace, we must strike at the conditions of misery that envelop half the people of the earth. That is the purpose and the meaning of Point Four.

Point Four Seen in Light of History

It will help us to understand Point Four if we step back and look at it in the light of history.

In this century, scientific progress has brought us to the point where mankind, for the first time in human history, can wipe poverty and ignorance and human misery clean off the face of the earth.

Yet this cannot be done unless scientific progress is linked with political freedom. That is the lesson of history. Without political freedom, scientific progress can become a menace, rather than a boon to humanity. In the hands of totalitarians, scientific progress can be used to destroy civilization.

But working together, scientific progress and political freedom can open such a future as mankind has never dreamed of.

We have seen what this means in our own country.

What we did here in the United States was to create the kind of political system in which men could breathe freely and work freely—the kind of government in which the energies of human beings could be released to make the most of the material resources around them.

This is why our country has become the center of industry and science. This is why we have been called upon to lead the fight for freedom. We have given greater opportunity to the individual than has ever been known before. We have given more material well-being to all our people than any earlier society was ever able to achieve.

That is what scientific progress and political

freedom have done for us—and for many other countries founded in the traditions of our Western civilization.

Self-Development Fostered in Asia and Africa

Moreover, the tremendous developments that have taken place in the Western world in modern times are having a profound effect upon the ancient civilizations in Asia and Africa.

The people of these areas have learned that they need not suffer hunger, disease, and poverty. They know that something can be done to put a stop to these things. They also have learned of the ideals of political liberty and self-government.

These peoples have watched us and learned from us. Now they are determined to share as equals in the benefits of modern progress.

They are determined that their resources will no longer be developed in the interest of foreigners on the pattern of the old imperialism. And they don't want them developed for the benefit of Soviet imperialism either. They insist that these resources be developed for their own benefit.

They are determined to establish their own free political and economic institutions—institutions which will make use of the best of our experience and will, at the same time, retain the best of their own cultures, and their own great traditions.

This, I believe, is the mood and the temper that has come to Africa and Asia in my lifetime. It is real. It is good. It holds tremendous promise.

Common Sense as Basis of Point Four

At the same time, it has great dangers. Such a movement can be easily misled. Communists or reactionaries can exploit the hopes and aspirations of these peoples for their own evil ends. Unscrupulous agitators can use these forces of change to bring about disorder and bloodshed. We must do all we can to keep this from happening.

We want to help the people of these areas. We want them to learn the methods of our science and our industry and use these methods to develop their own resources.

Above all, we want to help them find out and apply the secret of our own success, the secret of our American Revolution—the secret that the vitality of our science, our industry, our culture, is embedded in our political life—the secret that only free men, freely governed, can make the magic of science and technology work for the benefit of human beings, not against them.

Now, what does Point Four have to do with this? It has everything to do with it. It is the way we have chosen to give our help and share our experience. It is the right way—and the only way—this can be done.

There is nothing of imperialism in our concept of Point Four. We do not propose to dominate other people, or exploit them, or force them to change their ways of life.

The two ideas that guide Point Four are—first, cooperation, freely sought and freely given, and second, help to those who want to help themselves.

Those are the only methods that can succeed today. We must never forget them or depart from them. In no other way can we work as friends and brothers with the awakening peoples in the underdeveloped regions of the world.

This is what Point Four means in the perspective of history. It is the way to prevent human progress from going off the rails—to prevent a smash-up of civilization—and to help bring mankind to the threshold of a brighter, more wonderful future.

This is not starry-eyed idealism. It is just plain, practical common sense. If we fail to do this job, we will never have world peace. We cannot survive as an island of prosperity in a sea of human misery. But if we do the job, the world will be transformed.

Point Four's Message to the World

Just take one specific example. If we could help the people of the Orient get a well-balanced diet—three square meals a day—instead of the few mouthfuls of rice that most of them eat now, just that one change alone would have more impact on the world than all the armies and battles of history.

It is not easy to do a job like this. To raise the level of diet means more than sending seeds and hoes abroad. It means that the people of these countries must develop farm-credit institutions, and irrigation projects, and roads and railroads, and new industries and new employment for the millions who live in cities. This will take technical assistance and capital development.

It will take work by the United Nations and by the governments of other free nations. It will take work by many of our Government agencies. Point Four is not just the concern of the State Department or the Mutual Security Agency, but of the Department of Agriculture, the Public Health Service, and other agencies.

But Point Four was never meant to be just a Government program. It is a program of people — our people — helping other people throughout the world.

Individually, and through our organizations, there is much to do—and no time to be lost. Many private organizations are carrying on Point Four programs overseas and they need all the help and support they can get. We can send them tools and books and medical supplies. Our young people can train themselves as technical experts to go abroad. We can welcome students and visitors to our country; we can learn from them while they learn from us.

In all we do, we must remember our great tradition. The American Revolution has never stopped. In almost every generation we have

overturned old ways of life, and developed new ones—always moving toward more freedom, more opportunity, and a better life for all our people. We have had setbacks on the way—but in the end we have always moved forward.

Now, through Point Four, we can help the people in the underdeveloped regions to move forward along the same path. We can help them to adapt the principles of freedom, which have inspired our development, to their own needs and circumstances.

This is the way for us to live up to our ideals as a Nation, and fulfill our destiny as the greatest and most favored Republic God ever made.

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY ACHESON ¹

[Excerpts]

Very often before the committees of Congress and in other audiences to which I have spoken I have been asked the question, "Do you think it right that in our requests from the Congress we should have so large a proportion of our funds requested for military purposes as against the smaller portion which goes into the constructive work of the world?" And I always say: "I think it's very sad, it is nothing that we want; we would much prefer to have it otherwise."

We are taking the leadership in the world in trying to make it otherwise. We have proposals now which are being discussed in the United Nations which would lead to disarmament, lead to the world being relieved of this dreadful burden. But until that can be accomplished we must, whether we like it or not, spend a large part of our time and effort, just as the early settlers of this country had to do, in protecting ourselves, in building up our defenses so that behind that shield the peaceful work can go on.

And this, in passing, leads me to refer to a matter which is perhaps connected with it, and that is the matter of organization. So often in talking about programs of this sort we get distracted into the matter of organization. I'd like to say only one word about that, and that is that it's a characteristic of the human mind that if it fixes itself very intently upon a purpose, and in order to accomplish any purpose you have to fix yourself intently upon it, but if you do that then that purpose begins to expand until after a time in your mind it encompasses the whole world. I see this happening in all the departments of government all the time.

People can start saying, "Well, this is a matter of foreign policy and since it's a matter of foreign policy the State Department must do it and foreign policy affects everything in the world," so

¹ Made before the National Conference on International Economic and Social Development at Washington on Apr. 9 and released to the press on the same date.

that people who take that view want to tend to expand the jurisdiction of the State Department. Or if you start from the point of view of the Treasury Department or the Department of Agriculture or the Department of Commerce you can say this leads to that and that leads to the next thing, and so this department should control all. And so you find people who say, "All you have to do is to find two characteristics in a program that means that it should be organized and managed by one organization" and those two characteristics are (1) if it's overseas, and (2) if it's economic.

Now, everything that is not in the United States, Canada, or Mexico, in a sense is overseas. And everything that is not purely military is economic and even most of the military program is economic. So that this conception, in which you must have an overseas organization which will run everything outside of the United States, is, I think, to lose sight of the real purpose of some of these programs. I will not go on with this at length but merely say that the economic work which is being done in Europe itself in connection with the military program is far more closely associated with the military program than it is with the sort of thing that we are doing here in Point Four. So I urge you not to waste your time on these matters of organization at present but to concentrate on the main point.

So we not only have to build our shield here, our military shield, but we have to give great effort and great thought to the economic environment as well as the security environment. And here I'm sorry to say that there is much to discourage the person who is interested in helping to get international developments in the economic field. It isn't enough to have programs which will develop undeveloped areas, if you have a completely stagnant situation in the exchange of goods throughout the world. We all know that in the early stages of development of underdeveloped areas we must concentrate on the agricultural side of affairs. And that means that there must be considerable trade in other goods. And if one has a situation where trade is stagnant because of barriers, because of lack of foreign exchange, because of all the impediments to it which exist, there will be a very great break and great drag upon the development of underdeveloped areas, no matter how enthusiastic we are about Point Four and no matter how much effort we put into it.

I have been working for 12 years on the effort to free international trade from some of its barriers and I regret to say that there are as many now as there were when we began and the outlook is discouraging. But we must continue to fight for it and you must continue to help us because this matter of freeing trade throughout the world and bringing about a greater exchange of goods is essential for the purpose that you are meeting here today to consider.

Cooperation From Private Investors and Organizations Urged

Similarly, in the economic field, there is the matter of investment. Unless there is a climate to encourage investment abroad you will not get the developments in underdeveloped areas which we are seeking. And unhappily the climate does not seem to be getting better but in many parts of the world to be getting worse. There seems to be an idea that there is something bad about foreign investment in some parts of the world. Companies, people who have put a great deal of money, a great deal of effort into developments in underdeveloped areas are treated as though they were enemies of the country in which they are working. If that goes on it just means that there will not be foreign investment and there will not be, as you all know, governmental capital sufficient to do this job. And, after all, it doesn't make much difference whether the investment is the property of all the citizens of the country or some of the citizens. If the whole climate for the reception of foreign investment in a country is bad, then the capital will not go there, whether it's private or governmental.

And, again, there must be an environment which is congenial to the exchange of persons and ideas. If, in parts of the world, foreigners are regarded as suspicious and as enemies, then again you have a lack of the necessary environment to carry on the purposes which we want here. In other words, this must be a two-way street, there must be friendliness on the side of those whom we are trying to help as well as the desire on our part to be of help. And all through everything that we do we must keep in mind that what we are after here is to preserve and safeguard the underlying human values.

It's very helpful to me to have this opportunity to come and talk with you. A conference of this sort, this conference is of tremendous importance to the carrying out of this program because this program is fundamentally not something which a government as a government carries out. Now, I don't mean by that merely that private organizations are very important in actually carrying out programs abroad. That is true, but even more than that the entire effort that the government agency carries out here is really carried out through private organizations.

We do not have in the Government sufficient people to staff these operations, sufficient people to give us all the ideas, to give us all the working groups which are necessary. We turn to you. We turn to the colleges, to the groups, and to the organizations in the United States. And it is only if we are successful altogether in doing this work, as one great undertaking in which we are all concerned, that it will be successful. It takes the unending labor of organizations such as yours to make young men and women want to go into this

sort of work and want to go into it with a sense of dedication, with a sense of believing, as the early missionaries to this country believed, that there is something worth any degree of sacrifice in the task.

I know, in speaking with you, that I do not have to convince you that the Point Four Program is a good program. I don't have to stress its importance. What you would like me to do is to talk in the first place, about the subject of the morning, the Program in Action. And in doing that, again I shall do it not with the purpose of trying to build up your enthusiasm—because that is built up and you understand this program—but from the point of view of pointing out some of the underlying factors which we have to have in mind when we operate here.

Understanding Necessary to Allay Suspicions

And, again, if I may go back to a hackneyed subject, in order to understand the limitations which are necessary in the Program in Action and the methods which are necessary, we have to remind ourselves once more what it is that we are trying to do and what is the background out of which our present efforts emerge. Now, that background, as the President pointed out last night, is that two ideas of greatest importance are striking millions of people in the underdeveloped parts of the world at the same time, striking them with great suddenness and with great power. And these two ideas are, first of all, that a life of misery is not foreordained, that something can be done about it, that much can be done about it. And the second idea is that independence, freedom from foreign domination and foreign direction, is within their grasp and nothing is going to be allowed to interfere with that.

Now, these two ideas are ideas which have moved peoples profoundly over the centuries and they are hitting people, millions of people, in the underdeveloped areas for the first time with great power since the war.

And that leads to tremendous ferment. It leads to tremendous comings and goings in the population and the thoughts of the population. The purpose of the Point Four Program is to help direct this energy, this ferment, into peaceful channels of development, rather than into mere chaos. We know perfectly well that there is a tendency to look for panaceas. Indeed in many parts of the world these two thoughts which I have been describing to you are often confused. Many people in many parts of the world are led to believe that the mere attainment of national independence will bring automatically the fuller life, the freedom from poverty and misery and disease. We know of course that that is not the case. Therefore, these people, once being disappointed—because being free they are not merely immediately in good shape—turn to another panacea, which is

that of communism, which promises them that if they will embrace this doctrine then all these things will happen.

But what the Point Four Program is intended to do is to say we have knowledge, we have skills which you have seen and which are in part the cause of this great ferment which is going on in your minds. We are ready to share them with you. And we wish to work out with you methods by which you can know what we know and we can help you develop your own resources for your own purposes.

Limitations in the Program

Now, this being so, if we look at the nature of the people and the nature of the situation with which we are dealing we begin to see some necessary limitations in the Program in Action. One necessary limitation comes from the fact that many, if not most, of the peoples with whom we are dealing are suspicious of foreigners. Foreigners have come to them very often in the past and not always, or perhaps not often, with the best results. Therefore, they are suspicious. Why are these people coming to us? Why are they offering to do this for us? Is there some hidden purpose? Is there some desire on their part to get control of our country? These are the questions they ask themselves.

Then there is the limitation of the absorptive capacity of the peoples we are trying to help. Absorptive in several ways. First of all, they must take it in through their mind and through the training of their hands. And this cannot be done overnight. This is a long process.

Then there is the confusion in their minds as to what they want. Some want one thing and some another. Very often they haven't the real knowledge to understand what it is that they really need at the moment. There is a great desire in every part of the world for industrialization and there is very little understanding of how dangerous that is until there is in sight a strong agricultural base.

I think in all the times that I have talked with visitors from foreign countries since the war and, indeed, during the war, everyone who has come into my office starts out with, "We would like a steel mill." Well, they want a steel mill in every single country in the world. It makes no difference whether they have ore or coal or anything else. The steel mill is the mark of civilization, and that is what they want.

Now, it's not a question of pouring vast sums of money and vast numbers of technicians into these areas. It couldn't be done if we wanted to do it. Sometimes I have been in meetings where people talk about billions of dollars or hundreds of thousands of technicians being poured all over the world. Those people never stop to think of where the technicians are going to sleep and what

they are going to do. The mere question of housing of the missions which are already being sent out is a serious one in parts of the world where there aren't many houses. This thing has got to be done sensibly.

Adjusting to Internal Situations in Foreign Countries

Now, without going on further into a theoretical discussion, let me speak of one or two actual situations to show what can be done and what should not be done.

The first real necessity for success is that what you offer to do or what you're doing is something which the country wants. Now, often it's very hard to bring that about because the country doesn't know what it wants. But if the country does know what it wants and if what it wants is the right thing for it, then what you should do is to get in behind that and help with all your power and not say, "Oh, well, I wouldn't do it just this way, I would do it that way." If they have a good idea and one that is an effective one, get behind it and help them.

That is the situation in India. There the program is one which the Indians have worked out themselves. True they have worked it out with the help of American technicians, but they sought the technicians. We didn't force the technicians on them. They came out themselves with their own money. They employed these technicians. And they went to India and they developed an Indian governmental program which was started. So that when we came into the picture we could throw our help into something which had been developed by India with our people merely training the Indians who are training their comrades how to carry on this program. Immediately the thing caught hold like a prairie fire and the Government has now organized with us the Indo-American Fund, a joint undertaking, something which they started, something which they believe in. And we put all our effort and funds into that.

Starting with a small group where boys from these villages were taught the fundamentals of what they should do to increase food production and have better public health. Starting with that training school, boys, young men go back to their villages and persuade the elders of the village to adopt this rather revolutionary idea. This spreads on from there to other villages which have heard about this. They in turn come in to look at it and find everybody with two or three times as much food as they had before. The newcomers say, "We want that." Thus you finally get a program where the propulsive force comes from the country itself, and we are going along to help it.

Now, you find other situations where the country not only doesn't know what it wants but

isn't equipped to play any part in getting it. And there a great mistake would be made if we went in and said, "This is what you want, here are a lot of Americans, we will do this. We will undertake to train your people." What you have got to do is to start at the very beginning.

There was a situation such as that in one country which we are helping. There, as in almost all these places, the great need was for an increase in the food supply. When we got to the country we found that the only people dealing with agriculture was the thing called a "bureau," which was made up of six people with a budget of \$6,000 a year. Six people in the entire country dealing with agriculture! Well, you couldn't get anywhere until the country itself was better organized to be a partner in this effort. And, therefore, the first job was to show them how to develop the proper bureaus to carry on agricultural extension work in their country. That was done. Then programs were developed in conjunction with this new governmental outfit.

The other day I had a visit from some people in a very small country and they had come up to say, "Go easy. Take it easy. We are being overwhelmed by good will." They had at the same time six international organizations—the United States organization and four private ones—descend on them. And they said there were almost more "good-willers" in the country than there were citizens in the country. The country was simply bewildered. It didn't know what to do. People were starting projects and deciding they weren't any good and, the happy phrase, "cutting their losses," didn't carry much conviction to the population.

So finally we said, "Now, let's all get together here and let's all sit down and work out some coordinated plan, get the people and the government of the country in agreement with this and then go ahead a little more slowly."

You must adjust what you're doing to the absorptive capacity of the country and the willingness of the country to have you carry on the program. Money isn't the right way to go at it. Money is essential, money is necessary. Sometimes a lot of money is necessary, as in the Indian program where in order to carry out and reach the goals within the time which is allotted we must move much faster than the pure theory of technical assistance would permit.

Exportation of the American Idea

Those are some of the ideas which can be developed much more fully with others in your panel discussions this morning. But what I should like to leave with you are the points which I have just made.

First of all, that Point Four is one among many points. It is not the whole foreign policy. It cannot succeed unless the whole foreign policy succeeds.

Second, it must be adjusted. The work that we do must be adjusted to the condition, the situation in the country. It must be infinitely flexible.

Third, and it follows from the second, do not be doctrinaire about Point Four. Do not be like the Socialist Party where you have the pure doctrine and then 50 splinter doctrines coming off it. Do not say, "This is with Point Four and this is without Point Four." That sort of rigid thinking, I believe, gets us nowhere. Point Four must mean that we are primarily engaged in helping to teach these people how to help themselves.

Now, what is necessary to bring that about in a particular country depends on that country. And, therefore, do not be rigid. Do not have purely doctrinaire ideas.

And, finally, one last thought. We have said over and over again that this is exporting the American idea, the American Revolution, or the American dream. It is very true, but if that is true let us be sure, and be terribly sure, that we are preserving the American dream, the American idea, in America.

Do not let us be smug and believe that merely because you can read in the books that America was like this, or that Abraham Lincoln said it was like this, it will be like that without our constant effort and our constant fighting to make our country what we want it to be and what we believe it has been and will be in the future.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

- Joint Economic Report. Report of the Joint Committee on the January 1952 Economic Report of the President with Supplemental and Minority Views and Materials Prepared by the Staff on National Defense and the Economic Outlook for the Fiscal Year 1953. S. Rept. 1295, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 134 p.
- Revision of Immigration and Nationality Laws. Minority Views. S. Rept. 1137, Part 2. 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. 2550] 11 pp.
- Amending Section 3 (A) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as Amended. S. Rept. 1319, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. 2611] 3 pp.
- Amending Section 32 of the Trading With the Enemy Act. S. Rept. 1235, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. 2544] 4 pp.
- Extension of Rubber Act of 1948. H. Rept. 1513, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. R. 6787] 7 pp.
- Investigating the Administration of the Trading With the Enemy Act Since December 18, 1941. S. Rept. 1294, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. Res. 245] 2 pp.
- Assist in Preventing Aliens From Entering or Remaining in the United States Illegally. H. Rept. 1505, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. 1851] 3 pp.
- Supplementary Extradition Convention With Canada. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on Executive G. S. Exec. Rept. 5, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 18 pp.
- Continuance of the Mutual Security Program. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for the Continuance of the Mutual Security Program for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1953. H. Doc. 382, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 14 pp.

U. S.-Netherlands Relations Reviewed

*Address by the President*¹

The carillon which Your Majesty has presented on behalf of the people of the Netherlands will be a wonderful gift. When it is completed it will greatly enrich the life of this city, and it will bring pleasure to millions of Americans when they come to visit this National Capital. No gift could be a better symbol of the harmonious relations which have always existed, and which should always continue to exist, between the Netherlands and the United States. On behalf of the people of the United States I am happy to accept this gift from the people of the Netherlands.

Our two countries have always been close together in spirit. There are many communities in this country, including our largest city, that owe their origin to the early Dutch settlers who came over here. Three of our Presidents—Martin Van Buren, Theodore Roosevelt, and Franklin D. Roosevelt—traced their origins to the Netherlands.

The people of the Netherlands are no strangers to us. They are welcome here whether they come as visitors or as settlers.

Last September Queen Juliana wrote a remarkable letter to me.² In that letter she expressed her great concern over the plight of the refugees in Europe and expressed the hope that something could be done to alleviate their distress and to give them new lives of usefulness and dignity. It was a letter full of compassion and human understanding for the problems of these unfortunate people.

Since that time, I have been working to find a way to help solve this problem. Our Government is supporting an international effort to provide opportunities for resettlement overseas not only for the unfortunate refugees of Europe but also for those people who live in overcrowded areas and need a chance to migrate.

¹ Made on the occasion of the acceptance of a gift of a carillon from Queen Juliana at Meridian Hill Park, Washington, on Apr. 4 and released to the press by the White House on the same date.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1951, p. 572.

I have recently sent a message to the Congress recommending that this country provide aid to those escaping from Communist tyranny and at the same time accept additional immigration into this country.³ One of the recommendations I made was that we should admit additional families from the Netherlands. I hope the Congress will act favorably on this recommendation. If they do, we can add to the already warm ties which bind the United States and the Netherlands together.

The people and the Government of the Netherlands are working closely with us in our struggle to bring about permanent peace in the world. They know how terrible war can be. They know it first-hand from the Nazi invasion. When the Netherlands was overrun, the spirit of the people, however, did not die. It found expression in the courageous resistance movement of the Dutch people. Queen Wilhelmina visited us in those sad and terrible years. She demonstrated for all of us the undying courage of the Dutch people and their faith in ultimate victory. In those days, we worked together for victory—now we work together for peace.

The American people are proud and happy to have been able to contribute to the revival of the Netherlands after the war. We have been impressed by the vigorous way in which the Dutch people have rebuilt their economy. We have great admiration for the plans now being carried forward in the Netherlands to reclaim additional land from the sea.

Most of all, we have been impressed by the determination with which the people of the Netherlands have joined in the common defense of Europe. The Netherlands is an important member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. And now Dutch Armed Forces are preparing to enter into the European Defense Community. It is only through this kind of effort, it is only

³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 7, 1952, p. 551.

through unity with other nations, that any one of the free nations can make itself secure against the threat of war in the future. Through the United Nations, through the North Atlantic Treaty, the people of the Netherlands and the United States are working side-by-side for peace in the world.

Your Majesty, Your Royal Highness, we are happy to have you with us. We are grateful for the magnificent gift which the people of Holland are making to us. We hope you will come again.

When you return to your country I hope you will carry the thanks of the American people to the people of the Netherlands and that you will express to them our good wishes and cordial friendship.

General Eisenhower Asks Release From SHAPE Assignment

[Released to the press by the White House April 11]

The Secretary of Defense has addressed the following letter to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers Europe:

APRIL 10, 1952

DEAR GENERAL EISENHOWER: In accordance with your request contained in your letter of 2 April, and with the approval of the President, I am taking appropriate action to secure your release from assignment as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers Europe, effective 1 June, and to have you placed on inactive status upon your return to the United States.

With kindest regards, I am

Very sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT

The following is the text of General Eisenhower's letter to the Secretary of Defense:

2 APRIL 1952

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I request that you initiate appropriate action to secure my release from assignment as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers Europe, by approximately June 1st, and that I be placed on inactive status upon my return to the United States. A relief date fixed this far in advance should provide ample time for the appointment of a successor and for any preparation and counsel that he may desire from me.

This proposal is in the spirit of the understanding I gain from officials in Washington who outlined the special purposes of my original appointment in December 1950. At that time it was believed by those individuals that, because of past experience, I had relationships with respect to Europe which would facilitate the formation

of a common defense structure and the establishment of a pattern for its operation. An assumption on the part of responsible officials of our Government that I could be helpful in the vital task of preserving peace was, of course, a compelling reason for instantaneous return to active service and acceptance of this assignment.

As of now, I consider that the specific purposes for which I was recalled to duty have been largely accomplished; the command has been formed, its procedures established, and basic questions settled. Moreover, a program of growth and development, based on early experience and searching reexamination, has been agreed at governmental levels. There are many difficulties to be overcome but, given the wholehearted support of the NATO community, this program will provide a reassuring degree of security in this region, despite the continued presence of the threat of Soviet communism. There is every reason to believe that the NATO nations will continue to work together successfully, toward the goal of a secure peace.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

The following is the text of a letter to Lt. Gen. Paul Ely, Chairman, The Standing Group, North Atlantic Treaty Organization:

2 APRIL 1952

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have this date requested the United States Government to initiate action looking to my relief as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers Europe, by approximately the first of June.

This action is in consonance with my understanding and intentions when the President of the United States, in response to request from the NATO Council, appointed me to the post more than a year ago. It was assumed at that time that wartime experience particularly qualified me to facilitate the initial organization of SHAPE, establishment of its procedures, and the institution of basic programs. Since these phases are now accomplished and in view of the press of other developments, it is my hope to return to inactive military status.

In addition to establishing organizational and procedural patterns, I feel that we have made considerable progress during the past year in our efforts to build adequate defenses in the European region. As related to you in my Annual Report,¹ these gains were accompanied by a number of shortcomings and continuing problems. But, in the main, the results have been definitely positive.

The way to greater progress over the coming months was charted in the memorable conference at Lisbon, the prime significance of which was the

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 14, p. 572.

coordination of military requirements with economic capabilities and the setting of specific goals for each of the NATO countries. If these goals are achieved, we shall see, by the end of this year, respectable forces established on the Continent, with the promise of further increase in future years, including substantial German reinforcement through the European Defense Force. I know that you and your associates will spare no efforts to bring into realization all the essential steps agreed at Lisbon.

When I entered upon my duties in December 1950, I was sure that our common task in Europe was a job that had to be done. From later experience, I am convinced that it can be done and that, given full cooperation, it will be done.

Throughout the period of my service here, the support of the NATO governments, peoples and armed services, and of the Standing Group and Military Committee has been a prime factor in whatever success we have achieved in this command. I am most deeply grateful to you and hope that our NATO commands under your direction will continue to flourish as guardians of the peace.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

William H. Draper, Jr. Named U. S. Representative to NAC

[Released to the press April 8]

The President on April 8 designated Ambassador William H. Draper, Jr., to be U.S. permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

At the same time Ambassador Draper was nominated to be U.S. special representative in Europe, it was announced that upon the reorganization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), he also would become senior U.S. civilian representative in Europe responsible for North Atlantic treaty affairs. A reorganization of NATO was approved by the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon. The reorganization called for the elimination of the Council of Deputies and the estab-

lishment of the North Atlantic Council in permanent session.

Appropriate ministers of the respective governments will attend several meetings each year as in the past. In between these meetings the Council will be in regular session attended by permanent representatives of each country who will represent their governments as a whole.

Ambassador Draper, as the U.S. permanent representative, will represent the U.S. Government as a whole on the North Atlantic Council. Ambassador Frederick L. Anderson, the deputy U.S. special representative in Europe, will serve as Ambassador Draper's general deputy. To assist Ambassador Draper with respect to his activities on North Atlantic treaty matters, Ambassador Livingston T. Merchant is being designated by the President as alternate U.S. permanent representative to NAC and will be Ambassador Draper's chief adviser on NATO matters.

With the designation of Ambassador Draper as U.S. permanent representative, the posts of U.S. special representative in Europe and U.S. permanent representative have been combined in one individual. Thus for the first time, there is a single U.S. official in Europe coordinating and supervising U.S. participation in the North Atlantic Council and the execution of the Mutual Security Program.

Ambassador Draper will be charged with seeing that U.S. activities in these fields are effectively integrated and administered to assure that the defensive strength of the nations concerned shall be built as quickly as possible on a basis of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid. In this capacity Ambassador Draper will represent the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director for Mutual Security, and the Mutual Security Agency.

Ambassador Merchant, in addition to serving as alternate U.S. permanent representative, will be Ambassador Draper's deputy for political affairs. Ambassador Draper will also be assisted by Paul R. Porter, who will serve as deputy for economic affairs, and Daniel K. Edwards, who will serve as deputy for defense affairs in connection with NAC matters. Messrs. Porter and Edwards will have the personal rank of Minister.

Belgium's and Switzerland's Progress Toward Security

The following statements by Ambassador Murphy and Minister Patterson were made over the NBC-TV network program, "Battle Report," on April 6 and were released to the press on the same date.

STATEMENT BY ROBERT D. MURPHY U.S. AMBASSADOR TO BELGIUM

During the past 30 years, I have represented the United States—in one capacity or another—in some eight different countries. My official travels have taken me through possibly a score of others.

It is safe to say that Belgium is second to none when it comes to making an American feel that he is really not too far from home. The people of Belgium are as much like Americans as any people I know, and as friendly and hospitable. Their vigor, their efficiency, their love of liberty, and their competitive spirit—all are virtues we Americans generally associate with ourselves.

The same is true of another Belgian characteristic: The impatient desire to get on with a given job and to do that job effectively.

This is the Belgian's attitude toward meeting their international commitments. Their record in contributing to their own security, as well as to that of the free world, is excellent. Their cooperation within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is genuine. Their response to the military and economic aid we are giving them is that of a willing industrious partner in a great common effort.

That effort—as we well know—can mean the difference between the preservation of freedom and totalitarian enslavement. The free nations either build the strength and unity with which to deter aggression or face the terrible consequence of failure.

The Belgians have clearly demonstrated their awareness of this hard fact.

Like much of the rest of Western Europe, Belgium emerged from World War II the victim of physical destruction and economic pillage. Its people were gripped by that sense of weakness, and insecurity, and uncertainty which must be expected of those who have experienced foreign occupation and devastation. The Belgians have suffered these not once, but many times. There is little we Americans can teach our Belgian friends about the meaning of war and aggression, for they have seen far too much of both.

Belgium has less than 9 million people, about as many people as New York City. In size, the country is just a little larger than our own State of Maryland. But in 7 short years, the Belgians have staged a spectacular come-back. American aid—although it has been less for Belgium than for other western European countries—has, of course, helped to make that come-back possible. But the Belgians' ability to help themselves is primarily responsible. Through determination, sound policies, and hard work, Belgium has reached an enviable state of solvency, not only economically, but politically, and militarily.

This solvency is greatly to the free world's advantage. Belgium's currency, for example, is among the strongest in the world, and the Belgian franc is backed by a sound money policy.

Up to the end of January 1952, Belgium has extended about 370 million dollars in credits through the European payments system to her neighbors and allies in Europe. In ratio to population that would be the equivalent of at least 15 billion dollars for the United States.

Belgian industrial production is today some 40 percent above prewar levels. Last year, new record highs were set in the production of steel, iron, and electric power.

Belgium's immense overseas territory, the Belgian Congo, which is really the heart of Africa, is an important source of many raw materials of great value to the defense effort of the whole Western World, and especially to the United States.

But what about Belgium's contribution to the defensive military strength of the free world?

Belgium is the only western European nation to demand 24 months of military service of her young men. She added 12 months to the service period almost immediately after the Communists launched their aggression in Korea.

Belgian infantrymen are fighting with the U. N. Forces in Korea. Belgian planes are serving on the Korean airlift.

Belgium has already furnished three divisions to the united army which is being molded for the defense of Europe. By 1954, the Belgians expect to have the full six divisions they have promised General Eisenhower ready for duty. They are also well on their way to having an air force they can be proud of.

Belgium has long been self-sufficient in the production of small arms and small-arms ammuni-

tion. She is rapidly moving toward self-sufficiency in the production of a number of other military end-items. Equally important, she is beginning to produce munitions for other countries of the North Atlantic area.

I am often asked about Belgium's political stability. Belgium gives every evidence of being in full control of her internal political situation.

She has had her share of internal political differences. But then, what democracy does not? The important thing to bear in mind is that communism is only a minor nuisance in Belgium. At the close of the war, the Communists had about 10 percent of the popular vote behind them. Today, that percentage is down to 4 and is still declining.

I don't want to leave the impression that Belgium has reached her peak effort in Western defense. But from a condition of chaos and destruction which marked the end of the war, Belgium has come a long way in the right direction. Crises may lie ahead for Belgium, but there may also be crises ahead for others including ourselves. Every day our power and strength to meet crises are growing.

The problems ahead for the free peoples continue grave. We are still in the process of building the strength with which to insure the freedoms we cherish. But we can, I think, look ahead today with confidence that we have the ability to meet crises and to overcome them.

Our partner, Belgium, is giving an excellent example of speeding progress toward the security we both want.

STATEMENT BY RICHARD C. PATTERSON U.S. MINISTER TO SWITZERLAND

Switzerland is one country about which the average American knows relatively little. Today, I'd like to talk about some of the things which demonstrate that Switzerland is well worth close acquaintance.

When one mentions Switzerland to the man in the street he is most apt to think of a small country. It is true that Switzerland is small. It is not as large as West Virginia. Its population is only a little more than 4.5 million. But its size belies its significance. For Switzerland, indeed, is of great importance to the United States and to the entire free world.

The United States and Switzerland have very much in common.

Like the United States, Switzerland is a union of states, their states being called cantons. The Swiss economy, like ours, is diversified, with free enterprise playing the key role. The Swiss Government also is elected by the people. A Swiss citizen enjoys the same civil liberties as does an American. I believe that Americans who have

seen Switzerland at first hand are impressed with the contributions which democratic Switzerland makes to the free world.

Why is Switzerland, with which we have so much in common so important to us as well as to other free nations?

Here are just a few of the reasons.

Switzerland's economy is perhaps the most stable in Europe. This has meant much to a Western Europe seeking to deter aggression as well as to get back on its feet economically after a very destructive war. The Swiss have contributed more than one-half billion dollars in aid and loans to the relief and rehabilitation of post-war Europe. They have participated in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, which was formed to help carry out the objectives of the Marshall Plan. They also belong to the European Payments Union and have done a great deal to promote the free flow of trade that is essential to healthy European trade relations.

But the Swiss—and this is noteworthy—have not found it necessary to ask for a single American dollar in aid.

Just as the economic strength of Switzerland is valuable to Europe so it is of real moment to the United States. We are joined with a free community of nations, including Switzerland's western European neighbors, in the common defense of democracy. Switzerland's contributions to the economic stability of Western Europe are contributions to the over-all strength of democracy throughout the world.

While it is true that they have established an enviable record in avoiding military conflict, not having fought a war for more than 130 years, their military significance is striking. Above and beyond the obvious importance of Switzerland's geographic and strategic position, it has one of the largest, best-trained, and best-equipped armies in Western Europe. According to an official publication, 800,000 soldiers can be mobilized in a matter of days. This is impressive evidence of an historic democracy's determination to remain free.

As in the United States, Communists exercise no influence over national policies and have virtually no popular following. The Swiss people also recognize the dangers of communism and maintain constant vigilance to prevent its growth.

Although traditionally Switzerland has not sought security through collective action, its policy of armed preparedness is in purpose similar to the policy currently being pursued by the United States and other countries of the free world. The purpose of all of us is security from aggression.

There can be no doubt about Switzerland's will to defend itself against any aggressor. The ability and determination of the Swiss to resist attack are significant contributions to world security.

Good Faith vs. Empty Promises in the War of Ideas

by Adrian S. Fisher
Legal Adviser¹

In the early days of the Republic, the Congress approved the appointment of three consular officials who were considered adequate to handle such problems as might confront the new nation in the field of foreign affairs. I think we can safely predict that that day is gone—never to return.

Through the years, and somewhat reluctantly, we have come to realize that our destiny is closely linked to that of other nations. As this realization has penetrated deeper into the consciousness of succeeding generations of Americans, international affairs have occupied a place of increasing importance in the life of the Nation. In keeping with this development, the agency of the Government responsible for foreign affairs has grown until today the Secretary of State has an overseas staff of nearly 20,000 people, including persons employed locally, in 290 missions scattered through nearly 75 countries. In addition, there are nearly 10,000 on the headquarters staff.

Much of the growth shown here postdates World War II and as such reflects the world leadership thrust upon us after V-J Day. Be that as it may, 30,000 people is a lot of people. They do the staff work on American foreign policy. And when you consider the scope and the variety of the international problems facing us and the enormous responsibilities we have assumed, they have plenty to do. But they are not "policy-makers" as such.

In general terms, our foreign policy is an amalgam of what the various interested agencies of the Government believe is required by American interests and the security of the people. It develops out of a distillate of the knowledge and the judgment of hundreds of specialists and technicians. It takes shape as a result of recommendations for action from various officials with a subsequent compromise of conflicting views or

perhaps a rejection of one proposal in favor of another. If a specific plan of action results, it may again make the rounds for scrutiny and criticism. If a major decision is involved the final product then goes to the President for approval.

It is entirely possible that the approved policy may contain ideas or suggestions which originated in the brain of a first secretary in a legation thousands of miles from Washington or which first appeared in a report from a staff economist of the National Security Resources Board. On numerous occasions, policies have been put into effect that were first advanced by private individuals.

There are numerous agencies which participate in making policy. The Constitution charges the President with responsibility for our foreign policy. It placed the purse strings in the hands of the Congress and treaty ratification in the hands of the Senate. The Secretary of State is the top specialist on world affairs in the Administration, but his function is to advise the President and act in his behalf. The Department of Defense, the National Security Resources Board, the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, the Tariff Commission, the National Security Council, and the Psychological Strategy Board also have a finger in the pie.

The overseas organization of the Department has a vital part to play in policy matters. It operates as the eyes and ears of the Nation. The officers of the Foreign Service channel back to headquarters a steady flow of reports on political situations, economic conditions, trade and labor matters, and a variety of other items that bear on American interests. This information is the factual foundation upon which policy is built. It is coordinated and evaluated by the headquarters staff and is moved up through the echelons of the Departmental organization.

In a sense, the senior officers of the Department make up the professional core of policy making. They are at the center of the web, the strands of

¹Excerpts from an address made before the Massachusetts League of Women Voters' School of International Relations at Cambridge, Mass., on Apr. 1 and released to the press on the same date.

which reach into many agencies of your Government.

There is another group which plays a vital role in the formulation and development of our foreign policy. That is the public of the United States. This does not mean that decisions are made by guessing as to what the Gallup Polls would show and then following the polls regardless of whether it was in the best interest of the United States. What it does mean is that experience has shown that in the long run no policy can be successful unless it has the support of an enlightened and informed public.

The decisions which are made in the field of world affairs affect every one of you. Therefore, you have the privilege and the duty to take an active part. For this reason, a great Secretary of State described the fundamental task in the conduct of foreign affairs as focusing the will of a hundred and forty million people on problems beyond our shores.

The necessary synthesis here has to be developed out of a relationship between the Government and the citizens, wherein the people are fully informed on the why's and wherefore's of a particular situation.

Peace With Justice and Honor

Now, given this frame of policy making—what are the policies that have resulted and on what are they based? The thesis on which we have operated is one, I believe, that is widely accepted and earnestly supported by the American people. We proceed on the conviction that the welfare and the security of the United States are served best by peace—peace with justice and with honor. Further, we are of the opinion that such peace is best obtained through collective security.

Implicit in this thesis is the obligation to do what we can to aid our partners in the collective effort to preserve and extend their freedoms because, like peace, freedom is an entity. Our own freedom is threatened if the freedom of others is erased by tyranny.

Some of the critics of American foreign policy here in this country indignantly condemn this thesis as idealistic and charge that moralizing will get us nowhere. I will grant that there is here a coloration of idealism, but there is also a strong streak of practicality present. I am further convinced that the national interest is best advanced by a blend of idealistic as well as practical considerations.

For some months past and certainly for many months in the future, a major American objective has been opposition to communism and preventing the virus from infecting areas which are now free of contamination. The means to this objective involves the economic, political, and military reconstruction in regions endangered by Soviet

pressure. Included are the situations of strength now under construction in Western Europe, at key points in the Mediterranean, in the Middle East, and in the Far East.

In this effort, we start with three major premises which are equal in importance and entirely interdependent.

We recognize that to a tragic degree the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is rooted in the concept of brute force. Therefore, if a nation or group of nations is to stand up to Moscow or deal with the Kremlin on anything approaching parity, that nation or group of nations has to be able to muster the kind and quantity of military strength that Stalin respects.

We know that the appeal of communism takes its quickest and strongest hold where misery and want abound. Therefore, the antidote to the spread of the Communist virus is the easing of hardship and a standard of living high enough that a man's work yields to him the food, shelter, and clothing necessary to life.

Finally, we have seen that Communist strategy relies on despoiling the victim of his faith in the future of the free world and surrounding him with an atmosphere of social chaos and confusion. Therefore, it is essential that we counter by building the individual's confidence in his capacity to manage his own affairs under conditions of order and stability.

It is evident that the latter two of these premises are far broader of base than the first and that they are linked with two revolutionary movements now sweeping certain areas of the world. Of both these the United States was a progenitor. We were certainly important agents of the revolution of production and perhaps have an even greater hand in the export of the revolutionary concept of the dignity of the individual.

We now witness the reaction of peoples who for the first time have seen economic progress previously undreamt of. We now see the reaction of peoples to ideas of self-government and social justice that they had not heretofore known. We are identified as the champions of those ideas and it is to us that these people look for help in bringing them to pass. We cannot welcome them by offering tanks and planes alone. If there is to be a partnership, it must be a full partnership. It must include food for the mind and the spirit as well as for the stomach.

There is idealism here—but there also is a strong streak of practicality and would be even if there were no Soviet menace. These people are our neighbors in a fast shrinking world. The first premise—a free world rearmament—is a direct response to Soviet tactics. It was effected when the Soviet Union rejected a workable standard of disarmament we offered them. We continue to offer it, but as long as the Kremlin fails

to respond, the free world must look to its defenses.

What has been done by the United States to put these premises into force? What has been done to build a strong, well-coordinated group of free nations, able and willing to defend themselves against any potential aggressor?

A number of milestones have already been passed. Through vigorous action in the United Nations, the United States forced the Soviet to withdraw from northern Iran. Prompt assistance by the United States enabled the Greek Government to crush a Communist-instigated revolt. American aid enabled the Turkish Government to maintain its independence in the face of Soviet sabre rattling. The United States put into effect the Marshall Plan, which has given essential assistance in the reconstruction of the economic life of an entire continent. The Marshall Plan has worked. Someone in 1947 commented that the Communists could take over France by picking up the phone. Much the same was true of Italy. The Communists held Government posts, dominated trade-unions, and commanded the support of important blocks of voters. And their strength was rising.

Decline of Communism in Europe

Today, no Communist holds a cabinet post in the governments of our European allies there. Communist strength in the parliaments has dropped. In France, a Communist stronghold, in 1946, out of 627 deputies (in the Parliament) 181 were Communists. Today the number is 95.

The drop in Communist strength is shown in other developments. Party membership in Western Europe is a third lower than in 1946, less than 1½ percent of the population. The circulation of Communist newspapers is half what it was, and many trade-unions have freed themselves of Kremlin control.

At the same time, needed economic assistance reached friendly free nations in Southeast Asia and in the Pacific area which effectively checked internal Communist threats and strengthened and stabilized the governments concerned.

Once a start had been made on the road back to stability, the North Atlantic Treaty was drafted. It declared that an attack on one member of the pact was an attack on all. This gave heart to the individual members, particularly the smaller members, by assuring them that if they were attacked they would not have to fight alone. The treaty served notice on any potential aggressor that the old totalitarian technique of picking off victims one by one would no longer work. The treaty recognized that if the underlying principle of collective security—a joint defense based on self-help and mutual aid—was to be applied, a political framework had first to be constructed.

This principle was expressly recognized in the United Nations Charter. It followed the pattern of the Organization of American States and is in turn being duplicated by the proposed Pacific security arrangements and for the proposed Middle East Command.

To give the initial impetus to these defense agreements, the United States launched the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and followed up with the combined economic and military aid which is now going forward under the Mutual Security Program.

In December 1950, at the Brussels conference, the North Atlantic Treaty powers agreed to a Unified Command of their forces in Europe. General Eisenhower took command of these forces. After the great debate, the United States dispatched additional troops to Europe as part of this force. On the military side both General Eisenhower and General Gruenther have said that gratifying progress has been made. On the political side, this action has also had important effects. It showed the people of Europe that we regard them as important. It showed them that they had not been consigned to the fate of being overrun, devastated, and then liberated. It made possible more progress toward the unification of Europe than has occurred in the past one thousand years. It made possible the Schuman Plan, the discussions concerning the European defense forces, and the European Defense Community.

These discussions played a key part in restoring Germany to a place in the family of free nations. It is extremely important to the people of Europe that their defense perimeter included Western Germany. It is obviously common sense that the German people take part in the defense of their own territory. How could this be worked out without risking a rebirth of German militarism and without imposing conditions offensive to German dignity and their wish for equality, which are essential to their willing and enthusiastic participation?

We should like to see the peaceful unification of a free Germany. This was the United States' objective when it sponsored the recent U. N. resolution on Germany. Under that resolution a U. N. commission was created to investigate whether the necessary conditions for free elections existed in all of Germany. We support this resolution and welcome the commission. However, the history of Communist obstruction, and specifically the Communist refusal to permit the commission to enter Eastern Germany, does not lead us to hope that this objective can be reached in the immediate future.

Britain, France, and the United States are working toward an end of the occupation by a series of contractual arrangements with the Federal Republic, thus restoring the fullest German sovereignty possible in the present situation. At Lisbon, NATO approved the creation of a European

Defense Community, in which West Germany would participate as an equal member. West German troops would participate in the European defense forces. The strength and unity of the European community is the primary safeguard against the revival of aggressive militarism.

I believe these steps, the Unified Command under General Eisenhower, and the progress toward a unified European community, represent real accomplishments. It has not been accomplished without assistance from the United States. There have been large amounts of American aid, money which has come out of your pocket. This year it is going to require more. The present foreign assistance program calls for 7.9 billion dollars.

With a program of this magnitude, a responsible administration must answer the question "If our policy has been successful, why do we need all this money?"

Reasons for Financial Aid

Of this amount, 4 billion dollars is for military equipment and 1.8 billion dollars is in defense support—that is, funds to enable the North Atlantic countries to obtain machinery, equipment, and commodities which they must have if they are to maintain sound economies capable of carrying their heavy defense burdens.

Let us consider what these burdens are. Our European allies had to start building their military forces almost from scratch. Since 1949 they have doubled their military budgets. Each has lengthened its period of military conscription. Military production in Europe has been expanded almost four times beyond the 1949 level. More than half a million men have already been added to their military forces on active duty. Even more vital has been the steady conversion of these troops into effective combat units, through improved organization. All told, the number of combat divisions available in Europe has doubled since General Eisenhower assumed command last spring.

The European citizen who has made this achievement possible has an income one-third of his American prototype. He pays about the same percentage of his meager income in taxes. He has yet to recover completely from the personal losses he sustained during the war. And on top of these difficulties, since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the stepped-up program of rearmament has pushed prices up twice as fast as the rise experienced in this country. Finally, in certain countries such as Britain and France, the Governments have assumed heavy commitments in defense of the other parts of the free world. The share of the program which our friends are undertaking at the present time comes pretty close to the limit of their capacities. To try to go beyond these limits might produce a strain on their eco-

nomie and political structures which would endanger both their security and ours.

I have made these references to military strength because a defensive shield is an essential part of United States policy. This aspect of our policy is by no means an end in itself. The United States is not trying to beat the Soviet Union at its own militaristic game. It is not trying to match them gun for gun and tank for tank. We are merely trying to make impossible the bargain-basement conquest so dear to Soviet hearts. It is important that this be understood throughout the entire world.

Last fall, in the General Assembly, the United States took a leading role in proposing a workable system of world disarmament. As a result of this a disarmament commission was established, which is now meeting in New York. At first glance, having spoken at such length about building collective military strength, it would appear somewhat contradictory to speak of our desire to reach agreement on the reduction of all armaments. But on further examination, there is no conflict. The free world is not increasing its military strength as an end in itself. It is doing so because it is compelled to by Soviet policy.

The very development of sufficient strength against aggression may convince the Kremlin that aggression can never again be profitable. It may convince the Kremlin that its self-interest requires sincere steps to reach genuine enforceable agreements for the reduction and control of armaments.²

I would like to dwell on this disarmament proposal because it presents two important aspects of our war of ideas with the U. S. S. R. Like it or not, we are now engaged with the U. S. S. R. in a struggle for the minds of men. We can win this struggle only if we convince the people of the world that the United States wants to have peace and a chance to improve their lot, while the promises of the U. S. S. R., despite the tinsel, offer only despotism and slavery.

Purpose of Disarmament Proposals

A vital component in this struggle is the good faith of the United States. The proposals we are making in the hope of easing international tensions are seriously made. For example, the disarmament offer to the Soviet Union is drafted with no little effort and much care, so that it can be accepted by the Soviet Union if they are really interested in a general reduction in armed forces. The United States will be overjoyed if the Soviet Union agrees to use our proposals as a basis of negotiation. We are fully prepared to go through with our part of the bargain. There are some

² For text of the disarmament resolution, see BULLETIN of Mar. 31, 1952, p. 507.

people who feel that the Soviet opposition to the disarmament proposal in Paris shows that they are not interested in disarmament. They immediately tab our proposal propaganda. This is a serious mistake and one which should not be repeated. The United States Overseas Information Service capitalized on the United States proposal to the fullest. But the reason that it is effective in the campaign of truth is basically because we are serious about it. That is where the element of good faith enters. The people in other parts of the world that we are trying to reach have had their fill of empty maneuvers.

This is our advantage over communism in the war of ideas.

The disarmament problem presents another aspect of what might at first glance appear to be a disadvantage under which we are fighting in our war of ideas with the U.S.S.R. The reduction and regulation of armaments, particularly atomic weapons, is a very complex subject. It requires consideration of such matters as a census, the levels to which disarmament should be carried, and detailed provisions for safeguards and inspection to see that the safeguards are being carried out. In the atomic energy field in particular these safeguards are very complicated. When we make a proposal, we make one which we would be prepared to live with if it were accepted, and one which contains the safeguards necessary for others to feel the same way. The Soviet Union labors under no such restriction. In the atomic energy field, for example, they have urged the simple outlawing of the bomb, even though at the same time they would retain the fissionable materials from which a bomb could be made in a very short time. Against this simple slogan we must use relatively complicated, though workable, proposals. We often appear to be preoccupied with procedure.

The same adherence to simple slogans, whether workable or not, appears in other fields. In the field of German elections, the Soviet Union urges "All-German elections" and leaves it to others to deal with the unpleasant fact that a free election cannot be held under the heel of the secret police and under the shadow of the concentration camp. In the Genocide Convention the U.S.S.R. shouts for the outlawing of genocide, but objects to provisions which would permit the world to determine whether this heinous crime has been committed on the Estonians, Letts, and Lithuanians.

As I said earlier, at first blush this would appear to be a disadvantage in the war of ideas. In the world of advertising it is, I believe, a truism that short simple slogans sell more soap than complicated explanations. But a habit of making only serious, workable offers in international affairs and for dealing only in the truth, no matter how complex, will not be a handicap in the war of ideas if we conduct ourselves wisely and vigorously.

The essential difference between our position in

all these matters and that of the Soviet Union is that in these important matters—sometimes going to the very heart of national security—we do not limit ourselves to mere promises. We are prepared to set up machinery so that the representatives of all countries can go into all other countries and satisfy themselves and their people that what is being promised is being done. Here are the short, simple slogans which we can use to sell democracy. It is that we have no Iron Curtain, no secret police. It is that we are prepared to give real security for our international promises, that we propose effective controls. It is that we have nothing to conceal; it is that the peoples of other countries can satisfy themselves that we want peace. It is that they can satisfy themselves that in transmitters, the moving pictures, and the printed matter which carry news and ideas we are not dealing in propaganda. We are dealing in the facts of American life. We are showing what can be done by men in societies where men are free. We are thus striking at a soft spot in the monolith of communism. The Iron Curtain was dropped to prevent the penetration of these ideas because they constitute the one area where rigid Soviet controls cannot be applied.

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Problems Facing Underdeveloped Areas in Asia and Africa

PREPARING FOR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE THROUGH SOUND CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

*by Ambassador Francis B. Sayre
U.S. Representative in U.N. Trusteeship Council*¹

My topic this evening is a world problem, as tremendous in its proportions, as profound in its far-reaching consequences as the stupendous struggle now raging between Soviet Russia and the free world. It is the problem of the world's far-flung underdeveloped areas. It affects directly the question of world peace or war in the twenty-first century. Upon its successful solution hangs the further advance of civilization. Just what is this problem?

Three Poison-Breeding Factors

It is the perilous situation resulting today in large parts of Asia and in most of Africa from the conjunction of three poison-breeding factors:

First. A condition of appalling human need. It is not that the peoples in large parts of Asia and Africa lack merely the good things of life. They are born into a lifelong struggle against desperate hunger, against disease that saps their strength, against ignorance and illiteracy that shuts out hope. Living standards in most of Asia and Africa are the lowest in the world. In many sections, life expectancy at birth is only 32 years. One out of every three babies dies before reaching its first birthday. Those suffering from malaria in Asia today equal the total population of the Western Hemisphere—and every year three million of these sufferers die. Tuberculosis, malaria, and yaws are rampant. All are controllable diseases. Monstrous illiteracy bars the door to spiritual or technological advance. More people in Asia and Africa are unable to read a word from a printed book or direction than inhabit the whole of Europe and of the United States.

¹Address made before the American Academy of Arts and Sciences at Boston, Mass., on Apr. 9 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

Second. Embittering memories of cruel racial discrimination and exploitation which accompanied much of nineteenth century colonialism. These have left livid scars. Racial inferiority complexes have been generated; and these today offer serious hindrances to Western attempts to build bulwarks for freedom. The poison of racial hatred has bred among many people in Asia and Africa profound distrust, and in some cases fear, of all white peoples.

Third. Surging forces of nationalism. Earlier conditions which made for isolation of underdeveloped peoples have been largely swept away by modern commerce, the radio and world-scale military activities. In consequence, Asia and Africa today, emerging from the primitive conditions which have locked them in for centuries, are being confronted with twentieth-century problems which they scarcely understand and for which they are quite unprepared. The result is the high explosive of nationalism. Even nations which have recently achieved independent statehood are often rabidly nationalistic. Many of these peoples, freed from the fetters of colonialism and awakening to the world around them, are beginning to feel the striking disparity between the peoples of the Western world, in their eyes luxuriating in plenty, and themselves, lacking even the bare essentials of existence. At the same time, they, like the populace of France in 1789, are tasting new-found power. For, however successfully it may be curbed for a time by political institutions or popular ignorance, power ultimately rests in the hands of the people. Millions of men and women living in the underdeveloped areas of Asia and Africa, more and more insistently are asking why they should live as the disinherited people of the world.

It is the conjunction of these three interrelated factors—desperate human need, the feeling of re-

sentiment bred by long years of cruel racial discrimination, and an explosive, new-found nationalism—that constitutes the problem of underdeveloped peoples in Asia and Africa. Here is a problem which must be comprehended and met today if we are to have world peace in the twenty-first century. Even if the Soviet state collapsed tomorrow, there could be no assurance of world peace until this problem is mastered. For peace depends inescapably upon human freedom; and in the face of desperate hunger and need, of deep-rooted racial hatreds, of the sudden acquisition of power by peoples quite unprepared for its responsibilities, there can be no genuine freedom.

The March Toward Political Independence

Significant surface tide rips now and again reveal these strong deep-moving currents at work. At Paris last November and December in the General Assembly, one felt their power in the debates of the Fourth Committee [Trusteeship], where the representatives of some 60 nations deal with problems of trusteeship and dependent peoples. Of these 60 nations, eight administer the territories of dependent peoples and are responsible for their governance. Some 50 do not carry such responsibility, although within the borders of many of them live primitive peoples whose life is much the same as that of peoples in non-self-governing areas. Consequently, in the Fourth Committee, in spite of support from some nonadministering delegations, the 8 administering powers can be hopelessly outvoted.

The issues underlying the current Fourth Committee debates are basic. Certain peoples, isolated from the busy pathways of mankind, are today underdeveloped and lack the modern resources, the training, and the experience to govern themselves competently or to defend themselves against possible attack by aggressor states.

Leading Western nations during past centuries, with or without right, have entered the territories of many of these peoples and successfully exercised control and government over them. Under the system of national sovereignty as developed in international law they consider today their right to control these people and to exercise sovereignty over them legally and constitutionally unassailable.

But, during the last hundred years, throughout the world has come an awakening social consciousness and a deepening sense of the sanctity of those human rights which must lie at the foundation of every lasting world order. As a result, men and women everywhere today are questioning the right of one people to govern and control another against the latter's consent; and the challenge is being pressed not only by dependent peoples but also by many other nations which themselves possess no colonial territories. However strongly entrenched in law and in constitu-

tional theory may be the colonial powers' right to rule an alien people, there is a growing popular tendency today to shift the issue from constitutional to moral considerations. The resulting pressures are intensified by old resentments against nineteenth century colonialism.

The march toward political independence within recent years has been assuming dramatic proportions. Moved by a complex of motives and forces, hastened by the pressures of world opinion, the great colonial powers today in numerous instances are giving up former possessions or putting a time limit on the continuance of their rule. Since the Second World War some 500 million people—a fifth of the entire population of the world—have won political independence.

Solving New Problems of Independence

But with independence come new problems; and genuine freedom is not to be had until a way can be found to solve them.

LIBYA

Examples abound. Libya as a result of the vote of the General Assembly in 1949 has now become a "united, independent and sovereign State," and the occupying powers, Great Britain and France, have transferred all their governmental powers to the new Libyan Government as from December 24, 1951. Free and democratic national elections have already been held there and a new constitution has been inaugurated.

But independence carries with it inescapable responsibilities. Defense involves large outlays of money; so do necessary buildings and public works. So do adequate educational programs and public-health measures. So do schools and hospitals and training institutions for indigenous school teachers and doctors and nurses. Thus far the necessary revenues have for the most part come out of the treasuries of Great Britain and of France, the administering powers. Libya itself lacks sufficient revenues. The U.N. budget is not large enough to support the necessary expenditures. For the time being, Great Britain and France have promised to make good the deficits in the Libyan budget. During the current year the United Nations is advancing to Libya over a million dollars in technical assistance. Similarly, the United States is advancing about \$1,500,000 in technical assistance. But the question still remains: How will the Libyan people in the long run meet the necessary costs of economic and social and educational advancement? From where will the money come?

SOMALILAND

Or take another example. The people of the former Italian colony of Somaliland in 1950 were placed under Italian administration in accordance

with the vote of the General Assembly in 1949 and were promised their political independence at the end of 10 years. The civil expenditures in Somaliland for the past year were almost double the amount of receipts derived from the Territory itself. Local receipts totalled \$4,616,850, while civil expenditures amounted to \$8,463,140. The difference is made up by a direct contribution from the administering authority. The Government of Italy also assumed all obligations relating to the Security Corps. Also, it is worth noting that about 75 percent of the direct and indirect taxes in Somaliland are paid by Italians.

Experts express doubt whether Somaliland can ever be a viable state, with a high or even moderate level of government services. They question whether the country possesses sufficient natural resources or possibility of industrial development ever to produce the revenues necessary for an adequately governed self-sufficient state. In 1960, Italy, the administering power, steps out. What then?

Problems such as these face us today in many similar areas. Men and women are questioning the right of any nation to govern an alien people against their will. But the maintenance of independence and the development of economic and industrial resources cost money and require trained personnel. Where are they to come from? Surely the answer is not simple abandonment. Underdeveloped peoples cannot be left to live on in ignorance and want. Human progress imperatively demands that they be given a helping hand. In many of the underdeveloped areas in Asia and Africa, man has today perhaps his last opportunity to meet these extended problems with humane and Christian solutions. If he fails, can he be surprised if communism moves in?

Devising System of International Accountability for Dependent Peoples

Underlying the debates in the Fourth Committee is the effort on the part of many of the non-administering powers to widen the scope of international accountability for the government of dependent peoples beyond the point specifically agreed to by the eight administering powers in 1945 when the Charter was written and the international trusteeship system set up. How far can a system of international accountability for the government of dependent peoples be pushed? In other words, have the representatives of the 60 nations which are members of the United Nations the power to require the administering states to adopt such specific policies in the government of their dependent peoples as the Fourth Committee may decide upon by a majority vote?

The contest takes many different forms. Last November in the opening days of the session, the Fourth Committee voted to grant hearings to rep-

resentatives of the Ewe people, dwelling within the trust territories of French and British Togoland in West Africa. Since these representatives were invited to present their views in a controversy involving an international trust territory, there seemed little question as to the Fourth Committee's competence to grant the hearings. In fact, the United Kingdom representatives at the very outset spoke in favor of the invitation. This, however, was followed by a resolution similarly to grant a hearing to chiefs of the Herero, Nama, and Damara tribes dwelling in South-West Africa. South-West Africa is not a trust territory but a mandated territory set up by the League of Nations under the administration of the South African Union. The representative of the Union Government strongly protested that since South-West Africa is not a trust territory, such a resolution would be an unconstitutional intervention in their domestic affairs and thus a violation of their Charter rights. Others took a contrary view. Upon the passing of the vote, the Union delegation promptly withdrew from the Fourth Committee and boycotted its further proceedings.

There followed severe criticism by the representative of Guatemala upon British rule in British Honduras; and this in turn was followed by critical references by Greece to British rule in Cyprus and by Yemen to British administration in Aden. After a strong British protest there followed an attempt on the part of the Arab group to question French rule in Morocco. French Morocco is neither a trust territory nor under mandate. The representative of Iraq charged that the "lamentable position of Morocco" was basically due to the policy of colonialism pursued by France there. Every manifestation of nationalism, he asserted, was being harshly and sternly suppressed. The French representative, protesting the illegality of the proceeding, and asserting that he could not continue to take part in a debate which was wholly unconstitutional, walked out of the Committee.

In debating the legality of the proceedings most of the nonadministering powers took the position that the Fourth Committee was entirely competent to discuss political matters and political aspects not only in trust territories but in all non-self-governing territories as well, and a resolution to that effect was introduced. Running through many minds was the position strongly taken by certain nonadministering powers the preceding year that the Fourth Committee is competent by its vote to determine the specific policies which "the administering authorities are under a clear obligation to implement." Dark clouds began to gather over the Fourth Committee.

In the end, however, the Iraq representative agreed not to press the matter to a vote and the French representative returned to the Fourth Committee. But none of us could fail to realize

the deep-seated cleavages becoming manifest. Intense emotions had been aroused; far-reaching issues were at stake.

One must not overmagnify the seriousness of these incidents of last November. On the other hand, every flier must know the air currents upon which he depends. Storm signals are appearing in many quarters. It is not wise to ignore them. Failure to recognize and meet the problem of underdeveloped peoples in Asia and Africa can seriously injure the machinery of the United Nations, might seriously impair our chances for world peace in the years to come.

Relation of Underdeveloped Areas and Political Dependency

We must not become confused in our thinking. The problem of underdeveloped areas is not altogether the same as that of dependent peoples. Many dependent peoples, such for instance as those of Bermuda or Malta or Hawaii, possess a comparatively high degree of development, but prefer or need the continuing protection and assistance of a Great Power; whereas, on the other hand, some peoples, such as those in Libya, now possess political independence but remain as yet for the most part underdeveloped. Nevertheless, these two problems of underdevelopment and political dependency are intimately interrelated; in many areas of Asia and Africa they directly coincide.

Both reach deep into the heart of the problem of world peace.

World peace, as all of us know, can be built only upon human freedom. Yet today some 200,000,000 people are non-self-governing. What is the solution?

The easy but superficial answer is prompt independence for all. This is the answer which the Soviets beguilingly espoused at San Francisco when the U.N. Charter was being framed in 1945. It is an answer that has instant emotional appeal to almost everyone. It wins support in every General Assembly, particularly among the Latin American groups and those Middle Eastern states which have achieved their independence after long years of struggle.

We of America, perhaps more than any other people, believe that freedom is the rock upon which all human progress must be built. Without it there can be no democracy, no stable world peace.

Under its Charter, the United Nations is consecrated to the task of assisting all non-self-governing peoples in their progressive development toward independence or self-government. This is the deep purpose of every people outside of the Soviet ring.

Since the setting up of the United Nations, as has already been pointed out, some 500 millions of people have acquired political independence. Seven new nations of Asia—India, Pakistan, Cey-

lon, Burma, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Indonesia—have come into existence. To these must be added Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel in the Middle East; and in Africa, Libya, which was given independence last December. Somaliland, Nepal, the new states of Indochina, and others loom on the horizon.

But what so many people fail to understand is that political independence is not synonymous with human freedom. In 1783 the wresting of American independence from the British Crown was only the first step toward freedom. As a next step it took a constitutional bill of rights to guarantee freedom of speech and of the press, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, freedom from illegal process. Thereafter it took the people of the independent nation many years of sustained effort to build the social and cultural foundations necessary to establish American freedom and make it reasonably secure. Indeed, we are still in the building process. As we move forward we continually gain new vision and new goals.

Genuine freedom cannot be achieved by mere political grant or military victory. It comes only as adequate foundations—political, economic, social, and educational—can be prepared for it.

In Somaliland, for instance, unless the people can, through actual experience and training, learn what majority rule by secret ballot means and accept the responsibilities that must go with democracy, unless the local revenues can be increased through rapid agricultural or industrial development to pay for sorely needed schools and teachers and hospitals and doctors, there will be no genuine individual human freedom there 10 years from now.

Political independence is a notable step along the way. But surely it is only a step, and in no sense the goal itself. Peoples can be as effectively manacled by economic and social forms of servitude as by political oppression. In other words, among the peoples living in many primitive parts of Asia and Africa, the real problems go far deeper than political status. In such areas genuine solutions can come only through slow processes of education and training in the fundamentals upon which successful self-government must be built.

When the United States undertook the administration of the Philippine Islands in 1898, in spite of insistent Filipino demands, we did not give them independence for almost half a century. Instead we sent among them armies of school teachers and doctors and road builders. We helped them to learn what democracy means in action and we gave them practical experience in the exasperating art of self-government.

The grant of premature political independence without adequate economic and social preparation for it can bring to a people untold harm. Indigenous leaders, unrestrained by the civic standards that come with widespread education, can exploit

their compatriots as ruthlessly as aliens or even more so. Neither can the cause of international peace be served by giving full independence to a people unable to defend themselves. Large parts of Asia and Africa today possess immense natural resources and offer exceedingly valuable strategic bases, but are inhabited by peoples quite unable to hold their own against lawless aggressors armed with twentieth-century weapons.

Our course is clear. If we are to have lasting peace, we must stimulate and help the peoples in all underdeveloped areas, self-governing as well as non-self-governing, to construct the kind of economic and social and educational foundations necessary to prepare them for maintaining their political freedom and to qualify them for increasing self-government.

Task of the U.N. Trusteeship Council

In this great task the United Nations is now engaged on a broad front through its principal organs and specialized agencies. These, for example, are the precise objectives of the Trusteeship Council for the trust territories of Africa and the Pacific. And it is along these lines in fact that significant and promising advances are actually being achieved today.

Of the six principal United Nations organs it is the Trusteeship Council which devotes its attention most directly to the struggle for human freedom in areas not yet prepared for full political independence.

Today 11 trust territories—7 in Africa and 4 in the Pacific—have been placed under the international trusteeship system. They embrace a population of some 18,000,000 people. It is true that only about a tenth of the non-self-governing peoples of the world live within the confines of trust territories. Nevertheless, among them the Trusteeship Council has a unique opportunity to point the pathway which leads to freedom for all.

I wish there were time to tell you something of the adventures of the Trusteeship Council along these pathways. I think of the people living in the Trust Territory of Western Samoa and of how, in 1947, their chiefs and leaders sent a petition to the Trusteeship Council asking for self-government. In response the Trusteeship Council promptly sent a mission to Samoa, composed of a Belgian, a Chilean, and myself. Assisting us were a Norwegian, a Frenchman, and a Brazilian, members of the Secretariat. We spent the summer in Samoa, studying the problem at first hand, visiting the Samoan villages, talking with the people. The mission reached unanimous conclusions. We recommended that immediate steps be taken to give Samoans a substantially greater measure of self-government. "Even a limited degree of self-government," declared our report, "involves risks which are not underestimated by the Mission. But these risks must be taken.

Training in self-government can come only through actual experience sometimes costly." We recommended among other things that a Government of Western Samoa should be established and that legislative power should be placed in the hands of a local legislature. We also recommended that Samoans should have an absolute majority in the legislature. Before the year was out the New Zealand Parliament had given to the Samoans a new government embodying substantially every one of our mission's recommendations.

It takes a visit to a trust territory to see what trusteeship really means. An inspection trip took me not long ago to the former Japanese islands of the Pacific, now a trust territory under U.S. administration. I went out questioning. I came back impressed.

During the period of the Japanese mandate, the peoples of the Islands had been given no training, no hope. War had hit the Islands hard. During my visit, I found that within the 2½ years since the United States had assumed its trusteeship responsibilities more than 100 local municipalities had been organized to give the inhabitants training in the ways of democratic government. Approximately 80 percent of the Islanders of voting age at present enjoy some form of suffrage. Almost every inhabited island today has its elementary schools. More than 90 percent of the children of school age are enrolled in local schools. Indigenous teachers are being taught in an effective training school at Truk, where once the Japanese were building their war machine. Disease has been drastically reduced. Malnutrition has been virtually eliminated. Indigenous medical assistants, dentists, and nurses, trained at Guam or at Suva, are carrying their ministrations throughout the islands.

Americans are winning a place in the hearts of the Pacific Islanders. Last year came a petition to the United Nations from Saipan, one of the Pacific Islands. "It is our fervent hope," reads the petition, "that all of the islands in the Northern Marianas be incorporated into the United States of America, either as a possession or as a territory, preferably as a territory." To their great disappointment the petition was not granted.

Throughout the trust territories, the inhabitants are learning in the crucible of experience what self-government and freedom really mean.

"But why force upon peoples who through the centuries have developed their own cultures and found happiness in them, a twentieth-century culture which they neither understand nor want?" many will ask. "Would it not make for the happiness of all to leave them unmolested in their own ways of life?"

The answer is that we have no choice in the matter. No one can stay the hand of advancing cultures—least of all in an age when insistent com-

mercial and military demands have knit all peoples into an inescapable unity. Western Samoa during the whole of the second half of the nineteenth century struggled unyieldingly to preserve its indigenous culture and its isolation from Western civilization. It was of no avail. Other attempts all tell the same story. In our present shrunken twentieth century world no people can successfully isolate their indigenous culture behind a Chinese Wall. Each people has incalculable contributions to be given to humanity. Our twentieth-century life demands that every people make its peculiar contributions and together share our differing cultures.

Coordination of Economic Assistance Programs

Once we know the direction in which to work, we must not be dismayed by the magnitude of the task. The exciting fact is that today this problem of underdeveloped areas is being intelligently attacked as never before. The attack is on an international scale, in the main by the United Nations but also by the coordinated efforts of individual states.

Food is one of the paramount issues. As José de Castro has aptly said: "Only by raising the buying power and consuming capacity of the undernourished two-thirds of the world can the other third survive and prosper. Isolationism can be as dangerous in the matter of food consumption as in the realm of war and politics."

The U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) is laboring manfully to increase food supplies throughout the world. It is showing many peoples the superiority of the plow to the hoe, of modern scientific agriculture to archaic methods of tilling the fields. Even so, progress is slow. Two months ago I was watching Arabs plowing their fields in northern Morocco. The plows consisted of the twisted branches of trees. Iron plows were beyond the workers' reach.

Power development, flood control, irrigation projects cost money and cannot be put through without capital from the outside. In the past fiscal year, 1951, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development made 21 loans for development projects in 11 countries totaling nearly 300 million dollars.

For the first year of an expanded program of technical assistance and economic development, 54 governments pledged to the U.N. Technical Assistance Board over 20 million dollars. Nearly 19 million dollars has been pledged so far for the 1952 program. Up to June 30, 1951, more than 500 requests had been received from 64 countries and territories. At that date 252 projects had been initiated or approved through agreements with 45 countries providing for 741 experts and 551 fellowships. From further agreements, then under negotiation, projects requiring the services

of 674 experts and 590 fellowships were expected to result.

Separate nations are also engaging in this considerable effort. The U.S. total program of technical assistance excluding its contribution to the United Nations amounts to more than 200 million dollars. This is part of the appropriation of 1 billion, 440 million dollars voted by Congress last October 31 for economic and technical cooperation. The United Kingdom in 1945 passed the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, setting aside £120,000,000 to promote the development and welfare of the colonies. Other administering powers are pushing forward in similar developments.

Difficulties abound. Economic-assistance programs cannot be rammed down the throats of undesiring recipients. At least one non-Communist country has refused the offer of American technical assistance because of their fear or misunderstanding of our motives. Also, innovations may arouse the opposition of tribal chiefs or the holders of vested rights. Then, again, old time subsistence economies, easygoing and never exacting, are often of greater appeal than increased revenues. Progress as conceived of in our Western cultures is not coveted by every people, particularly if it involves the abandonment of ancestral ways of life.

The building of economic foundations for freedom clearly involves more than handing out in backward areas dollars or pounds or francs for expenditure. Like all effective work for human progress it requires a deep understanding of the people concerned, tempered with infinite patience and wisdom. It will not succeed unless wrought with an abiding faith in the dignity and worth of every personality, regardless of the color of his skin or his unfamiliarity with formal education. We have still a long, long way to go. Nevertheless, economic progress is being achieved—more rapidly it would seem and on a more extended scale than ever before in human history.

The Importance of Adequate Social Foundations

Adequate social foundations are as necessary as economic ones. In the space of less than 3 years the United Nations has secured the adoption of a Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This is not a treaty, not a law, but a definition of goals. But it has already had an important impact upon the thinking of mankind. The treaty on genocide, now ratified by 35 nations, is an attempt to outlaw the practice of mass extermination of peoples.

Basic among social problems is, of course, that of disease. Sick men cannot till their lands. In this field another U.N. agency, the World Health Organization (WHO), is mobilizing attack upon an international scale. The Trusteeship Council

is also constantly at work, pioneering in the trust territories in the field of social problems. For instance, in a recent report covering the Trust Territory of Tanganyika, the former German colony of East Africa, the following problems are listed as having come under the Council's consideration: social welfare and security, population pressure and movement, standard of living, housing, child marriage, immigration, general labor conditions, wage rates, trade-unions, labor disputes, labor conventions and legislation, cooperative societies, medical services, hospitals, dispensaries, clinics, and prisons.

In this field perhaps the most profound and baffling problem of all is racial discrimination. One thing we know. Brazen racial discrimination undermines the position of the white man in the world community. Change will come; and it is greatly to the interest of the white race to help to guide rather than to impede that change. In a number of areas the problem is being solved—and successfully solved along the lines pointed out by courageous missionaries for many years. They call it the pathway of human brotherhood. The peoples of the United Nations at the very outset of the Charter pledged themselves to a "faith in fundamental human rights," and "in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small."

As a matter of fact, experience over many years has shown that when colonial administration is based upon the exploitation of human beings, it has bred only difficulties and well-nigh insuperable problems. On the other hand, when colonial administration has come to be based upon the conception of sharing common problems and common fortunes, stable and reasonably satisfactory solutions have generally been reached. One thinks of New Zealanders and Maoris, of Americans and Filipinos. Wise colonial administration recognizes the oneness of the human race.

Developing Ideals of Human Progress

Another and perhaps the most necessary foundation for human freedom, particularly among primitive and tribal peoples, lies in the field of education. "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free," wrote Thomas Jefferson, "it expects what never was and never will be." In Asia, Africa, and the South Pacific, many peoples still lack any comprehension of what human progress outside their own static cultures means.

In the weird Cargo Cult of the South Pacific, one gains a glimpse of the thought processes of the primitive mind. Among these peoples runs an unquestioning belief in magic, in the power of the fetish, in unholy spells. Struck with the utterly inexplicable power of foreigners to produce, as from the skies, inexhaustible supplies of ships and

guns and food and kerosene stoves and machine monsters of indescribable power, certain South Pacific peoples under the spell of the Cargo Cult, perhaps touched by a misunderstood conception of sacrifice gained from Christian missions, will take it upon themselves with sudden decision to destroy everything they possess—to tear down their houses, burn their pathetic belongings, chop down their trees and root up their gardens, in a fine gesture of faith and hope that their gods or ancestors will thus be induced to send to them, too, even as to the foreigners, miraculous machines and a wealth of food.

As a general rule in underdeveloped areas there is an intense eagerness for modern schooling rather than resistance to it. In most such areas it is far easier to get children to come to school than to provide sufficient schools and sufficient trained teachers to teach them. One cannot plan an educational program based upon the use of foreign teachers for a population running into millions or even tens of millions. Manifestly there are not enough foreign teachers to be had. Adequate training schools where indigenous teachers can be trained constitute the keystone of any effective program for widespread education. Into these must be gathered the most promising boys and girls of the territory. This all takes time and costs large outlays of money.

There is also the crucial question of what to teach. It will do no good to give to primitive peoples a classical education. People living in primitive or tribal conditions must learn, not higher mathematics or ancient history, but how to make life more meaningful and rewarding for themselves and their fellows and how to improve the conditions under which they live.

The problem of underdeveloped areas in Asia and Africa cannot be solved in a night. It requires endless effort along a hundred different fronts. Its solution can come only through patient, untiring constructive work, and not through mass destruction.

But the great fact is that the free peoples of the world are comprehending ever more clearly the underlying issues and concentrating upon the constructive way forward. Measurable progress is being made.

The fight for freedom is a twofold fight. It involves not only resistance to political oppression but also emancipation of men and women from the shackles of hunger, disease, and ignorance. Both are necessary. Victory in one field contributes to victory in the other.

Soviet communism will not win. Neither authoritarianism nor ruthless dictatorship can ever permanently prevail. Free men working together throughout the world for human freedom possess matchless power. Today they are uniting as never before. Their power is unconquerable.

Educational Exchange Agreement With South Africa

[Released to the press March 26]

The Union of South Africa and the United States on March 26 signed an agreement putting into operation the program of educational exchanges authorized by Public Law 584, 79th Cong. (the Fulbright Act). The signing took place at Capetown with J. H. Viljoen, Minister of Education, Arts and Science, representing the Union of South Africa, and Waldemar J. Gallman, American Ambassador to the Union of South Africa, representing the Government of the United States.

In signing the agreement which is the twenty-fourth to be concluded under the Fulbright Act, Ambassador Gallman said:

It gives me great pleasure to sign, on behalf of my government, this agreement for financing educational exchange programs. I am sure that a wider exchange of knowledge and professional talent through personal contact will promote cooperation between our two countries in a most constructive way.

In reply, the Minister of Education, Arts and Science expressed his thanks to the Government of the United States for this

act of friendship designed to further closer cooperation, mutual understanding and respect between our countries. We in distant South Africa are already greatly indebted to the American people for their generosity in having assisted many of our students financially or otherwise, either to undertake research work in this country or pursue their studies in the United States.

The agreement provides for an annual expenditure not to exceed the equivalent of approximately \$16,000 in South African currency for a period of 3 years to finance exchanges between that country and the United States for purposes of study, research, or teaching. The program will be financed from certain funds made available by the U.S. Government resulting from the sale of surplus property to the Union of South Africa.

All recipients of awards under this program are selected by the Board of Foreign Scholarships, appointed by the President of the United States.

Under the terms of the agreement, a U.S. educational foundation in the Union of South Africa will be established to assist in the administration of the program. The Board of Directors of the foundation will consist of four members, two of whom are to be citizens of the Union of South Africa and two to be citizens of the United States. The American Ambassador to the Union of South Africa will serve as honorary chairman of the Board.

After the members of the foundation in the Union of South Africa have been appointed and a program formulated, information about specific opportunities will be made public.

Military Assistance Agreement With Chile

The Departments of State and Defense announced on April 9 that a bilateral military-assistance agreement had been signed that day with the Government of Chile.¹

The American Ambassador in Santiago, Claude G. Bowers, and Eduardo Yrarrazaval, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, signed the agreement.

This is the fifth bilateral military-assistance agreement which the United States has concluded with another American Republic. The other agreements, all very similar, are with Peru, Ecuador, Cuba, and Brazil. Negotiations on two more, with the Governments of Colombia and Uruguay, are in progress. What is involved is the provision by the United States of military grant aid to strengthen the defense of the Western Hemisphere. This military-aid program for Latin American nations was authorized in the Mutual Security Act of 1951. It is designed to assist the countries concerned in developing their capabilities to join in carrying out missions important to the security of all the American Republics.

The bilateral military grant aid program is consistent with inter-American instruments already in effect, such as the Rio Treaty, the resolution on Inter-American Military Cooperation approved at the Washington Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics last year, and is in full conformity with the planning of the Inter-American Defense Board.

Conversations on Military Assistance Agreement With Uruguay

[Released to the press March 31]

The Departments of State and Defense announced conversations are being initiated on March 31 at Montevideo with the Government of Uruguay to study the possibility and desirability of concluding a bilateral military assistance agreement.

The American Ambassador at Montevideo, Edward L. Roddan, is being assisted by representatives of the Department of Defense in the conversations. They are being carried on under the terms of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which authorized a program of military grant-aid for Latin America.

¹ For text of agreement, see Department of State press release 267 of Apr. 9.

Power Credit for Colombia

The Export-Import Bank announced on April 1 its authorization of a credit of \$2,600,000 to the Empresa de Energia Electrica, S. A., Medellin, Colombia. The purpose of the credit is to assist in financing a hydroelectric power plant of 50,000 kw. capacity on the Rio Grande River near Medellin, transmission lines, and related facilities. Empresa de Energia Electrica, S. A., owned by the city of Medellin, serves the largest and most important industrial area in Colombia which has, however, lately been suffering from a power shortage.

The granting of the credit which the Bank has announced is in furtherance of the policy of supporting the power program of the Empresa. In 1944 the Bank extended a credit of \$3,500,000 to the Empresa for the same purpose.

The credit of \$2,600,000, which will be guaranteed by the Banco de la Republica, will bear interest at the rate of 4½ percent per annum and is to be repaid over a 15-year period beginning in 1953.

Herbert E. Gaston, Chairman of the Board of the Export-Import Bank, in announcing the credit said, "The availability of power is basic to the economic development of Colombia and the Export-Import Bank is very happy to be able to assist Colombia in this important development."

Point Four Agreement With El Salvador

With the signature in San Salvador April 4, 1952, of a Point Four general agreement between the Governments of the United States and El Salvador, there are now 33 countries with which general agreements have been signed. There have been cooperative technical programs in operation in El Salvador for the past 10 years. The new agreement provides for their continuation and possible expansion.

American Ambassador George P. Shaw signed the agreement for the United States and Foreign Minister Roberto E. Canessa for El Salvador. Wyman R. Stone, director of the Health, Welfare and Housing Division of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, and other American and Salvadoran officials were present at the ceremonies.

An agricultural mission of the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations of the Department of Agriculture has been engaged in extensive research and extension activities since 1942. A large demonstration farm and experimental station is operated by them in cooperation with Salvadoran technicians at San Andres and another at Santa Cruz Porillos.

A health and sanitation mission of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs has been in operation

in El Salvador since 1944. Its principal activities include the completion and partial equipment of two hospital-health centers, a tuberculosis pavilion and a national nursing school, and carrying out an extensive rural sanitation program emphasizing the provision of safe water supply and sewage systems. The Federal Security Agency, in September 1951, sent out a specialist in medical social work to develop this service in the hospital at San Salvador.

Investigations into the fishery resources of El Salvador are being conducted by a fisheries expert from the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior. He also will advise the Government on the modernization of the industry.

In January of last year, an education mission was sent out by the Institute of Inter-American Affairs to inaugurate a vocational-education program and to assist in organizing the San Salvador technical school.

Today, there are 18 American technicians in El Salvador working with 620 Salvadoran specialists in various phases of the development program. Last year the American contribution to the program was \$307,900 and the Salvadoran contribution was \$553,000.

Trade Negotiations With Venezuela

[Released to the press April 11]

Formal negotiations with the Government of Venezuela to supplement and amend the trade agreement with that country which was signed on November 6, 1939, will begin according to present plans, at Caracas on April 18.

The head of the U.S. team for these negotiations will be Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., Deputy Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs of the Department of State. The other members of the team are William F. Gray, Office of South American Affairs of the Department of State; Harold P. Macgowan, Adviser on Trade Agreement Policy, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce; James H. Kempton, Agricultural Attaché, American Embassy, Caracas; Herbert E. Striner, Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior; and G. Lucille Batchelder of the Office of Middle American Affairs of the Department of State who will serve as secretary of the delegation.

Formal announcement of the intention to negotiate a supplementary trade agreement with Venezuela was made on August 29, 1951.¹ U.S. participation in the negotiations will be under the provisions of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, as amended.

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 10, 1951, p. 433.

Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly

SUMMARY OF MAJOR ACTION: PART I

by Paul B. Taylor

The U.N. General Assembly held its sixth regular session at Paris from November 6, 1951, to February 5, 1952. Around 4,000 persons—members of the Secretariat and of delegations from the 60 member countries, including 26 foreign ministers—attended all or part of the session, in addition to observers from a number of non-member states and from nongovernmental groups. Coverage of the meetings by press and radio services was probably greater than at any previous international meeting in history.

These annual meetings, participated in by the great majority of nations and attended by such a galaxy of leading personalities, have over the years become a powerful forum for the expression of governmental views on major foreign-policy issues. In it, all member states, through their ranking spokesmen, present their points of view. Naturally, the Assembly has been the outstanding forum for debate of the critical issues of our time—those between international communism on the one hand and the democratic countries on the other. But the scope of the discussions always extends more widely, dealing with a variety of economic, social, and political problems relating to all areas of the world. Moreover, the General Assembly has indispensable annual functions in the U.N. system: voting the U.N. budget, electing members of councils and other bodies, and reviewing, in its several committees, the varied work of the United Nations as a whole. Over and above these organizational functions, the General Assembly has increasingly become the principal political action body of the organization.

The U.S. representatives at the session were Dean Acheson, Warren R. Austin, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Mike J. Mansfield, John M. Vorys, and Philip C. Jessup.

The alternate representatives included John Sherman Cooper, Ernest A. Gross, Benjamin V. Cohen, Anna Lord Strauss, and Channing H. Tobias.

Assembly Elections

At its opening meeting, the Assembly elected as its President, Ambassador Padilla Nervo of Mexico and, as the seven Vice Presidents, the heads of the delegations of China, France, Iraq, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, and Yugoslavia. The following committee chairmen were also elected:

First Committee (Political and Security): Finn Moe (Norway)
 Second Committee (Economic and Financial): Prince Wan Waithayakon (Thailand)
 Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural): Mrs. Ana Figueroa (Chile)
 Fourth Committee (Trusteeship): Max Henriquez Urena (Dominican Republic)
 Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary): T. A. Stone (Canada)
 Sixth Committee (Legal): Manfred Lachs (Poland)

Later, the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee elected Ambassador Sarper of Turkey as its chairman.

Each year the Assembly elects new members of the U.N. councils to replace those whose terms have expired. It elected Chile, Pakistan, and Greece for 2-year terms on the Security Council. The third vacancy—the seat formerly held by Yugoslavia—was filled only on the 19th ballot. The United States and a number of other countries strongly supported Greece for that post; Byelorussia, the Soviet candidate for the vacancy, did, however, receive substantial backing. To fill the vacant seats in the Economic and Social Council, Argentina, Belgium, China, Cuba, Egypt, and France were elected for the coming 3-year term. Argentina then resigned its seat on the Trusteeship Council and the Assembly elected El Salvador in its place. Six vacancies had to be filled, by the Assembly and the Security Council, on the International Court of Justice—one caused by the death of a judge, five by the expiration of terms of office. Judge Carneiro (Brazil) was elected to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Judge Azevedo.

The following five judges were elected for the full term: Judge Golunsky (U.S.S.R.), Judge Hackworth (U.S.), Judge Klaestad (Norway), Judge Rau (India), Judge Ugon (Uruguay).

Major Political Issues

The Paris session of the General Assembly offered great potentialities for influencing public opinion on critical issues. The countries of the free world had for some years been engaged in a sustained build-up of military and economic strength against, first, the threat and, later, the actuality of Communist aggression. This undertaking involved hard and long sacrifices for many countries. The Soviet Union attempted in the General Assembly to divide and split the countries of the free world, charging that the United States is bent on war, that it refuses to make peace in Korea, and that it is forcing an armaments race on the world and thus causing economic disaster to many populations. In contrast, Andrei Vyshinsky and other Soviet spokesmen pictured the Soviet Union as a true champion of peace and disarmament and conciliation. These charges were squarely met, and it can be said that the Soviet Union failed completely to achieve a weakening of the free-world effort. On the contrary, the great majority showed their determination to persevere in the collective U.N. action in Korea and in carrying out other major programs undertaken in previous years, such as the development of capacity for more effective U.N. measures against any future aggression.

Political conditions existing at the beginning of the session also brought to the fore a number of new and critical issues relating particularly to the Middle East and Arab States. The strong nationalist movements in this broad area, which had already been reflected in such matters as the oil controversy in Iran and the controversy between Egypt and the United Kingdom over the Suez Canal, gave great emphasis in the General Assembly to the problem of Morocco and to the general issues of self-determination and the operation of the trusteeship system.

Disarmament

On November 7, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced that they would submit joint proposals for proceeding with the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments, including atomic weapons.¹ Reaffirming their determination to develop the strength required for their security and that of the free world, they declared their belief that if all states would sincerely join in disarmament efforts the security of all nations would be increased. A few hours later President Truman,

in a radio address to the American people, explained the new disarmament proposals, making clear that they were the result of long and careful preparations.² He said that although the United States is determined to build up the necessary defenses of the free world, we would much prefer to see nations cut down their armaments on a basis that would be fair to everyone. The two U.N. Commissions heretofore working in the armaments field—the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission on Conventional Armaments—should be consolidated into one, and this new Commission should consider the tripartite proposals. The proposals contained three principal points:

(1) A continuing inventory of all armed forces and all armaments should be undertaken in every country having substantial military power and should be checked and verified in each country by impartial U.N. inspectors.

(2) While this process of inventory and inspection was taking place, nations would work out specific arrangements for the actual reduction of armed strength.

(3) On the basis of (1) and (2), reductions should be made as soon as possible with full knowledge and fairness to all.

On November 8, Secretary Acheson, in his speech in the general debate, outlined the proposals further and asked that the item be included in the agenda of the Assembly.³

Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky made his reply the following day. He ridiculed the proposals as a dead mouse brought forth by a mountain and said he had been kept awake all the previous night laughing at the proposals. He advanced Soviet proposals on the same subject along the lines of previous rejected Soviet proposals. Vyshinsky's cynical remarks brought about an immediate indignant reaction throughout the world; it was noted that the controlled press in the Soviet and satellite countries made no reference to the incident, and Vyshinsky took the unprecedented step of making a second address in the general debate. In this speech he once more criticized the tripartite plan and introduced amended Soviet proposals.

In the Political and Security Committee Secretary Acheson presented the tripartite proposals on November 19.⁴ After considerable discussion, a number of the smaller states, particularly those in Asia and the Middle East, urged that direct negotiations on the problem take place at once between the great powers. Accordingly, the Committee on November 30 established a subcommittee consisting of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United

² *Ibid.*, p. 799.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 803.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 3, 1951, p. 879. (See also correction *ibid.*, Jan. 14, 1952, p. 58.)

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1951, p. 802.

States, with Assembly President Padilla Nervo as chairman, to seek by private discussion to formulate mutually acceptable proposals. The subcommittee began its meetings on December 3, and on December 10 President Padilla Nervo reported on the areas of agreement and disagreement between the three Western Powers on the one hand and the U.S.S.R. on the other—the areas of agreement being largely in the field of procedures.⁵ On December 13 the Three Powers submitted a revision of their resolution, to include elements to which the U.S.S.R. and the three had agreed in the subcommittee and as many suggestions from other members as was possible. They also accepted certain separate amendments proposed by other members. On December 19 the Committee adopted the revised resolution, with some amendments, by 44 votes to 5 (Soviet bloc) with 10 abstentions. The proposals of the Soviet bloc which, as in previous years, failed to provide safeguards against violations, were overwhelmingly rejected. On January 11 the Assembly approved the Committee's action by 42 votes to 5 with 7 abstentions.

This resolution established a single Disarmament Commission composed of the members of the Security Council plus Canada, and it directed the Commission to prepare proposals to be embodied in draft treaties for (1) the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments; (2) the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; and (3) effective international control of atomic energy to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. The resolution laid down certain principles to guide the Commission in its work. These included provision for progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces and armaments. In the atomic energy field, the U.N. plan is to serve as the basis for international control unless a better and more effective system is devised. This disarmament resolution constitutes the most important achievement of the session.⁶

Other Political Questions

The crucial problem of Korea was on the agenda in the form of the reports of the U.N. commissions working on different aspects of that problem. The United States and, in fact, practically all members agreed that to discuss the problem while the armistice negotiations were still in progress would not help these negotiations and might well hinder them. On the other hand, the Soviet delegation tried unsuccessfully from time to time to force a debate on Korea, doubtless hoping to confuse the issue or to improve the position of the Communist negotiators by transferring the discussions to

Paris. Since the armistice negotiations continued at Panmunjom throughout the session, the Assembly, on the final day, adopted a proposal submitted by the United States, United Kingdom, and France that provided for a special session of the General Assembly to deal with Korea in case of an armistice or of other developments which make consideration of the problem desirable. The resolution was adopted by the overwhelming majority of 51 to 5 (Soviet bloc) with 2 abstentions.⁷

The Assembly carried further its collective-measures program under the resolution on Uniting for Peace adopted at the preceding session. The Collective Measures Committee established by that resolution had, during 1951, made a significant study of the means by which preparations could be made for more effective United Nations collective action if in a future case such action were undertaken. The United States and 10 other members of the Collective Measures Committee jointly introduced a resolution designed to carry forward the work. This resolution, with a number of amendments, was adopted by the Assembly by 51 votes to 5 (Soviet bloc) with 3 abstentions.⁸ In the resolution the Assembly took note of the Collective Measures Committee report, continued the Committee for a further year, and, in effect, recommended the continuation and further development of the collective-measures program initiated by the 1950 resolution on Uniting for Peace.

The Yugoslav representative introduced a complaint against the Soviet group's hostile activities toward it, and in his main speech he made a detailed indictment of the conduct of all these states. The Assembly adopted, by 50 votes to 5 (Soviet bloc) with 2 abstentions, a Yugoslav resolution recommending in general that the governments concerned conduct their relations in accordance with the Charter.⁹

On a proposal by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States the Assembly adopted, by 45 votes to 6 (Soviet bloc plus Israel) with 8 abstentions, a resolution appointing an impartial U.N. Commission to carry out a simultaneous investigation in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Berlin, and in the Soviet zone of Germany in order to determine whether existing conditions there make possible the holding of genuinely free elections throughout these areas.¹⁰

The members of the Arab League submitted a complaint entitled "Violations of the Charter and of Human Rights in Morocco." A General Committee recommendation that consideration of the question of inclusion of this item in the agenda be postponed for the time being was adopted by the General Assembly by 28 votes to 23 with 7 abstentions.

⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 18, 1952, p. 260.

⁸ For text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1027.

⁹ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 14, 1952, p. 62.

¹⁰ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 55.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Jan. 7, 1952, p. 17.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 31, 1952, p. 507.

The Soviet Union and its satellites pressed a number of propaganda themes throughout the session, in addition to those relating to disarmament and Korea. They introduced a resolution condemning the United States for the adoption by Congress of the so-called Kersten amendment, which became section 101 (a) (1) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and which authorized an appropriation of \$100,000,000 for "any selected persons who are residing in or escapees" from Iron Curtain countries "to form such persons into elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes."¹¹ The U.S.S.R. evidently sought through this complaint to brand the military assistance programs of the United States as intervention in the internal affairs of other countries and as designed to provoke war. The U.S. delegation flatly denied that Congress had ever intended the money to be used for any activities contrary to the U.N. Charter. On January 10, 1952, the Assembly by 42 votes to 5 (Soviet bloc) with 11 abstentions decisively rejected the Soviet charges.

In an omnibus resolution, the Soviet Union attempted to obtain Assembly approval of its own position concerning disarmament (even though the disarmament debate had been concluded and the resolution adopted), its proposals concerning Korea and a Five Power "peace pact," and its attempts to have the Assembly declare any participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization inconsistent with U.N. membership. The Assembly referred the Soviet disarmament proposals, together with the record of the debates, to the newly created Disarmament Commission; it rejected the other proposals.

The Assembly also dealt with a number of political problems which it had considered at previous sessions. Under earlier General Assembly resolutions, provision had been made for the independence of a united Libya by January 1, 1952. The United Kingdom of Libya was proclaimed as an independent state on December 24, 1951, and the General Assembly adopted a resolution designed to provide such further assistance as might be required and to achieve if possible its admission to the United Nations. On the Palestine question, the Assembly adopted, by a large majority, resolutions continuing the Palestine Conciliation Commission and providing for the adoption of a 3-year program, involving the expenditure of \$250,000,000, for the relief and reintegration of Palestine refugees.¹² In a resolution on the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa, the Assembly continued the efforts to reach a conciliatory solution and called upon South Africa to suspend implementation of the Group Areas Act.

¹¹ For a statement by Mike J. Mansfield, U.S. delegate to the General Assembly, explaining the U.S. vote against this Soviet resolution, see *ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1952, p. 128.

¹² For text of the Palestine assistance resolution, see *ibid.*, Feb. 11, 1952, p. 226.

After consideration of the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB), the General Assembly decided that the situation along Greece's northern frontiers had improved sufficiently to permit the dissolution of that 4-year-old watchdog body. At the same time, however, the Assembly provided for the establishment at New York of a Balkan subcommission of the Peace Observance Commission which would be available to conduct observation, on the request of states concerned, in any area of tension in the Balkans.

The admission of qualified states to membership was the subject of a Peruvian proposal adopted by the Assembly. The question of admission, the proposal stated, should be determined only on the basis of the Charter qualifications of the applicant, and it requested the Security Council to reconsider applications in accordance with this standard. A Soviet proposal requesting Security Council reconsideration of 13 applicants (omitting the Republic of Korea but adding Libya) received a majority vote in the Political Committee but failed to be adopted by the Assembly.

The problem of Chinese representation was raised once more by the U.S.S.R., this time in a request for inclusion of an item on this subject on the agenda.¹³ The Assembly adopted a resolution recommended by the General Committee rejecting inclusion of the Soviet item in the agenda and postponing for the duration of the meetings at Paris consideration of any further proposals to unseat the representatives of the National Government of China or to seat representatives of the Chinese Communist regime. The resolution was adopted by 37 votes to 11 with 4 abstentions. Another question relating to China was the complaint by China of Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945. The Assembly adopted, by 25 votes to 9 with 24 abstentions, a resolution proposed by China finding that the U.S.S.R. had obstructed the efforts of the National Government of China in re-establishing Chinese national authority in Manchuria after the Japanese surrender and that it gave military and economic aid to the Chinese Communists against the National Government of China, and determining that the U.S.S.R. has failed to carry out the treaty of friendship and alliance of August 14, 1945,¹⁴ between China and the U.S.S.R.

• *Mr. Taylor, author of the above article, is officer in charge of General Assembly Affairs for the Bureau of United Nations Affairs. He served as principal executive officer of the U.S. delegation to the Sixth General Assembly.*

¹³ For statements by Secretary Acheson and Ambassador Warren R. Austin on this subject, see *ibid.*, Dec. 3, 1951, p. 917.

¹⁴ For text of the Chinese resolution, see *ibid.*, Feb. 11, 1952, p. 220.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Cannes Film Festival

The Department of State announced on April 9 that the Cannes International Film Festival will be held at Cannes, France, April 23–May 10, 1952. Chester A. Lindstrom, chief, Motion Picture Section, Department of Agriculture, will serve as U.S. delegate. Gerald M. Mayer, attaché, American Embassy, Paris, and formerly European representative of the Motion Picture Association of America, will serve as alternate U.S. delegate.

The object of this Festival is to encourage the development of the motion picture art in all its forms and to create and maintain a spirit of emulation and cooperation among all film producers in all countries. A number of prizes will be awarded at the Festival.

The U.S. exhibit will consist of the following three Government-produced documentary films: "River Run" (Department of Agriculture); "West Point" (Department of the Army); and "Demonstrations in Perceptions" (Department of the Navy). These films were selected by the Review Committee on Visual and Audio Materials, which is composed of representatives of 11 motion-picture producing agencies of this Government. In addition, the U.S. film industry will send several feature-length and documentary films for the competition at Cannes.

Sixth Hydrographic Conference

The Department of State announced on April 9 that the Sixth International Hydrographic Conference will convene at Monte Carlo, Monaco, on April 29, 1952. The U.S. delegation to this Conference is as follows:

Delegates

Capt. Earl O. Heaton, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Department of Commerce
Capt. George F. Kennedy, U.S.N.R., Navy Hydrographic Office, Department of Defense

Technical Advisers

H. R. Edmonston, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Department of Commerce
Guillermo Medina, Navy Hydrographic Office, Department of Defense
William G. Watt, Navy Hydrographic Office, Department of Defense

The International Hydrographic Conference serves as the deliberative and legislative assembly of the International Hydrographic Bureau. The Bureau was founded in 1921 for the purpose of

establishing a close and permanent association between the hydrographic services of the member states and of coordinating their efforts with a view to promoting easier and safer navigation on all of the seas of the world. Headquarters of the Bureau are located at Monte Carlo. United States participation in the Bureau was approved by an Act of Congress of March 2, 1921.

International hydrographic conferences are usually held quinquennially. The Fifth Conference was held at Monte Carlo, April 22–May 5, 1947. At the forthcoming Conference the activities of the Bureau during the last 5 years will be reviewed.

ITU: Seventh Session of Administrative Council

On April 9 the Department of State announced that Francis Colt de Wolf, Chief, Telecommunications Policy Staff, and U.S. representative on the Administrative Council of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), will attend the seventh session of the Council, which will convene at Geneva, Switzerland, on April 21, 1952. Mr. de Wolf will be assisted by the following advisers:

Donald C. Blaisdell, U.S. representative for Specialized Agency Affairs, Geneva, Switzerland
Helen G. Kelly, Telecommunications Policy Staff, Department of State
Wayne Mason, U.S. telecommunications attaché, American Legation, Bern; resident at Geneva, Switzerland

The establishment of the Administrative Council was provided for in the Atlantic City Telecommunication Convention (1947) and certain protocols annexed thereto. The Council functioned on a provisional basis until the Convention entered into force on January 1, 1949. The functions of the Council, which serves as the governing organ of the ITU, are to insure the efficient coordination of the work of the Union, to supervise the administrative functions of the Union, to deal with problems arising between plenipotentiary conferences, and to perform such other operations as may be delegated to it by plenipotentiary conferences. The Council, which is composed of 18 members of the Union, meets at least once a year. The last (sixth) session of the Council was held at Geneva, April 16–May 26, 1951.

At the forthcoming session the Council will consider the administrative and fiscal operations of the ITU. The agenda for the session is limited in view of the imminence of the Plenipotentiary Conference, which is scheduled to be held at Buenos Aires in October 1952.

Inter-American Travel Congress

On April 11 the Department of State announced that the Fourth Inter-American Travel Congress will convene at Lima, Peru, on April 12, 1952. The members of the U.S. delegation are as follows:

Paul C. Daniels, American Ambassador to Ecuador; *Chairman*
Jess B. Bennett, Air Transport Association, Washington, D.C.
Franklin Moore, President, Inter-American Hotel Association, Harrisburg, Pa.
John D. J. Moore, U.S. Inter-American Council, Inter-American Council of Commerce and Production, New York, N.Y.
Robert H. Wall, Assistant Chief, Travel Bureau, Department of Commerce
Laurin B. Askew, Assistant Attaché, American Embassy, Lima; *Secretary*

The purpose of the Fourth Inter-American Travel Congress is to encourage and promote tourist travel, a matter of economic and technical interest to all the countries of the Americas. The Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted on January 16, 1952, a resolution in which the Congress was designated as an "Inter-American Specialized Conference" within the meaning of article 93 of the Charter of the OAS. In accordance with that resolution, the Inter-American Economic and Social Council prepared the program and regulations of the Congress in collaboration with its Organizing Committee.

The agenda includes consideration of such matters as organization of continuing activities in the travel field; economics of tourist travel; reduction or elimination of travel barriers; role of travel agencies in tourist interchange; resolutions affecting tourist travel approved at previous Congresses; travel-publicity techniques; facilities for organized groups of tourists; and policy and planning of tourist travel in the inter-American and national fields.

Invitations to participate in the Congress have been extended to all the governments of the American Republics, as well as to a number of international and nongovernmental organizations.

The previous (Third) Inter-American Travel Congress was held at San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina, February 15-24, 1949.

Commission on Narcotic Drugs

[Released to the press April 11]

Harry J. Anslinger, Commissioner of Narcotics, Department of the Treasury, and U. S. repre-

sentative on the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs, will attend the seventh session of the Commission which will convene at New York, N. Y., on April 15, 1952. George A. Morlock, Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State, and Alfred L. Tennyson, Chief of the Legal Division, Bureau of Narcotic Drugs, Department of the Treasury, will serve as advisers.

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, which is one of the nine permanent functional commissions of the U.N. Economic and Social Council, was formally established on a permanent basis in 1946 to assume the functions and powers previously exercised by the League of Nations in the application of international conventions on narcotic drugs. The functions of the Commission include assisting the Council in exercising supervision over the application of international conventions and agreements dealing with narcotic drugs; advising the Council on all questions concerning the control of narcotic drugs and preparing draft international conventions thereon; and considering changes required in the existing machinery for the international control of narcotic drugs. Fifteen governments, elected by the Council, comprise the membership of the Commission. Its last (sixth) session was held at Lake Success, April 15-May 14, 1951.

Among the items on the provisional agenda of the forthcoming session are the proposed single convention on narcotic drugs; progress report on the work of the Division of Narcotic Drugs; abolition of opium smoking in the Far East; annual reports of governments; laws and regulations relating to the control of narcotic drugs; the report of the U.N. Commission of Enquiry on the Coca Leaf; and illicit traffic in narcotic drugs in 1951, including illicit trafficking by the crews of merchant ships.

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The Headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following numbers issued in 1952: S/2535, February 20; S/2549, March 5; S/2551, March 6; S/2552, March 7; S/2553, March 10; S/2554, March 10; S/2556, March 11; S/2557, March 12; S/2558, March 13; S/2559, March 17; S/2560, March 17; S/2562, March 18; S/2563, March 20; S/2565, March 24.

The United States in the United Nations

A weekly feature, does not appear in this issue.

Progress Toward Solution of Europe's Refugee Problem

SECOND SESSION OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR THE MOVEMENT OF MIGRANTS FROM EUROPE

by George L. Warren

The second session of the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe was held at Geneva from February 18 through February 23, 1952. The first session took place immediately after the adjournment of the Conference on Migration at Brussels on December 5, 1951.¹ Fourteen governments at Brussels indicated intention to become members of the Committee. Seventeen governments were represented at Geneva as full participants in the Committee. Other governments, the Holy See, and international organizations were represented as observers.

At its first session the Migration Committee adopted a number of resolutions which brought it into formal existence, a budget totaling \$36,954,000, and a plan of operations to move during 1952, 116,000 migrants and refugees who would not otherwise be moved from Europe to overseas countries of immigration. Upon the termination of operations of the International Refugee Organization (Iro) on January 31, 1952, the Migration Committee took over the direction and operation of ten ships, already reconditioned for the movement of migrants, which were relinquished by Iro. The Committee also undertook on that date the movement of 12,205 refugees who had received visas to countries of immigration prior to that date but whom Iro was unable to move because of exhaustion of its funds. Iro made a payment to the Migration Committee of \$950,000 toward the estimated cost of this movement (\$2,300,000) and undertook to pay the balance of approximately \$1,300,000 from any further funds that might be received by the Organization during its period of liquidation. In February 1952, the first month of operations, the Committee moved

over 9,000 migrants and refugees from Europe and scheduled the movement of over 11,000 persons for March.

At the second session at Geneva, the following 17 Governments were represented as full members of the Committee: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United States, and Venezuela. Austria and Venezuela were not represented at the first session of the Committee and Denmark was represented only as an observer. The following additional Governments were represented at Geneva as observers: Argentina, Colombia, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The representatives of New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden indicated informally that decisions as to membership in the Migration Committee by their Governments would be made as soon as consideration had been given to the allocations of contributions made to them by the Committee during the course of the second session. The representatives of Israel, Peru, and the United Kingdom reported that membership in the Committee was under active consideration by their Governments.

The Deputy Director, Pierre Jacobsen, reported that during February 1952 negotiations had been initiated with emigration countries to organize the necessary facilities and processing for the outward movement of migrants and refugees. Similar negotiations were also in progress with immigration countries in order to complete the final schedule of movements planned for 1952. The U.S. Displaced Persons Commission had made arrangements with the Committee to move approximately 28,000 German migrants, eligible for admission to the United States under the Displaced Persons Act, on a full cost reimbursable basis, and initial payment on account of this movement of \$765,000 had already been made to the Committee. Other movements during Feb-

¹ For an article by Mr. Warren on the Conference on Migration and the first session of the Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe, see *BULLETIN* of Feb. 4, 1952, p. 169.

ruary and March 1952 comprised 1,000 persons to Rio de Janeiro, 3,050 to Australia, and 1,150 to Canada. Two of the ships under charter to the Migration Committee were being used solely in the movement of migrants from the Netherlands to Australia and Canada. The Deputy Director also reported that a trust fund of \$500,000 had been deposited with the Committee by the Iro to cover the cost of transport of any refugees remaining in Shanghai who might secure visas to countries of immigration in the future. Over 150 such refugees had already left Shanghai at the expense of the fund.

Revised Budget Adopted

As a result of the foregoing developments the Committee adopted a revised budget totaling \$41,350,660, an increase of \$4,396,660 over the total of \$36,954,000 adopted at the first session at Brussels. This increase was entirely in the operational items of the budget—no changes being made in the totals of the administrative expenditures or of the operating fund. The total number of persons to be moved by the Committee by the end of December 1952 was increased from 116,000 estimated at Brussels to 137,500. This increase in the persons to be moved was accounted for largely by the refugees turned over to the Migration Committee by Iro for movement and also by the prospect of the movement during the year of an additional 10,000 refugees. The larger movement envisaged automatically increased the total of reimbursements anticipated from governments and of dollar equivalents of services rendered by governments directly, which was set down at \$22,254,504. Of this total, services paid for directly by governments such as the processing of migrants were estimated at \$8,800,000 and reimbursements for transportation at \$13,374,504. Included in this latter figure was the \$2,100,000 anticipated to be received from the Government of Italy for the movement of 35,000 migrants from Italy at \$60 per migrant. In addition to the \$13,374,504 in reimbursements for transportation, \$2,737,096 was expected to be received in reimbursements from Iro for the movement of refugees from Europe and Shanghai.

Each member government of the Migration Committee is obligated to make an agreed contribution to the administrative expenditures of the Committee. During the session new percentage allocations were made to the following member and prospective member governments as follows:

	<i>Percent</i>
Denmark	1.144
Norway	1.060
Sweden	2.600
Israel	.297
Argentina	4.400
Venezuela	1.000
New Zealand	2.119
Total	12.620

The representative of Venezuela formally accepted the allocation to his Government at the session. As a result of the discussion on the new allocations of contributions, the Committee agreed that the whole scale of allocations of contributions would be reviewed later when a decision was reached to continue the activities of the Migration Committee for a second year.

The representatives of the governments present at the second session were not in a position to announce formally the amounts of their anticipated contributions to the operating fund. Contributions to the operating fund of \$14,000,000 are voluntary. The purpose of the operating fund is, first, to supply working capital for the Committee's operations, and thereafter, to cover the cost of movement of those migrants and refugees who are not included in the cost reimbursable schemes of movement and for whose movement no other funds are available. Approximately \$9,000,000 of the U.S. contribution will constitute a contribution to the operating fund. Many of the governments represented at the session indicated that the appropriate procedures had already been initiated to provide their contributions to the operating fund.

Appointments to Committee's Staff

The Deputy Director reported that he was in the process of establishing the staff of the Committee and of necessity had been obliged to make a limited number of appointments from the former Iro staff, particularly of those persons directly engaged in shipping operations. Such appointments were essential in order to maintain momentum of movement and to avoid demurrage charges on ships taken over from Iro. Many appointments made to date are of a purely provisional nature and subject to change after the full membership of the Committee is known in order that the final composition of the staff may reflect the appropriate balance of nationalities. As of February 1, 1952, 49 officials of professional grades and 125 employees had been recruited. Of the officials, 27 were at headquarters and 22 in field liaison offices. Small liaison missions have been established in Australia, Austria, Brazil, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the United States. The total number of officials eventually to be recruited is 107 and recruitment is proceeding with respect to the 58 posts still to be filled.

The Committee discontinued the arrangement adopted at Brussels by which the powers and authority of the Director were vested in Franz Leemans and George L. Warren. In lieu of this arrangement, the Committee established an Executive Committee consisting of representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States. The chairman of the session, Mr. Leemans, advanced the suggestion that the Executive Committee meet at Washington in

May 1952. This suggestion appeared to meet with general approval. The powers and authority of the Director were vested temporarily in Mr. Jacobsen as Deputy Director until such time as a Director is elected by the Committee.

A close review of the passengers available for movement and of their destinations revealed that when the current movement to the United States is completed in early June 1952, there may be an inadequate number of passengers to fill all the ships under charter to the Committee until mid-July when the peak of the anticipated seasonal movements to Canada and Australia will be reached. By mid-summer of 1952 the Committee may require more ships than are presently available to meet the total requirements of movement. The Deputy Director, in consequence, urged the governments receiving migrants to plan their movement schedules in close cooperation with the Committee staff in order that an evenly balanced movement may be secured throughout the year and ships available to the Committee be used at maximum efficiency without financial loss resulting from demurrage charges.

Mr. Leemans (Belgium) was elected and served as chairman of the second session of the Committee. Ginsti del Giardino (Italy) served as first vice chairman; F. Nilo de Alvaranga (Brazil) as second vice chairman; and Dr. H. von Trutzschler (Germany) as rapporteur. The Committee adjourned on February 23, 1952, to be reconvened at the call of the Chairman but in no event later than September 1952.

• *Mr. Warren, author of the above article, is Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Department of State. He was U. S. representative to the February session of the Migration Committee.*

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¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

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- Examination of Petitions. Second Report of the Standing Committee on Petitions. T/L.255, March 28, 1952. 29 pp. mimeo.

Request for Extension of Emergency Powers

[Released to the press by the White House April 7]

The President on April 7 sent identical letters to Alben W. Barkley, President of the Senate of the United States, and Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives, as follows:

I ask the Congress as a matter of the utmost urgency to act, before it commences its Easter recess, to extend for a period of sixty days emergency powers which otherwise will terminate when the treaty of peace with Japan becomes effective.

On February 19, acting on the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, I transmitted to the Congress a proposed Emergency Powers Continuation Act¹ and recommended favorable action thereon.

This measure would continue specific enumerated powers until six months after the termination of the national emergency proclaimed by the President on December 16, 1950, or until earlier dates fixed by concurrent resolution of the Congress or by the President.

There was a single, simple reason for this measure, namely, the impending termination of the state of war with Japan through the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Japan. As I explained in my message, the still-existing state of war with Japan—which is the last existing state of war between this country and others—provides the legal foundation for many important statutory powers which this Government is now exercising in carrying out the national defense program. I pointed out that unless the Congress acts to continue these powers they will end when the state of war with Japan ends (or, in some cases, within a fixed time thereafter), with very serious consequences for the national security.

The Congress has been considering my request, but has not yet passed the required legislation. In the meantime, the Senate has given its advice and consent to the ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty, and the required number of other countries have ratified the Treaty so that it is antici-

pated that it can be brought into effect as soon as the ratification by the United States is deposited.

There are important reasons why the Japanese Peace Treaty must be put into force very promptly. Failure to do so will be a reflection on responsible government in the United States, which will be very damaging and impossible to explain to the rest of the world. However, in the absence of action by the Congress the coming into force of the Treaty would result in the termination of certain emergency powers which are now being exercised and which are very important.

I therefore urge the Congress to act immediately to provide at least a temporary extension of the emergency powers in order to prevent a lapse when the Japanese Peace Treaty is put into effect.

I would like to set forth some of the compelling reasons why bringing the Japanese Peace Treaty into force cannot be delayed.

Advance planning has been going on many months for the necessary steps involved in turning authority back to the Japanese Government when the Treaty comes into force. This planning has been done not only by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and the Government of Japan, but also on the part of other powers concerned. These plans have been made on the basis that the present Treaty will come into force by the first half of April. Any significant delay beyond that time would seriously interfere with Japan's orderly transition from the status of an occupied country to that of a free and independent country. Furthermore, because of the complexity of the plans and the number of governments involved, the date finally established for bringing the Treaty into force must be announced ten days in advance. This is why action by the Congress before Easter is imperative.

The United States cannot be put in the position of delaying the bringing into force of the Treaty. The Treaty was signed in the United States—at San Francisco—on September 8, 1951. Long before that the United States had urged that peace be re-established with Japan as promptly as possible, and the United States took the lead in negotiating the Treaty. Because of the special position

¹ H. Doc. 386.

of the United States as the principal occupying power in Japan, the Treaty provides that, regardless of other ratifications, it shall not come into force without the deposit of the ratification of the United States. This deposit has not been made. If now the United States were to delay the Treaty's coming into force, for avoidable reasons of a domestic nature, when other countries are ready to act, no credit would be brought either to this country or to our democratic processes. We would be widely misunderstood even among our friends, and we would open the way for hostile propaganda by those in Japan who would turn their backs on the democratic way of life.

It is likewise of the utmost importance to the security of the country to continue in effect without any lapse the emergency powers dealt with in the proposed measure I have recommended. Among these are the authorizations under which the Government is now operating the railroads to insure the movement of troops and war materials; is controlling the entry into and the departure from the United States of aliens and citizens whose movements would be dangerous to the national security; is continuing the commissions of a large number of reserve officers on active duty in our armed forces the loss of whom would create a serious problem; and is making full use of trained aviation officers who would be lost by the reinstatement of peacetime limitations. Furthermore, there are a number of provisions which furnish protection and benefits to civilians engaged in defense activities, to members of the armed forces, to veterans, and to the members of their families.

As is apparent, these powers are such that even a brief lapse would have the most serious consequences.

Consequently, the problem which confronts us can be solved only by very prompt Congressional action; and I earnestly ask that such action be taken.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

EDITOR'S NOTE: On April 9 Congress passed a bill on extension of presidential war powers. However, in the final version of the bill, as amended by the Senate and concurred in by the House, the extension date of some 60 war powers was finally established as June 1, in spite of President Truman's request for a 60-day extension.

Coordination Procedures Under The Mutual Security Act

Executive Order 10338¹

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 507 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 373 (Public Law 165, 82nd Congress, approved October 10, 1951), and as President of the United States and Commander in

Chief of the armed forces of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. *Functions of the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission.* (a) The Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in each country, as the representative of the President and acting on his behalf, shall coordinate the activities of the United States representatives (including the chiefs of economic missions, military assistance advisory groups, and other representatives of agencies of the United States Government) in such country engaged in carrying out programs under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and he shall assume responsibility for assuring the unified development and execution of the said programs in such country. More particularly, the functions of each Chief of United States Diplomatic Mission shall include, with respect to the programs and country concerned:

(1) Exercising general direction and leadership of the entire effort.

(2) Assuring that recommendations and prospective plans and actions of the United States representatives are effectively coordinated and are consistent with and in furtherance of the established policy of the United States.

(3) Assuring that the interpretation and application of instructions received by the United States representatives from higher authority are in accord with the established policy of the United States.

(4) Guiding the United States representatives in working out measures to prevent duplication in their efforts and to promote the most effective and efficient use of all United States officers and employees having mutual security responsibilities.

(5) Keeping the United States representatives fully informed as to current and prospective United States policies.

(6) Prescribing procedures governing the coordination of the activities of the United States representatives, and assuring that these representatives shall have access to all available information essential to the accomplishment of their prescribed duties.

(7) Preparing and submitting such reports on the operation and status of the programs under the Act as may be directed by the Director for Mutual Security.

(b) Each Chief of United States Diplomatic Mission shall perform his functions under this order in accordance with instructions from higher authority and subject to established policies and programs of the United States.

(c) No Chief of United States Diplomatic Mission shall delegate any function conferred upon him by the provisions of this order which directly involves the exercise of direction, coordination, or authority.

SEC. 2. *Referral of unresolved matters.* The Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in each country shall initiate steps to reconcile any divergent views arising in the country concerned with respect to programs under the Act. If agreement cannot be reached the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission shall recommend a course of action, and such course of action shall be followed unless a United States representative requests that the issue be referred to higher authority for decision. If such a request is made, the parties concerned shall promptly refer the issue to higher authority for resolution prior to taking action at the country level. The Director for Mutual Security shall assure expeditious decisions on matters so submitted.

SEC. 3. *Effect of order on United States representatives.* (a) All United States representatives in each country shall be subject to the responsibilities imposed upon the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in such country by section 507 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and by this order.

(b) Subject to compliance with the provisions of this order and with the prescribed procedures of their respective agencies, all United States representatives affected by this order (1) shall have direct communication with their respective agencies and with such other parties and in such manner as may be authorized by their respec-

¹ 17 Fed. Reg. 3009.

tive agencies, (2) shall keep the respective Chiefs of United States Diplomatic Missions and each other fully and currently informed on all matters, including prospective plans, recommendations, and actions, relating to programs under the Act, and (3) shall furnish to the respective Chiefs of United States Diplomatic Missions, upon their request, documents and information concerning the said programs.

SEC. 4. *Further coordination procedures.* The Director for Mutual Security shall be responsible for assuring the carrying out of the provisions of this order. He is authorized to prescribe, after consultation with the interested Government agencies, any additional procedures he may find necessary to carry out the provisions of this order.

SEC. 5. *Prior orders.* (a) To the extent that provisions of any prior order are inconsistent with the provisions of this order, the latter shall control, and any such prior provisions are amended accordingly. All orders, regulations, rulings, certificates, directives, and other actions relating to any function affected by this order shall remain in effect except as they are inconsistent herewith or are hereafter amended or revoked under proper authority.

(b) Nothing in this order shall affect Executive Orders Nos. 10062, 10063, and 10144 of June 6, 1949, June 13, 1949, and July 21, 1950, respectively.

(c) Executive Orders Nos. 9857, 9862, 9864, 9914, 9944, 9960, 10208, and 10259 of May 22, 1947, May 31, 1947, May 31, 1947, December 26, 1947, April 9, 1948, May 19, 1948, January 25, 1951, and June 27, 1951, respectively, are hereby revoked.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,
April 4, 1952

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

New Ambassador to U.S.S.R. Takes Oath of Office

Statement by Ambassador George F. Kennan

[Released to the press April 2]

There is very little that I can say at this time. As you know, the President has appointed me Ambassador to the Soviet Union. I am down here in Washington to take the oath of office and get ready for my new job. I am going to start for Moscow in the latter part of this month.

My job in Moscow, as I see it, will be to implement the policies of the U.S. Government within the area of responsibility given to me. The Embassy at Moscow is only one small part of the machinery for the implementation of our foreign policy and its effectiveness is always going to depend on the extent to which the Ambassador there bears this in mind and contrives to function as a member of a team. The opportunities for service must be determined, as in the case of any other diplomatic mission, largely by circumstances, and I cannot foresee them at this time. I will be happy if the work at Moscow gives me a chance to

make a contribution to the reduction of existing tensions and the improvement of the international atmosphere. Those are objectives which seem to me urgently desirable and I see no reason why they should not be within the realm of possibility, if the desire is reciprocated.

Samuel Reber, Jr., Named U.S. Assistant High Commissioner for Germany

[Released to the press April 8]

U.S. High Commissioner John J. McCloy announced on April 8 the appointment of Samuel Reber as U.S. Assistant High Commissioner, a post he will fill in addition to duties as Director of the Office of Political Affairs. At the same time Mr. McCloy announced that Chauncey G. Parker, Assistant High Commissioner, will return to the United States this week. Maj. Gen. George P. Hays, Deputy High Commissioner, who was recently appointed Commanding General of U.S. Forces in Austria, expects to leave Germany next week for his new post in Salzburg.

After General Hays' departure and during the absence of Mr. McCloy, Mr. Reber will be the ranking Hicog official. The High Commissioner is planning to fly to Washington next week to attend the annual hearings before congressional committees. Mr. Parker, who will assist him at the hearings, will then reassume his position with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development from which he has been on loan to Hicog since late 1950.

The appointment of Mr. Reber, Mr. McCloy pointed out, is in line with organizational changes being made throughout Hicog in anticipation of the conclusion of contractual agreements with Germany and the change-over to Embassy status. Mr. Reber, a career diplomat, has been Director of the Office of Political Affairs since June 1950 and one of Mr. McCloy's principal advisers.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Apr. 5-11, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

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Progress Toward International Peace and Unity

*Address by Secretary Acheson*¹

Among the opportunities which this occasion offers me, none is more pleasant than to be able to express to Senator Wiley my gratitude for the kindness and help which I have received from him over many years.

When the Senator came on the Foreign Relations Committee in January 1945, I had just taken over the duties of Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations. From then to the present time in varying capacities I have worked closely with the Committee and its members. Senator Wiley has moved from the junior member of the Committee to its ranking Republican member. He has carried with him always a nature in which kindness and helpfulness to others is fundamental and a code of values which has put the interests of his country before any partisan or personal advantage.

Such a man is, of course, a firm believer in a bipartisan—or, as Senator Vandenberg used to insist, nonpartisan—approach to foreign policy. He has been energetic in Washington and in extensive travels abroad to keep abreast of fast changing events. He constantly makes suggestions, examines closely the suggestions of others, and holds firmly to what he believes, after considering the case, to be the best and soundest course.

He knows also that things cannot always go according to our hopes. And so to him, as one of our novelists has said, “A trouble is a trouble and to be taken as such; he feels no obligation to snatch the knotted cord from the hand of God and deal out murderous blows.” I salute him with affectionate esteem.

This occasion also affords me another valued opportunity to meet with you, as I have had the privilege of doing on a number of occasions over the past half a dozen years.

The other day, I looked back over some of the

subjects we have covered in these meetings, and it made an interesting short history of the broadening concerns and the developing programs of these postwar years.

Previous Meetings in Retrospect

In 1946 we talked about the control of atomic energy.

In 1947—a year in which we had the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and two fatefully unproductive meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow and in London—in that year, we discussed the implications of the expansionist and aggressive policies of the international Communist movement. We recognized that this was the fundamental problem we were up against and that it could not be talked out of existence. We recognized that what we faced was a long and hard task of building up strength among the free nations in place of the weakness that then existed. And when we talked about strength we had in mind not only a shield of military strength but people who had enough to eat and governments that had vitality and stability. The next year, as I recall, you had a holiday from these homilies.

In 1949² we discussed the problems presented by the Communist advance in China and the programs that were being developed that year for military aid to free nations.

And in 1950,³ on the occasion of my last appearance before you, we reviewed the principal lines of action which had by then been developed to safeguard our national security and well-being. The unfolding of this design had led to the ECA, the Point Four Program, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the various military-aid programs, and the Campaign of Truth, which is a necessary part of all we are doing to build a peaceful world.

¹ Made before the American Society of Newspaper Editors at Washington on Apr. 19 and released to the press on the same date.

² BULLETIN of May 8, 1949, p. 585.

³ *Ibid.*, May 1, 1950, p. 673.

Pattern of Events to Date

What I would like to do this afternoon is to bring this story up to date. I think it might be useful to look at some of the current developments in this continuing story—some of the items you are carrying on your front pages these days—to examine them, not as isolated phenomena, but as part of the whole pattern of events.

There is a temptation to look at the day-to-day events as a kind of verbal badminton game, in which some sort of poppycock goes back and forth across a net until someone scores a point. But the recent events I want to talk about are much more meaningful than moves in a propaganda game. They grow out of large policies and large purposes, both on our side and on the Communist side. And the stakes are still high: Whether there will be peace or war; whether our cherished values will survive.

Among other things, this spring has brought a whole series of Soviet moves which some people—mistakenly, I think—have grouped together and called a Soviet “peace offensive.”

I think a better name for these procedures might be the “golden apple” tactic. You may remember a story in Greek mythology, in which all the gods were invited to a wedding except one, and that was the Goddess of Discord. She was upset about this, and she threw a golden apple over the fence, hoping to cause a ruckus among the guests and break up the party.

Several apples have been tossed over the Iron Curtain this spring. Happily, they have not produced discord. The reason why this is so must be sought against the background of the great constructive purposes we and our allies have been carrying forward and the persistently destructive actions of the Communist movement.

We have arrived at a climactic moment in the development of the community of free nations. From the end of the war, we have been part of a vast constructive effort to create an organization of society in the world which would be stable, enduring, and strong.

In place of the shattered and fragmented world left in the wake of the Second World War, we and others who share the same aspirations have been trying to create conditions in the world in which our principles of the worth of the individual and the unity of society could survive and could flourish. These are not merely pleasant evangelistic ideas which we think it would be nice to propagate.

These efforts grow out of the urgent necessities we face in the world and out of the basic fiber of American life.

No free society can exist—neither our own, nor any other—if there are large areas of instability and weakness in the world. And so we have sought to help create a fabric of international society which would be made up of nations who may

represent great diversity in their traditions but who have in common a dedication to freedom, who are healthy both economically and politically and whose common strength is such that they need not live in fear.

Soviet Blocking of Constructive Efforts

What has been the role of the Soviet Union in this period? You who have reported the successive events of this story know only too well the long string of broken promises, the consistent blocking of our attempts to settle problems, the long record of noncooperation and hostility. The Soviet rulers have demonstrated that they seek to perpetuate chaos. Their fundamental aim has been to block the constructive efforts of the non-Communist states and to exploit weakness and discontent.

I think perhaps the most revealing indication of this intention was the Soviet rejection of the invitation to participate in the European Recovery Program.

Here, as late as 1947, was an offer by the United States to aid in the reconstruction, not only of Western Europe, but of all Europe. The Soviet refusal, and Soviet-compelled rejection by its Eastern European satellites, revealed more clearly than any other single gesture the direction of Soviet policy.

The Soviet answer was not only a flat “no” but a countertactic: The establishment of the Cominform for the express purposes of defeating the Marshall Plan; and the Molotov Plan, designed to bring the economies of Eastern Europe more firmly under Soviet control. When we sought to pull down barriers to trade and mutual assistance among all European nations, the Soviet answer was to raise still higher the barriers along the Elbe and the Danube.

But despite these obstructions, and despite even the Communist use of force, we have been making progress. This progress has not been even in all parts of the world, because the needs and possibilities have varied greatly from one area to another. But, taken together, the results have been encouraging enough to demonstrate that we are on the right track and must persevere.

In Europe, we have come to a very large and exciting conception, which is on the verge of being realized. This is unity in Western Europe within the framework of the Atlantic community.

Sketch of World Setting

I would like to talk about this at greater length in a moment. First, I would like to stretch the world setting in which this movement has been taking place.

In other parts of the world, our efforts have taken an almost infinite variety of forms but have been directed to the same purpose—to create a fab-

ric of international life in which there can be freedom from domination and opportunity to achieve individual and national fulfillment.

In some areas, this has meant primarily efforts to develop the underlying conditions of the life of the people, so that there could be an orderly development toward freedom and progress. In other areas, this has meant dealing with outright aggression by force of arms.

And over all this, there has been the creation and development of the United Nations, in which we have taken a leading part. We believed, and still believe, that a system founded on harmony of the great powers and the rule of law offers the best framework within which this diverse development could go forward.

Despite the fact that, at every step of the way, we have met nothing but obstructionism and hostility from the Soviet Union, we have been moving steadily, doggedly, and with a good measure of success, toward the fulfillment of our purposes.

The United Nations' success in halting and throwing back the aggression in Korea is a tremendous advance for collective security, which should not be obscured by the long and difficult negotiations to bring the fighting to an end.

Soviet obstruction has blocked great-power harmony but has not been able to stop the powerful advance of a collective-security system based upon the growing strength and unity of nations who believe in the Charter of the United Nations.

Despite Soviet efforts to obstruct, Japan is being restored to the community of nations. Without benefit of any assistance from the Soviet Union, many states have achieved their independence including Indonesia, the Philippines, Ceylon, Burma, Pakistan, and India. We and the nations associated in the Colombo Plan, again without benefit of any cooperation from the Soviet Union, are giving practical assistance to the peoples of South and Southeast Asia who are energetically striving to meet their own needs in their own way.

And that, indeed, is the touchstone of all our technical-cooperation programs and our policies throughout the Middle East and in all of Asia and Africa—what we seek to do is to help the people of these areas to fulfill their aspirations for self-government and individual freedom and material progress in a responsible way, in a peaceful and orderly way.

I think there is a growing understanding among the leaders of the people in these areas, despite the agonizing conflicts that arise as an inevitable part of this process of growth and development, that our purpose and our record is one of genuine help toward responsible and peaceful solutions. They have learned to be suspicious of the Communist Pied Piper who strides through this troubled area with a bag of tricky slogans and a pretty propaganda tune which leads only to the drowning of their hopes in a new imperialism.

Progress Toward World Unity

With this setting in mind, I come back to what has been happening in Europe. Here all that has been going on since 1945—the programs of relief, of economic recovery, of bold and courageous action to build stable governments free from foreign domination, and the growth toward vigorous military establishments capable of deterring attack—all these things have brought our friends in Europe to the threshold of the larger conception of the unity of all Western Europe.

European unity has been a goal for which men have striven for centuries, by diplomacy and by force. What is important about this effort we see before us now is that it will bring together, in free and voluntary association, in practical institutions growing out of the urgent necessities of the times, much of Western Europe.

There is a kind of unity, perhaps, east of the Iron Curtain—but it is the unity of the cemetery. This is an abomination against man's nature; it is contrary to history and it cannot endure.

What has been going on in Western Europe is a totally different thing. It will have strength because it meets human needs and desires. It has been a process of practical growth, moving haltingly at times, because it has sought to accommodate real conflicts by negotiation and peaceful persuasion.

The margin between success and failure in this operation has sometimes been a narrow one. The difficulties are deep and real. Our allies have been grappling with critical economic problems. They have wrestled with ancient rivalries and painful memories of recent conflicts.

Despite all this, they have come now within sight of the goal, and the thing that is at stake at this moment is whether they and we will be able to go forward to the realization of this conception. That is the issue.

Antagonistic Soviet Campaign

Soft music has been coming out of Moscow, about peaceful coexistence, about peaceful trade and German unity. This line to Western newsmen and others would be more persuasive if the Soviet propagandists were not at the same time, out of the other side of their mouths, engaged in one of the most vicious and savage episodes in their hate campaign against the West.

The Communists have trumped up a monstrous charge that the U.N. Command has used germ warfare in Korea. This charge has been denied categorically and repeatedly by the U.N. Command in the field and by the Government of the United States in Washington. I deny it again here.

Not only this; but General Ridgway has offered to the International Red Cross every facility to investigate this charge behind our own lines. Although the Red Cross asked for similar facili-

ties from the Communists, they received instead only defamation and abuse. Again, when the World Health Organization offered to help combat any epidemics which might exist, they were ignored.

American newspaper enterprise has exposed the falsity of the alleged "proofs" of these charges advanced by the Communists, and the Voice of America and our other information media have been combating this hate campaign energetically with the facts of the situation.

The Soviet so-called "peace campaign" might be more persuasive, too, if our memories were so short that we forgot the Stockholm "peace appeal" of 1950—a peace appeal which was immediately followed by the Communist attack on Korea.

Peaceful trade has been another subject of the current campaign. Ostensibly called to examine world trade policies, a recent Moscow economic conference was used to unfold grandiose proposals for expanded trade.

The offers made by the President of the Soviet Chamber of Commerce linked machinery and herring, ships and lemons, ball bearings and textiles—a cunning mixture of consumer goods with items of strategic importance. By appearing to offer new markets, the Soviets seek to sow dissension and to secure strategic materials to build their war-making potential. The facts are, of course, that the consumer goods are available to them at any time they choose to purchase them and through normal channels.

Other pertinent facts, not advertised in Moscow, reveal current Soviet steps to halt trade between East Germany and Greece and the well-known, long-standing Soviet effort to starve Yugoslavia into submission by halting trade between that country and its neighbors.

The security controls, which we and other free governments have imposed over trade with the Soviet bloc, will continue to be necessary as long as the broad course of Soviet policy is directed toward the maintenance of a huge military machine.

In this connection, it is pertinent for us to note that the United States will increase immeasurably the attractiveness of this type of Soviet propaganda if we permit restrictionism here to shut out foreign goods. These restrictive practices will, of course, increase rather than lighten the burden on the American taxpayer.

Discussions on Germany Delay Action

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has sent two notes to the British, the French, and ourselves concerning Germany.

In its first note, on March 10,⁴ the Soviet Government urged that the four occupying powers should discuss the German peace treaty. The

treaty they had in mind would permit the creation of a German national army and prohibit Germany from associating in western European defense. The treaty they propose would also freeze the frontiers along the provisional lines discussed at Potsdam.

The three Governments replied to this note on March 25,⁵ after consultation with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. This reply pointed out that a peace treaty could only be discussed with an all-German Government and that the existence of an all-German Government depended on the holding of free elections in the whole of Germany. They called attention to the fact that at Potsdam it was decided that frontiers should be fixed in the peace treaty.

The three Governments, again on the basis of consultation with the Federal Republic, also made it clear that they were engaged in a great forward step toward building up the unity of Western Europe through a common defense policy and that they intended to continue to follow that policy.

In its second note, the Soviet Union repeated the negative positions it had previously taken and made no affirmative proposals regarding German unity or free elections. Instead, it continued to emphasize proposals of what ought to go into a German peace treaty, disregarding the necessity of having an all-German Government in order to have a peace treaty.

When it came to the question of free elections, the only proposal from the Soviet Union was that there be more discussion.

We and our allies have had considerable experience with the Soviet Union in discussing things, when there is no agreement on principles. We have found that discussion, under these circumstances, is a delaying action and a frustrating experience.

We cannot forget that these matters have been discussed repeatedly at great length with the Soviet Union. This was done in 1947 at the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow and again in London; in 1949, for weeks at the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris; and again for months at the Palais Rose in 1951.

The main things that emerged from the Soviet discussion of elections and the creation of a government which would have jurisdiction over the whole of Germany are these:

First, the Soviet Union never has been willing to relax in any respect whatever its control over Eastern Germany. The Soviet Union would never even discuss Soviet ownership over a vast amount of East German industry.

Second, the Soviet Government was bending every effort to infiltrate into Western Germany.

And third, they insisted that every major exercise of power by an all-German Government should be subject to a Soviet veto.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Apr. 7, 1952, p. 531.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 530.

These attitudes have never changed.

An analysis of the first Soviet communication shows plainly that the Soviet Government is making no commitment of any sort as to what kind of elections they are prepared to permit. There is no reason to believe that they wish to have a Germany any less under their control, and they do not make their position on this point any clearer.

Also, the Soviet Government continues to insist that a German Government shall be precluded at all times from associating itself with the great project of the unification of Western Europe.

The Soviet Union would like the Germans to think that there is a contradiction between unification of Western Europe and unification of Germany. There is not. Germany can be united and free as a full member of the free community of Europe. But a united Germany cut off from defense with and by the West could not be a free Germany. The German people have only to look across the curtain at their brothers in East Germany to see what the Soviet Union means by freedom.

We and our allies and the German people cannot forget the 7 years of fruitless negotiations with the Soviet Union to try to reach agreement on an honest basis for German Union. We cannot forget the Soviet walk-out from the Allied Control Council in Berlin, or the ruthless Soviet attempt to starve out the two million people of Berlin, or the Soviet termination of the quadripartite administration of the city of Berlin.

Across the border from Germany are the Austrians who were promised their independence in 1943. After 258 meetings between our deputies and the Soviet deputy, we and the Austrian people are still waiting for the Soviet Union to fulfill this promise.

The Western Powers and the West Germans have made many proposals for free elections in Germany. The latest effort is being made through the United Nations, which set up a commission to investigate the possibilities of free elections throughout Germany. That commission was granted free access to all Western Germany, but it still waits in vain for permission to enter Eastern Germany.

In the light of all this we are entitled to ask for some tangible evidence that there has been a shift in the Soviet position.

Our keen awareness of the past will not prevent us from giving serious attention to these or any other Soviet proposals. Together with the British, the French, and the Germans, we are studying the latest Soviet note. Of course, I cannot attempt here to forecast the course of these considerations.

We are willing and eager to resolve any or all major frictions in the world by peaceful negotiation, when and if there appears to be any honest and reasonable basis for negotiations. We have

given an earnest of this in our proposals for disarmament.

But we and our allies have made it clear that we cannot take a step backwards; we cannot jeopardize the emergence in Europe of the new era of cooperation which is replacing the rivalry and distrust of the past. And so we continue to give our full support to plans designed to secure the participation of Germany in a purely defensive European Community. For here is the true path of peace.

Open Door Policy Toward Discussion

If any believe that the Western attitudes lack in initiative and are purely responses to Soviet stimulus, they must find here the refutation. Here they must see proof that we have been moving in the right direction. Here they must see on the Soviet side responses to the initiatives of the free nations in building soundly and strongly.

As we survey the world around us, we still must take cognizance of the basic facts in the present situation. We are still confronted with massive armed forces, backed by a huge military budget and powerful reserves. The military resources of the satellite nations are still being mobilized. The peoples of these countries are being kept in increasing isolation from the outside world and in calculated ignorance of the truth. The Communist international movement is still fostering insurrection and subversion wherever it can. And venomous hate continues to pour out of the vast Soviet propaganda machine.

There is only one way to hasten the day when we may hope for peaceful actions, not words, from the Soviet rules—and that is to push resolutely forward on our present course.

I repeat with undiminished belief what I said to you in 1947: This may be a long campaign. It will take nerve and steadfastness. We must be firm, and we must never close the door to agreement or discussion.

Above all, we must hold fast to our faith in freedom which shall some day prevail in all the world.

Correction

In the *BULLETIN* of March 31, 1952, page 508, Carroll Binder was incorrectly identified as the U.S. representative in the Subcommittee on Freedom of Information. Mr. Binder serves on the Subcommittee as a private individual, not as a representative of this Government. The Subcommittee is a body of experts appointed by the U.N. Economic and Social Council.

In the same issue, page 515, second column, line 19 should read, "On March 21 the representatives of Chile, the . . ."

Our Far Eastern Policy

by John M. Allison

*Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*¹

I have found in some 20 years of activity in the field of foreign affairs that many of us are apt to forget or not to realize the implications of the fact that foreign affairs are *foreign affairs*. As Harold Nicolson, brilliant British commentator on diplomacy and allied matters, has said, we must realize that foreign affairs concern "not our own national interests only, but also the interests of other countries." We cannot expect a foreign policy to be developed and to be put into action in the same manner as, for example, a national budget, an education bill, or a bill to build a levee along the Mississippi. These matters of domestic policy can be prepared by a responsible Cabinet member or can originate directly in the Congress, can then be passed by the Congress and carried out by whatever is the appropriate agency. However, in dealing with foreign affairs we often ignore the fact that other countries with interests and prejudices as strong as our own must be consulted and brought into agreement if any policy is to be effective.

This is particularly true in the Far East where we have had recent examples of the fact that a policy which has much to commend it from a domestic American point of view finds opposition in other countries when we attempt to implement it. The Congress, in providing legislation for the establishment of a mutual-security program, very properly considered that U.S. funds should not be made available to countries which were not generally in sympathy with the broad aims of the United States and the United Nations, and in the Mutual Security Act set forth certain conditions which had to be met by countries who wished to obtain military, economic, or technical assistance from the United States. Under the provisions of

this Act, it has been considered necessary to request countries seeking aid to sign agreements in which they undertake to observe certain conditions set forth in the Mutual Security Act. In Asia we have found that particularly the younger nations, which have just recently achieved their independence, have been reluctant to sign such agreements as they interpreted any such action as indicating they were taking definite sides in the cold war, which at present seems to divide the world. These new countries, all of them non-Communist if not anti-Communist, had hoped to be able to follow a neutral course just as our own United States tried to do in the early years of its independence. It has been necessary for those of us who are interested in giving aid and assistance to these countries, when they desire it, for the purpose of achieving stability and security to persuade them that they are not violating their own best interests in agreeing to the conditions set down in the Mutual Security Act. In most cases this has been possible but in a few there is still hesitation. I believe that when these countries fully understand the motives behind the U.S. action they will agree that our course is proper, but, in the meantime, we do encounter these difficulties.

The Present Situation in the Far East

Before we can usefully consider what our policy in any part of the world should be, we must spend time considering what the present situation is in the area with which we are dealing. What is the situation in the Far East today? Certainly the basic fact which we must always keep in mind is that today the nations of the Far East are united in at least one thing, if nothing else, and that is their desire for national freedom and independence. We still hear criticism of Western imperialism and colonialism, and there are many who would have the United States take a strong stand

¹Excerpts from an address made at the fourteenth annual Public Affairs Conference, Principia College of Liberal Arts, Elsah, Ill., on Apr. 17 and released to the press on the same date.

against its European allies in order to remove such vestiges of colonialism as still remain. But before we agree wholeheartedly with this stand it may be helpful to think for a moment of what has happened in the Far East in the few years since the end of World War II. Seven nations with a population of over 600 million have attained independence. These nations were formerly members of the colonial systems of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Japan, and the United States. This is by no means a negligible achievement. Much remains to be done but in our impatience let us not forget that much has already been done.

It is important to realize that these new countries often lack a sufficient number of trained leaders, that they have achieved independence at the end of a long and destructive war which has disrupted their economies and their social systems. It would be unrealistic to expect that in the short period of 7 years which has elapsed since the end of the war in the Pacific that there would arise strong and stable countries who could expect to carry on their activities in the same manner and with the same degree of success as the older countries of the Western world with their long experience of independent activity. We might perhaps look back at our own history and study the confusion which existed in the United States during the first 7 or 8 years after the conclusion of the war of independence and while we were still operating under the Articles of Confederation. When we see the difficulties that we had in developing unity of action and a strong central government in a country where a great majority of the people were from the same stock and with the same traditions, we cannot be impatient with the efforts made by these new countries of Asia with their great varieties of races, cultures, and languages often under one national leadership. There are mutual suspicions among these new countries just as there were mutual suspicions and distrust among the 13 colonies which made up the new American Nation. We must also remember in thinking of the attitudes of these new countries toward the United States that they look upon us as one of the Western Powers and bracket us with the European powers, that their experience with the West in the past has not always been happy, and that there is a residue of suspicion left which will take many years and much understanding to overcome.

In addition to these new states such as Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines, we see in Asia today another great nation emerging from 6 years of occupation as a defeated country and about to resume its place in the family of nations. The peace treaty with Japan will go into effect next week and this nation of almost 85 million vigorous, intelligent, and industrially trained people will once again be a factor to be reckoned with whenever we think of Asia.

Aftermath of War and Japan's Future

Let us consider briefly some of the effects of the war on Japan which have a bearing on the future of that country. Before the war, Korea and Formosa together supplied Japan almost 2 million metric tons of rice annually so that the Japanese empire was almost self-sufficient in food. Today, Japan must depend upon foreign sources to meet the approximate 20 percent deficit in its own food supplies. Japan's former sources of raw materials in Manchuria and North China are now behind the Iron Curtain so that it must seek elsewhere those raw materials which are essential to its industrial life. Its own factories have had to be put back into operation; its financial system reorganized; its merchant fleet which contributed so much before the war to the prosperity of Japan has had to be rehabilitated almost in its entirety. But even more perhaps than these material factors which for some time to come will condition Japan's future, there must be considered the effect of the war upon the people. The shock of defeat, the readjustments necessary as the result of the removal of many of Japan's former political and industrial leaders from their normal activities have created problems which cannot be ignored. As I have just mentioned, for a period of more than 6 years the Japanese people have lived under alien military occupation. While there can be no question but that this occupation was a most enlightened one, nevertheless it was an occupation, and in the final analysis the Japanese people have not been responsible for their own destiny. Up until recently when occupation controls were relaxed in anticipation of the treaty's coming into effect, there was a natural and inevitable reluctance on the part of the Japanese leaders to take the initiative in solving the many political, social, and economic post-war problems when the final responsibility rested elsewhere. This was one of the most pressing reasons why the U.S. Government made every possible effort to bring about an early peace treaty and the early end of the occupation. We saw the necessity of letting the Japanese leaders stand on their own feet and begin to run their own country.

In addition to the economic, political, and social changes brought about as the result of the war, anyone who realistically considers the future of Japan must take into account the strategic situation in which Japan finds itself and the relationship of the present power situation in Asia to the future of Japan. It would be pleasant to ignore the question of power relationships and to consider only what would be wise and desirable from the moral, political, and economic viewpoints. Unfortunately, we cannot ignore the problem created by a change in the balance of power in the Far East any more than elsewhere in the world. An astute scholar has recently said that statesmen who profess not to believe in the "balance of power" are like scientists who do not believe in the law of gravity. So if we are to consider the future of

Japan and our policy toward it as it emerges from a disastrous war and 6 years of occupation, we must consider the effect of the present power situation in Asia. This is particularly acute because of the completely unarmed position in which Japan finds itself off the coast of Asia where Communist aggression has been most active. In fact, there is reason to believe that the outbreak of this Communist aggression was at least partially due to the unarmed condition of Japan and the belief of the aggressors that domination of the Korean peninsula would make more easy the ultimate domination of Japan with its great industrial base and industrially trained population. In developing policy toward Japan, these facts cannot be ignored nor are they being ignored by the leaders of Japan.

Asian Resistance to Aggression

In looking at the rest of Asia, we are often discouraged by the evidences we see of disaster, continued fighting in Korea, continued stalling and befogging of issues by the Communist negotiators at the truce talks, the enslavement of 400 million Chinese by a ruthless, Soviet-dominated Communist Government, continued pressure by Communist forces on the young states of Indochina, and Communist-directed banditry in Malaya. All of these and more are certainly enough to discourage anyone, but a year ago the situation was even worse. One of my colleagues in the Department of State was fond of saying that the situation in the Far East at that time reminded him of the opening sentence of *Swiss Family Robinson*. You will recall that it goes something like this: "For six days the storm raged with unabated fury and on the seventh grew much worse." At that time the U.N. Forces had almost been thrown out of Korea. The Japanese people were becoming more and more restive under military occupation which, due to Soviet intransigence, there seemed no prospect of bringing to a close. The Philippines were almost bankrupt; Huk bandits were terrorizing the countryside. There were indications of an early attack by Communist China on either Formosa or Indochina or both. There was not even the beginning of any sort of collective-security system in the whole Pacific area.

Anyone who claims that the situation today leaves no cause for worry would be deliberately ignoring reality, but nevertheless, compared with a year ago, I believe we can point to real progress. Let us consider for a moment the situation today in Korea. Some short-sighted persons have called our action in Korea "useless" and there is considerable understandable impatience at the long drawn-out struggle going on in that peninsula. But before we make up our minds that the sacrifices made in Korea by many brave men have been useless, let us consider what they have accomplished. We must remember that it was not

the Republic of Korea, it was not the United States, nor was it the United Nations which started the fighting; but it was the Republic of Korea, the United States, and the United Nations which stood up to aggression and beat it back. Today the aggressors have been thrown back beyond the point from which they started. The Communists have utterly failed in achieving their objectives in Korea. They have lost well over a million trained soldiers and enormous quantities of matériel. North Korea has been devastated and for years to come will be an economic liability with nothing to compensate for this destruction. One of the most important results of the Communist aggression in Korea has been the action of the United Nations. For the first time in modern history, an international organization has shown that not only can it be effective in times of peace but that it can and will resist aggression. The League of Nations was never able to accomplish this. A real forward step has been made in development of a world organization determined that aggression shall not prosper.

As I said a few moments ago, a year ago it looked as if the Chinese Communist forces might soon attack Formosa or Indochina. There is no doubt that the action taken by the United Nations in Korea had a real deterrent effect on the plans of the Communist aggressors so that those areas have had an additional year in which to continue building up their economic, political, and military strength. The threat, of course, has not disappeared. There are said to be some 200,000 Chinese Communist troops massed on the Indochinese border. The Chinese Communist press and radio continue to cry for the conquest of Formosa. The free world cannot afford to relax but it can have confidence, born of experience in Korea, that the nations of the free world will continue to resist aggression.

The Philippines over the past year have made remarkable progress. The Communist-led Huks have been reduced to small scattered bands still able to commit acts of terrorism but now unable to mount the large-scale attacks of the past on provincial towns. The Government's deficit dropped to less than one million pesos from 154 million pesos the year before. Production of export crops has boomed. But even more important, in my opinion, has been the effect on the people of the Philippines of the elections of last November, which, due to the courageous leadership of Philippine President Quirino and his Secretary of Defense Magsaysay, were the most honest and free of any ever held in that land. The result of the election was a great step forward in the establishment of democratic processes in the Far East and was so recognized by President Quirino even though his own party suffered defeat.

Fighting continues in Indochina and we hear much about it, but we do not pay enough attention to the progress which has been made in other areas

in the three Associated States of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Due in part to American aid, there has been a gradual increase in economic recovery. Exports of rubber and rice, while still far below the prewar level, were the highest last year they have been since V-J Day. There has been real progress in building up the national army of Vietnam, which has been mainly equipped through American aid. Approximately 1,000 new Vietnamese officers were graduated from training schools last year plus significant numbers of technicians and noncommissioned officers. The progress these three Indochinese States have made along the road to independence was most vividly illustrated by their participation in the Japanese Peace Conference on a basis of equality with all the other participants, and their signature of the treaty as independent nations. The new nations of Indonesia and Burma have been completing the organization of their own institutions in such a way as to carry out their new responsibilities. Constant progress is being made and both of these countries have shown a determination to develop institutions and to suppress communism. They are jealous of their independence and wish to preserve it in their own way, and they are sometimes reluctant to accept assistance as, rightly or wrongly, they fear that such assistance might compromise in some manner their newly won independence or prevent them from maintaining their position of neutrality in what they tend to view as a power struggle now dividing the world.

An Area Security System Developed

In looking at the present situation in the Far East, we see that whereas a year ago there was not even an embryonic security system embracing the whole area, today we have a series of mutual security and defense pacts soon to be brought into effect with Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand which, as the President has said, are "initial steps" in the development of an over-all security system for the Pacific area. These pacts have two purposes. The peoples of Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines have been much closer to Japanese aggression than we have been and there was a natural reluctance in those countries to think in terms of a peace treaty with Japan that would not make impossible by its own terms the resurgence of Japan's aggression and the possibility of Japanese rearmament. The United States, on the other hand, believed that the only kind of a treaty which would have any hope of lasting was one which was not punitive, which was based on trust and a spirit of reconciliation, and that it was not possible to seek certainty about Japan's future actions by imposing restrictions in a treaty which would deny freedom to Japan. While such restrictions might initially give an illusion of certainty, it was the belief of the United States that such an illusion would be quickly shat-

tered. The Governments of Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines were able to give their people the assurances they needed about their future security as a result of the conclusion of these mutual security and defense pacts, and they were then able to join with the United States in offering to Japan a treaty of reconciliation and trust. But these mutual defense and security treaties do not look only, or even primarily, to the past. They are the basis for hope in the future and set forth in the language of our Monroe Doctrine our sense of common destiny with these peoples of the Pacific. As John Foster Dulles stated in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning these treaties:²

It is highly appropriate that not only our friends, but our potential enemies, should learn that our concern with Europe, evidenced by the North Atlantic Treaty, and our concern with Japan, in no sense imply any lack of concern for our Pacific allies of World War II or lack of desire to preserve and deepen our solidarity with them for security. The security treaties with these three countries are a logical part of the effort not merely to liquidate the old war, but to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific as against the hazard of new war.

Having looked for a time at what the present situation is in the Far East, let us consider what is the U.S. policy for the area as a whole and toward specific parts. In some measure the description of the present situation has given a clue to various aspects of our policy. It is of course true that our policy toward the Far East, as is our policy toward other areas of the world, is designed to strengthen the fabric of peace generally and specifically the security of our own country. But such broad general statements are not of great utility in considering what we should do. In thinking of our Far Eastern policy, I often go back to a book published 30 years ago, "Americans in Eastern Asia," by Tyler Dennett, and as I read the concluding paragraph of that work I believe it gives, if properly interpreted in today's terms, a brief and forthright description of what American policy has been and is with respect to the Far East. This is that statement:

In conclusion, we repeat that the tap-root of American policy in Asia is most-favored-nation treatment. An attitude of self-righteousness is neither becoming nor justified. American policy is not philanthropic; it is not, in its motive and history, benevolent; but it is beneficent, for the United States is so situated that American interests in Asia are best promoted by the growth of strong, prosperous and enlightened Asiatic states. Indeed it is difficult for an American to believe that the repression or weakening of any part of Asia is a benefit to any power. The United States is committed to its policy by geographical, economic and political facts, and in the same measure is also bound to a policy of cooperation with all powers which sincerely profess a similar purpose.

Obviously, if the taproot of American policy is most-favored-nation treatment with its implication of equality of treatment and opportunity, we cannot look with equanimity at the Iron Curtain

² BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1952, p. 190.

which is being erected to keep the 400 million Chinese on the mainland of Asia from contact and peaceful cooperation with the rest of Asia and with the rest of the world. If it is in American interest to promote the growth of "strong, prosperous, and enlightened Asiatic states," America must continue a policy of assistance and encouragement to the newly independent states of Asia, and we must be willing to cooperate, as we are doing through the United Nations and through our mutual security and defense treaties with other powers which sincerely profess a similar purpose.

Japanese Treaty of Equality Breaks Precedent

We have made clear through our initiative in bringing about a peace treaty with Japan our policy toward that nation. We have insisted that this treaty should be a liberal one—one which would contain promise for the future and not the seeds of future wars. We negotiated this treaty with Japan on a basis of equality—there was mutual give and take. When the Japanese delegation came to San Francisco to sign the treaty they were not kept in confinement away from the other delegations as had been the fate of the German plenipotentiaries at Versailles after World War I. The Japanese were received in the same manner as all the others. This treaty broke new ground in international relations. Sir Zarfrullah Khan, the distinguished Foreign Minister of Pakistan, said of the treaty:

It opens to Japan the door passing through which it may take up among its fellow sovereign nations a position of dignity, honor and equality . . . It is evidence of a new departure in the relations of the East and the West as they have subsisted during the last few centuries.

But American policy goes further than just advocating that Japan be given a good start and a position of equality among the nations as the peace treaty goes into effect. We realize that Japan must be given security in which to make use of her newly won freedom. It is in this field of security that Japan's problems will, in many respects, be most difficult. For the time being Japan's defense from external aggression will be dependent upon the maintenance in Japan of American forces in accordance with the security pact signed by Japan and the United States on September 8, 1951.³ At some point Japan must decide in what manner she wishes to contribute to her own self-defense. That is a problem which has both political and economic aspects.

There is a genuine concern on the part of many Japanese as to the means by which they can discharge their responsibility for their own defense while avoiding the creation of a military machine such as that which formerly took over and ran Japan. There is also the question in Japan as to how the great costs of a modern defense establish-

ment can be financed without so weakening the economic fabric of the country that it would be a ready prey to that very Communist infiltration which it is designed to combat. These are real problems. As President Truman has pointed out, a beginning has been made in the development in the Pacific area of security on a collective basis which will enable each nation to have security without developing itself those forces which can be an offensive threat. The Japanese Government has elected to take part, and it cannot be too often emphasized that this choice of Japan's was a free choice. As early as February 1951 when Mr. Dulles was in Japan he discussed this general topic with the Japanese and he said publicly that if Japan wished it could share collective protection against direct aggression. He went on to say:

That, however, is not a choice which the United States is going to impose upon Japan. It is an invitation. The United States is not interested in slavish conduct. . . . We are concerned only with the brave and the free. The choice must be Japan's own choice.

This decision of the Japanese Government to enter into a security pact with the United States was undoubtedly a difficult one. However, just as the United States has shown trust in the Japanese people and Government by advocating and signing a treaty of reconciliation without arduous post-treaty controls, so must the Japanese people trust the U.S. Government and people that they will so implement this security treaty that it will contribute to the true long-term good of both countries and the peace of the whole Pacific area. The United States will not falter in its determination to insure the security of Japan.

U.S. Aims in Korea

In Korea our aim is as it always has been—the achievement of an independent, united, and free Korea. In cooperation with our friends in the United Nations we are committed to repel the aggression from North Korea and to restore peace and security in the area. We have repelled the aggression—the aggressors have been thrown back beyond the point from which they started. Our military leaders are now engaged in armistice talks which we devoutly hope will soon bring an end to the fighting. If we succeed in getting an armistice we shall then proceed to the political stage where we will discuss how to bring about the independent, united, and free Korea which is our objective. If the armistice talks fail, we will be confronted with a most serious situation. It would not be profitable to speculate at this time as to what we should do in that unhappy event. We shall continue to do our part to make the talks a success—if they fail it will be because the Communists do not want them to succeed.

But let me utter a word of caution. Should an armistice be obtained it would not mean our

³ For text of the pact, see *ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1951, p. 464.

troubles are over. There are the political talks which I have mentioned. There are other problems in the Far East which can still plague us. I have spoken of the continuing threat to Indochina and Formosa. The United States and the other nations of the free world cannot relax—I am afraid we must learn to live for some time to come with crisis. We shall need all the resolution, firmness, and patience we can summon if the tremendous sacrifices we have already made are not to be in vain.

Conflicts of Opinion Regarding China

What shall we do about China? This is a question about which there are many conflicts of opinion, and which evokes much passion. But some things are clear and agreed. Communist China is an aggressor, declared so by the United Nations—the people of mainland China are suffering under purge after purge in which thousands are killed and more imprisoned. Foreign businessmen and missionaries are not allowed to carry on their normal activities, even those whose countries have recognized the Communist regime. At the same time, Communist Chinese at the Soviet-sponsored economic conference in Moscow make high-sounding offers of trade deals with the West. There are in Red China, American and British businessmen through whom it would be normal for these trade offers to be made. But no, these men are in jail, or being threatened with prison or worse if they don't agree to Communist demands. Under such circumstances why should we take seriously the Communist offer of friendly trade with the West? Americans have a traditional friendship for the people of China. Today, however, it is only possible to show that friendship through the Chinese Government on Formosa. Much has been said about the faults of that Government. I do not intend to enter that controversy. I intend to look to the future—not the past—we must work with what we have, not what we might like to have.

It seems to me abundantly clear that the United States is committed by the terms of President Truman's statement of June 27, 1950,⁴ to prevent Formosa from falling into Communist hands. That this continues to be our policy is evidenced by the fact that the Administration has asked the Congress to include in the Mutual Security Act provision for funds for economic and military support for Formosa which will help the Government and people there to increase their ability to defend themselves. In the opinion of the U.S. Government the National Government still represents China. This opinion is shared by the majority of the members of the United Nations. There have been 96 votes on this question in more

than 45 international organizations and the National Government continues to occupy the Chinese seat in all of them. It is our policy that this shall continue to be the case. The Chinese Government and people on Formosa are making a real effort to create conditions there which will show the world that they are deserving of its support. We shall continue helping them in this task.

U.S. Goal—Toward a True Freedom

In the rest of Asia we are helping the countries of Southeast Asia—Indonesia, Indochina, Burma, the Philippines, and Thailand—with military or economic assistance programs or both. We are giving considerable help to the Associated States of Indochina and to France to enable them to continue their struggle against the Communist-led rebels of the Vietminh. We shall continue to give such aid. In their association with France the people of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have been granted constantly increasing attributes of independence. We all know what would happen if the Communists should triumph. There would be loud shouting about having thrown the foreigner out and restoring independence to a colonial people. But where is the true independence of North Korea, Communist China, Outer Mongolia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, or those States which were among the first to fall behind the Iron Curtain—Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia? I think we are doing the right thing in helping our friends in Indochina toward a true freedom, not an illusory one.

The United States need not be hesitant in actively working to advance the ideal of freedom which was the foundation of our own revolution. As recently pointed out by an astute British writer, Barbara Ward, in the *New York Times*, Thomas Jefferson once prophesied that this ideal would be capable of permanent extension—"to some parts sooner, to others later but finally to all." Let us not fear to live up to our tradition.

Communiqués Regarding Korea To the Security Council

The Headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers: S/2564, March 21; S/2565, March 24; S/2566, March 25; S/2568, March 26; S/2569, March 27; S/2570, March 28; S/2572, March 31; S/2573, April 2; S/2586, April 2; S/2587, April 3; S/2588, April 7; S/2589, April 7; S/2591, April 8.

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 3, 1950, p. 5.

Ratification of Japanese Peace Treaty And Pacific Security Treaties

Statement by the President

[Released to the press by the White House April 15]

As President of the United States, it gives me great satisfaction to sign, and thus ratify, on this day the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the Security Treaty with Australia and New Zealand, the Security Treaty with Japan, and the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of the Philippines. The signing of these documents completes another in the series of steps being taken by free nations to bring peace and security to the Pacific.

When the United States and at least two more of the countries mentioned in article 23 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan have deposited their ratifications, the historic ceremonies of restoring Japan to a position of independence, honor, and equality in the world community which began at San Francisco last September will have been brought to a conclusion.¹ The related security and mutual defense treaties will become effective when their ratifications are either deposited or exchanged in accordance with their respective terms.

In signing these documents, I know that I express the essential unity and will of the American people for the earliest possible achievement of lasting peace and freedom with security. The Treaty of Peace with Japan and the related security and mutual defense treaties, when they go into effect, will bring that goal nearer to realization.

¹ Article 23 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan provides that the treaty shall come into force when Japan, the United States, and any five of the following countries have deposited their instruments of ratification with the U.S. Government: Australia, Canada, Ceylon, France, Indonesia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom.

Up to today ratifications have been deposited by the following countries named in article 23: Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Thus, in order to bring the treaty into force it will be necessary for the United States and two other countries named in article 23 to deposit their instruments of ratification.

Subject to the expected prior deposit of at least two additional instruments of ratification, the United States plans to deposit its own instrument of ratification on Apr. 28, 1952. These three additional deposits will bring the Treaty of Peace with Japan into effect on that date for those countries which have deposited their ratifications by that time.

This advance announcement of the planned effective date of the Treaty of Peace is being made in order to permit an orderly completion of the transition of Japan from the present occupation status to that of full sovereignty. In addition, it will enable those nations which are reestablishing relations with the Japanese Government to change from their present accreditation to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to that of normal peacetime relations with the Japanese Government.

The related security and mutual defense treaties will become effective when their ratifications are either deposited or exchanged in accordance with their respective specific terms.

Point Four Agreements Concluded With Iran

[Released to the press April 15]

The Department of State announced on April 15 that project agreements for technical cooperation in the fields of agriculture, public health, and education have been concluded with the Government of Iran. The project agreements were signed on April 1, 1952, in Tehran by William E. Warne, U.S. Director of Technical Cooperation, for the United States, and Khalil K. Taleghani, Minister of Agriculture, Mohammad Ali Maleki, Minister of Health, and Mahmoud Hessabi, Minister of Education, representing Iran.

The three project agreements, calling for an expenditure of approximately \$11,000,000 by the United States, describe the detailed operations of the expanded Point Four Program provided for in the exchange of notes at Tehran on January 19, 1952. At that time the United States agreed to contribute up to \$23,450,000 for the 1952 fiscal year toward the program of technical cooperation.¹

The agricultural program includes such projects as the development of an agricultural extension service, improved livestock practices, irrigation development, soil and water conservation, and plant development.

The public-health program provides for the establishment of sanitary engineering, nursing, and public-health education divisions in the Ministry of Health to combat communicable diseases, improve sanitary conditions, and provide maternal and child-health care, and other services necessary for the development of a rural public-health service.

The objectives of the education program are to provide for improved rural facilities by establishing demonstration schools, better training for a greater number of rural teachers, and the extending of the program to remote areas.

As an emergency measure to meet the local currency costs of the Point Four Program, which the Iranian Government is unable to pay at the present time, agreements have also been entered into which will make rials available for the technical-cooperation projects in the amount of \$6,000,000.

The first of these is the student emergency assistance program to provide dollars in the United States for subsistence and tuition of stranded Iranians whose sources of funds have been cut off by the Iranian Government currency restrictions.² Under this program, rials must be deposited by the students' sponsors in Iran before the students may receive dollars in the United States. The rials go into a special account to be used by the Point Four director in Iran to meet local currency requirements. The United States has agreed to use up to \$1,000,000 in this program.

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 11, 1952, p. 217.

² *Ibid.*, Apr. 28, 1952, p. 659.

The other is a program whereby the United States will supply approximately 34,000 metric tons of sugar valued at \$5,000,000. The agreement to cover the terms of the sugar purchase was concluded on March 31, 1952, in Tehran.

Under the terms of the consumer goods (sugar) agreement the Government of Iran will sell the sugar through regular commercial channels and will deposit the equivalent of the \$5,000,000 in rials in a special account for the Point Four director to use in meeting local expenses of the program.

The sugar will be shipped to Persian Gulf ports of Iran in three separate shipments in May, June, and July.

Emergency Assistance For Iranian Students

[Released to the press April 7]

A program to provide emergency assistance for approximately 1,000 Iranian students stranded in the United States by reason of their sources of funds having been cut off by the new currency restrictions adopted by the Government of Iran because of the shortage of dollars, was announced by the Department of State on April 7.

The purpose of the emergency program is to provide dollars in the United States only for maintenance and tuition in amounts equivalent to Iranian currency made available by the students' sponsors or parents in Iran. The rials (Iranian currency) deposited by the sponsors will go into a special account to be used by the Point Four director in Iran to meet local currency requirements of the technical-cooperation and economic-development program.

The Near East Foundation, 54 East 64th Street, New York City, will administer this Iranian Student Emergency Assistance Program under an agreement with the Technical Cooperation Administration of the Department of State.

The Point Four Program in Iran is one of rural development—improvement in agriculture, health, and education at the village level. There is an inadequate number of Iranian specialists in most fields and much of the success of the Point Four Program will depend on increasing the number of urgently needed technicians.

The emergency student assistance program covers Iranians enrolled as regular or special students in recognized colleges and universities and also visiting professors and research workers attached to educational and scientific institutions. The majority of the Iranian students in the United States is studying technical subjects such as agriculture, engineering, and medicine.

The emergency program is to cover students' living costs and other necessary expenses through

the end of the 1951–52 academic year, or through August 21, 1952. The amount a student can receive for living expenses is determined by the university and in no case may exceed \$160 a month.

The Iranian students are attending more than 200 different schools but more than half of them are enrolled in New York University, Columbia University, Syracuse University, University of California, (at Berkeley and at Los Angeles), University of Southern California, Los Angeles City College, Indiana University, University of Nebraska, Utah State Agricultural College, and the University of Maryland.

Recent Publications

[Released by the Department of State]

Technical Cooperation, Assistance for Eritrea. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2269. Pub. 4315. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom—Signed at London June 15, 1951; entered into force June 15, 1951.

Economic Cooperation With the Federal Republic of Germany Under Public Law 472, 80th Congress, as amended. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2278. Pub. 4333. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany—Signed at Frankfurt Feb. 27, 1951, and at Bonn Mar. 28, 1951; entered into force Mar. 28, 1951.

Economic Cooperation With Portugal Under Public Law 472, 80th Congress, as amended. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2279. Pub. 4334. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Portugal—Signed at Lisbon May 17, 1951; entered into force May 17, 1951.

Technical Cooperation, Training of Venezuelan Nationals. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2280. Pub. 4336. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Venezuela—Signed at Caracas May 23 and June 7, 1951; entered into force June 7, 1951.

Violations of Peace Treaty Guaranties of Human Rights. European and British Commonwealth Series 31. Pub. 4376a. 180 pp. \$2.

Vol. I. Rumania—expression—press and publication. Supplement.

Double Taxation, Taxes on Income. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2316. Pub. 4407. 35 pp. 15¢.

Convention between the United States and Switzerland—Signed at Washington May 24, 1951; entered into force Sept. 27, 1951.

United States Educational Commission in Japan. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2335. Pub. 4438. 19 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Japan—Signed at Tokyo Aug. 28, 1951; entered into force Aug. 28, 1951.

U.S.-Italian Negotiations on Import Restrictions

[Released to the press April 16]

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON

The Department yesterday delivered a reply to the Italian note of January 15 which urged this Government to revoke its restrictions on traditional Italian products, such as cheese, almonds, and hats, and to prevent any further restrictions on imports of Italian goods that would increase the dollar deficit and aggravate the economic and social difficulties of Italy. Copies of the Italian note and of our reply are available.

The Italian note raised important issues regarding recent trends in United States trade policy. United States trade policy is an important part of our over-all foreign policy which seeks to erect a firm foundation for the defense of the free world against aggression. The major problem in United States foreign trade today is the wide margin by which our exports exceed our imports, the so-called "dollar gap," which results in foreign countries not being able to pay for the American goods they need.

The dollar gap is as much our problem as that of the rest of the world. A big creditor nation that refuses to import can never expect to be paid for its exports. If we do not want to lose our export markets—and certainly no taxpayer wishes to continue to bear the burden of foreign aid indefinitely to enable other nations to buy our goods—we must import.

Furthermore, if the joint defense effort is to be strong enough to stem Soviet aggression, independent nations must act together, each utilizing its resources, plants, and manpower in the most economic manner. This will not occur by itself. It requires cooperative action and bold leadership. When inconsistencies show up in United States policy, reflecting the pressures for restrictions on trade, United States leadership is weakened. In the long run, American interests will suffer. We cannot throw up barriers here while at the same time we urge the destruction of such barriers abroad in the interests of close partnership in the free world. I am sure that the American people recognize that the United States must cooperate in

order to receive the cooperation of other nations joined with us in the defense of the free world.

U.S. MEMORANDUM OF APRIL 15

The Department of State has considered the Italian Embassy's memorandum of January 15, 1952 concerning the economic, social, and psychological repercussions on Italy of United States import restrictions. In accordance with the Embassy's request, copies of the memorandum have been furnished to the Department of Agriculture, the Tariff Commission, and other United States Government agencies most concerned with problems of this nature.

The Department wishes to assure the Italian Embassy of the continuing interest of this Government in expanding the opportunities for world trade and in permitting other countries to earn the dollars with which to pay for their essential imports, thus cutting down the need for extraordinary United States assistance. The Department believes not only that a high level of imports can be absorbed by the United States economy but that imports benefit the United States as well as the other nations joined in the defense of the free world. Existing legislation provides ample safeguards to protect domestic producers in the minority of cases where a high level of imports might cause serious injury to domestic industry. To the American consumer a high level of imports means a wide variety of goods from which to choose and generally lower prices. To many important domestic producers, imports mean an increase in the dollars available to foreign nations which makes it possible for them to buy American goods, including products from all sections of the country and from a wide range of industries. Furthermore, the threat to the security of the free world makes it even more urgent that high levels of world trade be encouraged so that the nations of the free world can cooperate in making the best possible use of their resources, their plants, and their labor force. By each contributing what it can produce most efficiently, the defense and economic stability of the democratic nations will be strengthened.

The Department would like to make the following comments on some of the specific cases which were mentioned in the memorandum and which are the subject of concern to the Italian Government. With respect to the Embassy's apprehension that restrictions on imports of olive oil may be imposed, the Department has already replied separately to the Embassy's note on this subject. No restrictions on imports of olive oil are contemplated at this time.

Section 104 of the Defense Production Act of 1951

The Administration is continuing its opposition to the extension beyond June 30, 1952 of Section 104 of the Defense Production Act of 1951. It believes that the import restrictions on cheese and other dairy products imposed

under Section 104 are inconsistent with the long-run interests of the American people including the American farmer. The Department's reasons for believing that Section 104 should not be extended are reviewed in full in the Secretary's letter of March 10, 1952 to Senator Burnet R. Maybank, a copy of which is enclosed.¹ The Senate Banking and Currency Committee recently voted to replace Section 104 with language corresponding to that of Public Law 890, legislation which existed prior to Section 104. If the Congress should finally pass legislation in this form, import restrictions on fats and oils, rice and rice products, peanuts, cheese and other dairy products would be authorized only upon the President's determination that they were essential to (a) the acquisition or distribution of products in short supply, or (b) the orderly liquidation of temporary surpluses of stocks owned or controlled by the Government. Such legislation would enable this Government to act consistently with its existing international commitments.

"Escape Clause" Actions

The Department appreciates the concern which the Italian Embassy has expressed in its memorandum regarding the so-called "escape clause" actions, that is, the modification of trade agreement concessions where serious injury is caused or threatened to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products. This Government believes that these modifications of concessions should be retained only for such time and to such extent as is necessary to prevent or remedy the injury.

Accordingly, a system providing for periodic review of "escape clause" actions is in the process of being established.² Your attention is directed to the President's letter of January 5, 1952 to the Chairman of the Tariff Commission, a copy of which was furnished the Embassy.

In this letter the President stated that he has requested the preparation of an Executive Order which would call for periodic investigation and report by the Tariff Commission on each escape clause action indicating whether or not the modified concession should be continued in its existing form. The Department believes that this procedure should help ensure that "escape clause" actions will remain in effect only so long as required to prevent serious injury to the domestic industry concerned.

Almonds

The Italian Embassy also expressed its concern over the fee on imports of shelled almonds over a certain quantity which the United States recently imposed. This restriction is applicable only to the current marketing season ending September 30, 1952, and further investigation would be required prior to any decision to extend this quota to the next season.

"Buy America" Policy

The Department appreciates the concern of the Italian Government regarding the application of the "Buy America" policy to Government procurement. It believes that permitting concerns in friendly foreign countries to compete effectively with domestic concerns in bidding for government defense contracts will result in more economical government procurement with substantial savings to the United States taxpayer. It will also give foreign countries the opportunity to raise their levels of production and earn needed foreign exchange. The Department recognizes that restrictive features of the "Buy America" policy, which was incorporated in United States statutes as early as 1933, were developed under circumstances far different from those which exist today, and warrant careful re-examination in the light of present circumstances.

¹ For text of this letter, see BULLETIN of Mar. 31, 1952, p. 517.

² For text of a report on trade agreement escape clauses, transmitted by the President to the Congress on Jan. 10, see *ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1952, p. 143.

The Department once again wishes to assure the Italian Embassy of its sympathetic interest in the Embassy's concern in promoting a high level of Italian exports to the United States, thereby enhancing Italy's ability to purchase goods from the United States, strengthen its economy, and contribute to the achievement of a prosperous and peaceful world, an objective to which both our governments subscribe.

Enclosure :

Copy of letter to Senator Burnet R. Maybank

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D. C.

ITALIAN NOTE VERBALE OF JANUARY 15

The Italian Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to transmit the attached memorandum regarding the grave consequences for the Italian economy and Italian-American trade, of any restrictions adopted on imports of Italian goods in the United States.

The Italian Embassy will be grateful if the Department of State will call the attention of the Department of Agriculture, the Tariff Commission and the other interested United States authorities, to the serious economic, social and psychological repercussions that recent United States restrictions have had in Italy and other friendly countries of Europe, which are trying to increase their dollar earnings through exports.

For the reasons pointed out in the attached memorandum and in the previous notes submitted by this Embassy to the Department of State, the Italian Government is appealing to the Government of the United States to revoke the recent restrictions on imports of cheeses, almonds, hats, etc. and to prevent any further restrictions on imports of Italian goods that would increase the already enormous dollar deficit and aggravate the economic and social difficulties of Italy.

The Italian Embassy expresses its thanks to the Department of State for its kind attention to these problems and for the action it will deem opportune to take in response to the requests of the Embassy.

AMBASCIATORE TARCHIANI

MEMORANDUM: Economic, Social, and Psychological Repercussions in Italy of U. S. Import Restrictions and other Protectionist Practices

1. The question of United States trade restrictions and other measures which unfavorably affect Italian imports into this country has been the subject in recent years of frequent communication from this Embassy to the Department of State, the Treasury Department, and other appropriate United States authorities. In this connection special reference is made to a number of documents, listed under Encl. A.³

2. The international emergency precipitated by the invasion of Korea, and the subsequent mutual defense efforts of the United States and its partners and allies, have created a new framework which is likely to continue over a number of years. It is characterized by a number of adverse features, such as shortages of essential materials and manpower, inflationary pressures, sudden shifts in the volume and terms of international trade, and so forth.

There is, however, a fair prospect that some of these difficulties can be considerably alleviated, and ultimately turned to the advantage of the cause of world-wide stability, as a result of closer economic coordination among peace-loving nations, and among NATO allies in particular.

Such coordination, as President Truman stressed on many memorable occasions, calls for a fuller utilization of the joint productive resources of the democratic nations for purposes of both defense and economic stabilization.

³ See p. 665.

The need for coordination and utilization of the economic resources and production capacity of free nations is also receiving increasing emphasis in the quarterly report to the President from the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, which, furthermore, analyze and bring into a single focus the joint defense efforts of this country and its European partners.

3. The effects and implications of the new situation are so vast, and its ramifications so extensive, that it becomes desirable, and indeed essential, that each of the main aspects of economic relations between the nations of Western Europe and the United States be reviewed afresh, in the light of current conditions and requirements. One such aspect is foreign trade, which is of obvious and paramount significance with respect to both the major objectives of the current effort of the United States and its allies, i.e., rearmament and the maintenance of domestic and international economic stability.

4. It is hardly necessary to recall that the current mutual defense effort is based, so far as Western Europe is concerned, on the foundations built by the ECA program. In turn, the ECA programs were deeply concerned with the establishment of the freest possible flow of trade among the participating nations and throughout the free world. One of their major purposes was to make a frontal attack on the so-called "international dollar gap", or "dollar shortage" problem on the assumption that only an expanding and well-balanced pattern of foreign trade could give stability to Europe and strengthen America's first line of defense across the ocean. Consequently, it was the declared purpose of the ECA program to help reduce the unbalance in the world trade due to the "dollar shortage" stemming in turn from the chronic excess of United States exports over imports.

The ECA countries were assisted and encouraged in the organization of "dollar export drives". Steps were taken to stimulate an increasing acceptance of European imports in the United States.

The vital significance of this new policy, in the interest of the United States and its security, as well as that of world economic stabilization, was underscored in a number of important State papers such as the Gray report, the Rockefeller report, the latest reports of ECA, of the Defense Production Administrator, of the Council of Economic Advisers, of the National Association of Manufacturers, of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, and in the final declaration of the 38th National Foreign Trade Council Convention held in New York October 1951, which discussed this important and significant theme: "International Trade and Investment are essential to the Defense and Economic Advancement of the United States and the Free World".

5. All this was highly gratifying and encouraging to the Italian Government, which is extremely anxious to re-establish a situation in which Italy can earn and pay its own way through the exports of products of the skill and ingenuity of its enterprise and manpower, rather than to continue to rely on assistance. It was also realized that neither the administrative nor the legislative branch of the United States Government could be expected to disregard altogether the short-term impact of the new policy upon a number of special situations. It was felt, however, that the domestic situations requiring special safeguards could only be few and relatively limited, given the unprecedented level of prosperity reached by the United States economy in postwar years and the related situations of full employment.

It was consequently hoped that the new trend in United States foreign trade policies—already heralded prior to the Second World War by the adoption of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements policy—was here to stay, and that the anomalies and inconsistencies which still existed with respect to their practical implementation would disappear as rapidly as possible.

6. There have been, however, indications in recent months that, while the American Government continues to be fully committed to the principle of trade liberaliza-

tion, renewed recourse is being made to restrictive practices, and that the inconsistencies between principle and practice, far from disappearing, are once more increasing. Should this new trend continue unchecked, a very serious situation would result. Much of the progress made through GATT and other agreements would be undone and many of the gains of the Marshall Plan would be wasted. Such a prospect is naturally viewed by the Italian Government with considerable alarm, and is a matter of major concern, particularly under the current unsettled conditions of the international and European economy.

7. Italian exports to the United States include to a very large extent foodstuffs (such as olive oil and cheese), certain farm products (such as almonds), and a number of specialties and typical commodities. They have enjoyed in recent years a moderate expansion which, however, has hardly made a dent on the trade unbalance between Italy and the United States. In 1951 Italian imports from the United States exceeded exports to the United States by over 6 to 1, representing a total deficit of more than 350 million dollars. The hopes and prospects of further development, however, have been virtually nullified by restrictions placed by the United States Government on the import of a number of commodities which are of vital importance to Italy's economy.

Here are some examples:

a) *Cheese* imports from Italy and other foreign countries have been placed by the Department of Agriculture on a quota basis, which will cause a decrease of about 40% in one of the most important, typical items of Italian export and consequently a substantial increase in the trade unbalance against Italy. The resulting loss in dollars, probably more than 2 million, will compel Italy to reduce her purchases of wheat, cotton, and other agricultural products in the United States, whose production and export interest millions of American farmers and which constitute a burden on American taxpayers in the form of the price-support program.

The restrictions placed on Italian cheese imports seem particularly inappropriate because Italian cheeses do not compete, for the most part, with cheeses produced in the United States. Being produced from sheep's milk (pecorino and romano) or requiring many years of seasoning (parmigiano and reggiano), Italian cheeses are not competitive with their limitations which are produced in small quantity in the United States.

Imports of Italian and all other foreign cheeses in the United States as a whole still represent a negligible portion of total American consumption (less than 5% of total consumption). Therefore the benefits gained by American producers through recent restrictions of imports are limited and in any case greatly overcome by the loss of export outlets for other important American farm producers. On the other hand, these restrictions are having disastrous economic, social, and psychological effects on the Italian economy and especially on the poor regions of southern Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, where the production and export of sheep's milk cheeses to the United States constitutes the principal means of livelihood.

Moreover, the imposition of direct quantitative import restriction is in direct contradiction to the whole spirit of American foreign trade policies, and to policies which the United States has been sponsoring in Europe.

As the Italian Embassy has pointed out in recent memoranda to the Department of State, the recent restrictions on imports of Italian cheeses have voided the U.S. tariff reductions agreed upon at Torquay, reductions for which Italy granted equivalent tariff concessions in favor of the American exporters.

b) Another key item in the Italian-American trade, namely *olive oil* is threatened by similar restrictions on imports, following the demands of the California producers of olive oil to the Department of Agriculture to extend to olive oil Section 104 of the Defense Production Act, as amended, or to invoke the "escape" and "peril" clauses for an increase in tariff protection, which would curtail the imports of olive oil from abroad.

Italian olive oil, refined and packed in Italy, has earned through many years a position of well deserved prestige with the American consumers. A large market has thus been built in the United States for olive oil of high quality. Imports of Italian olive oil into this country have, therefore, in no way endangered, rather they have favored domestic production by stimulating a taste for good olive oil.

Olive oil, as cheese, constitutes one of the few Italian agricultural sources of foreign exchange earnings. Continuous export of this product is essential to Italians in order to obtain less expensive vegetable oils needed for her domestic consumption. The dollars Italy acquires from the export of olive oil are entirely spent in the purchase of soy beans, soy oil, and other oil seeds in the United States which is a traditional source used by Italy in procuring supplies of these products in the substantial quantities required.

c) Following the demands of *almond* producers, the U.S. Tariff Commission proposed and the American Government recently introduced an increase in duties on imported almonds beyond a certain quota. As a matter of fact, imported Italian almonds are not competitive but supplementary to the American production because of their particular quality and characteristics: most Italian almonds are bought by the confectionery industry, which cannot be completely supplied by the domestic production.

Measures increasing duties or otherwise restricting imports of almonds into the United States will contribute to worsen the trade deficit of a country which imports from the United States agricultural products in amounts 5-6 times surpassing the value of her exports of specialty foodstuffs to the United States.

d) The tariff duties on *women's fur felt hat bodies* have been raised, from December 1, 1950 by decision of the President following a report of the Tariff Commission suggesting the recourse to the "escape clause" mostly because of strong competition created by hats from Czechoslovakia.⁴ The effect of this action was, of course, to impose serious consequences on the Italian hat industry.

Now that the United States has withdrawn its concessions to Czechoslovakia under the GATT Convention, it should not be difficult to restore the conventional concessions to friendly countries, thereby eliminating a situation which, in addition to inflicting unnecessary damage on Italy and other democratic countries, produces very adverse psychological and political repercussions.

Such a request was made to the Department of State in the Embassy's note No. 11340 of October 23, 1951, but to date no favorable action has been taken. Meanwhile, the Italian hat industry continues to suffer serious consequences as a result of being cut off from its most important export market, the United States.

e) New threats concerning the tariff treatment of such commodities as wines, cherries, garlic, marble, motorcycles, bicycles, tobacco pipes, leather goods, etc. are looming ahead, as a result of representations of domestic manufacturers to the U.S. Tariff Commission under the "peril point" and "escape clause" of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, or to the Department of Agriculture under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.

10. The economic and other effects of this new trend are only too obvious. To quote from the *New York Times* of September 22, 1951:

It is fundamental American policy to encourage as free a flow of trade and commerce throughout the world as possible. That is one of the basic premises on which rests the Marshall Plan and in fact our whole approach to the political and economic problems of Europe, not to mention our own Reciprocal Trade Act and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to which we are party.

Inherent in this policy is the need for Europe to increase its exports to the U.S. It should be obvious

even to the most extreme protectionists that it makes more sense to help Europe earn dollars than to keep on giving dollars away while preventing Europe from earning them.

In more general terms, the effects of U.S. import restrictions can be summed up under the following heading:

(a) effects on GATT and international trade policies at large

(b) effects on the "dollar gap"

(c) effects on inflationary pressures

(d) political and psychological effects

Each of these effects will be briefly reviewed in what follows:

11. To begin with, it is clear that international trade policies are a matter not only of principle but also of practical implementation. Due tribute has been paid in previous sections of this paper to the leadership taken by the U.S. Government in bringing about a liberalization of international trade relations. The question now is that such liberalization appears to be jeopardized by recent restrictive actions, and the threats of others to come, constituting a return to harmful protectionist practices of the past.

If the United States, or for that matter any of the signatories of GATT, makes increasing recourse to "peril level" or "escape clauses" and adopts restrictive measures with respect to the very items of foreign imports which stand to benefit by conventional tariff rates and other concessions, the very heart of GATT is impaired and the whole policy of trade liberalization, while honored in principle, becomes disregarded and inoperative in practice.

The situation becomes particularly disquieting when such practices are adopted by nations having such vast power and international responsibilities as the United States:

To quote once more from the *New York Times* (November 7, 1951):

The issue is serious precisely because the U.S. and Belgium are countries heavily committed to trying to establish a system of international trade within which free enterprise can function. It is not that the U.S. and Belgium are worse than anybody else. It is not that they, of all countries, should, for reasons that from a nationalistic viewpoint are perfectly sound, risk making the whole system of international agreements a dead letter by penalizing the private enterprises in all countries that have relied on being able to do business on certain known terms and conditions.

The hat case report may well become a classic document in international trade history. It shows how conclusions about such elements as "necessity", "injury", "justifiable protective measures" differ when arrived at from the standpoint of the community of nations and when arrived at, for example, by the U.S. Tariff Commission acting in perfect good faith in accordance with the terms of agreement to which the U.S. adheres.

Nobody questioned that the U.S. had a right to consider the desire of hat manufacturers in Danbury and Norwalk, Conn. to require European hat makers to pay more than 40% to 50% duties (agreed to by the U.S. at Geneva Tariff Conference of 1947) before selling their hats in the U.S. But what sticks out a mile from this report is the chaos that faces all international trade in which private business partakes and which requires the investment of substantial capital sums if every country acts only on such considerations without submitting its actions to international review. The nationalized Czechoslovakian industries could easily juggle their prices to sell over any conceivable duty barrier. It is the private European companies that cannot.

12. As for the "dollar gap," it is apparent that, if this is to be narrowed down to limits compatible with international equilibrium, Italy and other European countries must rely chiefly on an increase in their exports of specialties and other typical goods to the United States.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1952, p. 96.

For Italy cannot be expected to compete in mass produced goods and "heavy" durables or appliances, and must concentrate on manufactured specialties requiring to a large extent the use of specialized labor and traditional skills. In all cases, these imports are but a negligible fraction of total American consumption, hence of total domestic production. And while it is the essence of competition to bring about some redistribution of resources in the interest of an efficient division of labor, the effect of these imports on American industry, including the interested segments of it, cannot be but extremely small, particularly in the context of a prospering economy of full employment.

If escape and peril clauses were invoked at will, simply to avoid the slightest injury to a marginal fringe of domestic producers, there could be no hope for Italy or other countries to develop their imports to the United States, and consequently to bring their dollar account into balance.

The situation would become particularly hopeless if the slightest indication of success in that direction in any individual line or commodity should be used as a signal for invoking escape clauses. A vicious spiral would develop and the whole process would become nugatory.

13. There can be no question but that restrictive import practices at the present time intensify inflationary pressures in this country and abroad. It is generally recognized that one of the basic means of fighting inflation, domestically and at the international level, is through production and more production, so that the gap between disposable income and consumers' goods can be narrowed and, if possible, closed. Restrictive import practices have, of course, exactly the same effect on inflation as the curtailment of production, since they affect both the supply and the price level of consumers' goods.

Even more serious is the impact of such restrictions on international inflation, since foreign countries, such as Italy, which are already suffering from adverse changes in the terms of trade of the past 18 months, are faced with additional difficulties with respect to the earning of dollars. At one and the same time, economic aid has been decreased, the Italian "dollar gap" has increased to more than 350 million dollars and Italian requirements for supplies from the dollar area have increased, both for defense production and for rebuilding after the disasters of recent floods whose damages are estimated at more than 500 million dollars.

It is unnecessary to emphasize this point, since the growing threat to the joint defense effort and to the economy of the European members of the NATO alliance has become a matter of common knowledge, and of urgent concern for the American Government.

14. Finally, there are the political and psychological effects to be considered; these can hardly be overestimated. What is at stake is the vast store of goodwill and gratitude which exists in Italy and other friendly countries as a result of the generous postwar American aid, and of Marshall Plan aid in particular. For, most segments of Italian public opinion are altogether at a loss to understand how the vast amount of help poured into Italy during the past 3 years, with the express purpose of restoring the stability of both the domestic and the international economy of the nation, can be reconciled with the recent restrictions that have hit vital sectors of the Italian economy. The very fact that these restrictions are but incidental and almost trivial within the over-all context of U.S. policies, is bound to intensify their adverse impact. This is because they appear to involve the mistaken idea that, while American policies are liberal and indeed generous at their over-all level, they acquire an altogether different connotation as soon as the protection of special interests is concerned.

This implication, no matter how unwarranted, plays directly into the hands of that vocal minority of opinion which is swayed by Communist propaganda in Europe. As it is known, the Communists noisily press their line that the Marshall Plan and other aid programs are not really

meant to bring about the economic emancipation of Western Europe but to perpetuate their dependence on American bounty, and that American aid programs are calculated to find additional outlets for domestic production, while barring the door to foreign products. The result is that a state of confusion and doubt is generated in the minds of some people—which is sedulously exploited by the Communist minority for its own ends—despite the constant emphasis of the Italian Government on the true facts.

15. The emergence of renewed symptoms of reversal to restrictive trade practices is particularly disquieting and disappointing at the present time, when the mutual defense effort of the democratic nations calls for the greatest practicable "pooling" of means and resources. In this connection it may be permissible to call attention to a situation which appears to stand out as a major inconsistency in the American policies related to the mutual defense effort, both at the domestic and at the international level. The acute shortages which have developed since June 1950 in many lines of domestic industrial production for military and other essential purposes, make it only natural that the greatest possible recourse be made to imports, particularly from friendly and allied countries.

In line with this principle, an Executive Order (no. 10210) was issued by the President of the United States in February 1951, authorizing all military and civilian procurement agencies of the U. S. Government to make defense contracts "without regard to the provisions of law" concerning the making of such contracts. The Italian Embassy understood that the Executive Order would permit the "Buy American" statute either to be waived or otherwise modified in application. Yet, certain specific instances, which have occurred recently (for instance, in connection with bids submitted to the Munitions Board on behalf of Italian manufacturers of optical and precision instruments) indicate conclusively that the Executive Order is still disregarded as concerns the statute, on the ground that the use of the authority under the Order is permissive and not mandatory. As late as September 29, 1951, the Munitions Board informed a foreign firm that "to date, this authority has not been exercised." The communication continued to the effect that, as far as the Board was concerned, the limitations of the "Buy American" Act were still being enforced, and for this reason a bid which was substantially cheaper than those submitted by American manufacturers but not to the extent of the full 25 percent prescribed in that Act, was rejected.

Recent examples of difficulties met by Italian firms because of the "Buy American" Act have been brought to the attention of the Department of State with Embassy's memorandum on the "dollar gap" problem, of September 1950, and Embassy's Note no. 13661 of December 18, 1951. Because of these difficulties Italy is losing important opportunities of work and the means of earning the much needed dollars for her purchases in the United States, and the Italian industry is prevented from helping to relieve the shortages being encountered in the defense production.

16. It is unnecessary to stress that legislation such as the "Buy American" statute, which was passed at the height of the great depression and when domestic unemployment was between 10 and 15 million persons, has become altogether obsolete and anachronistic under the conditions of full employment which have prevailed in the United States during the past 10 years. This is even more true today under the present emergency, and is recognized implicitly in the President's Executive Order which permits suspending the operation of the Act. The Order was widely publicized in Italy as evidence of the firm determination of the United States to make the joint defense effort mutual in fact as well as in name, and as a timely and welcome step toward trade liberalization in general. The fact that the Order has apparently had no influence on the administration of the statute and that the Italian industries are practically excluded from bids

that would assure substantial economy for the U. S. Government and reduce unemployment in Italy, is also a source of considerable embarrassment for the Italian Government, in the face of the many inquiries and representations which are being received by Italian firms desirous of participating in these bids.

17. In conclusion, it is certainly not the desire of the Italian Government to overrate the significance of the problems outlined in this memorandum, within the general context of the close economic and political relations between the two countries. There is no doubt, however, that their significance should not be overlooked with respect to both the present emergency and ultimate trends.

The Italian Government is confident that the Government of the United States will do everything in its power to eliminate obstacles and procedures that are proving so distressing for Italian exports to the United States, bearing in mind the necessity for Italy to reduce unemployment and increase her dollar earnings.

[Enclosure A]

PREVIOUS ITALIAN MEMORANDA ON U. S. TRADE BARRIERS AND IMPORT RESTRICTIONS

1) *Memorandum on situation and outlook of Italian exports to the United States* (August 1949).

This memorandum gave a general outline of the trade situation between Italy and the United States, illustrating the need for reduction of trade restrictions and for the increase of exports of Italian goods to the United States market.

Particular mention was made of the drastic increase in American import duties on all typical and traditional Italian exports from 1913 to 1930, and especially of the high protective barriers, customs procedures, and regulations.

The memorandum also underlined the importance for Italy of resuming her exports to the United States in order to maintain and increase her purchases of American products.

2) *Memorandum [of September 1949] on the necessity of increasing Italian exports to the United States.*

This memorandum called the attention of the United States authorities to the unnecessary hardships caused by a policy which intended to restrict imports of certain goods, but which at the same time did not succeed in promoting to any worthwhile extent the demand for similar or related domestic items. The examples given illustrated that the duty on such items during the last 25 years meant many millions of dollars in taxes paid by American consumers in the form of duties and higher domestic prices, without developing domestic production. This was especially true for items such as olive oil, anchovies, vermouth, pignolia nuts, musical instruments, etc.—some of these are absolutely non-competitive, some have characteristics which are beyond any possibility of imitation, while others, even if sold at much higher prices than the corresponding domestic articles in consequence of heavy customs duties, still appeal to certain categories of American consumers because of their traditional customs or habits (food habits, for example, of Americans of Italian extractions).

3) *Memorandum on import obstacles encountered by Italian exporters in the United States market* (December 1949).

This memorandum illustrating the facts contained in the preceding memorandum, listed a series of specific cases of the discouraging experiences of Italian exporters and the handicaps encountered by them in the introduction of new articles.

The memorandum also offered suggestions for overcoming the difficulties and the obstacles created by the highly complicated and strict regulations of the Customs, Patent, Food and Drug Administration authorities and laws such as the "Buy American" Act, Tariff Act of 1930, etc.

4) *Memorandum on the need of reducing trade unbalance between Italy and the United States through further lowering of U. S. tariff duties on typical and non-competitive Italian exports products* (June 1950).

This memorandum analyzed briefly the critical situation of the Italian export trade based on figures for the year 1949. Italy imported from the United States in 1949 6½ times (in total value) as many goods as she was able to export to the United States, (\$458.1 million versus 71.2 million). Her annual trade deficit with the United States, which before the war (1935-38 average) was \$21.5 million, in 1949 became 18 times larger.

A list was attached to the Memorandum showing some typical Italian export items (mostly non-competitive with American production subject to U.S. protective duties of 50 percent, 60 percent, 90 percent ad valorem).

5) *Memorandum on the "dollar gap" problem* (September 1950).

This memorandum suggested that, in order to reach a better equilibrium of trade between Italy and the United States and to lessen the Italian "dollar gap," more liberal views were needed in solving import problems, some of which were directly aggravated by the too strict application of laws or regulations such as:

1. Custom Bills and Procedures (now being revised);
2. Food and Drug Act;
3. Tariff negotiations;
4. "Buy American" Act, etc.

The memorandum pointed out that the continued existence of trade barriers raised long ago, under domestic and international economic conditions which no longer exist, was an anachronism in contradiction with the general policy followed by the United States Government and with the program of a closer international economic cooperation.

6) *Note Verbale on the subject of import quotas on cheeses, adopted by the United States on August 9, 1951.*

The note pointed out that none of the circumstances mentioned in the amended provisions of the Defense Production Act (Andresen Amendment) really existed as to require an import control of Italian cheeses, most of which were, because of their characteristics (especially in the case of sheep's milk cheese) non-competitive with domestic production. It was also mentioned that the restrictions on imports of Italian cheese would amount to a violation of the provision of Article II of the GATT and would void the U.S. tariff reductions agreed upon at Torquay for which Italy had granted similar tariff reductions in favor of American producers.

The most striking result of these restrictive measures was an increase of the Italian trade deficit and a reduction of her dollar earnings from exports to the United States, which have been used for the procurement of essential foodstuffs and raw material in this country.

7) *Memorandum on the importance for the Italian economy of exporting almonds to the United States and on the necessity of avoiding any restrictive measures in this connection* (September 1951).

This memorandum was inspired by the pressure exercised by the California Almond Growers Exchange on the U.S. Tariff Commission which resulted in an increase on the duties of almonds imported from Italy and the adoption of other restrictive measures and controls applied to this Italian export. The memorandum pointed out that there was no real necessity for the application of such measures because imports of Italian almonds were not in competition with local production. In fact, their particular characteristics and quality destined them to special uses, for instance in the confectionery industry, which could not be completely supplied out of domestic production.

Again, principal result of these measures was a further injury to the Italian economy and the aggravation of the trade deficit of a country that imported from the

United States agricultural products in amounts surpassing 5 to 6 times the value of her exports to the United States of typical Italian foodstuffs like cheese, olive oil, wines, etc.

8) *Comments on recent requests by American manufacturers for tariff increase on leather goods (April 1951).*

These were comments on some press reports which described the alarm created among United States leather manufacturers by the competition of foreign exporting firms. In order to avoid the danger of "bankruptcy" for the whole U.S. leather industry, industry spokesmen advocated an increase in tariff protection.

9) *Note Verbale of October 1951 on the increase of protective tariffs on fur felt hats, by the application of the "escape clause."*

The Note called the attention of the United States authorities to the fact that the new customs duties of December 1950 applied to hats and hat bodies imported from Czechoslovakia, Italy, and other countries. However, since the adoption of other restrictive measures against Czechoslovakia, the trade with that country has ceased. In consequence the above said measures might be reconsidered with advantage to both our countries.

10) *Memorandum of November 1951 to the ECA, aimed at having Italy included as an authorized source of supply among the countries bidding on commercial and government procurement authorization lists, at least for the products and services which Italy is in a position to offer and export.*

11) *Note Verbale of November 24, 1951 on the threatened adoption of quantity restrictions or increase of duties on imports of olive oil.*

The Note related that the California olive oil producers intended to invoke the adoption of quantity restrictions on imports of olive oil, under the provisions of Section 104 of the Defense Production Act, as amended, or to invoke the "escape" and "peril" clauses for an increase of the tariff protection, which would curtail the imports of olive oil from abroad.

The Note called the attention of the State Department to the fact that olive oil is one of the most important Italian exports to the United States and its sale in American markets enables Italy to buy in the United States large quantities of other foodstuffs and raw materials necessary to her economy, including the soy beans, soy oil, and other oil seeds used in Italian domestic consumption.

The Note observed also, as in the case of restrictions on cheeses, that from a practical point of view none of the conditions contemplated in Section 104 of the Defense Production Act really subsisted and that none of the circumstances under which Art. XIX of GATT admits the application of the "escape clause" were present; therefore any increase of duty or any quantity restrictions on imports of olive oil will be considered a violation of the multilateral trade agreements signed at Geneva, Annecy, and Torquay, and an unnecessary blow to a traditional current of exports which enables Italy to buy heavy quantities of agricultural products in the United States.

12) *Note Verbale [of December 16, 1951] complaining of the new system of subsidies adopted by the Department of Agriculture in favor of American lemon and orange exports, competing with Italian products in foreign markets.*

The Note Verbale points out that the adoption of these provisions by the Department of Agriculture does not appear consistent with the U.S. tariff laws, which contemplate drastic countervailing duties against foreign products benefiting of subsidies and that such regulations failed to comply with the provisions contained in Article 16 of the General Agreement on Tariff and Commerce as well as with the obligation to notify the other Contracting Parties of the intention to adopt export subsidies, indicating its importance, nature, and effects.

The Italian Government is seriously concerned regarding the effects such measures will have on the Italian economy since the citrus production and exports represent one of the few economic resources for the poor regions of southern Italy and assures work to large masses of the population. Exports of lemons, oranges, and their sub-products represent, moreover, an important source of supply of foreign currency needed for Italy's purchases of raw materials and foodstuffs abroad.

This system of subsidies, which affects important Italian trade currents, and the recent quantity restrictions on imports of products of particular interest for the Italian economy, as *cheeses*, *almonds*, etc., besides seriously impairing the Italian economy tends to destroy the advantages gained through the Annecy and Torquay regulations for which Italy granted the United States adequate tariff concessions.

13) *Note Verbale of the Italian Embassy regarding the "Buy American" Act (December 18, 1951).*

The Note called the attention of the Department of State to the damaging effects of continued application of the "Buy American" Act in the present emergency situation requiring a closer economic cooperation between the United States and Western European countries.

The "Buy American" Act represented the natural expression of a situation of economic depression which, happily, no longer exists. Now its protective, drastic measures prevent foreign countries from participating in bids connected with economic mobilization and defense production, place obstacles in the way of relieving shortages in the United States (as machine tools, optical instruments, etc.) and simultaneously providing democratic countries with the means of reducing unemployment and earning dollars needed for their economic recovery.

Recent Soviet Maneuvers

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press April 16]

In answer to questions on whether the U.S. policy of negotiating from strength had changed in any way, in view of the current Soviet "peace offensive," Secretary Acheson at his news conference on April 16 made the following extemporaneous statement:

I think that we have always taken the view that one who is in a stronger position is much more able to negotiate than a person who is in a weak position. We never changed our view on that. We always have negotiated—we have been negotiating for years with the Soviet Union.

We have never stopped negotiating. The question is not whether you are willing to negotiate, but what you can negotiate about, and whether there is any real desire to negotiate.

I shouldn't say, in the first place, there was a stepping up of the peace offensive. If you take the whole of the Soviet propaganda together, one of the items which has taken an extraordinarily large part of the attention of all the media of Soviet propaganda has been this biological warfare matter, in which they have made the most false, continuous charges against the United States, although it is directed also against the U.N. Command in Korea. There, over and over

again, proposals have been made by us to have this investigated by the International Red Cross and to have the World Health Organization come into it.¹ But all suggestions looking toward the ascertaining of the facts are brushed over by the Soviet Union without so much as a comment. But the campaign goes on and has taken a vast amount of space in all media—radio, press, and otherwise.

Now, that, I should not call a “peace offensive.” The things which you possibly have in mind are the exchange of notes in regard to Germany,² the economic conference,³ and that sort of thing.

With respect to the Moscow Economic Conference, I spoke on that subject before, and I think that everything that has happened has tended to bear out what I said at that time.

I think it is very interesting to note, if you will read my comments on March 14, that what has happened is that while the Soviet spokesmen in Moscow have been indicating a willingness to buy quantities of luxury and other goods of that sort, this is all wrapped up with and tied to the procurement of strategic materials, which are important from the Soviet point of view in building up their military strength.

The whole thing seems directed toward raising doubts as to whether the defense of the West is an urgent matter, and should be carried forward with the zeal that we all believe is necessary. I don't think that maneuver has succeeded in any way.

Founding of OAS Celebrated

Remarks by the President⁴

[Released to the press by the White House April 14]

It is a pleasure for me to meet with you and to extend to each one of you a personal greeting on this Pan American Day. We are celebrating the founding of the Organization of American States [OAS], which was established 62 years ago. This organization symbolizes the good-neighborly relations and the peaceful cooperation that we have developed in our inter-American system.

Last year, on December 13, the new charter of the Organization came into effect. This was a forward step in the long history of this Organiza-

tion. From now on, by virtue of its new charter, the Organization will have an even better opportunity to continue its important work of furthering the cooperation of our respective countries.

That cooperation was high-lighted about a year ago when this Government had the honor to act as host to the fourth meeting of Foreign Ministers. At that time, the Foreign Ministers gave careful consideration to the common problems facing our hemisphere by reason of the aggressive policy of international communism. Acting in accordance with the finest inter-American traditions, they worked out a common set of policies regarding our regional action in regard to that danger.

Our governments emphasized at that time our determination to uphold our common objective of achieving a peaceful and cooperative world order. We expressed our firm resolve to strengthen our defenses only in order that our countries might continue to live in peace and devote themselves to promoting the cultural and economic welfare of their peoples. Our policy continues to be guided by that purpose today.

The Organization of American States is tangible evidence of our belief that cooperative effort among nations is essential to prevent aggression, to eliminate want, and to increase human liberty and happiness. In the achievement of these aims, the principles of mutual respect, of solidarity, and of belief in the dignity of man, upon which our inter-American system rests, are of profound importance. They express the essence of our common faith and form the basis of our common purpose.

This anniversary should be a day of rededication to the great spiritual values of our common heritage.

In that spirit, I extend my best wishes to each of you and through you to the Organization of American States and to the peoples which it serves.

Fellowships Available for Study In Latin America

[Released to the press April 17]

A few fellowships for study in Latin America are still available under the U.S. Government's educational exchange program for the current year, the Department of State announced on April 17. Offered under terms of the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations, which provides for an annual exchange of students between the United States and each of the signatory republics, the fellowships are tenable in Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.

¹ BULLETIN of Mar. 17, 1952, p. 427, and Mar. 24, 1952, p. 452.

² *Ibid.*, Apr. 7, 1952, p. 531.

³ *Ibid.*, Mar. 24, 1952, p. 447.

⁴ Made at Washington, on the occasion of receiving members of the Council of the OAS on Pan American Day (Apr. 14), 62d anniversary of the founding of the Pan American Union, keystone of the OAS.

Completed application forms must be returned to the International Educational Programs Branch, U.S. Office of Education, Federal Security Agency, Washington, before May 20. The Advisory Committee on Exchange of Students will nominate a panel of five candidates to be submitted to each of the four countries concerned. Final selection of two persons to study in each country will be made by the government of the respective country. Application forms and further information regarding these fellowships may be obtained from the Office of Education.

Under this program the U.S. Government provides transportation to and from the receiving country, and the host country pays tuition, a monthly maintenance allowance, and in some cases a small allowance for books and incidental expenses. It will probably be necessary for the stu-

dent to supplement his maintenance allowance from other sources to meet cost-of-living expenses.

Applicants should have the following general qualifications: U.S. citizenship; a bachelor's degree or its equivalent at the time of acceptance of the grant; sufficient knowledge of Spanish to carry on the proposed study; and a good academic or professional record. Since appropriate university study facilities are not available in all the countries, candidates must be capable of carrying on independent research. They are therefore required to present a suitable plan of study or a research topic approved by their adviser or supervising professor, if enrolled in an educational institution, or by the Office of Education, if not so enrolled. All other considerations being equal, persons under 35 years of age and veterans are given preference.

Mutual Security Requires Mutual Understanding

by Wilson Compton

Administrator, International Information Administration¹

The U. S. International Information Administration is important. Its commission comes from Congress. Its operating tools include press and publications services, radio—that is the Voice of America—motion pictures, overseas information centers, and the interchange of persons.

The International Information Administration deals with ideas. It does not deal with bullets, though there is a very specific relationship between ideas and bullets. It is my belief—and history supports me in this—that ideas can be more powerful than guns. It is my belief that the successful operation of the International Information Program can mean the difference between global peace and global war. It is my belief that our security rests in large part upon our ability to promote an honest understanding of America and America's aims as well as to counter the lies and the half-truths which the Communists are telling about us.

Today's world is a dangerous world. The freedoms which we cherish can no longer be taken for granted. The menace of aggressive international communism confronts many free nations

to whose security our own is very directly related; and it confronts us. We are concerned for our national security today, and we are doing something about it. We are concerned also about our security tomorrow and we should be doing something about that, too.

That, my friends, is why I want to talk to you about America's foreign policy and about the role of the International Information and Exchange of Persons Program in helping to make that policy effective.

Our Foreign Policy Defined

What is America's foreign policy? When I came to the Department of State some weeks ago I asked the same question. I was given a pamphlet of about 75 pages entitled "Our Foreign Policy."² That pamphlet made interesting reading. And it is available to anyone who wants it.

I was told also that if I wanted a more extensive definition I could get it in about an 8-foot shelf of documents; or if I wanted it in complete historical perspective from the beginning of the Republic, I could find it on a whole wall of the library.

¹ Excerpts from an address made before the Southern Pine Association at New Orleans, La., on Apr. 7 and released to the press on the same date.

² For excerpts from this pamphlet (Department of State publication 4466), see BULLETIN of Mar. 24, 1952, p. 478.

Since then I have seen our foreign policy stated in 10 short paragraphs on a single typewritten page. But I like an even shorter—if unofficial—definition:

“Our foreign policy is the average reaction to international affairs of the ordinary decent American citizen, conscious and reasonably well informed of our relations with other nations, who wants first, to have his own chance in life; second, to assure at least as good a chance in life for his children; third, to wear his own collar; fourth, to live in peace; fifth, to be a good neighbor.”

Now, this statement of foreign policy has little to do either with an 8-foot shelf of documents or with official “gobbledegook.” And to the extent that it implies that the U.S. Government stands around waiting for something to happen on the international scene before taking concrete action, it is certainly not realistic.

But it does give us an excellent point of departure. By and large, it is consistent with the basic objective of a sound democratic foreign policy as the Department of State sees it. That objective is to preserve the security of the Nation while helping to create a decent world environment.

Simple? Perhaps. But sometimes—and much to our regret—the seemingly simple things prove to be the most difficult. But the difficulty is not so much in determining the policy itself as in choosing or deciding the specific means of carrying it out. That is where we often get into controversy. In foreign affairs as in domestic affairs, every American has his own opinion. As I have said, “He wants to wear his own collar.”

Basic Premises

Now, I do not want to assail you with a long dissertation on foreign policy. I do want to spend some time talking about the U.S. International Information Administration. But I do think that we ought to examine some of the basic premises upon which America’s foreign policy rests.

One major premise is that our freedom and our security are directly linked to the freedom and security of the entire free world. The Mutual Security Program, under which we are cooperating with our friends in building the defensive strength necessary to deter aggression, is based on this assumption.

The truth is that America cannot go it alone in this kind of world. I am equally certain that we do not want to. I hope that we shall not be penny-wise and pound-foolish. If we are, we will pay the consequences or, if we do not, our children will.

A second premise of America’s foreign policy is that it seeks a just peace. Let me repeat that phrase: “a just peace.”

It is certain that we cannot have security for ourselves if we do not have a just and stable peace.

It is equally certain that we cannot have security with a synthetic peace manufactured in and dictated from the Kremlin. Peace without justice is not peace.

The President made that point in a recent statement from which I quote:

... we must build peace in the world: not peace at any price, but a peace in which the peoples of all countries—big and little alike—can live free from the fear of aggression.³

A third premise of our foreign policy is that America’s security is directly affected by the social and economic condition of the other free peoples. I am thinking here of the living standards of the hundreds of millions of people living in the underdeveloped areas.

America will not have genuine security without a stable peace. We will not have a stable peace so long as hunger, illiteracy, and disease are rampant among millions of people who know that there is a better way to live and are determined to seek it.

Communism feeds on economic discontent and social upheaval. Communism holds out the hope—false though it be—of a better world. And though the Communists’ promises are one thing and their actions quite another, we dare not assume that they are not getting results. For the hungry, the sick, and the unlettered, the picture the Communists paint is much like the straw for which the drowning man grasps.

If we Americans wish to preserve and strengthen our own freedom, we must encourage and help the rest of the free world to do likewise. It is a tragic fact—but a fact, nevertheless—that hungry people are as much concerned with bread as they are with freedom. And communism pretends to offer bread.

This is where our Point Four Program of technical cooperation with the people of underdeveloped areas comes in. Point Four marks America’s awareness of how our own security is related to the standard of living of other peoples.

It is designed to help the peoples of underdeveloped areas to help themselves. It is designed to raise their standards of living by helping them to develop a technological understanding of their own. Point Four symbolizes the helping hand of Christian doctrine even as it is a positive force against the inroads of communism. It is one of our greatest investments in peace, and one of the least expensive.

A fourth premise of American foreign policy, the last I am going to discuss, is that we must take *positive action* to promote both economic stability and military strength among our free neighbors. The North Atlantic Pact, the job which General Eisenhower is doing to build an effective European defense force, the Marshall Plan, the economic and military provisions of the Mutual Security Program—all of these things

³ See *ibid.*

have been and are a part of the building of a free-world bastion strong enough to deter aggression or, if necessary, to defeat it.

America cannot go it alone in today's world. We are big, but we are not that big. We are a wealthy Nation, but not that wealthy. We need friends. But we need solvent friends; and we need to stay solvent ourselves.

The aid we are giving Europe is not charity. It is an investment in free-world stability and in our own security. We are not committed to support foreign economies indefinitely and we should not be. We are committed to helping these economies to become self-supporting.

But we should not make the mistake of thinking of economic and military aid as distinct and separate. They are anything but that. A nation's military potential is—and always has been—directly related to its economic potential. We should not shut our eyes to this fact.

An Instrument of Foreign Policy

Now let me talk about the International Information Administration as an instrument of American foreign policy.

Recently, Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, made a significant statement about the International Information Program in his testimony before Congress. The general, like most top military men, is concerned primarily with our military defenses.

This is what the general said about the relationship between American security and our overseas information program:

We must go all out in the battle of ideas. Only thus can we hope to convince potential aggressors that another war cannot pay.

I am convinced that failure to carry on a vigorous offensive in the field of ideas would be to invite calamity. Let us make no mistake—we are not going to get into a propaganda war. We are already in it and we had better stay in it, if we want what we need, namely, allies who understand us, respect us and have faith in us.

But there is a vast distinction between what we are seeking to do in the international information field and what the Soviets are doing. The Iron Curtain countries have geared their propaganda to the "Big Lie," an inhuman mixture of deceptions, half-truths and no truths at all. The present Soviet charge that we have been using bacteriological warfare in Korea is typical. It is a complete fabrication from start to finish.

Now, it takes a lot of money to sustain a worldwide "Big Lie" campaign. The Soviet Union and its satellites are now spending more than 1 billion, 400 million dollars.

We have geared our program to the "Big Truth." That costs much less than the "Big Lie." During the current fiscal year, we have for the

"Big Truth" campaign overseas an appropriation of 85 million dollars. For the next fiscal year, the President has asked 133 million dollars for these purposes. Last week, the House Appropriations Committee recommended 111 million dollars to the House as a whole for conducting the information and educational exchange program.

Whatever Congress' final decision, we will get along. I am more interested in our doing a good job with whatever funds Congress decides to make available than in complaining because it did not appropriate more.

Our Campaign of Truth is the road to victory in the battle of ideas. This is not only a moral evaluation, important as that may be. It is a conclusion based upon hard facts.

Consider, if you will, what we are doing with the written word. We are reaching a large foreign reading audience.

Our press materials, for example, daily go to an estimated 10,000 foreign newspapers with a readership of more than 100 million. For the most part, these materials are distributed through our information centers overseas to the newspapers and other publications in their areas.

As for magazines, pamphlets, and other publications, plans call for production of more than 91 million copies during the current fiscal year. Inasmuch as an average of five or more people read a single copy, these publications have a minimum audience of nearly one-half billion people.

And that is quite an audience.

I might say, also, that these publications are printed in about 60 different languages. One publication, for example, has been reproduced in 26 languages.

You will be interested to hear that the paper which goes into our press releases and publications is purchased almost exclusively in this country. During the current fiscal year, we will be buying some 7,000 tons of newsprint and more than 2,000 tons of book and other paper stocks.

Motion pictures, which we are producing in 40 different languages, have proved particularly effective in telling America's story abroad. Last year, our films told that story to more than 500 million people in 86 countries. This year, the number who will view the films is expected to be even greater.

Another vitally important phase of America's Campaign of Truth is the exchange of persons program. In the past year, nearly 8,000 students, teachers, professors, and leaders came to this country from abroad or went overseas on U.S. Government-sponsored grants. But many more thousands traveled the two-way street of understanding as the guests of private individuals and agencies. Right now, for example, there are more than 30,000 foreign students studying on about 1,400 American campuses. Less than 10 percent of these students are supported by U.S. Government funds.

At present, we are putting strong emphasis on the exchange of leaders—journalists, labor leaders, government officials—people who are opinion-moulders and can exert influence in their home countries. These are people who have learned the truth about America first-hand and can spread the truth among their own peoples when they return.

In addition to publications, motion pictures, and the exchange-of-persons program, we are operating a vast chain of overseas information centers which greatly assist the other programs I have just described. At the present time we have 165 overseas information centers located in 59 countries and 34 binational centers in 22 countries. These centers provide not only a place for distributing materials, but provide local citizens with a variety of services. They contain well-stocked libraries and are the meeting place for lectures, discussions, concerts, and motion-picture showings.

Communist Reaction to VOA

Perhaps the best evidence of the effectiveness of these programs is the reaction of the Communists themselves to what we are doing.

Take radio—the Voice of America.

We know that the Soviet Union *alone* is spending over a billion dollars a year on its propaganda activities. Much of that is being spent to keep our information materials and the Voice of America from penetrating the Iron Curtain.

The Soviets are spending almost as much on jamming our radio broadcasts to Russia as we are spending on our entire world-wide radio program—a program in which we are now broadcasting in 46 languages. The total Soviet expenditure on propaganda activities is more than 10 times as great as the amount we are spending on our international information activities. These are not merely educated guesses. These are estimates taken from the Soviet Union's own published reports.

The psychotic Communist fear of the facts and of America's Campaign of Truth is also evidenced by the methods the Communist governments use to keep their people from listening to our broadcasts and from reading our information materials.

Severe penalties are imposed on people in the Soviet Union and in the satellite areas who are caught repeating what they have heard over the Voice of America. In many areas, owners of radio sets are under surveillance. Electric current has been turned off in rural areas during peak Voice of America broadcast hours.

The Communist press maintains a constant barrage of criticism of our information program. It constantly seeks to discredit our reliability.

Communist government leaders, such as Premier Gottwald of Czechoslovakia, have publicly

stated that our information campaign is hitting them where it hurts. They have warned fellow Communists that everything possible must be done to “stamp out” listening to the “criminal” Voice of America. The Soviet Union has nearly 1,000 radio stations doing almost nothing else but trying to jam our broadcasts. The Communists have gone to great lengths to keep the Voice of America from penetrating the Iron Curtain. But they will not succeed.

We are getting through the Iron Curtain. In some of the satellite areas our listening audience is as much as 80 percent of those who have radio receivers. In some areas in the Soviet Union, 75 percent of our broadcasts get through the jamming screen. In Moscow and Leningrad—where the jamming is particularly intense—our penetration average is about 25 percent.

We are now broadcasting around the clock to the Iron Curtain countries in their own languages. If we don't get through one time, we do another.

Recently, as you may know, we commissioned a novel floating radio transmitter. It is mounted on a ship and is operated for us by the Coast Guard. It carries powerful short-wave transmitters and one 150,000-watt medium-wave transmitter which is three times as powerful as the most powerful transmitter in operation in the United States today. We are also building seven broadcasting stations with many new electronic features. Each of these seven stations will have a signal power of a million watts—20 times as great as that of the most powerful commercial stations known to be operating anywhere in the world today. Two of these transmitters will be operated in the United States, one in North Carolina, and one in the State of Washington. The other five are at strategic points overseas.

We have asked Congress for authority to construct additional installations of the same power. We have also asked for two more floating transmitters, each with a power of 500,000 watts or 10 times that of our most powerful domestic stations. The House Appropriations Committee has recommended a substantial amount for these purposes. What Congress will do, of course, remains to be seen.

I mention these facts to show the extent to which the Voice of America is now penetrating the Iron Curtain, the provisions under way and in prospect for increasing that penetration and overcoming Communist jamming techniques. If within a few years we are able to complete these powerful radio broadcasting and relay installations, we will be able to reach over 98 percent of the world's population with the Voice of America. Meantime, we hope to keep on improving the message of hope, friendship, and helpfulness with which we shall continue to seek the understanding, respect, and confidence of all peoples.

America's security is intertwined with the security of the whole free world. We need our friends even as they need us. The free peoples can effectively deter or defeat aggression only if we maintain our strength, our stability, and our unity of purpose.

America has been generous with her assistance to other peoples. We are generally respected among the other free nations, even admired, and considerably envied. But we are by no means universally trusted. Many people—even among the nations which are our staunch allies—are inclined to question our motives. Too many people have a distorted picture of our American democracy—an impression which is being energetically promoted by Moscow. This is one of the most formidable aspects of the so-called Cold War in which we are now engaged.

It is important that we do not shut our eyes to this fact. Russia is not winning the Cold War. But Russia could win it if we fail to meet our responsibilities in the informational arena.

We have made and are continuing to make positive gains. We can make even greater gains with your help—with the help of the American people. I have said that the business which has brought me here is your business just as much as it is my business. It is the business of every American.

We are taxing ourselves and spending huge amounts now for a very simple purpose: We do not want a third world war. A third world war is not necessary. It is not inevitable. It is less likely to happen if we are strong.

But we can never win a peace with armaments alone. Ideas and attitudes are equally important. The battle for men's minds cannot be neglected. In the long run, success in this battle may well prevent one of bullets and bombs on the global scale.

And that brings me to the question of America's long-run economic stability.

When I was a young fellow I studied economics. I have never ceased to study it, and I marvel at some of the odd economic adventures which we undertake. But it does not take a great economist to know that what we borrow we pay for; that what someone borrows, someone else lends, that there is no mysterious way in which liabilities become assets. The economics which I learned says that this applies to governments too.

We are today investing heavily in the means of war because we must. We are investing at the

same time in the means of peace. That is the kind of investment for which I speak to you today. An investment in the minds of men everywhere—an investment that will build understanding, respect and trust for America. If we do not learn to make an investment in ideas, no amount invested in guns and tanks and bombs will bring peace to us or to our grandchildren.

The kind of peace we seek must—first and foremost—be based upon the unity of all the free peoples. That unity cannot be preserved by wishful thinking or by shirking, avoiding, or ignoring the issues which constantly arise. We Americans must learn to understand and respect other peoples. We must help them to understand us. We must learn to see and respect the values in their customs and cultures as well as our own; and we must see that they have an understanding of our American way of life.

The free world's moral strength lies in mutual understanding; and if the free world does not have moral strength it is not strong, however large its armies and however vast its armaments. Let us make no mistake about that. We cannot have mutual security without mutual understanding; and we cannot have mutual understanding if we do not work at it.

We are working at it through the U.S. International Information Program for which I speak. That is the reason I say that this program may in the long run play a key role in determining whether we are to have peace or war.

As a patriotic organization representing an important group of American taxpayers, the Southern Pine Association is, of course, interested in keeping governmental expenditures to a minimum level consistent with national security.

To the extent that our efforts in the "war of ideas" strengthen the free world and weaken the threat of Communist aggression, to that extent will American taxpayers benefit. To the extent that we can add to the solidarity and the mutual confidence of the free peoples, to that extent will we Americans have greater security.

This is not far-fetched. It is simple arithmetic. Nearly three-fourths of our governmental expenditures today is related to national defense and national security.

To skimp on the provisions necessary for our national security while the present dangerous situation exists, would be foolhardy. But to look ahead to a time when such great expenditures for these purposes may not be necessary is good economics and plain common sense.

Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly

SUMMARY OF MAJOR ACTION: PART II

by Paul B. Taylor

Economic Questions

A large share of the work of the Second and Third Committees, dealing with economic, social, and humanitarian questions, consists in the consideration of the relevant sections of the report of the Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc); they do, however, handle some matters directly without prior Council consideration. Most of the problems are subjects of continuing study from year to year, in the developing work of the United Nations in this field.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The Second (Economic) Committee considered the general problem of economic development which has attracted growing attention in United Nations economic discussions in recent years. The key problem was that of financing economic development. As at the preceding session, many underdeveloped countries urged that additional facilities for international financing of economic development be created and that an international fund be established by the United Nations to give grants in aid for non-self-liquidating projects. A resolution proposed by Chile, Cuba, Burma, Egypt, and Yugoslavia was adopted by the General Assembly on January 12 by 30 votes to 16 with 11 abstentions. The resolution requested Ecosoc to submit to the next Assembly session detailed plans for establishing a special fund for grants and long-term low-interest loans to underdeveloped countries. The United States opposed

this resolution, mainly on the ground that no developed country is in a position now to contribute to a fund of this nature and that the adoption of a resolution calling for a fund, or for studies leading to the creation of such a fund, would give rise to expectations which could not be fulfilled. On the subject of economic development the Assembly also adopted a resolution asking Ecosoc, in continuing its studies, to pay particular attention to the financing of non-self-liquidating projects through existing institutions.

LAND REFORM

The problem of land reform, which Secretary Acheson raised in a speech before the fifth session of the General Assembly and on which the Assembly, Ecosoc, FAO, and other specialized agencies had worked during the past year, came up for discussion. The Assembly adopted a resolution sponsored by the United States and representative countries from all the other regions of the world, that approved the comprehensive resolution on this subject adopted by Ecosoc at its thirteenth session¹⁵ and made additional recommendations to governments.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

On the subject of technical assistance, the main resolution,¹⁶ introduced by the United States, approved the work which Ecosoc had done in this field, provided for the pledging of contributions

EDITOR'S NOTE: Part I of this article appeared in the BULLETIN of April 21, 1952, page 632.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1951, p. 473.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Dec. 17, 1951, p. 995.

for 1952, called for cooperation by private and nonprofit organizations, and recommended the strengthening of internal machinery within the governments of underdeveloped countries for planning programs.

A resolution relating to emergency international action in the event of famine was introduced by the United States. It requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with appropriate specialized agencies, to recommend procedures for effective concerted action in the event of famine caused by national disasters. It also gave the Secretary-General the authority to draw upon the resources not only of governments but also of private, voluntary organizations.

Social and Humanitarian Questions

REFUGEE PROBLEM

At the sixth session, the Assembly further considered the international refugee problem. It adopted resolutions that asked the governments to cooperate with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, authorized the High Commissioner to issue an appeal for funds for emergency aid to the most needy group of refugees within his mandate, and recommended continuing efforts by all states and agencies concerned to give special attention to the refugee problem in connection with programs of economic reconstruction and development and with migration projects.

CHILDREN'S FUND

The Assembly continued its support for the U.N. International Children's Emergency Fund. It appealed to governments and private persons to continue to contribute to the fund during 1952. The United States has always been by far the largest contributor to the refugee and the UNICEF programs. However, the U.S. delegation abstained from voting on the resolutions relating to contributions to these two programs on the ground that it was not in a position to give assurance that the United States would make an additional governmental contribution to these programs.

HUMAN RIGHTS

The major part of the discussions in the Social and Humanitarian Committee related to the drafting of covenants on human rights. Consideration of the difficult problems involved in the preparation of such instruments has taken place in previous sessions of the Assembly, in the Commission on Human Rights, and in Ecosoc in past years. In the recent session of the Assembly, as in previous discussions, the United States made clear its readiness to participate in the effort to draft acceptable covenants on this problem for later consideration and possible ratification by member states. The Assembly discussions related

to a number of general directives which member states wished the Assembly to lay down for the guidance of the Human Rights Commission in its further efforts to draft the necessary legal instrument. One important resolution provided that separate covenants should be drawn up at the same time, one to contain civil and political rights, and the other to contain economic, social, and cultural rights. The United States supported this action on the grounds that problems of drawing up and applying treaty provisions in these two fields are quite distinct and that to treat them together would make the entire process more complex and difficult.¹⁷

Ten resolutions provided directives to the Human Rights Commission in the further elaboration of this subject. The Social and Humanitarian Committee as well as other committees discussed the principle of self-determination. A number of delegations strongly advocated that provisions on this subject be included in the human rights covenants. The U.S. delegation supported the inclusion of appropriate provisions on this subject in the covenants. The resolution as drafted, however, was unsatisfactory to the United States, mainly because it dictated to the Human Rights Commission the precise language which was to be included. The U.S. delegation accordingly opposed the resolution which was adopted on this subject.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

In the field of freedom of information, the Assembly postponed action on the two conventions proposed in this field, as well as on the other aspects of the subject. A significant debate took place on the violations of freedom of information committed by Czechoslovakia in the trial and imprisonment of William Oatis. Channing H. Tobias of the American delegation, as well as a number of other delegates, delivered powerful indictments of the unjustified actions of the Czechoslovak Government in this case.

Problems of Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories

The work of the Trusteeship Council in relation to the trusteeship system takes place under the authority of the General Assembly, and a large share of the work of the Assembly's Trusteeship Committee consists of the detailed consideration of the Council's annual report. In addition, by the provisions of chapter XI of the Charter, those states administering non-self-governing territories not under international trusteeship submit information on economic, social, and educational conditions in these territories to the Secretary-General. In a sense, therefore, a large share of the work of

¹⁷ For a statement by Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt on this subject, see *ibid.*, Dec. 31, 1951, p. 1059.

the Trusteeship Committee consists of a careful review of the information submitted to it concerning the operation of the trusteeship system and the pertinent developments in non-self-governing territories reported to it by the responsible powers.

Of the 60 members of the Committee, 8 are states which administer non-self-governing territories; the remaining 52 have no such responsibilities. Since the inception of the Committee, certain members of the administering group have tended increasingly to differ with certain nonadministering members in their approach to questions considered by the Committee. These differences became somewhat more pronounced at the sixth session of the General Assembly. The United States at this session continued to pursue moderate policies and to attempt to obtain the largest possible measure of agreement with respect to such policies.

Most of the resolutions adopted by the Assembly on the basis of reports from the Trusteeship Committee related to the working of the trusteeship system and the treatment of information furnished on non-self-governing territories under article 73 (e) of the Charter. Among the more controversial proposals adopted by the Assembly were resolutions providing for the participation of indigenous inhabitants of trust territories in the work of the Trusteeship Council; inviting administering authorities to specify a period of time in which it is expected that trust territories shall be given self-government or independence; setting up a special committee to consider administrative unions affecting trust territories; and providing for participation in the Special Committee on Information from non-self-governing territories. With a few exceptions, the United States voted for all of the resolutions approved by the Assembly in this field.

The efforts of the United Nations to find a solution to the perplexing problem of South-West Africa, formerly a mandate under League of Nations supervision, continued to be a controversial issue. When the Trusteeship Committee decided to grant a hearing to certain South-West African chiefs or their spokesmen, the South African delegation withdrew from the Committee, contending that its action was illegal. The Assembly adopted two additional resolutions on the substance of the problem. The most important of these urged the Union of South Africa to resume negotiations with the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South-West Africa for the purpose of concluding an agreement providing for the full implementation of the 1950 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which had held that the Union of South Africa continued to have the international obligations stated in article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the mandate for South-West Africa. The resolution also authorized the *Ad Hoc* Committee to examine reports on the administration of the territory of South-West Africa

as well as petitions relating to the territory. In a second resolution, the General Assembly reasserted the opinion that the normal way of modifying the international status of South-West Africa would be to place it under the international trusteeship system by means of a trusteeship agreement.

Budgetary and Administrative Questions

The Assembly took a number of important decisions in the administrative and budgetary field. By a vote of 47 to 5, it set the 1952 budget for the United Nations at \$48,096,780. Although the United States, in line with our objective of economical operations without curtailment of essential U.N. functions, had unsuccessfully opposed in the Administrative and Budgetary Committee certain increases, it voted in favor of the final budget. The opposing votes were cast by the Soviet-bloc states on the ground that the budget was unduly inflated, particularly since it authorized expenditure of funds to implement a number of political decisions opposed by the Soviet Union. The Assembly adopted, by 46 votes (U.S.) to none with 4 abstentions, permanent staff regulations to replace the provisional regulations drawn up in 1946. These regulations set forth the policies governing the relationship between the Secretary-General and his staff. The Assembly also established a Negotiating Committee to solicit funds from U.N. members and nonmember governments to finance certain operational programs of the United Nations which are not provided for in the regular budget. These programs include the technical-assistance program, the Korean Relief and Reconstruction Agency, and the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

One of the most important financial problems, from the point of view of the United States, was the question of the establishment of the scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations among member governments. The United States has maintained since the First General Assembly that no one member state should contribute more than one-third of the ordinary U.N. expenses for any one year. In 1948 the Assembly endorsed this principle, and the U.S. contribution, originally set in 1946 at 39.89 percent, has gradually been reduced. The Committee on Contributions recommended to the sixth session that the U.S. contribution for 1952 be set at 36.90 percent, a reduction of 2.02 percent from the 1951 assessment. This recommendation was based on the fact that, in considering the rate of progress which should be followed in achieving the ultimate objective of eliminating maladjustments, the Committee agreed that for 1952 the scale should reduce existing maladjustments by one-third.

The U.S. delegation vigorously maintained that

the United States contribution should immediately be reduced to 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ percent, in accordance with the principle established by the Assembly in 1948. Since the acceptance of the United States position would have meant fairly substantial increases in the contributions of other states this year, a majority of delegations, although recognizing the long-term merits of the United States claim, were firmly opposed to the United States position. The majority considered that the policy adopted by the Contributions Committee would lead to a reduction of the United States contribution to one-third over a 3-year period, and this was the maximum concession they could make. Only two states voted in favor of the United States position, 29 voted against, and 20 abstained. The United States then abstained in the vote on the resolution finally adopted by the Assembly which set the United States contribution to 36.90 percent. Under section 602 of Public Law 188 (82d Congress, 2d session), the United States was prohibited from making a commitment requiring an appropriation of funds for a contribution by the United States in excess of 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ percent without prior consultation with the Appropriations Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives.

Legal Questions

The Sixth (Legal) Committee considered, among other subjects, the procedure to be followed by the United Nations concerning the making of reservations to multilateral conventions, the improvement of the Assembly's methods and procedures for dealing with legal and drafting questions, and the definition of aggression. The International Law Commission had considered the definition of aggression, but was unable to agree on specific recommendations. The United States strongly maintained that it was impossible to draw up a complete list of acts of aggression which would include all conceivable situations, that omissions in the definition would encourage an aggressor, and that the organs of the United Nations should pass on the aggressive nature of each case submitted to them. The General Assembly adopted a procedural resolution simply providing for inclusion of the question of the definition of aggression in the agenda of its next session. The United States voted against this resolution because of two paragraphs that somewhat prejudiced the question of whether aggression should be defined.

Conclusions

In attempting to appraise any single session of the General Assembly, one should remember that the functions of the General Assembly are not those of an *ad hoc* conference called at a chosen time to deal with a particular matter. They are,

rather, functions which need to be performed regularly each year: political action on matters placed on the agenda, reviewing the United Nations work as a whole, keeping the machinery in motion by making necessary financial appropriations and holding necessary elections, and providing a forum in which any state may say whatever it wishes about international affairs in general. The Charter provided for this procedure on the theory that the annual review of the work of the United Nations and of international events generally is in itself useful to the international community. Beyond that, the significance of the acts or debates of any session will obviously depend upon the circumstances existing in international affairs at the time and, in addition, on the effectiveness of the between-session work of the councils and other bodies which come up for a final stamp of approval by the General Assembly. Moreover, many of the most important projects of the General Assembly are cumulative in nature, extending over several years. Thus, the final emergence of a united and independent Libya, which received the blessing of the Assembly at this session, is in large part the result of actions taken by the Assembly as far back as 1949.

In our view, the essential political task of the General Assembly at this session was the implementation and further development of the major United Nations and free-world programs, initiated in previous years, for the maintenance and strengthening of peace and security. The broad question which was constantly before the Assembly in many forms was whether nations would move forward in realizing this program or would be induced by the U.S.S.R. to slacken their efforts and accept Soviet substitutes for the program. The Assembly decisively rejected as substitutes for security the Soviet proposals for paper "disarmament," a Five Power pact, condemnation of U.S. military assistance to other countries, and condemnation of NATO. Had a Korean armistice been achieved, the Korean problem would have been one of the outstanding items of the session. However, since the negotiations at Panmunjom continued throughout the entire session, the Assembly steadily refused to embark on any discussions of the problem in order not to jeopardize these negotiations in any way; naturally, too, it refused to accept the proffered Soviet substitutes for the U.N. program in Korea.

In the notable disarmament resolution, the Assembly advanced the over-all U.N. program one important step. The votes on these major East-West issues were large; usually only the Soviet bloc voted in the negative. However, the interplay of other issues, notably those affecting the Near and Middle Eastern countries, led to an increased number of abstentions.

Problems of the Near and Middle East received special attention throughout the session, and the member states of those areas tended to work to-

gether, in an Arab-Asian bloc, in order to make their points of view prevail.

The Assembly did useful work in the economic, social, trusteeship, budgetary, and legal fields. In each of these fields, as well as the political field, neither the United States nor any other member always had its way.

Although the sixth session was actually slightly shorter than average sessions of the Assembly, the members generally felt that new efforts should be made to shorten future sessions substantially. A Norwegian proposal on this subject, submitted during the last few days, could not be acted upon. However, the Secretary-General will study the problem in consultation with permanent U.N. delegations and member governments.

•*Mr. Taylor, author of the above article, is officer in charge of General Assembly Affairs for the Bureau of United Nations Affairs. He served as principal executive officer of the U.S. delegation to the Sixth General Assembly.*

Collective Security To Preserve the Peace

*Statement by Harding F. Bancroft
Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

My Government believes that the task before the Committee this year is to carry forward the momentum started in the Uniting for Peace resolution;² to strengthen the United Nations in the field of collective security. As Secretary of State Acheson said in 1950, when the Uniting for Peace resolution was introduced, "The United Nations must move forward energetically to develop a more adequate system of collective security. If it does not move forward, it will move back."³ This year, as in the years to come, we should continue to move forward. The world waits to see whether we can build on the start we have made.

The report of the Collective Measures Committee last year and the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on January 12⁴ provide guideposts for our work.

First, my Government suggests that we examine the report and fill in the gaps that necessarily remain because of the short period we had at our disposal last year. The filling of these gaps in

the field of collective economic measures as well as of military measures can help to insure that United Nations collective action will be timely and effective in case of need. The Secretariat, with its usual competence, has given us a working paper⁵ which is most helpful in pointing out the topics in last year's report which require further attention. We believe that the idea of a U.N. legion in particular is a subject well worth exploration. We think that a realistic evaluation of its possibilities should be made this year by the Collective Measures Committee.

I feel sure that members of this Committee, as well as the Secretary-General, will have other ideas which can be fruitfully considered so that we can build on the foundations already laid down. It would be well to invite suggestions from other states, not represented on this Committee, on matters to which attention should be given. Such suggestions might cover either proposals for more detailed treatment of subjects touched upon in our first report or proposals for study of other subjects within the general area of our work. In addition, the Committee should continue its analysis of the U.N. action in Korea since our last report, so that the advance planning which the United Nations can do will have the full benefit of that experience.

Second, both the report and the resolution of the General Assembly stress the need for member states to take preparatory action so that they will have the capability in immediate readiness to contribute armed forces and other assistance and facilities in support of U.N. collective action. This ability and readiness the General Assembly recognized in its resolution are "essential to an effective security system." The Committee should therefore consider what it can do to promote and facilitate national action on the part of member states in the four general areas in which the General Assembly has recommended preparatory action. These are—

(1) that states take further action to maintain forces so trained, organized, and equipped that they could promptly be made available for service as U.N. units in accordance with constitutional procedures;

(2) that states prepare themselves so as to be able to provide assistance and facilities to U.N. forces engaged in collective measures;

(3) that states determine in the light of their existing legislation the appropriate steps for carrying out promptly and effectively U.N. collective measures of all sorts;

(4) that states continue the survey of their resources in order to ascertain the nature and scope of the assistance which can be rendered in support of U.N. action.

In the view of my delegation, the Collective

¹ Made in the Collective Measures Committee on Apr. 15 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

² BULLETIN of Nov. 20, 1950, p. 823.

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 2, 1950, p. 523.

⁴ For an article by Joseph J. Sisco on the Collective Measures Committee's report, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1951, p. 771; for text of General Assembly resolution see United Nations, *Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during 6th Session*, 6 Nov. 1951–5 Feb. 1952, p. 2.

⁵ No. 2/52 dated Apr. 7, 1952.

Measures Committee can be helpful to member states in carrying out these recommendations of the General Assembly. The need for coordinated preparation has been demonstrated. Our work can show how individual states can prepare themselves most effectively to unite their strength with other members of the United Nations in the common objective of keeping the peace. Member states have already recognized the need for further preparatory steps by their support of the Uniting for Peace resolution and of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly this year. The Committee can build upon this willingness to take such action by suggesting further practical steps.

Another important question for us to consider is the nature of the machinery that the United Nations should have for the future in order to continue its progressive development as a collective-security organization. During this second year of our work we should be able to foresee with greater clarity the longer term needs of the United Nations in this field. While all of us recognize that our basic objectives cannot be accomplished in a short time, and that greatest progress may be achieved only in graduated steps, we can provide that machinery for the United Nations which will

insure that its development, though gradual, will be steady and certain.

The work of this Committee has the realistic objective of organizing our collective strength to preserve the peace and to insure that neither this strength nor the power of individual states will be used save in the common interest. Our efforts are based on the proposition that the more effectively the members of the United Nations are organized to unite their strength to maintain peace, the less likely it is that world peace will be challenged.

This work in no sense detracts from the fundamental importance of pacific settlement. A system of collective security is more than the organization of collective strength. It includes also the development of procedures for negotiation and other methods of peaceful adjustment, under principles of justice and international law. The greater progress that we can make in this Committee the greater will be the opportunity for the processes of pacific settlement to ease the political tensions in the world. It should be our resolve to make the United Nations work *in all its aspects* in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

The Tunisian Question in the Security Council

On April 2, 11 delegations to the Security Council from African and Asian states addressed similar letters to the President of the Council drawing attention to "the present grave situation in Tunisia" and requesting that the Council call a meeting for consideration of the matter. The Council held its first meeting on the Tunisian question on April 4; a second meeting was held on April 10. At the third and final meeting on April 14 on this question, the Council rejected inclusion of the item in its agenda by a vote of 5 in favor (Brazil, Chile, China, Pakistan, U.S.S.R.), 2 against (France, U.K.), and 4 abstentions (Greece, Netherlands, Turkey, U.S.).

Following are texts of statements regarding the U.S. position in the matter by Secretary Acheson and by the Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Ernest A. Gross:

PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON

[Released to the press April 16]

I think our position was stated quite clearly by Ambassador Gross, but I would be glad to state it again. I think what we have to always have in

mind is Judge Holmes' famous statement, that general principles do not decide concrete cases.

We have a duty as a member of the Security Council to exercise our best judgment as a matter of policy, as to whether taking up a given matter in the Security Council at a particular time will or will not contribute to the solution of that problem. We cannot get into an automatic position where the fact that someone has proposed a resolution automatically requires the United States to vote that the matter should be discussed at that time, when in the judgment of the U.S. Government that will not be the best way of contributing to the solution of the problem.

The problem is the problem in Tunisia. The people in Tunisia have aspirations. The French Government has stated that it is willing to go a long way toward meeting those aspirations. It seems to us that the sound way to proceed here is to give time for the French authorities and the Tunisian authorities to discuss, negotiate, and find a solution.

Now, if they can't, another situation is created.

We can always reconsider whether the time at which a matter should be discussed in the Security Council is the appropriate time. But what we are attempting to do is to exercise our best judgment

as to how to reach a sound solution in the interests of both parties to a dispute. It seems to us that our action in saying that this is not the time when we wish to vote to have that matter before the Council was the best way to contribute to the solution of it.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GROSS¹

I express the following views of my Government on this subject.

It is only natural that the States which have proposed inclusion of this item on the agenda, drawing heavily upon their own past experience, should do everything they consider helpful in encouraging the progress of other areas towards self-government.

My Government has always considered that the United Nations organ should be available for examination of any problem which causes serious friction in international relations. For this reason we have supported inscription of charges, however groundless or malicious, when made against us. At the same time, it is clear that under the Charter, the parties to a controversy are obliged to seek a solution by negotiation. As Security Council consideration should be designed to help the parties reach agreement, each member of the Security Council, which acts on behalf of all members of the United Nations, has a responsibility to ask himself whether consideration of a problem in the Council at a given moment will really help to bring the parties closer to the desired agreement.

From the information available to my Government, it would appear that the essential facts may be summed up as follows. There is a genuine and broadly shared desire on the part of the inhabitants of Tunisia for a greater voice in the government of that area. On the other hand, French authorities have recognized the validity of Tunisian demand for internal autonomy. They have proposed a plan for the people of Tunisia to progress toward that goal and it is hoped that negotiation between the French authorities and the Tunisians will soon begin.

We do not wish to pass judgment upon the most recent developments in Tunisia. The United States, however, cannot condone the use of forceful methods by either party. Force cannot possibly be an end in itself. Force and violence only serve to embitter the atmosphere and thus impair the chances of peaceful progress toward the common objective.

It is the belief of my Government that at this moment it is more useful to concentrate on the

¹ Made before the Security Council on Apr. 10 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

problem of facilitating negotiations between the French and the Tunisians than to engage in debate at this table. The overriding objective of the Security Council must be to foster agreement through negotiation between the parties themselves. The French program of reforms, in our view, appears to constitute a basis for the resumption of negotiations looking toward the establishment of home rule in Tunisia. We fervently hope that France, faithful to its tradition, will bring about farsighted and genuine reforms in Tunisia; history has taught us that in the long run the voices of those who really represent a people will be heard and will assert themselves.

The Council will note that in stressing the desirability of negotiation, I am not dealing with the question of the Council's competence to consider this matter. If this item is not included on our agenda at this time, the Council will, nevertheless, remain open to any member of the United Nations to bring the question to the Council's attention again. My Government would naturally reassess the situation if that is done.

For these reasons, Mr. President, I have been instructed to abstain on the question of including this item on our agenda at this time.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Apr. 14-19, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

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261	4/5	Compton: Information program
263	4/7	Iran: Student assistance
*276	4/14	Acheson: Greetings to Cambodia
*277	4/14	Point 4 course completed
*278	4/14	IAA and Point 4 exhibit
279	4/14	Human Rights Commission
†280	4/15	Cowen: Mutual Security Program
281	4/15	Japanese treaty ratified
282	4/15	Iran: Point 4 agreements
*283	4/16	Sargeant: Together we are strong
†284	4/16	Acheson: \$10 million aid for Korea
285	4/16	Acheson: Trade policy note to Italy
286	4/16	Exchange of notes with Italy
*287	4/16	Murphy: Ambassador to Japan
*288	4/16	Sebald: Ambassador to Burma
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290	4/16	Acheson: U.N. vote on Tunisia
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*292	4/16	Acheson: Greetings to Laos
293	4/17	Latin American fellowships
294	4/17	ILO regional conference
295	4/17	Inter-Wheat Council
†296	4/17	Colombia: Military assistance
†297	4/18	Sorenson: Point 4 director
†298	4/18	Paso: Executive meeting
299	4/19	Acheson: World security progress

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Commission on Human Rights (ECOSOC)

On April 14 the Department of State announced that Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. representative on the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, will attend the eighth session of the Commission, which will convene on that day at New York, N. Y. She will be assisted by the following advisers:

Advisers

Herzel H. E. Plaine, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, Department of Justice
James Simsarian, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
Marjorie M. Whiteman, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Ad Hoc Advisers

Harper Barnes, Assistant Solicitor, Department of Labor
Herbert W. Beaser, Office of the General Counsel, Federal Security Agency
Frieda S. Miller, Director, Women's Bureau, Department of Labor

The Commission on Human Rights, which is one of the nine permanent functional commissions of the U.N. Economic and Social Council, advises and assists the Council on all matters relating to the obligation assumed by the members of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Eighteen governments, elected by the Council, comprise the membership of the Commission. Its seventh session was held at Geneva, Switzerland, April 16–May 19, 1951.

At its eighth session the Commission will give high priority to carrying out the directives contained in resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. At its fifth regular session the General Assembly had decided that, as civic and political freedoms and economic, social, and cultural privileges were interconnected and interdependent, provisions relating to these subjects should be included in the Covenant on

Human Rights. Upon reconsidering the matter at its sixth regular session (Paris, Nov. 6, 1951–Feb. 5, 1952), the General Assembly decided that the Commission, instead of incorporating such provisions in a single instrument, should prepare two draft covenants, one relating to civil and political rights and the other relating to economic, social, and cultural rights. The Commission was directed also to incorporate in each draft covenant (1) an article concerning the right of all peoples and nations to self-determination, and (2) specific clauses relating to the admissibility and legal effect of such reservations as any country might desire to make with respect to provisions of the covenant in becoming a party thereto. In addition, the Commission was requested by the General Assembly to prepare recommendations on measures for carrying out the provisions of the two covenants after their entry into force.

Priority will also be given by the Commission to the formulation of recommendations on international respect for the self-determination of peoples, a subject which is to be considered by the General Assembly at its seventh regular session in 1952. Other items on the agenda for this session of the Commission relate to such topics as: (1) review of the work program of the Commission, and the establishment of priorities with respect to its activities; (2) definition and protection of political groups; (3) injuries suffered by groups through the total or partial destruction of their media of culture and their historical monuments; (4) development of the work of the United Nations for wider observance of, and respect for, human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world; (5) annual reports on human rights; (6) a draft declaration on the rights of the child; (7) the rights of the aged; (8) the right of asylum; (9) an international court of human rights; (10) the continuing validity of minorities treaties and declarations; and (11) the Yearbook of Human Rights.

International Wheat Council

The Department of State announced on April 17 that on that date the eighth session of the International Wheat Council would convene at London. The U.S. delegation is as follows:

Delegate

Leslie A. Wheeler, Collaborator, Office of the Secretary, Department of Agriculture

Alternate Delegate

Elmer F. Kruse, Assistant Administrator for Commodity Operations, Production and Marketing Administration, Department of Agriculture

Congressional Adviser

Walt Horan, House of Representatives

Members

Maurice M. Benidt, Chief, International Wheat Agreement Staff, Production and Marketing Administration, Department of Agriculture

Albert J. Borton, Chief, Commodity Program Division, Grain Branch, Production and Marketing Administration, Department of Agriculture

Anthony R. DeFelice, Attorney, Office of the Solicitor, Department of Agriculture

Eric Englund, Agricultural Attaché, American Embassy, London

Robert L. Gastineau, Head, Grain Division, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

L. Ingemann Highby, Chief, Food Branch, Agricultural Products Staff, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State

Earl O. Pollock, Assistant Agricultural Attaché, American Embassy, London

Roger Stewart, Chief, Grain Branch, Food and Agriculture Division, Mutual Security Agency

The International Wheat Council was established in 1949 pursuant to the terms of the International Wheat Agreement of March 23, 1949, an instrument designed to assure supplies of wheat to importing countries and markets for wheat to exporting countries at equitable and stable prices. Administration of the agreement is the primary function of the Council, which is composed of the representatives of 46 exporting and importing countries parties to the agreement. Each member country may be represented at Council sessions by a delegate, an alternate delegate, and such technical advisers as are necessary.

Article 22 of the agreement provides that "The Council shall, not later than July 31, 1952, communicate to the exporting and importing countries its recommendations regarding the renewal of this Agreement." It is expected that the Council at its forthcoming session, will approach the matter through giving detailed consideration to the amendments required to make renewal of the agreement generally acceptable to all the member countries.

The last (seventh) session of the International Wheat Council was held at Lisbon, October 30–November 2, 1951.

American States Members of ILO

On April 17 the Department of State announced that on that date the fifth Regional Conference of American States Members of the International Labor Organization (ILO) would convene at Rio de Janeiro. The tripartite U. S. delegation to the Conference is as follows:

REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegates

Philip M. Kaiser, Assistant Secretary of Labor

H. M. Douty, Chief, Division of Wages and Industrial Relations, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor

Advisers

Wilbur J. Cohan, Technical Adviser to the Commissioner for Social Security, Federal Security Agency

John T. Fishburn, Labor Adviser, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

REPRESENTING THE EMPLOYERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegate

Charles E. Shaw, Director, Employee Relations Overseas, Standard Oil Company (N. J.), New York, N. Y.

Advisers

Ward H. Donahoe, Insurance and Social Security Division, Department of Standard Oil (N. J.), New York, N. Y.

L. Roy Hawes, Past Master, Mass. State Grange, North Sudbury, Mass.

REPRESENTING THE WORKERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegate

Serafino Romauldi, Latin American Representative of the American Federation of Labor, A. F. of L. Building, Washington

Adviser

Michael Ross, Director, Department of International Affairs, Congress of Industrial Organizations, Washington

The forthcoming Conference is one of a series of meetings initiated by the Governing Body of the International Labor Office in 1936 for the discussion of those subjects relating to the work of the Organization which are of particular interest to the countries of the American continent. The last (fourth) Regional Conference of American States Members of the ILO was held at Montevideo, April 25–May 7, 1949. The 19 American States which are members of the ILO have been invited to participate in the forthcoming Conference.

Among the items on the provisional agenda of the Conference are the report of the Director General, application and supervision of labor legislation in agriculture, achievements and future policy in social security, and methods of remuneration of salaried employees.

The United States in the United Nations

April 11–April 24, 1952

General Assembly

The Collective Measures Committee—Continuing its second year of studying the ways and means of strengthening international peace and security in accordance with the Uniting for Peace resolution and the General Assembly's resolution of January 12, 1952, the Collective Measures Committee (CMC) held its opening meeting on April 15, at which it approved a list of twenty nominees to the panel of military experts and began general debate on its program of work.

Harding Bancroft, the U.S. deputy representative on the CMC, opened the general debate by stressing that the committee should carry forward this year the momentum of the Uniting for Peace resolution of 1950, to strengthen the U.N. in the field of collective security. "This year, as in years to come," added Mr. Bancroft, "we should continue to move forward. The world waits to see whether we can build on the start we have made."

Mr. Bancroft laid particular emphasis on the need for member states to take additional preparatory action to place themselves in a position of readiness to make maximum contribution to the U.N. collective-security system. Mr. Bancroft said that

both the report and the resolution of the General Assembly stressed the need for member states to take preparatory action so that they will have the capability in immediate readiness to contribute armed forces and other assistance and facilities in support of U.N. collective action. This ability and readiness the General Assembly recognized in its resolution are "essential to an effective security system." The committee should, therefore, consider what it can do to promote and facilitate national action on the part of member states in four general areas in which the General Assembly has recommended preparatory action. These are:

One, that states take further action to maintain forces so trained, organized, and equipped that they could promptly be made available for service as U.N. units in accordance with constitutional procedures.

Two, that states prepare themselves so as to be able to provide assistance and facilities to U.N. forces engaged in collective measures.

Three, that states determine in the light of their existing legislation, the appropriate steps for carrying out promptly and effectively, U.N. collective measures of all sorts.

Four, that states continue the survey of their resources in order to ascertain the nature and scope of the assistance which can be rendered in support of U.N. action.

In addition, Mr. Bancroft indicated other lines along which the committee might proceed during the next several months. He suggested that the CMC examine its first report with a view to filling

in the remaining gaps. In this connection, Mr. Bancroft added:

We believe that the idea of a U.N. legion in particular is a subject well worth exploration. We think that a realistic evaluation of its possibilities should be made this year by the Collective Measures Committee.

Mr. Bancroft said also that another important question to consider is the nature of the machinery that the United Nations should have for the future in order to continue its progressive development as a collective-security organization. Concluding, Mr. Bancroft stated:

The work of this committee has the realistic objective of organizing our collective strength to preserve the peace and to ensure that neither this strength nor the power of individual states will be used save in the common interest. Our efforts are based on the proposition that the more effectively the members of the United Nations are organized to unite their strength to maintain peace, the less likely it is that world peace will be challenged. . . . This work in no sense detracts from the fundamental importance of pacific settlement.

In addition to holding general debate, the committee approved the list of 20 nominees to the Panel of Military Experts submitted by the Secretary-General. Now that CMC has approved the list, the 20 high-ranking officers are available on request to states wishing to obtain technical advice regarding the training, organization, and equipment of elements of national armed forces for prompt service as U.N. units. Of the 20 officers, 8 belong to the Army, 6 are Navy officers, and 6 represent the Air Force. The U.S. officers are Lt. Gen. W. D. Crittenberger, U.S. Army, Vice-Admiral Oscar C. Badger, U.S.N., and Lt. Gen. H. R. Harmon, U.S.A.F.

Korean Relief

Cash and commodity contributions totaling \$448,587,702 have been pledged or contributed for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea, according to the report submitted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Economic and Social Council.

\$243,940,531 of this total has been contributed to the emergency program which has been carried on by the Unified Command since the outbreak of hostilities. The contributions have come from 38 states, 5 U.N. agencies, and over 20 nongovernmental organizations. The U.S. Government's contribution amounted, through March 3, 1952, the reporting date of the Secretary-General's report, to slightly over \$215,000,000.

\$205,000,000 has been contributed to the U.N. Korean Reconstruction Agency, which was established by the United Nations to undertake the post-war relief and rehabilitation program. Twenty-seven states have made pledges to this agency. At present, pending the cessation of hostilities, UNKRA is cooperating closely with the Unified Command in the emergency relief program by providing personnel and supplies. In conjunction with the Unified Command, it is making plans for the post hostilities and is gradually assuming a larger role in the present program so that it may assume full responsibility by the target date of 180 days after the cessation of hostilities.

Economic and Social Council

Commission on Human Rights—On April 14 the Commission on Human Rights reconvened at the U.N. headquarters for its 8th session. It proceeded first to reelect the officers who had served at the 7th session:

Dr. Charles Malik (Lebanon), Chairman;
René Cassin (France), First Vice-Chairman;
Mrs. Hensa Mehta (India), Second Vice-Chairman
H. F. E. Whitlam (Australia), *Rapporteur*.

By the end of the first week, the Commission had adopted a self-determination article for inclusion in both the covenants which it is expected to draft: one on civil and political rights and one on economic, social, and political rights. The article reads:

All peoples and all nations shall have the right of self-determination, namely the right freely to determine their political, economic, social and cultural status.

All states, including those having responsibility for the administration of non-self-governing and trust territories and those controlling in whatsoever manner the exercise of that right by another people, shall promote the realization of that right in all their territories, and shall respect the maintenance of that right in other states, in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

The right of the peoples to self-determination shall also include permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence on the grounds of any rights that may be claimed by other states.

The United States voted in favor of the first two paragraphs and opposed the third. An article on this subject is being included upon the express directions of the General Assembly.

The Commission is currently debating a resolution on the subject of self-determination which will go forward to the Assembly and will supplement the article in question.

The Commission has not yet determined how or in what order it will approach the two covenants whose completion is its main task for this session.

Commission on Narcotic Drugs—Discussion of the proposed single convention on narcotic drugs to replace the 1912 convention and 7 other agreements and protocols is the major item on the 14-point agenda of the 7th session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, which convened on April

16 at U.N. Headquarters. The Commission will also study coca leaf addiction in South America and control of new synthetic narcotics.

Last year the Commission undertook a preliminary study of a draft convention prepared by the Secretariat but postponed full discussion because few governments had had an opportunity to prepare comments. The U.N. Secretariat draft proposes to replace the existing Commission on Narcotic Drugs with an international drug commission which, though subject to the general authority of the United Nations, would be a relatively autonomous body. The proposed commission would establish policy to be implemented by an international drug board, which would replace the present Permanent Central Opium Board and Supervisory Body. The control of synthetic narcotic drugs is being considered on the suggestion of the French Government. Although control for certain synthetics has been established, variations in formula make it possible to create new and uncontrolled drugs. The commission will consider whether international measures should be taken to meet this problem.

Security Council

Tunisia—The Council held three meetings, April 4, 10, and 14 to discuss inclusion of the Tunisian Question on its agenda as requested by 11 member states: Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. The proposal was rejected, April 14, by a vote of 5 (Brazil, Chile, China, Pakistan, U.S.S.R.)-2 (France, United Kingdom)-4 (Greece, Netherlands, Turkey, United States). The Council also rejected by the same vote: (1) a Chilean draft resolution to include in the Security Council agenda consideration of the 11 communications with regard to the situation in Tunisia, but to postpone consideration "for the time being"; and (2) Pakistani draft resolution which called for an invitation to be extended to the above-sponsoring delegations (with the exception of Pakistan) to reply to remarks made by the French representative at the Council meeting on April 4.

Ambassador Ernest A. Gross (U.S.), in explaining the abstention of the U.S. Government, stated:

It is the belief of my government that at this moment it is more useful to concentrate on the problem of facilitating negotiations between the French and the Tunisians than to engage in debate at this table. The overriding objective of the Security Council must be to foster agreement through negotiation between the parties themselves. The French program of reforms, in our view, appears to constitute a basis for the resumption of negotiations looking toward the establishment of home rule in Tunisia. . . . The Council will note that in stressing the desirability of negotiation, I am not dealing with the question of the Council's competence to consider this matter. If this item is not included on our agenda at this time, the Council will, nevertheless, remain open to any member of the United Nations to bring the question to the Council's attention again. My government would naturally reassess the situation if that is done.

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The Department of State

bulletin

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MAY 17 1952

Japanese Peace and Security Treaties Enter Into Force

U.S. DEPOSITS INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION

[Released to the press April 28]

The treaty of peace with Japan and the security treaty between the United States and Japan, both of which were signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951, entered into force concurrently on April 28, 1952, at 9:30 a. m., eastern daylight saving time.

The treaty of peace with Japan was brought into force by the deposit at that time in the Department of State of the instrument of ratification by the United States. On that occasion, Secretary Acheson and the Legal Adviser, Adrian S. Fisher, made the following remarks, respectively:

"At this time I formally deposit the instrument of ratification by the United States of America of the treaty of peace with Japan.

With the deposit of this instrument the treaty of peace with Japan enters into force in accordance with the terms of article 23.

Mr. Fisher, it gives me pleasure to turn this document over to you to be placed in the archives with the signed original of the treaty."

"Mr. Secretary, I am happy to receive the United States instrument of ratification of the treaty of peace with Japan. It will be placed in the archives with the treaty.

The deposit of this instrument of ratification has brought the treaty into force on April 28, 1952, at 9:30 a. m., eastern daylight saving time. The treaty is now in force between Argentina, Australia, Canada, France, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan."

Immediately after the deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification of the treaty of peace with

EDITOR'S NOTE.—The signature by the President on April 15 of the treaty of peace with Japan and the security treaty between the United States of America and Japan constituted the U.S. ratifications of these instruments. [BULLETIN of Apr. 28, 1952, p. 658.] The treaty of peace with Japan provides in article 23 that it shall come into force when it has been ratified by Japan and by a majority of the 11 signatories named in that article, including the United States. As of April 23, Japan and 6 of the key Allied signatories have deposited their ratifications, including the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Pakistan, and France, so that the United States deposit will bring that treaty into effect. In the case of the security treaty between the United States and Japan, exchange of ratifications in Washington is provided.

For text of the treaty of peace with Japan, see BULLETIN of Aug. 27, 1951, p. 349 (also printed as Department of State publication 4330); for text of the security treaty with Japan, see *ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1951, p. 464.

Japan, Ryuji Takeuchi presented his credentials as Chargé d'Affaires of Japan to Secretary Acheson, and became the first diplomatic representative of Japan in the United States since the war. Mr. Takeuchi had been until then Chief of the Japanese Government Overseas Agency in Washington.

Secretary Acheson welcomed Mr. Takeuchi and then proceeded to exchange the instruments of ratification of the security treaty between the United States and Japan, bringing the security treaty into concurrent effect with the treaty of peace. A protocol of exchange was signed.

The ceremony was concluded with a statement by the President read by the Secretary and a message from the Prime Minister of Japan read by Mr. Takeuchi. The ceremony was attended by representatives of the countries parties to the treaty of peace with Japan and by other dignitaries.

Statement by the President ¹

With the deposit of the U.S. ratification which brings into force the treaty of peace with Japan, the state of war has been terminated and Japan has been restored to a status of sovereign equality in the society of free peoples. This great event is especially gratifying to the Government and people of the United States who have worked in close association with the Government and people of Japan for its restoration as a prosperous and progressive nation. This common effort has strengthened the essential bonds of friendship between our two peoples.

The treaty of peace terminates the allied occupation of Japan and with it the entire regime of control and opens a new era in Japan's history. During the past 6 years, the Japanese people and government have worked to build a democratic and peace-loving nation with a sincerity and earnestness that has won them the respect of the world. The treaty of peace affords Japan an opportunity to make a great contribution to world peace and progress.

¹ Read by Secretary Acheson.

State of War With Japan Terminated

A PROCLAMATION²

WHEREAS the Treaty of Peace with Japan was signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951 by the respective Plenipotentiaries of the United States of America and 47 other Allied Powers, and Japan;

WHEREAS the text of the said Treaty, in the English, French, Spanish, and Japanese languages, is word for word as follows:

(Here follows the text of the Treaty)

WHEREAS the Senate of the United States of America by their resolution of March 20, 1952, two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein, did advise and consent to the ratification of the said Treaty with the following declaration:

"As part of such advice and consent the Senate states that nothing the treaty contains is deemed to diminish or prejudice, in favor of the Soviet Union, the right, title, and interest of Japan, or the Allied Powers as defined in said treaty, in and to South Sakhalin and its adjacent islands, the Kurile Islands, the Iabomai Islands, the island of Shikotan, or any other territory, rights, or interests possessed by Japan on December 7, 1941, or to confer any right, title, or benefit therein or thereto on the Soviet Union; and also that nothing in the said treaty, or the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification thereof, implies recognition on the part of the United States of the provisions in favor of the Soviet Union contained in the so-called 'Yalta agreement' regarding Japan of February 11, 1945."

WHEREAS the said Treaty was duly ratified by the President of the United States of America on April 15, 1952, in pursuance of the aforesaid advice and consent of the Senate and subject to the aforesaid declaration;

WHEREAS it is provided in Article 23 of the said Treaty that the Treaty will come into force for all the States which have then ratified it when instruments of ratification have been deposited by Japan and by a majority, including the United States of America as the principal occupying Power, of the following States, namely Australia, Canada, Ceylon,

France, Indonesia, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, and in Article 24 of the said Treaty that all instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America;

WHEREAS instruments of ratification of the said Treaty were deposited with the Government of the United States of America by Japan on November 28, 1951 and by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on January 3, 1952, by Australia on April 10, 1952, by New Zealand on April 10, 1952, by Canada on April 17, 1952, by Pakistan on April 17, 1952, by France on April 18, 1952, and by the United States of America on April 28, 1952;

WHEREAS instruments of ratification were also deposited with the Government of the United States of America by Mexico on March 3, 1952 and by Argentina on April 9, 1952;

AND WHEREAS, pursuant to the aforesaid provisions of Article 23 of the said Treaty, the Treaty came into force on April 28, 1952;

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim and make public the said Treaty of Peace with Japan to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof, subject to the declaration hereinbefore recited, shall be observed and fulfilled with good faith, on and after April 28, 1952, by the United States of America and by the citizens of the United States of America and all other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof, and do hereby further proclaim that the state of war between the United States of America and Japan terminated on April 28, 1952.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the city of Washington this twenty-eighth day of April in the year of our Lord
[SEAL] one thousand nine hundred fifty-two
and of the Independence of the
United States of America the one hundred seventy-sixth.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Japan takes her rightful place of equality and honor among the free nations of the world at a time when Communist imperialism, having already enslaved large areas and many unfortunate peoples, is seeking to extend its system of tyranny and exploitation by direct and indirect aggression. We are confident that the people of Japan are alert to this danger and are ready and willing to play their full part in meeting the common menace. For their part, the American people will continue to work with the people of Japan to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter. To this end, simultaneously with the coming into effect of the treaty of peace, the United States has exchanged ratifications with Japan, and thus also brought into concurrent effect, the security treaty between the United States of America and Japan.

² No. 2974 (17 Fed. Reg. 3813).

Statement by John Foster Dulles

The American people join in rejoicing with the people of Japan who again have peace, freedom, and control of their own destiny as Japan today takes her place as an equal and honored member of the community of free nations. She is welcomed. A long hard road has come to an end.

A new way lies ahead. It will not be an easy way. Indeed, the future difficulties and problems are immense, not only for Japan but for every nation. We can, however, be confident that these problems can be solved in an atmosphere of peace and freedom and as between equals.

As our two nations have worked together over these past years we have found that even the most difficult problems could be solved if only we cared enough to take the time and make a serious effort to solve them. This can well be our motto for the future—let us care enough to make sure that the friendship now begun will endure for all the future.

Statement by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida³

Today, we have witnessed the consummation of the treaty of peace with Japan and the concurrent coming into effect of the security treaty between the United States of America and Japan.

This is a memorable day for Japan and the Japanese people.

In making our new start today, our people know that no nation can live unto itself, that no nation can draw dividends unless it contributes to a common world effort and invests in the common welfare of humanity.

We face a great test to human wisdom and human courage.

Today, stimulated by a broader vision and understanding of the principles of humanity, equality and justice, I can assure you that our people will proceed forward drawing upon the fount of our strength and unity. So rooted we can meet the challenge of our times.

On this memorable occasion I would like to express the gratitude of my Government and people for the enlightened and magnanimous statesmanship of the United States and other countries which has made this peace possible and which enables us to stand again as a full member in the community of nations.

A New Approach to Treaty Making

by John M. Allison

*Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*⁴

Perhaps the most significant and constructive international action by the United States during 1951 was the negotiation and conclusion of the Japanese peace treaty and the Allied mutual defense and security treaties with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. In a brief paper it is not possible to deal with these treaties in detail but certain aspects are of primary significance in the field of international law. These treaties broke new ground in the history of treaty making from several points of view. The conclusion of these treaties was an effective demonstration of cooperation between the executive and the legislative branches of the Government. The signing of the Japanese peace treaty, on September 8, 1951, in San Francisco by 48 nations, was also a great demonstration of allied unity. In my opinion it is no exaggeration to say that the results achieved were due primarily to the vision, imagination, and energy of one man, John Foster Dulles. Mr. Dulles would be the first to admit, as he has on many occasions, that he could not have accomplished what he did without the complete and understanding cooperation of President Truman and the Secretaries of State and Defense.

Of great significance was the demonstration of cooperation between the Executive and the Senate in bringing a treaty to the point of ratification.

Before 1918, ratification of treaties, at least in a large part of the world, was little more than a conventional formula, and generally speaking negotiators of treaties were certain that if they faithfully executed their instructions the treaty they signed would be ratified as a matter of course. With the development after the first World War of what at that time was called the "new diplomacy," and particularly as a result of the action of the United States Senate in refusing to consent to the ratification of the Versailles Treaty, it became clear that the old conditions would no longer automatically prevail. The fact that any treaty negotiated by the United States can only be ratified "by and with the advice" of a two-thirds majority of the Senate and the fact that such consent will not be given unless the required majority is convinced of the rightness of their action is a great safeguard against secret treaties or secret policies and is a necessary element in democratic control over foreign policy. However, it can at the same time be a highly inconvenient and inefficient method of carrying out national policy. In discussing this aspect of "democratic diplomacy" in his valuable little book on *Diplomacy*, Harold Nicolson states that—

while the new practice represents an immense gain in the direction of "open covenants" it is a terrible responsibility in respect of negotiation. The art of negotiation is severely hampered when one powerful negotiator demands concessions from his fellow negotiators without being in a position to guarantee that his own promises will similarly be fulfilled. If democratic diplomacy is to prove as efficient as its predecessors, this is one of the problems which it will have to solve.

³ Read by Mr. Takeuchi.

⁴ Address made before the American Society of International Law at Washington on Apr. 24 and released to the press on the same date.

Harold Nicolson wrote his book in 1939 just before the beginning of World War II. In my opinion, if he were writing today he could use the example of the manner in which the Japanese peace treaty was negotiated to show that democratic diplomacy has gone a considerable distance in solving the problem. From the time that he was appointed by the President on September 8, 1950, as chief U.S. negotiator until just one year later on September 8, 1951, when the treaty was finally signed, Mr. Dulles and his associates in the Department of State made a deliberate effort to keep the members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate informed of what they were doing and the way in which they were doing it. During this period there was a series of meetings between Ambassador Dulles and the members of the consultative subcommittee on Far Eastern affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. At all important stages in the negotiation of the treaty, Ambassador Dulles consulted with the subcommittee and on several occasions with the whole committee on specific problems that arose. Suggestions were received from members of the committee as to how many of these problems might be solved, and these suggestions played a real part in the determination of the final text of the treaties.

Not only were members of the Foreign Relations Committee kept informed but Mr. Dulles made it a practice to discuss treaty matters with influential members of the Senate who were not members of the Foreign Relations Committee but who would be called upon to pass final judgment on the treaties themselves. There were also several meetings with members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives. While the House of course has no direct part in the ratification of treaties, nevertheless it does have a part in passing implementing legislation by which treaties can be carried out, and it was therefore believed important that as many Members of Congress as possible should be kept fully informed. When the time came to send a delegation to San Francisco to sign the treaties, members of both the Senate and the House of Representatives were included on the delegation. This procedure, providing continuous consultation with the Congress, was proved to be justified when the treaty came before the Senate. It was approved unanimously by the Foreign Relations Committee and was then overwhelmingly approved in the Senate itself by a vote of 65 to 11. It has been demonstrated that the people at the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue can cooperate effectively when both are convinced what they are doing is for the true and lasting benefit of their country.

Not only did these treaties set a precedent in the manner in which the various branches of the U.S. Government handled them, but the method of negotiating the treaty with the Allied Powers was unique in the modern history of diplomacy. Most

multilateral treaties are concluded as the result of a conference of all the nations concerned wherein the representatives of the various governments, gathered around a table, put forth their ideas and eventually, through the process of give and take, reach agreement on a text of a treaty. At the end of the war it was assumed that the normal process would be followed in the case of a treaty with Japan. In fact, in the summer of 1947, the United States made an attempt to call a preliminary conference of the powers most directly concerned with a view of setting up procedures for the negotiation of a Japanese peace treaty. Countries invited were the then 11 members of the Far Eastern Commission, and in the invitation it was specified that decisions of the conference would be by majority vote.

All members of the Far Eastern Commission except China and the Soviet Union accepted the invitation and agreed to the suggested procedure. The Soviet Union maintained that a treaty of peace with Japan should in the first instance be discussed by the Big Four prior to discussion with the other nations concerned. China was agreeable to having the treaty discussed from the beginning by all members of the Far Eastern Commission but maintained that the voting procedure should be the same as that prevailing in the Far Eastern Commission, which in effect meant that each of the Big Four, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China, would have a veto. Neither of these positions was acceptable to the United States, and the plans for the proposed conference were therefore abandoned. It was not until 1950 that serious steps were again taken looking toward the early conclusion of a treaty. By this time there had been radical changes in the situation in the Far East. The forces of Nationalist China had been driven from the mainland and a Communist regime set up which had been recognized by many of the countries most intimately concerned in concluding a peace with Japan. The Far Eastern Commission had been increased to 13 nations, and although Nationalist China still retained its seat on the Commission, of the remaining 12 nations, 6 recognized the Communist regime as the lawful government of China.

Restoration of Freedom to Japan

It had become evident to the United States that time was running out and that it was important to bring about a treaty with Japan and restore that nation to a position of equality among the nations of the world at the earliest possible time. But how could this be done? The Soviet Union still maintained its position that the treaty should only be discussed by the Big Four, and there was an obvious difference of opinion between the Soviet Union and the United States as to which government of China should be included among the Big Four. The United States continued to believe that

all of the nations on the Far Eastern Commission, which were the nations who had been most active in the war against Japan, had a right to be consulted, but here again it was impossible to call a conference, for these nations were equally divided as to which government of China was the legitimate one.

In these circumstances, tradition was thrown aside. Ambassador Dulles had traveled to Japan on a journey of investigation during the summer of 1950, at which time he had consulted at length with General MacArthur, with members of the diplomatic corps, members of the American and European communities in Japan, and with Japanese Government and private leaders. He was convinced that if Japan was to be kept as a voluntary member of the family of free nations it was essential that early progress be made toward obtaining a peace treaty. He determined that the normal treaty-negotiating procedures should not deter him in doing what he could to bring about a treaty. If it was not possible to call a conference for all the nations concerned to sit around the table and discuss the treaty, why not talk to all these countries individually? And that is what was done.

The first consultations took place in the autumn of 1951 at Lake Success where several of the Foreign Ministers of the countries represented on the Far Eastern Commission were present to take part in the session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. During these early talks, the representatives of the various countries were handed a short, simple memorandum giving a general statement of principles which, in the opinion of the U. S. Government, would govern the type of treaty proposed to end the state of war with Japan. This brief statement consisted of seven points, and it was hoped it would instigate discussion among the various countries so that the United States could reach a decision as to the possibility of obtaining a treaty at all and the chances of obtaining one substantially of the character thought by the United States to be most desirable. These discussions were held with representatives of all members of the Far Eastern Commission and in addition with representatives of Indonesia, Ceylon, and the Republic of Korea, nations which had but recently achieved their independence. It is important to note that representatives of the Soviet Union participated in these discussions although the Soviet Government later disavowed these talks.

As a result of reactions received to the seven-point statement, the United States determined there was general agreement on the desirability of an early peace treaty with Japan and that in general, with certain exceptions, general agreement as to the type of treaty which should be concluded. Ambassador Dulles had been a member of the American Delegation at Versailles which drew up the treaty to end the first World War,

and he was deeply convinced of the unworkability of a punitive treaty which, while it might well be justified because of the crimes of the aggressor, nevertheless contained not an inspiration to co-operation and peaceful action in the future but rather the seeds of future war. This viewpoint was shared by the President and the Department of State and the majority of the Congressional leaders consulted, so that from the beginning there was unanimity in the American Government for the course of action followed. The United States was determined that the treaty should in fact restore freedom to Japan and that only a treaty of reconciliation and trust would in the final analysis be effective.

Consultations on Widespread Scale

Having ascertained the general reaction of a majority of the countries on the Far Eastern Commission, it was believed important to consult again with Japanese leaders. From the very beginning it had been the belief of the U. S. negotiators that this treaty should not be an imposed treaty in the traditional sense and that the Japanese should be given appropriate opportunity to express their opinions. It was of course acknowledged that those powers which had suffered as a result of Japanese aggression should have the primary voice in determining the treaty's terms. In the preliminary talks with the other members of the Far Eastern Commission it quickly became evident that certain of the powers, those which had been in the path of Japanese expansion such as the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, would be most reluctant to conclude a treaty with Japan which did not in itself contain guarantees against renewed Japanese aggression and rearmament unless some other form of security could be assured them.

It was the hope of the United States, therefore, that there might be developed some form of collective security in the Pacific area which would enable Japan to take its rightful place and contribute its share to the collective defense of the Pacific area without developing military forces which by themselves could be a threat to anyone. Ambassador Dulles and members of his staff departed in January 1951 for Japan and after intensive consultation with Japanese and foreign leaders continued their journey and visited the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. In each of these countries they had the opportunity to consult with the local leaders and to receive at first-hand the views and feelings of those peoples toward concluding a treaty with Japan. During this trip the foundation was also laid for the conclusion of the mutual security and defense treaties which form a part of the Japanese peace settlement.

Initial Stages of Treaty Draft

Upon their return to Washington from this tour around the Pacific, Ambassador Dulles and

his staff believed the time had come when the general principles contained in the earlier seven-point memorandum might be expanded and put into treaty language. This was done, and, in March of 1951, a first draft was circulated to those countries with whom the United States had been discussing the treaty. This original draft was still a brief document and consisted of only 8 mimeographed pages of foolscap size. It might be interesting to interpolate at this point that the final treaty draft as signed at San Francisco consisted of 21 pages of similar size. The change from a document of 8 pages to a document of 21 pages is evidence of the fruitfulness of the discussions which took place among all the powers concerned and effectively disposes of the charge made by the Soviets and its satellites that the treaty signed at San Francisco was merely an American document forced upon a reluctant conference.

While the United States had been developing its ideas as to the proper form of a treaty, the Government of the United Kingdom had also been busy and, as a result of discussions with members of the Commonwealth, had produced a draft of its own. This draft was circulated by the United Kingdom to the Commonwealth and one or two other countries and was discussed at length with the United States. As a result of these discussions, which took place over a period of approximately 2 months, it was decided that there should be a joint U. S.-U. K. draft which would be presented for the comments of the other nations. The United States and the United Kingdom finally completed their draft and circulated it to the Allied Powers during the first half of July 1951, and it was kept open for further changes until the middle of August.

Prior to completing the joint U. S.-U. K. draft, Ambassador Dulles and members of his staff individually or collectively had visited London, Paris, Karachi, New Delhi, Canberra, Wellington, Manila, and Tokyo. It will therefore be evident that in addition to communications through normal diplomatic channels with all the nations at war with Japan, the American negotiators visited the capitals of eight of the countries represented on the Far Eastern Commission in order to obtain their views.

By the middle of August, the U. K. and the U. S. Governments believed that ample opportunity had been given to the countries concerned to express their views, and, while it was realized the treaty was not a perfect document, it was decided that if we were to await perfection we would never obtain a treaty. Therefore, invitations were issued to the 50 countries which had been at war with Japan to meet in San Francisco and sign the treaty, a treaty which had been developed not around one large conference table but around many conference tables in many countries and over a period of almost 11 months. It was made

clear in the invitations to the conference at San Francisco that this was a conference to sign the treaty of peace and not one where the whole matter would be reopened with results which would most certainly have led to indefinite delay. During this 11 months' period of consultation and drafting the U. S. Government had kept the National Government of China informed at all stages of the type of treaty that was being developed, and in view of the vast amount of denunciation of the treaty text in specific terms made by the leaders of the Chinese Communist regime, it is evident they too had been kept informed, presumably by their Soviet friends, of the terms of the treaty as they were drafted.

It was a matter of great regret to the Government of the United States that the 400 million people of China were not represented at San Francisco. As it was not possible for the Allies to agree on who should represent China at the time of the signing of the peace treaty, it was determined that neither the Chinese Nationalist Government nor the Communist regime would be invited. However, insofar as possible, as a result of consultations with the National Government of China, the interests of China were safeguarded in the terms of the treaty itself. The sponsors of the treaty draft, while disagreeing as to which government represented China, agreed that the people of Japan should not be held in subjugation to an alien occupation any longer because of dispute among the Allied Powers over China.

Points of Interest to Law Students

With respect to the terms of the treaty itself, there is not the time to go into detail nor do I believe that to be necessary in view of the great amount of public discussion which has taken place concerning the treaty. There are, however, certain points which are of special interest to students of international law, and these I shall briefly mention. It will be noted that article 2 of the treaty requires Japan among other things, to renounce all claims to Formosa, the Kurile Islands, and Sakhalin but does not state in whose favor such claims are renounced. Here again a practical solution was needed to meet the problem caused by differences among the Allied Powers over the question of China. The Potsdam surrender terms are the only peace terms to which Japan and the Allied Powers as a whole are bound. There have been other understandings and agreements between certain of the Allied Governments, but these did not bind Japan nor were all of the other allies bound by these agreements. Therefore, in essence, the peace treaty embodies that portion of the Potsdam surrender terms which provided that Japan's sovereignty should be limited to the four main islands and such minor islands as might be determined. Certain of the Allied Powers suggested that the treaty of peace should not merely

delimit Japanese sovereignty but should specify precisely the ultimate disposition of each of the former Japanese territories. While from the point of view of international law this would have been more satisfactory, it would have raised questions to which at present there are no agreed answers. As Ambassador Dulles pointed out in his address at the peace conference in San Francisco,⁵ it was necessary—

either to give Japan peace on the Potsdam Surrender Terms or deny peace to Japan while the Allies quarreled about what should be done with what Japan is prepared, and required, to give up. Clearly, the wise course was to proceed now, so far as Japan is concerned, leaving the future to resolve doubts by invoking international solvents other than this treaty.

Another portion of the treaty believed to be of special interest to those concerned with international law is the manner in which the treaty comes into force. Article 23 gives the nations most actively concerned in the Pacific a special position and provides that the treaty shall come into force when the instruments of ratification of Japan and the majority of the members of the Far Eastern Commission which signed the treaty, together with Indonesia and Ceylon, have been deposited with the United States. It is specifically provided that this majority must include the United States as the principal occupying power. The position of primacy given the United States was readily agreed to by the other countries in view of the great responsibilities of this country in connection with the occupation.

The brief mention previously made of the various mutual defense and security treaties with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand may have given the impression their only purpose was to make it possible for those nations to associate themselves with the United States in advocating a treaty with Japan containing no arduous restrictive clauses, particularly ones dealing with rearmament. While this certainly is one of the purposes of those treaties, it is not, I believe, the chief purpose, for these treaties do not look only to the past, they look to the future. Let me quote Ambassador Dulles before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:⁶

It is highly appropriate that not only our friends, but our potential enemies, should learn that our concern with Europe, evidenced by the North Atlantic Treaty, and our concern with Japan, in no sense imply any lack of concern for our Pacific allies of World War II, or lack of desire to preserve and deepen our solidarity with them for security. The security treaties with these three countries are a logical part of the effort not merely to liquidate the old war but to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific as against the hazard of new war.

In bringing to a close this brief consideration

of the Japanese peace treaty and the allied treaties, we cannot help but ask ourselves whether these treaties will last and be effective. In my opinion that will depend not so much on the conditions in the treaties but on whether or not they express the facts of the mutual relationships between the signatories. Allow me to call to mind the words of Professor Morgenthau of the University of Chicago in his stimulating book, *The Idea of the National Interest*, when he points out:

It is a general law of international politics, applicable to all nations at all times, that only those agreements have a chance to be effective and to last which express in legal terms the identical or complimentary interests of the contracting parties, and that they last only as long as their terms coincide with those interests.

I believe the treaties signed last September do coincide with the true interests of the signatories. As far as the treaties are concerned, the work of the lawyers is finished. It is now the task of the policy-makers to insure that our future policies are such that our fundamental interests will continue to coincide and that these treaties will thus continue to be effective.

Voluntary Aid to Korea Reaches \$10 Million

Press Conference Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press April 16]

I thought you might be interested to know that, according to the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid, some 10 million dollars' worth of food, clothing, medical supplies, and other commodities has now been provided for assistance in Korea by American nongovernmental agencies.

American organizations including church, welfare, relief, and other groups have contributed commodities and funds for Korean relief to supplement the efforts of the United Nations to ameliorate the hardships suffered by the people of the Republic of Korea as a result of 22 months of destructive warfare.

Many American religious groups have contributed generously for this purpose and, together with the voluntary contributions of groups in other countries, have provided the means for attacking the serious problems which the Korea people face.

This outpouring of aid is one more example of the ability and determination of free peoples to assist in overcoming the hardships which have overtaken the people of the Republic of Korea in their gallant stand against Communist aggression.

⁵ BULLETIN of Sept. 17, 1951, p. 454.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1952, p. 190.

Law and the Growth of the International Community

*Address by Secretary Acheson*¹

Law in our national societies performs a number of functions. One is restraint upon antisocial conduct—a negative function, criminal law, for example. This requires courts and sheriffs, police and prosecutors. Except for the trial of war criminals, our international legal system is here in a rudimentary stage.

Another function of law is accommodation, providing rules for the orderly conduct of day-to-day life: How property shall be transferred from one owner to another; what conduct is consistent with the exercise of property rights, or personal rights.

These are the traditional, nondynamic aspects of law. They are important; they have their place.

But the function of law which I propose that we discuss this evening is not directed toward imposing negative restraints, or toward formulating rules of accommodation which avoid or resolve disagreements. It is rather the essentially legislative function which mobilizes the community into action to deal with situations which by common agreement are unsatisfactory and which can only be remedied by positive and sustained measures.

While the restraining and accommodating functions of law are addressed to the task of defining and protecting existing rights, the legislative function is addressed to bringing about progress and change. Adjustments are made in society so that we can go ahead, so that things happen.

It is not easy to isolate and analyze this legislative function as it operates on the international scene. There is no exact international equivalent of the national legislative bodies with which we are familiar. And international adjudication provides little scope for the legislative role played by our national courts in, for example, the definition of unreasonable restraints on trade or of unfair labor practices.

Nevertheless, as Judge Hudson's volumes on *International Legislation* so abundantly prove, members of the international community do utilize the legislative function which I have described. Nations do consult together about international problems and adopt rules of action which subsequently guide and govern their conduct. A glance at the index of documents collected in Judge Hudson's last volume shows such diverse matters as fisheries, patents, sugar, tin, banking, highway traffic, insurance, and health.

Philosophic Consistency in British Law

The importance of the traditional judicial and administrative processes is clear beyond doubt. But the dominant task which has to be performed in the international, as in the national community, is essentially legislative: that task is to pull the community together through dynamic, propulsive, and creative measures which will change unsatisfactory situations and create new ones responsive to human needs.

What I have said suggests that this legislative task, on the national or the international level, is not simply a series of haphazard and disassociated actions. It is a cohesive whole, guided by certain operative principles leading toward the goals which the community is seeking.

If you were to take from the shelves all the volumes which contain the statutes enacted by the British Parliament in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, you might well shrink from the effort of distilling any guiding principles from them. You would surely find the books full of unrelated minutiae, but I think you would also find yourselves drawn by a defined current.

The other evening when I was thinking about this problem, I remembered a book which I had not read for over a quarter of a century, and took it from the shelf to see if my memory was right and whether some of its thought and analysis was as apposite as I remembered. The book was written before World War I. It attempted to iso-

¹ Made before the American Society of International Law at Washington on Apr. 24 and released to the press on the same date.

late the basic principles lending cohesion and strength to the British Nation. Many of you are familiar with this book, *The Underlying Principles of Modern Legislation*, by an eminent and scholarly British constitutional lawyer, the late W. Jethro Brown.

This study of nineteenth and early twentieth century British legislation may seem a far cry from the complex issues of international life with which we are grappling today. But as I turned over the pages, it seemed to me that this was not so.

The task the author had set himself, in a world so different from ours, was to discover some philosophic consistency underlying the vast body of legislation with which the British people were attempting to meet the economic and political pressures of the time. He was writing in an era of golden placidity—on the surface, at least. But he was gravely concerned whether his countrymen would be able to solve their problems within the orderly pattern of legal processes. If British legislative ingenuity were unequal to the task, he foresaw the dangers of violent revolution which had overwhelmed less flexible societies.

In the record of legislation before him, the British lawyer saw the unfolding of Acton's principle of liberty. Liberty, Jethro Brown pointed out, has two aspects—the citizen as an end in himself, and the citizen as a member of the community contributing to the general well-being. From these two aspects of liberty there are derived, in his own words, "two fundamental principles—the Worth of Man and the Unity of Society."

These two principles underlay the broad range of legislation which he scrutinized. The principles seemed to work together, not in a conscious or deliberate way, to form a balanced and integrated national attitude. Making themselves felt in the concrete responses of the British Parliament, these two principles were, in a deeply practical sense, the major premises of the British community.

Developing Principles of International Legislation

We Americans see at once that these principles are also the touchstones of our American community.

The worth of man, the fact that all men are created equal, has been hammered into our democratic tradition on the anvils of revolution and of civil war. We are—each of us—firmly and rightfully aware of our own individual dignity: our right to our own thoughts, our own faith, our own politics.

We Americans are individualists; but we are at the same time keenly sensible of the unity of society, of the fact that we are joint venturers in the common American enterprise. We don't like to be told what to do; but we revere the law, and we gladly serve our country and our community. We grumble at taxes, but we pay them, for we

know, as Justice Holmes put it, that they are the price of civilization.

But these two principles—the worth of man and the unity of society—are not merely English principles or American principles. They are aspects of the ideal of liberty. And the ideal of liberty is going out across the world, as Jefferson said it would, "to some parts sooner, to some later, and finally to all."

And so, when nations, seized of the ideal of liberty, group themselves together in a free international community, we should expect that larger community—if it is to be a valid and going concern—to build upon these two fundamental principles.

I suggest to you this evening, that if we examine the recent growth of the international community, viewing that growth as a manifestation of international legislation at work, we will find Jethro Brown's thesis borne out on the international scene.

We have no complete reference list of contemporaneous international legislation. But I would like to illustrate how international legislation has worked and is working; and at the same time, suggest what principles seem to me to underlie this body of legislation.

In doing this it is unimportant to argue the traditional philosophic question whether a rule has the force of law if it lacks organized sanctions of power. The important question is whether the actors on the international scene, faced by complex problems, agree among themselves upon practical solutions, and thereafter govern their conduct accordingly.

TASK OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY VS. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

After all, international problems are human problems which have to be solved by human beings. This basic fact is not changed by the additional consideration that the individuals happen to be grouped in national societies represented by national governments.

Looked at from this point of view, there is no essential difference between the task of the American community in applying to a complex of problems such a solution as the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the task of the international community in launching the rehabilitation of postwar Europe through the instrumentality of the Marshall Plan.

As a national community, we had to deal, in the Tennessee Valley, with great potential assets and great present liabilities. The valley, comprising seven states, contained areas which were among our poorest, industrially, educationally, socially. The area contained vast possibilities for power development. But the problem was not merely one of physical development; it was the advancement of the life of four and a half million

people, so that the whole area would become a great national asset.

The national community had to take hold of this. It had to introduce something new into the situation, something that would have a propulsive force, to revitalize this whole area.

And this was done. Around the great power development, there was created a new sense of community interest in that river valley that affected everything—schools, electric lights, farms, jobs, railroads, hospitals, factories, cities, churches—everything.

And all of this was done by taking common action in a legislative and in an administrative way, to release and sustain the energy of the people of the Tennessee Valley for the solution of their own future.

THE MARSHALL PLAN

Now, don't we find something of the same sort happening on the international scene in the working out of the Marshall Plan?

Europe, in 1947, had been through the travail of war, the destruction of war, with its social, political, and economic institutions torn apart.

It was not just an economic problem; the problems affected the whole life of the people, their spirit, their vitality, their determination to rebuild and face the present and the future.

What General Marshall said to the people of Europe was: we in this country are willing to back you if, on your side, you are willing to work together to develop a program which each one of you—and all of you together—will implement in every way you can, so that new things can be accomplished in Europe.

And the people of Europe said: yes, we will do that.

They came together and worked out a plan which took international action, legislative action within countries, administrative action, action by private citizens, by workers, by employers, and we added to this great help from the United States.

They set up the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, to which 18 countries now belong, and the European Payments Union, and laid the groundwork for the Schuman Plan.

There had to be many adjustments and compromises; conflicts of interest had to be reconciled. But the result it produced was something of a miracle in Europe.

The whole life of Europe became different. It became alive; it became hopeful. Individual people had a new sense of the possibilities of life. National societies became vitalized, and a fabric of strong community action among nations had been woven.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

Let us turn to another example, in the field of defense.

By 1948, it had become clear that the Atlantic community had to be able to protect itself.

Something had to be done to assure that everything that was being created and rebuilt would be protected and preserved.

This was a lesson that we in this country learned from our earliest days, from our frontier farming communities and our birth as a nation. The lesson we learned was that defense was an integral part of the function of the community, that as people moved to meet this necessity they wove a stronger fabric of community life.

This is what we have found on the international stage. As economic recovery progressed, it became possible to do something about the need for protecting ourselves, in a cooperative way. First of all, various nations gave one another assurances of assistance in the event of attack, through such instruments as the Brussels Treaty in 1948, and the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949.

But assurances were not enough, when real strength was lacking. We saw that each of us would have to develop our military establishments.

Then we saw that this wasn't enough. We would have to increase our total strength by making our military forces complementary to each other rather than complete in themselves. That was General Bradley's idea of balanced collective forces, instead of balanced national forces.

And this, in turn, led to the integration of forces under a common command, with all that this involved: a unified command structure, common facilities and training programs, and a meshing of production, budgets, and even of political institutions.

As always happens in this kind of development, there was a movement from immediate necessity to broader patterns of cooperation, until finally we reached the broadest possible adjustment of international interest in the direction of a wider and growing unity.

This is the meaning of the European Defense Community, within the broader framework of the North Atlantic Community, which in turn is comprehended within the still broader concept of the United Nations.

The European army is a dramatic illustration of creative action to find common solutions to common problems, action that leads to a whole blossoming of growth and development. For the European Defense Community will have not only a common army, but joint political supervision, a common military budget, a common procurement system. It is a great stride toward the long-cherished goal of a united Europe, and even more, toward the unity of international society.

What we have been witnessing, in the broad sweep of this European experience since the end of the war, has been a series of community actions by the people of the North Atlantic area, actions to establish peace, security and economic well-being by grappling with a succession of connected problems.

We are witnessing a series of positive actions, unprecedented in their scope, to achieve that unity of international society which alone can assure the realization of individual human needs and aspirations in the world as it is today.

THE POINT FOUR PROGRAM

Let us consider another example, one that has to do with other kinds of actions, and other parts of the world.

From the time of the first colonies on the eastern seaboard of this country, and through the march across the continent, this Nation has recognized the interest of the entire community in agricultural development.

It was under President Lincoln, almost a hundred years ago, that there was established in the U.S. Government a Department of Agriculture. By this step, the Government showed its awareness of the relation between the problems of the farmer in Iowa and the steel puddler in Pittsburgh.

Out of this came the development of the whole great activity of the Department of Agriculture today, working through its county agents, through land-grant colleges, carrying forward scientific experimentation, improving the productivity of the land, widening skills and techniques, steadily raising the standard of living not only of the workers on the farm but also of the entire American community.

This is what we have come to call, on the international stage, the Point Four Program.

In the world today there is a comparable relationship between the rice farmer in Burma, or the sheep herder in Uruguay, and the worker at the loom in Manchester, England, or Manchester, N. H.

Here again was a problem rising out of the need of the individual human being and affecting an international society which despite its divergencies had a genuine unity.

And here also, in President Truman's Point Four Program, was the introduction of an element that stimulated a whole range of actions in the underdeveloped parts of the world.

The idea of the unity of society is deeply imbedded in our consciousness. It is not a new idea. From time immemorial, man has built up, in concentric circles, the family, the tribe, the city-state, and the nation. Nor is the idea of a unified international community a new one. Many nations and many faiths have dreamed of empire.

What is relatively new is the corollary principle of the worth of the individual. For this principle means that a unified society has validity only as it serves the human needs of its members.

THE UNITED NATIONS

On the international scene, this principle also comes into play by way of analogy to the position of the individual state within the international

community. In the community of free nations, the basis is one of consent, persuasion, free cooperation. At times this may seem a difficult basis on which to operate, but it affords restraints against the arbitrary exercise of power or will by any member of the community.

The convergence of these two principles—the unity of society and the worth of man—finds its loftiest symbolic and practical expression in the greatest act of international legislation, the creation of the United Nations. For, as stated in its Charter, that concretely unified society of nations stakes its faith upon “fundamental human rights . . . the dignity and worth of the human person” and “. . . the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small”.

It is within the inclusive framework of the United Nations that the international legislation I have described this evening has gone forward.

A free international community based on fundamental tenets is all very well, one may say, for those who agree on those tenets, but what about those who do not?

In our concept of society, power is lodged in the society as a whole for the good of all. In the totalitarian state, the state is something separate and apart from the people. The state is one party in the conflict and the people constitute another party. No matter how much dictators prattle about “democracy”, the dictatorial state does not symbolize the rule of the people; it rules the people. Transposed to the international scene, this theory inspires a policy designed to bring about a result in which a single state dominates other states. It does not contemplate participation on an equal basis in a unified society.

Perhaps the cleavage is graphically illustrated by one of the points still unsettled in the truce negotiations at Panmunjom. The stand of the United Nations in regard to the return of prisoners of war rests upon our belief in the worth of the individual. As General Ridgway properly said this week, the difference in concept of the value of human life as held by the Communists and by the free world is a fundamental issue at stake in the current negotiations over the exchange of prisoners.

The international community does not require uniformity. On the contrary, one can welcome diversity if only there is a common acceptance of the basic principles of the unity of society and of the worth of the individual.

Our idea of the international community is that it is an open-ended one. It is not exclusive. It is not directed against anyone. It is open to any who accept the fundamental postulates.

Even with those who do not accept the postulates and therefore do not become full and intimate members of the community, the adjustment of differences is always possible, provided one thing—and that is that one party does not have as a fundamental objective the destruction of the other.

In reflecting upon ways of developing a free and peaceful international community, men often tend to be governed by a passion for organization as a thing in itself. It seems sometimes to be assumed that the only thing which is lacking in a search for Utopia is the perfection of organization. Sometimes this has led to the theory that all we need is a code of international rules carefully drawn up and written down and applied by an international court to effect the solution of every international conflict.

We know that this is not true. Organization, whether national or international, is merely an instrument and must be used by skillful craftsmen.

The existence of an instrument does not eliminate the need for craftsmanship nor does the existence of international organization eliminate the need for statesmanship. The day-to-day problems, whether they arise among friends or between adversaries, require for their solution the continuous application of human wisdom. This is as true among nations as it is within nations.

So long as those who are charged with seeking solutions of international problems are animated by the companion concepts of the unity of society and the worth of the individual, we need not despair of the wholesome growth of the international community.

The National Interest and Current World Problems

by Charles B. Marshall

My assignment calls for me to relate the national interest to the problems of the United States in the present world situation.

Let me comment first on that phrase, "the national interest."

Only a few years ago the economic interpretation of virtually everything was in vogue. Writers of considerable repute were fobbing off the significance of the national interest as a factor in foreign policy, interpreting it as merely a facade to conceal special interests and to deceive the public.

The return of the phrase to respectable parlance, indicating the recognition of a valid national interest paramount over particular interests, is a gain for straight thinking.

Often a decision in foreign policy is inseparable from the question of the domestic consequences of the decision. It is necessary in such an instance to recognize that our national destiny in a world of many nations is more important than the domestic group interests affected by the decision. In settling questions of conflict between the necessities of national security and group interests, the idea of national interest is valid and essential.

The phrase, moreover, indicates a step away from the utopianism beclouding too much the discussion of international affairs in the sequel to both World War I and World War II.

Nations do have interests. In some instances their interests coincide with the interests of other nations. Sometimes interests of different nations harmonize without coinciding. Sometimes they differ, but not incompatibly. Sometimes they are mutually exclusive. Out of these variations

comes the real nature of international life. It is useless to try to ignore this by talk about global harmony and the universal state. Such talk, while edifying to those who like it, only hinders—it does not help—the handling of world problems.

So it is good to hear people talk about international problems again in terms of national interests rather than in the abstractions of world government and world law.

Indeed, it would be a blessed thing if all differences among nations could be translated into differences of interest alone and not differences of basic purpose and principle. It is unselfish to compromise on interests. It is unseemly to compromise on one's principles.

Here I myself stray off into utopianism of another sort. The world is nowhere near that stage of adjustment where all national differences can be dealt with as solely differences of interest, and the coming of that day is too remote for prediction.

I have said enough in praise of the idea of national interest. Now let me say some things in criticism.

The usefulness and significance of the phrase are limited. It begs more questions than it answers.

In appraising the significance of the national interest, I must distinguish between instances in which the decision turns on weighing our world position as a Nation against the claims of particular domestic interests and instances in which the issue lies simply between different lines of action in the foreign field.

I know of no case of the latter character in which the settlement of an issue of our national policy in the line of responsibility would have been

facilitated by injecting the question: Shall we or shall we not try to serve the national interest?

What Is the National Interest?

The question in the arena of responsibility in handling an issue involving foreign policy alone is not whether, but how, to serve the national interest. That involves the question of what is the national interest in a particular situation.

The question of serving the national interest is always a subtle and complex one in real situations.

I am sure all of the following things are clearly in our national interest: To avoid war; to preserve our institutions; to have strong allies; to avoid inflation; to have a prosperous civilian economy; to find common grounds on which to stand with the various nations which have newly come to responsibility; to preserve our access to strategic waterways and vital raw materials; and to protect the property and safety of our nationals abroad.

I could extend this list by dozens of items.

Now any matter of foreign policy pertaining only to the realization of one of those items would not present an issue at all. No one would have to work his brains overtime on it. No series of exhaustive meetings would have to be held. No protracted debate about the nuances and contradictions would be necessary. In such an instance the policy decision would crystallize spontaneously.

In any practical question presenting a real issue the national interest has several aspects. Indeed, there are many national interests, not just one.

The difficulties arise in the conflict of one interest with another; for example, in the clash of the interest in peace with the interest in preserving national institutions, in the clash of the interest in having a strong defense with the interest in having a strong civilian economy, or in the clash of the interest in preserving access to a waterway with the interest in eliciting the adherence of another country to one's cause.

I trust I have made my point of the inconclusiveness of the national interest as a guide in any particular policy problem.

Beyond that, I believe the concept of national interest is inadequate and misleading even as a broad concept on which to found a policy.

Responsibility as a Guiding Principle

It seems to me that a more appropriate guiding principle is the idea of responsibility. This is a very different sort of idea.

I want to take the rest of my time in talking about the contrast between national interest and responsibility and examining the idea of responsibility as it enlightens our present problems.

First I want to discuss our special role in the world today.

The great political issues of our time revolve around rival approaches to the handling of the problems growing out of such circumstances peculiar to modern times as the massing of peoples—their expanded numbers and their increased concentration; the sharpening of the clash between cultures due largely to awakened consciousness of the disparities in well-being between peoples in relation to the advance or lag of production techniques, and the destructiveness of modern war due both to the concentration of industry and population and to the greater inherent efficacy of modern weapons—their huge lethal power and the capability for distance and stealth in attack.

One approach would exploit these circumstances for the purpose of widening the scope and strengthening the foundations of a monopoly of political power.

The other approach seeks to compose clashes of interest and to work out patterns of accommodation.

The legitimate question of politics is not how to eliminate conflicts of interest—a utopian concept—but how to organize society so that conflicts can be adjusted rather than fought out.

This difference in approach is brought to bear both within and among nations. The lines of difference are intertwined and subtle, for the lines along which great issues form are never as sharp as a razor.

Insofar as the issue has crystallized among nations, however, the Soviet Union stands clearly as the champion of the first approach.

Internal political circumstances cast the Soviet Union in that role. It is ruled by tyrants, who reached the seat of power through conspiracy and, having achieved power, have not dared risk their hold on it by resort to a valid procedure of consent. They have remained conspirators after becoming governors, combining the usages of conspiracy with the prerogatives of the state. Both at home and in the world at large, the conspiracy that walks like a state requires tension and conflict to maintain its grip. In the service of this purpose it employs a doctrine emphasizing the patterns of conflict—class war, subversion, and the like.

This rule is established over a great range, commanding great resources in people and materials.

Huge military forces at its disposal are deployed in positions bearing on northern and central Europe, the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the Republic of Korea, and Japan.

The Soviet Union has auxiliaries in the form of embryonic governments under the guise of domestic political groups in territories beyond its imperium.

The Soviet power is such that no combination of nations adequate to cope with it is conceivable without the support and participation of the United States.

The United States thus finds itself in the position of leadership among peoples which prefer

to work out a method of handling the problems of our times alternative to the pattern offered by the Soviet and which are impeded in this effort by the fact of Soviet opposition.

Our Constitutional Values

A failure to exercise this leadership would almost certainly result in a world power situation endangering the survival of our constitutional values. These are the values expressed in the Preamble of our Constitution. I do not doubt that you know them all, but let me enumerate them anyway.

The first is the perfection of our Union, the concept of a nation with steadily growing public values.

Second comes the idea of justice—of power subjected to standards superior to the mere attainment of the ends of power.

Third in the enumeration is domestic tranquility, conveying the idea of a nation at peace with itself, a nation where issues can be decided by reason, by discussion, and by compromise.

Then we come to the common defense—the protection of the nation from penetration from the outside.

The idea of the general welfare is another of the values set forth. It embodies the idea of a government which serves and is not master, which is accountable to all of its people as contrasted to a government which serves the exclusive interest of a dominant group.

Finally, we have the blessings of liberty—the situation in which each person can make choices for himself, regarding his life, the life of his children, his religion, and his thoughts.

The fundamental and enduring purpose of our foreign policy is to maintain in the world circumstances favorable to the continued vitality of these values in the United States.

I want to stress the novelty in the American consciousness of the responsibilities which the present world situation imposes.

Our power, whence come our responsibilities, has three main foundations: Position, political strength, and economic resourcefulness.

The circumstances surrounding the development of each of these were such as to conceal their eventual implications.

The diffusion of power among several nations of great magnitude provided the relatively stable and protective situation which enabled the Americans to move onward from an Atlantic beachhead to become a continental Nation, singular among the great powers in that it lies in both the Northern and Western Hemispheres, faces on both the Atlantic and the Pacific, and stretches from the tropics to the Arctic.

Government Based on Accountability and Freedom

The same circumstances enabled the Americans to preserve and mature a Government based upon

stipulated principles of accountability and freedom. Their purpose in doing this was purely domestic. The strength of the Government thus established is one of the great political facts of our time, important for all the globe.

The Americans developed a fecund agriculture and productive industry, without equal, through the expansion of an internal market. That circumstance concealed from them the eventual world importance that American economic strength would have.

Some 60 years ago Lord Bryce described the United States as living "in a world of peace" and as "safe from attack, safe even from menace." Such was the national situation in the historic past, when the United States was a remote and intermittent factor in the ratios of world power and when Americans were concerned almost exclusively with the problems of their own national development. Lord Bryce added: "For the present at least—it may not always be so—America sails upon a summer sea."

Within a lifetime the summer sea vanished. The world frontiers closed. Two world wars were fought. Germany and Japan were eclipsed in defeat. Other great powers suffered relative declines. Patterns of empire were sundered. Many erstwhile dependencies attained sovereignty. Revolutionary communism established a power base. Two nations emerged into positions of primary magnitude—the United States as one and the Soviet adversary, the other.

So great an accession of responsibility in so brief a span has placed great moral tests on this Nation.

One difficulty rises from the sense, as expressed recently by former Chancellor Robert M. Hutchins of the University of Chicago, that "this country has been thrust against its will into a position of world leadership."

True, no referendum on the issue whether or not to be a nation of such wide responsibilities was ever held. The choice was made unconsciously in many decisions of our past. We were thrust ahead not against but by our wills. The choice is nonetheless binding for having been made in unawareness of the consequences.

Here we have a paradox—an accession to great power accompanied by a sense of deprivation of freedom.

We feel that paradox in another way.

In our historic past we viewed our role as that of standing normally aloof from the power balance whose benefits we enjoyed. At most we would entertain the idea of throwing in our weight only momentarily to reestablish the balance whenever it might break down in general war.

We regarded our role as like that of a pedestrian who might choose to vary his solitary walks by intermittently riding with others, without foreclosing himself from choosing to walk alone again.

Now that is changed. Our power makes our interposition essential to the preserving of the causes with which our interests lie. We must go along with others if we are to keep others with whom to go along.

Our power is the basis of our essentiality, and our essentiality compels us to replace our historic sense of freedom by a new consciousness of responsibility.

While losing a sense of freedom, we lose also a sense of effectiveness.

In the era when we stood normally aloof from the balance of power, our decision to become a world factor for a season had drastic and immediate results in redressing the balance.

Now, by having become permanently involved in preserving the balance, we are no longer vouchsafed the opportunity to alter the situation dramatically and radically by sudden action.

This involvement leaves for us the exacting course of seeking a solution in the long pull through persistent effort to make the best of the situation stage by stage in the knowledge that such is the only way of making the situation better.

Let us look for a moment at the foreign policy which this situation imposes.

It gives us no promise of arrival at some calculable moment at which we can say that all our troubles are behind us, that everything henceforth will be tidy and easy, and that we have crossed the one last river.

I said this to a group of Texans with whom I was discussing our national policy recently. One of them asked me whether I actually thought coexistence with the Soviet Union was possible.

That is a curious question. It makes a matter of speculation out of something known to be true. Coexistence with the Soviet Union is not simply possible; it is a fact. Coexistence with a great power that tries to lead a double life as state and as conspirator is vexatious for sure, but it is preferable to the tragedy of general war and its sequel, whichever side might win.

Our policy seeks to avoid the tragedy of war, to abate the difficulties of coexistence by correcting the circumstances affording special advantage to the adversary, and to work with other nations as best we can to guide international life toward the patterns of conduct preferable to us.

This policy, often called the policy of containment, is sometimes criticized as if it aimed for a protracted, static confrontation—a sort of perpetually frozen *status quo*.

Such perpetual equilibrium is foreign to the processes of history.

The policy is based upon no assumption of arresting change. It rests rather upon the assumption that the factors of position, population, talents, resources, and moral values redound to the ultimate advantage of the side of our interests, and that, in the long pull, it will be the adversary who must adjust his purposes.

This is not a foregone conclusion. What we and our friends do will be an essential factor in determining the outcome.

This is no cause for disquiet. History presents no foregone conclusions. I know of no way to formulate a policy that will absolve us from the subsequent necessity of exercising resolution and restraint and paying the costs, whatever they may be.

Three Lines of Policy

The policy works along three general lines.

The first is to make coexistence more tolerable. This calls for improving our armed strength and that of the nations standing with us and combining them more effectively through a system of alliances; for helping the depleted and dislocated economies of our friends to regain a healthy level of activity; for helping the economically lagging countries to improve their production methods; and for widening the area of peace by bringing the former enemy countries, Japan and Western Germany, back into collaboration with other countries.

The second line is to prevent serious deteriorations in the conditions of coexistence by avoiding losses in areas of sharp political conflict.

The third general line relates to the development of international usages and institutions of responsibility as instruments of free collaboration among nations instead of the collaboration by intimidation offered by the adversary.

To succeed in these endeavors will require the collaboration of others.

They will not work along with us on the basis solely of our national interest. The collaboration must be founded on an identity among their interests and ours. The primary responsibility for discovering and developing that identity of interests is ours, because we are in the position of greatest strength.

This is not a simple responsibility. It is irksome and expensive and contains no easy formula for complete success in a stipulated interval.

The policy of responsibility lacks the simplicity—here I use the word “simplicity” in the sense of Proverbs 1:22—of the counsel of unlimited violence, a counsel based on the fallacy of trying to reduce all problems of power to the limits of the problems of force.

The policy lacks the utopian tidiness of the dream of solution by world government.

It lacks the traditional ring of the counsel of solution by default, by which I mean the idea of confining our security to this hemisphere—a counsel put forth by some claiming the mantle of statesmanship even though the formula on which it rests contains a fallacy recognizable to any school boy familiar with solid geometry. The fallacy inheres in this: Two points on the same sphere can never be farther than a hemisphere apart; hence the whole world lies in the same hemisphere with us.

The policy based on the principle of responsibility lacks the crisp appeal of a phrase like "the national interest." It involves this paradox—that we can serve our national interest in these times only by a policy which transcends our national interest. This is the meaning of responsibility.

No nation could ask more of history than the privilege of coming to great responsibility.

To satisfy our American professions of the values of competition, we have at hand one of the most exacting contests in ideas ever experienced.

To test our faith in freedom, we have abundant opportunity to make choices of action that will profoundly affect the course of human affairs.

To test our devotion to values, we have the opportunity not simply to proclaim them but actually to support them by gifts and deeds and perseverance.

This juncture in our experience is not comforting for those who take the utopian approach to in-

ternational problems—those who remind one of Kipling's lines:

Thinking of beautiful things we know;
Dreaming of deeds that we mean to do,
All complete, in a minute or two—
Something noble, and grand and good,
Won by merely wishing we could.

I recall the words opening one of Christina Rossetti's poems:

Does the road lead uphill all the way?
Yes, to the very end.

That is the road which a great and responsible nation must tread. It is an uphill road all the way. For Americans who do not mind walking that kind of a road, this is not a time for misgiving but a great time in which to live.

•*Mr. Marshall is a member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State. The above article is derived from an address made before the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, Pa., on Apr. 18.*

Component Parts of the Mutual Security Program: Military Aid, Defense Support, Technical Assistance

by Myron M. Cowen
*Consultant to the Secretary*¹

The world in which we live has been becoming more complex each year. At least the problems with which we as Americans must contend have become more complex with a geometric rather than arithmetical progression. In less than the lifetime of many of us present, since the year 1900, the world which we inherited from our fathers has seen more changes than our ancestors had seen in thousands of years. It is not only the magnitude of change that affects us, but the accelerating rate of change. We have become familiar with the new physical forces unknown to the world of our grandparents. The new sources of power for electricity and petroleum products have changed our industrial system. We are now familiar with the political changes from what now appears to us as the halcyon years of the Edwardian twilight to the middle of the century. We are engaged in a race of adjustment. The problem of civilized man today is the problem of understanding, assimilating, and controlling the new forces loose in the world.

In the United States we have a special problem, in addition to this, because we must attempt to understand and act wisely as our country's position has been changing from the security in which it lay beyond two great oceans in the year 1900 to a world from which that type of security has disappeared forever. When we think of security today, we must always think in terms of atomic explosions, planes, and guided missiles that travel faster than the speed of sound. Our way of life and our system of Government are being given their strongest test today, and they are going to succeed or fail depending upon the amount of understanding and wisdom with which our citizens approach their problems. Forums and conferences such as this are indispensable to our survival. You, as citizens, must understand what your Government is trying to do, and you must participate in its decisions. Regardless of the inherent complexity of modern government, you must not delegate to anyone responsibility beyond your close understanding and participation.

Obviously, without understanding we cannot have responsible participation. I would suggest that this type of conference which you, by your

¹ Address made before the University of Colorado World Affairs Conference at Boulder, Colo., on Apr. 15 and released to the press on the same date.

participation, are jointly developing with the University of Colorado is rapidly becoming part of our democratic machinery.

MSP: A Basic Vehicle of Our Foreign Policy

I want to talk to you about the major problem which our Government faces today. That is the problem of our foreign relations.

It is not my intention to repeat the familiar statements on the nature and scope of the menace posed by Soviet communism. We all understand that the United States, and the free world, is confronted by an aggressive totalitarian force, a force which is seeking world domination and which is accompanied by a dogma that preaches the inevitability of such domination.

It is my intention to tell you something about what our Government is doing to maintain and strengthen this Nation's security. The fundamental principle of our foreign policy is, of course, to preserve the security and well-being of our own nations.

Unfortunately, self-preservation in this kind of world is no simple matter. Today, that term applies a very direct complex relationship between ourselves and other free peoples of the world. Neither we nor they can stand alone in today's world. To attempt to do so would almost seem to be fatal. President Truman made that point well in a recent message to Congress.² He said:

Without our friends abroad, the threat of aggression would move close to our own shores. Without their armed forces, the bases on their soil, and the raw materials from their mines and forests, our military power would be gravely hampered in its defense of the United States, and our whole economy would be seriously weakened.

I could go on and cite innumerable statistics to demonstrate how dependent this country is upon the rest of the free world. I could point out that we are reasonably self-sufficient in only six of the basic raw materials which are of strategic importance to us production-wise. I could point out that the loss of Western Europe alone would give the Soviet bloc the balance of power in terms of population control, technical skill and manpower, and in some of the basic ingredients of the industrial capacity. And, of course, the converse of this is directly true. The rest of the free world would have little chance of survival without the strength and determination of the American people to help them.

But all of this is common knowledge. You and I understand that we must work with others if we are to bring about an adequate defense against aggression. You and I know that the only chance for a decent peace lies in a mutual-security effort by all of the free peoples.

That is why I want to spend my time today talking about America's Mutual Security Program. That program is one of the basic vehicles of our foreign policy. It is a hard-headed and, I believe, a well thought out program to build the collective strength we need for our security. The Mutual Security Program is one part of our mutual-security effort. Its purpose is to be, as General Eisenhower said, "a real deterrent to aggression." The funds asked by the President for this program represent approximately 12½ percent of that part of our budget which is devoted to security. The President has recommended appropriations of 64 billion dollars in round figures for our major security programs, defense programs, and the like. He has recommended 7.9 billion dollars specifically for the Mutual Security Program to help build the strength of our friends and allies.

The Appropriation Recommended

Let us look at the President's recommendation more closely. This recommendation for an appropriation of 7.9 billion dollars breaks down this way:

The lion's share—\$5,350,000,000—is for direct military assistance, and \$1,819,000,000 is for defense-support efforts. The remaining \$656,000,000 is for economic and technical assistance.

Direct military assistance, defense support, economic and technical assistance—what do these phrases mean? What are included under these headings in the President's recommendation?

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Military assistance is just what it says. It has to do with helping our friends develop the weapons for defense and the trained manpower to handle these weapons. It is concerned primarily with military production of munitions. It is concerned—to cite one highly important example—with the equipping of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in Europe with the physical means of deterring aggression. The overwhelming bulk of military-aid funds will go into the provision of guns, planes, tanks, and other military items within the United States which will be shipped to our friends abroad. When you look at the appropriation figure, this assistance I have just mentioned you will find described under the heading "end items."

You will see, in addition to that heading, another one called "offshore procurement." In addition to the munitions which we produce here in this country, we expect to place approximately one billion dollars of contracts in Western Europe in the coming fiscal year for the production in Western Europe of military equipment, ammunition, electronics, spare parts, naval craft. This so-called "offshore procurement" serves several purposes. It produces needed equipment more cheaply than it could be produced here. Offshore

² BULLETIN of Mar. 17, 1952, p. 403.

procurement is also a source of needed dollar earnings. It enables our partners to develop their capacity for arms production by making use of their available labor and industrial facilities. It brings close the time when they will be able to carry the production load themselves. All these things add up to what we mean when we talk of direct military assistance.

Now, what do we mean when we talk of defense support? In Western Europe you have highly developed economies, workshops with the ability to produce great quantities of goods. The assistance that we give these economies is to allow them to import and pay for goods, materials, and commodities which their workshops need in order to produce the necessary goods and commodities to support their own defense effort.

Secretary of State Acheson, in his recent testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, gave an excellent example of defense support. He was talking about the close and vital relationship between the stability of a nation's economy and its ability to defend itself.

The Secretary of State cited Great Britain as an example of an indispensable ally, vitally in need of defense-support funds if she was effectively to discharge her obligations to the free world's united defense program.³

Now Great Britain has to import heavily if she is to survive. Great Britain lives by importing food and raw materials, converting these materials into exports, selling the exports in order to get the means with which to buy more food and more raw materials.

Great Britain thus follows a type of trade cycle. As long as her exports and imports are in balance—as long as she is not paying out more than she is receiving—Great Britain gets along nicely. She had reached this state by the middle of 1951. She was making ends meet.

Then when her rearmament program went into high gear, that program added to heightened demand for raw materials on the world market. The result: Prices of those materials went up.

What happened to Great Britain? Her rearmament program is primarily dependent upon the British metal-using industry. But those industries account for 50 percent of all British exports in normal times. The rearmament program is now taking one quarter of the production of these metal-using industries which account for 50 percent of all British exports. The upshot is that Great Britain is not only paying more for her raw materials from abroad; she also has fewer finished products to export, fewer products with which to pay the cost of the even more urgently needed imports.

Britain's trade cycle has become a vicious trade cycle. This makes for a considerable drain on British gold and dollar reserves. The drain is

stepped up even further when other nations—for whom Great Britain serves as a sort of bank or family clearinghouse—begin to withdraw funds. The withdrawals become heavier because the prices of products in the world market are going up, and these countries want to buy what they need before prices get any higher.

Great Britain is now operating at a large deficit. Her financial position is made more difficult. She is caught between Scylla and Charybdis, or, as we say here, between a rock and a hard place—she is caught between the requirements of the civilian population and the demands of military security.

Faced with this situation, the British are faced with the necessity of taking drastic steps and they have taken them. They have cut their imports. They have cut down their subsidization of foods. They have cut the costs of Government. The degree of austerity which the British people have forced upon themselves is almost inconceivable to us. I dare say that most of us here would not dream of going without some of the things the British are going without unless we were actually engaged in a world-wide war.

But even this austerity has not been enough. Britain's reserves have continued to drop off. Unless the drain on those reserves is effectively halted, Britain will neither be able to maintain a going economy nor meet her commitments under the free world's mutual-defense program. Britain would stop manufacturing the means of defense.

Britain's failure in this respect—or for that matter the failure of any of our other European friends—would be fatal to the mutual-defense effort. To say the least, America's own security would be even more seriously endangered. To use the President's words again, "the threat of aggression would move close to our own shores."

DEFENSE SUPPORT

This, then, is where the defense-support program comes in. Under that program, we Americans are helping Great Britain to do two things. We are putting up money to buy some of the raw materials which Britain needs to keep her factories busy turning out badly needed military goods. We are also helping to buy the food and textiles needed to help the British people maintain a tolerable standard of living and to continue to work effectively for the common good.

Not only will defense-support funds help to keep the British economy sufficiently stable to meet defense requirements, it will return much more than a dollar in actual defense materials for each dollar spent. For the English add their skilled labor and their factory plant to the raw materials which the American dollar is buying.

Defense-support aid is absolutely essential if we are to have genuine security for America. The situation in England is—in many respects—the situation in which most of the countries of Western Europe find themselves.

³ *Ibid.*, Mar. 24, 1952, p. 463.

It is well enough to offer our allies guns with one hand. But that gesture will mean relatively little if we do not give them the necessary defense support with the other.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Now I have commented at length on two of the three types of aid provided under the Mutual Security Program. I should like now to consider briefly the third type of assistance—technical assistance. This is more popularly known as Point Four. And Point Four is designed to help the peoples of the world's underdeveloped areas to develop their technologies and thus to better their standard of living as well as their ability to defend themselves.

Because the Point Four or technical-assistance part of the Mutual Security Program is better known than other aspects of it, I shall today touch just one part of the program. In fact, just one part of the program in one country—India.

India's overriding problem is food production. Accordingly, the assistance program for India will emphasize food production, and the work will be done at the village level.

The program will be based on the creation of village centers, such as the recent successful village experiments in the Etawah region. Etawah is a 100-square-mile area in which a group of Indian agricultural experts, with the participation of several Americans, increased local food production during the period 1949–52 by 46 percent. The methods used were simple. These technicians, or shirt-sleeved diplomats as they have been called, convinced local farmers to try a better yielding, native variety of wheat and the use of a native legume as a green manure crop. They introduced a locally made plow with a six-pound steel point. They inoculated cattle. They started simple sanitation practices in the village. As a byproduct the villagers asked for classes in adult literacy and volunteered their labor on local roads and irrigation ditches.

The Indian Government seeks, with American help, to complete the establishment of 80 such village centers in 1953; each center, starting with a few villages as a training base, will reach out within 4 years to encompass 200,000 people. Thus, the village centers undertaken in 1953 are designed to reach 16,000,000 people.

It is the plan of the Indian Government to expand this village work to 160 centers in 1952, 320 centers in 1955, and 600 centers in 1956. By the end of the Indian 5-Year Plan, 1956, the national goal is to produce 7,000,000 tons more grain per year. Within 3 years we hope to find that our American technicians will have worked themselves out of their jobs. The development centers will be left in the hands of the Indians themselves.

This is a bold plan. If carried through successfully, it would be the greatest agricultural im-

provement program ever carried out by an underdeveloped country in so short a time. U.S. assistance will be used primarily for personnel and materials needed from outside India, and most of it will be applied to this village approach. Most of the cost will be in Indian rupees, and most of the personnel will be Indians.

Since more irrigation water is the largest ultimate factor in expanding food production, substantial American help will be used for engineering services and equipment on major irrigation projects, now under construction, and calculated to increase India's irrigated area by 27,000,000 acres.

This, then, is but a very small part of the Point Four story. What we are seeking to do in India, we are also seeking to do in many other underdeveloped areas. In helping those free peoples who lack our technological development, we are striking a mighty blow for freedom as well as for humanity.

Military aid, defense support, technical assistance—these are the three component parts of the Mutual Security Program budget.

Are we getting true value received for the funds we have been, and are, investing? This is, of course, the crucial question. The usual practical test as to the effectiveness of an action taken lies in the results achieved.

Answers to Criticisms

I think, therefore, that we ought to take a look at some of the criticisms that have been made of the Mutual Security Program. More specifically, at some of the questions that have been raised as to the manner in which the program is being carried through.

One such question has to do with whether or not our European friends are shouldering their fair share of the load. I should like to state categorically that they are doing all they can at present within the limits imposed by their domestic economic situations.

They are meeting their commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty defense organization. The productivity of Western Europe as a whole is now some 40 percent above what it was before World War II. And it would be well for us to bear in mind that Western Europe—not the United States—was devastated by war.

To attempt to impose additional military defense burdens upon the still shaky economies of our European allies would be to court disaster both for them and for ourselves. Production-wise, the factories of Western Europe are doing as much for our common defense as the traffic will bear.

Much has been made of the statement that the Europeans are not taxing themselves as steeply as we are. It is true that there are some inequities in the tax structures of some of the Western European nations. It is *not* true that the European man in the street is not carrying his share of the

tax burden. Here are just a few of the relevant figures!

Tax receipts in the United States for 1951 amounted to 25.8 percent of our gross national product. In the United Kingdom, the comparative percentage was 33.7. In the Netherlands, it was 28.3. In France, it was 30.7. In the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), it was 30.3.

In some of the Western European countries, the percentage was somewhat lower than in our own country. But, by and large, Western Europe is doing its share in footing the bill for the free world's defense and security.

Looking at this matter of the military defense tax burden from the standpoint of the average citizen, it is well to recall that the typical American is a lot better off than his Western European counterpart. The average yearly income of the Western European is about \$600, not quite one-third of the average in our own country. For us, a substantial diversion of our material resources to the defense effort may mean less luxury goods for the individual.

For the European, such a diversion of resources means less food and less clothing.

I must reiterate: Our overseas allies are doing their share in carrying the load imposed by defense requirements. They can do more only if we help them to do more.

Now, another criticism of the Mutual Security Program's operations which has been widely heard goes something like this: Why are we asking for 7.9 billion dollars for the next fiscal year when we have yet to expend all of the funds appropriated for the current fiscal year?

The answer here is a complex one. But it is completely valid.

In the first place, the production of a tank, a plane or a piece of artillery does not begin and end with an agreement as to a given blueprint. From the time a military end-item is authorized to the time it comes off the assembly line, a number of months must pass.

This time lag has little relation to any possible deficiencies in planning, poor coordination, or inefficient productive techniques.

It has everything to do with the complexity of modern arms.

Let us take the fighter plane as an example. It takes about 18 months to produce the simplest type of fighter plane from the time the basic raw materials are gathered together to the time the plane is actually finished. The more complex fighter and, of course, the bomber take even longer.

Looking at the fighter plane, we find that its complexity has increased considerably since World War II. The World War II fighter had 515 electrical wires measuring about 920 feet. The fighter of today has about 5,525 wires measuring about 23,000 feet.

The time from drawing board to delivery date is

much longer than it ever was before. You place contracts this year for planes that you wish in production next year and the year after. The Congress appropriated in 1952 money that will not be spent until 1953 or 1954. This is, of course, quite proper. Anyone with experience in industrial planning will readily agree.

But the time lag between purchase order and actual production, then, is one explanation of why we haven't as yet spent all of the funds appropriated for fiscal year 1952. And that lag is directly related to the problem of complexity of military equipment.

But there is a second and perhaps even more vital explanation—an explanation which has to do with the over-all requirements of the American people during a period of international instability.

Today, America is neither completely at war nor completely at peace. American boys are fighting with the U.N. forces in Korea even as are those of our allies. But America is not engaged in a global warfare. And America is doing everything possible to prevent such warfare from breaking out.

The problem we face, economically speaking, is to maintain a reasonable balance between the needs of military defense and the civilian needs of the American people.

Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett put it very well in a recent statement. He said:

Under the system of partial mobilization, we want to expand production so that we do not have to use up more metal than is necessary, or divert more manpower than is necessary from our civilian economy, not only to preserve the civilian economy but to give us an expandable base in case the tragedy of war hit us.

Mr. Lovett went on to say that we must have enough military material and enough troops ready to serve as a deterrent so that any potential aggressor would know that he would not have an easy victory and ultimately that he would be defeated. "We must have," he said, "a military force in being but yet maintain sufficient economic flexibility to improve, add to, or change the nature of that force should it become necessary to do so."

I grant you that this makes for very tricky going. But the fact of the matter is that, from the defense planning point of view, it cannot be a question of going whole hog or none. We have to get the planes, tanks, and guns we need into the field when they are needed, and where they are needed. But we must still have ready access to the funds with which to produce different types and different quantities of weapons with which to meet any changes in the situation that may arise.

What we have done is to make a conscientious choice. We wanted to get enough of the current equipment to guarantee that if something happened in 1951 or 1952, our fighting men would not be without reasonably competent equipment, but we did not want to freeze ourselves with equipment that would be outdated. We wanted to be

sure that we could make the best use of our advantages in research and development and be able to continue to produce new and better equipment.

There are, in short, both long and short term aspects to the Mutual Security Program. And there is the question of maintaining reasonable balance between the civilian and military defense requirements of the Nation.

If we bear these things in mind, we will find that much of the criticism of our "failure" to spend all of the Mutual Security funds heretofore allotted is unwarranted.

The Time for Decision

The Mutual Security Program is now being considered by the Congress. As you know, most of the discussion has centered about the amount of the program, whether it is too large a program, whether the countries who are receiving assistance could not do more themselves, whether they actually needed this aid.

The objective of the program is to create such forces for ourselves and for our allies that they will be, in General Eisenhower's language, a real deterrent to aggression. Before this program was sent to the Congress by President Truman, each part of it had gone through the closest and most

rigorous screening. This screening had started with our missions abroad. Before their recommendations came to Washington, they had been carefully examined by our representatives in each country. Then in Washington they were carefully examined again at each stage before the program as a whole was presented to the Director of the Budget. Then it was screened again. Actually, the program is considerably smaller than that which had been recommended by a good many officials. In its present form, it can be quite accurately described as the minimum program to do what it sets out to do.

The hearings in Congress are about through. Congress has heard the testimony of the top officials from the Executive Branch of the Government and it has heard the opinion of our top military leaders here and overseas. They have said in their own opinion that this program for 7.9 billion dollars is essential if our objective is to have at a reasonably early date force and sufficient economic and political stability to be a real deterrent to aggression. Anything less than this program could only dangerously delay the establishment of a healthy and hopeful condition for peace and security. The choice and the decision now rest with each of you and your elected representatives.

The Heritage of the Americas

by Howland H. Sargeant

*Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs*¹

We of the Americas have developed something very important to the world. We have evolved a system in which men and nations can make gatherings such as this the basis of their relationship. There have been difficulties, but we have found ways to solve them.

Over a century ago José del Valle, of Honduras, who wrote Central America's Declaration of Independence, said that "the proper study of the men of America is America."

We have made that study our business. With what results?

Well, today the nations of the Americas are giving the rest of the world a practical demonstration that wars are unnecessary, that international problems *can* be settled in friendship and in peace.

The great liberator, Simon Bolivar, said that

war was the epitome of all evils. We of the Americas have outlawed war in our hemisphere.

Maintaining Peace and Freedom

Understand me. Bolivar did not believe—we do not believe—in peace at any price. To quote Bolivar: "The sacrifices we have made on behalf of peace are less than those we owe to the maintenance of freedom."

We of the Americas believe in peace and freedom. We believe that both are attainable if men and nations work together toward that goal.

This togetherness of the Americas has grown with the years. It is today firmly cemented in our united resolution to preserve our freedom and work for an enduring peace.

The Knights have chosen Columbus as their patron. Columbus is a hero to all Americans—north, central, south. He belongs to all of us. The smallest of the American nations has as much right to pride in him as the greatest. His name,

¹ Address made before the Washington General Assembly, Knights of Columbus, on Apr. 24 and released to the press on the same date.

and that of his great queen, Isabel, are honored throughout our hemisphere. Why?

Well, I do not think it is solely because he "discovered" America. His name represents to us something even more important than that. It represents unselfish courage—persistence in the face of great difficulties—faith.

It represents, in short, the essence of everything we believe America to represent.

These qualities are always important. Today, in the gravest crisis ever faced by free men, they are our first defense.

Courage! As Secretary Acheson said last Saturday before the American Society of Newspaper Editors,² our people must have "nerve and steadfastness" if we are to preserve our liberties.

In summoning "nerve and steadfastness" to our defense, we Americans turn for inspiration to the great figures of our past.

We think of Washington in the dark days of our struggle for independence.

We think of José Martí, father of Cuban independence. Someone once wrote of Martí:

"If one were to pick any one man to represent the spirit of Latin America, it would be Martí."

I would add to that. Not Latin America alone but all the Americas take courage from the name of José Martí. Martí was one of the originators of the Good Neighbor Policy. He prophesied that the day would come when the Americas would form one great community to stand or fall together.

Bolívar, too, dreamed of the Americas united in peace and standing together in defense of freedom. He foresaw that the power of this community—the American community—would be brought to the defense of any nation threatened by a foreign enemy or by internal factions threatening anarchy.

Persistence in the face of difficulties!

All of these men shared this quality. For none was the path made smooth. Most of them knew that they must die before their goals were achieved. But they persisted.

Faith!

These men believed in that for which they fought and worked. Their courage and persistence had roots in their faith. They knew their cause could not fail.

José de San Martín—the Washington of Argentina, the liberator of Chile and Peru—put that cause in these words: "The cause that I defend is the cause of the human race."

These men believed that the "cause of the human race" was not limited by national boundaries. They saw that when liberty anywhere was threatened, liberty everywhere was in danger.

I like to remember that General Miranda, Venezuela's great hero, volunteered for our Revolutionary Army. Bolívar corresponded with Henry

Clay upon the subject of freedom. Artigas, national hero of Uruguay, and Tiradentes, revolutionary martyr of Brazil, carried with them on their campaigns the text of the Declaration of Independence of the United States. They quoted from that text in talks with their armies.

All of us remember that it was in Philadelphia, in 1791, that the Peruvian Jesuit, Viscardo, published his famous letter calling on Spanish Americans to assert their freedom.

I could recall many other great names in the history of the Americas. These names are a joint heritage for all of the Americas. As with Columbus, we *all* claim them as our own.

Basis of Inter-American Unity

The basis of our Western Hemisphere unity is of long standing. The foundations of that unity were laid long before the shadow of the Kremlin had darkened the world. In time that shadow will pass. When that happy day dawns, we of the Americas will be found still working together on the problems of peace. Not even the urgent demands of our defenses have been able to divert our energies from that program.

Most of us remember that it was just 10 years ago this month that the Institute of Inter-American Affairs was founded. That program—a program for the peaceful improvement of the lot of men—has become a pattern not only for inter-American cooperation but for world cooperation.

As President Truman has said, "With such a program, we could, in cooperation with other peoples, inaugurate the most hopeful and fruitful period of peaceful development the world has ever seen."³

I thank my good friends of the Knights of Columbus for the opportunity to be here tonight. And I would like to say again, in behalf of my country: "You, our distinguished guests from the Americas, are very welcome. Come again."

IMC Reviews Newsprint Situation

The Pulp-Paper Committee of the International Materials Conference on April 16 announced that its member governments have unanimously accepted its recommendation that no newsprint allocations be made at this time; but the Committee has been directed to keep free world newsprint problems under review and to recommend allocations or other action if necessary.

This agreement follows a report from the Committee that the 1952 newsprint situation in the free world indicates total production of approximately 8,928,000 metric tons, and total require-

² BULLETIN of Apr. 28, 1952, p. 647.

³ *Ibid.*, June 4, 1951, p. 883.

ments of approximately 8,920,000 metric tons, thus showing supply and demand virtually in balance.

This report, based largely upon the reporting countries' own estimates of requirements and production, confirms previous indications that the tight supply situation which has existed since 1950 is easing, and that countries now have reasonable prospects of improving their newsprint position during 1952. However, such prospects could be affected by shortages of producers' raw materials, or even by minor variation in consumption levels of the major consuming countries.

An important factor in the improved newsprint position is the increased production of supplying countries. The Committee reports that through more efficient use of existing mills and by addition of new capacity, 1952 production in the free world of 8,928,000 metric tons will be about four percent or 343,000 metric tons above the 1951 level. This forecast assumes full and continuous use of production capacity throughout the year; irregularity of demand, therefore, could lead to reduced production and possibly to new supply difficulties.

The 1952 requirements of leading consuming countries showed few appreciable increases over last year. Also, total stocks of newsprint at the beginning of 1952 were much higher than in January 1951. Moreover, in arriving at a balance between supply and demand for 1952, a further substantial increase in free world stocks during this year was taken into account.

The Committee will keep itself fully informed on any reversal of present supply and consumption trends. All member countries have agreed to consider recommendations for the resumption of allocation plans should circumstances require.

During the course of its previous studies, the Committee recommended four emergency allocations totaling 33,650 metric tons of newsprint to 18 countries, and all these tonnages have now been delivered.

Fifteen nations are represented on the Pulp-Paper Committee. They are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Arrangements Completed for Cotton Credit to Spain

On April 23 the Export-Import Bank announced that arrangements have now been completed for the operation of the recently authorized credit of 12 million dollars for the purchase and export of cotton to Spain.¹

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 14, 1952, p. 47.

The credit, bearing interest at the rate of 2¾ percent per annum and repayable in 18 months, is extended to the following Spanish commercial banks with the guaranty of the Bank of Spain coupled with exchange assurances: Banco Hispano Americano, Banco Exterior de España, Banco Español de Crédito, Banco de Vizcaya, Banco Central, and Banco de Bilbao.

The Spanish commercial banks will in turn utilize the services of U.S. commercial banks. The following United States commercial banks have been designated for this purpose: Bank of America, National Trust & Savings Association; Chase National Bank of the City of New York; National City Bank of the City of New York; Irving Trust Company, New York; Bankers Trust Company, New York; and Manufacturers Trust Company, New York.

The credit is to be used to finance the purchase of raw cotton, including spinnable waste, which has been purchased under contract entered into subsequent to March 11 and shipped subsequent to the date of the contract.

Further detailed information will be supplied through the shippers' banks or their agents in Spain.

Military Assistance Agreement With Colombia

The Departments of State and Defense announced on April 17 that a bilateral military assistance agreement had been concluded on that day with the Government of Colombia.¹

The agreement was effected by an exchange of notes signed by the American Ambassador to Colombia, Capus M. Waynick, and Gonzalo Restrepo Jaramillo, Foreign Minister of Colombia. It is the sixth of its kind to be signed as the result of negotiations which the United States is conducting with certain of the other American Republics.² Under these agreements certain of the other American Republics will be assisted in developing their capabilities to participate in the collective defense of the Western Hemisphere.

The agreement concluded with Colombia is consistent with, and conforms to, inter-American instruments already in effect, such as the inter-American treaty of reciprocal assistance (the Rio treaty), the resolution on inter-American military cooperation approved at the Washington Meeting of Foreign Ministers of 1951, and the continuous planning of the Inter-American Defense Board.

¹ For text of the agreement, see Department of State press release 296 of Apr. 17.

² For text of a similar agreement with Ecuador, see BULLETIN of Mar. 3, p. 336.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings¹

Adjourned During April 1952

ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Council: 15th Session	Montreal	Jan. 29-Apr. 2
Air Navigation Commission: 9th Session	Montreal	Jan. 29-Apr. 2
Tripartite Conference on Aid to Yugoslavia: Second Conference	Washington	Feb. 19-Apr. 21
UN (United Nations):		
Trusteeship Council: 10th Session	New York	Feb. 27-Apr. 1
8th Session of the Trusteeship Council Committee on Rural Economic Development of the Trust Territories.	New York	Apr. 15 and 18
International Children's Emergency Fund:		
Committee on Consultative Status for UNICEF Advisory Committee of Nongovernmental Organizations.	New York	Apr. 8 and 25
UNICEF-WHO Joint Committee on Health Policy	New York	Apr. 9-11
Working Party on the Creation of a General Fund Raising Committee.	New York	Apr. 11 and 25
Program Committee	New York	Apr. 14-17
Committee on Administrative Budget	New York	Apr. 18 (1 day)
Executive Board	New York	Apr. 22-24
Economic and Social Council:		
Commission on Status of Women: 6th Session	Geneva	Mar. 24-Apr. 4
Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations	New York	Apr. 8-9
Second International Industries Fair	Karachi	Mar. 1-Apr. 6
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):		
Executive Board: 29th Session	Paris	Mar. 13-Apr. 7
Arid Zone Hydrology, International Symposium on	Ankara	Apr. 25-29
4th Inter-American Conference on Social Security	Mexico City	Mar. 24-Apr. 8
ITU (International Telecommunication Union):		
CCIR International Radio Consultative Committee:		
Study Group I	The Hague	Apr. 1-10
Study Group III	The Hague	Apr. 1-10
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization):		
Petroleum Planning Committee: 1st Meeting	London	Apr. 2-14
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Second Training Course for Agricultural Extension Workers of the Western Hemisphere.	San José	Apr. 6-25
Meeting of Governing Board of Inter-American Indian Institute	Mexico City	Apr. 10-11
Milan International Trade Fair	Milan	Apr. 12-30
1st Inter-American Convention of National Associations of Travel Agencies.	Lima	Apr. 12-15
4th Inter-American Travel Congress	Lima	Apr. 12-20
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Fifth Regional Conference of American States Members	Rio de Janeiro	Apr. 17-30
Meeting of the Council, Interparliamentary Union	Nice	Apr. 15-19
34th International Lyon Fair	Lyon	Apr. 19-28
PASO (Pan American Sanitary Organization):		
Executive Committee: 16th Meeting	Washington	Apr. 21-30
International Cattle Exposition	Habana	March-April

In Session as of April 30, 1952

International Materials Conference	Washington	Feb. 26, 1951-
Four Power Conference on Swiss-Allied Accord	Bern	Mar. 5, 1951-
West Point Sesquicentennial	West Point	Jan.-

¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Apr. 25, 1952. Asterisks indicate tentative dates.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

In Session as of April 30, 1952—Continued

International Conference on German Debts	London	Feb. 28-
International Exhibition of Drawings and Engravings UN (United Nations):	Lugano, Switzerland	Apr. 10-
Economic and Social Council:		
Human Rights Commission: 8th Session	New York	Apr. 14-
Narcotic Drugs Commission: 7th Session	New York	Apr. 15-
Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business Practices: 2d Meeting.	New York	Apr. 28-
International Wheat Council: 8th Session	London	Apr. 17-
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Metal Trades Committee: 4th Session	Geneva	Apr. 21-
ITU (International Telecommunication Union):		
Administrative Council: 7th Session	Geneva	Apr. 21-
Cannes International Film Festival	Cannes	Apr. 23-
South Pacific Commission: 9th Session	Nouméa	Apr. 28-
Sixth International Hydrographic Conference	Monaco	Apr. 29-

Scheduled May 1-July 31, 1952

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization):		
Petroleum Planning Committee, Meeting of Working Group . . .	Paris	May 1*
Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 4th Meeting	Washington	May 12-
Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law	Brussels	May 2-
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Working Party on Fertilizers: 2d Meeting	Bandung, Indonesia	May 5-
Working Party on Rice Breeding: 3d Meeting	Bandung, Indonesia	May 5-
International Rice Commission: 3d Meeting	Bandung, Indonesia	May 12-
Meeting on Fisheries Statistics	Copenhagen	May 26-
FAO-Caribbean Commission Meeting of International Poplar Com- mission.	Rome	May 26-
Committee on Commodity Problems	Rome	June 3-
Council: 15th Session	Rome	June 9-
European Forestry and Forest Products Commission: Meeting of Working Party on Torrent Control and Protection of Ava- lanches.	Nice	June 28-
FAO-Caribbean Commission, Meeting on Home Economics and Education in Nutrition: 2d Regional.	Port-of-Spain	June 30-
WHO (World Health Organization):		
5th Assembly	Geneva	May 5-
Executive Board: 10th Session	Geneva	May 28-
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Iron and Steel Committee: 4th Session	Geneva	May 5-
Governing Body: 119th Session	Geneva	May 26-
35th Session of the ILO	Geneva	June 4-
International Rubber Study Group: 9th Meeting	Ottawa	May 5-
Caribbean Commission: 14th Meeting	Guadeloupe	May 6-
International Symposium on Problems of Desert Research	Jerusalem	May 7-
Sample Fairs	Valencia and Barcelona	May 10- June 10-
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Council: 16th Session	Montreal	May 13-
Air Navigation Commission: 10th Session	Montreal	May 13-
Standing Committee on Aircraft Performance: 2d	Copenhagen	May 19-
Sixth Annual Assembly	Montreal	May 27-
UN (United Nations):		
Economic and Social Council:		
Fourteenth Session of the Council	New York	May 13-
Social Commission: 8th Session	New York	May 12-
Technical Assistance Committee	New York	June-
Technical Assistance Committee	New York	July 7-
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 2d Meeting, Working Party on Small Scale Industries and Handicrafts Marketing.	Bangkok	July 28-
Trusteeship Council: 11th Session	New York	June 3-
Fisheries Conference, South Pacific Commission.	Nouméa	May 14-
Universal Postal Union: 13th Congress	Brussels	May 14-
ITU (International Telecommunication Union):		
CCIR International Radio Consultative Committee:		
Study Group V	Stockholm	May 15-
Study Group VI	Stockholm	May 15-
Study Group XI	Stockholm	May 19-
European Regional Conference on VHF Broadcasting (41 mc/s to 216 mc/s).	Stockholm	May 28*

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

Scheduled May 1–July 31, 1952—Continued

International Cotton Advisory Committee: 11th Session	Rome.	May 17–
Paris International Trade Fair	Paris.	May 17–
UNESCO Executive Board: 30th Session	Paris.	May 24–
Wmo (World Meteorological Organization):		
Regional Association for Europe: 1st Session.	Zürich	May 26–
Meeting of Commission for Maritime Meteorology	London	July 14–
International Conference on Large Electric High Tension Systems:	Paris.	May 28–
14th Session.		
International Convention for Protection of Industrial Property	Vienna	June 2–
Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of	Washington.	June 3–
Migrants from Europe: First Meeting of Executive Committee .		
International Whaling Commission: 4th Meeting	London	May 29–
International Meeting of Tonnage Measurement Experts	The Hague	June 4–
Eighth General Assembly of the Inter-American Commission of Women.	Rio de Janeiro	June 8–
21st Session of the International Criminal Police Commission	Stockholm	June 9–
Annual Meeting of the Directing Council of the American Inter-	Montevideo.	June 13–
national Institute for the Protection of Childhood.		
26th Biennial International Exhibition of Art.	Venice	June 14–
International Philatelic Exhibition	Utrecht	June 28–
Second Meeting, International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic	St. Andrews (New Bruns-	June 30*
Fisheries.	wick)	
Sixth International Congress for Animal Husbandry	Copenhagen	July 9–
Fifteenth International Conference on Public Education	Geneva	July 15–
International Conference on Soil Fertility	Dublin	July 21–
18th International Red Cross Conference	Toronto	July 23–
Pan American Institute of Geography and History:		
Third Consultation on Geography.	Washington.	July 25–
International Sugar Council	London	July or August

Continuation of Negotiations on Jammu and Kashmir

THIRD REPORT BY THE U.N. REPRESENTATIVE FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN

On April 22 Frank P. Graham, U.N. Representative for India and Pakistan, transmitted to the Secretary-General his third report to the Security Council (S/2611).¹ In it he noted progress toward agreement on the remaining four proposals of his 12-point compromise plan. He stated that demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir had advanced to the point where prerequisites for a plebiscite should be considered, and that in the future he intends to consult with the U.N. Plebiscite Administrator-designate (Admiral Chester Nimitz).

Part I (not here printed) of the report deals with the 12 proposals for an agreement on demilitarization. In Part II, the U.N. Representative discusses the terms of reference laid down in the Security Council's resolution of March 30, 1951, analyzes other resolutions relating to his mission, and states his conclusions. Part III consists of

his recommendations. Those annexes to the report which are not printed here include the Security Council's resolution of November 10, 1951;² the U.N. Representative's letter of September 7, 1951, to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan; and a résumé of a statement made on February 5, 1952, by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan.

Following are the texts of the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Security Council's resolution of March 30, 1951 (Annex I of the report), and of the Security Council President's statement of January 31, 1952 (Annex III), which directed the U.N. Representative to continue negotiations:

U.N. doc. S/2611
Dated Apr. 22, 1952
[Excerpts]

PART II

Conclusions

(1) *Progress has been made on the twelve proposals*

Progress has been made in the acceptance of an increas-

² *Ibid.*, Dec. 10, 1951, p. 959.

ing number of the twelve proposals for an agreement on demilitarization. On 15 October 1951 in his first report, the United Nations Representative reported to the Security Council that the two Governments had accepted four of the twelve proposals. On 19 December 1951, in his second report, he reported to the Security Council that four more of the twelve proposals, or a total of eight, had been accepted by both Governments.

He can now report acceptance, by Pakistan, of the remaining four proposals, with certain qualifications regarding the character of forces to be demilitarized. India maintains that if agreement can be reached on the issues of the number and character of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line, the other two remaining differences (i. e., the period of demilitarization and the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator) can be solved without difficulty.

The chief remaining obstacle is the difference over the number and character of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization.

(2) Progress has been made in demilitarization

(a) Substantial withdrawals of forces from the State of Jammu and Kashmir have been made from time to time by both India and Pakistan since the cease-fire on 1 January 1949.

(b) In response to discussions about further withdrawals of military forces from the State, the Government of India has, in addition, decided to withdraw unconditionally one division, with supporting armour. It estimates this to total 18,000 men.

(c) With such withdrawals it appears that the Governments of India and Pakistan will have both withdrawn over 50 per cent of their forces from the State.

(d) The Government of India has decided to withdraw to distances varying from 70 to 450 miles from the western Indo-Pakistan border, the forces which were moved up near that border last summer.

(e) The withdrawals referred to in sub-paragraphs (b) and (d) above are now in process of execution.

(f) The Government of Pakistan has indicated that most of its forces that were moved to the western Indo-Pakistan border during the past summer have been withdrawn to their peace-time stations.

(3) Inter-dependence of the two resolutions

Part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution and paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January resolution have been connected by the Governments of India and Pakistan and are inter-dependent on questions of demilitarization. Part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948³ and the resolution of 5 January 1949,⁴ as a whole, are inter-dependent on requirements relating to the preparation of a plebiscite.

(4) Concerning further procedures

The United Nations Representative should have in mind the considerations set forth in this report. In the future, the United Nations Representative, in addition to the assistance to be provided by his civilian and military advisers, has the purpose to have the view or the Plebiscite Administrator-designate on those problems which have a bearing on their common responsibilities. This consultation should be without prejudice to the question of the formal induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator-designate, which should be a result of the further negotiations.

(5) Urgent need of a settlement

The need is urgent for the settlement of the dispute between India and Pakistan concerning the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This dispute has been before the Security Council for over four years. More than three

years ago the two Governments accepted the 13 August 1948 and the 5 January 1949 resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. A settlement is important not only for the sake of approximately 4 million people in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, but also for the sake of over 400 million people in India and Pakistan, whose peaceful progress is of vital importance for the peoples of the world.

PART III

Recommendations

Accordingly, the United Nations Representative recommends:

(1) That, taking notice of the progress made in the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through withdrawals of forces from both sides of the cease-fire line, the Governments of India and Pakistan refrain from taking any action which would augment the present military potential of the forces in the State.

(2) That the Governments of India and Pakistan, taking into account their agreements under the UNCIP resolutions and their acceptances under the twelve proposals, should:

(a) Continue their determination not to resort to force and to adhere to peaceful procedures; and to follow faithfully their agreement to instruct their official spokesmen and to urge all their citizens not to make statements calculated to incite the people of either nation to make war against the other with regard to the question of Jammu and Kashmir (twelve proposals, paragraphs 1 and 2).

(b) Observe the cease-fire effective from 1 January 1949 and the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949 (twelve proposals, paragraph 3).

(3) That the Governments of India and Pakistan, as a means of further implementing the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, should undertake by 15 July 1952 further to reduce the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

(4) That the United Nations Representative's negotiations with the Governments of India and Pakistan be continued with a view to:

(a) Resolving the remaining differences on the twelve proposals, with special reference to the quantum of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, and

(b) The general implementation of the resolutions of the UNCIP of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.

Annex I

Resolution Adopted by the Security Council on 30 March 1951 (S/2017/Rev. 1)

HAVING RECEIVED AND NOTED the report of Sir Owen Dixon, the United Nations Representative of India and Pakistan, on his mission initiated by the Security Council resolution of 14 March 1950;

OBSERVING that the Governments of India and Pakistan have accepted the provisions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949; and have reaffirmed their desire that the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations;

OBSERVING that on 27 October 1950 the General Council of the "All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference" adopted a resolution recommending the convening of a Constituent Assembly for the purpose of determining the "Future shape and affiliations of the State of Jammu and Kashmir"; observing further from statements of responsible authorities that action is proposed to convene such a Constituent Assembly and that the area from which such

³ U.N. doc. S/1100.

⁴ U.N. doc. S/1196.

a Constituent Assembly would be elected is only a part of the whole territory of Jammu and Kashmir;

REMINING the Governments and Authorities concerned of the principle embodied in the Security Council resolutions of 21 April 1948, 3 June 1948 and 14 March 1950 and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations;

AFFIRMING that the convening of a Constituent Assembly as recommended by the General Council of the "All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference", and any action that Assembly might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State or any part thereof would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with the above principle;

DECLARING its belief that it is the duty of the Security Council in carrying out its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security to aid the parties to reach an amicable solution of the Kashmir dispute and that a prompt settlement of this dispute is of vital importance to the maintenance of international peace and security;

OBSERVING from Sir Owen Dixon's report that the main points of difference preventing agreement between the parties were:

- (a) the procedure for and the extent of demilitarization of the State preparatory to the holding of a plebiscite, and
- (b) the degree of control over the exercise of the functions of government in the State necessary to ensure a free and fair plebiscite.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. *Accepts* in compliance with his request, Sir Owen Dixon's resignation and *expresses* its gratitude to Sir Owen for the great ability and devotion with which he carried out his mission;

2. *Decides* to appoint a United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan in succession to Sir Owen Dixon;

3. *Instructs* the United Nations Representative to proceed to the sub-continent and, after consultation with the Governments of India and Pakistan, to effect the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949;

4. *Calls upon* the parties to co-operate with the United Nations Representative to the fullest degree in effecting the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir;

5. *Instructs* the United Nations Representative to report to the Security Council within three months from the date of his arrival on the sub-continent. If, at the time of this report, he has not effected demilitarization in accordance with paragraph 3 above, or obtained the agreement of the parties to a plan for effecting such demilitarization, the United Nations Representative shall report to the Security Council those points of difference between the parties in regard to the interpretation and execution

of the agreed resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 which he considers must be resolved to enable such demilitarization to be carried out;

6. *Calls upon* the parties, in the event of their discussions with the United Nations Representative failing in his opinion to result in full agreement, to accept arbitration upon all outstanding points of difference reported by the United Nations Representative in accordance with paragraph 5 above; such arbitration to be carried out by an Arbitrator, or a panel of Arbitrators, to be appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice after consultation with the parties;

7. *Decides* that the Military Observer group shall continue to supervise the cease-fire in the State;

8. *Requests* the Governments of India and Pakistan to ensure that their agreement regarding the cease-fire shall continue to be faithfully observed and *calls upon* them to take all possible measures to ensure the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere favourable to the promotion or further negotiations and to refrain from any action likely to prejudice a just and peaceful settlement;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan with such services and facilities as may be necessary in carrying out the terms of this resolution.

Annex III

Statement of the President of the Security Council on 31 January 1952⁵

... Speaking as President of the Security Council, I have the impression that a very clear and positive conclusion emerges from the practically unanimous statements made during the present discussion.

The Council feels that Mr. Graham has made real progress in that some measure of agreement was reached between the parties on various points, and that he should continue his negotiations in pursuance of his terms of reference under the resolutions of 30 March 1951 [S/2017/Rev. 1] and 10 November 1951 [S/2392] in order to remove the remaining difficulties which he has described.

It being understood that any member of the Council has the right to ask for a Council meeting to be convened at any time to deal with the question which is now being discussed, the sense of the meeting is also that Mr. Graham should submit a report to us, which we hope will be final.

Although we cannot strictly limit the negotiations which, to have every chance of success, must be flexible, I feel I can say that the Council definitely expects to receive a report within two months, that is by 31 March.

I believe that I am correctly interpreting the feelings of my colleagues in stating that in these circumstances Mr. Graham, acting under the resolutions I have mentioned, will continue negotiations under the terms which I have just specified and which reflect the statements made in the Council.

⁵ *Official Records of the Security Council, Seventh Year, 572nd meeting.*

Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

THIRTY-EIGHTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 16-31, 1952¹

U.N. doc. S/2593
Transmitted April 9, 1952

I herewith submit report number 38 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-31 January, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués numbers 1145-1160 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Discussion of the airfield question under agenda item 3 continued in sub-delegation meetings during the major part of this period. The United Nations Command delegates patiently and explicitly reiterated their position as outlined in report number 37. At the session of 18 January the United Nations Command delegation pointed out the strange logic of Communists who, while accusing the United Nations Command of desiring to prolong a state of war, would create dangerous tensions during an armistice by insisting on the right to build military airfields. Again on 24 January the United Nations Command delegation asked the Communists to state clearly whether they intended to increase their military air capability during the armistice. Again the Communists evaded answering this question.

On 25 January in an earnest endeavor to break the deadlock, the United Nations Command sub-delegation proposed to the Communists that staff officers of each side, meeting jointly, immediately begin drafting that part of the armistice agreement pertaining to agenda item 3 on which tentative agreement had been reached and that discussion of the airfield issue be suspended pending report by the staff officers of progress made. This proposal was accepted by the Communists on 27 January at which time the United Nations Command delegate made the following statement: "We are prepared to proceed on this basis with the clear understanding that we reserve the right to return to the subject of airfield restrictions as soon as the sub-delegations reconvene. We hereby record our unalterable intention to do so".

The staff officers held their initial meeting on 27 January at which time the United Nations Command representatives presented a draft of the armistice agreement pertaining to agenda item 3, a copy of which is attached hereto.² This draft was based on the three agreed principles stated in United Nations Command report number 36 and the following additional agreed principles:

"4. In order to ensure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate (the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level), both sides undertake not

to introduce into Korea any reinforcing military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective. Such rotation of military personnel as within the limit agreed upon by both sides shall be reported to the military armistice commission so that the supervisory organ of (neutral nations) may be entrusted to conduct on-the-spot supervision and inspection, which shall be carried out at the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides.

"5. Each side shall designate an equal number of members to form a military armistice commission to be responsible for supervising the implementation of the armistice agreement and for settling through negotiation any violations of the armistice agreement. The functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armistice agreement shall be carried out in accordance with the following two provisions:

"A. Within the demilitarized zone, the military armistice commission utilizing joint teams directly despatched by it shall be responsible.

"B. Outside the demilitarized zone, at the ports of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides and at the places where violations of the armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred, the supervisory organ of representatives of (neutral nations) shall be entrusted to be responsible. Upon the request to the supervisory organ of (neutral nations) by both sides or either side on the military armistice commission for investigation of a violation of the armistice agreement, the supervisory organ of (neutral nations) shall carry out the inspection.

"6. Both sides agree to invite (neutral nations) acceptable to both sides which have not participated in the Korean war, to send, upon their consent, an equal number of representatives to form a supervisory organ to be entrusted by the military armistice commission to be responsible for carrying out the functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in paragraph four and five B of this proposal. Upon the request by both sides or either side on the military armistice commission for carrying out these functions, the supervisory organ of (neutral nations) shall despatch immediately inspection teams to carry out the functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armistice agreement at ports of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides, and at places where violations of the armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred outside the demilitarized zone, and shall report on the results of supervision and inspection to the military armistice commission. In performing their above-stated functions, the inspection teams of (neutral nations) shall be accorded full convenience by both sides over the main lines of communication and transportation as agreed upon by both sides."

At the close of the period staff officers of both sides were meeting in an effort to arrive at a mutually acceptable draft of armistice agreement under agenda item 3 with the understanding that the airfield issue would be reopened when the item 3 sub-delegation reconvenes.

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on Apr. 9. Texts of the 30th, 31st, and 32d reports appear in the BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; the 33d report, *ibid.*, Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395; the 34th report, *ibid.*, Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430; the 35th report, *ibid.*, Mar. 31, 1952, p. 512; and the 36th and 37th reports, *ibid.*, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 594.

² Not printed here.

With the gradual development of discussion on agenda item 4 relating to prisoners of war, the Communists maintained an adamant position that the individual prisoner of war must be repatriated after an armistice, whether or not he desires such action. They have insisted that the plain wording of the Geneva Convention supports their view. They ignore the fact that forced repatriation is completely repugnant to the basic humanitarian concept of the Geneva Convention, the concept of protection for the individual. Without admitting openly they imply that in the matter of repatriation of prisoners of war the Geneva Convention is designed to protect the interests of the state rather than the individual. In opposition to their propaganda attempts to cloud and distort the issues, the United Nations Command has resolutely held that the principle of freedom of choice stands openly and conclusively as an equitable and humane solution to the problem of repatriation. The United Nations Command remains opposed to the inadequate, inhumane and revengeful doctrine of forced repatriation which the Communists advocate.

With equal emphasis, the United Nations Command presented, as logically and cohesively as possible, the further provisions of its proposal. In addition to establishing sound, workable solutions for the exchange of prisoners of war, it provides for the return to their homes of persons displaced by the war. By using prisoner of war exchange facilities, the unfortunate civilian victims of the conflict could be returned to their homes swiftly with a minimum of inconvenience to the individual and to the military forces concerned. The United Nations Command proposal insures that, by the application of the voluntary repatriation clause, those persons who prefer to remain where they had been carried by the flow of war would be permitted to do so.

As a further indication of its good faith and sincere desire to effect an exchange of prisoners which would be most advantageous to each side, the United Nations Command presented the Communists with newly revised rosters, in Korean and Chinese, of all the prisoners it had reported initially. Included on these lists was all available information on each individual listed. The Communists were informed that additional supplementary data on all the prisoners taken, since the start of hostilities, by the United Nations Command was available on short notice and would be provided in return for similar data from the Communists on United Nations Command and Republic of Korea prisoners taken by that side.

In view of the Communists' reluctance to make substantial effort to reach a satisfactory solution and their failure to take any positive steps whatsoever to resolve differences, despite their oft-repeated assertions that they do, in fact, desire early agreement, the United Nations Command decided to take a determined step toward expediting agenda item 4. After explaining carefully our belief that both sides must take positive steps to resolve the issues which have thus far prevented agreement, the United Nations Command presented a draft of an agreement for the disposition of prisoners of war and civilians which incorporates all of the items considered essential for a complete solution. (A copy of the proposed wording of this draft is appended hereto.) The initial reaction of the Communists, as was expected, indicated no agreement to those parts of the United Nations Command draft which touched on voluntary repatriation.

The Communists claimed that prisoner of war camp number eight, Kang-Dong, was attacked by United Nations Command aircraft at 2100 hours, 14 January and that total prisoner of war casualties included twenty killed and fifty-five injured. The Communists admitted that the camp was not marked as a prisoner of war installation. The United Nations Command lodged an immediate protest of the blatant disregard by the Communists of the basic humanitarian principles of the Geneva Convention, specifically Article 23, which requires that all areas holding prisoners of war be plainly marked with identifying symbols and that such areas not be located at or near strategic and tactical military targets.

The United Nations Command further demanded that all prisoner of war and civilian internee camps be marked without delay so as to be visible from the air and that the exact locations of such installations be reported to the delegation. After some delay and weak excuses, the Communists agreed to United Nations Command demands and presented data which they allege shows exact locations of prisoner of war camps in their area. A careful investigation by United Nations Command of the alleged bombing incident indicated only that allied planes were in the vicinity of Kang-Dong for the purpose of attacking military targets in the area at the time the Communists claimed the attack took place. Failure of Communists to properly mark or to furnish accurate location of prisoners of war camps made it impossible to determine whether United Nations Command aircraft attacked the prisoner of war camp at Kang-Dong.

At the request of the Senior Delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross the United Nations Command provided transportation for two delegates to the conference site at Panmunjom where they attempted to arrange an interview with the commanders of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers. With full respect for the neutral position which the International Committee of the Red Cross has traditionally maintained, the United Nations Command was happy to be of assistance to that organization and considers it regrettable that the Communists, without valid reason and with deliberate disregard of the humanitarian concepts epitomized by the International Committee of the Red Cross, do not see fit to permit them access to the prisoner of war camps in their territory. Their continued prevention of prisoner of war relief activities remains completely at variance with the concepts of the civilized world.

No significant changes were apparent in the character of enemy activity across the Korean battle front as contact was limited primarily to frequent patrol clashes, usually of short duration, and minor probes by small enemy detachments. Local United Nations Command raids into forward enemy positions were met by determined opposition and were followed by swift enemy counterattacks. These raids served the multiple purpose of inflicting casualties, capturing prisoners, securing intelligence, and maintaining a peak of United Nations Command combat efficiency, as well as providing a physical and psychological deterrent to any hostile plans for aggressive action. Hostile troop dispositions and front lines remained unchanged although the enemy effected the relief of two of his front line divisions. As a result of dwindling guerrilla strength, both the numbers and size of dissident groups engaged by Republic of Korea forces decreased as the current anti-guerrilla operations entered its ninth week.

Patrol activity on the western front resembled that of recent periods. United Nations Command elements conducted both day and night raids in the Punji, Kigong and Mabang areas. These aggressively conducted, small-unit operations invariably encountered determined enemy opposition supported by strong artillery and mortar fires. The largest enemy unit thus engaged was one of battalion strength which tenaciously resisted a United Nations Command raid in the Mabang area on 24 January. Reinforced enemy counter action followed each instance wherein a United Nations Command raiding group initially succeeded in forcing an enemy withdrawal. The enemy chose not to employ his armor in these defense operations, although both air and ground observation disclosed the continued presence of hostile armor on the western front. Each such observation was immediately followed by air and artillery strikes which forced the enemy to keep his armored elements well hidden, and prevented their concentration in any one locale. The enemy continued the periodic rotation of units in contact by effecting the relief of a division of the Forty Second Chinese Communist Army in the Saginak area.

United Nations Command-initiated patrol clashes constituted the major portion of ground action on the central

and eastern fronts. Hostile action was limited to infrequent patrols and probes during the hours of darkness by small enemy groups. The number of small-unit actions on these fronts showed a decrease as contrasted to previous periods, due largely to the weather conditions which adversely affected ground operations in the more mountainous parts of the battle line, particularly on the eastern front. Snow, low overcast, fog and haze restricted ground operations during seven days of the period although United Nations Command elements conducted two highly successful raids on enemy positions in the Mulguji and Yuusil areas on 21 and 25 January, respectively. The only change in enemy unit dispositions occurred in the Mulguji area where local Chinese Communist reserves were employed in the partial relief of front-line units.

Republic of Korea forces continued to inflict telling blows on guerrilla elements in Southwestern Korea. Appreciable gains were scored despite a decrease of remunerative guerrilla targets. Of the present guerrilla strength in rear areas, it is estimated that only 2,000 are armed. Reports further indicate that those who have been killed and captured during the current operations include a substantial number of local leaders. Partially as a result of this factor and the heavy casualties suffered, the remaining guerrilla elements appear extremely reluctant to engage Republic of Korea forces. These conditions, coupled with poor communications among the guerrilla bands, sharply curtail their capabilities.

Recent prisoners state that the enemy is continuing his efforts to maintain and improve his military capabilities. Statements of several Chinese Communist prisoners point to a reorganization of combat units which apparently includes efforts to augment their fire power. North Korean prisoners' statements during the past three months, similarly reflect an increase in the logistical position, morale and unit troop strength of the North Korean Corps on the eastern front. These reports clearly indicate that the enemy is determined to maintain and improve his military potential in Korea. Despite the evidence of preparations for continued hostilities, the enemy thus far fails to display any definite inclination for early offensive action.

United Nations Command naval forces operating in the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and the Gulf of Korea expended ammunition at a higher rate during the closing weeks of January than the maximum rate recorded during World War II as the blockade and patrol ships shelled major coastal transportation hubs and enemy positions at both ends of the battle line with a nearly continuous barrage of naval artillery fire. Coastal rail and highway routes and bridges were cut repeatedly by night and day attacks aimed at preventing the enemy from improving his position with respect to supplies.

The carrier forces operating on both coasts concentrated their efforts on the interdiction of enemy transportation and continued to increase the number of rail cuts. Their planes also assisted in the destruction of enemy supply dumps and small craft, and in attacks on enemy troops in support of United Nations Command ground forces. Land based Marine squadrons divided their attacks between enemy troops, gun positions, and transportation in the enemy rear areas with excellent results. Although enemy anti-aircraft and small arms fire succeeded in inflicting losses on Naval and Marine squadrons, brilliant rescues by helicopters and by ships picketing the North Korean ports, saved the pilots of a number of stricken aircraft.

Enemy coast artillery continued to duel with United Nations Command ships, but shipboard batteries silenced enemy gun positions with the help of air spotting. Quick maneuver and heavy return fire prevented damage to or casualties on United Nations Command surface ships during the period. Check minesweeping and the destruction of frequent illegal floater mines encountered were continued by surface forces, while patrol planes made daily reconnaissance of the waters surrounding Korea. On the west coast hundreds of rockets were fired into the defense positions around the sea approaches to Chinnampo, inflicting numerous troop casualties. Night bom-

bardments and heckler missions harassed enemy soldiers at battle line and in rear positions along both coasts.

Amphibious forces carried out replenishment by sea of United Nations Command troops near the coasts and supplied the garrisons of United Nations Command-held outpost islands off the North Korean coasts. Among their unusual tasks was the recent evacuation of nearly 20,000 refugees from west coast Korean islands where the Koreans had gone to escape Communist rule.

The United Nations Command air offensive against North Korea was continued as land based aircraft flew a total of 11,999 sorties in support of United Nations Command operations. Additional attack restrictions and precautions were initiated in order to reduce the chance for accidental injury by friendly aircraft of United Nations Command troops held in Communist prisoner of war camps.

The primary objective of the air attack was the systematic interdiction of enemy rail and highway lines of communication, augmented by attacks on rolling stock, locomotives, vehicles and supply installations along the main arteries for enemy logistics. The shift of some railroad interdiction to lines further north, as reported during the first half of January, was continued. Several successful daylight fighter-bomber attacks were made on the Sinanju-Chongju and Kunu-Ri-Huichon lines. These were complemented by night medium bomber strikes against the key rail bridges at Chongju and Sinhungdong and by light bomber attacks on bridge repair crews.

The repair and reconstruction of enemy airdromes has slowed down noticeably. Uiju and Sinuiju, both of which are located near the Yalu River, were the only major serviceable airfields in North Korea. The latter was successfully attacked by medium bombers on the night of 26-27 January. All other North Korean bases suitable for operation of jet aircraft remained inactive and unserviceable so that no new attacks were required.

Air-to-air fighting between Communist MIG-15 interceptors and friendly fighters was again spotty. More than 2,000 MIG sorties were observed during the period; however, only a fraction of this number were actually aggressive enough to seek combat with United Nations Command aircraft. Although usually heavily outnumbered, formations of United Nations Command aircraft destroyed or damaged thirty-one MIGs while flying counter air sweeps deep into enemy territory. The heaviest day of air-to-air activity was 25 January when friendly pilots destroyed ten and damaged four of the 297 MIGs sighted. Three of the kills were achieved by pilots who were flying air cover for an unarmed United Nations Command helicopter engaged in the rescue of a friendly pilot who had crash-landed deep in enemy territory.

The requirement for close combat air support continued on a reduced scale due to the general reduction in ground force activity all along the front; however, United Nations Command reconnaissance and fighter-bomber aircraft regularly patrolled behind the enemy lines in search of ground targets and information about enemy troop dispositions. These operations accounted for an estimated 348 enemy casualties, ninety-seven destroyed or damaged gun positions and eighty-seven destroyed and damaged bunkers. In addition, medium bombers regularly made night attacks on Communist battle area positions designated by United Nations Command ground forces.

The United Nations Command requirements for high priority movement of personnel and supplies by air remained high as combat cargo aircraft flew 3,036 sorties to airlift 7,018 tons of supplies and equipment to Korean-based United Nations Command units. This tonnage includes United Nations Command sick and wounded who were transported between bases in Japan and Korea.

There were no reports of enemy aircraft operating over United Nations Command positions during the period.

During the annual celebration of the Lunar New Year, United Nations Command leaflets, loudspeaker broadcasts, and radio broadcasts emphasized United Nations efforts to restore peace to the Korean people in the New Year. These media reminded North Korean and Chinese

Communist soldiers of the callousness with which their comrades' lives were sacrificed during the past year by the leaders of the Communist aggression. United Nations proposals for voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war were explained and contrasted with Communist impressment of captured Korean soldiers into an alien-controlled Army, forcing them to bear arms against their own country. Continuing attention was given to dissemination of detailed factual reports of the constructive United Nations Command proposals in the armistice negotiations and prolonged Communist obstruction of efforts to restore peace.

A total estimated dollar value of supplies and equipment of nearly \$230,000,000 was programmed in support of the United Nations Command for Korean relief and economic aid program during the period of 1 October 1950 to 31 December 1951. Of this total, supplies and equipment worth nearly \$99,000,000 have been delivered. The total includes \$208,225,248, programmed out of United States appropriated funds; \$81,379,029 worth of supplies and equipment have been delivered. Also included in the total are contributions from other United Nations member nations and voluntary relief agencies with an estimated dollar value of \$21,494,440, of which supplies worth \$17,224,033 have been delivered. The above figure of \$230,000,000 includes some 21.7 million dollars of supplies financed with ECA funds.

It was reported that during the latter part of December, the number of refugees for whom suitable winter housing had yet to be provided was 2,383 in Kangwon-Do and 1,137 in Chungchong-Namdo. Besides these, there were a large number of arrivals in Cholla-Namdo from some of the islands off the west coast, south of the 38th parallel. In general, it may be stated that the refugee situation was fairly well stabilized in the eastern provinces, but that in the west there was still considerable movement and shifting within and between provinces.

In the field of public health a low incidence of communicable diseases was reported, pointing to the efficacy of the nationwide immunization program which is being actively prosecuted. A *bacillus calmette guerin* tuberculosis control program is scheduled to start immediately in the Seoul area under direction of Danish medical personnel working with the United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea. The Italian Hospital Unit is co-operating and has authorized the use of its facilities.

Inflation continued to be a very serious threat to the war-disrupted economy of the Republic of Korea. The United Nations Command is taking positive action to do all possible to prevent hyper-inflation.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

South Pacific Commission

The Department of State announced on April 22 that the ninth session of the South Pacific Commission will convene at Nouméa, New Caledonia, on April 28, 1952. The United States delegation is as follows:

Acting Senior Commissioner:

Milton Shalleck, Attorney and Counselor at Law, New York, N.Y.

Acting Commissioner:

Karl C. Leebrick, Alternate Commissioner; Liaison Officer, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

Advisers:

Philip E. Haring, American Consul, Nouméa, New Caledonia

R. S. Herman, Secretary of Guam

Claude G. Ross, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State

The South Pacific Commission was established by an agreement which entered into force on July 29, 1948. It is a consultative and advisory body to the six member governments (Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) in matters affecting the economic and social development of the 17 non-self-governing territories in the South Pacific under the scope of the commission. (The scope of the commission was extended to include Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands by an agreement signed by the six member governments on November 7, 1951.¹) American Samoa, Guam, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands are the territories under U.S. administration within the purview of the commission. Sessions of the commission are held biannually; the last (eighth) session was held at Nouméa, October 29-November 9, 1951.

The agenda for the ninth session is devoted principally to internal administrative matters of the commission, and includes consideration of such items as the commission's work projects and activities; extension of projects to Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; annual fiscal statement for 1951; audit of commission books; draft financial regulations; staff rules, salaries, and allowances; and publications, including the draft annual report for 1951.

Executive Committee of PASO

The Department of State announced on April 18 that the sixteenth meeting of the Executive Committee of the Pan American Sanitary Organization (PASO) will be held at Washington April 21-30, 1952. Since H. van Zile Hyde, U.S. representative on the Executive Committee, will be unable to attend the meeting, the alternate representative, Frederick J. Brady, assistant chief, International Organizations, Division of International Health, Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency, will serve as acting U.S. representative. Dr. Brady will be assisted by the following Department of State advisers:

William G. Bowdler, Division of International Administration

Howard B. Calderwood, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs

Simon N. Wilson, Office of Regional American Affairs

The Executive Committee, which was set up by a directive of the Twelfth Pan American Sanitary Conference (Caracas, January 12-24, 1947), performs interim executive and advisory functions between meetings of the Directing Council of the Pan American Sanitary Organization. It

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1038.

is composed of the representatives of seven governments elected by the Directing Council for 3-year terms.

The agenda for the sixteenth meeting of the Executive Committee includes consideration of such matters as adoption of the program of meetings; financial report of the director and report of the external auditor for the financial year 1951; proposed program and budget of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau for 1953 and 1954; reports of the Permanent Committee of the Executive Committee on (a) revision of the constitution of the Pan American Sanitary Organization and (b) amendments to the rules of procedure of the Directing Council; amendments to the staff rules of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau; relations between the Pan American Sanitary Organization and nongovernmental organizations; and plan of long-range health programs.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

First U.S. Ambassador to Postwar Japan Takes Oath of Office

Remarks by Ambassador Robert D. Murphy

[Released to the press April 21]

I am deeply grateful to the President and to the Secretary of State for this mark of their confidence in appointing me the first U.S. Ambassador to postwar Japan. I approach this delicate task in great humility. At the same time I hope to profit by the splendid contributions toward the reconstruction of Japan which have been made by General MacArthur, John Foster Dulles, General Ridgway, and the host of devoted Americans who have served in Japan since the end of hostilities. I shall hope to maintain the fine tradition established years ago by Ambassador Grew.

I entertain the greatest admiration for the Japanese people, the fine spirit of cooperation shown by them in achieving partnership in the free world community and in the task of rebuilding their own country. They are working with the United States in full accord and harmony.

I am not oblivious to the innumerable and difficult problems inherent in this mission. They relate to the preservation of peace, the maintenance of security from aggression, and economic rehabilitation. Basically these problems are faced by peoples the world over, and I only hope the small experience I have had in dealing with them in Europe will avail me in Japan. I intend to do everything in my power to bring about an ever closer understanding between the peoples of our two countries.

THE CONGRESS

President Urges Early Action On St. Lawrence Seaway Project

[Released to the press by the White House April 19]

The President on April 19 sent identical letters concerning construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway to Tom Connally, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, and Charles A. Buckley, Chairman, Committee on Public Works, House of Representatives. The text of the President's letter follows:

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am writing to urge that your committee act favorably at an early date on legislation approving the 1941 Agreement between the United States and Canada, and authorizing the United States to join with Canada in constructing the St. Lawrence seaway and power project.

As I informed the Congress in January,¹ the question before the Congress now is not whether the seaway should be built, but whether the United States should share in its construction, operation, and control. The Canadian Government is ready and willing to build a seaway from Montreal to Lake Erie on the Canadian side of the boundary, if the Congress does not authorize the United States Government to participate in building the joint Canadian-U.S. seaway agreed to in 1941. It would be extremely unwise and unrealistic for the Congress voluntarily to abandon the opportunity for the United States to jointly control a waterway so vital to our security, our commerce and industry, and our relations with our Canadian neighbors. And yet, if the Congress does not act soon on the legislation before it, that will be the result, for we cannot ask the Canadians to delay much longer.

In addition to the seaway, the St. Lawrence project will yield very large benefits in hydroelectric power. The same dams that create a navigation pool in the International Rapids section of the St. Lawrence River, will yield 12.6 billion kilowatt hours of electric energy per year—half to each country—energy that is badly needed in both countries. In order to build these works, if the Congress does not enact the legislation now before it (or other appropriate legislation), it will be necessary for the United States and Canada jointly to apply to the International Joint Commission—a body set up under the Boundary

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 11, 1952, p. 232.

Waters Treaty of 1909 with authority to approve such projects. In accordance with an exchange of notes early this year,² copies of which were transmitted to the Congress in January, preparatory work has been proceeding on such a joint application.

On Monday of this week, Mr. Lester B. Pearson, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, together with other Canadian and United States officials, met with me here in Washington. Mr. Pearson expressed the desire of the Canadian Government to proceed rapidly with the construction of the project—both the seaway and power phases. The Canadians agree with us that the quickest and most desirable way to get started on the project is for the Congress to approve the joint development plan now before it.

In order to lose no time if the Congress does not act, however, we agreed at Monday's meeting that the application to the International Joint Commission will be completed and filed at an early date. Thus the arrangements are nearly completed for proceeding with the St. Lawrence project by an alternative means if the Congress fails to act soon on the 1941 Agreement.

I hope that these alternative arrangements will not have to be followed through, because it is so obviously to the advantage of all our people—including the railroad and port interests that have been opposed to the project in the past—for the United States to participate fully in the construction and control of the project. That can only be done if the Congress acts. I cannot believe the Congress will let the opportunity pass to safeguard and advance the vital interests of our people in the St. Lawrence River.

We need the seaway and the power. We need them as soon as the necessary works can be built. The best, the simplest, and the quickest way to get them is through legislation by the Congress. Full hearings have been completed before the appropriate committees of the Senate and the House. I strongly recommend that your committee and the Congress promptly complete action on this vital matter.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Aid to Netherlands To Continue Under Battle Act Provision

[Released to the press by the White House April 23]

The President has sent the following identical letters to Kenneth McKellar, Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate; Richard B. Russell, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate; Tom Con-

nally, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate; Clarence Cannon, Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives; Carl Vinson, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives; and James P. Richards, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives:

I have been advised that a small quantity of petroleum exploration equipment was shipped from the Netherlands to Poland after the effective date of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the Battle Act). This oil drilling equipment is an item listed by the Administrator, pursuant to Title I of the Battle Act, as one embargoed in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act. Any shipment of any such items listed automatically results in all military, economic and financial assistance to the Netherlands being cut off, unless I determine, in accordance with the powers granted to me by Section 103 (b) of the Act, that "cessation of aid would clearly be detrimental to the security of the United States." The Administrator of the Act has advised me that aid to the Netherlands should be continued. He made this recommendation after consultation with representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce; the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Mutual Security Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Central Intelligence Agency.

I am informed that the facts are as follows: The shipment, which took place recently, involved small quantities of oil drilling equipment. Technical experts in this country believe that this amount of this particular type of equipment would not add significantly to the capacity of the Soviet bloc to explore for, or to produce petroleum.

The shipment is the final one against binding obligations incurred in August 1949. The original contract was entered into in good faith by the Netherlands shipper and the Polish government enterprise 2 years before the passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act and prior to any international understanding that the equipment in question is of primary strategic importance. At the time the original transaction was negotiated, the Dutch shipper had obtained the consent of his Government to complete the contract and subsequently had obtained a Dutch export license. By the time the embargo list was established, pursuant to Title I of the Battle Act, and became operative on January 24, 1952, the Dutch equipment had been practically paid for by the Polish enterprise. Before the final shipment took place, officers of the U.S. Government held discussions with the Government of the Netherlands in an effort to find a means of avoiding this shipment. The Netherlands Government considered that this equipment would not significantly contribute to the military potential of the Soviet

² *Ibid.*, p. 234.

bloc (a conclusion in which our U.S. technical experts agree). It also took into account the fact that the shipment had been virtually paid for and represented the final transaction under a binding contract made in good faith more than 2 years previously. The Netherlands Government, therefore, concluded that it would not block the shipment.

Cessation of aid to the Netherlands would materially weaken the whole system of defenses now being built up under the North Atlantic Treaty. Consequently, cessation of aid to the Netherlands would be "detrimental to the security of the United States."

The Netherlands is making a substantial contribution to the mutual security of the free world. The Netherlands has been a participant in the North Atlantic Treaty defense program since its inception and, notwithstanding a most difficult domestic economic situation, has made courageous political and military decisions and has taken positive steps in order to make its participation in the program effective. The Netherlands Government has demonstrated a cooperative spirit, and has displayed a genuine sense of concern and responsibility toward the mutual defense effort.

The Netherlands Government has committed itself to make substantial contributions—industrial, financial and military—to the North Atlantic Treaty defense program. In this connection, it should be noted that the Netherlands Government is carrying out on its own initiative a strict program of internal financial controls and is reducing the level of civilian consumption in order to provide added resources for defense.

From the standpoint of military strategy, the Netherlands occupies an important position. The Dutch have shown a willingness to cooperate in coordinated planning so as to make possible the maximum use to NATO forces of Holland's strategic location. In addition, the Netherlands Government has specifically committed itself to provide a substantial number of troops, naval vessels and air units and to be responsible for their maintenance and training. However, the Netherlands' contribution to the security of the free world—and, hence, to the security of the United States—cannot, in the absence of assistance, be carried out as planned.

The Netherlands Government cooperates with the United States and other countries of the free world to prevent or limit drastically export to the Soviet bloc of items that are considered to be strategic. The Netherlands controls are well designed to effectuate understandings arrived at and are efficiently operated.

Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of Section 103 (b) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act, I have directed that assistance by the United States to the Netherlands be continued. In reaching this determination, I have acted upon

the advice of the Administrator of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act, Mr. W. Averell Harriman, and have taken into account "the contribution of such country to the mutual security of the free world, the importance of such assistance to the security of the United States, the strategic importance of imports received from countries of the Soviet bloc, and the adequacy of such country's controls over the export to the Soviet bloc of items of strategic importance."

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Approval Requested for Puerto Rican Constitution

*Message of the President to the Congress*¹

To the Congress of the United States:

I am transmitting to the Congress for approval the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, adopted by the people of Puerto Rico on March 3, 1952.²

The Constitution has been submitted to me pursuant to the Act of July 3, 1950, 64 Stat. 319 (48 U.S.C., Supp. IV, 731b-731e). This Act authorizes me, upon adoption of a constitution by the people of Puerto Rico, to transmit the constitution to the Congress if I find that it conforms with the applicable provisions of the Act and of the Constitution of the United States. I do find and declare that the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico conforms with the applicable provisions of the Act of July 3, 1950, and of our own Constitution.

Fully recognizing the principle of government by consent, the Act of July 3, 1950, authorized the people of Puerto Rico to organize a republican form of government pursuant to a constitution of their own choosing. The Act was adopted by the Congress of the United States "in the nature of a compact". By its own terms, the Act could become effective only when accepted by the people of Puerto Rico in a referendum.

On June 4, 1951, the people of Puerto Rico voted by a large majority to accept the Act of July 3, 1950, thereby reaffirming their union with the United States on the terms proposed by the Congress. Following the referendum, the voters of Puerto Rico elected delegates to a Constitutional Convention. The Convention convened in San Juan on September 17, 1951, and concluded its deliberations on February 6, 1952.

¹ Transmitted Apr. 22 and released to the press by the White House on the same date.

² H. Doc. 435.

The Constitution approved by the Constitutional Convention was submitted to the people of Puerto Rico in a referendum on March 3, 1952. It was adopted by an overwhelming majority.

In the course of its studies and deliberations, the Constitutional Convention made a careful analysis of the constitutions of each of the States of the Union, as well as that of the Federal Government. As a result, the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico contains many provisions which are common to constitutions which have been adopted by the States, as well as other provisions which are designed primarily to meet local problems.

The Constitution establishes the government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico with three coordinate branches of government, legislative, executive and judicial. The city of San Juan is designated as the seat of government.

The legislative power of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is vested in the legislative Assembly, consisting of a Senate composed of 27 members and a House of Representatives composed of 51 members. Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives are to be elected by direct vote at each general election for a term of four years. Both United States and Puerto Rican citizenship are requisites for election to legislative office.

Under the Constitution, the executive power of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is vested in a Governor, to be elected by direct vote in each general election for a term of four years. To be eligible for election as Governor, a person must be at least 35 years of age, and must have been, during the 5 years preceding the date of election, a citizen of the United States and a citizen and *bona fide* resident of Puerto Rico. The Governor is vested with the powers usually lodged in a chief executive under our form of Government, including the right to veto bills enacted by the Legislative Assembly. The Legislative Assembly may override the Governor's veto by a vote of two-thirds of the total number of members of which each house is composed.

The judicial power of Puerto Rico is vested in a Supreme Court, and in such other courts as may be established by law. The Supreme Court is designated as the court of last resort in Puerto Rico and is to be composed of a Chief Justice and four Associate Justices. The Justices of the Supreme Court are to be appointed by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate of Puerto Rico, and are to hold office during good behavior. Justices now serving on the Supreme Court, who have been appointed by the President of the United States, are to continue to hold office during good behavior.

The Constitutional Convention gave careful consideration to the objective of ensuring an independent judiciary. It limited the number of Justices of the Supreme Court to five members and expressly provided that the number cannot be increased except by direct request of the Supreme

Court itself. Independence of the judiciary is further advanced by the provision of the Constitution placing responsibility for administration of the entire judicial system in the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who is appointed for life and removable by impeachment only.

The new Constitution contains a bill of rights which corresponds with the highest ideals of human dignity, equality and freedom. The bill of rights includes provisions which are similar to our own basic Constitutional guaranties. In addition, it contains express provisions regarding public education, conditions of labor, and the protection of private property. The bill of rights also recognizes the existence of certain human rights, but acknowledges that their full enjoyment depends upon an agricultural and industrial development not yet attained by the Puerto Rican community.

Amendments to the Constitution may be proposed by a concurrent resolution approved by not less than two-thirds of the total membership of each house of the Legislative Assembly. The amendments must be adopted by a majority of the qualified electors either in a general election or in a special referendum.

The Act of July 3, 1950, was the last of a series of enactments through which the United States has provided ever-increasing self-government in Puerto Rico.

The Treaty of Paris, which ceded Puerto Rico to the United States, was ratified and proclaimed fifty-three years ago. After a brief period of military government, the Congress in 1900 adopted the first organic act of Puerto Rico, known as the Foraker Act, which established a civil government for the Island. By making provision for a popularly-elected lower house of the legislative assembly, called the House of Delegates, the Foraker Act extended some measure of local self-government to Puerto Rico. Preponderant control of the local government of Puerto Rico was retained by the United States, however, by virtue of the President's authority under the Act to appoint the Governor, the heads of the Executive Departments, the Justices of the Supreme Court, and the eleven members of the Executive Council of Puerto Rico.

The present Organic Act of Puerto Rico, enacted on March 2, 1917, provided a substantial advance in local self-government for Puerto Rico. By creating the Legislature of Puerto Rico, composed of a popularly-elected Senate and House of Representatives, it gave the people direct control over the legislative branch of the government. Concurrently, the Executive Council created by the Foraker Act was divested of its legislative functions. An opportunity for greater participation in the formulation of executive policies was provided the people of Puerto Rico by authorizing the Governor, with the advice and consent of the insular Senate, to appoint the heads of the

executive departments, except the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Education. Authority to appoint the Governor, the Attorney General, the Commissioner of Education, the Auditor, and the Justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico was reserved to the President of the United States. The Act granted full United States citizenship to the people of Puerto Rico and gave them a bill of rights. It also authorized them to elect a representative to the Congress, accredited to the House of Representatives.

In 1946, I appointed the first native of Puerto Rico as Governor, Jesus T. Pinero.

By the Act of August 5, 1947, the people of Puerto Rico were authorized to elect their own Governor. This Act also provided that the heads of all executive departments of Puerto Rico were to be appointed by the elected Governor of Puerto Rico, including the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Education. As a result of the Act, therefore, the people of Puerto Rico assumed direct responsibility and control over the executive branch of the local government. The President of the United States still retained authority to appoint the Auditor and the Justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, but even this authority will be relinquished upon approval of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

Through the Act of July 3, 1950, providing for the establishment of a constitution government in Puerto Rico, the United States gives evidence once more of its adherence to the principle of self-determination and its devotion to the ideals of freedom and democracy. The people of Puerto Rico have accepted the law as enacted by the Congress. They have complied with its requirements and have submitted their Constitution for the approval of the Congress. With its approval, full authority and responsibility for local self-government will be vested in the people of Puerto Rico. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico will be a government which is truly by the consent of the governed. No government can be invested with a higher dignity and greater worth than one based upon the principle of consent.

The people of the United States and the people of Puerto Rico are entering into a new relationship that will serve as an inspiration to all who love freedom and hate tyranny. We are giving new substance to man's hope for a world with liberty and equality under law. Those who truly love freedom know that the right relationship between a government and its people is one based on mutual consent and esteem.

The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is a proud document that embodies the best of our democratic heritage. I recommend its early approval by the Congress.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
April 22, 1952.

May 5, 1952

Recent Publication

[Released by the Department of State]

Double Taxation, Taxes on Income. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2347. Pub. 4463. 14 pp. 5¢.

Convention between the United States and Canada—
Signed at Ottawa June 12, 1950; entered into force
Nov. 21, 1951.

Double Taxation, Estate Taxes and Succession Duties. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2348. Pub. 4464. 8 pp. 5¢.

Convention between the United States and Canada—
Signed at Ottawa June 12, 1950; entered into force
Nov. 21, 1951.

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The Problem Ahead

by Francis H. Russell

Director of the Office of Public Affairs¹

U. S. SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS

MAY 27 1952

Within our generation there have been two world wars, and today we are struggling to prevent Korea from erupting into a third one. Hundreds of thousands of boys have been sent far from home. Billions of dollars' worth of our material have been required to preserve freedom abroad. Our country has been thrust from its quiet, comfortable isolation into world leadership at a time when civilization—it is far from trite to say—hangs in the balance.

And today we find ourselves in what must appear as the most unlikely situation of all: The Kremlin holding a "world trade conference," putting forth plans for "easing the tension" in Germany, and suggesting a big power conference to "settle over-all problems."

It is about this latest development in the present world conflict that I would like to talk.

The problem presents itself here at home in concrete ways. A few days ago a woman from Connecticut said to me: "These are obviously crucial days. Far-reaching decisions will have to be made. It is supremely important that we do the right thing. A lot of my friends and I have been wondering whether there is not some specially vital program for this country that we should be supporting." She referred to the William Allen White committee, the Committee To Defend America by Aiding the Allies, which supported action that helped to save the cause of freedom in the early days of World War II. It seemed to her, she said, that people of similar-seriousness of

purpose today should be throwing their weight behind some one measure that might be of comparable importance.

We discussed her question at some length but without, I am afraid, coming to the kind of conclusion she hoped for. It may be that the days of simple problems with simple solutions, when you could throw yourself behind a slogan like "Fifty-four forty or fight," or a Committee To Defend America by Aiding the Allies and feel that everything that was important was wrapped in a single package—it may be that those days have gone forever.

But there is more to it than that. There is another reason why this woman and many like her are having trouble. It is tied in, I suggest, with the problems that are raised by these latest moves of the Kremlin. It relates to the fact that we are passing from one phase in our international relations into another, which has new premises and new problems and requires new answers.

Recognizing World Problems

We can say, I think, that the first phase of the present era in world relationships, the era marked by sharp conflict between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world, began during World War II. The problem as it presented itself during the first phase was most cogently set forth by President Roosevelt as related in an article by Forrest Davis in the April 10, 1943, *Saturday Evening Post*. Mr. Davis spent a week living in the White House and talked at length with the President. He said he was authorized to sum up the President's views this way:

¹ Address made at Jackson College, Jackson, Miss., on May 2. Also printed as Department of State publication 4589, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C., for 5¢.

"The defeat and disarmament of the Axis will leave . . . power vacuums in Europe from the limits of the Soviet Union in the east to the English Channel and in Eastern Asia. With Germany reduced and France in ruins, Russia becomes the only first-rate military power on the Continent. Under such circumstances, the great mass of the Russian Bear, strong with victory, would overshadow the west as at no time since Russia became a great state.

"The riddle at the heart of postwar planning in the western democracies is what use the Kremlin proposes making of such power . . . Russian successes in the field have not produced greater warmth in Moscow toward the western allies. Yet, as matters stand, the shape of the postwar world depends . . . on Stalin . . . It is not too much to say that he can have the kind of world he desires. If Stalin elects to collaborate, the foundations of a world society of good will can be laid with confidence.

"Should Stalin elect otherwise, the western allies would no doubt be driven back on a balance-of-power system . . .

"All planning for future international cooperation calls for sweeping assumptions and entails risks. To assume that Russia, Britain and the United States will, once the enemy is vanquished, submerge their ideological differences, subdue ancient grievances, overcome rivalries over air routes and trade, and collaborate loyally in the restoration of Western Europe and the reorganization of Eastern Asia plainly implies such a risk. The President prefers to make that assumption and is willing to shoulder the risk."

The policy during this phase of our relations with the Soviet Union was described by Mr. Byrnes, while he was Secretary of State, as one of "patience and firmness." Later, as difficulties increased, the order was reversed. It was "firmness and patience." But there was still the hope President Roosevelt had voiced that the men in the Kremlin would decide that it was in their interest and the interest of the people whom they ruled, as well as that of the rest of the people in the world, to proceed on a "live and let live" basis. The risks of this course of action were taken. And I cannot help thinking that future generations will applaud the all-out effort that was made to demonstrate to the men in the Kremlin that, provided only each nation was permitted to work out its own pattern of life, the Soviet Union had

no reason to fear its world neighbors. The record of the free world's desire for peace is clear and indisputable. It will serve us in good stead.

But by the spring of 1947 it was clear that the Soviet Union had no intention of proceeding on that basis. The countries of Eastern Europe had Communist regimes forced upon them by the occupying Soviet armies in violation of the Yalta Agreement of February 1945, which provided for free elections in the liberated states of Europe. Shortly afterward, as a result of a Communist coup, Czechoslovakia came under Soviet domination. The United Nations was prevented from achieving its objectives by the Soviet's consistent use of the veto and its substitution of harangues and diatribe for orderly debate. The Kremlin placed every obstacle it could in the way of the economic recovery of Western Europe. It brought pressures against Turkey to induce its capitulation on the Dardanelles, and it supported a bloody guerrilla warfare against the Government of Greece. Finally, at the Moscow conference in March 1947, it made such impossible demands in connection with reparations, boundaries, and the economic and political unification of Germany that Secretary Marshall became convinced that the efforts of the free world to work out its problems with the Kremlin on a "live and let live" basis were futile.

Marshaling the Resources of the Free World

So the second phase began, a phase which has lasted up to just about the present time. It was the phase in which the free world began marshaling its vast resources in all fields—political, economic, military, and moral—converting these resources from potential into actual strength.

So we have seen the Truman Doctrine of March 1947, aimed immediately at protecting Greece and Turkey against Soviet pressures but stating more broadly that we will "help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity . . . (enabling) them to work out their own destinies in their own way."

We have seen the Marshall Plan, adopted in 1948 by Congress, designed to enable Western Europe to recover from the devastations of World War II and to strengthen the economic stability of a vital part of the free world.

We have seen, in April 1949, the United States and 11 other members of the North Atlantic Community sign a treaty laying the foundation of

NATO to build up the military defenses of Western Europe, with General Eisenhower as the first Supreme Commander.

We have seen the Rio Pact of 1947 and the Organization of American States, set up in 1948, aimed at strengthening the defensive forces and cementing the unity of the Western Hemisphere.

We have seen the Point Four Program, proposed by President Truman in 1949, aimed at improving living conditions of people in underdeveloped areas of the world by making available to them the knowledge and experience of the United States in achieving better education, better food, better governmental procedures, better roads, better health, and all the other related measures indispensable to a modern standard of living.

We have seen the adoption by the United Nations of the Acheson Plan, in November 1950, designed to make it possible for the General Assembly to act quickly in preserving the peace when the Security Council has been thwarted by the obstructive action of any power.

We have seen the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, beginning in September 1949 and reinforced by the Mutual Security Program of 1951, seeking, with the collaboration of the participating states, to build up the military capacity of the free world and to promote the most efficient use of their economic and military resources.

We have seen the foundations laid, in September 1951, for increasing security in the Pacific by the Treaty of Peace With Japan and the security treaties with Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.

And, most crucially of all, when it was clear that Communist aggressors were willing to resort to armed force to gain their ends, we have seen the decision to defend the Republic of Korea, thereby making a reality of collective security and giving confidence to all countries threatened with Communist aggression.

Building Our Strength

All of these measures have required careful planning, great effort, and many sacrifices. In some instances the margin of success is narrower than we should like. Nevertheless it can be said that at just about this point of time we are passing from the period when the free world was relatively disunited, unawake, and weak—a period when our military security was too largely based

upon a virtually exclusive possession of the atom bomb—into a period where our vast potential strength has been made actual and can be brought to bear upon our basic problem.

Of course we must maintain these four strengths.

Politically, we must promote the solidarity of the peoples of Western Europe, the North Atlantic Community, the American Republics, and other free-world areas and give constructive leadership in the work of the United Nations.

Economically, we must remove unreasonable trade restrictions, thereby making it possible for other countries to trade with us since only by such trade can the free world obtain the benefit of its vast resources.

Militarily, we must continue to build our own forces and help our allies to build theirs through the Mutual Security Program.

We must demonstrate the moral power of the free world through our support of the basic principles of democratic government. We must carry the Campaign of Truth to other peoples of the world, particularly those behind the Iron Curtain, so that they will know, for instance, that rarely before in our history has there been such a widespread, such a genuinely high-caliber ferment of constructive ideas as is going on today.

Using Strength Wisely

But now, with this process of building our strength well advanced, the question that faces us is "What do we intend to do with this strength?" This, I would like to suggest, is what the woman from Connecticut, and many other people, are really concerned about.

The question must arise in the mind of any intelligent person. It takes different forms. For instance, we hear it said: "What is our basic strategy, our blueprint for victory? Are we only moving from day to day or do we have a firm objective?"

Or others say: "We are being asked to make great sacrifices; is there a light at the end of the tunnel?"

Or again: "Will this country and other free countries go bankrupt before we achieve our objective? If so, is there not a danger that in the very process of building up our strength to preserve our freedoms we will destroy the foundations of the freedom that we are struggling to protect?"

Not only are these questions being asked, but we can detect also the main outlines of the answers that are being put forward.

First, there is the group that says, in effect, "Let's drop some bombs and get it over with." A short while ago these people described themselves as proponents of "preventive war" though they never succeeded in explaining just what the difference would be between the war they were promoting and the war they were endeavoring to "prevent." More recently they have favored a bigger war in Korea and taking military action against Communist China. Still more recently they urge that we assist the Chinese Nationalists to launch an attack on the mainland of China.

What all these measures amount to is either a deliberate embarking upon World War III or a reckless disregard of the likelihood that World War III would result. This is a risk we must not take because we want, subject only to the preservation of freedom, to avoid the frightful devastation of a third world war.

Now, the second answer that is being put forward is a slight variation of the first. It is suggested that we decide right now what kind of conduct we would like from the men in the Kremlin, and then tell them clearly and in detail what they must do and what they must not do; then, if they do not do immediately what they must do, or do do what we say they must not do, we "let loose with all we've got." This, as I say, is to all practical intents and purposes a variant of the first school of thought and would have the same results.

The third suggested line of action is, at first view, far more attractive. It suggests that we sit down with the men in the Kremlin and work out "spheres of influence," that we draw a line and say that on one side of the line the Kremlin will be supreme and that on the other side of the line free peoples will be allowed to work out their own pattern of life in their own way.

"Isn't this what we want? Isn't this what we have been struggling for?" the proponents of this approach say.

But we must ask ourselves a few questions. Can we honestly say that after a given date we will foreswear all interest and concern in all people on the other side of the line, many of whom have been as passionately attached to human freedom and have worked and sacrificed as valiantly in its behalf as any of us have? Are we to say that the

bonds that link free men can really be severed by the drawing of any such line?

More practically, are we sure that, by agreeing to such a line, we would not be falling into a well-laid Communist trap?

What is the design of the Kremlin? Two and a half years ago Secretary Acheson said: "The danger to the rest of the world . . . arises out of the belief made amply clear in Bolshevik political writings that the holding of power by the rulers of the Soviet Union requires the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the countries now free of their control."²

Lenin and Stalin have time and time again told their followers that the strategy of the Communist conspiracy must be to move forward whenever and wherever possible and by all possible means but to recognize that there will be times when forces of resistance will develop and temporarily make impossible further expansion. At such times, the Communist dogma goes, everything possible must be done to hold all gains, appear to subside for a period so that the resistance will disappear and then move forward again.

Lenin, for instance, said: "The strictest loyalty to the ideas of communism must be combined with the ability to make all the necessary practical compromises, to tack, to make agreements, zigzags, retreats, and so on." And "the task of a true revolutionary party is . . . to be able throughout all compromises, when they are unavoidable, to remain true . . . to its revolutionary purpose."

Stalin has added, with obvious insight: "It is not for nothing that the proverb says, 'An obliging bear is more dangerous than an enemy.'"

It is obviously in line with that strategy that the Kremlin is now holding out the lures of the world trade conference, the "peace crusades" and the talk of "lessening the tensions." The recent Soviet proposals for "talks" on Germany are in the same category.

So we cannot adopt this third suggested policy without examining carefully the Soviet proposals and insisting that, before we agree to sit down with them, they explain to the people of the world exactly what basic issues they believe are susceptible to negotiation, and what guaranties they are willing to put up that agreements, if and when reached, will be kept. To fail to do so would mean that all of the fruits of blood and sacrifice, all of the tremendous effort of the past 5 years,

² BULLETIN of Dec. 18, 1950, p. 962.

all of the welding of a strong free world would be scrapped—and shortly we should see the Kremlin moving forward again.

The fourth possible course of action is the hardest to describe. By its very essence it is the least sharply defined. It requires the greatest balance of intelligence, patience, persistence, and nerve.

It is that we maintain and, where necessary, increase the free world's strength—political, economic, military, and moral—on the assumption that, confronted with this strength, finding it impossible to carry off any more aggressions, or succeed with its subversions, shown up for what it is, oppressive and ruthless, the police state will suffer from its inherent and inescapable weaknesses, the master plan of the Kremlin will perforce and in time fall apart, and will be replaced by something more amenable to the decencies of international life. This policy seeks to avoid the tragedy of war, to correct the circumstances affording special advantage to the Kremlin, and to guide international life toward cooperative patterns of conduct.

The reasonable expectation of the success of such a program is testified to not only by all human experience but by what we know of what is going on behind the Iron Curtain; by the splitting off of Yugoslavia; by the increasing purges in satellite countries; by the hysterical Communist propaganda; by the thousands upon thousands of fugitives that continue to stream over to the free world with stories of tensions, uneasiness and dissatisfaction with life under a police state; and most recently by the eloquent testimony of the 100,000 North Korean and Chinese Communist prisoners-of-war who say they prefer even barbed wire camps to life under a Communist regime.

Accepting Responsibility for the Future

The scene where the conflict is centered will change from time to time, as will the nature of the challenge. Now it will be putting down guerrilla warfare, as in Greece. Now aid to a satellite that has made the break, as in Yugoslavia. Now Germany, in exposing a spurious offer of unity. Now Indochina or Iran.

There will be failures and successes—but increasingly more successes than failures, we are justified in expecting.

This fourth way is not the quick way, the easy way, that ad writers for the soap products love to talk about—there is no quick and easy way in

this case—but it is the way that best holds out the promise of ultimate victory without laying the world waste in a war that it would be only less disastrous to win than to lose.

The cost will be high, but the price of freedom has always been high. And we must remember that the free world has, over the Soviet world, twice the population, five times the steel production, four times the coal, nine times the oil, and ten times the electric power.

If we succeed in maintaining our strengths and avoiding war, then behind the security that these strengths will insure, the two ways of life will, in effect, go into competition with each other to demonstrate their comparative worths for mankind—the free world versus the police state. If our convictions are sound, if the free way of life is more in accord with human needs, human drives, human hopes, human nature, then, given the opportunity, it will commend itself to human beings everywhere.

That is why moral strength—moral, intellectual, spiritual, ideological, the dynamic of the democratic idea, whatever you call it—is in the long run the most important of all.

It is triply important. Not only is it the *means* by which in the long run we shall win this struggle. It is the *reason* we must win it, because we are the custodians of this precious heritage from those who have fought and worked before us. And it is the *foundation* upon which the world we are working toward, the world that will increasingly emerge as that struggle is won, will be built.

We can only build it through a brotherhood of the free. And this is an undertaking in which we must provide the leadership. We can provide leadership for a free and dynamic society only in one way—that is by *being* preeminently that kind of society ourselves.

The answer, therefore, is one for every American to provide. These are not questions that can be given final answers in the State Department, in the White House, or even in Congress, because the answer depends upon the willingness of the American people to make the necessary sacrifices, to pay high taxes, to have their boys take part in military training and in many instances be stationed abroad, to perform all the other tasks and accept all the other inconveniences and hardships that are required.

Above all, the answer requires an unusual depth of understanding of the forces at work in the

world today so that necessary measures by the free nations will not be undercut by lack of popular support.

Harold Nicholson, the British writer on modern diplomacy, has pointed out that we are in a period when diplomacy must be carried on in the glare of klieg lights and is subject to public approval and support; and the public which must support the necessary measures does not always have the knowledge, experience, and insight necessary for wise decisions. To the extent this is true, it is a shortcoming that must be corrected if we are to survive.

There is no substitute—absolutely none—for individual responsibility. The task of exercising our world leadership, of becoming adequately informed, and of making sound judgments is hard. It takes time. It takes intense mental effort. It takes persistence. These are the real dimensions of the answer that must be made to the woman from Connecticut.

There will be headaches and heartaches ahead, but I suggest we put over our fireplaces what Pericles told us more than two thousand years ago: "The key to liberty is courage."

The European Payments Union

by Louis C. Boochever, Jr.

The Council of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), under whose authority the European Payments Union (EPU) operates, has recently taken the important decision that the Union should continue to function beyond June 30, 1952. OEEC has requested from the EPU Managing Board recommendations for the solution of the principal problems involved in such a continuation. The international agreement which established EPU in 1950¹ provided that OEEC, in consultation with the United States, should determine the conditions on which EPU might remain in force beyond the 2-year period for which the original arrangements were effective. Although the exact terms under which the Union will operate after June 30 are still uncertain, a brief review of the existing structure, its accomplishments, problems, and prospects, may prove useful.

Organization and Functioning

The shortage of foreign exchange reserves and particularly of dollars in Europe after World War II, the disruption of productive facilities and commerce, and the general lack of convertibility of currencies caused most European countries to attempt to avoid trade deficits, which would normally have to be settled by the payment of gold or dollars. Each country, therefore, tried to balance within narrow limits the value of its export and import accounts with each of its trading partners. To achieve this balance, European governments generally resorted to the restriction of imports through the use of exchange controls and import quotas. This system of balancing international accounts bilaterally, although it helped revive trade after the war, severely limited its volume; the flow of goods between any two countries tended to be held down to the level set by the partner least able or willing to import or export. The restrictions on trade within Europe in many cases prevented importers from buying from the more efficient producers and held back the move-

¹ Agreement for the Establishment of a European Payments Union, signed at Paris on Sept. 19, 1950. The terms of this agreement were generally applied in settling the accounts of members as from July 1, 1950.

ment of goods needed for the recovery of Europe's economy.

After the inauguration of the European Recovery Program, a renewed effort to restore a more normal level of commerce within Europe culminated in the establishment of the European Payments Union.² The United States encouraged the creation of EPU, contributed to it financially, and has maintained a continuing interest in its effective operation.

Under the EPU agreement, the member countries periodically settle the net surplus or deficit in their European accounts with the Union as a whole, rather than separately with each other, and any surpluses which a member earns in trade with one EPU country are automatically offset against any deficits it may have with other members in arriving at this single EPU position. EPU thus inaugurated a comprehensive system of multilateral intra-European payments and marked a definite break with the pattern of bilateral balancing of trade.

A second major feature of the EPU mechanism is that the net position of each member country with the Union is settled only partially in gold or dollars; the remaining portion is settled by the extension of credit by the Union to debtor countries, or by creditor countries to the Union, according to an agreed schedule. Each country has a quota for the purpose of determining the relative amounts of credit extension and gold or dollar payments required in any settlement with the Union and the limits within which a surplus or deficit will be automatically settled in some part by credit extension.³ This quota is normally equal to 15 percent of the total value of the country's intra-European exports, imports, and invisible transactions in a base year (1949). The United Kingdom has the largest quota, equivalent to about 1 billion dollars; France's quota is 520 million; Germany's is 500 million dollars; and at the other extreme Iceland has a quota of 15 million dollars. The total of quotas for all members is about 4 billion dollars.⁴

²For an account of earlier approaches to the problem of restoring intra-European trade, as well as for an introduction to the principles of EPU, see BULLETIN of May 1, 1950, p. 681.

The membership in EPU is identical with that in OEEC and includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, the Free Territory of Trieste, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

³The position of any country with the Union is determined on a cumulative basis; net surpluses or deficits in each month are added to or subtracted from those for previous months. It is the cumulative position which, along with the gold-credit ratios and country quotas specified in the agreement, regulates the financial settlement which a member must make with the Union.

⁴No individual quotas were allocated to Iceland and Trieste, which are members of the sterling area and Italian monetary area respectively.

Ratio of Gold Payments to Credit Extension

A country which is running a deficit with the Union is extended 100 percent credit by the Union as long as its cumulative deficit does not exceed 20 percent of its quota. If the deficit rises above this level, however, the member must settle in gold from 20 to 80 percent of this deficit, depending on the size of the deficit in relation to its quota. Members that are cumulative creditors in their European accounts extend credit to the Union to cover in full any surplus up to 20 percent of their quota; for any surplus above this amount, they receive payment in gold from the Union equal to one-half of the surplus and extend credit for the other half. If a member exceeds its quota as a debtor, it must settle the deficit beyond its quota fully in gold. OEEC must take special decisions to determine the terms of settlement for members which exceed their quota as creditors.

The ratio of gold payments to credit extension was designed to provide incentives for both creditor and debtor countries to bring their intra-European trade as a whole into a reasonable balance. For example, when a country is in a debtor position, the obligation to cover an increasing part of its deficit in gold or dollars serves as an incentive for corrective measures.

Apart from whatever credit is provided under the quotas, initial balances were made available on the books of the Union as grants or loans to countries judged to be "structural" debtors, or, generally speaking, those faced with the prospect of persistent deficits in their trade. Similarly, countries considered to be in a strong intra-European payments position made special grants to the Union. Austria, Greece, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Turkey were allotted initial (credit) balances, while the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Belgium made grants to the Union. The United States made a portion of its dollar aid to the latter countries conditional on their extending such grants to the Union.⁵

The United States also provided the EPU working capital fund of \$350 million which has been available to meet the demands on the Union in settling the accounts of members. The provisions for gold payments to the Union as compared with those for gold payments by the Union are such that it may be called upon to pay out at a particular settlement more gold than it has received. The use of the initial balances made available to prospective debtors also tends to require the Union to pay out in gold more than it receives since the

⁵For four of the countries (Austria, Greece, Iceland, and Turkey) facing persistent EPU deficits and lacking adequate means for making payments or repaying credits to EPU, the U.S. has made available special aid resources which are used to settle their deficits with the Union. Austria and Greece, which are not granted access to the credit facilities of the Union, settle deficits with the Union fully in gold.

Surplus or deficit as percentage of quota	Creditors		Debtors	
	Receive gold from the Union	Grant credit to the Union	Pay gold to the Union	Receive credit from the Union
	Percentages			
Above 0 and up to 20		20		20
" 20 " 40	10	10	4	16
" 40 " 60	10	10	8	12
" 60 " 80	10	10	12	8
" 80 " 100	10	10	16	4
Over-all percentages of total quotas	40	60	40	60

(Source: OEEC, *European Payments Union: First Annual Report of the Managing Board.*)

grants to the Union by prospective creditors did not fully offset them.

Other important features of the EPU agreement provide under certain circumstances for the use in EPU settlements of the trade balances between members which were outstanding (and unfunded) at the time the Union became effective and for regular clearing of payments between EPU members and countries which are not members of the EPU but which are within the "monetary area" of a member.⁶ Both of these provisions affect particularly the relation of the United Kingdom to the Union, because, at the inception of the EPU, other European countries held substantial sterling balances and because many important trading countries, such as Australia, India, and Ceylon, are members of the sterling area. The payments balances between EPU members and the sterling area as a whole, therefore, are settled through Britain's account in EPU and within the British quota.

The Bank for International Settlements (Basel, Switzerland), as agent for the Union, determines the payments position of the members at the end of each month on the basis of reports from the Central Banks of the member countries and the manner in which surpluses and deficits should be settled in accordance with the EPU agreement. The managing board of seven members, appointed by the Council of OEEC, supervises the execution of the agreement. A representative of the United States attends the sessions of the board as an observer.

⁶ When such balances are used for settling net deficits with EPU, they are customarily described as "existing resources." Net surpluses and deficits are first adjusted to take account of the use of existing resources, initial balances, or both before arriving at the "accounting" surplus or deficit, which is settled by gold payment and credits as shown in table.

Objectives and Accomplishments

Underlying the rather complex technical provisions of EPU are general policy objectives of great importance both to the European members and to the United States. EPU was designed to promote a freer flow of trade within Europe, to reduce the incentive for European countries to apply remaining trade and payments restrictions in a discriminatory manner, and to assist the member nations in making the transition which would be required at the conclusion of the European Recovery Program. The members also hoped that it would stimulate a degree of specialization in trade and production which would encourage efficient producers within Europe and in this way promote the earning and conserving of dollars necessary for a return to the general convertibility of currencies. In addition, it was contemplated that a mechanism like EPU, by providing a framework for closer coordination of monetary and fiscal policies and for the lowering of trade barriers, would provide a stimulus toward further political and economic integration within Europe.

Despite the strains on the European economy and on EPU stemming from the urgent acceleration of defense efforts after Korea, EPU has a record of considerable achievement in meeting its objectives. The establishment of the Union, with its system of multilateral payments, virtually eliminated the financial incentive for governments to restrict trade with other EPU members in a bilateral or discriminatory manner. As a result, EPU has undoubtedly tended to encourage reliance on the more efficient producers within Europe and to discourage the establishment and expansion of those which are less efficient.

The EPU system of multilateral compensation, moreover, has permitted a substantial expansion

in the volume of intra-European trade with a very modest use of gold reserves, outside assistance, and credit extension. During the first 19 months of operations under EPU, total imports and exports of the members were roughly 30 billion dollars. This volume of trade would be equivalent to an annual rate of over 18 billion dollars as compared with an estimated 12 billion dollar volume in 1949. Monthly bilateral surpluses and deficits of the EPU members in this period totaled about 6 billion dollars, of which 75 percent, or 4.5 billion dollars, was cleared by the automatic multilateral offsetting of the surpluses and deficits accruing within accounting periods, and by the operation of the cumulative principle in offsetting surpluses in one month against deficits in an earlier month. Part of the remaining 1.5 billion dollars was settled by the use of existing resources, of special resources provided by the United States to certain debtor countries, and of initial balances, but the major portion of the settlement was by the gold payments and credit extension provided for under the country quotas, or agreed upon for members exceeding their quotas.

U.S. dollar assistance associated with this volume of intra-European transactions—including “conditional” aid, special resources to intra-European debtors, the actual use of the capital fund contributed by the United States, and a special payment to the United Kingdom to compensate for sterling used in EPU settlements—amounted to \$431 million or 7 percent of the 6 billion dollar total. By comparison with the system for clearing intra-European payments which preceded EPU, it can be demonstrated that the value of intra-European trade which has taken place under EPU is very large in relation to the value of foreign exchange reserves or of U.S. aid employed in effecting the necessary international settlements.

With respect to the removal of restrictions on trade, the EPU made possible the adoption by the OEEC of a Code of Trade Liberalization which, in addition to establishing the principle of nondiscrimination in intra-European trade, provided for the progressive removal of quantitative restrictions on trade among its members. The OEEC members have accepted an obligation to remove such restrictions on commodities comprising 75 percent of their private imports from other OEEC members in a base year (1948). Although this level of liberalization has not been universally achieved, and from time to time member countries have had to retract measures of liberalization after they were instituted, nearly all countries have made considerable progress, and some have liberalized substantially more than 75 percent of their trade.

The functioning of the EPU has been closely associated, moreover, with European progress toward economic integration and political federation. As a result of the examination of the EPU

positions of various countries by the managing board and by OEEC, and their recommendations based on this examination, the Union has assumed an unprecedented role in guiding the national and international financial practices of its members. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the managing board takes decisions on a majority basis, and that, with certain exceptions, these decisions are binding on all the EPU members. The reduction of international barriers to trade and invisible transactions under the OEEC Code of Trade Liberalization is also considered as a major step toward a single European market, free from national restrictions.

The contribution of the EPU toward a return to full multilateral trade and the general convertibility of currencies is more difficult to evaluate. Although this objective has obviously not been achieved, world events such as the sharp rise in commodity prices after Korea and the acceleration of armaments programs have been decisive in determining the progress of European nations in this direction. In discussing the EPU objective of encouraging financial independence and the transition to a sound and stable pattern of worldwide commercial and financial relations, the managing board of the EPU made the following comments in its First Annual Report:⁷

The crucial question for the satisfactory operation of the Union, or of any other payments system, including a system of full convertibility, is to what extent the member has been able to achieve and maintain internal and external equilibrium. It was hoped that the automatic incentives and checks built into the Agreement, together with the counsel and advice of the Organisation [the OEEC] to its members, through the various organs established for this purpose, including the Managing Board as well as the other Committees of the Organisation, would tend to influence the policy of members and lead them to follow courses of action which would maintain their equilibrium. The experience of the first year in this matter is not without hopeful signs. Assistance or counsel has been given to many members, both debtors and creditors, with a view to averting extreme positions and consequent difficulties; in many of these cases, whether or not because of the intervention of the Organisation or of the appreciation by members of their obligations under the Agreement, there has recently been a reversal of the previous tendencies which were working against the achievement of equilibrium; or at least a halt has been called.

Problems and Prospects

Despite the progress under the EPU agreement, many aspects of intra-European commercial and financial relations still require improvement, and certain stresses in the operation of the EPU itself should be resolved if it is to continue to function effectively. Thus, although progress has been made in freeing trade from quantitative restrictions, both the United Kingdom and France have recently (since the report of the managing board, cited above) been undergoing acute payments dif-

⁷OEEC, *European Payments Union: First Annual Report of the Managing Board*, Paris, August 1951, p. 35.

difficulties which have led them to reimpose certain trade restrictions temporarily. This retrogression in the position of the two largest trading countries within the ERT has raised various problems in connection with the ERT's resources and has also tended to discourage further progress under the program for liberalizing trade.

Bilateral dealing and discrimination in the administration of trade controls within the ERT area still occur even though the need for this type of control as a means of regulating the balance of payments has been virtually eliminated. The remaining practices of this type are motivated principally by the desire to secure a bargaining advantage either in the procurement of scarce materials or in selling particular commodities for which the demand is weak. In attempting to encourage increased Belgian imports from the ERT area, as one means of reducing the continuing surplus of Belgium beyond its quota, the OEEC has concurred in Belgian efforts to divert imports from the United States to European sources through the use of restrictions on trade with the dollar area. In the view of the United States, these Belgian restrictions are in conflict with various international obligations which the Belgians have undertaken, and represent a step away from the goal of a more liberal pattern of world trade.

Principal institutional problems affecting the ability of the ERT to continue to function effectively concern the adequacy of the convertible assets for the purpose of making the necessary gold payments to members after June 30, 1952, and the terms for settlements with extreme creditors once they have exhausted their quotas. The managing board of the ERT considers that the Union's convertible assets should be strengthened to promote its effective functioning. The United States believes that the ERT members will be able to deal with this problem from their own resources and does not contemplate at this time any further United States contribution to the ERT capital fund. The OEEC Council has requested the ERT managing board to reconsider its analysis of the additional assets required and to make proposals on increasing them.

The relation of extreme creditors to the Union is especially acute in the case of Belgium, which has far exceeded its quota as a creditor, but has continued to settle its surpluses with ERT partially through the extension of credit to the Union. Belgium does not wish, after June 30, to make additional credit available to the Union beyond the amount it will have extended by that time and, in the meantime, has been restricting its exports to the ERT area in order to limit its surplus. A decision by the ERT to settle any Belgian surplus fully in gold or dollars, however, might result in a serious drain on the ERT's convertible assets. The managing board is currently formulating proposals for dealing with this problem.

The European nations, convinced that the ERT has been of great benefit to their trade and their economies, believe that the alternative to its continuation under the present circumstances would be a reversion to an extremely restrictive form of bilateral bargaining and discrimination in their intra-European trade relations. Such a reversion not only would jeopardize the remarkable economic recovery which has taken place in Europe since the war but also would hinder the transfer among the European nations of commodities and military equipment essential to the strengthening of the common defense.

The United States encouraged the formation of the ERT in order to support objectives vital to European recovery. Now the ERT has assumed added significance as a mechanism which facilitates those economic transactions within Europe necessary for the current intensive building of military defenses in the free world. Our Government continues to maintain a keen interest in the development of the ERT and welcomes the recent action by the OEEC Council as evidence of European determination to provide for the effective operation of the Union during this crucial period.

• *Mr. Boochever, author of the above article, is an economist in the Office of European Regional Affairs.*

Procedure for Travel In Iron Curtain Countries

The Department of State announced on May 1 that it was taking additional steps to warn American citizens of the risks of travel in Iron Curtain countries by stamping all passports not valid for travel in those countries unless specifically endorsed by the Department of State for such travel.

In making this announcement, the Department emphasized that this procedure in no way forbids American travel to those areas. It contemplates that American citizens will consult the Department or the consulates abroad to ascertain the dangers of traveling in countries where acceptable standards of protection do not prevail and that, if no objection is perceived, the travel may be authorized.

All new passports will be stamped as follows:

THIS PASSPORT IS NOT VALID FOR TRAVEL TO ALBANIA, BULGARIA, CHINA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, POLAND, RUMANIA OR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ENDORSED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AS BEING VALID FOR SUCH TRAVEL

All outstanding passports, which are equally subject to the restriction, will be so endorsed as occasion permits.

U.K. Protests Against Increased U.S. Use Of Trade Agreement Escape Clauses

PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON

[Released to the press April 30]

Last week some of you asked about the British note on possible action by the United States to impose trade restrictions under the escape clauses of our trade agreements. This note was received in the Department on April 10 and was later published by the British Embassy on April 18.

Now, most of our trade agreements, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, contain a clause saying that tariff concessions may be withdrawn under certain conditions if necessary to prevent serious injury to a domestic industry. The British note points to a substantial increase in the number of applications which U.S. producers have made to the Tariff Commission for the use of this clause. The British concern is that, if this clause should be applied loosely whenever there is a material increase in competition from imports, it would have a serious effect on the ability of the United Kingdom and other countries to earn dollars. Increased dollar earnings are necessary if they are to lessen their dependence on grant aid from the United States and to carry their share of the military burden.

The Department would agree that the escape clause should not be resorted to lightly and that in the trade agreements that we have made with other governments it was understood that the use of these provisions would be confined to cases of genuinely serious injury to domestic industry flowing from our trade commitments. Clearly the application of loose standards in this field would undo much of what has been accomplished under the Trade Agreements Program.¹

If we and our partners in the free world are to build the kind of economic and military strength we need for our security, we must all cooperate to reduce and minimize the barriers to trade between us.

¹ For text of a report on trade agreement escape clauses, prepared for the President by the Trade Agreements Committee, see BULLETIN of Jan. 28, 1952, p. 143.

BRITISH AIDE MÉMOIRE OF APRIL 9

Applications under Article 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act

In recent months there has been a most disturbing increase in the number of applications for relief under Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951. Among those which directly affect important United Kingdom export trade are those relating to motor bicycles and parts, bicycles and parts, certain chinaware, tobacco pipes and wood screws.

2. These cases and others which affect the United Kingdom less, are still at the stage of investigation or hearing. Recommendations have not yet been made by the Tariff Commission. It is obviously premature to assume that relief will be granted in the cases now under review but in the light of the decisions reached in respect of fur felt hats and hatters' fur,² there are obviously grounds for anxiety, and it may, therefore, not be too early to bring the following considerations to the attention of the State Department.

3. The United States market has never been an easy one for the goods of other countries. Large as it is, it is extremely well-supplied in most cases by domestic producers who pride themselves in being among the most efficient in the world. Since the last war a great deal of effort has been expended, both by the Government of the United Kingdom and indeed by the United States Administration, to persuade exporters in the United Kingdom to cultivate the United States market. It has appeared both to the United Kingdom and to the United States Governments, that it was essential, for both economic and political reasons, that the dependence of the United Kingdom on external aid should be ended as rapidly as possible. It has long been clear that deplorable restrictions on international trade could be avoided only if the United Kingdom were able greatly to increase its dollar earnings. It has been clear, also, that the power of the United Kingdom to be

² *Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1952, p. 96.

an effective ally, strong both militarily and economically, was threatened by the difficulty in balancing its external, and particularly its dollar, account.

4. In earning dollars the United Kingdom, more perhaps than any other country, must rely on increasing sales in the United States of manufactured goods in direct competition with United States industry. British manufacturers and exporters, in spite of the temptation of higher profits in easier markets, have responded to the challenge. They have neither sought nor been given assistance which would render "unfair" the competition they offer the United States producers, and such success as they have had has been hard won. They are perturbed by the mounting evidence that any marked success in selling their goods in the United States will be countered by applications from United States industry for further protection and the fear that some at least of these applications may be granted. This feeling is not confined to the trades in which applications have already been made, but is very widespread so that it becomes a question whether, should the fears prove to be justified, the United Kingdom effort to pay its way by earning dollars on a fair competitive basis can be maintained. Should it fail, the economic policies of the United States as well as of the United Kingdom would be frustrated, and the ability of the United Kingdom to play its necessary part in the Western alliance would be weakened.

5. These considerations, although they apply with particular force to the United Kingdom, apply also to other European countries. In their memorandum of January, 1952, the Italian Embassy argued this matter among others with great force and conviction,³ and the United Kingdom would endorse what was said on it there.

6. It is not disputed that the withdrawal of tariff concessions under an "Escape Clause" procedure may very occasionally and in certain special circumstances be justified; and it is in fact recognised in Article XIX of the GATT that participating countries are free to withdraw tariff concessions included in the schedules to the GATT if, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of obligations under the GATT, products are im-

ported in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers.

7. If, however, the purpose of the tariff negotiations conducted under the GATT is not to be defeated, it is of the greatest importance that the provisions of Article XIX should be invoked only in cases where increased imports are causing or threatening undoubtedly serious injury to domestic producers and where the other conditions laid down in the GATT are also satisfied. Moreover, while this applies to action taken by any contracting party, it applies with special force to any suggestion that the United States Government should have resort to Article XIX. This is so for two reasons. First, if the contracting party which is the major creditor country in the world were to set an example of withdrawing tariff concessions whenever they revealed their effectiveness through more vigorous competition between the imported and the domestically produced product, it would be politically impossible for the Governments of the debtor countries—which have their own internal vested interests to contend with—to withstand pressure to have recourse to Article XIX in order to free themselves from tariff commitments which were proving embarrassing. Secondly, if any suggestions were to get about that the United States Government were prepared to apply any but the most rigorous standard of judgment to Escape Clause applications, the reliance which exporters in the United Kingdom and other countries could place on the continued application of United States tariff concessions would be so undermined that their will to make the special efforts and to take the added risks that are frequently necessary to increase their dollar-earning exports would be seriously impaired. In such circumstances, the difficulties of the Governments concerned in playing their part in what must be a cooperative endeavour to redress the present unbalance in payments between the dollar and non-dollar areas would be gravely increased. That in turn could not but affect the ability and willingness of those Governments to cooperate with the United States in commercial and other policies.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

9th April, 1952

³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 28, 1952, p. 660.

Economic Progress as a Source of Political Strength and Stability

by Willard L. Thorp

*Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

Today, the economic aspects of our foreign policy are intimately interwoven with our political and security objectives. In strengthening the structure of the free world and building toward a durable peace, failure to build strength on the economic front would represent fatal negligence. Yet we have often tended to think of international trade as a matter of concern only to the traders themselves and have sometimes failed to see its vital relationship to the other major elements in our foreign policy program. You who are especially concerned with imports are making a vital contribution to the security and economic health of the free world.

Since 1934, when Secretary of State Hull proposed, and Congress enacted, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program, American policy has been devoted to expansion of trade and opposed to trade restrictions. We have not stood alone in this position. In the planning for the postwar world, freeing world trade from restrictive barriers was one of the foundation stones. In the lend-lease agreements, the charters and articles establishing agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Monetary Fund, in the Anglo-American Financial Agreement, and in the bilateral agreements of the Marshall Plan, the concept of expanding the flow of trade on a nondiscriminatory basis was clearly set forth as a common objective of the major trading nations of the world.

One might be led to believe, from the propaganda about the Moscow Economic Conference, that expansion of trade was another new Russian

invention. But the free world's record is clear and long in this field. It is a record of genuine action, not of lip-service. The negotiation of trade agreements, especially the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, has greatly reduced tariff barriers both here and abroad and has limited the scope of trade barriers of all kinds. The European trade liberalization program under the auspices of the OEEC and the EFTU has been a direct attack upon the problem in Western Europe. The Schuman Plan has as its central objective, the free flow of coal and steel within the six member countries. And even the recent Commonwealth meeting of Finance Ministers, while considering an increase in import restrictions to protect the dwindling gold and dollar assets of the sterling area countries, reaffirmed the convertibility of sterling and the expansion of trade as fundamental, long-run objectives.

Given this apparently favorable environment, why has there not been a greater trade expansion? The chief reason lies, I believe, in the relatively low level of production outside the United States, and especially in Western Europe, which has been a dominant factor in the world economic picture during the postwar period. After all, the exchange of goods requires, in the first instance, the availability of goods for sale.

Economic Programs Aid World Conditions

During these years, therefore, governmental barriers to trade have been strongly reinforced by the limitations of the world economic conditions. American postwar economic policy has been directed in large part to these very world conditions. The purpose of the Marshall Plan was the

¹ Address made before the National Council of American Importers, Inc., at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 24 and re-leased to the press on the same date.

economic recovery of Europe, centered largely on facilitating increases in output and productivity. The purpose of the Point Four Program is the economic development of the underdeveloped areas, again with special emphasis on increasing production.

These programs have had their effect, and their influence will continue to increase. Before the defense programs in the various countries began to retard temporarily the processes of economic expansion of civilian goods, it had become clear that we were reaching a point where some of the economic limitations on trade were beginning to be overcome. The policies of lower trade barriers and of increased economic productivity were at last beginning to bear fruit. For the first time, we were beginning to be faced with the specific consequences of these policies, so far as our own economy is concerned. They are coming out of the area of theory into the area of fact. And so, once more one hears the question, Do we really want an expansion in foreign trade?

I am not a prophet, but I can see shadows in the crystal ball. They do not constitute a real pattern, but without too much exercise of the imagination, they can be interpreted as storm warnings for the future of trade. They worry me and they should worry you. The policies of the last eighteen years, now that they are actually leading to increased trade, are being challenged. Some of the doubts are raised by decisions of public policy, and some by the increasing demands by various special-interest groups for governmental action to provide greater protection against foreign competition.

Let us look at some current policies of governments. I shall distinguish between Government actions which fall within the orbit of Government policy intended to be in the general interest and those which may be the reflection of private pressures.

Let me start at once by saying that I do not include quota arrangements, based upon balance-of-payments necessity, as representing policy decisions that international trade should, as a matter of principle, be limited to a particular quantity. I would distinguish between quotas used to protect a domestic industry and those to protect gold and foreign exchange reserves. In this latter case, the quotas are intended to allocate the import trade within a total which is limited by the amount of foreign exchange which happens to be available. The recent extension of quota restrictions by the United Kingdom, various Commonwealth countries, and France are of this type. They are necessities not wanted by the countries concerned, and are clearly thought of as temporary.

Pro and Con of Trade Restrictions

But there are trade restrictions which reflect declared public policies. First are those which are related to so-called national planning. Trade

controls may be used as a means of encouraging a national plan of development. In many countries, plans for industrialization are used to justify "infant industry" protection. This is an old familiar. Perhaps it can be justified to encourage conception and to encourage survival during the hazardous period of infancy. But there is real danger when new industries follow the strictly nonbiological principle of "once an infant, always an infant." Our own chemicals industry is a case at point, where the incidence of the tariff rates is in many cases well over 100 percent, and in some may be as high as 200 and 300 percent.

Trade controls are also used in some countries to diversify their economies by discouraging exports in the raw material stage and encouraging exports after some degree of processing. Or they may be used to achieve greater domestic production of food and other necessities because of future uncertainty as to outside supplies.

There are also the situations where interference with foreign trade is used to enforce some domestic policy or program. This is clearly illustrated in the United States in the field of agriculture. Our domestic policy is to protect the farmer by supporting agricultural prices as parity may require. Since such a policy may at times result in maintaining our agricultural prices above world prices, there is the possibility that agricultural commodities will flow into the United States in abnormal quantities, and we will find ourselves helping to support agriculture in other countries as well. Consequently, our domestic agricultural policy can bring about a series of restrictions on imports designed to hold down the cost of the domestic program.

These various cases of public policy restrictions are often contrary to the objectives of expanding trade, even though they are undertaken to achieve other public policy objectives.

Controlling Factors of Restricting Imports

Turning to the second source of trade restrictions, namely, those imposed to satisfy special-interest groups, I think we all should be greatly concerned with the significant increase in the United States in the demands which such groups have been making for protection from foreign imports.

As I pointed out earlier, we have had a long period of automatic protection in many fields. During the past 10 years, our own production has expanded at a time when many historical foreign sources have been unable to produce any substantial quantities for export. The revival of these foreign competitors, and we have hardly heard from Japan as yet, has brought forth cries of threatened injury from an increasing number of special groups, many of whom have themselves expanded during recent years to fill a domestic

demand formerly met by foreign producers. I need not comment to you about section 104, whereby the Defense Production Act was made the vehicle for restricting the importation of cheese, on the grounds that foreign cheese is a threat "to the security and economic interests of the United States." But, there have been two cases under the escape clauses of the Trade Agreements Program where protective action was approved by the Tariff Commission and the President, one on hatter's fur and the other relating to hat bodies, and a temporary restriction in the form of a fee has been imposed on the imports of certain almonds under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The list of escape clause applications is steadily increasing, and now includes jeweled watches, motorcycles and parts, blue-mold cheese, wood screws, spring clothespins, ground-fish fillets, garlic, bicycles and parts, glacé cherries, bonito and tuna fish, certain types of china, tobacco pipes, dried figs, estrogenic compound, and whiting. This comes at a time when the economic recovery of other free world countries is not yet complete and there is every reason to expect the list to expand.

I am not criticizing these industries for seeking protection. That is their privilege and their right. I am citing them to illustrate how widespread is the belief that foreign goods will force American producers out of business, and the demand that the Government provide protection against foreign competition. Measured against national yardsticks of U.S. production or foreign trade, the economic significance of the foregoing industries, and therefore of the protection which they seek, does not loom large. But this is not the real measure. If American practice becomes that of restricting imports whenever they begin to increase even slightly, and other countries also follow the same pattern, the possibility of expansion of trade is destroyed.

I have been outlining one side of the picture. The threats of restriction seem ominous, but there are good signs, too. Under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program, tariffs on imports into the United States have been lowered at least one-half on the average from the extremely high rates imposed by the Tariff Act of 1930. Administrative steps have been taken to ease the procedural difficulties of entry so far as possible, and the Custom Simplification Bill has passed the House. Last year's imports into the United States nearly reached \$11 billion and broke all records, although we must in honesty admit that this figure was achieved by a physical volume of imports only 44 percent above that of 1936-38, at an average price three times the prewar level. The real challenge is one of the future rather than the present, but it does force us to take a fresh look at our policies.

What, therefore, should our policy be? First, let me put the problem in its immediate setting.

The United States is an exporting nation. We are organized to sell abroad. Last year, we exported the equivalent of nearly one out of every two bushels of wheat harvested, one out of every three bales of cotton picked, every fourth pound of tobacco produced, and about one out of every seven pounds of prunes dried. Our movies and our manufactured-goods industries have large foreign markets. In fact, most U.S. producers have an interest one way or another in the export market.

The United States is a creditor nation. Private investors hold foreign securities, many of our corporations have foreign branches or subsidiaries, and the Government itself is a large foreign creditor. In fact, foreign obligations to agencies of the U.S. Government as of today exceed \$10 billion. These not only bear interest, but the principal amounts must be repaid to us at varying dates in the future. And a creditor can only be a successful creditor when the debtor is able to meet his obligations on time and in full.

Bearing in mind that we are an exporting and a creditor nation, consider the fact that in the last 30 years, our exports have exceeded our imports in every single year. Last year, the gap was \$4 billion. From 1945 through 1951 it totalled \$31 billion. Many elements have contributed to balancing our foreign accounts in the past. In the last 30 years, important parts have been played by foreign securities sold in the United States, by the receipt of gold, and by the granting of foreign aid by the Government. While the situation can be affected in the future by developments such as expanding tourist trade or increased private foreign investments (which help while they are being made even though they create a new problem thereafter) there really seem to be only three basic alternatives: (1) we can decide to reduce the payments which foreign countries make to us by reducing our exports or by accepting default on payments on the loans which we have made; (2) we can continue meeting the balance with grant funds from the public treasury; or (3) we can take our payment in the form of imports of goods and services. The first solution takes it out of the producer for export and the taxpayer; the second takes it out of the taxpayer; the third increases the competition for the American consumers' dollar. One thing is certain, that unless we continue to meet the gap with public assistance, either exports will drop and loans will go into default, or imports will have to increase.

Present developments suggest that the fears of foreign competition may be effective in checking efforts to expand any competitive imports, in which case the producer for export, the taxpayer, and the consumer will all suffer. The consumer deserves at least one brief mention. His and her interest is obviously in having the widest choice of goods available at the lowest possible price. As among these various alternatives, I certainly

would cast my vote for permitting foreign countries to pay their way by sending us goods.

I am not talking about flooding the American market with foreign goods. Our own gross national product is over \$325 billion per year. It has increased \$100 billion in the last 5 years. In many lines, the present percentages supplied by foreign producers are well below the prewar proportions. What are small percentages to us, are often of tremendous importance to other countries.

Every time we take action to restrict the imports of some specific commodity, we do much more than affect a limited and special situation. It creates fears in the hearts of all those endeavoring to sell in the American market that, if they are at all successful, similar restrictive action will be taken against them. What may appear to be an unimportant action, when measured against the vast scale of our total economic picture, can lead to consequences of wide significance. We create grave uncertainty as to the prospects of doing business with the United States, and undermine our leadership in the world in the economic field.

But it is not enough to consider foreign trade merely in terms of the character of our balance of payments. If one is considering the problem in isolation, perhaps that is where attention should be focused. But the moment that foreign trade is viewed in a broader setting, it is clear that we should strive for the same goal in this field as we have for our own economy itself—expansion. The purpose of economic activity is to provide goods and services to satisfy human wants. The basic economic goal is a higher standard of living. Our national progress has been made by technology plus capital to apply it, and by buying and selling in a wide market.

Our economic policies and programs with respect to other countries are also aimed at higher standards of living in the interest of political and economic stability and progress. This rests upon two basic requirements—that more goods be produced and that there be some way whereby these goods can be exchanged for other goods.

Creating a Flexible Economic Foreign Policy

These principles underlie European recovery as envisaged in the Marshall Plan. Similarly, the Point Four Program for economic development makes very little sense in a world of highly restricted trade. Economic progress can be made much more rapidly with a relatively free exchange of goods than if each country tries to operate a Robinson Crusoe economy. Restriction in one country leads to restriction elsewhere; discrimination breeds discrimination.

Our interest in economic progress in other countries is partly economic, in expanding markets for our producers and expanding sources of goods

for our markets. Recent studies make it clear that we are entering an era where the requirements for raw materials will greatly increase. Much of the expansion of raw material production will be in areas which in turn have a demand for our capital goods. This will help, but we cannot solve the basic economic problem entirely by means of trade in noncompetitive goods, nor would this be a healthy thing for us to attempt. More important to note is the historical fact that the largest volumes of trade have been among the most advanced countries. I am sure that this fact has been part of the explanation for their advancement, including our own.

Our interest in economic progress in other countries is partly economic. It is also political. The defense program is no stronger than the economic foundation upon which it rests. The political strength and stability of each country is closely related to its rate of economic progress.

This is the framework in which our economic foreign policy should be established. It must be related to our overall objectives, to the kind of world we hope to build, and to the various policies and programs upon which we are embarked.

In a recent note to the U. S. Government, the Italian Government highlighted the immediacy of our trade-policy problem, observing that the imposition of restrictive trade measures by the United States "plays directly into the hands of that vocal minority of opinion which is swayed by Communist propaganda in Europe. As is known, the Communists noisily press their line that the Marshall Plan and other aid programs are not really meant to bring about the economic emancipation of Western Europe but to perpetuate their dependence on American bounty, and that American aid programs are calculated to find additional outlets for domestic production, while barring the door to foreign products. The result is that a state of confusion and doubt is generated in the minds of some people—which is sedulously exploited by the Communist minority for its own ends. . . ." ²

As a matter of fact, the basic objectives of our foreign policy are clear. We seek peace. We seek economic and social progress. And in that framework, I submit, we in the United States have no choice except to move forward as we have been doing for 18 years, striving to expand the world's ability to produce and to establish conditions whereby these goods and services may be exchanged within and among countries with relative freedom. Mr. Stimson once wrote, "The attitude of isolationism—political or economic—must die; in all its many forms, the vain hope that we can live alone must be abandoned." We have the opportunity to demonstrate how right he was, in our trade policy of today and tomorrow.

² BULLETIN of Apr. 28, 1952, p. 661.

General Ridgway Assumes SHAPE Command

Statement by the President

[Released to the press by the White House April 28]

Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway has been appointed Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, (SACEUR) to replace General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower. This appointment was made by the North Atlantic Council meeting in Paris. General Ridgway was nominated for this position by me in response to the unanimous request of the Council that I nominate an American officer for the post. General Ridgway's appointment and General Eisenhower's release as Supreme Allied Commander Europe will become effective approximately June 1, 1952.

I feel that General Ridgway is particularly well qualified to perform the duties of Supreme Commander. His service in the European theater in World War II and his leadership of the United Nations forces in Korea have been outstanding. His recent experience as Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command for Korea and as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Japan, have given him a broad background of international military responsibilities. General Ridgway brings exceptional knowledge of present-day combat and of modern training needs and training methods to the common task of preparing our collective forces for the defense of Europe.

I have every confidence that General Ridgway will make an outstanding contribution to our common defense efforts.

In accordance with General Ridgway's desires, I am continuing to make General Gruenther available as Chief of Staff to SACEUR. General Alfred M. Gruenther has outstanding experience and abilities. He is thoroughly conversant in North Atlantic Treaty affairs and is well known to all of the NATO commanders. General Gruenther affords a continuity of staff leadership and planning to Supreme Headquarters that is especially valuable at this time.

I have every confidence that Generals Ridgway and Gruenther will make an outstanding team for our common defense effort.

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press April 30]

I would like to congratulate General Ridgway on his appointment as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. I would like to add that I think all of the members and well-wishers of NATO are to be congratulated also.

General Ridgway's ability and gallantry as a military leader have been displayed both in Korea and in Europe. He does not come to Europe as a stranger, but as one who aided in its liberation

and formed firm friendships there. In the long-drawn-out peace negotiations in Korea, he has shown a patience and firmness which have won the highest praise. He has shown complete devotion to the ideals of collective security, which is the guiding principle of the United States in Europe, in Asia, and everywhere else on the globe.

The free world is fortunate also that General Gruenther remains, at the request of General Ridgway, as his Chief of Staff. General Gruenther's contribution to the security of Europe, to the accord between all who are most directly concerned in building this security, has been very great, and I am very happy that it is to continue.

General Clark Assumes Far East and U.N. Commands

Statement by the President

[Released to the press by the White House April 28]

I am appointing Gen. Mark W. Clark to succeed Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway as Commander in Chief of the U.N. Command for Korea and as Commander in Chief of the Far East Command of the U.S. Armed Forces.

In making this appointment, I want to emphasize that General Clark will continue the policies which have been so ably carried out by General Ridgway with regard to the U.N. action in Korea, including, if possible, the achievement of an honorable armistice.

State of National Emergency Terminated

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS by Proclamation No. 2352 of September 8, 1939, the President proclaimed the existence of a national emergency in connection with and to the extent necessary for the proper observance, safeguarding, and enforcing of the neutrality of the United States of America and the strengthening of our national defense within the limits of peace-time authorizations; and

WHEREAS by Proclamation No. 2487 of May 27, 1941, the President proclaimed the existence of an unlimited national emergency, requiring that the military, naval, air, and civilian defenses of this country be put on the basis of readiness to repel any and all acts or threats of aggression directed toward any part of the Western Hemisphere; and

WHEREAS acts of aggression against the United States of America by Axis Powers subsequently led to declarations by the Congress of the existence of states of war between the United States of America and Japan, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria; and

WHEREAS the state of war between the United States of America and Japan, which was the last of the aforesaid states of war still existing, was terminated by the coming

¹ No. 2974 (17 Fed. Reg. 3813).

Into force this day of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951:


NOW, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United States of America, do proclaim that the national emergencies declared to exist by the proclamations of September 8, 1939, and May 27, 1941, terminated this day upon the entry into force of the Treaty of Peace with Japan.

Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to affect Proclamation No. 2914, issued by the President on December 16, 1950, declaring that world conquest by communist imperialism is the goal of the forces of aggression that have been loosed upon the world, and proclaiming the existence of a national emergency requiring that the military, naval, air, and civilian defenses of this country be strengthened as speedily as possible to the end that we may be able to repel any and all threats against our national security and to fulfill our responsibilities in the efforts being made through the United Nations and otherwise to bring about lasting peace; and nothing herein shall be construed to affect the continuation of the said emergency of September 8, 1939, as specified in the Emergency Powers Interim Continuation Act, approved April 14, 1952 (Public Law 313—82d Congress),² for the purpose of continuing the use of property held under the Act of October 14, 1940, ch. 862, 54 Stat. 1125, as amended.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-eighth day of April in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-two, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-sixth.

[SEAL]



U.S. Constitution, Not U.N. Charter, Invalidates Alien Land Law

On April 17, 1952, the Supreme Court of California handed down a decision in the case of *Sei Fujii v. The State of California* (38 *Advance California Reports* 817). This case, which has caused widespread public interest, has resulted in a decision which is of great significance in two respects. The court invalidated the California Alien Land Law on the ground that it ran afoul of the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The court also rejected the reasoning of the lower court that the Land Law had been invalidated by certain provisions of the U.N. Charter.

The California Alien Land Law of 1920 provided in part that aliens ineligible to become citizens could not acquire real property in the State. Any property purchased in violation of the provisions of the law immediately and automatically would become the property of the State itself. The constitutionality of the Alien Land Law was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of *Porterfield v. Webb*, 263 U.S. 225 (1923). Sub-

sequently, section 9 of this law, as well as provisions of other state laws of a similar character, have been declared unconstitutional by the country's highest court.

The present case involved a Japanese alien, Sei Fujii, who purchased a piece of property in California in 1948. Fujii then brought an action in the Los Angeles County Superior Court for a declaratory judgment that the provisions of the Alien Land Law had not effected a forfeiture of his property to the State. The Superior Court ruled that the Land Law was valid and that under its provisions Fujii's property had escheated to the State.

Fujii appealed, and the District Court of Appeal reversed the lower court.¹ After drawing attention to the earlier U.S. Supreme Court cases upholding the constitutionality of the statute in question, the District Court of Appeal declared the statute invalid by virtue of the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter (primarily articles 55 and 56). Finding that the Land Law contravened the human rights provisions of the Charter, the court held that the law was invalid.

The State of California, having lost in the District Court of Appeal, asked the Supreme Court of California for a review. By its decision of April 17, 1952, the California Supreme Court affirmed the intermediate court's decision, but rejected the reasoning of that court.

Although the California Supreme Court split 4-3 on the constitutional issues in the case, all seven justices agreed that the human rights provisions of the U. N. Charter did not operate of themselves to invalidate the Alien Land Law. Chief Justice Gibson, speaking for three justices, said:

It is first contended that the land law has been invalidated and superseded by the provisions of the United Nations Charter pledging the member nations to promote the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction as to race. Plaintiff relies on statements in the preamble and in Articles 1, 55 and 56 of the Charter.

It is not disputed that the charter is a treaty, and our federal Constitution provides that treaties made under the authority of the United States are part of the supreme law of the land and that the judges in every state are bound thereby. (U. S. Const., Art. VI.) A treaty, however, does not automatically supersede local laws which are inconsistent with it unless the treaty provisions are self-executing. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall: A treaty is "to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the Legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract—when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the Legislature must execute the contract, before it can become a rule for the court." (*Foster v. Neilson*, (1829), 2 Pet. 253, 314.)

In determining whether a treaty is self-executing courts look to the intent of the signatory parties as manifested by the language of the instrument, and, if the instrument is uncertain, recourse may be had to the circumstances

² For the President's letter requesting passage of this Act, see BULLETIN of Apr. 21, 1952, p. 641.

¹ For the opinion of the District Court of Appeal, see *Cong. Rec.* of April 28, 1950, p. 6072.

surrounding its execution. [Citations.] In order for a treaty provision to be operative without the aid of implementing legislation and to have the force and effect of a statute, it must appear that the framers of the treaty intended to prescribe a rule that, standing alone, would be enforceable in the courts. [Citations.]

It is clear that the provisions of the preamble and of Article 1 of the charter which are claimed to be in conflict with the alien land law are not self-executing. They state general purposes and objectives of the United Nations Organization and do not purport to impose legal obligations on the individual member nations or to create rights in private persons. It is equally clear that none of the other provisions relied on by plaintiff is self-executing. Article 55 declares that the United Nations "shall promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion," and in Article 56, the member nations "pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." Although the member nations have obligated themselves to cooperate with the international organization in promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights, it is plain that it was contemplated that future legislative action by the several nations would be required to accomplish the declared objectives, and there is nothing to indicate that these provisions were intended to become rules of law for the courts of this country upon the ratification of the charter.

The language used in Articles 55 and 56 is not the type customarily employed in treaties which have been held to be self-executing and to create rights and duties in individuals. . . .

* * * * *

The provisions in the charter pledging cooperation in promoting observance of fundamental freedoms lack the mandatory quality and definiteness which would indicate an intent to create justiciable rights in private persons immediately upon ratification. Instead, they are framed as a promise of future action by the member nations. Secretary of State Stettinius, Chairman of the United States delegation at the San Francisco Conference where the charter was drafted, stated in his report to President Truman that Article 56 "pledges the various countries to cooperate with the organization by joint and separate action in the achievement of the economic and social objectives of the organization without infringing upon their right to order their national affairs according to their own best ability, in their own way, and in accordance with their own political and economic institutions and processes."

Justice Schauer, speaking for the three dissenting justices, said that he agreed "that the United Nations Charter, as presently constituted and accepted was not intended to, and does not, supersede existing domestic legislation of the United States or of the several states or territories."

Chief Justice Gibson stated that the Charter provisions on human rights did not of themselves operate to invalidate State laws, but added:

The humane and enlightened objectives of the United Nations Charter are, of course, entitled to respectful consideration by the courts and Legislatures of every member nation, since that document expresses the universal desire of thinking men for peace and for equality of rights and opportunities. The charter represents a moral commitment of foremost importance, and we must not permit the spirit of our pledge to be compromised or disparaged in either our domestic or foreign affairs. We are satisfied, however, that the charter provisions relied on by plaintiff were not intended to supersede existing domestic legislation, and we cannot hold that they operate to invalidate the alien land law.

The Chief Justice and three of his colleagues were of the opinion that the Alien Land Law was invalid because of the provision of the 14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." As to the contention that a reexamination of the constitutional issue was foreclosed by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Chief Justice stated that these decisions "do not foreclose, but rather invite, further consideration of the constitutional issues which have been raised." In particular, attention was drawn to the cases of *Oyama v. California*, 332 U.S. 633 (1948), and *Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commissioner*, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), in the U.S. Supreme Court, and *Namba v. McCourt*, 204 P. 2d 569 (1949) in the Oregon Supreme Court.

Chief Justice Gibson concluded his opinion as follows:

In the light of the foregoing discussion, we have concluded that the constitutional theories upon which the Porterfield case was based are today without support and must be abandoned. The California alien land law is obviously designed and administered as an instrument for effectuating racial discrimination, and the most searching examination discloses no circumstances justifying classification on that basis. There is nothing to indicate that those alien residents who are racially ineligible for citizenship possess characteristics which are dangerous to the legitimate interests of the state, or that they, as a class, might use the land for purposes injurious to public morals, safety or welfare. Accordingly, we hold that the alien land law is invalid as in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

West German To Receive Carl Schurz Centennial Grant

[Released to the press May 2]

The St. Louis *Post-Dispatch* has informed the Department of State that it will award the Carl Schurz Centennial Grant to a West German newsman to be assigned to the *Dispatch* for 6 months as a regular reporter and special feature writer. A candidate will be selected jointly by the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, the Department of State, and the St. Louis *Post-Dispatch*.

This award by the *Post-Dispatch* is an appropriate memorial to the great German-American liberal reformer and newsman for whom the grant is named. Carl Schurz arrived in the United States just 100 years ago and his name has been closely tied to St. Louis and the State of Missouri. Shortly after the Civil War, Schurz joined Emil Pretorius as editor and co-proprietor of the *Westliche Post* of St. Louis, and from 1869 to 1875 he served as U.S. Senator from Missouri. One of the assignments which the winner of the award is expected to cover will be the various events planned in honor of Carl Schurz during this centennial celebration of his arrival in the United States.

U.S. Continues Military Assistance to Iran

[Released to the press April 25]

Following an exchange of notes on April 24, 1952, between the Prime Minister of Iran and the Ambassador of the United States to Iran, it has been decided that military assistance from the United States to Iran should be continued. Shipments of military supplies by the Government of the United States will be resumed as soon as possible.

Yugoslav Discussions Concluded

[Released to the press April 22]

Delegations representing the United States, the United Kingdom, and French Governments which have been meeting in Washington to consider, on the technical level, economic problems relating to Yugoslavia have now finished their discussions and have forwarded their conclusions to their respective governments.

U.S.-Norway To Discuss German Enemy Property

[Released to the press April 23]

The Department of State and the Office of Alien Property, Department of Justice, have arranged to hold meetings on or about May 12, 1952, at Washington with representatives of the Norwegian Enemy Property Custodian's Office. The purpose of these meetings is to discuss conflicting claims to German enemy property arising between the United States and Norway. In the course of these discussions cases will be taken up involving American interests in property in Norway which may have been seized or blocked as German enemy property.

The Department on February 6, 1951, issued a statement requesting claimants to report to the Department of State any American interest in property in Allied or neutral countries seized or blocked as "enemy" property.¹ Individuals having claims with relation to property in Norway, which have heretofore not been submitted, are urgently invited to submit them before the May 12 meetings, to the Department of State, as it is expected that these meetings will provide the last opportunity for securing protection for such claims. If a communication has been transmitted to the Department by claimants with relation to property in Norway, it is suggested that it would be helpful to submit any information which would be needed to bring the communication up-to-date.

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 19, 1951, p. 294.

Visit of the Chancellor of Austria

On April 30 the Department of State announced that at the invitation of the U.S. Government Leopold Figl, Chancellor of Austria, will visit the United States. He will arrive at the International Airport, New York City, on May 11. The Chancellor will be met at the airport by the Austrian Ambassador and a representative of the Department of State. Dr. Figl, who will be accompanied by Mrs. Figl and two aides, will spend his first night in New York and proceed to Washington on May 12. He will be met at Union Station by the Secretary of State and other officials of the Department of State. During their visit to Washington the Chancellor and Mrs. Figl will stay at Blair House.

During his 4-day visit to the Capital, the Chancellor will meet with the President, the Secretary of State, and other high-ranking government officials to discuss matters of mutual interest.

Dr. Figl will begin his tour of the eastern part of the United States by proceeding to Williamsburg, Va., on May 16. From Williamsburg the party will go to Buffalo, N. Y., and will visit Niagara Falls on May 18. The Chancellor will be in Detroit on May 19 to deliver an address before the Economic Club of Detroit and inspect the Ford Motor Co. plant. After visiting Chicago on May 20 the Chancellor and his party will go to Madison, Wis., on May 21 to visit the University of Wisconsin and inspect experimental farms in the area.

On Thursday, May 22, the Chancellor will fly to New York, where he will be a guest at a luncheon given by the Overseas Press Club on May 23 and will deliver an address at Hunter College on May 26. He is also expected to visit the United Nations.

The Chancellor will depart for Paris by air on May 27.

Release of Additional MSP Funds to Israel

[Released to the press May 2]

The Department of State announced on May 2 that arrangements have been made for release to the Government of Israel of \$11,583,000, the balance remaining of the \$50,000,000 authorized by Congress under section 205 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 for the relief and resettlement of refugees in Israel.

Arrangements were also made to release to the Government of Israel within the next 2 months any funds remaining for essential purchases authorized under section 203 of the same act. Release of the latter funds depends upon the signing of agreements now under consideration in Tel Aviv.

Concerted National Action Needed To Spearhead Point Four Idea

by Eric A. Johnston

Chairman, International Development Advisory Board¹

Too often, I fear, we Americans tend to take for granted the democratic process as it functions in our country. It is entirely natural that we should, because participation in that process is the normal, everyday experience of citizenship.

But now and then, as occasion presents, I think it is a good thing to remind ourselves that this everyday experience is in itself an expression of the fundamental values inherent in our way of life.

That is why I should not like to let the occasion of this conference pass without remarking on its character. This was truly a national town meeting—a voluntary assembly of citizens to articulate opinion on one of the most important jobs this Nation has to do.²

It would be difficult to imagine a more forceful demonstration of the partnership that exists between the American people and their Government—the outspoken, constructive kind of partnership that is the very essence of our healthy, free society.

Yet even more significant, perhaps, this conference was a dramatic manifestation of our national will to continue with undiminished vigor the role of leadership thrust upon us in this century by the massive forces of history.

An Answer to Voices of Negativism

There are those who would urge us to retreat from the responsibilities of leadership in the still free world. Their voices are the voices of nega-

tivism and do-nothingness. They speak a familiar language: "We have done enough. Let the rest of the world take care of itself. Let's have no more global do-gooding. Let's tend to our knitting here at home."

To these shortsighted importunings, this conference was an eloquent reply. Upwards of a thousand people, representing millions more, met here to consider a policy that stands or falls on our willingness and capacity to lead. And the question before the house, I would remind you, was not whether we shall continue to pursue that policy. The question was how—how best to mobilize our initiative and skill in a program calculated to bring greater economic strength and political security to the nations within the orbit of our leadership.

In and of itself, therefore, this conference was a rejection of the thesis of retreat from our responsibility. It was an emphatic affirmation of our determination to face up to the obligations of world leadership and to discharge them, as best we can, by helping the peoples of the free world to forge ahead.

Government's Need of Private Resources

But one major conclusion must already be apparent to us all.

That conclusion is this: The job cut out for us cannot and should not be left to government alone.

The act for international development—our Point Four charter, so to speak—lays out a task of vast dimensions—one that will tax to the utmost all of our resources, all of our ingenuity, all of our capacity for organization.

It is my view that this task—which must be done—can only be done if we are able to marshal and put to work every force in our society that can contribute to its ultimate accomplishment.

¹Excerpts from an address made before the National Conference on International Economic and Social Development at Washington on Apr. 9 and released to the press on the same date by the conference.

²For texts of addresses made by President Truman and Secretary Acheson before this conference, see BULLETIN of Apr. 21, 1952, p. 607.

That is the thesis I want to develop here today. Out of the threads of the discussion at this meeting, I want to weave, if I can, a pattern of concerted national action in which all of you, and the great social forces you personify, will have a vital part to play.

Public agencies with public funds have already made a sound beginning. In the remarkably short period of 2 years, government has launched a dramatic attack upon the ancient ills of poverty, illiteracy, and disease that plague the economic lowlands of the free world. What the agencies of government have accomplished up to now is tribute enough to the wisdom of men like Henry Garland Bennett, and the patient skill of many other men who are translating the Point Four idea into reality in 33 countries around the globe.

These men in the service of the Government—and that is the service of us all—have laid the solid groundwork of our national policy of technical cooperation in the underdeveloped areas. That groundwork must be strengthened and expanded to the limits of practicability.

Mobilizing U.S. Skill and Industrial Initiative

Behind the spearhead of public action supported by public funds, we must mobilize the social force of American industrial initiative and skill in a dynamic companion program of private action supported by private funds.

It was the clear intent of the act for international development that the enormous potential of American investment capital should become an instrument of foreign policy. The idea of public action and private enterprise pulling in harness literally permeates the law.

I want to emphasize that phrase, "Pulling in harness." It means teamwork—the exertion of mutually helpful forces toward a common end. In this case, the common end has been clearly defined by the President and the Congress of the United States.

I should like to say to industry, therefore, that it must pull its weight in this vast undertaking in a genuine spirit of teamwork, fully conscious of the great responsibility which rests upon it to advance an important objective of our national policy. There is great need in this program for industrial statesmanship; there is no room at all for old-fashioned financial adventuring and unbridled profit taking.

To government, on the other hand, I should like to say that if there is no room in this program for economic imperialism, neither is there room for an exclusive bureaucracy. Government, too, must function as a member of the team—as the quarterback, if you like, who calls the signals and directs the strategy of attack. But no quarterback can do his job if he fails to use the power in his backfield. Indeed, upon him, more than on

anyone else, rests the main responsibility for teamwork and coordination.

Opportunities for Capital Investment Abroad

In the backfield of the Point Four team of public-private action, industrial enterprise carries smashing weight. Some idea of its potential may be gleaned from figures recently cited by Stacy May, economist of the International Basic Economy Corporation.

Since the end of the war, according to Mr. May, American private investment abroad has averaged about one billion dollars a year. This year, it may reach one billion two hundred million, or four-tenths of 1 percent of our national income.

But Great Britain, at the peak of its international economic leadership, put fully 10 percent of its national income into investment abroad. Over a period of 30 years, British foreign capital investment maintained a level of 2½ percent of Britain's national income.

I would not venture to suggest the total that our own capital investment abroad might be expected to reach during the present period of American economic ascendancy. But I agree completely with the estimate of the *Partners in Progress* report, that if industrial enterprise is given opportunity, incentive, and reasonable safeguards, the present total can, and will, be doubled.

There is no need to restate all the reasons why American private capital has not sought opportunity abroad in greater volume since the war. Every log in the jam impeding it has been examined and explained again and again by experts both in Government and in industry.

Nor is it necessary to review the recommendations made by one agency after another—by the National Foreign Trade Council, the International Development Advisory Board, the National Planning Association, the International Chamber of Commerce, the Department of Commerce—to mention only a few.

But there is need, I feel, to ask why all these studies and recommendations have produced so few results. There is need—and crying need—for action to break the log-jam and speed the flow of capital so vital to achievement of the Point Four goal.

A Mechanism for Speeding the Flow of American Capital

We know what must be done. I say, let's go ahead and do it! If we must create a more favorable attitude toward American investment in the underdeveloped areas, let's get on with the job of creating such an attitude—by treaties, if necessary, by diplomatic persuasion, by such mechanisms as the joint commissions envisaged in the act for

international development, or by whatever means may be at hand.

In other words, while we may recognize the complexities, I believe we must also recognize the exigencies of the situation. They are so great, in my opinion, that the success of the Point Four Program may be jeopardized if we do not speedily find the way to exert the full force of private initiative in its support.

With this sober conviction, I am going to ask the International Development Advisory Board to recommend to the Secretary of State a project designed to find out just what we can do with the means at hand to start private capital moving abroad in support of our Point Four objective.

I am going to suggest that we invite one of the underdeveloped countries to work with us in a laboratory test of measures that can be taken now to break the log-jam and stimulate the needed flow of American dollars for development.

In this "laboratory country," for example, we should make a serious effort to establish a joint commission, or some similar body, through which the problem of creating a favorable climate for industrial enterprise could be tackled at the national level. Much of the unfriendly attitude toward American capital in certain of the underdeveloped countries derives, I believe, from fears and apprehensions that can be dispelled by sitting down and talking matters out.

Whether the joint commission is the most practicable mechanism for doing this in every country remains to be seen; but where it is not, I believe we must find a workable alternative.

We should explore with the "laboratory country" the advantages of negotiating a commercial treaty containing assurances on the one hand of a receptive climate for American capital, and on the other, of a constructive attitude on the part of the investors. The treaty signed between the United States and Uruguay in November 1949,³ offers an example of what can be accomplished in this way.

In the "laboratory country," industrial development experts should be added to the staff of the Tca director to integrate private enterprise in the Point Four Program for that country.

I have heard more than one country director say that he constantly sees the need and the opportunity for industrial development projects quite outside the scope of governmental action but entirely compatible with the objectives of his program.

We should undertake to enlist the support of American industrial concerns for a program of partnership investment in the "laboratory country."

Some of these steps have already been taken in one or another of the Point Four countries. Joint commissions have been created in Brazil,

Paraguay, and Liberia. Industrial experts have been added to the Tca field organization in several countries. I have already mentioned the commercial treaty with Uruguay.

But I want to see a concentrated attack in one country—a frontal assault, as it were, on the obstacles which stand in the way of industry's full participation in the program of technical cooperation and economic development.

Partnership Between American and Foreign Capital

For many years, at every opportunity, I have put forward the idea of partnership between American and foreign capital.

I believe this is the key to successful American enterprise abroad, the kind of enterprise that will take us along the Point Four road toward greater security for ourselves and our fellows of the free world.

I am not alone in that opinion. A staff memorandum prepared for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs just a few days ago remarks, and I quote:

The joining of American capital with local capital and management in the formation of jointly owned enterprises encouraged by the governments of the United States and the local country offers a pattern for the future. It offers opportunities for mutually profitable operations and diminishes the fear of discriminatory treatment.

United States firms are finding it to their advantage, from the standpoint of goodwill, familiarity with local customs, and the ease in dealing with local governments, to enlist the participation of local investors in these projects.

Many of our great industrial firms have long ago perceived the wisdom of sharing the opportunity for investment and profit with the people of foreign countries. American Cyanamid, for example, has recently opened a new drug plant in India. Indian nationals own 90 percent of the company.

As Mr. Marshall told you yesterday,⁴ Standard-Vacuum has completed an agreement with the Indian Government for the construction of a 35-million-dollar refinery in Bombay. Twenty-five percent of the capitalization of the new company will be available to Indian private capital on a preference-share basis. Examples could be cited almost endlessly.

Partnership of this kind breeds mutual confidence, and mutual confidence, I submit, is the crux of the whole problem of generating a flow of American capital into the underdeveloped areas where it is so sorely needed.

But confidence is a two-way street. If American investors insist on assurance against expropriation, restrictions on conversion and discriminatory tax and tariff measures, they must be

³ See BULLETIN of Dec. 5, 1949, p. 866a, and *ibid.*, Dec. 12, 1949, p. 909.

⁴ C. B. Marshall, Director of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. of New York.

prepared to give assurance in return against ruthless exploitation, economic imperialism, and political interference.

These may be only skeletons in the closet, long since dead, so far as we are concerned. But in the surging new nationalisms of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, the fear of them is very much alive today.

American industry can lay those ancient ghosts once and for all, I believe, by applying the principle that partners are likely to be friends.

Need for Enlightened Policies of Industrial Advancement

No amount of industrial enterprise, however, will produce the results we want unless the people of the country concerned share the fruits deriving from development.

Too often, in too many countries, the exploitation of natural wealth has meant the exploitation of men and women as well. Too often, in too many countries, the fruits of industrial advance have been tasted by too few.

But that has not been the story everywhere. It is worth a moment, I believe, to read some pages from the story written in Venezuela, where an enlightened policy has translated American capital investment into grass-roots benefit for the people as a whole.

This policy has been crystallized in a Venezuelan national slogan: "Sow the petroleum." That means plowing back the dividends from the country's oil resource into benefits for the country's 5 million people.

Under this policy, the Government of Venezuela has put 100 million dollars into agricultural development during the last decade. Subsidies are paid to coffee growers in poor years; irrigation and drainage projects have been undertaken; sugarcane planting and stock breeding have been stimulated.

More than 25,000 farm families have been brought into the country from Europe and established on the land. In a number of experimental projects, settlers on tracts of 100 acres each are learning new farm methods and the use of modern agricultural implements. These farmers have an opportunity to buy land, buildings, and equipment through installment payments over a 25-year period.

Modern schools in many towns and villages now testify to the wisdom of Venezuela's "Sow the petroleum" policy. Approximately 40 percent of the country's school-age children are in schools. The tuition-free central university in Caracas, with 14 new buildings, athletic fields, and a 1200-bed hospital will give the country one of the finest educational plants in the Americas.

Added to the Government educational program are more than 50 schools maintained by the for-

eign oil companies for workers' children. More than 12,000 Venezuelan youngsters are in these schools. Nearly 2,000 of their parents attend night classes, with a resulting increase in literacy of from 15 to 85 percent. About 250 scholarships a year are given to Venezuelan workers for study in trade schools and universities abroad.

Development of oil resources has provided the money for great advances in public health. Venezuela has reduced malaria from fifth to twenty-first place as the cause of death. The incidence of venereal disease has dropped from one in ten to one in twenty. National hospitals treat more than 150,000 patients a year free of charge and the Government operates out-patient clinics in the remote regions of the country.

A 4-year housing program, undertaken by the Government in 1951, at a cost of 60 million dollars, will provide nearly 25,000 family units for low-income groups.

Those are only a few of the stirring facts about the revolution taking place in Venezuela as a direct result of American investment in Venezuelan oil production. Many similar facts could be added. But these will serve, I believe, to indicate what private investment, properly handled, can do for the people of an underdeveloped land.

Point Four's Place in the Public Domain

Many of you here today are the representatives of national organizations in the fields of agriculture, education, public health, labor, business. During the past 3 days, you have had the opportunity to learn the nature of the challenge to our imagination, energy, and sense of responsibility, implicit in the plight of a billion or more people of the free world.

I hope your organizations will accept that challenge and help to meet it with all the resourcefulness at their command. The idea underlying technical cooperation in the underdeveloped areas of the world has not been copyrighted. The Point Four concept is in the public domain.

In October of last year, the New York *Herald Tribune* Forum presented a "Pilot Project for a Community Exchange Program." One of the panel members was a man whose name is already legend in the youthful annals of Point Four—Horace Holmes.⁵

In that pilot project, there was the seed of an idea I should like to see germinate and grow in every community in America. If that could be made to happen, ten, or fifty, or a hundred American towns and cities would have a Point Four Program of their own.

The rich experience of Carroll County, Georgia, where the pilot project was undertaken, could be

⁵ For an account of Mr. Holmes' work in India, see *Point Four Pioneers*, Department of State pub. 4279.

repeated in any county in America with enough initiative to set such a plan in motion.⁶

This is the kind of idea, I submit, that fires the imagination. It is the kind of idea that Americans can understand, because it springs from the great tradition of neighborliness in which our own community life is steeped.

Is it farfetched and impractical? I do not think it is. Once our communities see the opportunity to share directly in the vital job of helping to secure the peace and stability of the free world, I am confident that many of them will want to.

Through these community chapters, it should be possible with vision and vigor, to foster and develop town-to-town, city-to-city, county-to-county Point Four programs across the land.

Such a movement would have to be kept within the bounds of policy. Scattershot effort could easily prove futile. But through the field machinery of the Technical Cooperation Administration, on the one hand, and our national private organizations, on the other, a procedure for coordination and direction could readily be worked out.

I think it is worth a try. If the idea could be projected into reality, it would send hundreds of skillful, well-disposed Americans into the underdeveloped countries of the free world on specific missions of helpfulness. It would mean that hundreds of leaders from these towns and cities abroad would come to our municipalities not only to learn techniques and methods, but to see with their own eyes how the American system works.

The Strategic Front of Social Ideas

Let us not delude ourselves as to where and how the struggle between the American system and world communism really will be fought.

Let us not suppose that we may rest secure behind the defensive bastions of military strength we are erecting along the frontiers of the free world.

Behind these bastions, Communist aggression wages a relentless campaign to capture the minds of men. In every country of the still-free world, the Kremlin's army of penetration—thousands upon thousands strong, well-trained, disciplined, and dedicated—wages a never-ending battle to smash the democratic institutions and ideas that bar the way to world dictatorship.

It is on this front of social ideas and political concepts that the real contest with communism must be fought and won.

⁶For a feature story on this project, entitled "Amar Singh Discovers America," see the Department of State *Record*, March-April 1952, p. 27.

I, for one, am convinced that on this front, democracy must take the offensive. We must meet the enemy on the ground that he has chosen—in the villages and towns, on the farms, in the factories of the free world he is seeking to enslave.

Where he would stifle the democratic concept, we must give it nourishment. Where he uses the tactic of clandestine penetration, we must use the tactic of straightforward cooperation. Where he uses the weapons of hollow promise and abortive doctrine, we must use the weapons of helpful deeds and honest purpose.

That is why I want to see skilled and friendly Americans, as many as we can send, go into the underdeveloped countries on specific missions of helpfulness.

Meeting the Challenge of Our Century

Finally, before this conference ends, I want to say one other thing.

I believe we must not allow the interest and spirit that has motivated this great national town meeting to be dissipated once the curtain has rung down. There is too much vitality, too much energy, too much conviction among you to permit it to be wasted.

I believe we must undertake to capture the spirit and the drive so manifest in this conference in a permanent mechanism for citizen participation in the Point Four Program.

We need a clearing house for ideas and information. We need a way to give purpose and direction to our energies and effort. We need an institution which can mobilize the resources of our private organizations, of industry, of individual men and women in this great assault upon the economic and social ills that beset so much of the free world that looks to us for leadership.

To all of you, therefore, I propose that on the foundation of this conference we should create a national association for international economic cooperation, dedicated to the proposition that opportunity and freedom are the birthright of men the world around.

In America, by dint of sweat and skill, courage, and imagination, an abiding faith in the rightness of our way, we have secured that birthright for ourselves and for our children.

In our achievement lies the hope and promise of the future for a billion men and women elsewhere in the world.

To help them realize that hope and fulfill that promise is the challenge of our century. It is a challenge we cannot fail to accept. It is a challenge I know we shall not fail to meet.

U.S. Charts Course Toward Comprehensive, Coordinated Disarmament Program

*Statements by Ambassador Benjamin V. Cohen
Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations*

A 6-PRINCIPLE PLAN FOR EFFECTIVE DISARMAMENT ¹

It is the desire of my Government, and I hope of all of us, to make real progress in the field of disarmament. It is our desire to narrow and not widen the differences in viewpoint which stand in the way of progress.

It has been suggested by a number of us that we should strive at the outset to clarify and agree upon the objectives and principles which should guide us in working out the concrete details of an effective disarmament program. In large part, those objectives and principles have already been marked out for us in the resolution of the General Assembly.² But I think there may be positive advantages for all of us in an effort to agree upon a definite and precise statement of these objectives and principles.

The Soviet representative has repeatedly urged that no progress could be made until we took certain decisions in principle. At our last meeting he stated that "a decision in principle to prohibit the atomic weapon and to reduce arms would permit the Commission to begin squarely the preparation of detailed provisions for the prohibition of the atomic weapon and for the reduction in armaments and all questions connected with these proposals."

We have been obliged to oppose the Soviet proposals because they confuse a decision in principle with an agreement on principles. We believe that an agreement on principles and objectives will greatly facilitate agreement on the ways and means of carrying out these principles and objectives. But it must be clear that an agreement on principles and objectives is only the beginning of our task.

Responsible nations cannot morally or legally bind themselves to disarm on the basis of a decision on principle—on the basis of paper promises and without effective safeguards to protect them from the hazards of violations and evasions.

But if we can all agree in advance upon the objectives and principles which should govern a comprehensive and coordinated disarmament program, it should greatly simplify our main and primary task of agreeing on specific and practical measures and concrete and workable safeguards.

With this hope, the U.S. delegation has prepared a proposal setting forth six principles, which we believe constitute the essential principles of an effective disarmament program.³ We hope that these principles will be accepted unanimously by the Disarmament Commission as a guide for its future work. We believe that if we can agree on these principles we should be able to avoid many of the difficulties involved in our past debates both in the General Assembly and in this Commission, in which debates agreement or partial agreement on our objectives was obscured by differences regarding the ways and means of achieving those objectives.

Let me briefly state and explain these principles.

1. The goal of disarmament is not to regulate but to prevent war by relaxing the tensions and fears created by armaments and by making war inherently, as it is constitutionally under the Charter, impossible as a means of settling disputes between nations.

We have all agreed under the Charter not to use force or the threat of force in our international relations in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter. It is certainly anomalous that states which have solemnly undertaken to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to

¹Made before Committee I of the U.N. Disarmament Commission at New York on Apr. 24 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

²For text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Mar. 31, 1952, p. 507.

³U.N. doc. DC/C.1/1, dated Apr. 24, 1952. The proposal begins: "The Disarmament Commission accepts as a guide for its future work the following principles as the essentials of a disarmament programme." The remainder of the document is quoted verbatim in Mr. Cohen's statement and is printed here in small type.

refrain from force or the threat of force except in defense of the law of the Charter should maintain huge armaments. An effective disarmament program should give content and meaning to the solemn undertakings of states not to resort to war as an instrument of national policy. An effective disarmament program must be conceived with a determination to strengthen the peace and not as a mere haggling process to reduce the cost of preparing for war.

Excessive armaments aggravate, if they do not create, tensions and fears among nations. Disarmament by relaxing tensions and fears should facilitate peaceful settlement of political differences.

2. To achieve this goal, all states must cooperate to establish an open and substantially disarmed world,

(a) in which armed forces and armaments will be reduced to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no state will be in a condition of armed preparedness to start a war, and

(b) in which no state will be in a position to undertake preparations for war without other states having knowledge of such preparations long before an offending state could start a war.

This principle of an open and substantially disarmed world is the fourth freedom—freedom from fear, which President Roosevelt proclaimed in 1941. It was President Roosevelt himself who translated freedom from fear in world terms to mean “a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.”

3. To reach and keep this goal, international agreements must be entered into by which all states would reduce their armed forces to levels, and restrict their armaments to types and quantities, necessary for

(a) the maintenance of internal security,

(b) fulfillment of obligations of states to maintain peace and security in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

This principle reaffirms the concept stated in the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations that “armed forces shall not be used, save in the common interest” and it recognizes as does the Charter the inherent right of self-defense against armed attack. This principle also gives expression to the idea that national armaments should be limited to those appropriate for keeping the peace and that nations should not be free to find new and more dangerous weapons to take the place of prohibited weapons.

4. Such international agreements must ensure by a comprehensive and coordinated program both

(a) the progressive reduction of armed forces and permitted armaments to fix maximum levels, radically less than present levels and balanced throughout the process of reduction, thereby eliminating mass armies and preventing any disequilibrium of power dangerous to peace, and

(b) the elimination of all instruments adaptable to mass destruction.

This principle in plain and no uncertain terms makes clear that a comprehensive and coordinated disarmament program must relieve the world not only from the terror of all weapons of total destruction, including atomic and bacteriological, but from the threat of mass armies, without which no aggressor can carry through his evil designs.

5. Such international agreements must provide effective safeguards to ensure that all phases of the disarmament program are carried out. In particular, the elimination of atomic weapons must be accomplished by an effective system of international control of atomic energy to ensure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes only.

This principle has been repeatedly affirmed by the General Assembly. Disarmament without effective and foolproof safeguards is a snare and a delusion—a cruel deception. There must be effective safeguards to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions. If we wish to protect the world from the fear of atomic warfare there must be effective control not only of the making of the bomb but of the fissionable material from which the bomb is readily made.

6. Such international agreements must provide an effective system of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments, including atomic, to achieve the open world in which alone there can be effective disarmament.

If the nations of the world are going to disarm, they must be willing to disclose the arms which they have and to let other nations satisfy themselves that the disclosure is full and complete. No responsible statesman can be expected to risk the national security of his country for a hope which may prove to be illusory.

We all must learn that if we want to be relieved of the burden and fear of armaments and the scourge of war, we must have a world open enough not only to detect violation but to dispel suspicion of evasion.

I hope that we can all accept these six principles as the essential principles of a disarmament program. It will greatly facilitate our future work if we can agree on common standards by which to test and appraise specific measures for disarmament which I hope we may proceed to consider without undue delay.

DISARMAMENT AS SEEN THROUGH SOVIET SPECTACLES *

I should like to make only a few preliminary observations on the statements just made by the Soviet representative.

I really am quite embarrassed, Mr. Chairman, in knowing how to answer certain statements that are constantly repeated by the representative of

*Made before Committee II of the Disarmament Commission on Apr. 25 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

the Soviet Union and which seem to ignore what we have said here and what we have written in our documents. Sometimes I wonder whether the Soviet representative is prepared to discuss these problems with us here around the table or whether he is obliged to make statements for the Communist press, explaining not only the Soviet view but the views that we present here, through the Soviet's spectacles so that they do not get our own position whether they agree with it or not.

I find, for example, that many of the arguments that the Soviet representative has put forward this morning against our proposal for verification and disclosure⁶ are the very arguments he made before he had a chance to read our proposals. That would not be wholly surprising if these arguments do not really ignore what is written in our proposals.

Now, our proposals may not be perfect but we have covered the field of atomic energy in these proposals from the very first stage and very considerable information in the atomic field is required in the first stage. But, that is not all. The Soviet representative presents our scheme of stages as if anything after the first stage was intended to be remote and indefinite and indeed not likely to happen at all. It is that notion that disturbs me very much because the Soviet really looks at our proposals for disclosure and verification as if there were not going to be more than one stage and that it was problematic whether all nations would even complete the first stage.

Well, that certainly is not our intention. We have outlined a procedure of stages in order to have orderliness and in order to create confidence so that we can go from one step on to the next.

But the Soviet representative speaks as if there is to be one exchange of information and nothing more. That is not our idea. Our idea is that we move on quickly and that with good faith and cooperation the whole five stages should be completed within a year and certainly not over 2 years. We should have confidence in ourselves during that period.

If we are going to keep throwing accusations at one another and abusing one another we will never agree on disarmament or be able to carry through a disarmament program. And, we want to find ways of disarming.

Now, the Soviet representative, Mr. Chairman, has talked a great deal again about the work done by the U.S. Government in the atomic field, preparatory work done in the field of chemical warfare and in the field of bacteriological warfare. He speaks of that as if we were planning for an aggressive war. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The Soviet representative again quotes from General Bullene as if General Bullene was en-

gaged in preparing for an aggressive war. But he always fails to point out what the General says in the very speech that Mr. Malik quotes from. The General says,

Under our form of government it is inconceivable that the United States would start an undeclared war. It is not our way of life. But an enemy nation under a dictatorship can and does initiate undeclared wars. In our military planning, therefore, we start with a disadvantage. We must operate on the premise that the opening attack, whether it be war itself or the use of chemical agents in war, will be made by the enemy. This gives the enemy the initial advantage.

Now, that explains the motivation of my Government in their work in the field of scientific weapons. We want no war. We have sworn under the Charter to forego war and there will be no war unless the aggression comes from other quarters.

But Mr. Malik, as I say, continues to talk about our work in these fields. Does Mr. Malik want us to believe that the Soviet Union is doing no work in the field of atomic weapons, that the Soviet Union is doing no work in the field of chemical weapons, and bacteriological weapons? Certainly, the reports that we get are to the contrary.

Let us just consider for a moment what is happening in the Soviet Union in regard to atomic weapons. Generalissimo Stalin, and I assume we may accept his word, in an interview published in *Pravda* on October 6, 1951, said:

Indeed, one of the types of an atom bomb was recently tested in our country. Tests of atom bombs of different calibers will be conducted in the future as well, in accordance with the plans for the defense of our country from attack by the Anglo-American aggressive bloc.

I recall also the statement by the Soviet Foreign Minister before the *Ad Hoc* Committee on November 10, 1949, when he referred to the Soviet atomic energy program and said:

I am convinced that if unfortunately and to our regret this were necessary, we should have as many of these, that is, atomic weapons, as we should need.

The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union seems to be somewhat out of step with his superiors. They say that the Soviet Union has atom bombs. Marshal Stalin proclaims that tests of atom bombs of different calibers will be conducted in the future. The Soviet representative tells us here that atom bombs are weapons of aggression only. The question arises: Is the Soviet Union planning an aggression? If not, why is it producing and testing atomic weapons? If they are for defense in one case, why are they not regarded as for defense in the other?

Now, I thought that our common purpose here was to recognize that we all deplore the conditions under which we live whereby we have to build up armaments for defense, and that we want to try here to cooperate with one another to find ways and means of relieving the world

⁶ BULLETIN of Mar. 31, 1952, p. 503.

from the burden and fear of armaments and the threat of war.

Mr. Malik has also said in the course of his speech that the Secretary of State has indicated that he was opposed to continuing inspection in the atomic field. Now, I am sure that Mr. Malik is laboring under a misapprehension. It is true that the Secretary of State has said that a system of inspection *alone*, be it periodic or continuous, cannot insure the effective prohibition of atomic weapons, but he has also stated, and I am quoting from his remarks at a press conference on January 16, of this very year, that

what we must have in the field of international control is a control system giving an international agency sufficient powers to insure that atomic weapons would be effectively prohibited. . . .⁶

Of course that includes inspection but it includes other things as well, because if we are going to eliminate the use of atomic weapons we must see that the prohibition is not a mere paper prohibition but is in fact an elimination on which we all can rely.

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⁶ *Ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1952, p. 126.

⁷ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Document Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

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U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

World Health Assembly (WHO)

The Department of State announced on May 1 that Leonard A. Scheele, M.D., Surgeon General, Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency, has been designated by the President to serve as chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Fifth World Health Assembly, which will convene at Geneva on May 5, 1952. Other members of the U.S. delegation are as follows:

Delegates

Fannie Hurst Danielson, New York
E. G. McGavran, M.D., Dean, School of Public Health, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.

Alternates

Frederick J. Brady, M.D., International Health Representative, Division of International Health, Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency
Howard B. Calderwood, Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
H. van Zile Hyde, M.D., Director, Health and Sanitation Staff, Technical Cooperation Administration, Department of State

Advisers

Donald C. Blaisdell, U.S. Representative for Specialized Agency Affairs at Geneva
Melvin A. Casberg, M.D., Chairman, Armed Forces Medical Policy Council, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense
Rolf Eliassen, M.D., Professor of Sanitary Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.
George Foster, Ph.D., Director, Institute of Social Anthropology, Smithsonian Institution
Joseph S. Henderson, Assistant Chief, Division of International Administration, Department of State
Leonard W. Larson, M.D., Member, Board of Trustees, American Medical Association, Bismarck, N. Dak.
Lloyd C. Miller, Ph.D., Director of Revision, Pharmacopoeia of the United States of America, 46 Park Avenue, New York
Thomas F. Sellers, M.D., Director, State Department of Public Health, Atlanta, Ga.
Knud Stowman, Ph.D., International Health Representative, Division of International Health, Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency

Ruth Taylor, Chief, Nursing Section, Children's Bureau,
Federal Security Agency

Secretary of Delegation

Walter W. Sohl, Division of International Conferences,
Department of State

The Health Assembly is the policy determining body of the World Health Organization (WHO), which was formally established on April 7, 1948, after the deposit of ratifications of the organization's constitution by 26 member states of the United Nations. The organization sponsors demonstrations of the latest public health methods for controlling such diseases as malaria, rabies, plague, and venereal disease; assists governments in developing strong national health services; receives and disseminates information regarding the prevalence of epidemic diseases; as required, provides emergency assistance in combatting epidemic diseases; and is obtaining international standardization of dosages and nomenclature of drugs. The organization is composed of 78 member governments, plus one associate member, all of which may be represented at assemblies. The last (fourth) World Health Assembly was held at Geneva, May 7-25, 1951.

At its ninth session (Geneva, January 21-February 4, 1952) the Executive Board of the World Health Organization recommended the establishment of two main committees, namely, a Committee on Program and Budget and a Committee on Administrative, Financial, and Legal Matters, to function during the forthcoming fifth assembly. It is expected that a major portion of the work of this Assembly will be done by these two committees.

The provisional agenda for the Committee on Program and Budget provides for consideration of the proposed program and budget for 1953; discussion of the expanded program of technical assistance for economic development; and review of the reservations submitted by governments to the new International Sanitary Regulations.

The provisional agenda for the Committee on Administrative, Financial and Legal Matters makes provision for consideration of: (1) the scale of assessments for member nations; (2) recommendations regarding the status of contributions received from member nations; (3) applications received from several countries for admission as members or associate members; and (4) action required to convene future assemblies biennially, as opposed to annually. It is expected that this committee will also review the progress made by WHO in coordinating its policies and actions with respect to administrative and financial questions with the United Nations and the other specialized agencies.

In addition to the two main committees, there will be a series of technical discussions on the economic importance of preventive medicine and

the means of development of rural health services.

The reports of the two main committees, the Director General, and the eighth and ninth sessions of the Executive Board will be carefully reviewed by the Assembly. Another important action to be taken by the Assembly will be the election of countries to membership on the Executive Board to fill the vacancies resulting from the expiration of the 3-year terms of six countries (including the United States).

Caribbean Commission

The Department of State announced on May 1 that the fourteenth meeting of the Caribbean Commission will be held at Guadeloupe, French West Indies, May 6-11, 1952. The U.S. delegation to the meeting is as follows:

U.S. Commissioners

Ward M. Canaday, Cochairman; President, Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., Toledo, Ohio

Alonzo G. Moron, President, Hampton Institute, Hampton, Va.

Sol Luis Descartes, Treasurer of Puerto Rico

Advisers

Robert R. Robbins, (Chief Adviser), Officer in Charge of Non-Self-Governing Territory Affairs, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State

Mrs. Frances McReynolds Smith, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State

Stephen H. McClintic, U.S. Consul, Martinique, French West Indies

Secretary

Mrs. Virginia B. Lewis, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State

The Caribbean Commission was established in 1948 as an advisory and consultative body on economic and social matters to the Governments of France, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States and their 15 non-self-governing territories in the Caribbean. Like its predecessor, the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, it has evolved and recommended measures, programs, and policies which have contributed substantially to the economic and social well-being of the inhabitants of the Caribbean area.

Among the items on the provisional agenda of the fourteenth meeting are summary report of central secretariat activities and work program; report of the Industrial Development Conference (San Juan, Puerto Rico, February 11-20, 1952); study of customs barriers and trade liberalization in the Caribbean; report of the Fisheries Conference (Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, B.W. I., March 24-28, 1952); and preparations for the fifth session of the West Indian Conference to be held at Jamaica, B. W. I. in late 1952.

The thirteenth meeting of the Caribbean Commission was held at St. Croix, V. I., October 29-November 3, 1951.

Universal Postal Union

On May 1 the Department of State announced that the thirteenth Congress of the Universal Postal Union (UPU) will be held at Brussels May 14-June 30. The U.S. delegation to this congress is, as follows:

DELEGATES

John M. Redding, Assistant Postmaster General, *Chairman*
John J. Gillen, Assistant Executive Director, Bureau of Transportation, Post Office Department, *Vice Chairman*
Roy C. Frank, Solicitor, Post Office Department
Greever Allan, Director, International Service, Post Office Department

ASSOCIATE DELEGATES

Louis J. Doyle, Associate Solicitor, Post Office Department
Edward J. Mahoney, Assistant Director, Air Service, Post Office Department
John D. Tomlinson, Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

SECRETARIAT

Secretary

Fred D. Donovan, Post Office Department
Translator

Leonard Russie, Post Office Department
Interpreter

Murray Shapiro, Post Office Department

Almost all countries of the world are members of the Universal Postal Union, which was established in 1874. At the present time the Union is governed by the Universal Postal Convention, which was signed at Paris on July 5, 1947, and which entered into force on July 1, 1948. The purpose of the Union, the members of which constitute a single postal territory for the reciprocal exchange of correspondence, is to assure the organization and improvement of the various postal services and to encourage the development of international cooperation in this sphere. Each congress is held not later than 5 years after the effective date of the acts of the preceding congress in order to revise or complete those acts, if necessary. The last (12th) congress was held at Paris, May 7-July 5, 1947. Between congresses an Executive and Liaison Committee, headquartered at Bern carries on the work of the Union. In addition, an International Bureau at Bern serves as an organ of liaison, information, and consultation for the countries of the Union.

The purpose of the forthcoming congress is to make any changes in the convention and regulations deemed necessary in the light of present world-wide conditions.

FAO Rice Commission and Working Parties

On April 29, the Department of State announced that the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) will convene three meetings at Bandung, Java, in May 1952.

May 12, 1952

These meetings are as follows: (1) Third Session of the International Rice Commission convening on May 12; (2) Working Party on Rice Breeding, convening on May 5; and (3) Working Party on Fertilizers, also convening on May 5. The United States delegations to the three meetings are listed below:

THIRD SESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RICE COMMISSION

United States Representative

Wilhelm Anderson, Head, Far East Division, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

Alternate United States Representative

Leonard B. Ellis, Rice Specialist, Grain Branch, Production and Marketing Administration, Department of Agriculture

Advisers

Willard Brown, Agricultural Attaché, American Embassy, Djakarta

Loren Davis, Special Technical and Economic Mission, Manila

Ivan Miles, Special Technical and Economic Mission, Manila

WORKING PARTY ON RICE BREEDING

United States Representative

Leonard B. Ellis, Rice Specialist, Grain Branch, Production and Marketing Administration, Department of Agriculture

Advisers

E. R. Brooks, Special Technical and Economic Mission, Bangkok

Loren Davis, Special Technical and Economic Mission, Manila

Harry H. Love, Special Technical and Economic Mission, Bangkok

J. R. Thysell, Special Technical and Economic Mission, Bangkok

WORKING PARTY ON FERTILIZERS

United States Representative

Wilhelm Anderson, Head, Far East Division, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

Advisers

Willard Brown, Agricultural Attaché, American Embassy, Djakarta

Ivan Miles, Special Technical and Economic Mission, Manila

Robert L. Pendleton, Special Technical and Economic Mission, Bangkok

Ray K. Peterson, Special Technical and Economic Mission, Djakarta

Among the items on the provisional agenda for the third session of the International Rice Commission are amendments to the rules of procedure and the constitution of the commission; reduction of losses through improved storage and processing; improvement of small implements for rice production; equipment for lifting water for irrigation; specific factors affecting rice production in various countries; economic incentives for rice production; development of standard grades and

marketing; development of extension services; and the reports of the working parties on (a) rice breeding and (b) fertilizers.

The Working Party on Rice Breeding will make scientific studies on rice breeding and will explore the needs of plant breeding stations for technical assistance from outside sources.

The Working Party on Fertilizers will consider methods of improving the fertility of soils for rice production and, in that connection, will recommend to the Commission certain steps which should be taken by countries, both singly and cooperatively.

The International Rice Commission was established in accordance with the provisions of a constitution formulated at the International Rice Meeting held at Baguio, Philippines, March 1948, and approved at the fourth session of the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization held at Washington, D. C., November 1948. The Commission seeks to facilitate cooperative action on matters relating to production, conservation, distribution, and consumption of rice. Twenty-one countries comprise the membership of the Commission, which meets biennially. The last (second) session was held at Rangoon, Burma, February 6-11, 1950.

Germany and S. Africa Sign Protocol On Tariff Concessions

[Released to the press April 30]

On April 25, 1952, representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of South Africa at the headquarters of the United Nations at New York signed the protocol incorporating into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) the tariff concessions which had been concluded between these two countries in August 1951. The protocol was also signed by the United States on April 25 and previously by other contracting parties to the General Agreement. The schedules of concessions annexed to the protocol will enter into force on May 25, 1952. Under the provisions of the General Agreement the tariff rates negotiated between Germany and South Africa will be extended to the United States and other contracting parties to the agreement.

The items on which concessions were granted by Germany include citrus fruit; wool and mohair; certain medicinal, pharmaceutical, and insecticide ingredients; specified chemical products; and tanning and dyeing materials. Those granted by South Africa include certain structural steelwork; railway freight cars; specified earthenware and stoneware; and musical instruments.

Germany became a contracting party to the General Agreement on October 1, 1951, as a result of its negotiations for accession at the GATT tariff conference held at Torquay, England, from Sep-

tember 1950 to April 1951. The Union of South Africa is one of the original contracting parties to the General Agreement, having participated in the tariff conference at Geneva in 1947 which formulated the General Agreement.

Germany and South Africa did not conclude tariff negotiations until after the close of the Torquay conference. It was therefore necessary to embody the results of these negotiations in a separate protocol of supplementary concessions which was approved at the sixth session of the contracting parties to the General Agreement held at Geneva last fall and opened for signature at the close of the session on October 26, 1951.

Inter-American Indian Institute Representatives Named

The Department of State announced on April 22 that the President has designated Joseph C. McCaskill, Division of International Activities, Department of the Interior, as U.S. representative on the Governing Board of the Inter-American Indian Institute. The President has also designated D. Eugene Delgado-Arias, First Secretary of Embassy and Deputy Public Affairs Officer, American Embassy, Mexico City, as U.S. alternate representative.

The Inter-American Indian Institute was created pursuant to the terms of a convention which was ratified by the President of the United States on June 6, 1941, with the advice and consent of the Senate and which entered into force on December 13, 1941. It acts as the Permanent Committee of the Inter-American Indian Conferences and cooperates in the implementation of resolutions adopted by these conferences; collects, edits, and distributes information on all phases of Indian life in the Americas; conducts scientific investigations; and acts in a consultative and advisory capacity for national bureaus of Indian affairs. Headquarters of the institute are located at Mexico City.

The Governing Board exercises supreme control over the institute, and usually meets annually at Mexico City. Both Mr. McCaskill and Mr. Delgado-Arias will attend the next meeting, which will convene at Mexico City on April 22, 1952.

Letters of Credence

Haiti

The newly appointed Ambassador of Haiti, Jacques Leger, presented his credentials to the President on April 22, 1952. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and for the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 307 of April 22.

The United States in the United Nations

April 25-May 8, 1952

Security Council

Disarmament Commission—Committee I, which deals with the regulations of all armaments and armed forces, has held four meetings as of May 8. On April 24, Benjamin V. Cohen, U.S. deputy representative, introduced the U.S. proposal embodying six principles which the United States considers constitute the “essential principles of an effective disarmament program.” This proposal states that the goal of disarmament is not to regulate but to prevent war and that to achieve this goal “all states must cooperate to establish an open and substantially disarmed world.” International agreements must be entered into by which all states would reduce their armed forces to levels necessary for the maintenance of internal security and the fulfillment of obligations under the Charter. Such international agreements must insure the “progressive reduction of armed forces and permitted armaments to fixed maximum levels . . . and the elimination of all instruments adaptable to mass destruction”; and must provide effective safeguards to insure that all phases of the disarmament program are carried out. “In particular, the elimination of atomic weapons must be accomplished by an effective system of international control of atomic energy to insure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes only,” and finally that such international agreements “must provide an effective system of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments, including atomic, to achieve the open world in which alone there can be effective disarmament.”

In reply to a question by the Soviet representative, Mr. Cohen stated that the United States in proposing stages had no thought of “delaying” but rather of providing for the orderly development of the processes of disclosure. The United States hoped all stages could be completed, he said, in 1 year, or “with a reasonable degree of cooperation” in at least 2 years.

The representatives of Canada, France, and the United Kingdom welcomed the United States initiative in presenting this working paper. David M. Johnson (Canada) stated that these principles were “useful signposts” on the road to a common goal and that it would be very helpful if Com-

mittee members would state which principles they could accept and which they could not, in the latter case possibly suggesting alternative language.

At the May 8 meeting discussion continued on the United States proposal. The U.S.S.R. representative denounced this working paper as a “pointless” declaration. He stated that if in fact a reduction in present levels of armed forces and armaments was what was being proposed, why were objections raised to the U.S.S.R. proposal for a one-third reduction in existing levels. In reply, Mr. Moch (France) stated that an across-the-board reduction would not be equitable. However, he would be very interested in examining any alternative formula which the U.S.S.R. might wish to put forward. He also noted that if the Commission was ever to get out of the impasse it was in, the U.S.S.R. would have to make concessions and give the Committee an accurate and complete description of what was meant by “continuous inspection.” Mr. Malik replied that it would be useless for him to explain what the U.S.S.R. meant by this until the United States abandoned its plan for ownership of atomic installations.

Mr. Santa Cruz (Chile) noted that the United States paper constituted a step forward and that it was worth taking advantage of as a basis for further work. He also observed that the U.S.S.R. knew perfectly well that its one-third reduction proposal was unacceptable. Mr. Cohen (U.S.) stated that the United States paper was an honest effort to meet Mr. Malik’s point that it would serve no purpose to discuss details until certain decisions were taken in principle. The U.S.S.R. criticism of the U.S.-proposed system of disclosure and verification—that it relegated disclosure of atomic information to the remote future—was unfounded. In any event, if the U.S.S.R. were prepared to consider the adoption of such a system, the United States would welcome its concrete suggestions.

Committee II held its third meeting April 25 and continued the general debate on the U.S. proposals submitted April 5 for “Progressive and Continuing Disclosure and Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments.” At the meeting, April 25, the representatives of Brazil, China, and the Netherlands expressed appreciation of the “constructive approach” of the U.S. proposals and that

as a matter of principle there should be no disagreement regarding the main lines of these proposals. Mr. Malik (U.S.S.R.) stated that the more the U.S. representative and the representatives of the United Kingdom and France defended the U.S. proposals on disclosure and verification, the more it became apparent how unacceptable and unfounded these proposals were. In contrast, he stressed the advantages of the Soviet Union proposals referred to the Commission by General Assembly resolution of January 19, 1952.

Kashmir—Frank P. Graham, U.N. representative for India and Pakistan, submitted his third report to the Security Council, April 22, on the progress made to obtain the agreement of the Governments of India and Pakistan to a plan for the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The report presented

(1) progress made on the 12 proposals for an agreement on demilitarization—8 have been accepted by both Governments; (2) the views of the U.N. representative on the general problem and his conclusions; and (3) his recommendations.

Dr. Graham noted that Pakistan has indicated "acceptance of the remaining four proposals, with certain qualifications regarding the character of forces to be demilitarized" and that India "maintains that if agreement can be reached on the issues of the number and character of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line, the other two remaining differences (i.e., the period of demilitarization and the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator) can be solved without difficulty." He noted also in his report that in response to discussions about further withdrawals of military forces from the State, India has "in addition, decided to withdraw unconditionally one division, with supporting armor." With this withdrawal, the Governments of India and Pakistan will have both withdrawn over 50 percent of their forces from the State.¹

Korea—The acting representative of the United States to the United Nations (Ernest A. Gross) sent a note to the Secretary-General on April 28, 1952, to inform the Security Council that

the President of the United States has today appointed General Mark W. Clark to replace General Matthew B. Ridgway as the Commanding General of the military forces which the Members of the United Nations have made available to the Unified Command under the United States pursuant to the Security Council Resolution of July 7, 1950.

General Clark, after visiting U.N. Headquarters, left for Korea by plane on May 5.

General Assembly

The Balkan Subcommission of the Peace Observation Commission—The Commission held its second meeting on May 2 and unanimously noted

¹ For excerpts from Dr. Graham's Third Report to the Security Council, see BULLETIN of May 5, 1952, p. 712.

the first Situation Report of the U.N. Military Observers in Greece, which covered the period from February 6, 1952, to April 22, 1952. The report stated that "during the period under review the general situation on the Greek-Albanian and Greek-Bulgarian frontiers has been quiet." All five countries represented on the Balkan Subcommission—Colombia, France, Pakistan, Sweden, and the United States—have sent military observers to the Greek frontier areas at the request of the Greek Government.

The Palestine Conciliation Commission—The Commission held a series of closed meetings, April 21–30, at U.N. Headquarters. It issued a statement at the end of the session that:

1. The Commission would continue to hold its meetings at United Nations Headquarters, although it "did not overlook the possibility of meeting at its Jerusalem Headquarters and elsewhere if and when there should be a recognized need for such meetings."

2. It would resume discussions with the Israeli Delegation on the question of blocked bank accounts in order to ascertain Israel's present situation.

3. On the question of compensation for abandoned Arab property in Israel, the Commission agreed to ask the land specialist of its Refugee Office to undertake such discussions at the technical level with competent Israeli authorities as soon as possible.

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF)—The Executive Board of UNICEF held a 4-day session at U.N. Headquarters, April 21–24 to review progress of its child-aid operations and to examine recommendations for new activities in several areas. The Board, *inter alia*, (1) adopted a target program and budget of \$20,000,000 for the year beginning July 1, 1952. This will include \$1,710,000 for Africa, \$5,630,000 for Asia, \$1,850,000 for the Eastern Mediterranean, \$750,000 for Europe, \$2,640,000 for Latin America, and \$500,000 for global projects, \$3,000,000 for emergency situations, \$2,100,000 for freight, and \$2,000,000 for administration. (2) Approved \$8,609,000 in new apportionments for programs as recommended by the Program Committee, including emergency allocations of \$550,000 for Brazil, \$185,000 for India, \$110,000 for Jordan, \$29,000 for the Philippines, and \$1,560,000 for Palestine; and for projects to improve the health of children and mothers in Europe (France, Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Yugoslavia) and Latin America (British Honduras, Chile, Grenada, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Peru). (3) In order not to delay the implementation of these approved projects, as UNICEF's funds on hand are insufficient, it was decided by a vote of 18–(U.S.)–1 (U.S.S.R.)–4 (India, Indonesia, Philippines, Yugoslavia) to withdraw \$5,185,000 from the inactive funds previously allocated to China. This action left more than a million dollars in the China allocation, this balance being subject to withdrawal for use elsewhere should emergencies arise between now and the fall meetings of the Executive Board.

The Importance of Simplified Import-Export Procedures

*Statement by Harold F. Linder
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

Representatives of the Treasury Department have already commented on the technical provisions of this bill.² What I should like to comment upon briefly is the way in which this bill bears on our economic relations with other countries.

In my own experience with the representatives of other countries, I have been impressed with the importance they attach to this project of American customs simplification. The reason for this strong interest by foreign countries in what seems to be simply a technical project is not hard to find. It arises out of the critical importance which the export trade has for these countries. Take Canada, for example. Of every \$100 of goods Canada makes, she exports about \$22. For Great Britain, the comparable figure is \$21; for Belgium, \$30; and so forth. This means, as far as these countries are concerned, that their economic existence in some ways depends on their ability to export. In that kind of situation, the treatment of their goods in foreign customhouses is a matter of prime political and economic importance.

The relationship between a country's trade and its political orientation was a factor very much in the minds of the Soviet officials who planned the Moscow Economic Conference. They were very much aware of the fact that one of the most effective gestures of good will which one country can extend to another is an offer to take its goods on a reasonable basis. They were aware of the converse proposition, as well, that there are few things in international relations which generate political hostility quite as rapidly as an unwillingness to give another country a reasonable opportunity to trade. They already realize what we are only beginning to learn, that every national policy affecting foreign countries is a potential weapon in the Cold War between the East and the West.

When one tries to appraise the significance of the customs simplification project in this context, I think it is important to realize that the cumbersome and inequitable customs procedures with which this bill deals create rather a different reaction among exporters and importers than the more apparent forms of trade barriers such as tariffs. These customs procedures grew up in piecemeal, patchwork fashion over the years, as one current problem or another seemed to need special attention. In time, the problems disappeared, but the

provisions of law designed to deal with them did not. To the prospective exporter, the procedures now seem to have no apparent rhyme or reason. When incomprehensible procedures of this sort operate to prevent a product from being imported, the experience leaves in the businessman a sense of frustration and resentment, which inevitably is reflected in the attitude of his government.

However, the bill is important not only for its effect upon the attitudes of foreign countries but also for its bearing on the immediate problems which American exporters and importers face in their day-to-day business. The importance of simplifying import and export procedures from the businessman's point of view is indicated by the heavy emphasis which business groups concerned with international trade have placed on this objective. Business associations such as the International Chamber of Commerce have devoted a very considerable amount of time and effort to the streamlining of these procedures both here and abroad.

The sort of reform which such business groups hope to achieve in this field is in keeping with our objectives as a nation in the international trade field. For years, the United States has sought to reduce the degree of interference which governments have placed in the way of business enterprises engaged in international trade. Undue governmental interference, cumbersome administrative procedures, and red tape do not provide an encouraging climate for private enterprise in international trade. On the contrary, they tend to foster the growth of governmental trading. The simplification of American procedures and the elimination of American red tape would be the strongest kind of affirmation of faith in our own preachments.

In the end, our action in simplifying American procedures is likely to help our businessmen not only at home but also in foreign countries. The improvement of our practices should help to bring about reforms in the customs administrations of other countries and to make life abroad somewhat easier for the American exporter. Conversely, our failure to move ahead in this field may well lead to backsliding on the part of other countries in this field. Any such trend, which could easily develop, would end up with all of us the losers.

Canada is a particularly good illustration of this last risk. A few years ago, the Canadians simplified many of their customs procedures in the hope and expectation that the United States would do likewise and that a mutually profitable trade between our two countries could be facilitated. She developed a more equitable basis of valuation for customs purposes and increased the extent to which importers could get remedies in the courts from the decisions of customs officials. However, the Canadian Government has been under very continuous pressure to undo its reforms, because the United States has not so far removed some

¹ Testimony given before the Senate Committee on Finance on Apr. 22 and released to the press on the same date.

² H. R. 5505.

of the inequities which have plagued Canadian exporters to this country.

I have so far been stressing what this bill does. Let me conclude by mentioning what it does not do. This bill does not alter the tariff rates which now afford protection to domestic industry. It does not in any way threaten our industries. It does, however, eliminate some of the trade barriers which now exist in our customs practices and which in many cases were not originally intended by the Congress.

In conclusion, I want to record the Department's strong endorsement to the bill. The bill serves the interests of the United States as a whole and merits the favorable consideration of this Committee.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

Commerce With Latin America. Report of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. H. Rept. 1527, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 41 pp.

Convention With Finland Relating to Double Taxation on Estates and Inheritances. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Convention Between the United States of America and the Republic of Finland, Signed at Washington on March 3, 1952, for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Estates and Inheritances. S. Exec. K., 82d Cong., 2d sess. 11 pp.

Convention With Finland for Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Convention Between the United States of America and the Republic of Finland, Signed at Washington on March 3, 1952, for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income. S. Exec. L., 82d Cong., 2d sess. 12 pp.

Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance. Letter from Secretary of State Transmitting the Fourth Report Regarding the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Program, Pursuant to Section 6 of Public Law 897 (The Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950), for the Period from September 15 Through December 15, 1951. H. Doc. 392, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 1 p.

A Proposal by Canada and a Proposal by Australia Respecting Changes in the Delimitation of Certain of the Seasonal Zones Established in Annex II of the International Load Line Convention, Signed at London on July 5, 1930. S. Exec. Rept. 4, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany Executive Q, Eighty-second Congress, first session] 3 pp.

Amending War Claims Act of 1948 to Compensate Prisoners of War for Forced Labor and Inhumane Treatment. H. Rept. 1632, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. R. 3719] 9 pp. Also H. Rept. 1633. [To accompany H. R. 4345] 9 pp.

Making Special Quota Immigration Visas Available to Certain Alien Shepherders. H. Rept. 1636, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. 2549] 2 pp.

State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary Appropriation Bill, Fiscal Year 1953. H. Rept. 1665, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. R. 7289] 38 pp.

Authorizing Completion and Termination of the Issuance of Immigration Visas Authorized Under the Act of June 25, 1948, as Amended. H. Rept. 1708, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. J. Res. 411] 4 pp.

THE DEPARTMENT

Appointment of Officers

George Templeton as Chief of Motion Pictures Program, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, effective April 29.

Frank E. Sorenson as Director of the Education Staff of the Technical Cooperation Administration and Acting Director of the Technical Training Staff, effective April 18.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmation

The Senate on April 24 confirmed the nomination of William J. Sebald as Ambassador to Burma.

PUBLICATIONS

New Foreign Relations Volume Released

The Department of State released on April 24 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, volume V, The American Republics. The other four volumes comprising the series for 1933 have been previously published. The present volume contains sections on relations with Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama. Correspondence on multilateral relations with the American Republics and with Argentina were contained in volume IV. No significant negotiations took place with other republics of this hemisphere in 1933.

As the year 1933 marked the transition from the Hoover to the Roosevelt era, the record is of historic interest as showing the early application of the good-neighbor policy. A serious test case of the sincerity of the Roosevelt administration in avoiding intervention in neighboring countries was presented by the revolutionary upheavals in Cuba. To a country seething with unrest under the control of President Machado, Sumner Welles was sent as ambassador to serve as mediator between the government in power and the opposing

factions, in accordance with the treaty of relations with Cuba of May 22, 1903, incorporating the Platt Amendment, which was abrogated by the treaty of May 29, 1934. There followed the downfall of Machado, the short-lived government of President Céspedes, an army revolt led by the then Sergeant Batista, and the unstable regime of Grau San Martín, who was replaced in January 1934. In the attempts to mediate, close connections were maintained between the American Embassy and the various factions in all this period of change, but President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull were able to hold to their policy of taking no position which would involve intervention by the armed forces of the United States. The detailed story of this year of turmoil in Cuba is set forth in documents filling more than a third of the volume.

Further implementation of the good-neighbor policy was shown in continuing the negotiations begun in the Hoover administration looking to the relinquishing of American control in Haiti and in a disclaimer of further responsibility regarding the *Guardia Nacional* in Nicaragua. A new policy to receive attention was the initiating of discussions with several countries for reciprocal trade agreements.

One interesting item left over from the Hoover administration was a recommendation by the American Ambassador to Mexico and the Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs that in view of the threat of Japanese aggression a joint American-Mexican Commission be set up to study matters of mutual defense. This was set aside in November 1933 in view of the temporary lessening of tension between the United States and Japan.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933, volume V, The American Republics, was compiled in the Division of Historical Policy Research chiefly by Victor J. Farrar and Miss Matilda F. Axton, under the direction of E. R. Perkins, editor of *Foreign Relations*. Copies of this volume (lxxxiv, 887 pp.) may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. for \$3.25 each.

Recent Releases

Facts About Point 4. Economic Cooperation Series 32. Pub. 4546. 4 pp. 5¢.

A leaflet describing the Technical Cooperation Administration.

Building a Mutual Defense. General Foreign Policy Series 68. Pub. 4473. 99 pp., charts. 35¢.

The Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Apr. 1, 1951 to Oct. 9, 1951, fourth semiannual report.

Double Taxation, Taxes on Estates of Deceased Persons. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2355. Pub. 4474. 11 pp. 5¢.

Convention between the United States and Ireland—Signed at Dublin Sept. 13, 1949; entered into force Dec. 20, 1951.

Double Taxation, Taxes on Income. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2356. Pub. 4475. 21 pp. 10¢.

Convention between the United States and Ireland—Signed at Dublin Sept. 13, 1949; entered into force Dec. 20, 1951.

Double Taxation, Taxes on Income. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2360. Pub. 4477. 17 pp. 10¢.

Convention between the United States and New Zealand—Signed at Washington Mar. 16, 1948; entered into force Dec. 18, 1951.

Double Taxation, Taxes on Income. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2357. Pub. 4483. 31 pp. 15¢.

Convention between the United States and Norway—Signed at Washington June 13, 1949; entered into force Dec. 11, 1951.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Apr. 28–May 3, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

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306	4/22	Yugoslav discussions finished
307	4/22	Yugoslavia discussions finished
308	4/23	Thorp: Future of foreign trade
311	4/23	U.S.–Norway: Enemy property
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†324	4/28	Agri. and coop. credit conference
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326	4/29	Three meetings of FAO
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†330	4/29	Limiting importation of tomatoes
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*334	4/30	Birthday of Queen Juliana
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*339	4/30	Foreign Service retirements
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343	5/1	World Health Assembly
†344	5/1	Sargeant: Information program
*345	5/1	Cowen: Ambassador to Belgium
346	5/1	Upu: 13th congress
†347	5/2	Thorp: Testimony to House comm.
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United States Documents on Relations With the Soviet Union, 1933-1939: Part I

by Rogers Platt Churchill

The preface to a new volume of *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*,¹ explains that this collection of documents from the files of the Department of State is now being published because of the vital importance of the relations of the United States with the Soviet Union. By publication in a separate volume rather than in several annual volumes of the regular *Foreign Relations* series, the background of these relations from the diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States in November 1933 to the end of the year 1939 after the outbreak of the Second World War can be presented in one place, and the material made available much sooner than would otherwise be possible. Relatively little of this mass of documentation has hitherto been known, yet it is of utmost significance that this background should be studied, if an accurate understanding is to be reached concerning the relations of the United States and the Soviet Union which developed in the years during and after World War II.

Recognition of the Soviet Union

The documents for 1933 have, indeed, been previously published,² and they are here reproduced without change, because they describe the beginnings of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and contain the agreements signed on that occasion by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, to which reference will need to be made in the negotiations of the following years.

The volume opens with reports of feelers on the part of Soviet representatives on the subject of U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union. Such a

friendly arrangement between the two nations might more effectively restrain Japanese aggression in the Far East and facilitate some considerable, although unspecific, increase in their trade. These suggestions did not strike any responsive chord early in 1933, when Under Secretary of State W. R. Castle, Jr., repeated the principles which had hitherto characterized the attitude of the United States toward recognition of the Soviet Union:

This Government has been of the opinion, however, that any real or lasting benefit to the people of the United States would not be attained by the establishment of relations with Russia until the present rulers of that country have given evidence that they are prepared to carry out in good faith the international obligations which experience has demonstrated are essential to the development of friendly intercourse and commerce between nations [p. 4].

Already the United States had done much to reduce to a minimum the obstacles affecting commercial relations between the two countries, so that the Under Secretary could not believe that "the mere act of recognition of the Soviet régime would make it possible for the Soviet authorities appreciably to increase their purchases in the United States" (p. 5).

Only with the coming of a new administration was a new departure possible. Subsequent to the failure of the London World Economic Conference, serious attention was given to the restoration of the "happy tradition of friendship" which had long existed between the American and Russian peoples and to the resolution of the existing difficulties, which had lately kept them apart, by frank, friendly conversations. In preparation for this prospective endeavor, several documents illustrate the problems involved which should be settled prior to the recognition of the Soviet Government. The policy advisers most directly concerned accompanied their recommendations with the advice that agreement on all the difficulties should be obtained in advance of the accordance

¹ Department of State publication 4539, cii, 1034 pp. For sale by the Superintendent of Documents for \$3.75 (buckram).

² *Foreign Relations*, 1933, vol. II, pp. 778-840.

of formal recognition. The Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, Robert F. Kelley, declared:

It is to be especially emphasized that if the questions of repudiated debts and confiscated property are not settled prior to recognition, there is little likelihood that subsequent negotiations would result in a mutually satisfactory settlement [p. 8; see also pp. 6, 12, 14, 16, 17].

President Roosevelt on October 10, 1933, invited Soviet representatives to come to Washington "to explore with me personally all questions outstanding between our countries." This offer was accepted by Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, the President of the All-Union Central Executive Committee, on the 17th; and a small Soviet delegation, led by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov, began the conversations on November 8.

Intensive negotiations resulted in an agreement accomplished by exchange of notes between the President and Litvinov on November 16, in return for which the United States decided to establish normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. On the preceding day a "gentleman's agreement" had been initialed on the difficult problem of payment of debt owed to the United States over and above all claims of the Soviet Union, and on the method of payment. The exact sum to be paid had not been established, but Litvinov agreed to remain in Washington to discuss the amount in further conversations. No definite conclusions, however, were arrived at before the Foreign Commissar's departure, owing to the intricacies of the questions involved, and the subject was to become the burden of subsequent diplomatic negotiations. All these agreements are contained in this volume, but there is regrettably little regarding the course of the conversations which produced them. This lack was accounted for by Assistant Secretary of State R. Walton Moore, who explained in a radio address on November 22:

There were no stenographers present and no reports made and thus, so far as the conferences are concerned, there will be a bare outline and not a full picture exposed to the eye of the future historian [p. 42].

Before the year 1933 ended, a few routine matters were disposed of, and the first American Ambassador, William C. Bullitt, made a hurried journey to Moscow to present his credentials, to assist in the establishment of an embassy, and to hold introductory conversations with Soviet high officials, including Joseph Stalin himself, and his future diplomatic colleagues. The last document for this period is an optimistic despatch from Ambassador Bullitt describing his reception and the fine words spoken to him. It was to be an appreciable time in the future before an equally carefree communication would be composed. The education of the United States Government and of Ambassador Bullitt in the nature of negotiations with the Soviet Union would soon start.

Failure of Debt Conversations

Not long after the Ambassadors of the United States and the Soviet Union had reached their embassies, conversations began on the subject of the settlement of the debts and claims which the "gentleman's agreement" had not precisely specified. A U.S. draft proposal was explained to Soviet Ambassador Alexander Antonovich Troyanovsky on February 20, 1934, but when Bullitt first discussed it with Litvinov the latter surprised the Ambassador by the vehemence of his objections "to almost every sentence of the draft." What was even more astounding, Litvinov asserted positions which were contrary to what the Americans had understood during the discussions on the subject held at Washington. The main points in dispute, which were never agreed upon in nearly a year of negotiations, comprised these topics: (1) The exact sum payable by the Soviet Union to the United States in full satisfaction of claims and debts; (2) The rate of interest to be paid on this amount, and indeed whether or not, as Litvinov persisted in contending, any such interest was payable at all; (3) An argument whether there was to be a direct loan to the Soviet Government, which Litvinov insisted had been promised, or financial assistance in the form of credits, which was what all the Americans understood had been contemplated; (4) The question of what rates of interest, both regular and additional, were to be paid by the Soviet Union: the regular interest on the credit itself, and the additional interest charged on the amount of the credit to be used for the satisfaction of the amount of indebtedness and the interest upon it.

The papers collected in this volume illustrate the course of these long negotiations and their frequent acrimoniousness. The proposals and counteroffers made are here reproduced, with the various amounts suggested for the principal of the indebtedness and for the several interest rates which were bandied back and forth. Foreign Commissar Litvinov advocated several differences in interpretation of the understandings reached at the time of his conversations at Washington, of which regrettably no precise record had been made. The Americans objected to these variants as best they could, and Secretary of State Cordell Hull took an early opportunity to tell Ambassador Troyanovsky that they "were greatly surprised and keenly disappointed to learn that Mr. Litvinoff offered a contention and a version of the debt understanding, entered into at the time of his visit here, entirely different from anything the American officials thought they were discussing and entirely different from anything they were thinking about" (pp. 70-71).

As the conversations reeled along, Litvinov advanced other considerations which he alleged made it difficult for the Soviet Government to enter into any agreement with the United States.

During the first half of 1934, the Soviet fear of Japanese aggression in the Far East abated, and the interest of the Soviet Government in furthering good relations with the United States correspondingly declined. Ambassador Bullitt recognized the significance of the improvement in the Soviet position:

The nub of the matter is this: if the Soviet Government should again become convinced that an attack by Japan was likely or imminent we should probably find Litvinov willing to reach an agreement on the basis of our proposals. So long as the Soviet Union feels completely secure I believe that no agreement acceptable to us will be acceptable to the authorities in Moscow [p. 100].

For several months American officials found it incredible that Litvinov's bluster and intransigence would not be succeeded by acquiescence. The original proposals were maintained with insistent dignity, and negotiations were carried on with "unruffled patience." When the Soviet attitude remained adamant, the conversations were transferred from Moscow to Washington, and modifications were suggested for consideration, until a final, most liberal offer was given to the Soviet Government. Nothing seemed to avail, and Secretary Hull concluded that "personally I have little idea that the Soviet officials will come to any reasonable agreement. Litvinoff won his victory when he obtained recognition and regards everything else as of minor importance" (p. 146). After one last, brief meeting with Ambassador Troyanovsky, the Department of State on January 31, 1935, issued a press release which announced in a restrained manner, concealing the full bitterness and exasperation of the disappointment, that in view of the existing Soviet attitude "there seems to be scarcely any reason to doubt that the negotiations which seemed so promising at the start must now be regarded as having come to an end" (p. 173).

How deeply the American Government was touched by this unanticipated failure is better illustrated in the swift moves taken at Moscow. Early in February orders were issued for the withdrawal of the U.S. naval and air attachés and for the contemplated reduction of personnel at the Embassy, the abolition of the Consulate General at Moscow, and its replacement by a consular section of the Embassy.

Difficulties With Soviet Authorities

Other disappointments and irritations in relations with the Soviet Union first appeared during 1934. The Embassy began to encounter administrative difficulties, often petty and annoying, which hampered it in its functioning. Because of the trouble in obtaining a debt settlement agreement, and the consequent unlikelihood of genuinely friendly relations, it did not seem sensible to proceed with plans to spend a large sum of money to construct fine Embassy buildings in Mos-

cow. The unwillingness of Soviet authorities to make effective an oral promise to supply the Embassy with enough paper rubles at a fair rate of exchange for minor expenditures caused Ambassador Bullitt to recommend that "in every case understandings with the Soviet Government or representatives thereof should be made in writing or should be confirmed at a later date by a written document" (p. 74). So far, however, the Ambassador could remain philosophical, for he wrote, with some numerical exaggeration:

In Moscow we are subjected to a hundred such irritations daily and it is, I feel, our duty to endure them with equanimity and to preserve our wrath for major issues. We cannot forget that at any time the lines of major policy of the United States and the Soviet Union may run parallel [pp. 106-107].

Commercial Agreements

The United States had to some degree popularized the recognition of the Soviet Union by the anticipation of a large expansion of trade with that state, which would help to put unemployed Americans back to work. To the Soviet Union, however, trade was an item of lesser importance in the bargain, although American industrial products were highly desired. They could be substituted for elsewhere, as Litvinov had threatened in his anger during the negotiations over the debt settlement. Therefore, early in 1935, the United States initiated conversations for a commercial agreement with the Soviet Union.

The U.S. Government was favorably disposed toward the conclusion of a commercial agreement so that the tariff concessions granted to other countries under the reciprocal trade-agreements program could be generalized to the Soviet Union. This act could be supported only if assurances were received from the Soviet Government that its policies and practices would be in harmony with this program and would be accompanied by an undertaking substantially to increase the purchase of products of the United States.

It was now considered essential that these Soviet assurances should be obtained in writing: Vague statements, or an offer to accord most-favored-nation treatment to American imports in view of the monopoly of foreign trade by the Soviet Government, would be valueless and completely unacceptable. Litvinov was prepared in principle to agree to the suggestion to make a commercial agreement and was ready to declare that Soviet purchases of American products would be substantially increased. He mentioned that during 1935 these purchases would probably amount to some \$30,000,000, and he proposed that the agreement could be arrived at through an exchange of notes. His assurances were judged to be quite adequate, and the amount of American goods to be purchased in 1935 would furnish a satisfactory basis for generalizing the tariff concessions accorded other countries to the Soviet Union.

The commercial agreement was finally effected by an exchange of notes between the United States and the Soviet Union, signed on July 13, 1935. It was accomplished, now as also upon future occasions, only after some haggling over details. While Litvinov sought to obtain explicit acceptance of the points he desired, he attempted to avoid making definite commitments in return. These negotiations, however, were not conducted in the exacerbated spirit associated with the conversations on the debts and claims, nor were they unduly prolonged. The signature of this commercial agreement was the first significant success since the resumption of relations with the Soviet Union. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., telegraphed his pleasure at this occurrence to Ambassador Bullitt: "Congratulations on breaking the log jam between the United States and Russia" (p. 215).

Hereafter the commercial agreement was renewed annually. The negotiations are documented in this volume for each occasion, including the various demands brought forward by the Soviet Union which complicated the renewals. The exchange of notes signed on August 4, 1937, became the basic text for the subsequent years and contained a grant for most-favored-nation treatment in general to the Soviet Union. This modification was not made reciprocal because "the extension of most-favored-nation treatment on the part of the Soviet Union is valueless and misleading in view of the Soviet monopoly of foreign trade" (p. 414). The recompense for this received by the United States was an increase of \$40,000,000 in the minimum amount of purchases of American products which the Soviet Union expected to obtain in the year's trade.

Under these commercial agreements the minimum amounts of Soviet purchases were always actually exceeded, but even so the trade total with the Soviet Union scarcely approached the great expectations envisioned for it in anticipation of recognition in 1933. These presumptions were in some measure spoiled by the inability to attain agreement on the problem of claims and debts, which in turn prevented the extension of commercial credits to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the renewal of the commercial agreement was the one yearly achievement which lent some degree of cordiality to American-Soviet relations.

Protest Against Communist Interference

Another grievous disappointment in relations with the Soviet Union was sustained during 1935. Already in the preceding year evidence was accumulating in the Department of State of Communist activities in the United States which were being stimulated and directed from Moscow. It was also understood that a congress of the Communist International was expected to be held in 1935 in the Soviet Union, at which it was probable

that Communist delegates from the United States would be present and at which action would probably be taken that would be inimical to the United States. All this was held to be in violation of the pledge given by Litvinov on November 16, 1933, that the Soviet Union would not attempt, and would try to prevent, Communist interference in the internal affairs of the United States. On the basis of this evidence, Ambassador Bullitt was instructed to protest against these actual and potential violations of the Litvinov pledge, which he did orally and informally on October 5, 1934. Litvinov was irritated and evasive, claiming to know nothing about these activities, and retorted:

No nation ever starts talking about the activities of the Comintern unless it wishes to have as bad relations as possible with us. The activities of the Comintern are merely an excuse for breaking diplomatic relations [p. 158].

When it became definitely established that the sessions of the seventh Congress of the Communist International were to be held at Moscow in 1935,³ the Department of State clearly set out what would be considered as violations of the propaganda pledge (p. 221) and asked for detailed, current reports from the Moscow Embassy. Bullitt's admonitions to Litvinov on the seriousness of the prospects were greeted with jocular insistence that neither he nor Joseph Stalin knew anything about this, and Bullitt caught on that the familiar attitude was to be persisted in, that "the Soviet Government has no connection with the Third International and knows nothing whatsoever about its activities" (p. 222). Just before the congress opened, the American Ambassador wrote a long despatch of unusual prescience, containing his conclusions with regard to the present and future policy of the Soviet Union, which particularly merits careful study (pp. 224-227).

The sessions of the seventh congress were reported from Moscow as well as the availability of information allowed. The resolutions of the congress, the recommendations of the tactics to be followed by Communists throughout the world in the great struggle of the united front against fascism, the more important references made to the United States, and the organizational arrangements of the Comintern are contained in this volume. Some of the speeches made by the American delegates and sent back in translations consisted of tales of their derring-do in the United States and boastful claims to all for which the Communists in the United States had been responsible, so happily in excess of the facts.

Promptly upon the close of the congress, as he had been urged to do, Bullitt sent his appraisal and recommendations to the U.S. Government (pp. 244-248). There was no doubt at all that Litvinov's pledge had been flagrantly violated,

³ The seventh congress was in session between July 25 and Aug. 20, 1935.

but the Ambassador advised that this was no time to sever diplomatic relations nor to make a written protest because it "would produce only a violent and insulting reply and a fruitless exchange of notes. Although he did make certain suggestions whereby American displeasure could be shown, Bullitt cabled to President Roosevelt:

Whatever you do, the Bolsheviks will make it hot for us here. But, as Judge Moore⁴ says, we are already accustomed to Hades and acclimated [p. 249].

The President and Secretary Hull believed, on the other hand, that it was necessary to present a formal, written protest to the Soviet Government. A long note of protest was handed to Acting People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Nikolay Nikolayevich Krestinsky on August 25 and made public on the same day. Krestinsky at once declared that, although he would read it, the protest would be rejected. The formal reply given to Bullitt 2 days afterward contained the viewpoints he had earlier anticipated, and Krestinsky made it abundantly clear: "I cannot accept your protest and am obliged to decline it" (p. 253). The Ambassador again suggested the measures he thought might be taken, but President Roosevelt felt that these should be held in reserve. Secretary Hull recorded the American dissatisfaction and disappointment in an extensive release to the press on August 31, 1935.

Outwardly the Soviet Government was unperturbed; Litvinov made the definite comment a little later that "the Soviet Government would not in any way restrain the activities of the Communist International in the United States or the Soviet Union, or of American Communists connected with the Communist International in the Soviet Union" (p. 265). The sixth congress of the Communist International of Youth⁵ echoed the proceedings of the greater institution, but no protest was made by the United States. Aside from a few minor matters, relations with the Soviet Union in 1935 were disheartening and full of disillusionment for the United States.

Developments During 1936

Among the documents for the year 1936 included in this volume is a limited number not solely concerned with relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. These papers refer to significant internal conditions within the Soviet Union, to important statements of policy, or to incidents of outstanding political, economic, or military importance which had influence upon foreign affairs or entered into the consideration of the United States and other countries in the conduct of their relations with the Soviet Union. The growing strength of the Red army, illustrated

by the sharp increase in the Soviet annual budget for military expenses in both revealed and concealed items, was attracting attention. The assumed efforts of Joseph Stalin to maintain unquestioned control of the Communist Party and to install thoroughly loyal members in governmental positions are shown in reports on the continuation of the party purge and the curious procedure and happenings at the Moscow trial of the Trotskyite-Zinovyevite Terrorist Center (Aug. 19-24), together with the influence that these events and changes might exert upon the foreign relations of the Soviet Union.

The relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were in a state of patient repose after the failures of the preceding year; nothing new of importance was attempted. Considerable hopeful meaning was attributed to a remark by Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, in his speech of January 10, 1936, in which he declared that "the policy of *rapprochement* between the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America . . . has enormous significance from the point of view of the preservation of general peace" (p. 283).

This remark was seized upon as a friendly gesture, indicating that relations with the United States were still desired and appreciated, but little actual impression upon their course was observed. Far more descriptive of the position occupied by the United States was the adroit use by Ambassador Bullitt of timeless selections from reports by Neil S. Brown, while he had been Minister to Russia between 1851 and 1853, to picture the frustrations faced by a representative to the Soviet Union (pp. 289-291).

Shortly before he departed as Ambassador from the Soviet Union, Mr. Bullitt wrote a lengthy, skillful despatch filled with his own views on the policies which the United States should follow toward the Soviet Union and communism. Distilled from the actual experiences endured in the course of his term of service, one sentence revealed how much he had learned:

We should not cherish for a moment the illusion that it is possible to establish really friendly relations with the Soviet Government or with any communist party or communist individual [p. 294].

On the occasion of the third anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, the Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, Loy W. Henderson, wrote an even lengthier appraisal in which he judiciously surveyed the definite advantages both Governments had experienced from that recognition, as well as the disappointments each had sustained (pp. 307-319). Unless the international situation should become more precarious, he believed that there was little likelihood of an understanding with the Soviet Union providing for payments on the American debts and claims.

⁴R. Walton Moore, Assistant Secretary of State.

⁵Held at Moscow between Sept. 25 and Oct. 11, 1935.

One of the agreements of November 16, 1933, between Litvinov and the President had released and assigned to the United States certain assets in which the Soviet Union, as the successor of former Russian Governments, or its nationals, may have had or may claim to have an interest, and any amounts realized from this assignment were to be reported to the Soviet Union. It was contemplated that such sums as might be recovered would be deposited in a special account in the Treasury Department, where they would constitute a fund for the satisfaction in part of the claims of the United States and its nationals against the Soviet Government.

Meanwhile a number of suits had been instituted in American courts for the determination and recovery of these assets, when it became necessary to obtain clarification and interpretation of some early decrees and actions of the Soviet Government. Negotiations were undertaken, and in the course of 1936 and 1937 some of this technical information was furnished. The testimony of a Soviet legal expert had been required, and Mark Abramovich Plotkin, Assistant Chief of the Juridical Department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, made trips to the United States in the summer of 1936 and in December 1938-January 1939. When his presence was desired a third time later in 1939, it was learned that he had been purged. A modicum of success has attended this one of the agreements of November 1933: A few million dollars from these assigned assets has been deposited in the Treasury with the passing of time.

New Difficulties Encountered

The second American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Joseph E. Davies, arrived in Moscow on January 19, 1937. He was accorded a courteous reception and made a favorable impression. In early conversations with Soviet officials the unsettled problem of the American debts and claims, still standing in the way of amicable relations, was gingerly brought to the Ambassador's notice. He plainly summarized the existing American position for his questioners:

... an honorable agreement had been made with full knowledge of all facts prior to entering into it; that it had not been performed by them; that it was a matter of relatively little importance to us and might be of vital consequence to them in the future; [and] that it was their problem and their next move [p. 372].

In his relatively short term of a year and a half, Ambassador Davies was frequently away from the Soviet Union, so that much of the business of the mission was therefore conducted by the *Chargé d'Affaires*. The acceleration of the purge, the campaign against foreigners in the Soviet Union, and Stalin's efforts to obtain completely trust-

worthy followers in the Government and military establishments engaged the attention of the Embassy, which attempted to assess the possible effects of these happenings upon conditions within the Soviet Union and upon its foreign standing. There were three major trials: that of the "Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Center" (Jan. 23-30, 1937); that bringing about the execution of outstanding military leaders (June 11-12, 1937); and the trial and execution of seven prominent party or state officials (Dec. 20, 1937). The deliberate campaign against foreigners in the Soviet Union was pursued with unabated intensity and callous indifference to foreign opinion. Foreign residents were freely charged with espionage, were jailed, and were expelled from the country. As a concomitant, Soviet citizens and officials were so terrorized that they feared to associate with foreigners; the American Embassy lost most of its associations with nonofficial persons and found it difficult to have easy access in official intercourse with more than a sharply limited number of government representatives. Foreign missions were frequently engaged in efforts to protect and to regain the freedom of their imprisoned nationals. There was a somewhat ominous undertone in the message of September 20, 1937, that "fortunately thus far during the purge, no American citizens have been arrested" (p. 393).

Besides the inconveniences caused by the anti-foreign terrorism, the Embassy continued to be harassed in other ways. After careful investigations, concealed wiring and a Soviet microphone were discovered in the Ambassador's office, and photographs were taken. No protest was made, but special equipment was kept on hand for testing the wiring and the walls of the Embassy. The principal sour note arose out of the excessive and inconsiderate manner of examining the baggage of arriving and departing members of the Embassy staff and the attempts to levy export duties on articles purchased in the Soviet Union. These inconveniences and strange practices remained as serious annoyances which were combatted with determination; Secretary Hull labeled them "contrary to the long established practice of civilized nations." A memorandum by George F. Kennan, at this time at the Department of State, summarized the position of an American Ambassador in Moscow, and the practical results of the existing Soviet system upon the operation of the Embassy (pp. 446-451).

Soviet Attempts To Purchase War Materials

The expanding rearmament plans for all the military branches of the Soviet Union resulted in demands for war materials and armaments which Soviet industry could not yet satisfactorily produce, and efforts were begun to acquire these products in the United States. These included munitions, armor plate, technical data and plans, man-

ufacturing processes and construction assistance contracts, airplanes, engines, and drawings, but especially the purchase of naval vessels to be built in the United States, or to be shipped as parts for assembling in the Soviet Union. A large selection of papers bears upon negotiations for these purchases during 1937-1939.

Many circumstances conspired to limit the successful issue of these efforts for purchases in the United States. The methods used by the Soviet Union were uncommonly devious and cumbersome. A separate corporation [the Carp Corporation] was established principally for the purpose of facilitating the purchase by the Soviet Government of military and naval equipment in the United States. As a new organization, it had not established its reputation, and a serious degree of confusion arose from its manner of operation. Several lawyers participated in negotiations, and approaches to American firms were made both directly and through the good offices of departments of the Government.

Use was made also, doubtless in the belief that their political influence would prove helpful, of retired army and naval officers and of a Democratic national committeeman. A number of these retainers frequently tried to smooth out resultant difficulties through conversations with officers of the Department of State and the Navy and War Departments and occasionally in joint conferences with representatives of the Soviet purchasing company and American firms. Occasionally the confusion would be compounded by intercession by the Soviet Embassy, and at last by the presence of a Soviet naval commission in this country.

Impediments were also encountered from the American side. When plans for construction of a battleship were submitted for approval, they would be examined in the Department of State to see that no specifications were contrary to international policy or treaty engagements. The plans would go to the Navy Department, to determine whether the construction of a ship as planned would disclose to foreign governments or manufacturers any military secrets contrary to the interests of American national defense. Some plans required modification, which caused further delay. In other cases, specifications were included which would have required the active participation of the Navy for a prolonged period of time, and this burden could not be assumed when American naval construction was likewise increasing.

American firms were frequently fully occupied with such orders and could take on no more. They hesitated to accept Soviet contracts without the express approval of the Department of State, whereas it was the policy of the Department only to declare that a proposed transaction would not appear to be in violation of any existing statute or treaty, or to express an outright objection in exceptional circumstances. Furthermore, quite naturally, American companies were reluctant to

enter into contracts with Soviet agencies for what were really small, sample quantities of recent developments, when it appeared obvious that such orders were merely attempts to copy trade secrets cheaply.

The Soviet representatives complained that they found evidence that subordinate officers in the Navy Department had repeatedly advised shipbuilding and other interested American companies not to enter into contracts with Soviet representatives, and that these companies did not dare to accept such contracts for fear of reprisals in the matter of contracts with the U.S. Navy. When these charges were reported to the Department of State, conferences were held with the highest officials of the Navy Department to insure that the policies of the two Departments were in agreement and were carried out in practice.

The Acting Secretary of the Navy, Admiral William D. Leahy, was somewhat disposed to believe that the subordinate officers would not exercise such determining influences, and on September 24, 1937, he "reiterated that the President had recently told him that he hoped that the Russians would be successful in their negotiations to purchase a battleship in this country" (p. 483). Soviet Ambassador Troyanovsky some 2 months later told Secretary Hull about such obstructions to the completion of a battleship, and arrangements were made for him to go to the White House. At the close of 1937, for the first time, the Soviet principals "were greatly encouraged since the Soviet Ambassador's conversation with the President" (p. 490), and were now attempting to close two contracts, one for the construction of a battleship in the United States and the other for the purchase of plans, materials, armament, and equipment to be exported and assembled in the Soviet Union.

Protection of American Citizens

The relief expressed by the American Embassy in Moscow that "thus far" it had been spared the problem of numerous arrests of American citizens by Soviet authorities on vague political charges was short-lived. During the last quarter of the year the Embassy was actively engaged in the protection of the welfare and interests of several American citizens of whose arrests it had become aware. The Soviet Government had failed to supply timely notification of these arrests and had held the Americans incommunicado, in absolute violation of another of Litvinov's pledges of November 16, 1933. During the rest of 1937, the Embassy made futile attempts to circumvent the obstructions put in the way of its members to gain access to, and have essential conversation with, the imprisoned Americans to ascertain their actual citizenship status and the facts surrounding their apprehension.

It is true that the persons arrested were ordinary individuals of no special standing, sometimes the victims of adverse economic circumstances and of misguided beliefs that they could tide over depressed times by a temporary sojourn with relatives who had remained in the Soviet Union. In one outstanding instance, American passports had been obtained by fraud. Even so, these individuals were believed or known to be American citi-

zens, and Secretary Hull made it clear to the Soviet Ambassador that it was just as important, from the standpoint of good relations, that these matters should be cleared up thoroughly whether or not those involved proved to be American citizens (p. 500).

● *Mr. Churchill, author of the above article, is a historian in the Division of Historical Policy Research.*

Turkish-American Partnership

*by George C. McGhee
Ambassador to Turkey¹*

It gives me particular pleasure to meet with members of the Turkish-American University Association and their guests. Members of this association are composed of graduates of American and Turkish universities, who have in many cases subjected themselves to the academic disciplines and enjoyed the university life of both countries. It was my own privilege to attend universities in two countries, my own and England. I have always been grateful that I could have this experience, which I feel greatly broadened my horizons and, I hope, prepared me for the work in which I am now engaged.

The exchange of students and professors between the United States and Turkey, which I am glad to say is now taking place on a greater scale than ever before, offers obvious advantages to both countries. However, this exchange is not new. The fine work done here by Robert College and by our other American educational institutions throughout Turkey has been of inestimable value in showing Turks what Americans are like. The unselfish Americans who have given their lives in the service of these institutions have, I am sure, stimulated a desire on the part of many Turks to understand America better. I am glad that this group gathered here today is establishing even closer bonds between the Turkish universities and American educational institutions in Turkey and in the United States.

¹ Address made before the Turkish-American University Association at Istanbul on Apr. 11.

Under an agreement between the Governments of Turkey and the United States, the American Ambassador serves as honorary chairman of the U.S. Educational Commission in Turkey, better known as the Fulbright Commission. I consider this one of the most important as well as the most agreeable of my duties since it enables me to keep in close touch with the educational and cultural interchange between our countries. I have been gratified to see the keen interest shown by Turkish students in attending universities in our country. There are now 25 Turkish graduate students in the United States under Fulbright auspices. I have been proud of their fine record—the academic honors they have won, the many friends they have made. I have also been pleased with the warm welcome that has been extended to our own professors and students who have come to visit your institutions of higher learning. I am especially happy that several Turkish professors are now lecturing in American universities.

As a practical illustration of the educational exchange which the Fulbright program has brought about, I cite the case of Prof. Hamdi Peyurcioglu of the Technical University of Istanbul, who has just returned from Northwestern University in Illinois. Here he did valuable research in soil mechanics, a subject of great importance to the economic development of Turkey.

On the other hand, I am sure that all of you here know of the valuable contribution that Prof. Robert R. Wilson has made through his lectures on international law right here in the law faculty

of Istanbul University. Dr. Wilson will soon return to the United States but he will never forget Turkey. A founding member of this Turkish-American University Association, he proposes to work in America for the inauguration of programs whereby groups of American and Turkish educators can visit and consult with their opposite numbers in our two countries.

Important though it is, this educational exchange between our two countries is, however, only one aspect of Turkish-American relations—relations which have become so close that I venture to refer to them in the title I have chosen for my remarks today as partnership, Turkish-American partnership. Partnership is a word which has particular connotations to Americans. It implies a relationship of mutual confidence and trust between equals—the pursuit of common objectives—the sharing of responsibilities as well as rewards. I consider it a term peculiarly applicable to the happy relationship which has developed between our two countries in the postwar period.

Although there are many aspects of this partnership, I feel I should at the outset make some reference to one which, if not the most important, is at least the most publicized. I speak of the military and economic aid which my country has been able to extend to Turkey—aid which now aggregates over one billion dollars.

Achievements of Aid Program

Americans are gratified with the results achieved through our aid to Turkey. The aid program has been a true partnership in which the Turkish people have matched the American aid with a great national effort. We share with our Turkish friends their pride in the accomplishments of the Turkish Army—accomplishments which have been possible because of the fine military spirit of the Turks, and the Turkish tradition of military organization and discipline. We are pleased that the Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey has been able to make a contribution toward the training and equipping of this great army. The chief of our military mission, Maj. Gen. William H. Arnold, assured a committee of our Congress in Washington only a few days ago that we had found the Turks to be a people “imbued with a spirit—the will to retain freedom of thought, expression, and action—that is an integral part of our own philosophy of democracy.” We feel that our program of military aid to Turkey, begun in 1947 under the Truman Doctrine, is one of the outstanding successes of American postwar policy.

Since 1947 we have seen evidence of great economic progress in Turkey—in increased agricultural production, growing industrial activity, development of national resources, improvement of highways and transport, in fact throughout the

entire economic fabric of the nation. Full credit for this progress goes to the Turkish people, who have grasped the vision of their country's potentialities and have been willing to do the hard work necessary to take advantage of their opportunities. We are proud, however, that our economic mission headed by Russell H. Dorr, many of whose members have worked side-by-side with Turks, has been able to assist Turkey during this period of progress. We are glad that American supplies and equipment, furnished under our Marshall Plan and subsequent aid programs, has also made an important contribution.

Important as American aid to Turkey is in the military and economic fields, I do not believe it should obscure other factors in Turkish-American relations. From a long-term point of view, I believe that better understanding of each other—of our respective histories, cultures, and customs—may prove even more important. It will be my endeavor as American Ambassador here to continue the work of my distinguished predecessors in promoting a fuller understanding and appreciation of each other's way of life.

It is because of the role which education can play in promoting this understanding that I am, during this present stay in Istanbul, devoting much of my time to visiting educational institutions. I have a warm spot in my heart for university campuses, where I spent some of the happiest and most profitable of my years, and still manage to maintain close relationships with universities in my own country. I have been greatly impressed with what I have seen so far of your Turkish universities. I find they compare favorably with our own, both in their physical plant and their academic standards. One finds here the same objective search for those universal truths which are the aim of every true scholar.

One of the most encouraging aspects of the recent development in Turkish-American relations has been the rapid growth in the fund of knowledge in America of the true Turkey and the Turkish people. For more than a century after our own national independence was established, Americans were too much concerned with developing our own continent to devote more than incidental attention to what was happening in other parts of the world. Moreover, we had few business interests in the Middle East, and, apart from our pioneer doctors and educators, few American travelers came here. This whole area was until quite recently a relatively unknown quantity in American world relations. Our concept of Turkey was a romantic one which had been distorted by the prejudices of Western historians.

It was only in the years between the First and Second World Wars that Americans began to become conscious of the real Turkey. Our attention was focused on Turkey by the amazing career of Turkey's great leader, Ataturk, who must be rec-

ognized as one of the outstanding political and military figures of all times. It was a part of the genius of this great man that he recognized the importance of strengthening Turkish ties with the Western World. This enlightened vision of this great leader, along with an awakened interest on the part of the Western World, including America, in the potentialities of the new Turkey opened the way for the recent developments which have now brought us so close together.

In this perspective, the adherence of Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization represents the fulfillment of an historic Turkish urge. Through this step, which had the solid backing of the United States, Turkey became an integral part of the Western community. Turkey is now represented in the Nato Council, the highest Council of Europe. The accumulated wisdom of Turkish statecraft will now be brought to bear on Nato decisions, and the moral force of the awakened Turkish people will act as a spur to those whose spirit wanes.

I am quite confident, moreover, that a true interpretation of history would tell us that this close association of Turkey with the Western nations is not based on chance, but on bonds of an enduring quality. Perhaps it would be well to analyze the ties between us, to be sure that our partnership will withstand the vicissitudes of time.

Basic Similarities

First among these ties I should say is the great value which we both attach to our independence and to our democratic way of life. I believe that Turks and Americans are basically alike in our high regard for the dignity of the human individual, in our pride of our respective national heritages, and in our determination to remain free from any dictation whatever, whether foreign or domestic. In neither of our countries are there class or other distinctions which stand as a barrier to any man's achieving whatever his ability and hard work entitle him to achieve. This common love of individual liberty I take to be one of the great links between our two peoples.

I believe that another factor making for mutual confidence between us is the similarity of our attitudes toward other peoples. Both of our countries, as founding members of the United Nations, have adopted the spirit of the U. N. Charter as our guide in our relations with other countries. The United States has not now and never will have any design to impose its will on any other people or to possess their territory. We also realize that Turkey has no desire to dominate other people and no territorial ambitions. It was a part of the genius of Ataturk to realize that the destiny of the Turkish people was to develop their homeland of Anatolia and to live in peace with their neighbors.

We are linked by a common desire that each country in the world fulfill its own aspirations and make its own contribution to world progress within the framework of the United Nations.

In addition, both of us are determined to better our way of life. Both of us have a dynamic concept of history—are capable of great exertions. Neither of us are content with little plans. In 1776 years the American Republic transformed a wilderness into the greatest industrial Nation, with the highest standard of living in the world. Within a scant 30 years the Turkish Republic has laid the agricultural and industrial base for a modern state. Any nation which can increase its wheat production by 70 percent and its cotton production by 140 percent, as Turkey has in the last 2 years over the average of the preceding 5 years, need recognize no limits to its attainments.

Both of us, too, are people who not only have ideals but are willing to fight for them. If necessary we are willing to die for them. At present our soldiers are fighting shoulder to shoulder in backing up United Nations collective-security action against Communist aggression in Korea. Long before Korea, Turkey was standing as the bulwark against Communist pressures in the Middle East. Indeed, without Turkey there would probably not be a Middle East today. It would have gone by default in the "Cold War." Now we are linked together in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, presenting a common front along with our other Nato allies against any possible aggression.

I am convinced that this partnership between our two countries is not the temporary consequence of a common threat from a possible aggressor. It is rather an enduring relationship which arises from the fundamental nature of our people—from our common interest and aspirations—from a mutual desire to preserve world peace and prepare the way for a better world in the future. I therefore look upon my mission here not as an episode in the Cold War but as a chapter in a long history which we expect to have a happy ending—a step forward along a road which has been thoroughly charted and which we know is leading us to a common destination.

Our partnership rests upon firm foundations of enlightened self-interest and mutual respect. It is our joint participation in a great historic movement, and as such it depends on a firm understanding not only between our Governments but between our peoples. It is our duty to see that this understanding acquires greater depth and strength through the process of enlightenment and education.

It is for that reason in particular that the work which can be done by those such as you who are present here today is so important. It is in the hands of such as you that the Turkish-American partnership rests. I feel it is in good hands.

Refutation of Trumped-up "Evidence" of Germ Warfare Charge

Press Conference Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press May 7]

I have just been reading the alleged "confessions" of two American fliers who were shot down in Communist-held North Korea in January. I should like to talk about these so-called "confessions" for a minute because they are so revealing, though not in the sense that Communist propagandists intended.

A reading of these statements makes one fact crystal clear: while they may have been signed under duress by the American fliers, they were dictated by Communist propagandists. They contain all the Communist clichés so alien to American youths. We have no way of knowing, of course, whether the fliers signed the statements at all.

Both statements have picked up the standard Communist picture of the world as divided into two hostile "camps"—the so-called "peace-loving camp" of Communists and the "imperialistic" and "warmongering" camp of Wall Street.

For example, Lt. Kenneth Enoch is alleged to have stated: "I have seen the truth as printed by the democratic Chinese press, and all these truths and kind treatment show all the more clearly the lies and untruthful war propaganda of the Wall Street radio and press . . . I am beginning to see very clearly just who is the peace-lover and who is the warmonger responsible for this inhuman war, and I am determined to struggle for peace against Wall Street capitalism, to clear my conscience of past errors. I am filled with determination to join the peace-loving camp."

I submit that there are no two men in the whole U. S. Air Force who would of their own volition express themselves in such terms.

These statements are, of course, merely additional trumped-up "evidence" to support the utterly false Communist charges that we have waged bacteriological warfare in Korea. They are another example of the incredible lengths to which they will go to propagate the "big lie."

These charges have been flatly denied by American authorities, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and by authorities of other nations having forces in Korea. Moreover, the Communists, knowing their charges would not stand up under the scrutiny of competent, independent investigators, have refused the offer of the International Committee of the Red Cross to conduct an impartial investigation on both sides of the battleline in Korea. They have rejected an offer of the U. N.'s World Health Organization to provide technical assistance in Communist-held areas where we were accused of having caused epidemics.

Although not permitted to make an on-the-spot

investigation, competent scientists in many parts of the world have examined the "evidence" submitted by the Communists and, as a result, have pronounced the charges an obvious and clumsy hoax.

All of this is generally understood, at least in parts of the world where people have access to facts. These Communist propaganda themes are part of the "hate America" line which is now being supplemented with a "hate Americans" line.

Sowing the seeds of hate among people may in the Communist view produce some short-range benefits, but I am convinced that, as their cynicism is increasingly revealed, they will find that they were in fact sowing the wind.

Status of Reply to Soviet Note of April 9 on Germany

Press Conference Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press May 7]

I can only tell you that exchanges of views are going on and are being coordinated in London on the reply to the Soviet note of April 9 concerning Germany. Now, insofar as the wisdom or unwisdom of having any discussions in regard to these notes, the whole purpose of our earlier note¹ and our purpose in any future note would be to attempt to find out what are the intentions of the Soviet Union which lie behind these notes which they are writing.

In a way we are limited by writing notes in finding out about intentions. But there are other bits of evidence which I think bear on the wisdom of having discussions because having discussions always has to do with the bona fides of the people with whom you would talk.

And what do we find happening in almost coincidence here at the same time? First of all, a Russian pilot shoots into a perfectly inoffensive and peaceful French airplane. That bears a little, I think, on the intentions of people who are writing these notes.

At the same time, we find that the Communist-dominated—the Soviet-dominated government of East Germany is inciting the West Germans to overthrow their government in West Germany by force and violence. That bears on the bona fides of people.

Then we have this thing which I have been talking about this morning, which I want to underline again. For months now, with unprecedented intensity, this biological warfare propaganda campaign has kept up.

¹ For text of U.S. note of Mar. 25, see BULLETIN of Apr. 7, 1952, p. 530.

What is the purpose of that? I think I described it in a statement which I made to you this morning.² But I want to stress that this is not only an indication of intention. It seems to me to be an international crime.

Here is a great nation which talks about the fact that it wants peace; it wants to reduce tensions; and what is it doing? Month after month after month this campaign of utter falsehood, of hate-mongering is being poured out by every media of communication at the disposal of the Soviet Government.

All of those things we have to take into consideration when we are determining how best through our next note to probe Soviet intentions.

U.S. Requests Views of U.S.S.R. on Proposed Austrian Settlement

[Released to the press May 9]

The United States on May 9 through the American Embassy at Moscow delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs a follow-up note to the tripartite note of March 13, 1952,³ proposing an abbreviated treaty as a basis for the resumption of Four Power negotiations on the Austrian state treaty. The British and French Embassies at Moscow transmitted identical notes. Text of the U.S. note follows:

The Government of the United States refers to its note of March 13 in which it proposed that the four powers immediately conclude a settlement which would fulfill the pledge made to the Austrian people in 1943 that their independence would be restored.

A draft abbreviated treaty was proposed as a basis for the resumption of the negotiations which have been in progress since 1947 and which, despite several hundred meetings of the representatives of the four powers, have not succeeded in reaching final agreement.

This Government considers that its proposal provides a basis for an immediate and equitable settlement in Austria which would relieve a source of constant tension in Europe and render justice to the Austrian people.

The Government of the United States requests, therefore, that the views of the Soviet Government on the proposal for an Austrian settlement, as contained in its note of March 13, be made known at the first opportunity.

² See p. 777.

³ BULLETIN of Mar. 24, 1952, p. 448.

VOA Broadcasts Soviet Slave Labor Songs

[Released to the press April 25]

Songs of the Soviet slave-labor camps, rarely heard outside the barbed-wire confines of the camps, were broadcast to the world by the Voice of America on International Labor Day, May 1.

The Russian folk melodies which originated among the estimated 15 million prisoners of more than 200 Soviet slave-labor camps, were smuggled out of the U.S.S.R. by two recent Russian escapees, Savva Yurasoff and Sergei Maximov, who had spent a total of 7 years in slave-labor camps.

The escapees sang and hummed the melodies as members of VOA's music service wrote down the music. A singing choir was assembled from the ranks of Russian displaced persons residing in the United States to sing the songs for the worldwide broadcasts. Boris Ledkovski, also an escapee, conducted the choir, now known as the Black Sea Cossacks. The soloist was Leonid Lougovskoy, former Odessa opera baritone who escaped recently.

Programs containing the songs were beamed to the free world and Iron Curtain areas in 39 languages by powerful short-wave transmitters in the United States and relayed by both short- and medium-wave transmitters abroad, including the U. S. Coast Guard Cutter *Courier*, the VOA's floating relay station now undergoing tests in the Caribbean.

The songs broadcast were "Farewell," "Blizzard," "In Solitary," "A Letter from a Labor Camp," "Night is Falling," "A Song of the Fugitives from Solovetsky Labor Camp."

A literal translation of "In Solitary" follows:

I'm sitting in solitary
Looking out of the jail window,
And tears stream down my emaciated face.
The guards will summon me,
Summon me once, summon me twice.
They will cock their rifles,
And I will be still forever—forever.
And where I'll be buried, no one knows,
And I'll never know myself.
Why should I perish so young?
Why should I perish so young?

Letters of Credence

Liberia

The newly appointed Ambassador of Liberia, Clarence Lorenzo Simpson, presented his credentials to the President on May 5, 1952. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 355 of May 5.

Agreement Reached on Administration of Zone A of Free Territory of Trieste

[Released to the press May 9]

Following is the text of a United States, United Kingdom, and Italian communiqué, together with a memorandum of understanding between the three powers reached at London May 9 concerning the administration of Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste. The communiqué and memorandum of understanding were released simultaneously in the three capitals:

Communiqué

Representatives of the Governments of Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States today concluded conversations begun on April 3, 1952, with a view to arranging for a closer cooperation in Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste between the three Governments and with the local authorities. These arrangements are incorporated in a memorandum of understanding which follows below.

The conversations have necessarily involved a complete and detailed examination of all aspects of the existing structure of government in the Zone and of the implications of the changes made. Without prejudice to a final solution of the problem of the future of the Free Territory as a whole, this understanding is designed to give greater practical recognition to the predominantly Italian character of the Zone.

The three Governments are confident that the spirit of friendly understanding which has been present throughout the conversations will be present in the operation of the arrangements contained in this memorandum.

This confidence is unchanged by the realization that these conversations, while limited to the question of administration in Zone A, have emphasized that the three governments, inspired by the purposes and principles of the United Nations, are determined to promote and encourage peaceful cooperation in international problems and the respect everywhere for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Memorandum of Understanding Between the Governments of Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States Regarding Administration in Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste

1. In accordance with the decision announced on March 27, 1952,¹ and with a view to arriving at arrangements for a closer collaboration among themselves and with the local authorities in the administration of Zone A, the Governments of Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, have approved the following conclusions and understandings reached by their representatives.

2. The three governments have started from the premises, which they all share, that such arrangements should be of a nature so as not to prejudice the ultimate solution of the future of the territory as a whole and as to continue to ensure to all inhabitants of the zone the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion.

3. Since the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States retain the responsibilities with regard to the administration of Zone A devolving on them under the Treaty of Peace with Italy, particularly Annex VII thereof, the commander of the UK and U.S. troops retains all powers of government in the zone.

4. Taking the foregoing into account, the three governments have approved the following arrangements.

5. An Italian political adviser to the zone commander will be appointed by the Italian Government to represent it in all matters affecting Italy in regard to the zone. The Italian political adviser will have status similar to that of the U.S. and the UK political advisers.

6. A senior director of administration will be proposed by the Italian Government and will be appointed by the zone commander. The senior director of administration will be responsible to the zone commander and under the latter's direc-

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 14, 1952, p. 585, footnote 1.

tion will administer, by means of two directorates, the functions of civil government indicated in the following subparagraphs. He will have under his administration:

(a) A Directorate of Interior consisting of the following branches: Local Government (zone President and communes), Department of Labor, Department of Social Assistance, Public Health Office, Education Office, Census and Survey Office, Fire Service.

(b) A Directorate of Finance and Economy consisting of the following branches: Department of Commerce, Department of Production, Department of Finance (including customs and finance guards), Department of Transportation, Department of Public Works and Utilities (with the exception of construction and housing for the UK and U.S. troops), Office of Agriculture and Fisheries, Loans Section.

7. Italians in a number adequate to ensure efficient administration of the directorates, departments and offices, mentioned in paragraph 6 above will be proposed by the Italian Government and will in the same manner be appointed by the zone commander to staff those directorates, departments and offices. They shall be responsible to the zone commander through the senior director of administration. Persons appointed in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph and of paragraph 6 above may be replaced by the zone commander, who shall ask the Italian Government to propose their successors. The Italian Government retains the right to recall persons

proposed by it, on due notification to the zone commander. Employees who have been recruited locally and who are now exercising civil functions in the Military Government will be retained to the maximum practicable extent; any dismissal shall be effected with the prior approval of the zone commander.

8. While it is intended initially to retain the present organization of the directorates administered by the senior director of administration, he may recommend modifications thereof to the zone commander and effect them with the latter's approval.

9. The three Governments have noted the intimate connections that exist between the economy of the zone and the Italian economy as a whole and the essential contribution that is made to the well-being of the zone by the Italian Government. The three Governments therefore reaffirm that all the existing economic and financial agreements between them concerning Zone A, and the understandings reached pursuant thereto, remain in full force and effect. Security controls over international trade shall continue to be administered by UK and U.S. officers appointed by and responsible to the zone commander.

10. The Governments of the UK and the U.S. will instruct the Zone Commander concerning the application of the present understandings and the necessary readjustments to be made in the present organizations of the Military Government, in order to carry out the provisions of this memorandum of understanding as soon as practicable with a view to substantial completion by July 15, 1952.

Understanding Necessary To Build a Free-World Coalition

by Howland H. Sargeant

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs¹

When I was a boy, a favorite juvenile insult went like this:

Sticks and stones may break my bones but hard words will never hurt me.

Asking indulgence of any psychiatrists who may be in the house, I advance the theory that this was a defense reaction. Actually all of us, adults as well as young fry, find criticism—especially if we think it unjust—very hard to take.

We can handle the sticks and stones, but hard words are another matter.

¹ Address delivered before the Massachusetts School of Home Economics, University of Massachusetts, at Amherst, Mass., on May 3 and released to the press on the same date.

When your distinguished chairman, Dean Helen Mitchell, asked me to talk today on "The United States and World Opinion," I found that old bit of childish repartee running through my mind. For, truth to tell, when we look into world opinion today, we find the United States coming in for a lot of verbal brickbats.

Some of us, encountering critical or hostile attitudes, react very much as did those little boys of my youthful acquaintance. We stick out our chins. We mutter the adult equivalent of "sticks and stones." We propose retiring, in a huff, from the rest of the world and letting these "un-friends" of ours stew in their own juice.

We react, in other words, as human beings frequently do when called upon to exercise some of

the nobler Christian virtues. We hanker after righteousness, but . . . !

It so happens, however, that "buts" in our international relations today are signposts on the road to disaster.

The free peoples of the world—all of us—are facing a threat to all freedom. It is no longer a question of "sticks and stones" but survival.

We can save freedom. We can overcome this danger.

But we can do it only if we work and think together. Victory lies in our *united* strength. Not one of us can go it alone. We haven't the resources. We haven't the manpower.

Leadership in this emergency has fallen to the United States. We alone of the free nations have the material resources, backed by technical skills, to produce that leadership.

It is a terrible responsibility to be the strongest nation in the world.

That responsibility, however, is ours. And to our material and technical resources we must add moral strength. And that means giving more than just lip service to tolerance, patience, understanding. We have to practice these virtues—all of them.

To back out, taking the "sticks and stones" attitude, would doom freedom everywhere to destruction, our own included.

We are not going to back out.

We are not, however, dictators. This free-world coalition we are building must be based not only on the consent but the understanding of the free world.

As a means of arriving at this understanding let us explore this matter of world opinion.

We will take the free world. What are the attitudes of peoples? What is their attitude toward us?

Europe, as a starter.

Informed public opinion in Western Europe is anti-Communist. They have had a bitter dose of totalitarianism. They want no more of it.

But twice in the past 30-odd years these Europeans have had a close-up of war. Their longing for peace is intense. They look on their still-shattered cities, count their millions of dead. They recall the horrors of occupation.

We speak of "neutralism." It isn't just that. It is rather an almost psychopathic refusal to *believe* that peace could be so impermanent—that the danger still exists. The great progress that is being made toward building defensive unity in Europe is, I think, a tribute to the basic realism of these people—realism supported, I might add, by an unhappy awareness of what is going on just over their borders in the satellite countries. Stories seep through. Refugees talk. Wishful thinking isn't much help in the face of those facts.

These people are still suffering economically from the impact of World War II. Their econo-

mies can ill support the burdens imposed by the defense program.

Their people demand improvement in their living standards. To ask for further sacrifices puts an almost unbearable strain upon morale.

The Europeans are proud—with reason—of their culture. They are keenly conscious of national prestige. They fear for both.

These are traits we share in common. They are very understandable.

Attitude of the People in Asia and the Near East

The situation in southeast and southern Asia differs from that of Europe in several important particulars. The attitudes of the people reflect years of colonialism and a present fierce determination to maintain their independence.

We Americans, like the Western Europeans, take freedom for granted. We are apt to be rather less than completely sensitive to the meaning of nationalism to the Asians, to whom independence is the sweeter for being so newly won.

These people, too, are proud of their culture. They recall civilizations predating those of Europe, old when America was undiscovered. They want to maintain that culture.

They want peace and stability. But they want, also, an improvement in their standard of living. We, who have never starved, talk very glibly of "stomach communism." It is a different story when you have known hunger from birth.

The Asians do not realize that Communist imperialism would impose a colonialism far worse than the old pattern. Communism has been—and is being—sold them as an escape from their miseries. The new and greater miseries that it imposes are not so evident.

Many of the attitudes found in southern and southeastern Asia may, in varying degrees, be found in the countries of the Near East. Nationalism, for example, is a potent force. And so is the desire to preserve ancient cultures and traditions.

So, too, is the need for economic improvement.

Religion is a vital factor in both the Near East and Asia. Foreign customs and technological practices that violate religious teachings are not welcomed.

These are the people of the free world. These are the segments of the great coalition the free world today is trying to cement. The free world that looks to the United States for leadership.

Charge and Countercharge

By and large, these people like us. They like us and they don't—frequently for the same reasons.

Generally speaking we are admired for our great technological progress; for our ability to get things done; for our generosity.

At the same time we are condemned as materialistic; as too cocky; as emotionally unstable.

Some of the people definitely do *not* like us. There are those who actively hate us.

This comes as a shock. But let us examine this hate. Let us try to understand it.

Not all of it is spontaneous. Some of it is, of course. There are always those who hate "foreigners." And we are "foreigners" to just about 94 percent of the human race. These—the "Americans are foreigners and I hate foreigners" people—are spiritual isolationists. We have them in this country, so we need not be too superior.

For a much larger number of people—vastly larger—this hate has been artificially created. It has been planted—and is being carefully nourished—by those who seek the destruction of the United States, by those who see the United States as the major obstacle in their plans for world domination.

This isn't just an assumption. We have ample evidence of its truth. For example, when the U.N. Forces pushed the North Koreans back in the fall of '50, American intelligence found a written report of a speech by a Red army officer. "The United States," he told his men, "is the only obstacle in our road—we must crush the United States."

"Crush the United States"—remember that. It is the cornerstone of the Communist conspiracy. It is a "must" if their objective, world rule, is to be attained.

To attain their goal they must inspire world-wide, active hatred of the United States. The campaign to create that hate is being waged with unrelenting ferocity. It is backed with unlimited funds and directed by masters of hate propaganda.

The peoples of the Iron Curtain, and now the Bamboo Curtain, are the Number One targets of this campaign. If the men of Moscow and Peiping are to maintain control of their enslaved millions these people must not be permitted to think kindly of the United States. That some of them *do* think kindly of us is, I think, a credit to relations established over past years.

The Communists, however, are determined to break down these old-established traditions of friendship.

We are warmongers. We are "tools of Wall Street." We are the new Hitlers and Tojos.

You have heard some of this propaganda. Much of it is *so absurd* that the first reaction, to some of the stories, is to laugh. No one, we think, would believe such tommyrot.

There are many, of course, who do not. Others do. Believe me, they do—no matter how insanely fantastic the stories may be.

Recently the Soviet radios have been "quoting" a young Indonesian who, according to their story, returned home from the United States because he could not stand the lynchings. In New York, he is alleged to have reported, the customary Sun-

day afternoon amusement is attending these spectacles.

Ridiculous! Yes, of course. But the story has gained credence. And not only in Indonesia or even Asia: It has spread all over the world.

The Chinese Communists are, at present, conducting a world-wide campaign charging the United States with having used germ warfare in Korea. Broadcasts bring to the Communist "mike" a procession of alleged eye-witnesses: Persons who had *seen* United States planes releasing the germ-laden bombs; others who had collected germ-bearing insects; alleged scientists who had examined the germs and identified them.

The Communists have found "racism" in the United States a most effective weapon. It is exaggerated, magnified, distorted, however, out of all semblance to the facts.

Anyone who has traveled abroad knows this. Norman Cousins, lecturing in India under the provisions of the Smith-Mundt Act, relates a typical experience. He was speaking at the College of Commerce in Lahore. In the question period a student, about 19 or 20, demanded the floor. Leveling a finger at Mr. Cousins, he said:

You have come to the wrong place if you expect us to believe all this propaganda about America. We know the truth and we students protest your use of the platform of this college to pass off dishonest and untruthful stories about the United States.

The chairman of the meeting attempted to silence the boy. Mr. Cousins, however, insisted that he be allowed to state his reasons for hating the United States.

The boy did so. "If you really want to be honest with us," he said, "you would admit all the ugly things you do to people in the United States who do not happen to have fair white skins."

He went on. Lynchings. Mob violence. His voice grew more tense and angry. The entire student body breathed approval.

In his report to us, Mr. Cousins asked: "What do we say when we are confronted with these attitudes and arguments?"

This is how he handled it.

Mr. Cousins told that boy that, certainly, race prejudice existed in the United States. He asked him, however, to make a distinction between the problem as it actually was and as it was presented in Soviet propaganda.

He pointed out that Americans were deeply concerned over the problem. He quoted Walter White, head of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, on the steps being taken to eradicate this evil from American life, that progress was being made—amazing progress.

He told the boy something of what the people of the United States, white and colored, were doing; what the Government was doing. He mentioned American negroes who had distinguished

themselves in various walks of life—literature, music, sports, philosophy, etc.

He asked the boy if India, too, did not have problems of racial, social, and economic discrimination. He spoke of the Untouchables.

"To a large extent," he said, "this is a common problem. Perhaps all peoples, working together inside the United Nations, might be able to contribute to the self-understanding that would go into the making of any basic attack on the problems of prejudice . . . racial, social, religious, economic, political. Perhaps such a *common* effort might be more constructive than the destructive and often ill-informed criticism that served only to enlarge misunderstanding and therefore prejudice."

Communist "Peace" and Hatred Synonymous

Communist "peace" talk ties in with this "hate" campaign. Even the most casual perusal of Communist literature reveals this fact.

"Peace" and hatred for the non-Communist world, particularly the United States, are made synonymous. To be *for* peace, one must above all hate the United States and friends of the United States.

Even Communist prelates join the chorus. At a meeting of the World Peace Council, the Metropolitan of Moscow spoke of "the beastly Americans, hordes of modern barbarians, gnashing their teeth like some foul plague."

A rather badly mixed metaphor, but there it is.

The Communists make capital of a world-wide fear that the defense program will lead to war.

By and large, the free peoples consider us essentially nonaggressive. There is, however, an uneasy fear that we may go "trigger-happy." They have seen military build-ups before in the name of "defense." And what followed.

They know, too, that our military strength is *their* strength; that it is the best guaranty against the Communists' starting an all-out war.

But they aren't quite sure.

A recent Danish visitor to the United States, Arne Sorenson, made a wry comment upon American "militarism."

Writing in a Danish magazine, he said:

In America almost every uniformed person looks like a disguised civilian. Is there any better guarantee that the Americans do not threaten a troubled world with an aggressive war, than just this helplessness to convince you that they are in love with military vanity?

With memories of goose-stepping armies, the Dane found this very reassuring.

Our Materialism and Tactlessness

Then there is that charge of materialism. As a young Finn of my acquaintance put it: "It isn't your imperialization I fear, but your Coca-colonization."

He added, hastily, that he liked Coca Cola.

They fear we are too gadget-conscious. That we put too much emphasis upon material comforts. That we disregard the spiritual things in life. That we are lacking in culture.

To be honest, we Americans have to admit that we do like our gadgets.

We enjoy material comforts.

Americans have, perhaps, oversold this aspect of American life. And we have ignored the more important principles upon which that life is based. We know better ourselves. But we haven't bothered enough to put the other story into words.

All too frequently we have permitted most unrepresentative voices to speak for us. If we are regarded in some places as material-minded barbarians, we'll have to admit that often we have painted ourselves as just that.

As a case in point, I recently read a travel book—written by an American. The writer devoted several humorous, rather sneering chapters to French plumbing. He allowed just *two lines* to Notre Dame Cathedral. And a line and a half of that concerned the absence of central heating in Notre Dame.

If I had been French, born and bred, I could not have been more irritated.

Of course, there are travel books that do full justice to Notre Dame. Over the years, thousands of visiting Americans have done justice to it. But that book—well, I hope it is never translated into French.

This picture of a gadget-mad United States lost in materialism isn't just confined to illiterates. It has found disturbing acceptance even among the intellectuals.

Let me read two paragraphs recently appearing in *Le Figaro*.

Wrote Francois Mauriac, a leading Catholic non-Communist:

It is not what separates the United States and the Soviet Union that should frighten us, but what they have in common. These two technocracies that think themselves antagonistic are dragging humanity in the same direction of dehumanization.

Andre Siegfried, a leading Protestant anti-Communist, wrote this:

America differs from Europe and resembles Russia, both adorers of the technical.

A widely read European, George Mikes, writes:

Jazz is their music, comic strips their most admired pictures, magazine stories their literature, Hollywood films their most popular entertainment, skyscrapers their architecture and their newest ballpoint pens write under water.

This isn't the America a lot of us know. It isn't the America that lined up, a few years back, to make Toscanini's tour a triumphant procession from one end of the country to another. It isn't the America that supports several thousand

symphony orchestras, and that queues up long hours for tickets to the Metropolitan.

The Other Side of the Picture, "Our Friends"

Our Danish friend, Mr. Sorenson, felt we hadn't given other peoples the real picture of American home life. He wrote:

And what was the question asked after my return to my own country?

Is there any home life *at all* in the United States? Are they not running around all the time, afraid of not earning enough money or spending it in fancy, crazy ways?

Mr. Sorenson made a point of visiting American homes. He found his visits both charming and moving. "There are not many countries in the world," he wrote, "where you find a family life of this quality. Denmark, my own country, of course, the other Scandinavian countries, Britain and a few others."

Some of our friends are almost as unrealistic as our critics. The United States is all-perfect. It is Utopia upon earth. Our streets are paved with gold. I'll skip these.

I could quote European or Asiatic top brass. Or Government pronouncements. I could list treaties.

I will skip these. When I, personally, talk of our friends overseas I have other pictures in mind. I have one in particular. He was an elderly man—a French peasant—driving his cart along a road in Normandy. He spoke no English. He did not need it. When I said "American," his smile was enough.

When I say "our friends," I think of that man. I see his face. It tells, for me, a far more deeply moving story than elegantly turned phrases or official statements.

Those of you who have traveled abroad have met that man. You know that face. Perhaps not in Normandy: It could have been London, Rome, Bangkok, Madras, almost any place. He might have been the elevator man in your hotel, a waiter in a restaurant, a bus or taxi driver, or just someone you happened to speak to on the street. You were an American. Anything he had was yours.

Why? Well, sometimes it was an American he had known. Or some relative who had gone to America and who still writes. Or something he had read.

The ECA built a lot of that kind of friendship. The Institute of Inter-American Affairs has done it. Point Four is doing it.

It isn't because of what we give. It is because of the feeling behind these programs, feeling in the United States. Done without that kind of feeling, these programs do not make friends. On the contrary. No one likes to be on the receiving end of favors too continually.

The friendship of which I have just spoken is deep. There are no "buts" connected with it.

In handling our international public relations we do not have to worry about these friends of ours. And for that very reason we cannot let them down. We will let them down if we do not do something about these others—the ones who ignorantly hate us; the ones who are inclined to like us but . . . !

We will let *ourselves* down because we will permit our enemies to destroy the unity of the free world, our only sure defense against the new imperialism and the only possible foundation of the "friendlier, fatter, freer" world of our dreams.

But, if we are going to do this job, we have got to clear our minds of the "sticks and stones" attitude. We have got to *want* to do it.

This means all of us. Washington has already set up the machinery for the job. Congress has granted appropriations. It is functioning.

But Washington cannot do the job alone. The *will* to success must spring from the heart of America.

Progress of Information Program

I sincerely believe that the job *does* have the support of most Americans. We have come a long way since 1948, when Congress authorized the State Department to set up "information and educational exchange programs." We have made still more progress under the Campaign of Truth launched in 1950.

Today the Voice of America is broadcasting in 46 different languages. It reaches an audience estimated at something like 300 million. Our press materials daily go to an estimated 10,000 foreign newspapers with a readership of more than 100 million. The 91 million copies of periodicals and pamphlets which we expect to publish by the end of June will be made available to some 900 million readers.

Last year our films reached an audience of about 450 million persons in 86 different countries.

In the past fiscal year, July to July, nearly 8,000 students, teachers, professors, and civic leaders came to the United States from abroad or went abroad under the educational exchange programs. Six thousand of these have returned or will return to tell America's story to the home folks.

The Defense Department conducted an exchange program for Japan. The Mutual Security Agency is carrying on ECA's program of technical assistance bringing labor leaders, management, and professional groups to this country in a worldwide productivity drive. These people see, go home, and talk to their friends.

Altogether the Government is bringing over under current programs about 13,000 people a year for observation, study, training, and indoctrination.

Private organizations have done even better. In 1951 they arranged roughly about 40,000 exchanges. The 4-H Clubs exchanged young farm-

ers. The Rotary Clubs brought over students. The Girl Scouts, youth leaders—the list includes almost every kind of organization in American community life.

One community, acting as a community, in fact, brought over an exchangee of its own.

Amar Singh, a 25-year-old farmer from the Etawah district in the United Provinces of India, was invited to visit the *people* of Carroll County, Georgia. His assignment was to find out what made the *people* of Carroll County work together. The project was sponsored by the Herald-Tribune Forum.

Upon his return Amar Singh had a lot to tell his friends about America. He said: "I think the people like those I met in Carroll County are the kindest, the most broadminded and the most sincere people in the world."

He saw racial discrimination. He was critical of it. But he was understanding. India, too, he told the Carroll Countyers, had problems of discrimination.

He took back, of course, a lot of technical information—information to help his fellow farmers.

Carroll County, itself, learned a lot from Amar Singh. He was, for most of them, the first Indian they had ever seen. From him they gained understanding of that great, beautiful, complex country.

The trip was such a success that Carroll County decided that they should pay Amar Singh a return visit. As they could not *all* go, they sent, as their representative, Paul Patten, a county soil conservationist.

When Patten reached Ayana, Amar's native village, he found that the entire village, and villages for miles around, knew of Amar's visit to America. The villagers came by the hundreds to greet Patten and express their friendship for the United States.

There are other examples.

Pleasing Reaction of Exchanges to U. S.

In an address before a businessmen's club in Lisbon, Manuel Rodrigues, a returned Portuguese newsman, said:

What did I discover in America? To begin with, an almost classless society. Of course, there are big differences of income, but the taxes tend steadily to reduce the gap. I did not fail to notice, for instance, that in the cafeteria of a newspaper I visited the publisher would often have his lunch side by side with his most humble employee.

There is an evident connection between these facts and what I call the importance of the individual. In an elevator one can often see a small board bearing the name of the operator. The same happens in street cars of most cities. It is not some driver but "Mr. So and So," the driver.

You may think this a trivial detail. I, on the contrary, think it carries a lot of meaning. It goes far to prove the American democracy is, first of all, a state of mind.

A Ceylonese youth leader, Christopher Jay-

awardana, the Chief Commissioner of Boy Scouts, told a club meeting in Colombo:

On the general question of interracial relationships, I am fully satisfied that great efforts are on foot both legally and through education to provide full equality for all peoples. . . . My American friends share my conviction that America must free itself of discrimination if it is truly to serve as a great democratic force in the world.

Of the American people, he said:

I met a nation, proud of their country, loyal to the core to their flag, composed of many nationalities, but all American citizens and loyal to the country of their adoption, people generous and hospitable, open hearted and kind, keenly desirous of knowing as much as possible of Ceylon, of our ways and customs, genuinely interested in our welfare as a young Dominion and anxious to help us if we need their help.

William H. Whyte, writing in *Fortune*, finds this exchange program doing our most effective "hands across the sea" job. He urges that it be substantially expanded. He speaks in terms of nearly 200 million dollars. For those of us working in the program that sounds like Utopia.

Mr. Whyte argues that expansion alone isn't enough. He wants to see follow-up programs, and more intense orientation courses in the United States. He wants to see these visitors received in more American homes.

He is right, of course. Just exposure to the United States does not always produce complete understanding. It opens the door, of course, but more needs to be done.

We need to do more with these exchangeers while they are here. More attention should be given to—well, to their feelings. I know one Chinese lad attending college in a small North Carolina town. He complained bitterly to a young American friend that, when he went to the town, people stared at him. The young American grinned. "Yi-han," he said, "what would happen if I went to a little Chinese village—one where they had, probably, never before seen an American?"

The Chinese boy thought that over. Then he burst out laughing. "Why," he said, "the children would chase after you on the street yelling 'foreign devil'."

It took just those few words, at the right time, to straighten this lad out. Had those words not been spoken, the hurt would have grown. And a future friend for the United States might have been lost.

It is, frequently, the *little* things. We have to watch for them.

An Eca productivity team was staying at a hotel in a Midwestern town. The hotel was the favorite hang-out of the city's symphony orchestra leader—a most distinguished musician. The negro porter in the hotel was a great admirer of this man. He suggested to him that the visitors might like to attend a concert. The matter was arranged. And the team leader could not say too much of his, and his teammates' appreciation of

that evening's performance. And he was almost speechless with appreciation, and amazement, of the porter's part in the business. "The porter arranged it," he repeated dazedly.

To those of you who have the opportunity I urge that you take these exchangeers into your homes. It will be a rewarding experience for you. And you will be doing *your* job in making friends for the United States.

The Two-Way Street of Understanding

The job, as I see it, is a two-way street. We need understanding of America in these other lands. And we need understanding of these lands in America. Only by and through this understanding can we attain our goals.

One of the programs of the United States National Commission for UNESCO is the creation of understanding between peoples. The Commission, during its 6 years of existence, has had the great good fortune to have as its chairman, first, Milton Eisenhower, then George Stoddard, and now Luther Evans. Each of these distinguished American citizens has given generously of his time and himself to the objectives of the Commission.

The Commission works through people: teachers, scientists, technicians, religious and civic leaders, labor and business groups. Their ap-

proach is the *human* approach. And it is effective.

The United States is new to this job of international public relations. We are new to our role of world leadership.

To do it well and wisely we need a lot of help. Recently someone asked President Truman his favorite quotation. The President pulled from his pocket a slip of paper and read from the first Book of Kings, chapter 3.

You will remember that in this chapter Solomon, the son of David, just turned 20, had become king. He was worried. His new responsibilities appalled him. In a dream the Lord appeared and told him that whatever he wished should be his.

Solomon pondered. He spoke of the great job before him, of his youth and inexperience. He said:

I am but a little child. I know not how to go out or come in.

And Thy servant is in the midst of Thy people . . . that cannot be numbered nor counted for multitude.

Give therefore Thy servant an understanding heart.

In handling this new responsibility of ours, I think we all could echo that prayer. "Give therefore Thy servant an understanding heart."

If we are to meet the challenge of today, we will need both that understanding and a heart. We cannot win without them.

U.N. Command Offers Proposals for Settlement of Korean Armistice Issues

STATEMENT BY GENERAL RIDGWAY

Following is a statement made by Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander in Chief United Nations Command, on May 7 and released to the press at Tokyo on the same date:

The United Nations Command has been negotiating with the Communists in Korea for more than nine months in an endeavor to achieve an armistice. We have known that all the free nations of the world share our sincere desire to obtain a just and honorable cessation of hostilities in order to terminate the terrible toll of suffering, destruction and bloodshed and, by lessening the risk of spreading the conflagration, to advance the cause of world peace.

After many months of patient negotiations by the United Nations Command, three questions still remain to be resolved. These are: Basis of

exchange of prisoners of war, restrictions on reconstruction and rehabilitation of airfields and acceptance of the Soviet Union as a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. All three issues have been exhaustively explored in discussion with the Communists.

It was apparent that these issues could not be solved separately. Therefore, in a maximum endeavor to bring about a cessation of hostilities by means of an honorable armistice fair to both sides, the United Nations Command delegation, during an executive session held April 28, presented to the Communist delegation a just and integral solution to the three remaining issues.

The United Nations Command proposed, and it was accepted by the Communists, that the plenary session be executive in nature in order to allow unhindered freedom of expression within the meetings. This latter action was taken in accordance with the United Nations Command policy to

leave no stone unturned that would facilitate attainment of an armistice.

The solution provides that the United Nations Command is willing to exchange the approximately 70,000 persons who do not actually forcibly oppose repatriation for the 12,000 United Nations Command personnel which the Communists state they are now holding as prisoners of war.

The United Nations Command continues its willingness, following an armistice, to permit any suitable international body or joint Red Cross teams, together with observers from both sides, to interview the persons held by the United Nations Command who have indicated they would forcibly oppose repatriation and to return promptly to the Communists any such persons who it is determined would not do so.

In turn the United Nations Command agrees that the armistice provisions will not make any reference to reconstruction or rehabilitation of airfields. This solution also provides that the United Nations Command will accept the Communist nominations of Poland and Czechoslovakia for membership on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and that the Communists will accept the United Nations Command nominations of Sweden and Switzerland.

The Communists have rejected the solution proposed by the United Nations Command although it is a fair and equitable reconciliation of the opposing points of view.

The Communists continue to oppose the United Nations Command solution for the exchange of prisoners of war, which is based upon the humanitarian principle that no persons shall be forcibly returned to Communist control.

Since the presentation of the integral proposal by the United Nations Command, the Communists have had more than ample opportunity to thoroughly consider our proposal and discuss in executive session any aspect of the problem.

This the Communists apparently do not desire to do. Accordingly, in order that the world public may be rightfully and fully informed of our proposal, the United Nations Command yesterday proposed the termination of the executive sessions and resumption of open meetings. The Communists have acceded to our views in this respect.

It is of utmost importance that all nations of the world realize with crystal clearness that this United Nations Command proposal embodies the limit to which the United Nations Command can go and is not subject to substantive change.

Regardless of the views of the enemy on the individual issues, the United Nations Command proposed solution is contingent upon acceptance as a whole by the Communists.

The issues are clear, the stakes are manifest. Our position is one from which we cannot and shall not retreat.

The responsibility for peace in Korea rests on the Communist leaders.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

[Released to the press by the White House May 7]

The United States fully approves and supports without qualification the proposal for reaching an armistice which General Ridgway has offered to the Communist aggressors in Korea.

Last July the United Nations forces had repulsed Communist aggression in Korea, had proved to the Communists that aggression cannot pay, and had brought new hope for peace to free men around the world. The Soviet Union then indicated that Korean hostilities could be terminated by a military armistice. The United Nations Command in good faith and in a sincere desire to find a basis for a peaceful settlement began armistice talks with the Communists in Korea.

After many trying months of negotiation, in which each issue has been dealt with individually, tentative agreement has been reached on all but three issues. It is now apparent that the three remaining issues cannot be resolved separately. The United Nations Command proposal offers a just and a real opportunity to resolve these three issues together and simultaneously. The three-point proposal is:

1. That there shall not be a forced repatriation of prisoners of war—as the Communists have insisted. To agree to forced repatriation would be unthinkable. It would be repugnant to the fundamental moral and humanitarian principles which underlie our action in Korea. To return these prisoners of war in our hands by force would result in misery and bloodshed to the eternal dishonor of the United States and of the United Nations.

We will not buy an armistice by turning over human beings for slaughter or slavery.

The United Nations Command has observed the most extreme care in separating those prisoners who have said they would forcibly oppose return to Communist control. We have offered to submit to an impartial re-screening—after an armistice—of those persons we would hold in our custody.

Nothing could be fairer. For the Communists to insist upon the forcible return to them of persons who wish to remain out of their control is an amazing disclosure before the whole world of the operation of their system.

2. That the United Nations Command will not insist on prohibiting reconstruction or rehabilitation of airfields.

3. That the neutral nations supervisory commission should comprise representatives of four countries; Poland and Czechoslovakia chosen by the Communists, Sweden and Switzerland chosen by the United Nations Command.

The three parts of General Ridgway's proposal

are all parts of a whole. They must be considered as an entity—not piecemeal. Our agreement is contingent upon acceptance of the whole proposal. This is our position. The Communists thus far have indicated only a willingness to withdraw their proposal that the U.S.S.R. be a member of the neutral inspection commission. This spurious issue was raised by them late in negotiations and its withdrawal is no real concession on their part.

The patience and understanding shown by General Ridgway and the United Nations Command negotiators merit the highest praise. In spite of almost overwhelming provocation, they have made real progress in reaching agreement on many substantial terms for an armistice. General Ridgway's proposal offers a sound and sensible way to settle the remaining issues all at once. It will

have compelling appeal to those sincerely desiring peace.

PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON

[Released to the press May 7]

I can only say this. This morning General Ridgway put out a full statement saying what the proposals were which he had made, and Admiral Joy put out a further statement giving the details of the discussions. It is plain, in my judgment, that the proposals made by General Ridgway are fair and reasonable proposals and that any one who wished to bring about a truce in Korea would accept those proposals. The proposals were made with the complete support of the Government of the United States.

Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

THIRTY-NINTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD FEBRUARY 1-15, 1952¹

U.N. doc. S/2605
Transmitted April 15, 1952

I herewith submit report number 39 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 February 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués numbers 1161-1175 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

The current status of agenda item 3 of the draft armistice agreement, as proposed by the United Nations Command, is reflected in the copy appended hereto.² Staff officers meetings on this item continued as the major points of disagreement centered on the rotation figure of 40,000 and the number of port of entry complexes at which the neutral observer teams are to be stationed. The United Nations Command holds that at least seven port complexes on each side are desirable to ensure effective supervision of that part of the armistice agreement which provides that neither side shall introduce reinforcing combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons and ammunition. The figure of 40,000 for rotation is a requirement to enable personnel of the United Nations Command to be withdrawn from Korea when their tour of duty is completed. Communist insistence on 30,000 is a typical example of their intransigence and stalling.

The United Nations Command Sub Delegation again asked the Communists to make constructive efforts to

reach an agreement on the proposals made by the United Nations Command on agenda item 4 as the Communists continued to criticize, reject and otherwise depreciate the efforts of the United Nations Command to prepare an acceptable draft agreement. Finally, on 3 February, the Communists presented a draft proposal on exchange of prisoners of war. Their proposal, as expected, showed minor concessions on points which were of little or no value to them. On the major issues, such as voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war, giving up claim to the thousands of Republic of Korea Troops believed to have been pressed into Communist service and giving up claim to those civilian internees in the custody of the United Nations Command, the new proposal stuck close to the Communists' original stand. Not even the neutrality of the International Committee of the Red Cross was recognized in their proposal. Despite this lack of co-operation the United Nations Command Delegation continued to develop and isolate the differences of opinion and, where basic principles were not at stake, some adjustments in wording were agreed upon. The first was agreement to the Communists' demand that the parole principle should be applied equally to both sides. The principle of exchange of prisoners of war for civilians was also dropped in favour of a general clause which provided for the expeditious repatriation of civilians. On this question some formula was sought which would guarantee that both sides would have a check on the way in which the other side completed the civilian exchange. However, the Communists did not accept the United Nations Command proposals of neutral interviews and would make no counter proposals of their own.

Realizing that the Communists were adamant in their opposition to participation of the International Committee of the Red Cross as a neutral agency in either prisoner of war exchange or civilian exchange, the United Nations

¹Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U. S. representative in the Security Council, on Apr. 15. Texts of the 30th, 31st, and 32d reports appear in the BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; the 33d report, *ibid.*, Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395; the 34th report, *ibid.*, Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430; the 35th report, *ibid.*, Mar. 31, 1952, p. 512; the 36th and 37th reports, *ibid.*, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 594; and the 38th report, *ibid.*, May 5, 1952, p. 715.

²Not printed here.

Command proposed the establishment of joint teams in North and South Korea and in the neutral zone to be composed of equal numbers of representatives of the National Red Cross Societies of both sides. The Communists finally accepted this solution.

On the actual mechanics for exchange of prisoners and in the interests of completing the exchange as soon as possible, the United Nations Command finally accepted a time limit of sixty days for the completion of the exchange although the United Nations Command was faced with the problem of moving a much greater number of prisoners.

At the close of the period two major questions remained. The first was the basic disagreement on the principle of voluntary repatriation. The second concerned disagreement over the meaning and use of the term "repatriation" as to its applicability to sending to the Communists the United Nations Command held prisoners of war who on 25 June 1950 resided south of the 38th parallel. Also remaining unresolved was the agreement made on 1 January for each side to furnish the opposite side with complete information on all prisoners of war who were held in custody at any time since the beginning of hostilities. The United Nations Command stood ready on seventy-two hours notice to supply this vital information to the Communists. No answer has been received yet from the Communists.

The United Nations Command Delegation has consistently taken vigorous steps to expedite negotiations. In furtherance of this principle the senior United Nations Command delegate on 31 January, in a letter to the Communist delegate, proposed that discussion of agenda item 5 be initiated and that discussion of items 3 and 4 continue concurrently.

On 3 February the senior Communist delegate replied by agreeing to discuss agenda item 5 in plenary session. Plenary sessions on this subject were initiated on 6 February and have been scheduled so as not to interfere with discussion of items 3 and 4 on the Staff Officer and Sub-Delegation level respectively.

At the session of 6 February the senior Communist delegate opened with a long statement clearly political in nature. This statement follows in full:

"The fifth item of the agenda 'recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides' is the last item of the entire agenda of our present negotiations.

"During our discussions on the other items of the agenda, both sides have expressed again and again that the armistice in Korea should serve as a bridge toward the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

"Both sides have explicitly agreed that once an armistice is realized in Korea, a political conference of a higher level should be convened quickly by the governments of the countries concerned on both sides, to commence the work of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

"For this reason, our side formally proposes that we recommend that within three months after the Korean armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective, the opposing sides, the governments of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea and of the Peoples Republic of China on the one hand, and the governments of the countries concerned of the United Nations on the other, appoint five representatives respectively to hold such a political conference.

"Since the war in Korea will be stopped, there can be no justification for any further stay in Korea of all the foreign forces which have participated in the war, and on the other hand, in order to lay a foundation for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, it is absolutely essential for all the foreign forces to be withdrawn from Korea. During our discussions of the agenda, both sides have already agreed that the question of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea be referred to a political conference of a higher level of both sides, to be convened after the armistice, for discussion and settlement. Therefore, our side formally recommends that the above-

mentioned political conference should first discuss and decide upon the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. The withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea is a decisively important prerequisite for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. However, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question itself contains a series of important issues which require to be settled. Therefore, our side formally recommends that the above-mentioned political conference decide, in discussions, the question of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, and should also settle through negotiations the fundamental principles and specific recommendations regarding peaceful settlement of the Korean question, so that the military armistice in Korea will really become a bridge towards the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

"The Korean question is not an isolated question. The war in Korea has involved many problems beyond Korea. A peaceful settlement of the Korean question will, in fact, pave the way for the solution of those other problems which are related to the Korean question. Conversely, it is only when those other problems related to the Korean question are solved simultaneously that the peace in Korea can be consolidated. All arguments which attempt to isolate the peaceful settlement of the Korean question are untenable as well as invalid.

"On June 27, 1950, President Truman of the United States of America publicly connected the war in Korea with other questions of the East and used the Korean war as a pretext for a series of war-like measures in the East.

"The peaceful settlement of the Korean question calls for a simultaneous solution of these other important problems related to the Korean question. It is only when these problems related to the Korean question are solved simultaneously that peace in Korea can be consolidated; that peace in the East, which has been breached as a result of the war in Korea, can be recalled; and that the state of extreme tension into which the world has been plunged as the result of the war in Korea can turn for the better.

"Therefore, our side formally recommends that the above-mentioned political conference shall discuss the other problems related to peace in Korea.

"This is the main content of our draft of principles on the fifth item of the agenda. I hope that the plenary conference will seriously consider and adopt this draft principle as the agreed principle of the plenary conference of the fifth item on the agenda."

The formal proposal, submitted by the Communists, is as follows:

"Draft of the principle proposed by the Delegation of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers on the fifth item of the agenda. 'Recommendation to the governments of countries concerned on both sides.' In order to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, it is recommended that within three months after the Korean armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective, the opposing sides, the Governments of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea and the Peoples Republic of China on the one hand, and the governments of the countries concerned of the United Nations on the other hand, appoint five representatives respectively to hold a political conference to settle through negotiation the following questions:

- "(1) Withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea;
- "(2) Peaceful settlement Korean question; and
- "(3) Other questions related to peace in Korea."

On 19 February the United Nations Command submitted its proposal for item 5 as follows:

"The military commanders have not considered questions concerning a political settlement in Korea, including unification of Korea under an independent, democratic government and other questions arising from but not resolved by this armistice agreement. In order to ensure peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military commanders recommend to the respective governments and authorities concerned, namely, to the Democratic

Peoples Republic of Korea and the Peoples Republic of China on the one hand, and to the United Nations and to the Republic of Korea on the other hand, that steps be taken, within a period of three months, to deal with these matters at a higher level in a political conference for a Korean settlement, or by such other political means as they deem appropriate, including:

- "(1) Withdrawal of non-Korean forces from Korea;
- "(2) Peaceful settlement Korean question; and
- "(3) Other Korean questions related to peace."

At the session of 10 February the United Nations Command senior delegate made the following statement:

"Your objections to our proposal are inconsistent with the terms of reference of this military armistice conference and we do not agree with your remarks.

"On the very first day of our meeting, on 10 July 1951, we advised you that the United Nations Command Delegation would not discuss any matters except military matters related to Korea. We said: 'The United Nations Command Delegation is prepared to do its part in trying to work out an armistice agreement with the representatives of the Communist forces in Korea, for the cessation of hostilities in Korea, under conditions which will assure against their resumption.'

"We further said: 'This delegation is here for that sole purpose. It will discuss military matters in Korea relating to that subject. This delegation will not discuss political or economic matters of any kind. This delegation will not discuss military matters unrelated to Korea.'

"We also said: 'Before proceeding further with the work which brought us together, the United Nations Command Delegation proposes that we come to a full agreement to limit our discussions at this and all subsequent meetings solely to military matters related to Korea only.'

"On 11 July 1951, you said: 'We are bound in duty to discuss only Korean military matters at this meeting.'

"The quoted statements have been the basis upon which all our negotiations have been conducted here. In order to attain agreement on the agenda, the United Nations Command Delegation accepted your proposed item 5. However, that did not and does not mean that we are prepared to discuss or to recommend that the political authorities undertake discussions of matters not directly related to Korea.

"The first sentence of our proposal, regarding recommendations to the governments, is inserted to emphasize to the governments and authorities concerned that the military commanders did not engage in any discussion of political matters, a restraint agreed upon by our delegations at the very beginning of this armistice conference. Thus, the recipients of our recommendations are informed that the recommendations we make to them are not based on substantive consideration of those political matters by the commanders.

"In our proposal, our side has agreed to recommend that steps be taken to deal with the question of a Korean settlement in a political conference. By the addition of the phrase, 'Or by such other political means as they deem appropriate', it has merely avoided any indication that the military commanders were attempting to dictate to the political authorities the specific mechanical method which should be adopted by those authorities for their discussions. We consider this phrase essential.

"It is not appropriate for a military commander in the field to attempt to restrict, in a recommendation to political authorities, the nature, size and make-up of the political forum which will attempt to solve the problems which they are suggesting require solution. Methods and machinery for bringing about a political settlement are questions to be decided by political authorities. As I have said, it is not appropriate for our delegations to restrict their recommendation to any one particular type of political forum. The wording of our proposal includes both your specific recommendations and our more general one.

"In proposing the fifth item of the agenda on 25 July 1951, you stated: 'We may discuss under this item the question of recommending to the governments of the coun-

tries concerned on both sides that within a definite time limit after the armistice agreement becomes effective, a conference of their representatives of a higher level be convened.'

"In other words, your proposal specifically recognizes that it would be necessary to discuss whether we should recommend that a conference would be convened. And even with regard to that statement, I told you, on 26 July 1951, that in agreeing to accept agenda item 5, the United Nations Command Delegation was not committing itself in advance to any specific agreement regarding this item. The United Nations Command Delegation has not heretofore agreed to recommend the convening of a political conference. We have, in our present proposal, recommended such a conference as one possible method of solving the questions arising out of and not resolved by the armistice agreement.

"You have questioned the propriety of the change our side has made in the last item of your proposal. We insist on that revision because, in presenting your proposal, you indicated that this item could include all of the problems of Asia. The political means which is adopted by the governments and authorities concerned to solve the Korean problem will consider any and all matters which it is authorized to consider and which it includes on its agenda. However, it is not within the realm of a military commander in the field to make recommendations concerning matters which are themselves beyond the scope of his authority. Accordingly, while we agree with you in desiring to recommend that all questions necessary to assure a permanent peace in Korea be discussed, and settlement sought thereon, we feel it necessary to make it unmistakably clear that the problems of Asia in general are not within the terms of reference of the United Nations Command Delegations. If you do not agree with our revision of the last item of your proposal, we suggest that the entire item be deleted.

"We have gone as far as we can in meeting your proposal. We recommend that you study our proposal again and that it be adopted immediately."

The meetings of 11 and 12 February were characterized by further long propaganda statements by the Communist delegates reiterating their previous arguments. The senior Communist delegate then stated that he would offer a new proposal at the next session. At the close of the period the United Nations Command Delegation was awaiting notification of Communist readiness to meet for purposes of presenting their new proposal.

Hostile forces were moderately active in reconnaissance patrolling, particularly on the eastern front. The enemy was very prompt in mounting effective resistance to United Nations Command combat patrols on all parts of the front, and generally intercepted reconnaissance patrols within two miles of the United Nations Command main line of resistance. The bulk of the patrol contacts involved a platoon or less on either side, and the enemy employed forces in greater than company strength on only one occasion. The volume of hostile artillery and mortar fires was extremely light on the western front, relatively light on the central front, and somewhat heavier on the eastern front. There was no significant change in enemy dispositions during the period, and no change in the battle lines. The hostile attitude and capabilities also appeared to be unaltered.

On the western front, extending forty-five miles from the vicinity of Hunwang to Chunggang, action was extremely light, and on small segments of the front there was no physical contact for periods of several days. One action, however, involved battalion-strength forces on both sides. On 6 February a reinforced United Nations Command battalion undertook a raid into enemy positions about five miles east-southeast of Sigimak. The United Nations Command forces disengaged and returned to friendly lines after a four-hour fire-fight.

On the central front extending about thirty miles, from Chunggang to the vicinity of the Pukhan River, patrol contacts were sporadic except in the vicinity of Sutaе.

In this area there were numerous small-scale patrol actions, as United Nations Command forces probed up to four miles in advance of the main line of resistance. In the Kumsong area, small numbers of hostile aircraft made occasional nuisance raids on United Nations Command ground positions.

On the eastern front, the bulk of the patrol clashes took place on a fifteen-mile sector of the south of Mulguji and Tupo. Hostile reconnaissance patrols were very active in this sector, and were frequently caught by surprise fire within a few yards of United Nations Command outpost positions. Enemy artillery and mortars were much more active in the sector south of Mulguji, Tupo, and Yuusil, than elsewhere on the front. In the Tupo area, which constitutes the west flank of the North Korean forces sector, continuous troop movements were observed from 3 through 8 February, and continued intermittently to the end of the period. The bulk of this movement was to the south, although there was some compensating movement to the north, suggesting that a relief of front-line troops may have been in progress. From 12 through 13 February, Chinese Communist forces in the Mulguji area and North Korean forces to the south of Tupo and Yuusil carried out several small-scale attacks and feints against advanced United Nations Command positions. The attacks were accompanied by a substantial increase in the volume of artillery and mortar fire on the Mulguji and Yuusil sectors. All attacks were repulsed without loss of ground.

During the period, hostile guerrilla elements suffered more than 500 casualties through death or capture, in a series of small-scale conflicts with United Nations Command security forces. The dissident forces in United Nations Command rear areas have been so seriously reduced in the anti-guerrilla campaign during the past ten weeks that they no longer constitute a significant menace to rear-area military installations. However, they retain a limited capability to sporadically harass military lines of communications unless closely restrained by rear-area security forces.

The volume of traffic in enemy rear areas continued to be light throughout the period, and was no more than sufficient to maintain existing stocks of military supplies. However, the present logistic base appears to be adequate for hostile requirements. Hostile units are generally up to strength, and through periodic relief on the front, have been maintained at a higher level of combat readiness, either for offensive or defensive action.

A Navy carrier task force continued operations off the east coast of Korea. Jet and propeller driven aircraft of this command continued interdiction operation in the eastern half of North Korea, an area including not only the enemy's east coast supply route, running from Wonsan to the Manchurian border, but also the eastern portion of his rail and highway system crossing the throat of the peninsula from east to west. A large part of the task force strikes were devoted to rail breaking in northeast Korea despite numerous days of adverse weather, their planes averaged seventy rail cuts per day in addition to destroying and damaging bridges, by-passes, rolling stock, and trucks.

An accelerated increase in North Korean Communist anti-aircraft fire indicated the maintenance of an intensive attempt on the part of the enemy to protect his lines of communications. However, attacks were carried out with only a moderate aircraft loss rate because of an effective use of flak suppression methods.

The highly satisfactory record of downed pilots rescued, both by helicopter inland and by surface ships close to the coast, was sustained.

United Nations carrier forces in the Yellow Sea maintained on station there and alternately provided by the Australian, United States, and British Navies, conducted operations against enemy positions from the Han River estuary to Chinnampo. They included effective attacks on surface communications systems, bridges and road and rail traffic and on coastal gun batteries employed against

our surface vessels. The aircraft from the carriers engaged in air defense, gunfire spotting and bombing assistance in connexion with the operations of the blockading surface units along the many islands off the west coast of Korea.

Patrol aircraft, based in Japan and the Philippines, provided regular shipping and weather reconnaissance in the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and the Formosan Straits.

United States Marine aircraft, under the operational control of the Fifth Air Force, struck at the enemy throughout Central Korea. The major portion of their combat sorties was directed at supply routes and transfer points as part of the interdiction programme, in order to prevent an enemy supply buildup. Close support missions, limited in number by the relative inactivity of ground forces, were effective against enemy bunkers and gun positions in front of various of our front-line positions.

As the reporting period closed, surface units at Wonsan completed one year of continuous round-the-clock bombardment of that port. They persisted in harassing, interdicting and destructive fire on major industrial, transportation and communications centres in the Wonsan area and on the main supply routes from the bomb line to Chongjin. Key rail bridges, by-passes and embankments were kept under constant observation and under interdiction fire by surface units with the assistance of air spotting.

Enemy shore batteries were active in the Ungnam and Songju areas in several instances. In each case, however, the number of rounds fired was small, since counter-battery fire proved effective. The only hits received by friendly units were five. These were scored on HMS *Alacrity*. There were no personnel casualties and only minor material damage was suffered.

Surface units operating on the west coast maintained a twenty-four anti-invasion patrol of the approaches to the friendly islands bordering Kwanghae Province, from the Chinnampo area to the Haeju approaches. Vessels conducted night illumination firing on the surrounding sea areas and fired on troop and gun positions and junk concentrations. The seaward reaches of the Han River were patrolled and interdiction firing at enemy positions on the north bank was undertaken from time to time.

Friendly guerrillas reoccupied five of the recently enemy-taken islands. In each case, reports indicated the enemy had evacuated the islands prior to the friendly reoccupation. Evacuation of refugees from the friendly islands on the west coast continued.

Minesweepers continued the clearance of mines and the routine check sweeps along the east coast. Sweeping operations were seriously hampered by frequent periods of low visibility and rough seas.

An experiment in helicopter evacuation of wounded direct from front-line aid stations to a hospital ship especially equipped with a landing platform, and lying just off the coast, was completed. The experiment proved highly successful in that it reduced the time transpiring between the receipt of a wounded patient and treatment in a fully equipped hospital. This enabled medical personnel to increase the percentage of lives saved among combat casualties.

Far East Air Forces flew a total of 10,750 sorties in support of the Korean operation, the bulk of the effort being directed toward close combat air support, interdiction of enemy communications and the maintenance of air superiority. Freezing weather, icing conditions and heavy clouds interfered with air operations on several days; but there was no relaxation of the air campaign due to armistice negotiations.

The relative stagnation in ground fighting has again permitted the diversion of many fighter-bomber sorties usually reserved for close combat air support to armed reconnaissance and interdiction missions. United Nations Command propeller-driven fighter-bombers were dispatched against targets close to the battle area where they were relatively secure from enemy jet interceptors.

Typical targets for these attacks were bunkers, enemy troops, motor vehicles, tanks, gun positions, supply dumps, buildings, and troop billets.

United Nations Command medium bombers, operating at night, continued the interdiction programme by attacking important river crossings. Light bombers and Marine night-fighters, also operating during the hours of darkness, reported heavy destruction of enemy vehicular traffic and locomotives. During daylight hours jet fighter-bombers penetrated deep into North Korea in attacks on enemy rail lines and rolling stock.

Although the enemy appears to have abandoned his previous efforts to rehabilitate other airdromes and runways suitable for jet operation, his Antung-Sinuiju airbase complex remains very active. Offensive sweeps, escort and top cover missions have been required in order to protect United Nations Command fighter-bombers and lightly protected reconnaissance aircraft during their flights to targets in northwest Korea.

United Nations Command pilots reported the sighting of 1,645 enemy jets in northwest Korea. More than 400 of these sightings resulted in air-to-air encounters with the protective force of F-86 Sabre jets accounting for twenty-nine MIGs destroyed or damaged.

Air crews continued to report enemy night-fighter activity over targets in northwest Korea but no friendly losses to this cause have yet been confirmed.

Combat cargo aircraft continued to airlift high priority passengers, to evacuate patients, and to provide emergency supplies for United Nations Command ground, Air, and Navy units.

In leaflets and in radio broadcasts, the United Nations Command reiterated its firm opposition to any attempt to inject extraneous political issues into the armistice negotiations and thus force the Korean people to become pawns in a Communist drive for foreign political gain. Loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflets for the enemy forces contrasted United Nations Command good treatment of prisoners with Communist exploitation of North Korean and Chinese soldiers in a war of aggression against the Korean people. In all United Nations Command media, particular attention was given to explaining the reasons for the United Nations Command position on each armistice question, and to showing how that position protects the interests of the Korean people as well as of free nations everywhere.

Representatives of the United Nations Command on 3 February began conferences with officials of the Government of the Republic of Korea for the purpose of settling methods for curbing inflation in Korea and related financial, economic and civilian supply matters. There are many difficulties to be overcome in solving the complex financial and economic problems of this war-torn, economically undeveloped country.

Consultant Panel To Advise Disarmament Commission

The Department of State announced on April 28 the formation of a panel of consultants to advise and assist the Department of State and other agencies of the Government in connection with the work of the U.N. Disarmament Commission. The members of the panel are:

Vannevar Bush, Carnegie Institute of Washington

John Dickey, President, Dartmouth College

Allen W. Dulles, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Joseph E. Johnson, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

J. Robert Oppenheimer, Director, Institute for Advanced Study

The Disarmament Commission, established by the U.N. General Assembly at its last session as the result of the United States-United Kingdom-French initiative, is charged with the task of working out comprehensive plans for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments including atomic.

The consultants held their initial series of conferences today. They met with the Secretary of State; the U.S. Deputy Representative on the Disarmament Commission, Ambassador Benjamin V. Cohen; Assistant Secretary of State John D. Hickerson; officials of the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission; and members of the interdepartmental staff which has been working actively on this problem for some time.

The panel of consultants will meet at frequent intervals with top officials of the Government as the work progresses.

Current United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

General Assembly

Threats to the Political Independence and Territorial Integrity of Greece. Repatriation of Greek Children. Report of the Standing Committee on the Repatriation of Greek Children. A/AC.53/L.44, January 26, 1952. 5 pp. mimeo.

Ad Hoc Commission on Prisoners of War. Second Interim Report of the *Ad Hoc* Commission on Prisoners of War. A/AC.4618, February 11, 1952. 8 pp. mimeo.

Disarmament Commission

Working Paper Submitted by the Representative of the United States on April 5, 1952. Proposals for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments. DC/C.2/1, April 5, 1952. 12 pp. mimeo.

Security Council

Report of the Trusteeship Council to the Security Council on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for the Period from March 17, 1951, to April 1, 1952. S/2599, April 16, 1952. 47 pp. mimeo.

Letter Dated April 22, 1952, from Mr. Frank P. Graham, United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, to the Secretary-General transmitting his Third Report to the Security Council. S/2611, April 22, 1952. 36 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

Report on IMC's First Year of Operation

The International Materials Conference on April 29 made public a report covering the first 12 months of its operation—from February 26, 1951, to March 1, 1952. This report of approximately 100 pages contains charts, graphs, tables of historical statistics, and other informational data that has been obtained from the work which has been done by the Conference. It is being made available in three languages—English, French, and Spanish.

All 28 of its member governments, which by their cooperative effort have made possible the accomplishments of IMC, have participated in the preparation of the report. Through the Conference secretariat they have assembled the most comprehensive record possible. It was prepared in the belief that the record of that year of work will be of interest to all countries of the free world.

Besides reviewing the problems, establishment, and development of IMC, the report presents, for the first time in several instances, estimates of the free world supply position of the 14 commodities under IMC's province. It shows what direct action has been undertaken by the free world, through IMC, to cope with the shortages. It also gives an indication of some of the work that remains to be done.

The first 12 months of operation of the International Materials Conference represent a significant step in international cooperation among the countries of the free world for dealing with common problems resulting from shortages of essential materials. While the report is meant chiefly to be an historical account of this endeavor it reveals a transition in the Conference's work. From the interim steps which have been taken to alleviate the present and, in some cases, past shortages, the commodity committees have turned their attention also to longer range problems of production expansion, economic utilization of available supplies, substitution of other materials, and end-use control measures.

A review of the pattern of production and consumption of the IMC materials shows the interdependence of the free nations for the supplies needed in their efforts to sustain their defense programs and to maintain their economic stability.

The free nations are using IMC as a forum for discussions in an atmosphere of confidence and mutual understanding. Through this forum, a valuable experience in international cooperation is being gained. Its value, as a means of exchange of information on problems of common concern, has been generally recognized.

The report shows that the accomplishments of the initial period of operation are substantial. Nevertheless, it points out that a number of tasks remain to be completed. The assurance of an equitable distribution of commodities, which will remain in short supply at least through 1952, will continue to be a matter of major concern to the Conference. The methods of distribution will be improved in the light of experience and their implementation closely followed. The committees are expected to continue their studies on measures to increase production and conserve supplies. The need for a longer range examination of the world's supply position will depend upon the committees' evaluation of the situation and on member governments' decisions regarding the nature of international action that may be required by future developments.

The report is divided in two major parts. Part I deals with the Conference as a whole. Part II covers in greater detail the work of the seven commodity committees.

In part I, the establishment, organization, and operation of the IMC are explained; the problems encountered and the accomplishments made are listed; the remaining tasks are reviewed; and the free world supply position of IMC materials is given.

Following are the news high lights of the report:

In the 12 months of operation of the International Materials Conference, from February 26, 1951, to March 1, 1952, the seven commodity committees and the Central Group have held a total of 294 meetings of their full membership. Numerous sessions of subcommittees and working groups have also been held.

Through the process of collection and review of all available data, the committees were successful in developing reasonably complete figures on the past, present, and future patterns of produc-

tion, consumption, and trade in the commodities of concern to IMC. This accomplishment would not have been possible without the cooperation of the participating countries.

The analysis of the statistical data also revealed the really great interdependence of the countries of the free world for essential supplies.

Procedures for the collection and evaluation of data are for the most part now well established and provide a basis for keeping currently informed on the extent and nature of the supply position. Continuous efforts are being made to reduce the delays in securing the necessary information. Procedures have been established, also, for measuring the effectiveness of committee recommendations in terms of their implementation.

The major accomplishment of IMC during its first year of operation was the development of plans for international distribution of the materials in short supply and securing their prompt acceptance by the participating countries.

Development of Distribution Plans

The plans for the distribution of metals recognized three categories of needs, namely, (1) defense; (2) strategic stockpiling; and (3) essential civilian consumption. The supply was not sufficient to meet all of these needs in full, however, and in some cases did not permit any special allowance for strategic stockpiling. The distribution plans adopted by the committees generally provided for meeting defense requirements, if separately identified, in full, although even this was not possible in all cases owing to inadequate supplies. The plans provided for distributing the balance of the supplies for stockpiling, when feasible, and for essential civilian consumption.

The committees have endeavored not to interfere with the normal channels of trade but to take such trade patterns into account, insofar as possible, when making proposals for allocations. They have not made any recommendations for allocation by source. Such problems as exchange difficulties and the disrupting effect of allocation by source on marketing systems and established patterns of trade have made it seem undesirable, thus far, to consider this type of recommendation.

The development of the distribution plans on a voluntary basis and for their acceptance by the member governments concerned, during a time of extreme shortage, represent an important milestone in international cooperation for the solution of materials problems.

At present it is not possible to reach any firm conclusions as to the extent to which recommended allocations during the first year of operation of IMC have been implemented. However, the available data indicates that for the most part the allocations have been carried out as recommended.

A preliminary survey made by the secretariat, based upon information available to it, indicates

that most countries participating in IMC have adopted end-use or other controls which have the effect of restricting the use of scarce materials. More than half of the member countries have established direct end-use controls on many of the commodities which are under consideration by the IMC committees.

Substantial progress has been made by member countries in securing an increase in production of some materials. In view of the time element involved, however, it will be a considerable period before the results of these efforts will be apparent in an actual increase in available supplies.

Several of the committees have been aware that the problem of price could become one of the most serious problems affecting the distribution of available supplies. In most cases, however, they have not undertaken discussion of this problem. Some of them have considered it to be one of the pending problems which would have to be studied if its importance in the supply situation should increase.

It appears likely that the shortages of the commodities now subject to international allocation will continue to require plans of distribution at least through 1952, with the possible exception of newsprint and zinc.

The principal fields to which the committees that are concerned with shortages of probable long duration will address themselves are those of conservation and production.

The present efforts to keep the free world economically stable, to continue economic development, and at the same time, to build a strong defense position have created high levels of demand which, in certain cases, exceed all previous peaks in materials requirements.

Commodity Situations

Following is a current appraisal of the situation by commodities:

Copper—Although some improvement in the free world position seems likely in the latter part of 1952, copper may well remain in short supply throughout the year.

Zinc—It can be expected that the zinc supply position will continue to improve and may be sufficient to meet restricted requirements later in the year.

Lead—Developments in recent weeks would indicate that availabilities of lead will be adequate in 1952.

Manganese ore—Manganese ore is expected to be in easier supply in 1952.

Nickel—Continuance of the critical supply position of nickel for the remainder of 1952 is indicated.

Cobalt—It can be expected that cobalt will continue to be in short supply for the remainder of the year.

Tungsten—Tungsten is likely to be in short

supply for the remainder of 1952 and for a further period thereafter.

Molybdenum—Molybdenum is likely to be in short supply during 1952 and for a further period thereafter.

Sulphur—It is likely that some net increase in production will take place in 1953 over 1952. However, preliminary figures for 1953 indicate a continuing shortage of sulphur of approximately the same magnitude as in 1952.

Kraft pulp—Developments during the year brought about an apparent equilibrium between supply and demand of kraft pulp. This situation is likely to continue in 1952.

Dissolving pulp—A study of the dissolving-pulp situation in 1952 is now in progress.

Newsprint—Expanding production and a possible softening in demand may well solve the newsprint supply problems of most countries.

Cotton—The increased production and the decreased rate of consumption for the present season, as compared with the 1950–51 season, have eased

the supply position considerably. Supplies for the 1952–53 season will be largely dependent on the crop in the coming year, the early prospects of which will be watched with special interest.

Cotton linters—At the present rate of off-take, the supply for the balance of the 1951–52 season would seem to be at least adequate.

Wool—While it is difficult to compare supply and demand at this time of the season, the prevailing prices of wool do not indicate any excess of demand over resources.

U.S. Representative Named To Central Group of IMC

The President has designated James F. King as U.S. representative on the Central Group of the International Materials Conference to succeed Gabriel J. Ticoulat, who resigned from the Government service at the end of March.¹

U. S. Delegations to International Conferences

The Social Commission (ECOSOC)

The Department of State announced on May 8 that Arthur J. Altmeyer, Commissioner for Social Security, Federal Security Agency, and U.S. representative on the Social Commission of the U.N. Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc), will attend the eighth session of the Commission, which will convene at New York, on May 12, 1952. Other members of the U.S. delegation are as follows:

U.S. Alternate Representative

Jane M. Hoey, Director, Bureau of Public Assistance, Federal Security Agency

Advisers

Roger W. Grant, Jr., Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
Dorothy Lally, Technical Assistant to the Commissioner for Social Security, Federal Security Agency

Established in June 1946, the Social Commission is one of the nine permanent functional commissions of the U.N. Economic and Social Council. Eighteen governments, elected by the Council for 3-year terms, comprise the membership of the Social Commission.

Among the items on the provisional agenda for the forthcoming session are an evaluation of the advisory social-welfare services for the past 5 years; report on the world social situation; rehabilitation of the physically handicapped; family and child welfare; in-service training of social-welfare personnel; housing and town and country planning; report of the U.N. International Children's Emergency Fund; simplification of administrative procedures for migrants; and general program of work for the Social Commission.

The last (seventh) session of the Social Commission was held at Geneva, Switzerland, March 19–April 13, 1951.

Standing Committee on Performance (ICAO)

On May 9 the Department of State announced that the second meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization (Icao) Standing Committee on Performance will convene at Copenhagen, Denmark, on May 19, 1952. The U. S. delegation to this meeting is as follows:

¹ Information concerning the organization and functions of the Central Group was set forth in BULLETIN of Oct. 22, 1951, p. 665.

United States Delegate

Raymond B. Maloy, Chief, Engineering Flight Test Branch, Office of Aviation Safety, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Alternate United States Delegates

John A. Carran, Chief, Aerodynamics Section, Office of Aviation Safety, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Hugh B. Freeman, Aeronautical Engineer, Airworthiness Division, Civil Aeronautics Board

Advisers

Joseph Matulaitis, Chief, International and Regulations Staff, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

F. Stanley Nowlan, Jr., Engineering Consultant to the Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

The Special Committee on Aircraft Performance of the ICAO Airworthiness and Operations Divisions, meeting during the period April 2-19, 1951, to consider the tentative standards on performance proposed at a September 1950 ICAO meeting at Paris, had found that still more experience in the trial application and investigation of these standards was needed before they could be recommended for inclusion in the Operations and Airworthiness Annexes (Annexes 6 and 8) to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. Upon the recommendation of the Special Committee, and with the approval of the ICAO Council, the Air Navigation Commission established a small standing committee to continue the development of the tentative recommendations for international standards and recommended practices prepared by the Special Committee on Performance until it is found possible to present proposals for performance specifications suitable for adoption as amendments to Annexes 6 and 8, after review by all contracting states. The standing committee is composed of technical specialists provided by interested contracting states and the International Air Transport Association (IATA).

The first meeting of the Standing Committee on Performance was held at Montreal, Canada, November 6-16, 1951.

Rubber Study Group

The Department of State announced on May 5 that the ninth meeting of the Rubber Study Group would convene on that date at Ottawa. The U.S. delegation is as follows:

DELEGATE

Willis C. Armstrong, Special Assistant, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State

ADVISERS

Government

Frederick D. Bates, Jr., Chief, Chemicals and Rubber Section, Materials Division, Munitions Board, Department of Defense

George K. Casto, Director, Rubber Division, Emergency Procurement Service, General Services Administration

Everett G. Holt, Assistant to the Director, Rubber Division, National Production Authority, Department of Commerce

E. Dorrance Kelly, Rubber Director, Rubber Division, National Production Authority, Department of Commerce

Leland S. Spencer, Chief, Synthetic Rubber Division, Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Woodbury Willoughby, Counselor of Embassy, American Embassy, Ottawa

Arthur Wolf, Director of Rubber Group, Materials Branch, Defense Production Administration

Industry

John Lyon Collyer, President, B. F. Goodrich Company, Akron, Ohio

Harvey Samuel Firestone, Jr., President, Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, Akron, Ohio

Frederick T. Koyle, Carl M. Loeb, Rhoads and Company, New York

Paul Weeks Litchfield, Chairman of the Board, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, Akron, Ohio

William Francis O'Neil, President, General Tire and Rubber Company, Akron, Ohio

Thomas Robins, Jr., President, Hewitt-Robins Corporation, New York

George W. Tisdale, Vice President, U. S. Rubber Company, New York

Gilbert K. Trimble, Vice President, Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Company, St. Louis

Harry E. Smith, Vice President, Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., Passaic, N. J.

A. L. Viles, President, Rubber Manufacturers' Association, Inc., New Rochelle, N. Y.

Rosalyn Diehl Young, President, Rubber Trade Association of New York, Inc., New York.

SECRETARY AND ADVISER

George H. Alexander, Acting Chief, Rubber, Fibers and Hides Branch, Agricultural Products Staff, Department of State

Pursuant to informal discussions held between the Governments of the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States at London, August 1-9, 1944, the Rubber Study Group was established as an advisory body on matters of common concern. Its membership, which is made up of producing as well as consuming areas, now includes 16 additional governments and areas. The functions of the Study Group include: making studies of the world rubber position; developing measures designed to expand world consumption of rubber; promoting cooperation among nations with respect to international trade in rubber; considering the best methods of dealing with special problems as they arise; and submitting reports of its findings and recommendations to participating governments.

At its forthcoming meeting at Ottawa, the Study Group will review the production, consumption, and trade aspects of the world rubber situation and will reexamine the statistical position regarding production and consumption of rubber throughout the world.

The last (eighth) meeting of the Rubber Study Group was held at Rome, April 16-20, 1951.

The United States in the United Nations

May 9-May 15, 1952

Security Council

Disarmament Commission—At the sixth meeting, May 14, of Committee I various members continued to express dissatisfaction with the lack of progress being made, which was attributed to the U.S.S.R.'s obstructionism. Mr. Coulson (U.K.) stated that the U.S.S.R. should clarify what it meant by inspection on a continuing basis and simultaneous implementation of limitations and of a control system. He also wondered what the immediate practical result would be of a General Assembly decision to reduce armaments and prohibit atomic weapons if the implementation of it was delayed pending establishment of a control system. The U.S.S.R. proposal, he said, appeared to be designed to deceive public opinion. Mr. Malik (U.S.S.R.) stated that it would serve no useful purpose for him to explain the Soviet proposals so long as the United States adhered to the United Nations atomic control plan.

At the fourth meeting of Committee II, May 9, Mr. Moch (France) presented informally a French plan whereby disclosure and verification of conventional armaments and armed forces would be reduced to three stages instead of five, as follows: (1) Disclosure of the general volume of armed forces; (2) Disclosure of the organization of armed forces; and (3) Disclosure of the operational value of armed forces. After Mr. Moch indicated that he would not formally present the proposals unless the Soviet Union regarded a reduction in stages as an improvement in the United States suggested plan, Mr. Malik (U.S.S.R.) stated the Soviet delegation would study the French suggestions carefully, although they did not appear acceptable as a basis for discussion. Mr. Cohen (U.S.) assured Mr. Moch that the United States would examine his statement with the utmost care since it was anxious to find a common ground on which to proceed.

Economic and Social Council

Commission on Narcotic Drugs—The Commission during its 3-week seventh session, April 16-May 9, took the following action:

1. It agreed on names for the two international control organs on narcotics which would be established under the proposed single convention on narcotics; the Commission on Narcotic Drugs will be known as the International Narcotic Commission, and the organ replacing the present Permanent Central Opium Board will be called the International Narcotic Control Board.

2. It approved by unanimous vote a proposal that no provision for an International Clearing House should be made in a single convention on narcotic drugs. However, such measures as are now in force pertaining to an International Clearing House should remain in existence, namely, those covering export of narcotic drugs from countries which are not parties to existing conventions or protocols.

3. The Commission approved the first 13 articles of the proposed 51-article draft single convention on narcotic drugs. These deal with definitions, scope of the convention, obligations of parties and international control organs. Oscar Rabasa (Mexico), chairman, stated that it would not be possible for the Commission to complete the task of considering the entire draft convention at this session and that it would probably take at least two more sessions before a final draft convention could be placed before an international conference for adoption.

4. In connection with the problem of coca-leaf chewing, a resolution was adopted, 10 (U.S.)-4-1, recommending that the Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc) with the aid of the United Nations technical services and the specialized agencies, undertake field experiments in Peru and Bolivia; that these two Governments "take the necessary steps to limit immediately the production of coca leaves to licit consumption and manufacture" and "prevent the introduction into trading channels of coca leaves and cocaine which could form a source of supply for the manufacture or illicit export of narcotic drugs."

5. The Commission adopted a French-U. S.-sponsored resolution, 10-0-5, on the control of synthetic drugs, recommending that Ecosoc request the Secretary-General to draw the attention of governments to the desirability of bringing all

synthetic drugs under national legislation, and to accede without delay to the November 19, 1948 protocol dealing with such drugs. It also recommends that governments limit their estimates to medical and scientific requirements.

6. By a vote of 13-0-2 (Poland and U.S.S.R.) a resolution sponsored by Egypt, India, the United Kingdom, and the U.S., amended by Mexico and the Netherlands, was adopted which calls upon governments to exercise close international cooperation to control the illicit traffic in narcotics. It requested that the Secretary-General compile and bring up to date at regular intervals a list of merchant seafarers and members of civil air crews who had been convicted of offenses against narcotic laws on or after January 1, 1953, and to send the lists to governments of all states with a recommendation to take appropriate measures against these traffickers; and that a copy of such lists be sent to the maritime and aeronautical unions for their consideration.

The discussion on illicit traffic of narcotic drugs included examination of summaries of illicit transactions and seizures reported to the United Nations Secretariat during 1951, as well as the annual reports on illicit traffic during 1951 required from governments who are parties to the 1931 convention. H. J. Anslinger, U.S. representative, cited extracts from a report, dated March 10, 1952, received by the United States Bureau of Narcotics from General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, which *inter alia* noted that

Investigations, arrests and seizures in Japan during 1951 proved conclusively that communists are smuggling heroin from China to Japan, and are using the proceeds from the sale thereof to finance party activities and to obtain strategic materials for China. . . . Approximately fifty percent of the total seized in 1951 was either definitely labelled with a Chinese address as the source or else marked with well-known pre-war brands of Chinese heroin.

Hsiu Cha (China) supported Mr. Anslinger's charges against Communist China, stating that the increased growth and production of opium and its smuggling abroad were carefully organized and aided directly by the Chinese Communist Government.

7. The Commission adopted a resolution on scientific research into the origin of opium seized from illicit traffic. It requests the cooperation of governments in supplying samples of opium seized for analyses in the United Nations narcotics laboratory.

8. The Commission adopted its report to Ecosoc by a vote of 11 (U.S.)-2 (U.S.S.R., Poland)-1 (Yugoslavia).

Commission on Human Rights—During the past 5 weeks of its eighth session, the Commission, in addition to adopting a self-determination article for inclusion in both covenants, approved the following articles for inclusion in the draft Interna-

tional Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights:

1. Adopted, 16-0-2 (Yugoslavia, Belgium), the United States-proposed first article, as amended by Lebanon and revised by Poland. This article requests that each state individually and through international cooperation undertake to achieve progressively "the full realization of the rights recognized in this Covenant by legislative as well as by other means"; and to "guarantee" that these rights will be exercised without distinction of any kind.

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt (U.S.) and the representatives of France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom expressed dissatisfaction with the second paragraph of the article, particularly with the term "guarantee." Mrs. Roosevelt reserved the right to seek reconsideration later of this paragraph, and Mr. Azkoul (Lebanon) stated he would support such move.

2. By a vote of 15-0-3 (Poland, Ukraine, U.S.S.R.), the Commission adopted article 2, which recognizes the right to work and urges state action toward the achievement of economic development and full employment "under conditions safeguarding fundamental political and economic freedoms to the individual."

3. An article on "just and favorable conditions of work" was adopted 12-0-6 (Australia, Greece, India, Lebanon, Sweden, United Kingdom). The United States supported it in principle but had reservations as to its wording.

4. By a vote of 14-0-4 (Poland, Ukraine, U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia), the Commission adopted an article stating "The States Parties to the Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security."

5. The Lebanese-amended draft article on the right of education was adopted 9-5 (Greece, India, Lebanon, Sweden, United States)-4 (Australia, China, Egypt, United Kingdom).

Economic and Social Commission—The Commission began its eighth session at United Nations Headquarters on May 12.

The first few meetings have been devoted to general discussion of reports and programs on two of the agenda items: (1) Advisory Social Welfare Services and (2) Rehabilitation of the Physically Handicapped.

World Health Organization—The fifth World Health Assembly, legislative body of WHO, opened its annual session at Geneva on May 5. It elected Juan Saledo, Secretary for Health in the Philippines, as its President. The Program and Budget Committee recommended a budget for 1953 of \$8,485,095 as proposed by the Director General and the Executive Board. A United Kingdom proposal that the 1953 budget be maintained at this year's level was defeated, as well as the United States proposal that the budget be raised only to \$7,808,711.

Secretary Acheson Explains U.S. Position in Tunisian Matter

Following is an exchange of correspondence between Representative Jacob K. Javits of New York and Secretary Acheson regarding the position taken by the United States on inclusion of the Tunisian item in the Security Council's agenda.¹ Texts of the letters were released to the press on May 2 by Representative Javits' office.

Representative Javits' Letter of April 18

In common with many other Americans I have been deeply troubled by the action of the United States in abstaining from voting on the Tunisian issue in the Security Council of the United Nations. I can understand, of course, the issues of policy which we had to balance as between self-government for a territory of one of our firmest allies and the various problems with which that ally itself has to deal, of such great importance for us. At the same time abstention is certainly not in the character of the United States—nor is the shutting off of discussion about so critical a matter in terms of our own history and tradition regarding self-government.

There is a larger issue involved here, too, as I believe that the action of our Government in this case is related to one of the most fundamental questions affecting our own policy in the anti-Communist struggle in the world; that is, what should be our attitude regarding peoples seeking nationhood or self-government who have heretofore had territorial or colonial status while at the same time we had reason to be concerned about their capability for defending against Communist subversion from within or Communist aggression from without. Certainly in these cases we should be normally on the side of full and free discussion, far preferring this to revolutionary action, and our allies should certainly be persuaded on this point.

In total it seems to me that the very least which the State Department owes the American people is a rational and complete explanation of the abstention in the Tunisian case. This needs to be made—and promptly. I would certainly appreciate it if you could reply to this letter in that way.

Secretary Acheson's Reply of May 1

Thank you for your letter of April 18, 1952, expressing your concern over the action of the United States in abstaining from voting on the Tunisian issue in the Security Council. You request an explanation of the reasons which prompted this decision.

¹For texts of previous statements on this question by Secretary Acheson and Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, see BULLETIN of Apr. 28, 1952, p. 678.

The difficult decision to abstain on the vote to include the Tunisian item on the Security Council agenda was made only after the most painstaking assessment of all factors involved.

It was our view that the French were not opposed to the discussion of a reform program leading to the goal of autonomy, which is what the Tunisians desire. On the contrary, the French have said that they were prepared to negotiate such a program and in fact have recently proposed a program of reforms for Tunisia as a basis for negotiations. The Department of State believed that in putting forward such a program, the French recognized the validity of Tunisia's demands for home rule. We sincerely hope negotiations will commence in the very near future.

It has always been the position of the United States that the various U.N. organs should be available to examine problems disturbing international relations but that the parties first of all should try to reach a solution through direct negotiation in accordance with the well-established principle of the U.N. Charter. We did not intend our statement in the Security Council or our abstention to be a permanent barrier to a hearing of the Tunisian case. All that we were seeking to do was to encourage direct negotiations between the parties. In our best judgment, action by the Security Council at the time the matter was raised would not have assisted the parties in getting together to negotiate.

Naturally, if our hope concerning the prospects for the resumption of negotiations prove illusory, any U.N. member is free to bring up the case again. Under these circumstances, the United States would reexamine its position in the light of the situation then existing.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

Report of Activities of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. Message from the President of the United States transmitting a report. II. Doc. 353, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 69 pp.

Authorizing Additional Immigrants into the United States. Message from the President of the United States authorizing an additional 300,000 immigrants into the United States to alleviate the problems created by Communist tyranny in Western Europe. II. Doc. 400, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 8 pp.

Seventh Semiannual Report on Educational Exchange Activities. Letter from Chairman, United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, Department of State, transmitting the Seventh Semiannual Report by the United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange for the Period July 1 to December 31, 1951, Pursuant to Public Law 402, 80th Cong. H. Doc. 412, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 8 pp.

Authorizing Vessels of Canadian Registry to Transport Iron Ore Between United States Ports on the Great Lakes During 1952. S. Rept. 1354, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. 2748] 2 pp.

For the Relief of Certain Displaced Persons. S. Rept. 1362, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. 2145] 3 pp.

Imposition of Various Quota Restrictions and Limitation of Certain Imports

*Statement by Willard L. Thorp
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

I wish to thank the committee for the opportunity of testifying with respect to this bill. My testimony will cover only two problems related to the bill, namely, the provision of H. R. 6546 which would delete section 104 of the Defense Production Act,² and the proposal in H. R. 6843 to limit imports of commodities which contain scarce materials.

Section 104

I shall first make a few comments in support of the proposal to delete section 104, which deals with the imposition of quota restrictions on the imports of various products, notably fats, oils, and dairy products. Some members of the committee may recall that last fall I testified here on a bill to repeal section 104. At that time, as you may remember, the Department foresaw that the section was bound to have damaging effects on the ability of foreign countries to earn the dollars they need to put them on a self-supporting basis. We are now even more convinced that action on our part which deprives friendly countries of the opportunity to sell their products in this market will add to their difficulties in earning the dollars they need to maintain minimum living standards and to shoulder their part of the defense burden.

Furthermore, we are still convinced that, in the end, these measures will hurt American agriculture much more than they will help, since foreign countries would have to cut down on their

purchases of American agricultural products as their dollar earnings fall off. We are convinced that restrictive action in this limited field will have a much wider effect upon the future of our foreign trade.

We are concerned also at the fact that section 104 requires the United States to take action inconsistent with the provisions of agreements with other governments which had been entered into under the Trade Agreements Act, and is contrary to the objective, frequently stated by the Congress, of a self-supporting Europe. Certainly, section 104 is contrary to our basic policy of developing trade among the friendly countries of the free world so that businessmen can buy and sell their goods with a minimum of governmental interference in their activities. Inconsistencies of this sort tend to undermine the basis and effectiveness of our foreign policy, by raising fundamental doubts in the minds of other countries of the free world as to our sense of responsibility and the nature of our goals.

We have now had about 9 months in which to appraise the developments in the international field which have occurred as a result of section 104. These developments have convinced us that the Department's original estimate of the effect of section 104 on other countries, if it erred at all, erred in the direction of understatement. It is clear now that Canada and Western Europe have been profoundly disturbed by the implications of these restrictions. It is not so much the immediate dollar loss involved in these restrictions which concerns them, though that is serious enough for some of them. Much more important is the uncertainty which these measures have created, uncer-

¹ Testimony given before the Banking and Currency Committee of the House of Representatives on May 2 and released to the press on the same date.

² For text of section 104, see BULLETIN of Mar. 31, 1952, p. 518.

tainty as to the conditions under which trade will be permitted with the United States, and the possibility that an increase in sales to us, even if the percentage is small, may result in new trade restrictions. The effort to enter the American market often requires a substantial investment, and naturally is very sensitive to the possibility that the rules of the game may be changed. Our friends in Europe and elsewhere, whether they produce cheese or not, have begun to wonder whether the imposition of these restrictions is not an indication that the United States proposes to revert to a policy of raising trade barriers regardless of agreements and even though such action may weaken the collective economic strength of the free world.

This deep concern on the part of Canada and Western Europe has been evident in a number of ways. Last October, at Geneva, at a meeting of the contracting parties of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, nine governments formally protested against our restrictions under section 104, charging that this Government was acting inconsistently with its trade-agreement undertakings. The countries filing the complaint were Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway. The filing of a complaint of this sort is not done lightly; it is a fairly important political step on the part of any government. In this case, it was concluded that our action establishing quota restrictions on the import of cheese, was in fact inconsistent with the General Agreement. The action taken, however, went on to counsel the countries affected to withhold any offsetting actions on their part for the time being until it was clearer what steps the U.S. Government might take to rectify the situation.

There have been other developments since that meeting which are worth noting. The Dutch Government has announced that it is consulting with its partners in the Benelux Union, Belgium and Luxembourg, on increasing its duties against American goods in order to cut down the expenditure of its scarce dollars. The French have informed us that their loss of dollar income resulting from our cheese restrictions is contributing to the cut-back which they are imposing on their imports of dollar agricultural products. Meanwhile, the Italian Government has presented a memorandum to the Department of State describing the cumulative effect of recent U.S. import measures upon the Italian economy, and their potential significance.³

With the committee's permission, I should like to quote from the Italian note on the effects of these measures.

What is at stake is the vast store of goodwill and gratitude which exists in Italy and other friendly countries

as a result of the generous postwar American aid, and of Marshall Plan aid in particular. For, most of the segments of Italian public opinion are altogether at a loss to understand how the vast amount of help poured into Italy during the past three years, with the express purpose of restoring the stability of both the domestic and the international economy of the nation, can be reconciled with the recent restrictions that have hit vital sectors of the Italian economy. The very fact that these restrictions are but incidental and almost trivial within the over-all context of U. S. policies, is bound to intensify their adverse impact. This is because they appear to involve the mistaken idea that, while American policies are liberal and indeed generous at their over-all level, they acquire an altogether different connotation as soon as the protection of special interests is concerned.

This implication, no matter how unwarranted, plays directly into the hands of that vocal minority of opinion which is swayed by communist propaganda in Europe. As it is known, the communists noisily press their line that the Marshall Plan and other aid programs are not really meant to bring about the economic emancipation of Western Europe but to perpetuate their dependence on American bounty, and that American aid programs are calculated to find additional outlets for domestic production, while barring the door to foreign products. The result is that a state of confusion and doubt is generated in the minds of some people—which is sedulously exploited by the communist minority for its own ends—despite the constant emphasis of the Italian Government on the true facts.

These words were written several months before the Moscow Economic Conference. The developments at that Conference reenforce the validity of the point concerning Communist propaganda which the Italian Government was making.

Of course, in any balanced appraisal of the desirability of section 104, one must take into account its effects not only upon our foreign-policy objectives but also upon our domestic agriculture. On this score, representatives of the Department of Agriculture are in a better position to testify than I am. Looking at the case of cheese, I find it hard to believe that where a domestic industry has doubled its output since the prewar years, and where the imports of the product are less than 5 percent of our consumption and are only at the prewar level in quantity, that in such a case, the Government should be called upon to take special action to provide extraordinary protection against foreign supplies. American agriculture can rely upon other provisions of the law, such as section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the escape clauses of the Trade Agreements Act, which do provide the means whereby American farmers can be protected in any individual cases of injury.

In appraising the measures which are appropriate for the protection of American farmers, however, it has to be borne in mind that American agriculture relies heavily upon foreign markets for the sale of its products. In 1951, for example, American farmers sold 4 billion dollars worth of their products overseas, to foreign consumers they never saw and often never knew were their customers. Even some of the products that section 104 aims at protecting have regularly been on an export basis. In 1951 we sold the world 121 mil-

³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 28, 1952, p. 660.

lion dollars worth of dairy products, and imported only 25 million dollars worth of such products. In his own protection, the American farmer must live in a world in which nations stand ready to receive the products of one another and in which nations are willing, and have the financial means, to buy the products of one another. So far as international trade is concerned, the preservation of foreign markets is the surest protection that can be provided the American farmer.

In sum, therefore, it appears to the Department of State that our major foreign-policy objectives and our interest in the protection of the American farmer alike require that the terminal date of section 104 should not be extended beyond June 30, 1952.

H. R. 6843

The second part of my testimony deals with the proposal contained in H. R. 6843. This bill would establish quotas on the importation of certain products made from raw materials on which priorities or allocations are in effect in this country. In substance, the bill would require the President to cut imports of any product to one-half of the quantity imported during the period 1947 to 1949 whenever the product contains materials which are under domestic priorities or allocations control and a substantial portion of domestic producers of the article requests such import limitation. The only exception to this is a provision that the Secretary of Defense could certify that a higher volume of imports is required to meet essential defense needs, in which case imports would be limited to the higher amount certified by the Secretary of Defense.

How would this work? Steel, copper, and aluminum are under allocation under the Controlled Materials Plan. One or more of these three metals enters into the production of nearly every industrial product. Even though steel, copper, or aluminum were a very minor element in a particular product, all that would need to happen would be for a "substantial portion of American producers" to request the limitation of imports, and unless the Secretary of Defense established an exception, the President must automatically restrict imports to 50 percent of the 1947-49 imports. The only showing would have to be that the product contains a material under priorities or allocation control and that a substantial portion of American producers desire a limit on imports. There is no suggestion that either injury to producers or disadvantage to consumers might be an element in the consideration.

The degree of restriction which the bill lays down for imports is considerably more severe than the restrictions in effect on domestic producers. Today we have apparently gone through the worst

phase of materials shortages. Allocations for civilian production are increasing and end-use restrictions are being eased or removed at a significant rate. Looking back we can see that our materials limitations have fortunately not caused any great reduction in the flow of goods to the American consumer, and the expectation is that the supply of materials will increase as new sources become available. Certainly, for most commodities no one envisages anything like a 50 percent domestic limitation.

The committee will appreciate the fact, I am sure, that this bill suffers from the same disabilities as section 104. This bill, like section 104, takes no account of the fact that it is in the interests of the United States to give foreign countries a fair opportunity to earn the dollars they need so that they can shoulder their share of the common defense effort. It takes no account of the fact that we are engaged in a cold war with the Soviet bloc, with the latter trying to persuade friendly foreign countries to increase their trade with the bloc, particularly their trade in many commodities which would be affected by this bill. Nor does it take any account of the extensive efforts in which we have been engaged in cooperation with other friendly countries of the world to insure that existing materials were being fairly distributed and are being put to the best possible use. Instead of strengthening and extending the cooperative approach, it encourages each individual country to meet the problems created by the raw materials shortages on its own, even though its measures may operate at cross purposes with those of other friendly countries.

I should like to dwell for a minute or two upon the measures which have been taken cooperatively with other countries to develop an equitable system for the distribution of scarce world supplies. Since the middle of 1951, the International Materials Conference has been recommending international allocations of copper, nickel, cobalt, sulphur, tungsten, and molybdenum. This system, in itself, by limiting the supplies of scarce materials each country may claim, brings foreign competitors of American producers under a form of production limitation. No country is being allotted enough of these scarce materials to allow unrestricted operation of its industries. In addition, essentially the same principles of distribution are applied in steel and aluminum by the direct actions of the several major producing and exporting countries.

Another forum for this kind of activity has been the Office of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). As a result of OEEC action, the countries of Western Europe have now adopted common lists of prohibitions in the use of copper and nickel, based upon the U.S. lists, and have made progress towards similar action on zinc. In addition, most of them have imposed controls on a considerable range of other scarce products, the

restrictions in some cases being more drastic than those in effect in the United States.

These several developments, in combination, do not yield precisely the same pattern of controls in all countries. There are differences; on some items, the differences permit our manufacturers greater liberty in the use of scarce materials than their competitors in other countries, while in other situations the shoe is on the other foot. In some cases, limitation has been achieved by imposing excise taxes of as much as 100 percent on specified products. There is, however, by now a common approach to the problem and a common framework of controls, even though the form of controls may differ somewhat among countries. Because of this and because of the gradual easing of supplies, the number of situations in which competitive inequities can arise are likely to be few.

It has also been recognized, that the measures one country takes to conserve its scarce materials can profitably be studied and often copied by others. Therefore, there has been a great deal of exchange of this information among countries. In general, it has been felt that the precise use each country makes of its supplies over and above its defense requirements should be a matter for its own determination, in light of its needs and problems. If it wishes to cut back its own domestic supplies even farther, and export goods in order to earn dollars, we have felt that such an objective should not be discouraged. In many cases, we want the goods ourselves.

In this connection, I think an exaggerated impression may exist as to the extent of the problem with which this bill purports to deal. Many of the cases which superficially seem to represent cases of competitive inequities created by raw material shortages prove to be somewhat different in nature when the facts are examined more closely. In the case of chinaware, glassware, and spring clothespins, the industries concerned were making efforts to exclude foreign competition through resort to various provisions of law, such as escape-clause provisions of the Trade Agreements Act, well before current shortages began to be felt. However real they feel their problem of competition from imports may be, this problem apparently would have existed whether or not our current materials shortages had developed.

I want to conclude by pointing out that in cases where Americans are unemployed as a result of the pinch of raw materials shortages, this bill provides no assurances of reemployment. Cutting down on imports does not result in boosting domestic production where that production is being held back by a shortage of raw materials. The only sure solution for such a problem is the better utilization and distribution of the materials which are short. And, insofar as import restrictions can help toward that objective, section 101 of the

Defense Production Act already provides the necessary powers. Under section 101, the President already has the power to apply import restrictions in connection with the allocation and conservation of scarce materials. For those situations in which the bill would go beyond section 101 in providing for the exclusion of products from the United States, there is no assurance that the scarce material embodied in the product would be conserved for a more essential purpose. The products excluded from this country in most cases could readily be diverted to other countries instead; in some cases, in fact, the diversion would make it easier for the Soviet bloc to acquire some of the products which they are constantly seeking. In short, the net result of the bill would be to reduce the supply of goods available to American consumers, thereby aggravating our own supply problems, without increasing the availability of scarce supplies for other useful purposes.

For all of the reasons I have enumerated, the Department believes that this proposal will be harmful to our domestic economy and to our foreign-policy objectives. The Department strongly recommends, therefore, that the provision should not be enacted.

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Germany: Today and Tomorrow

PART I

by Henry J. Kellermann

We are approaching the end of that period of the Allied Occupation of Germany which will be known to future students of history as the "High Commission Phase." To a measurable degree, Germany today carries, and will probably carry in days to come, the stamp of this era. In fact, it is impossible to understand the situation in present-day Germany or to estimate the future course of events without examining specifically the developments of the past 3 years and without studying in particular the role the U.S. Government has performed.

When the High Commission assumed office in 1949, the Government of the Federal Republic was just being constituted and was about to embark on its tedious and uncertain course toward sovereignty. Its powers were defined by the newly created Basic Law,¹ itself an untested source of authority, and limited by an Occupation Statute² which reserved certain critical powers to the High Commission. The Government was supported by a slim majority of moderate parties which formed a tenuous, slightly right-of-center coalition and which were themselves held together by compromise of heterogeneous elements. On the other hand, the Government faced the formidable, solid opposition of the Social Democratic Party and of right- and left-wing splinter groups. Contemporary prophets predicted the early collapse of the coalition and the downfall of Konrad Adenauer's cabinet—and have been predicting it ever since.

To complicate the situation, the Adenauer government had to meet the full fury of the East German puppet regime and of its agents in West-

This article is based on an address which Mr. Kellermann, Director of the Office of German Public Affairs, made at Philadelphia on May 5 before the Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation, which this year observes the centennial of Carl Schurz' arrival in the United States from Germany in 1852. Schurz subsequently served as U.S. Minister to Spain, as a general in the Union Army, as U.S. Senator from Missouri, and as Secretary of the Interior under President Hayes.

Members of the Foundation have given generous support to U.S. Government programs for postwar Germany. They helped rebuild the Goethe House at Frankfort-am-Main, financed the sending of a highly successful art exhibit to Germany, and sponsored visits of Germans to the United States and of American citizens to Germany. In expressing appreciation to his audience, Mr. Kellermann said: "I cannot conceive of anything that symbolizes more inspiringly the synthesis which the great patron of your organization achieved in his person than this effort to build a better future with the help of the best that each one of us has salvaged from the tempests of the past."

ern Germany who turned their biggest propaganda guns on what they were pleased to call the hirelings of Wall Street imperialism. Communist agitation probed for soft spots in West German politics and found a few promising openings which could be exploited to stir up popular discontent with Mr. Adenauer's conduct of affairs and which, moreover, could be used to create friction between the Government of the Federal Republic and the High Commission. Furthermore, there was the ever-present danger that political opposition to the Government, fanned by right- and left-wing extremists and feeding on resentment of the Occupation, economic distress, and,

¹ *Germany 1947-1949, The Story in Documents*, Department of State publication 3556, p. 283.

² *Ibid.*, p. 89.

particularly, on the misery of millions of unsettled refugees, would return to power the radical parties of the right or the left.

Strengthening the New Government

Yet, instead of deteriorating as they did in the twenties, German politics attained strength, stability, and firm direction. Today, Mr. Adenauer is still the Chancellor. The coalition, although leading a precarious existence, still stands. Recent elections indicate that the Chancellor's policy, at least to this date, is still supported by a small but fairly constant majority of the electorate in most of West Germany. This fact is significant, since German participation in European defense and promotion of the Schuman Plan have been the mainstays of the Chancellor's foreign policy. The opposition is as strong as ever, but has made no material headway with its bid for control on the Federal level. In fact, in many decisive respects, the position of the Social Democratic Party differs from that of the Government not so much in principle as in considerations of strategy. What is more important, there has been no serious increase of the radical votes. Neo-Nazi groups have re-emerged, it is true, but not in sufficient strength to become an influential factor in national politics.

Communist votes, on the other hand, never very numerous since 1945, have steadily declined; so much so, in fact, that the Communist Party in Western Germany cannot be counted upon as an overt instrument of political power. At the same time, the trend toward political moderation has been maintained and safeguarded by measures of the Government designed to foster and protect democratic institutions and practices. One of the most important developments in this connection has been the establishment of a Supreme Constitutional Court with power to sit in judgment over groups and individuals endangering civil rights and democratic freedom.

In its external relations, the German Government has attained a position of prestige and influence. Mr. Adenauer's dignified and skillful presentation of Germany's case in international negotiations has gained him the respect and the acclaim of other governments including those of former enemy nations. I feel that tribute should also be paid to the many distinguished men and women whom Germany has sent to the United

States in the postwar years, both in official and unofficial capacity. They have gained good will and many friends for Germany through their dignified, tactful, and cooperative conduct of their business and personal affairs. All this bodes well for a successful conclusion of the contractual agreements now impending which will insure Germany treatment on a basis of equality in international relations.³

Some critics do not seem to appreciate the tremendous accomplishment which lies in the stabilization of the German political situation alone. Consider the odds: Germany has lost 52 percent of her prewar territory, but the Federal Republic has gained almost 10 million new inhabitants, an increase of 22.4 percent of her population. Every square kilometer in Western Germany, which in 1939 housed 160 habitants, today shelters 196. Consider further that these people had to be accommodated in an area which, according to German estimates, has lost 20 percent of its housing facilities; that they had to be absorbed by a labor market which has been weakened by the loss of about 30 percent of Germany's prewar industrial capacity; that they had to be fed out of an economy which has lost an even higher percentage of its agricultural resources. And consider finally that war, occupation, and economic distress do not exactly generate political balance, general satisfaction, and enthusiasm for international cooperation.

Contrast Between 1952 and 1925

Or, compare the situation in the seventh year after the end of World War II with that in the seventh year after World War I. The Treaty of Versailles had stipulated certain territorial changes, but, grievous though the loss was to many Germans, it was not comparable to the penalties of World War II. Besides, Germany was not divided in two parts, and, in spite of reparation burdens, German production capacity had not suffered materially and the national economy was recuperating fast. Loss in life was great but not comparable to the totals of World War II, and the prisoner-of-war problem was kept within conventional bounds.

Yet how markedly different from 1952 was the

³ For text of a statement by the Foreign Ministers of the U.S., U.K., and France and the Chancellor of West Germany on plans for these agreements, see *BULLETIN* of Dec. 3, 1951, p. 891.

situation in 1925. True, the government of the Weimar Republic was democratic in structure and form, but it was hamstrung and actively resisted by a conservative-to-reactionary conglomerate of parties which detested the very concept of democracy and ridiculed the constitution and its symbols. Respect for democracy was neither enforced nor cultivated. History, as taught in many German schools, was an array of battle dates and dynastic family events; generally, it ended with a review of the Bismarckian era or with the Treaty of Versailles. Curiously, there was never enough time left to study the history of the Western democracies, including that of the United States, or perchance to examine the merits of the Weimar constitution. The celebration of Constitution Day on August 11 was a farce; many a public-school superintendent used it to reminisce on the history of the German Empire and of its military achievements.

Youth of a Broken Nation

The young generation which grew up in those days lived from one crisis to the next. By 1925, it had witnessed the birth of a republic which was regarded by the outside world with suspicion and which, inside Germany, was undermined by disaffected patriots, frustrated counterrevolutionaries and mercenaries of fortune—all of them united in their dislike of the regime and what it stood for; a republic which was too weak and often too timid to rally to its own defense, until it was too late. By 1925, this generation had witnessed the early conspiracies of the Black Reichswehr; it had lived through the harrowing experiences of the abortive Kapp and Hitler putsches; it had seen the Reichswehr march against left-wing labor in Saxony; it had discovered what general strikes and street fighting can do to the normal life of modern cities; it had heard of the assassination of two Cabinet ministers and had noted defendants and witnesses insult the Government publicly in court; it had seen German authorities openly and secretly defy the Western Allies and reject their demands for reparations; and it had been witness to the occupation of the Ruhr by French troops. When they were in their teens, some of these youngsters had traded stocks and bonds between classes and had experienced the thrills of unearned wealth as well as the calamities of an inflation which saw the mark hit bottom at 4 trillion 200 billion to the

dollar, which left their parents destitute, and which broke the backbone of the middle class.

We know that broken homes breed crime. But those who have wondered how Germany could ever fall into the abyss of 1933 have probably never sufficiently considered what happens to a youth which grows up in a broken nation—a youth which matures without loyalties to established authority and to the personages and institutions which guarantee the security of a nation.

German history from 1945 to 1952 has not been exactly a bed of roses, but it has been vastly different from what it was after World War I in spite of greater losses and hardships. There have been no political assassinations backed by organized conspiracies, no general strikes, no putsches, no disorders of any significance. There is political opposition, but, with the exception of the right- and left-wing splinter parties, this opposition is not hostile to the state; above all, it is not anti-democratic. On the contrary, one may differ with the Social Democratic Party on economic principles and in matters of political strategy; but anyone who knows the tradition and the record of this party cannot doubt for one moment the sincerity and consistency of its devotion to democratic processes, to the protection of civil rights, to international cooperation and peace. To some extent, the situation appears reversed from what it was in the twenties. Then, the social democratic, liberal, and center parties were in power and were opposed by a conservative opposition which attacked the *Erfuellungspolitik*, that is, the policy of ready acquiescence to Allied demands, of the Government. Today, a predominantly conservative Government is at the helm of Germany defending with dignity the interest of the Federal Republic, pledged to the fulfillment of recognized international obligations, and avowedly dedicated to the preservation of democracy. It is hard to imagine that a situation such as this will lead to another 1933, or that a Government which is united with its own opposition in its determination to defend the democratic foundation on which it rests will not be able to insure the future of German democracy successfully against all attacks from within and without.

On the economic side, Germany's return to normalcy has been spectacular. Here, progress is visible and cannot fail to be noticed by the foreign observer who walks down the *Kurfuerstendamm*

in Berlin, the "Koe" in Duesseldorf, the Kaufingerstrasse in Munich, the Jungfernstieg in Hamburg, or the Zeil in Frankfurt. The displays of some of the stores can successfully compete with shop windows in any other European capital. Remarkably, these are the same arteries of traffic which a few years ago offered a picture of painful and dubious convalescence. In 1949 Germany was still losing economic substance through dismantling. The impact of the Marshall Plan was spotty and was only beginning to be felt. Production figures were not encouraging. Exports were low and foreign subsidies for imports high. Although the black market had shrunk somewhat after the currency reform,⁴ American cigarettes and coffee were still competing successfully with legal tender. The appalling housing shortage was aggravated by the influx of millions of refugees and expellees from the East.

Today, not even 3 years later, the reversal of the situation borders on the phenomenal. What is more, recovery extends practically across the board and is manifest in almost all areas of the national economy. In the fourth quarter of 1951, the production index in the Federal Republic reached an average of 142 of the 1936 level, an increase of 60 percent over the 1949 average.⁵ Industrial production, in fact, has doubled since the days of the currency reform and has tripled since 1947. Next to Great Britain, Germany today has the largest industrial production total in Western Europe. Food production likewise has gone up—an important fact, in view of the loss of the East German breadbasket. With coal production rising, one of the most serious shortages is being remedied to the immediate benefit of iron and steel production, which has not yet risen to pre-war levels. Altogether, the gross national product has increased from 81 billion deutschmarks in 1949 to 113 billion deutschmarks in 1951.

Equally impressive is the foreign trade turnover, which has more than doubled since the days of the currency reform. Exports have increased 500 percent since 1948 and the trade deficit has sunk from 1 billion dollars in 1949 to 29 million dollars in 1951.

The housing program has made progress. In

1950 and 1951, a total of approximately 766,000 dwelling units were built in West Germany and an additional 32,600 in West Berlin.

Employment totals show an increase of 8 percent in 1951 over 1949. What is more astounding, unemployment figures have not materially changed despite the steady growth of the total labor force due to the arrival of millions of newcomers from the East.

It is quite true that the recovery of the German economy is not felt equally by all segments of the German population; much remains to be done to insure an equitable distribution of income, especially through better tax laws. Improved income distribution is important in view of the increase of consumer prices which are far above the pre-war level. The redeeming feature on the other side is a slow increase of average weekly gross earnings from 57.21 deutschmarks in 1949 to 70.92 deutschmarks in 1951.

The most gratifying development, however, at least from the viewpoint of the American taxpayer, is the fact that, while this progress has been achieved with the help of Marshall Plan aid, the amount of assistance needed is progressively declining, in fact, has dropped approximately 80 percent since 1949.

A review of the political and economic developments in Western Germany since 1949 thus shows a magnificent record of achievement on the part of the High Commission. It would justify hopes for a prosperous future of Germany and for stable relations with the free nations of the Western World, were the realization of such hopes contingent on political and economic recovery only. However, it is not.

An Apparent Inconsistency

Stability and prosperity are national objectives of a high order. They make excellent planks in any political platform. What is more, they buy insurance against internal disorder and social tension. But they can appear to twist the meaning of history and to compromise our principles if they become the gift of the victor to the vanquished, particularly when the victor has spent staggering amounts of his human and material resources to lay waste the very nation which, to rehabilitate, he now pays billions of his own national fortune. Many of our fellow citizens,

⁴ For summaries of the 1948 currency-reform laws, see BULLETIN of June 27, 1948, p. 835, and Aug. 1, 1948, p. 141.

⁵ For an article on German economic developments during July–December 1951, see BULLETIN of Feb. 25, 1952, p. 302.

and by no means the prejudiced only, have often wondered about what seemed to them an appalling inconsistency of our policy.

The answer is, of course, that our objectives have never been physical destruction as an end in itself. Physical destruction was the tragic but the only available means of eliminating a political system which threatened to corrupt and wreck life as we knew and cherished it. It follows then that those who destroy not for destruction's sake assume an obligation to build something better in its place—not merely for the benefit of the vanquished, but for the protection of their own national interests as well.

In his *American Diplomacy*, George Kennan has this to say on the subject:

It is essential to recognize that the maiming and killing of men and the destruction of human shelters and other installations, however necessary it may be for other reasons, cannot in itself make a positive contribution to any democratic purpose. . . . Basically, the democratic purpose does not prosper when a man dies or a building collapses or an enemy retreats. . . . The actual prospering occurs only when something happens in a man's mind that increases his enlightenment and the consciousness of his real relation to other people—something that makes him aware that, whenever the dignity of another man is offended, his own dignity as a man among men is therefore reduced. And this is why the destructive process of war must always be accompanied by, or made subsidiary to, a different sort of undertaking aimed at widening the horizons and changing the motives of men and should never be thought of in itself as a proper vehicle for hopes and enthusiasms and dreams of world improvement.

Prosperity, then, in the truest sense, is more than the achievement of physical and economic well-being. Prosperity means the freedom of man to develop and utilize his talents in the light of his own preferences and for the benefit of the society in which he lives.

Smiles from "Fence-Sitters"

This, of course, is in a nutshell the essence of democracy as we understand it. It is also the reason why Machiavellians, *Realpolitiker*, and fence-sitters the world over have smiled at our indomitable efforts to make the world safe for democracy; why we have acquired the reputation of being "crusaders"; and why our foreign policy is frequently labeled as "reformistic," "moralistic," or, at least, as "optimistic" (rather than realistic). We bear no grudge against those who feel moved

to bestow titles on us which might not stand up to their standards of perfection, but which in our view give moral stature to our policies and vindicate our efforts in terms of the long-range benefits which we hope to derive from them. We should, however, be wary of those in our midst who insist on the cash-and-carry brand of foreign policy and who, failing to get what they want quickly, become either despondent or disaffected with the course of history.

Unless we realize that these principles are basic elements of American foreign policy, we shall neither understand nor appreciate the motives of our policy in Germany. For, impressive as the record of political and economic reconstruction in Germany may be, it does not tell the full story of the High Commission. Least of all does it do justice to the American record in Germany and to the personal contribution made by John J. McCloy and his staff.

We all owe a debt of gratitude to those Americans in Germany who since the end of hostilities have endeavored to bring about a peaceful and enduring partnership between Germany and the Western World. The year 1952 will determine whether their labors have been successful and whether Germany will return to the West as a full-fledged member of the community of free nations. We can face the outcome with more confidence than we have for many years chiefly because of the sacrificial efforts of our fellow citizens who have given their best to make sure that the mistakes of the past be not repeated and that we all will benefit from the growth of a friendly and democratic Germany. They have thrown open the gates for Germany's re-entry into the free Western World.

Basis of U. S. Policy

Essentially, the basic formula of U.S. policy in Germany is the philosophy expressed by George Kennan: that physical transformation of a country—through destruction or reconstruction—will have no enduring effect unless material change is supplemented by spiritual change. A number of outstanding American educators who drafted our first long-range policy statement for Germany in 1946 put it as follows:

The re-education of the German people can be effective only if it is an integral part of a comprehensive program for their rehabilitation.

The term "re-education" has since fallen somewhat into disrepute. Its choice may have been unfortunate from the beginning, although in 1946 it reflected quite accurately the status of German relationships to the Occupying Powers. It became more incongruous as Germany moved toward political autonomy. Moreover, the policy was afflicted from the very outset with an inner contradiction between ends and means: freedom was taught by force; conquerors turned into teachers. A situation like this does not make for responsive students. Besides, German capacity to adjust to unfamiliar influences has been questioned by the best Germans. It was President Heuss who said in a recent speech:

We are not a very easy people to deal with. Some of us succumb to the fashion of cultivating, as a matter of principle, an attitude of obstinacy towards the opinion of others; they say that this is patriotism. . . . Next to them are those who rush to the victors on the battlefield to get their philosophy certified. I do not care for either one of these attitudes; to me, they reflect a lack of inner security.

Military Government had the authority to reform by fiat. It could prescribe the laws, set up institutions of enforcement, and demand compliance. This is precisely what it did from 1945 through 1949. Democracy was ordered. Democrats were licensed; antidemocrats were purged. The sight of democracy being established by undemocratic means was not exactly inspiring. In some cases, it netted resentment and fear, in some grudging acquiescence, and in others acceptance. Democrats supported reform; but democrats were often in the minority, and antidemocrats lay low and waited for their day in court. The system might have worked had compulsion lasted until a new generation of public officials, teachers, journalists, and leaders in other professional fields grew up to assume responsibility. As it turned out, controls in the most sensitive fields of democratization—education and information—went by the board early in 1949.

It would be futile to argue today whether the original re-education program constituted an error in policy or in implementation. Undoubtedly, one could not order school reform and then leave the execution to Germans unprepared to promote the spirit of the policy. The American staff was pathetically small; the 60-odd education officials were overburdened with purging teachers and textbooks and with licensing substitutes. They

had no time to teach democracy or to instruct the new teachers and students in the proper use of aids, materials, and books written for them. Funds were meager; frequently there was no money for paper on which to print the new textbooks and no newsprint for the democratic press. For understandable reasons, physical rehabilitation had to come first. An apology often heard in those days was that democracy does not thrive on empty stomachs—a dubious philosophy, for which American history offers few, if any, supporting examples.

Resistance, however, came not only from Germans. Quite a few of our own fellow citizens felt that it was foolish and futile to convert a people without democratic tradition to democracy, and to do this within prescribed limits of time; others argued that it was not, nor ever had been, the responsibility of the victor to care for the moral salvation of the vanquished; it was therefore better to leave well enough alone, that is, to eliminate and punish the guilty and let the rest shift for themselves.

In 1949 responsible officials of Military Government argued that whatever could be done to establish democracy in Germany had been done; that Military Government had created basic institutions which would insure democratic conduct and that it was up to the Germans to make these institutions work. The Occupation Statute did not contain any powers in the field of democratization, and the American Government therefore had neither the right nor the obligation to spend any further thought or funds on a program which could not be legally enforced. For a while, prospects for democracy looked very dim.

In April 1949 a number of outstanding American citizens addressed a letter to the Secretary of State pointing out that the United States could not afford to spend billions on economic reconstruction without a more valiant effort in the field of education and cultural relations. They expressed their deep concern and apprehension that the educational program in Germany might be curtailed, and they urged the Secretary to interpret the Occupation Statute as broadly as possible so that an adequate program of education would be insured.

The Department replied on June 6, 1949:⁶

⁶ *Germany 1947-1949*, p. 544.

The Department has recognized quite early and has so stated, that the task of educating the German people away from authoritarianism and aggression and toward democracy and peace remains the hardest and longest of all our responsibilities in Germany and for the long run, the most decisive. The United States Government would have failed the American people, no less than the democratic elements in Germany in their justified hope for lasting security, if this task was regarded as consummated with the establishment of a German Government by democratic processes and if it desisted from further efforts to advise and assist the German people in the proper and effective use of their new freedom and of the democratic institutions and tools which it has helped provide for them . . . enduring security can, in the long run, be insured

only if there are set in motion within Germany those forces which will create a governmental system dedicated to uphold the basic human freedoms through democratic procedures.

A directive to the U.S. High Commissioner on November 17, 1949, made this view a matter of policy by stating that the reorientation of the German people toward democracy and peace was a basic purpose of the Occupation and that it remained an integral part of the Government's efforts to help develop and strengthen democratic government in Germany and to prepare the integration of Germany in the European community of nations.

Force of Joint Military-Diplomatic Power for Peace

*by Secretary Acheson*¹

It is a great honor to participate in this civilian tribute to the Armed Forces, and it is appropriate to the role of the military in this country that tribute should be paid in this way.

We are very much a civilian nation. Our taste runs to carpet slippers, to the peaceful arts, to creation, and construction. We are more interested in the plowshares part of the proverb. We have difficulty in thinking about force and violence in the world, except when applied to baseball umpires.

Our habits and our traditions are peaceful—so much so, that at times in the past we have regarded the military services reluctantly, as an afterthought.

And yet, the miracle is that whenever we have run into trouble, our country has produced a military leadership of extraordinary quality. In times of crisis, we have been blessed with military men who have been distinguished not only for professional ability but for character and for profound democratic convictions.

This was never more true than it is today.

I speak as a civilian, and as one who works closely from day to day with the top military leadership of this country. I say to my fellow citizens that we may regard with great pride and

confidence the military organization which serves and protects us.

A soldier in Wellington's army, whose letters were recently published, vividly expressed the confidence that capable military leadership can inspire. Just before the battle of Waterloo, when he learned that Wellington was to assume command of the troops in place of the Prince of Orange, he wrote in a letter home:

"I never remember anything that caused such joy, our men were almost frantic, every soldier you met told the joyful news."

And he described the soldiers saying to each other:

"Glorious news, Nosey has got the command, won't we give them a drubbing now."

And give them a drubbing they did, within the month, when "Nosey", otherwise known as the Duke of Wellington, justified their confidence by his leadership on the battlefield of Waterloo.

Tomorrow we celebrate National Armed Forces Day.

It is an occasion on which we say, not only to our generals and admirals, but to the men and women of all ranks who make up the military service: We are proud of you. We are grateful to you. We shall endeavor to keep alive and flourishing the values and the ideals to whose defense you are pledged and dedicated.

¹ Excerpts from an address made before the Third Annual National Armed Forces Day Dinner at Washington on May 16 and released to the press on the same date.

Close Relations Between Defense and State

Now, one of the very fortunate things to have happened is that the last two Secretaries of Defense have been men who have had service in both Departments over many years. General Marshall became Secretary of State after a long career in the Army and as Chief of Staff. One of the basic principles he enunciated when he came to the Department of State and carried through both there and at the Pentagon was the development of the closest possible relations between the two Departments.

Mr. Lovett had not only been Assistant Secretary of War, but had been Under Secretary of State when General Marshall was Secretary of State, and then Deputy Secretary of Defense when General Marshall became Secretary of Defense. So he too has a deep understanding of the importance of this relationship.

Under the spur of this understanding of these two men of unusual capacity and character and unique experience, there have developed working arrangements essential to providing the President with the necessary support and help in carrying out these two great responsibilities placed on him by the Constitution.

The benefits of this kind of cooperation were demonstrated, for example, in a comprehensive assessment of the security requirements of this nation prepared by the National Security Council, which made possible the preparation of detailed plans for increasing the effectiveness of our military and diplomatic position. These plans were put into effect immediately after the Communist attack on Korea.

This cooperation is also illustrated in the development of the National War College since 1946. Here are brought together officers of the three military services, and of the Department of State, the Treasury, and other agencies. They work together on common problems. They learn about each other's approach to these problems. And, what is equally important, they learn to know each other. These are officers of the services and the civil departments who, in time, will be the leading officers in their branches. This training and the friendships formed have made a great deal of difference. Today an increasing number of men in the different branches know intimately the men at the other end of the telephone, or the writers of letters and memoranda, or those sitting with them at conference tables.

There are many other mechanisms by which this coordination is being carried forward. Political advisers are attached to various military headquarters. Military advisers are a regular part of each diplomatic mission. Each week, General Bradley and the Joint Chiefs of Staff meet with top representatives of the Department of State to discuss current problems. And this kind of exchange takes place not only at top levels, but at

so-called working levels—although I hope you will not think that the top levels do not also work.

One measure of the success of this process has been that the current attacks are running both ways. Some charge that the Pentagon is running our foreign policy, and others say that Acheson is telling the military what to do, which seems a fair distribution of brickbats.

Now I have stressed the development of this relationship in some detail because it seems to me important that we continue to seek, not unification between our military and diplomatic services, but a growth of mutual understanding and methods of working together.

A Changed World and Its Problems

This is difficult, because our separate experiences have given us different habits of mind. Military matters are generally more finite, more precise than diplomatic matters. In the conduct of foreign affairs we must always reconcile ourselves to a higher degree of contingency, to a wider frame of reference, and to a far smaller degree of control of the elements involved.

But as I said a moment ago, what we are dealing with are not different problems but different aspects of the same problems. When history presents its problems, it does not do so in the manner of a member of the audience at Town Hall who stands up and says: "This question is for Mr. Lovett"; or, "This question is for Mr. Acheson."

The problems we wrestle with are, for the most part, across-the-board problems. They involve our entire Government—even the parts we ordinarily think of as domestic—and all our people. These problems essentially have to do with the change that has taken place in the role of the United States in the world during recent years.

In the youth of our nation, we were able to remain engrossed in the development of this wide and blessed continent, with only occasional forays into the problems of the outside world. We felt free to move in and out of the world picture as we chose. We were an energetic, youthful country that dashed in, laid about with its sword with decisive and dramatic effect, and then disappeared again. This gave a sense—or perhaps an illusion—of effectiveness and vigor.

But all that was possible because there was balanced distribution of power among the great nations of the world. We did not feel the world pressing in on us. The balance of power maintained by others gave us the opportunity to develop our country and our political independence. We developed our economic strength, not by competition with people from the outside, but by the development of our own interior market.

Now all that is changed. The distribution of power is wholly different.

We are no longer free to move in and out of the world as we please. The situation in which we

find ourselves today means continuity. It means adjustment. It means responsibility.

With that responsibility comes constraint. We cannot be sporadic and we cannot be aloof. We do things in the world now, not because we are a knight in shining armor, but because we have to do them in order to live. We can no longer be dramatic by stepping in with a sudden and effective impact on the world; now we have to have a permanent impact, in so far as we can, and we have to live with the results on the morning after.

Now this constraint, this responsibility, troubles people. The world is full of problems. The newspapers are full of them every day. We miss the good old days of our youth, which seem so carefree in retrospect.

Common Defense Necessary

But though we may chafe at the responsibilities which have descended on us, we cannot escape them. One of the consequences of these responsibilities is that both our military and our diplomatic services have new and vastly enlarged functions, which require them to act together.

The Second World War taught us that purely military objectives cannot be isolated from political objectives; and the course of events since the war has taught us that diplomacy cannot be carried on independently of military capabilities.

This is particularly clear to us in our efforts to deal with the great agglomeration of power controlled and directed by the Soviet Union.

The problems presented to us by Soviet intentions and capabilities, though by no means the only problems we have in the world, are at any rate the most urgent we have to face.

The fundamental situation we must start with is that we are confronted with a formidable combination of power—one that starts at the Elbe, and includes the Eastern European satellites, the Soviet Union, and goes across the Eurasian land mass through China and Manchuria. This power bears upon Northern Europe, Western Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, on the subcontinent of India, on Southeast Asia, on South Korea, on Japan, and across the polar cap upon United States and Canadian territory. This power has great forces mobilized and under its control, which are widely deployed and used for its purposes.

As to intentions, the Soviet Union has made itself perfectly plain. It has demonstrated hostility to all non-Soviet territories. It has taken the idea of conflict from the internal politics and internal society of the Soviet state and extended it to a principle of relations between states. We may or may not be able to influence these intentions but, in any case, what we can and must do is to prevent this conspiratorial movement from engulfing the world.

Now there are several important requirements

of this situation which have received insufficient attention among us, and on which I should like to dwell for a few moments.

One basic fact which stands out, and around which we must build our thinking, is that no combination of powers which does not include the United States is adequate to deal with Soviet power and the Soviet ambitions. This means that either we join in such an effort, or the effort is not made. It is also true that the United States acting alone could not prevent further dangerous accessions of territory and people by the Soviet power.

What follows from this is that we must join our efforts with those of older free nations and build a common defense. And in joining this effort, we must adjust ourselves to the others who are part of it. We cannot dictate; we cannot dominate. Relationships in the free world are based upon consent; upon free and voluntary cooperation. The coalition of free powers requires a high level of appreciation of each other's problems and high level of maturity and mutual understanding.

This has been illustrated in the preparation of the historic arrangements now approaching signature in Europe. Fourteen months of negotiation lie behind the European Defense Community, and 15 months have gone into the preparation of the agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany. During these months of negotiation, there has been a painstaking meshing of the interests of all parties, and the result will be a more enduring structure of peace than could have been achieved in any other way.

Combination of Power Essential

My second point flows from this one and has to do with the nature of the leadership we must exercise. To work with and to develop this combination of power which is essential to our own survival, we must develop policies and programs which are broader than our own immediate national interests. We must develop policies and programs which are broad enough to include the interest of those whom we want to associate with us. If we do less than this, we shall fail to exercise the leadership which circumstances require of us, and the combination of power we must seek to develop will fall apart with dangerous consequences to ourselves.

A third consideration that needs to be in our minds, I believe, is that when we think about power in the modern world, we are thinking about something which includes but must be broader than military force. It has become a cliché to speak of building strength, and then to list military, economic, political, and moral strength as a dutiful catechism without real comprehension or belief.

The power we talk about has to do with all the elements of modern society. The strength of

the combination of free states lies not only in its capacity to resist direct military attack, but in its capacity to satisfy the wants of its people and to evoke their allegiance.

Force alone cannot solve the problems we are dealing with. But the force we are building is absolutely necessary to prevent our adversaries from attempting by force to resolve these issues in their favor.

I want to make this point clear because there has been a widespread misunderstanding that what we are seeking to create is a static containment situation. This is not at all the case. The function of the force we must build is to insure that we shall continue to have freedom of choice, freedom to deal with the dynamic social forces in the world, freedom to bring into play all the affirmative measures that have to do with the way people live, and that reflect the whole constructive outlook of America. The function of the force we must build is to prevent these opportunities from being foreclosed by the use of force from the other side.

It cannot be said too often that we are carrying forward a program which is intended to prevent war from happening. We believe that war will not happen if we can create in areas of political tension sufficient strength so that it will be absolutely clear in advance that any attack will run into difficulty. The strength of the free world must be organized in such a way that the aggressor would at the outset, still be engaged in trouble at the point of attack when the full force of retaliation falls upon him. We believe, from the politico-military point of view, that this awareness on their part is the best way of preserving the security of our country, and of removing the temptation of attack.

Recent Significant Developments

We take special note of the fact that this is the third annual National Armed Forces Day. Five years have passed since the National Security Act was passed, setting up the military establishment, and it is 3 years since the act was amended to provide for the present form of the Defense Department.

These have been years of great progress, and we salute on this day not only the achievements of our three services but the progress that has been made toward increasing effectiveness through operation as a unified defense organization.

There has been another significant development during this period, which is illustrated, I believe, by the fact that the Secretary of State is participating in these proceedings. The past 5 years have witnessed a great and encouraging and necessary growth toward close working relations and mutual understanding between the armed services and those who conduct our foreign relations.

Both the foreign relations of the United States

and the defense of the United States have to do with matters and peoples beyond our shores. In both cases the Constitution, so far as the Executive Branch of the Government is concerned, puts in the President directly the supreme power, duty, and authority. The Constitution provides that he is in charge of the conduct of our relations with other countries. It provides that he is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

So, in a special manner the Secretary of State and his associates, the Secretary of Defense and his associates, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the advisers and the assistants to the President in carrying out functions which, by the highest law, are the President's responsibility and his duty.

Since, in both of these fields, he is dealing with problems and people beyond the area of the United States, it is of the utmost importance that these two groups of advisers not only work very closely together but that they understand one another's problems.

It is only in this way that recommendations can be developed for the President which are integrated, for what we are working on at the Pentagon and the State Department are not different problems but different aspects of the same problems.

The Congress understood this in the National Security Act of 1947 which spoke of the intent of Congress to "provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies and functions of the Government relating to the national security . . ." This act not only provided for a unification of the military establishment, but it included important provisions for the National Security Council, the National Security Resources Board, and the Central Intelligence Agency, provisions designed to give an institutional basis for the essential cooperation which the Congress so clearly saw was necessary.

These provisions have worked and have worked with increasing success.

It is of the utmost importance in the work of any institution that there should be the greatest confidence and intimacy between the individuals involved, because they, after all, are the institution.

Constant Effort To Secure Peace

War has always been a curse and a scourge, but the terrific increase in the lethal capacity of modern weapons makes the results of past wars insignificant by comparison. War as an instrument of policy is unthinkable for us, and the point and purpose of all our efforts must be to reduce the conditions that make for war, in so far as it lies within our power to do so.

But just as war is not inevitable, neither is peace inevitable. It comes by effort. The decisions made in the Kremlin are not made without regard to what action the free world takes.

I firmly believe, for example, that it was the

action of the United States and the United Nations in responding resolutely to aggression in Korea that helped break a chain of events which might have led to World War III. Whether or not we can at this moment see the ultimate settlement in Korea, this action has already been a tremendous accomplishment, which we must not allow to be dissipated by impatience or faintheartedness.

Whether time works in our favor, or against us, depends upon what use we make of time.

The climate that makes for war or peace is not like the physical climate. It is not something which comes blowing in from the West and blows out across the Atlantic without any action by any human being.

The international climate which may produce

war or may produce peace comes from what we do, and it is what we do and the effect of that upon the Communist calculations which, in my judgment, will determine whether we are going to maintain peace or whether we are going to have war.

We are not in a position in which we can glide along to effortless superiority. It is only if we use time with the greatest wisdom, the greatest concentration, the greatest constraint and effort, that time will be on our side.

If we do use it in that way, I believe that time will favor our cause. I believe that if we go on with unrelenting courage in the face of the circumstances before us, in the face of the belief that in our day destiny is offering no sure things, that the future will be secure for peace and freedom.

U.S., U.K., and France Reply to Latest Soviet Note on Germany

On May 13, the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, through their respective Embassies at Moscow delivered identical notes to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in reply to the Soviet note of April 9 concerning Germany. Texts of the tripartite and Soviet notes follow:

TRIPARTITE NOTE OF MAY 13

[Released to the press May 13]

1. In reply to the Soviet Government's note of the 9th of April, the United States Government wishes to make the following observations in regard to the unity of Germany, the election of a free all-German government and the conclusion of a peace treaty with that government. It remains the policy of the United States Government to achieve these objectives on terms that will insure unity with freedom and peace with security.

2. It is ready to begin negotiations with the Soviet Government on these issues; and it desires to do so just as soon as it is clearly apparent that it is also the intention of the Soviet Government to avoid the fruitless negotiations of the past. The United States Government and the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union must therefore first reach a clear understanding upon the scope of the negotiations and upon the fundamental problems to be examined. Proper preparation is essential to success and to avoid long delays. The Soviet Government's note of the 9th of April throws little new light on

what it considers should be the means of insuring the success of any such negotiations.

3. In its latest note the Soviet Government now stipulates that Germany must not be included "into one or another grouping of powers directed against any peace-loving state". Germany's proposed membership in the United Nations should surely make any such provision unnecessary. In any case the United States Government could not accept any provisions forbidding Germany to enter into association with other states which one of the signatories of the peace treaty might arbitrarily choose to regard as "directed against any peace-loving state". It cannot admit that Germany should be denied the basic right of a free and equal nation to associate itself with other nations for peaceful purposes. It must assume that the Soviet Government likewise cannot object to Germany's right to enter into defensive agreements.

4. In its note of March 25,¹ the United States Government pointed out that it is giving full support to the efforts which the free states of Western Europe, including the German Federal Republic, are making to bring into being a peaceful European community and thus to begin a new era in which international relations will be based on cooperation and not on rivalry and distrust. The United States Government welcomes the development of such a European community in which Germany will participate. Germany is divided because Europe is divided. This policy of Euro-

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 7, 1952, p. 530.

pean unity cannot threaten the interests of the Soviet Union or of any country whose policy is devoted to the maintenance of peace. The United States Government will, therefore, not be deflected from its support of this policy. It is more than ever convinced that it represents the true path of peace.

5. The United States Government has no responsibility for the failure to extend this cooperation beyond its present limits. It remains ready to examine with sincerity and good will any practical and precise suggestions designed to reduce tension and to heal existing divisions.

6. A German peace treaty can be worked out only if there is an all-German government formed as a result of free elections and able to participate in full freedom in the discussion of such a treaty. It is, therefore, not possible to hold discussions now about the provisions of a German peace treaty. The U.S. Government has already made known its views on some of the Soviet Government's proposals especially its erroneous interpretation of the territorial provisions of the Potsdam protocol and its intention to confine Germany in a position of permanent isolation from Western Europe while obliging her to seek to provide for her defense solely through her own national armed forces. The Soviet proposals would mean permanent shackles upon Germany's rights of international association and a permanent state of tension and insecurity in the center of Europe.

7. The all-German government resulting from free election must itself be free. Such freedom is essential both before and after a peace treaty has been negotiated. It must be able to maintain its genuinely representative character; to assume its responsibilities as the government of a reunited Germany and to play its full part in the discussion of the peace-treaty. This question of freedom is, therefore, inseparable from the problem of elections. The Soviet Government has still failed to give any indication of its views on this subject. The United States Government must ask specifically whether the Soviet Government considers that an all-German government, resulting from free elections, would be under four-power control until after the conclusion of a peace treaty or whether they agree that it should have the necessary freedom of action and powers of government.

8. The United States Government is happy to note that the Soviet Government now agrees in principle that there should be free elections throughout Germany. Such free elections can, however, only be held if the necessary conditions exist in all parts of Germany and will be maintained not only on the day of voting, and prior to it, but also thereafter. An essential first step is, therefore, to insure such conditions. Otherwise, no progress can be made. In recent years the eastern part of Germany has evolved in a direction increasingly divergent from the main path

of German progress. This is a principal reason why an impartial inquiry is needed before elections can take place.

9. The Soviet Government does not agree, however, that the international commission set up by the General Assembly of the United Nations should carry out such an inquiry throughout Germany. It bases this refusal on its interpretation of Article 107 of the United Nations Charter. But this reads as follows: "Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action." These words clearly do not preclude the United Nations from considering these aspects of German affairs. This interpretation was upheld by the United Nations General Assembly by an overwhelming majority. However, even under the Soviet Government's erroneous interpretation of the Charter there is nothing to prevent the Four Powers from availing themselves of the United Nations Commission in order to determine the conditions in which genuinely free elections could be held throughout Germany.

10. The Soviet Government suggests instead that responsibility for the inquiry could be entrusted to a commission formed by the four occupying powers. Before the United States Government could feel assured that this suggestion would result in an impartial inquiry it would need to know what would be the composition and functions of such a body. A commission composed solely of members with direct responsibilities in Germany would be both judge and party. Experience during the period of four-power control of Germany suggests that it would not be able to reach useful decisions. Thus the elections would be greatly delayed. Nor can the United States Government overlook the fact that the appointment of a four-power commission might be interpreted as a step towards the re-establishment of four-power control in Germany. This would be a retrograde move, out of keeping with constitutional developments in the Federal Republic.

11. For these reasons the United States Government maintains its preference for the United Nations Commission: It is already in being, its functions have been laid down and it can take action without delay. Nevertheless, the United States Government is ready to examine every possibility of determining whether conditions of freedom exist throughout Germany for the holding of genuinely free elections. The United States Government in agreement with the United Kingdom and French Governments and after consultation with the German Federal Government and the German authorities in Berlin, accordingly makes the following proposals:

(i) An impartial commission should immediately determine whether there exist in the Soviet Zone of Germany, as well as in the German Federal Republic and in all sectors of Berlin, the conditions necessary for the holding of free elections and, if not, should recommend for consideration by the Four Powers exercising responsibilities in Germany what step should be taken to create such conditions. The Four Powers should give the necessary facilities for the investigation of such a commission in the German Federal Republic, in the Soviet Zone, and in all sectors of Berlin. The three Western Powers and the German Federal Government have already stated their willingness to do so.

(ii) The Four Powers should utilize for this purpose the United Nations Commission which is already available. This seems the quickest and most practical course.

(iii) Despite its strong preference for the procedure under (ii) above, the United States Government is ready to consider any other practical and precise proposals for an impartial commission of investigation which the Soviet Government may wish to put forward, on the one condition that they are likely to promote the early holding of free elections throughout Germany.

(iv) As soon as the report of such an impartial commission is available, representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, French and Soviet Governments would meet to consider it, with a view to reaching agreement on:

(A) The early holding of free elections throughout Germany, including the creation where necessary of the appropriate conditions; and

(B) The assurances to be given by the Four Powers that the all-German government, formed as the result of these free elections, will have the necessary freedom of action during the period before the peace treaty comes into effect.

May 13, 1952.

SOVIET NOTE OF APRIL 9²

[Unofficial translation]

In connection with the note of the Government of the United States of America of March 25, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to state the following:

In its note of March 10³ the Soviet Government suggested to the Government of the United States of America and also to the Governments of Great Britain and France without delay to discuss the

question of the peace treaty with Germany in order that an agreed draft of a peace treaty would be prepared at the earliest time. With the aim of facilitating the preparation of a peace treaty the Soviet Government presented a draft of bases of a peace treaty with Germany expressing agreement also to discuss any other suggestion.

The Soviet Government suggested in this connection that the peace treaty be worked out with the immediate participation of Germany in the form of an all-German Government. In the note of March 10 it was foreseen also that the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., England, and France, fulfilling occupation function in Germany, should review questions of conditions favorable to the earliest formation of an all-German Government expressing the will of the German people.

Introducing its suggestion regarding the question of the peace treaty with Germany and the formation of an all-German Government, the Soviet Government proceeded from the fact that the decision to state basic questions has great significance for strengthening peace in Europe and responds to the requirements of just relationship to lawful national interests of the German people.

The urgency of the conclusion of the peace treaty with Germany creates the necessity that the Governments of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., England, and France take immediate measures for the unification of Germany and the formation of an all-German Government.

In this connection the Soviet Government considers it necessary that the Governments of the U.S.S.R., United States of America, England, and France without delay discuss the question of conducting free all-German elections as was suggested earlier. Recognition on the part of the Governments of the U.S.S.R., United States of America, England, and France of the necessity of conducting free all-German elections will create the full possibility of conducting such elections in the nearest future.

As regards the suggestion in connection with the future free all-German elections, regarding checking by the U.N. commission of the existence of conditions for such elections, this suggestion is in contradiction with the U.N. Charter which, in accordance with article CVII, excludes interference by the U.N. in German affairs. Such check could be carried out by a commission formed by the Four Powers fulfilling occupation functions in Germany.

The Government of the United States of America has had opportunity to acquaint itself with the draft of bases of a peace treaty with Germany set forth by the Soviet Government. The Government of the United States of America did not express agreement to enter into discussion of this draft and does not propose its own draft of a peace treaty.

Meanwhile the Government of the U.S.A. in-

² Handed to the U. S. Chargé d'Affaires *a. i.* at Moscow by Foreign Minister Vyshinsky.

³ BULLETIN of Apr. 7, 1952, p. 531.

roduced a series of objections to the specific points of the Soviet draft of bases of the peace treaty with Germany which involved further exchange of notes between the Governments and delay of decision of questions in dispute which could have been avoided by direct discussion between the powers. Inasmuch, however, as in the note to the U.S.A. of March 25 such questions are presented, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to dwell on these questions.

In the Soviet draft of the bases of a peace treaty with Germany it is said:

Germany obligates itself not to enter any kind of coalition or military alliances directed against any power which has taken part with armed forces in the war against Germany.

The Soviet Government suggests that such proposal is in accord with the interests of the powers fulfilling occupational functions in Germany and of neighboring powers, and, in equal measure with the interests of Germany itself as a peace-loving and democratic government. In such suggestion there is no inadmissible limitation of the sovereign rights of the German Government. But this suggestion also excludes the inclusion of Germany in any one or other group of powers directed against any kind of peace-loving state.

In the Soviet draft regarding the peace treaty with Germany it said:

Germany will be permitted its own national armed forces (land, air and sea), necessary for the defense of the country.

As is known, the Soviet Government introduced similar suggestions also regarding the draft peace treaty with Japan. Such suggestion is in accord with the principle of national sovereignty and equal rights between governments. It is impossible to imagine such a position whereby Japan would have the right of its national armed forces designed for the defense of the country but Germany would be deprived of this right and would be placed in a worse position. There cannot be any doubt that in the interest of peace, as in the interest of the German nation, it will be much better to create such armed forces than to create in West Germany hiring troops of revanchistes headed by Fascist-Hitlerite generals ready to engulf Europe in a third world war.

Regarding German frontiers, the Soviet Government considers quite sufficient and definitive the provisions in this matter of the Potsdam Conference which were accepted by the Government of the U.S.A. as well as the Governments of U.S.S.R. and Great Britain with which France associated itself.

The Soviet Government proposes anew to the Government of the U.S.A. to enter, together with the Governments of England and France, into discussion of the peace treaty with Germany and also the question of the unification of Germany and

the creation of an all-German Government. The Soviet Government does not see the basis for delays to the decision of these questions.

It is just now that the question is being decided whether Germany will be reestablished as a united, independent, peace-loving state entering into the family of peace-loving peoples of Europe or whether the division of Germany, and connected with it the threat of war in Europe, will remain.

The Soviet Government is simultaneously sending similar notes to the Governments of England and France.

Investigation of Allied Patrols Blockade

[Released to the press May 14]

In answer to a question regarding the refusal by Soviet authorities in Germany to permit Allied patrols entrance to the Autobahn linking Berlin and the Western zone, Secretary Acheson made the following extemporaneous statement at his news conference May 14:

We, of course, are very much aware of and are investigating urgently the interference which has taken place with our patrols on the road from West Germany to Berlin.

We are also fully aware of the statements which Mr. Ulbricht has made of a somewhat bellicose nature.

These actions seem to us to be the other side of the peace and unity coin which is being put forward in such a determined way by the Soviet-Communist side.

You understand, I am sure, that these patrols are known as "courtesy patrols." They are military police that go up and down on the road, and their function is to help out trucks and motorists, of the Allied Powers which break down along the road. I understand that there has been no interference with the movement of the trucks and passenger traffic from West Germany to Berlin.

We are looking into this matter very earnestly, and I think that it is well understood by you and by everybody, including the Soviet Government, that we are determined to maintain our position in Berlin and to assist and protect the interests of the people of Berlin in the Western zone.

Letters of Credence

Cuba

The newly appointed Ambassador of Cuba, Aurelio Fernandez Concheso, presented his credentials to the President on May 14, 1952. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and for the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 386 of May 14.

Notice of German Debt Conference To Settle Prewar Claims

[Released to the press May 8]

The Department of State announced on May 8 that the International Conference on German Debts, which recessed on April 4, will reconvene at London on May 19.¹ In preparation for the forthcoming session, Ambassador Warren Lee Pierson, U.S. representative to the Conference, met yesterday at New York with the U.S. creditor representatives to review developments to date and to consider the further work of the Conference. The meeting was also attended by officials of the Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Since it is anticipated that during the forthcoming session proposals will be considered which should provide a basis for an acceptable plan for the settlement of German prewar debts, all U.S. creditors, who have not already done so, are urged to inform the appropriate creditor representative of their holdings.

Persons holding prewar claims against or dollar bonds issued or guaranteed by the German Government, states, or municipalities, should communicate with the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc., 90 Broad Street, New York.

Persons holding dollar bonds issued by German corporations and religious bodies should communicate with the U.S. Committee for German Corporate Dollar Bonds, Suite 617, 910 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

Persons holding commercial and miscellaneous prewar claims against Germany, such as trade debts, mortgages, and other private claims, should communicate with Gordon H. Michler, c/o National Foreign Trade Council, 111 Broadway, New York.

New Deadline for Claimants of German Enemy Property

[Released to the press May 8]

Notice is hereby given that a new deadline of May 24, 1952, has been agreed upon between the interested countries for the submission of claims under article 23 of the Brussels agreement relating to the resolution of conflicting claims to German enemy assets (the Brussels Intercustodial Agreement).

Accordingly, Americans having claims with respect to property in Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands seized or blocked as German enemy property, which have

heretofore not been submitted, are invited to submit them urgently, so that the Department may examine the claim and, if appropriate, transmit it by May 24, 1952, to the country concerned as a sponsored claim under article 23 of the Brussels agreement.

The Department refers claimants to press release 1086 of December 12, 1951,¹ which gives further details on the matter and sets forth the information desired from claimants.

Peru Protests Increased Duty on Fresh Tuna

Following is an account of Secretary Acheson's remarks relating to the import duty on fresh tuna, made at a press and radio news conference on May 14:

Secretary Acheson, in reply to a correspondent's request for comment, stated that the Foreign Minister of Peru had handed the American Embassy at Lima a note of protest against H. R. 5693, a bill before the Congress which would increase the import duty on fresh tuna by three cents a pound.² He explained that the Department had not yet seen the note, but that he had an appointment with the Peruvian Ambassador the following day and he thought it fair to assume that the Ambassador would deliver a copy of the note and would wish to discuss the matter.

The Secretary went on to say that the tuna situation was one which gave the Department a great deal of concern. He pointed out that it bore directly upon our relations with both Peru and Japan and explained that the tuna industry in both countries was one of importance as a dollar earner for them. He said that the proposed action, in the bill now before the Congress, would seriously interfere with our relations with both countries.

The Secretary further said that when this matter had been discussed before the House last fall there had appeared to be a somewhat sudden and severe situation in our domestic tuna industry and that although the Department had not made any formal presentation, it had not objected at that time to the imposition, for a temporary period, of a three-cent duty. However, he said, it had developed that that local situation was not so acute as had been feared and was developing in a reasonably satisfactory way; therefore, the Department was taking a strong position in opposition to this bill and earnestly hoped that it would not be enacted by the Congress.

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1013.

² For text of a statement on this bill by Harold F. Linder, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, see BULLETIN of Mar. 3, 1952, p. 352.

United States Documents on Relations With the Soviet Union, 1933-1939: Part II

by Rogers Platt Churchill

The campaign against foreigners continued unabated in the Soviet Union through 1938, accentuated by the forced closure of consulates of many foreign countries, the arrest and expulsion of their citizens, and the reluctance of Soviet citizens and officials to have any association with foreigners beyond what was officially necessary. Some expelled Americans had acquired Soviet spouses, to whom exit visas were denied. Repeated but ineffectual representations were made by the American Embassy to the Soviet authorities in behalf of these individuals over a protracted period of time. Only subsequent to the active intercession of a new American Ambassador in August 1939 did it temporarily become easier for Soviet spouses of American citizens to quit the Soviet Union.

The last of the purge trials of the Rightist-Trotskyist Bloc, held at Moscow March 2-13, 1938, concluded with the execution of many formerly prominent Bolshevik leaders and was observed and analyzed by the American Embassy. There were some indications that the purge was subsiding, but it had left a condition often bordering on panic within the Soviet Union; fear haunted all sections of the community. Foreign observers speculated on the effects of the purge upon the morale of the Red army. Ambassador Davies, however, reported upon the growing military expenditures and on the confidence in the Soviet Government that a simultaneous attack by Germany and Japan could be successfully resisted. He expressed his belief that the Red army, although perhaps lacking experienced leadership at the top, would be exceedingly difficult to conquer or annihilate. Some weakness in industrial production back of the lines existed because of waste, inefficiency, and bureaucratic administration, but

"this great bear is lumbering along and with impressive results despite these handicaps" (p. 544).

Several highly interesting despatches were written by Ambassador Davies in the closing days of his short stay in the Soviet Union. He declared his conviction, based upon assertions of Soviet officials, that the Soviet Union would do more for the United States than for any other country. His summaries of conditions within the country, through parts of which he had toured, were the most optimistic reported by an American diplomatic representative. The growing strength of the Soviet regime, both politically and economically, was favorably appraised. He believed that the problems in American-Soviet relations had been moderated during his tenure and that the danger of Communist interference in the internal affairs of the United States had by now become "largely academic." Yet he was aware that in spite of the progress being made in material ways, "The pity of it all is, that one sees these wonderful things corroded, disgraced, corrupted and defiled by a ruthless mistaken zeal for the betterment of humanity, which is nothing other than a terrible tyranny" (p. 550).⁶

A Soviet Debt Proposal

Easily the most dramatic incident recounted in these final despatches was the surprise visit by Joseph Stalin while Ambassador Davies was having a farewell interview with Molotov on June 5, 1938. Among the questions discussed by them in this meeting, the most significant was the old thorn of the debts and claims due to the United States, with the new proposal advanced by Stalin for their settlement. Little has hitherto been known about this remarkable incident, but the full details as broached by Stalin, and formalized by Molotov in the next few days, are given in this volume (pp.

* EDITOR'S NOTE. Part I of this article appeared in the BULLETIN of May 19, 1952, p. 767. The new volume, referred to in the article, is *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents for \$3.75.

⁶ This passage has been omitted without indication in the reproduction of this despatch in Ambassador Davies' book, *Mission to Moscow* (New York, 1941), p. 308.

567-582, 594-601). The actual terms were scarcely half so good as those of the last, liberal American offer which had failed in 1935, but Ambassador Davies asked for and obtained permission to bring them personally to Washington before assuming his position as Ambassador to Belgium. Molotov had stipulated that future negotiations about this proposal should not, for the time being, go through usual diplomatic channels, so that a record has not been made of all the conversations in the United States which sought to modify the Soviet proposal in such a way that it could be recommended to both Governments as a basis of discussion.⁷

The United States found it impossible to consider a settlement on the basis of the Soviet proposal before the Senate had acted upon a somewhat similar plan, still under consideration in that body, put forward by the Hungarian Government. Ambassador Davies was authorized, however, to convey the information to Soviet officials that "the President and the Secretary of State were gratified at this gesture of friendship and the manifestation of good faith on their part to compose the differences and misunderstandings with reference to the debt settlement which had arisen subsequent to the Litvinov agreement" (p. 595). Aside from an independent move in June 1939 by Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau to take up the question of this debt with Soviet Ambassador Konstantin Alexandrovich Umansky "with a view to extending credits that would assist American exports" (footnote 85, p. 580), no further steps were taken to reach a solution of the American debts and claims within the period covered by this volume.

Ambassador Davies departed from the Soviet Union in June 1938, and over a year elapsed before his successor reached Moscow. Meanwhile the business of the Embassy was carried on by *Chargés d'Affaires*. These officers had to deal with the accumulation of irritating experiences with Soviet officials and of practices that interfered with the proper functioning of the Embassy. No entirely new difficulties arose to be added to those already mentioned, nor was any great success achieved in mitigating their effects, harmful to the promotion of useful and valuable relationships between the two nations for their own benefit and in the cause of world peace.

In Washington, Secretary Hull tried to make these difficulties clear to Ambassador Troyanovsky, pointing out to him that these hindrances were such as were "not common to any other civilized nation, nor even the uncivilized nations as a rule" (p. 624), but the Soviet Government apparently considered them as minor matters and ignored their cumulative significance. Upon the inquiry of the Soviet Ambassador regarding the status of plans for the construction of an Embassy

building in Moscow, he had to be reminded that Soviet authorities themselves had placed obstacles in the way of these plans, and that the money had now been allocated elsewhere. Until such time as the U.S. Government "had adequate assurances in which we could have every confidence that we could proceed with the erection of a building in the manner we proceed in other capitals," it would be impossible to consider any resumption of this desirable project.

Revived Soviet Attempts To Purchase Warships

On the other hand, some progress attended Soviet efforts to arrange construction of warships in the United States. The devious negotiating methods employed by the Soviet agents seriously hampered the conduct of business relations and produced endless confusion and misunderstandings. The Carp Corporation had not gained the confidence of American manufacturers, who were reluctant to enter into contracts with it unless they could get clear statements of approval from some department of the U.S. Government. The unsympathetic attitude of subordinate Navy officers deterred important American firms from being interested in Soviet orders. These officers were said to have declared:

We shall still be here after Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hull and Mr. Swanson* and Admiral Leahy have gone. They are temporary and we are permanent. In such matters as this, it is our wishes that are important, not theirs [p. 676].

The complications had become so frustrating that suggestions were advanced that the President should take an interest in the affair. Indeed, the Soviet Ambassador had been told at the Department of State that it was believed that the idea of the construction of large, modern warships for the Soviet Union "had been given approval in high quarters" (p. 688). Acting Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison and the naval architect had shown the plans for such a ship to the President at a luncheon meeting, where the President had "expressed the hope that a battleship in accordance with the plans could be constructed in this country, stating that he thought that its construction here would be desirable from several points of view" (p. 692). Secretary Edison further discussed with the President the "strong opposition to the proposed transaction on the part of several high ranking officers of the Navy Department" and said "that he had requested the President to make his position in the matter known to those officers" (p. 692). A White House conference was soon thereafter held, but, as some of the officers had left lacking a clear understanding of what the President wanted and had persisted in their opposition, Admiral Leahy wrote a memorandum to the President wherein he explained the

⁷ Some supplementary material is contained in Joseph E. Davies, *op. cit.*, pp. 370-374, 430-432.

* Claude A. Swanson, Secretary of the Navy.

situation and stated that further action by the President would be necessary.

In view of the time that these negotiations had been allowed to continue, the United States considered it desirable to give the Soviet representatives a reply which would leave them in no doubt whether it would be worth while for them to continue their efforts. Therefore on June 8, 1938, the Secretaries of State and of the Navy addressed a joint letter to the President setting forth the questions at issue, posing the political factors and treaty provisions involved, and requesting definite policy decisions from the President (pp. 694-699). The President gave his answers in brief marginal notations opposite the questions asked; he stated concisely that the U.S. Government should "give all help" and answered affirmatively the question whether the Navy Department should examine plans and cooperate with naval architects and shipbuilders to such a degree as it considered consistent with the interests of the national defense, handling these relations "by a specially detailed officer" under the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (footnotes 13 and 15, p. 698). When the naval architect and the Soviet Ambassador were informed of these decisions, they expressed their satisfaction. At the end of the year an unpublished mission traveled to Moscow to present plans for a super-battleship to the Soviet Government, which rejected them in favor of "the construction of a battleship along conventional lines, heavily armored and equipped with 16 inch guns" (p. 707).

The endeavors of the Embassy in Moscow to protect American citizens who had been arrested and detained by Soviet authorities acquired something of the flavor of a mystery story. To old cases, new ones were added. The obstacles interposed by the Soviet Government remained essentially the same, only being better perfected. Early in 1938 a protest against the violation of Litvinov's agreement of 1933 remained without appreciable result. In 134 cases of all kinds on which representations had been addressed to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, a total of 323 notes had never been answered (footnote 82, p. 668). One fact became clear: The delay in furnishing requested information was ascribed more frequently to the inability to obtain it, or even to the refusal to supply it on the part of "the competent Soviet authorities." A Soviet official assured the Embassy:

the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs' failure to furnish information on the whereabouts of arrested Soviet nationals (even though these persons may also be American citizens through dual nationality) is not because it does not desire to cooperate with the Embassy, but because the Commissariat itself is unable to elicit the desired information on such persons from the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs [p. 719].

It took "the competent Soviet authorities" a year to send word of the death of a detained per-

son "in one of the northern regions of the Soviet Union." If the Embassy, in the face of such adverse conditions, could effect the release and deportation of an American citizen after about a year, it felt that its efforts had been "crowned with success."

New Ambassadors—Old Problems

During the last year covered in this volume, new ambassadors appeared in both Washington and Moscow. Konstantin Alexandrovich Umansky replaced Troyanovsky in June 1939, and his presence imposed an additional handicap upon relations with the Soviet Union. Although his distaste for the United States was well known, it was believed desirable to accept him. He usually acted with an annoying air of glib assurance and imperious tactlessness. His favorite tactic was to complain, and he commonly charged discrimination against the Soviet Union. In contrast to his predecessor, he quickly encountered poor relations with the press and was prone to blame government officials for not interceding to correct this condition.

Laurence A. Steinhardt arrived in the Soviet Union as the American Ambassador on August 10, 1939, only a few days before the outbreak of war in Europe. In his preliminary study before departing, he had become convinced that methods of persuasion had not prevailed upon the Soviet Government and determined to apply the principle of reciprocity where feasible. As a result of several attempts, attended with some success, Ambassador Steinhardt believed that "it is possible in specific cases to obtain a modification of Soviet *intransigence* in respect of the usual courtesies if a sufficiently firm attitude is displayed" (p. 854). By use of this method certain concessions or ameliorations were obtained, even if only temporarily. It became somewhat easier to get Soviet spouses of American citizens out of the country. American officials and citizens received Soviet visas more promptly. The rigorous Soviet customs examinations and practices were less severe. The Embassy was able to look after the welfare of American citizens arrested by Soviet authorities with some success, and a few such persons trickled back to freedom. Yet the problems persisted. President Roosevelt acknowledged that "downright rudeness" could not be requited in kind, but "we should match every Soviet annoyance by a similar annoyance here against them," and the Soviet Ambassador could well be told that "the President honestly wonders whether the Soviet Government considers it worthwhile to continue diplomatic relations" (pp. 868-869).

In the United States, late in 1938, a Soviet national had been arrested for violation of the espionage laws and was brought to trial, promptly and openly, in February 1939. The papers included on this case (pp. 726-730, 918-926) show

the startling difference between the treatment accorded this individual and that endured by Americans arrested in the Soviet Union. He was able to communicate with the Soviet Embassy by telephone; formal charges were preferred in 24 hours; the Embassy was promptly informed of the causes of arrest; and he was interviewed by a Soviet vice consul, in full compliance with the Litvinov agreement of 1933. During his trial he had capable legal counsel, and the sustained interest of the Soviet Embassy was accommodated to the largest possible extent. It could hardly be expected that the Soviet Embassy would appreciate American legal procedures or would approve of the prisoner's conviction; but it never had to contend with the obstruction, delay, and evasion regularly met with by the American Embassy at Moscow.

For the year 1939, a generous selection of significant papers reflects the changing policies of the Soviet Government adapted to European developments and the measures taken to realize advantage for the Soviet Union from the situations which presented themselves. There were indications that the purge was running its course, and some of the purgers were themselves purged. Antiforeignism still remained, but the Soviet Government was actively interested in what went on in foreign countries. The growth of communism in the United States was studied closely, in something more than an academic manner. The Soviet press noted the increase of the membership of the Communist Party here; it particularly commended the Party's success in drawing into its ranks "more and more of the best people in the American Labor movement" (p. 734) and its efforts to develop a democratic front against fascism.

Shadows of Coming War

In the struggle against the spread of fascism, there was a notable withdrawal on the part of the Soviet Union from cooperation with western European powers and in its association with the League of Nations. Prominent Soviet leaders, in their speeches and in articles in the press, roundly criticized "the capitulatory policies of the bourgeois democratic powers" who were "making concession after concession to the aggressors." The surprise resignation of Litvinov, on May 3, 1939, as Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and his replacement by Molotov, caused intense and uneasy speculation. There was a growing appreciation that, as affairs in Europe were developing, initiative in action did not lie primarily with the Soviet Union and that its moves depended on circumstances. A revival of Russian nationalistic ambitions seemed to emerge under Molotov's direction of Soviet foreign policy, and signs multiplied of a sidling up to the dominating power of Germany. Together with these trends was an increasing expression of the determination and ability of the

Soviet Union to defend its rights and interests in any area by its own strength, and therefore "the creation of defensive armament must take precedence over any other desirable production" (p. 777). When the Soviet-German treaty of August 23, 1939, was sprung upon the world, and the negotiations among the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France for an antiaggression agreement against fascism collapsed, many diplomatists were less surprised than the unprepared mass of public opinion.

The Soviet Union continued to seek armaments and equipment in the United States to bolster its rapid rearmament program. A special naval mission came to the United States to assist in procuring acceptable plans and contracts for construction of battleships and also destroyers. Much the same obstacles remained in the way as in previous years, despite the favorable disposition of President Roosevelt, who was again consulted (p. 882, footnote 94, p. 890). Besides technical difficulties in drawing acceptable plans, which were not insurmountable, intervention by the Soviet Embassy and Ambassador Umansky's unpleasant insinuations intruded new distractions. With the coming of the war in Europe, practically all available shipbuilding facilities in the United States were required for American naval construction. With the sudden collaboration between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, and the aggressive acts in eastern Europe quickly initiated by the latter to the dismay of the democratic world, all chances for Soviet naval and military procurements closed down. The American naval architect "would have nothing more to do with the project" for the construction of warships for the Soviet Union and wanted merely to give it "a decent burial" (pp. 899, 902). A manufacturer of airplanes and parts, with whom Soviet purchasing agents had been negotiating, "was so outraged by the behaviour of the Soviet Government in its attack on Finland that he was going to call off the whole deal. He said that it was the first time in his business career that he had ever foregone with enthusiasm a chance to do business. . . . Nevertheless, he was unwilling to do business with such a government" (p. 903).

Early Wartime Incidents

War, the new alinement of Soviet foreign policy, and the rapacious imperialist aggressions of the Soviet Union in eastern Poland, the Baltic states, and Finland, all undertaken at the first convenient opportunity after years of fulmination against such capitalist habits, brought bitter disillusionment and further trials to the United States. Two episodes are documented in this volume. The methods used by the Soviet Union to force unwanted mutual-assistance pacts upon the three neutral Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and to station Soviet military or

naval garrisons in them at strategic places were observed and assessed with care (pp. 934-984). The precarious future of these states was clearly recognized. The other incident concerned the detention of the American vessel *City of Flint* in the northern Soviet port of Murmansk, whither it had been brought by a German prize crew after its capture in the Atlantic Ocean. The papers here printed reveal the complete frustration of the American Ambassador's valiant efforts to discover the true grounds for the detention of the ship and to establish communication with its captain and crew (pp. 984-1013). The evasion, delay, and deception practiced by the competent Soviet officials effectively prevented any assistance and made plain the length to which the Soviet Government was ready to go to shield and protect German actions to the impairment of relations with the United States from which there was less to fear.

When Finland was wantonly attacked by the Soviet Union and the city of Helsinki and the civilian population were bombed from the air, President Roosevelt sent his appeal to both contestants to refrain from ruthless bombings. No written, formal reply was received from the Soviet Government (footnote 2b, p. 799). In December 1939 the United States instituted the policy of a "moral embargo" against the exportation of airplanes and materials essential to airplane manufacture to nations obviously guilty of unprovoked bombing. With the expulsion of the Soviet Union from the League of Nations on December 14, that nation might have understood its low moral standing in the opinion of most of the world. After 6 years of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union following recognition by the United States in November 1933, nearly every anticipated beneficial result had failed to materialize, and their intercourse had descended to a low and uncongential level.

There is, to be sure, a great deal more material in this volume of documents than could be indicated in this summary, useful as well to the social and economic historian as to the political historian or to a specialist in diplomatic relations. On the other hand, certain papers have been left out, particularly correspondence of a multilateral nature relating to events connected with the coming of the war, such as the Soviet-German nonaggression treaty of August 23, 1939, and the concurrent negotiations among Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union which were unsuccessful in producing a mutual-defense agreement to oppose German aggression. Such correspondence, with other related materials, is reserved for the *Foreign Relations* volumes for 1939 which have to deal with the origins and the outbreak of the Second World War. Furthermore, a number of reports on the conflicting interests of the Soviet Union and Japan are to be published in the regular annual volumes for the Far East. In the preparation of this

volume a list of persons, with their identifications for this period, and a carefully prepared, detailed index have been included. All legitimate assistance and references have been given, and scrupulous care in editing has been taken, to facilitate the best use possible of this volume by scholars and general readers alike who desire a reliable understanding of the foreign policy of the United States in one of its most portentous aspects.

• *Mr. Churchill, author of the above article, is a historian in the Division of Historical Policy Research.*

Visits of Prime Minister Menzies and Chancellor Figl

Press Conference Statements by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press May 14]

The Australian Prime Minister, Robert G. Menzies, will arrive here on May 14 and stop over a few days for informal discussions on his way to London. I am looking forward to welcoming him both as a friend and as the Prime Minister of that great country.

Australia and the United States have many interests and objectives in common. We are both deeply concerned with the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, as well as with the problems of that vast area of the world.

As you know, we have recently concluded with Australia and New Zealand, a Pacific security treaty.¹ We shall, I hope, exchange ideas on the best means of carrying out the provisions of that treaty. I am sure that our meeting will enable us to review this and other matters of concern to both countries.

I should like to take advantage of this opportunity to say a few words about the distinguished guest of our Government, the Chancellor of Austria, Leopold Figl.

We have all, I am sure, admired the gallant stand that the Austrian people have made—and continue to make—in defending their liberties in the face of continued arbitrary and illegal Soviet acts. This stand has been made possible in large part by the great personal courage of Chancellor Figl and his colleague, Vice Chancellor Schaerf—whom I had the pleasure of meeting in March.

We all admire the manner in which these two men have put their country's welfare above partisan interest. We shall persevere in our aim that Austria will obtain her promised independence, now so long overdue because of Soviet obstruction.

It is a special pleasure to have Chancellor Figl and his wife as our guests.

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 10, 1951, p. 415.

Contest Between World Fear and World Faith

by *Wilson M. Compton*

*Administrator, International Information Administration*¹

This occasion is illustrative of the many different ways in which our national ideals find expression. We come here as free men. No one questions our right to assemble and to express our views on any subject in which we may be concerned.

We come from different churches, different creeds, different faiths. We meet in religious freedom, in mutual respect, in common understanding. Ours is a fellowship of faith and hope. This is a tie which binds us together in our community and our national life. It can be a tie which will bind together in a common aspiration all the peoples of the world who seek to live in peace and freedom, and as good "neighbors."

The specific purpose of our coming here today reminds us of the living faith of one of the great leaders of our national history. When the burden of high office was weighing heavily upon him, Abraham Lincoln had recourse to the church and to the clergy for spiritual guidance. It is singularly appropriate that by reason of the neighborly generosity of a man of a different faith, the preliminary draft of his historic Emancipation Proclamation should now find asylum in the New York Avenue Presbyterian Church where he worshipped with his family on the Sabbath Day.

In the early days of the Civil War when the fighting was drawing close to Washington, many public buildings were being commandeered by the Government for hospital uses. One Saturday night, piles of material were dumped on the sidewalks in front of the New York Avenue Presby-

terian Church. Dr. Gurley, who was then pastor of the church and a personal friend and counselor of Lincoln, announced from the pulpit on Sunday morning that "this will be the last service held in the church by order of the military authorities of Washington. The church is to be converted to hospital purposes." No sooner had Dr. Gurley finished making this announcement than Mr. Lincoln, who chanced to be at the service on that morning, rose slowly from the President's pew and said:

"Dr. Gurley, that order was issued without my authority. I rescind it. We need to have this church open to keep the stars shining in the skies."

Yes, perhaps today again, as in the dark days of the Civil War, we need to keep open our churches and our synagogues so that, like Lincoln, we too may keep "our feet on the ground and our eyes on the stars."

The words and deeds of Abraham Lincoln are an integral part of our national heritage, of our faith in democracy, of our belief in freedom. He has become part of the American spirit; and in these troubled times we are dedicated anew to the great task set forth in his renowned phrase—"that government of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth."

We are part of a Nation of great economic might. We are part of a Nation which has tried in many ways, and is still trying, to be a "good neighbor." We are part of a Nation which can, if it will, give impetus throughout the world to the spirit of faith and hope, in which alone will the peoples of the world ever find the road to peace. America has great power of production. It is on the way to great military might. Together with its freedom-loving allies it is capable also of a great spiritual leadership in a world which needs food as much as it needs spirit, needs spirit as much as it needs food, and will eventually have neither unless it has both.

¹ Excerpts from an address made at Washington on May 12 and released to the press on the same date. The occasion was a luncheon given by the Washington Hebrew Congregation and the Ministerial Union in honor of Barney Balaban, president of Paramount Pictures, who last year presented to the New York Avenue Presbyterian Church of Washington the preliminary draft of the Emancipation Proclamation.

In the world today are seven great religions. Each has its own historic background, its own creed, its own philosophy. Yet, through all of them runs a golden thread of the "good neighbor," a distillation as it were of the accumulated experience of mankind. It gives us courage as we seek to extend the frontiers of faith in a divided world. These are the tested teachings of the world's great religions:

"The true rule of life is to guard and do by the things of others as they would do by their own."

This is the Vedas of the Hindu.

"One should seek for others the happiness one desires for one's self."

This is the Mahayana of the Buddhist.

"Do as you would be done by."

This is the Zend Avesta of the Persian.

"Do not do unto others that which you would not wish others to do unto you."

This is the Lao Tse of Confucius.

"Let none treat his brother in a way he himself would dislike to be treated."

This is the Koran of the Mohammedan.

"Whatsoever you do not wish your neighbors to do to you do not unto them."

This is the Talmud of the Jew.

"All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even unto them."

This is the Golden Rule of the Christian.

Here then is history's greatest lesson: A rule of life.

Activities of the Information Program

I happen for the moment to be administering for the Government and the people of the United States a program often described as the "Voice of America." It has to do only with ideas. It has nothing to do with bullets. It has entered into the contest between world fear and world faith.

When in 1948 the Congress established the International Information and Educational Exchange Program, it set mutual understanding among nations and peoples as its major goals. In 1950 President Truman called for a great "Campaign of Truth." We are actively carrying out that campaign today through all avenues open to us.

We are seeking to strengthen the unity of the free nations, to arouse an awareness of common interests, and to build security not only for ourselves but for a free world. We are exposing the sham as well as the threat of international communism.

The Voice of America carries our message over the air in 46 languages. It is operating around the clock. It broadcasts about 400,000 words a day to a potential audience of 300 million listeners.

Through our press and publications program we are reaching more than 100 million readers. We send news, pictures, and selected magazine articles to our information offices overseas, which in turn supply them to thousands of foreign newspapers and periodicals. We distribute each month millions of booklets and leaflets, handbills, and posters.

Our motion pictures tell an American story to an annual audience of roughly 450 million persons. These films are produced in 40 different tongues. The films are popular and are effective in areas where most people cannot read.

Peoples of other countries are also learning about the United States and its ways through our overseas information centers. These centers provide libraries. They conduct special youth programs, sponsor lectures and conferences, prepare and circulate exhibits, and show our motion pictures. They work closely with local editors, radio commentators, and with community leaders generally.

In the past year, nearly 8,000 students, teachers, professors, and leaders came to this country from abroad or went overseas on U.S. Government sponsored grants. Many thousands more were sponsored through private agencies. We are emphasizing the exchange of leaders who are molders of opinion—journalists, labor leaders, government officials—who can spread the truth among their own peoples when they return. Is there a genuine interest in these exchanges of persons? Recently in a single city of India there were available 60 of these grants for study in America, and there were 22,000 qualified applicants.

These activities in our Campaign of Truth—radio, press and publications, films, information centers, exchange of persons—are an aid to the cause of freedom in the world.

Spiritual and moral factors are in every phase of our overseas information and educational exchange programs. The basic political beliefs of this Nation are rooted in religious faith.

Religion in VOA Programs

Over the Voice of America we regularly broadcast religious services, sermons, or messages by the clergy—village church services, Christmas and Easter programs. We broadcast last month in more than 40 languages to listeners around the world the story of America's observance of Easter, Lent, and the Passover. Distinguished clergymen for these purposes contributed excellent sermons and messages.

We radioed special programs overseas, including the Moravian Easter Sunrise Service in North Carolina and dramatizations of the Easter story. We directed Easter broadcasts to the Soviet Union in eight languages. We beamed special Easter broadcasts to the satellite countries. We featured religious observances to other countries of Europe,

to the Near East and the Far East, and to Latin America.

Not only by radio do we seek to reflect the moral and spiritual values in American life. Our information centers abroad provide balanced collections of U.S. religious publications. We also make wide distribution of the Holy Bible. We seek a general balance between Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish religious literature. We do not include publications of extreme religious bias. By preference as well as by law, we respect the great ideas of other cultures and other religions as well as our own.

Our information centers also include publications describing the threat of communism to freedom of the spirit and of religion. Among them is a Government-prepared publication entitled *100 Things You Should Know About Communism in Religion and Tensions Within the Soviet Union*. This booklet includes the story of Communist persecution of religious groups.

In seeking to advance the impulse of the religious motive in our international information program, we have the able help of an experienced permanent consultant and of an advisory panel on religion. This panel reviews information policy guidances and makes recommendations on the religious content of our overseas programs. On this panel at present are representatives of the Jewish Community Council of Washington, the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and the Protestant Faiths.

We have the help too of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Education Exchange in presenting to other countries the moral and religious aspects of American life. The Commission's recommendations have been helpful. Here is a comment from its report to the Congress last January:

In many respects, the life and institutions of this country cannot be explained to foreign audiences apart from the moral and religious principles which have conditioned them. The American family, our educational system, our public-health programs, and our political and social institutions have been directly influenced by our moral and religious heritage.

The Road to Human Brotherhood

We all recognize, appreciate, and prize the deeply spiritual significance of our own great public documents—the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States, the Bill of Rights—which shines so richly through the words of our great leaders. We recognize also that our religious and moral heritage enters into our international relations.

The Charter of the United Nations, too, declares the determination “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.”

But it is not our declarations alone which speak the spirit of America. Our actions in interna-

tional affairs since World War II speak louder than our words. We do respect the rights of other nations. We do seek to build collective security in the interest of peace. We do join with our neighbors in the defense of freedom—theirs and ours. We do oppose aggression. We seek no one's territory. We seek to help others to help themselves.

As President Truman recently declared in a message carried to the world by the Voice of America: “The people of the United States extend the hand of friendship to you across the seas. The future may look dark, but let us have faith, together, that all peoples will one day walk in the sunlight of peace and justice.”² This is the real meaning of the “Big Truth.”

The Campaign of Truth reflects these spiritual forces, the belief in democracy, in the rights of the individual, in freedom of worship. Behind our vast material advances lie great spiritual resources. We seek “a city which hath foundations.” We ask of all faiths and all denominations that they help us in this great adventure of the American spirit, a spirit of faith and hope which can be made to shine throughout the world as a beacon on the road to peace and human brotherhood.

Hearings on Importation Of Winter Tomatoes

[Released to the press April 29]

Notice was issued on April 29 by the Committee for Reciprocity Information (CRI) that public hearings will open at Washington on May 27 on a proposal presented to agencies of the U.S. Government by Florida tomato growers for a reduction in the U.S. tariff and the imposition of domestic marketing and import controls on winter tomatoes. The hearings are being held to enable the Interdepartmental Committee on trade agreements to obtain the views of all interested persons and groups on all aspects of the tomato proposal in order to determine the desirability and practicability of entering into trade-agreement negotiations with a view to preventing temporary market gluts.

The proposal, worked out at Mexico City last September by tomato-growing groups in Florida, Mexico, and Cuba, provides that the growers would recommend to their governments the conclusion of an intergovernmental agreement to regularize tomato marketings in the United States. The proposal contemplates a reduction in the U.S. tariff on fresh tomatoes and the imposition of import quotas and domestic marketing controls designed to moderate the fluctuations in shipments of tomatoes within the U.S. market with a view

² BULLETIN of Mar. 17, 1952, p. 421.

to avoiding gluts. A copy of the industry proposal is available upon request to the CRI.

All applications for oral presentation of views on all aspects of the proposal and all written information and views should reach the Committee for Reciprocity Information by noon, May 20, 1952. All communications on this matter should be addressed to the Chairman, Committee for Reciprocity Information, Tariff Commission Building, Washington 25, D. C.

If, following the hearings, it is decided that trade-agreement negotiations should be undertaken under the authority of the Trade Agreements Act as amended, formal notice of intention to negotiate will be given, and further hearings will be held by the Committee for Reciprocity Information and the Tariff Commission in accordance with the established trade agreements procedures.

Fisheries Convention Signed By U.S., Canada, Japan

[Released to the press May 9]

The international convention for the high-seas fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean was signed on May 9 at Tokyo by representatives of the United States, Canada, and Japan.¹ Ambassador Robert D. Murphy signed on behalf of the United States. The convention will be submitted to the Senate with a view to receiving the advice and consent of that body to ratification. It will enter into force on the day upon which the contracting parties exchange ratifications.

The convention, which was negotiated at the Tripartite Fisheries Conference held at Tokyo in late 1951, marks a further step in the conserva-

tion of international fisheries in the North Pacific Ocean. Japan now becomes a joint partner with the United States and Canada in cooperative measures to preserve and perpetuate the fish stocks of the North Pacific.

The convention introduces a new principle in international conservation practice on the high seas. Under it special treatment is accorded to fisheries already fully utilized and fully conserved. Each signatory agrees to abstain from exploitation of specified fish stocks which are already exploited to the maximum by one or both of the other parties provided the latter are carrying out programs for the conservation of the stocks and agree to continue to carry out such programs.

The convention establishes the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission composed of representatives of the three countries, each with equal vote. The Commission is empowered to investigate any fish stock of the North Pacific Ocean exploited by two or more of the parties and, when necessary, to recommend joint conservation action to the governments concerned. Excepted from such study and recommendation, however, are fisheries already covered by agreements between the parties, such as the Pacific halibut and sockeye salmon fisheries.

In the special case of fully utilized and conserved fisheries, the Commission may recommend that the country or countries not exploiting the stock refrain from such exploitation. The convention provides, however, that no such abstention should be requested of any parties in waters in which there has been a history of joint conservation activity by such parties, an intermingling of their fleets, and an intermingling of the stocks of fish exploited by their fleets. Accordingly, the convention stipulates that neither the United States nor Canada shall be asked to abstain from any stock in waters off the Pacific Coast of either country from the Gulf of Alaska southward.

To qualify under the abstention proviso, a fishery stock must be fully exploited and be under continuous study and regulation for conservation purposes. The convention recognizes three stocks, salmon, halibut, and herring, off the coasts of North America as meeting these conditions. Accordingly, by the terms of the convention, Japan agrees to abstain from fishing salmon, halibut, and herring in specified waters off the coasts of North America, and Canada agrees to abstain from fishing salmon in the Bering Sea east of 175 degrees west longitude.

Also signed on May 9 was a protocol to the convention, providing for further study and final determination of the lines bounding the salmon areas. These lines are tentatively set by the convention.

¹ For text of the draft convention and protocol, and an article on the subject by William C. Herrington, see BULLETIN of Mar. 3, 1952, p. 340. The text of the convention as signed is identical with the draft with the following exceptions:

Insert at the end of Article VII, Section 1, of the draft, *ibid.*, p. 345, the phrase "or of the Protocol to this Convention".

Change the first line of Section 1 of the Annex, *ibid.*, to read: "1. With regard to the stocks of fish in the respective waters. . . ."

Change the first line of Section 2 of the Annex, *ibid.*, p. 346, to read: "2. With regard to the stocks of fish in the waters. . . ."

In the Protocol, third paragraph, line 12, *ibid.*, change "Article IV" to "Article V".

The references to the date of signing in the last paragraph of the convention and the first and last paragraphs of the protocol, *ibid.*, pp. 345, 346, should read: "this ninth day of May, one thousand nine hundred fifty two."

Netherlands Signs Agreement To Pay U.S. for Logistical Support in Korea

[Released to the press May 15]

Secretary Acheson and Ambassador J. H. van Roijen of the Netherlands on May 15 signed an agreement under which the Netherlands agrees to pay in dollars for the logistical support furnished by the United States to the Netherlands Forces participating in the U.N. collective action in Korea. Payments are to be made on presentation of statements of accounts by the United States.

When informed of the imminent signing of the agreement between the United States and the Netherlands, Gen. Mark Clark took occasion to pay tribute to the Netherlands fighting forces. He stated:

Although I have just assumed command of the U.N. Command in the Far East, the reputation of the valiant Netherlands Forces in Korea is known to me as well as to every other freedom-loving person in the world.

The distinguished combat record of the Netherlands detachment is exemplified by its courageous four-day stand against the Chinese Communists during the bitter fighting at Hoengsong and Wonju. For this courageous action the detachment, attached to the 2nd Infantry Division of the U.S. Army, was awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation. Such heroism on the part of the unit and its members has not been unusual since Netherlands troops first arrived in Korea in November 1950. Colonel Den Ouden, the detachment's original commander, gave his life for the United Nations cause.

Equally outstanding is the contribution made to the success of the U.N. blocking and escort force by the Dutch sailors of the destroyers *Evertsen* and *Van Galen*.

The distinctive service given by Netherlands personnel in the ceaseless fight for a free world reflects the highest possible credit upon themselves and their homeland and has earned for them the gratitude and confidence of free peoples everywhere.

The United States has been providing the Netherlands Forces with materials, facilities, and services required in Korea which they have been unable to furnish for themselves, either because they cannot procure the necessary supplies elsewhere or because it is not feasible to establish separate lines of supply. The present agreement makes effective an understanding, reached before the Netherlands Forces arrived in Korea, that the Netherlands would reimburse the United States for the logistical support provided.

This agreement is one of a series of similar

agreements concluded, or in the process of negotiation, with the nations participating in the Korean action.

The text of the agreement with the Netherlands follows:

Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Netherlands Concerning Participation of the Netherlands Forces in U.N. Operations in Korea

This agreement between the Government of the United States of America (the executive agent of the United Nations Forces in Korea) and the Government of the Netherlands shall govern relationships in matters specified herein for forces furnished by the Government of the Netherlands for the operations under the Commanding General of the Armed Forces of the Member States of the United Nations in Korea (hereinafter referred to as "Commander") designated by the Government of the United States of America pursuant to resolutions of United Nations Security Council of June 25, 1950 and July 7, 1950.

Article 1. The Government of the United States of America agrees to furnish the Netherlands Forces with available materials, supplies, services, and facilities which the Netherlands Forces will require for these operations, and which the Government of the Netherlands is unable to furnish. The Government of the Netherlands and the Government of the United States of America will maintain accounts of materials, supplies, services, and facilities furnished by the Government of the United States of America to the Government of the Netherlands, its forces or agencies. Reimbursement for such materials, supplies, services, and facilities will be accomplished by the Government of the Netherlands upon presentation of statements of account by the Government of the United States of America. Such payment will be effected by the Government of the Netherlands in United States dollars. Issues of materials and supplies to the Netherlands Forces will not operate to transfer title to the Government of the Netherlands in advance of reimbursement.

Article 2. Pursuant to Article 1, appropriate technical and administrative arrangements will be concluded between authorized representatives of the Government of the United States of America and authorized representatives of the Government of the Netherlands.

Article 3. Classified items, specialized items, or items in short supply furnished to the Government of the Netherlands by the Government of the United States of America will be returned to the Government of the United States of America upon request, as a credit against the cost of materials, supplies and services previously furnished. If the Government of the Netherlands determines

at the time of redeployment of its forces that materials or supplies received from the Government of the United States of America hereunder are not desired for retention, such materials or supplies may be offered to the Government of the United States of America and if accepted, their residual value as determined by the Government of the United States of America will be used as a credit against reimbursement for materials, supplies and services previously furnished.

Article 4. Each of the parties to this agreement agrees not to assert any claim against the other party for injury or death of members of its armed forces or for loss, damage or destruction of its property or property of members of its armed forces caused in Korea by members of the armed forces of the other party. Claims of any other Government or its nationals against the Government or nationals of the Government of the Netherlands or vice versa shall be a matter for disposition between the Government of the Netherlands and such third government or its nationals.

Article 5. The Government of the Netherlands will maintain accounts of materials, supplies, services, and facilities furnished by other governments to personnel or agencies of the Government of the Netherlands, either directly or through the Commander. Settlement of any claims arising as a result of the furnishing of such materials, supplies, services and facilities to the Government of the Netherlands by such third governments, whether directly or through the Commander, shall be a matter for consideration between such third governments and the Government of the Netherlands.

Article 6. The requirements of the Netherlands Forces for Korean currency will be supplied under arrangements approved by the Commander; provided, however, that settlement of any obligation of the Government of the

Netherlands for use of such currency will be a matter of consideration between the Government of the Netherlands and the competent authorities of Korea. If with the approval of the Commander, personnel and agencies of the Government of the Netherlands use media of exchange other than Korean currency in Korea, obligations arising therefrom will be a matter for consideration and settlement between the Government of the Netherlands and the other concerned governments.

Article 7. The Government of the Netherlands agrees that all orders, directives and policies of the Commander issued to the Netherlands Forces or its personnel shall be accepted and carried out by them as given and that in the event of disagreement with such orders, directives or policies, formal protest may be presented subsequently.

Article 8. Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to affect existing agreements or arrangements between the parties for the furnishing of materials, supplies, services or facilities.

Article 9. This agreement shall come into force upon the date of signature thereof, and shall apply to all materials, supplies, services and facilities furnished or rendered before, on, or after that date, to all claims referred to in Article 4 arising before, on, or after that date, and to all technical and administrative arrangements concluded pursuant to Article 2 before, on, or after that date.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed this agreement.

DONE at Washington, in duplicate, this fifteenth day of May, 1952.

For the Government of the United States of America:
DEAN ACHESON

For the Government of the Netherlands:
J. H. VAN ROIJEN

Progress of Development Programs in South and Southeast Asia

[Released to the press May 1]

The Department of State released on May 1 a summary of the first annual report of the Consultative Committee on Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia. The Consultative Committee, in which the United States became a participant in 1951, was formed for the purpose of periodic consultation and exchange of views among governments interested in economic development in South and Southeast Asia. The Consultative Committee developed from the Commonwealth Committee, which in 1950 issued the original "Colombo Plan" report containing the 6-year development plans of several member countries in the area. The recent report was prepared at the fourth meeting of the Consultative Committee held in Karachi, Pakistan, at the end of March. Copies of the report will be available within the next few weeks.

The principal objective of the Consultative Committee is to exchange views on problems concerning the raising of living standards by accel-

erating the pace and widening the scope of economic development in countries of South and Southeast Asia by a cooperative approach to their problems. The development programs of countries in the area, together with the Committee's observations, constitute the report issued by the Committee. The bulk of the individual development programs presented for the report consists of projects to increase production of food and to develop electric power and transportation facilities.

Member governments of the Consultative Committee which provided material for the report included Australia, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, India, Laos, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, United Kingdom, United States, and Vietnam. The United States, as a member of the Consultative Committee, participated in the preparation of the report.

The State Department pointed out that the release of the report does not imply approval or endorsement of particular development programs

appearing in the report, nor does it commit any government to provide financial or other aid for such programs.

The report emphasizes that the Colombo Plan is not a centrally planned and directed blueprint for the development of South and Southeast Asia as a whole and points out that "the immensity of the problem and the variation in the stages and pattern of development in the various countries in the area make it essential that development should proceed on the basis of individual programs." The programs included in the report relate mainly to public investment on a large scale for basic economic development to arrest further decline in the present low standards of living or to provide a foundation for further improvement.

The report is intended as a review of the progress in economic development achieved by countries in the area during the first period of the original 6-year plan and is a summary of the progress of the plans, changes in the plans, and estimates of individual country-development programs for 1952-53.

Although the first year of the Colombo Plan will not end officially until June 30, 1952, it is already clear that the programs are off to a good start. Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Malaya, and North Borneo reported that their development expenditures in 1951-52, the first year of the plan, will amount to about 1.2 billion dollars, as compared to expenditures of about 633 million dollars during 1950-51. Their development expenditures are expected to be slightly higher, about 1.4 billion dollars, in 1952-53, according to plans contained in the report. Vietnam presented a 6-year development program. Several Asian members of the Consultative Committee, including Cambodia, Laos, Burma, and Nepal, have not yet reported their plans. Burma and Nepal had just become members of the Consultative Committee at the recent meeting last March.

The development programs are financed principally by the underdeveloped countries themselves, which according to the report are attempting to expand the local resources available for development purposes. A portion of the external costs is provided through locally coordinated, but independently operated, assistance programs of individual countries, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and other U.N. agencies.

Some member nations of the Consultative Committee have pledged or provided economic assistance to less developed member countries.

Australia has pledged a total of 70 million dollars in assistance to Consultative Committee member countries over a 6-year period. The United Kingdom has agreed to sterling releases to India, Pakistan, and Ceylon during the 6 years totaling about 710 million dollars in addition to the equivalent of about 168 million dollars already allocated for 1951 and 1952 development programs in Malaya and North Borneo. New Zealand has pledged about 8.4 million dollars for the first 3 years of the Colombo Plan, and Canada 25 million dollars for the first year.

As a part of its own program for underdeveloped areas, U.S. grant aid extended directly to those underdeveloped countries participating in the Consultative Committee amounted to 37 million dollars during fiscal 1951. In fiscal 1952, such direct U.S. grant-assistance programs in these countries will probably amount to about 90 million dollars.

The report concludes that—

The emergence of democratic systems of Government in the countries of South and South-East Asia and the determination amongst the people to achieve a fuller and better life constitute the motivating factors in the economic development of the area. The Colombo Plan draws strength from these factors as well as from the active good-will and material advance of other countries in or outside the area. These countries are keenly interested in the welfare and progress of the area, recognizing the fundamental truth that poverty anywhere is a danger to prosperity and peace everywhere. Self reliance on the one part and imaginative understanding on the other have together forged the Plan and given it a vitality that should ensure its success.

Agreement with U.K. for Release of Bases in Caribbean

[Released to the press May 15]

Agreement has been reached between the U.S. Government and the Government of the United Kingdom on the immediate release for agricultural use by Colonial governments of those areas in British Caribbean Colonies which were released to the U.S. Government under the Leased Bases Agreement of March 27, 1941, but which are not at present required by the U.S. Government for the purpose of the agreement. Formal terms and conditions of such use (which will continue until the U.S. Government again requires the areas for operational purposes) are still subject to negotiation between the two Governments.

Disarmament and International Law

by Ambassador Benjamin V. Cohen
*Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

I wish to discuss with you this evening some possible relationships between the problem of disarmament and international law. Some of you may be prompted to say that if and when the nations of the world can agree to disarm or reduce their armaments, disarmament may become a rubric in a code of international law but that the relationship between law and disarmament is today very shadowy and unsubstantial.

Now it is true, of course, that the Charter imposes no obligation *in ipsius verbis* on the members of the United Nations to disarm or reduce their armaments and that on the contrary, it contemplates "effective collective measures" for the maintenance of peace (Kelsen, *The Law of the United Nations*, pp. 104-6). Indeed, the language used in the Charter on the subject is, in a sense, less precise and specific than article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which stipulated:

The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

But article 11 of the Charter nonetheless does provide:

The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.

¹ Address made before the International Law Association, American Branch, at New York on May 9 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

Moreover, article 26 of the Charter provides:

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

Professor Kelsen has suggested that under article 39 of the Charter, authorizing the Security Council to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, the Security Council might possibly determine that the refusal of a member to accept the recommendations of the Security Council or the General Assembly in respect to disarmament or the regulation of armaments was a threat to the peace. (Kelsen, *ibid.*, pp. 105-6.) If this be true, it would seem that in the event of a veto in the Security Council, the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution² could recommend that the threat to the peace should cease.

But even in the absence of the adoption of any disarmament plan by the Security Council or the General Assembly, it would appear to be within the authority of the Security Council under article 39 to determine that the building up or maintenance of excessive armaments was in fact a threat to the peace under the Charter. If the Security Council should find that excessive armaments do constitute a threat to the peace, it would have authority to make recommendations or decide what measures should be taken to restore international peace and security. In event of a veto in the Security Council, the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution could make appro-

² BULLETIN of Oct. 23, 1950, p. 655.

priate recommendations to secure the abatement of the threat to the peace.

It should be recalled that under article 2 of the Charter all members agree to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice are not endangered," and "to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

Too little thought has been given to the implications of these solemn undertakings in paragraphs 3 and 4 of article 2 in the Charter. There may be a question as to the volume and kind of armaments required for self-defense and collective action under the Charter. There may be a question as to the way the United Nations is to deal with an armaments race which has gotten out of hand because of the failure or refusal of the Soviet Union to cut down its armed strength after the last war in anything like the same manner or degree as other great powers. But certainly it is anomalous that states which have solemnly undertaken to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force except in defense of the law of the Charter should be engaged in probably the most deadly and ominous armaments race in all history.

Effective Disarmament for Peace

It is all the more striking that this armaments race should go on between states which have specifically pledged themselves under the Charter to promote respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all. Certainly the fundamental freedoms were intended to include the Four Freedoms which President Roosevelt first outlined in his message to Congress on January 7, 1941.³ It should not be forgotten that President Roosevelt himself in that very message translated the Fourth Freedom—freedom from fear—into world terms to mean "a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world."

It has seemed to me that the world, by assuming that President Roosevelt was voicing only a visionary dream, has lost the very practical thought which he sought to embody in his definition of the Fourth Freedom. If we are to make any genuine progress in lightening the burden of armaments and in dispelling the fears and suspicions which armaments breed, we will have to move rapidly from the idea of haggling over quotas of armaments and come to accept the proposition that no state should be allowed to be in a condition of armed preparedness to wage a successful war.

³ H. doc. 1, 77th Cong., 1st sess.

Disarmament should be viewed as a process of creating conditions which make it difficult or impossible for nations to break or endanger the peace and not as a bargaining process to reduce the cost of preparing for war.

Effective disarmament for peace should mean the elimination of mass armies as well as all instruments adaptable to mass destruction. Effective disarmament should relieve the world not only from the terror of all weapons of mass destruction but from the threat of mass armies without which no aggressor can accomplish his evil designs. A small militia with small arms is quite sufficient to cope with internal disorders.

Effective disarmament means universal disarmament. It means an open world with no secret armies, no secret weapons, and no secret war plans. Responsible statesmen cannot be expected to risk the national security of their countries for a hope which may prove illusory. If we are to achieve true and effective disarmament, we must have a world open enough not only to detect violation but to dispel suspicion of evasion. Nations have become so accustomed to living in the dark that it is not going to be easy to learn to live in the light.

If we are to make real progress in the field of disarmament, we must approach the problem not as a means of regulating war, or the armaments used in war, but of rendering war impossible as a method of settling international disputes. We must approach the problem of disarmament as a means of ensuring the outlawing of war. We must face up to the fact that under the Charter which requires states to settle their disputes by peaceful means, and not to use force or the threat of force except in defense of the Charter, the maintenance of excessive armaments does constitute, in law as in fact, a threat to the peace.

Universal disarmament does not militate against collective security. On the contrary, universal disarmament should immeasurably increase the possibility of collective security by bringing the task of its accomplishment within manageable proportions. Law enforcement in the international field, like law enforcement in the domestic field, depends not on a vast accumulation of arms in the possession of the peace officers but on the rigid limitation of arms in the possession of organized groups not responsible to the peace officers. Large national armies and armaments are as inimical to international peace as large private armies and armaments have always been to domestic peace.

Rearmament and Human Welfare

If we knew of certainty that no nation was in a state of armed preparedness to undertake a war with any prospect of success or to accomplish an act of aggression by a quick, decisive blow, there would be a profound change in the climate of international relationships. Differences would remain,

differences in ideas, in interest, and even in power. But the people would know that they could not suddenly explode into war. The road to genuine understanding and peaceful settlement would not be blocked by the necessity of considering every problem in light of its effect on military potential in some future war rather than in light of its effect on human welfare in a peaceful friendly world. There would be much less danger of states seeking to strengthen and protect themselves in event of war by strategic settlements which themselves plant the seeds of friction and war. Armaments aggravate tensions and fears among nations. By releasing tensions and fears; disarmament should facilitate and strengthen the processes of peaceful settlement.

For good or ill, even in a disarmed world, power would still be an important factor. But national power in a disarmed world, like power in the domestic field, would depend not on armed preparedness, but on the health and virility of the people and the industrial and economic development of the nation. There should be very little difference in power relationships if all states arm to the hilt or if all states disarm completely, but there will be a great difference in the happiness and welfare of the people.

Practical men may say all such thinking in the international field is visionary and unreal, but I suppose practical men in the early days of the development of private law regarded the lawmakers who sought to outlaw private wars and private armies as visionaries and dreamers. It is worth remembering that the primary end of all primitive private law was to keep the peace. Crude approximations of justice through ordeals and trials by battle were accepted as far preferable to allowing men to take the law into their own hands and to engage in private wars.

It was probably not easy for primitive man to give up the right to take the law into his own hands in order to redress wrongs done him or his family. Even in modern society the instinct of man to duel and to feud is not completely extinct. But it was in a sense the genius of primitive law that it forbade resort to violence to rectify wrongs even before it developed completely adequate means of punishing or redressing wrongs other than the breaking of the peace.

In historic perspective, it would seem that the outlawing of war is a necessary prerequisite to the establishment of the rule of law. There would seem to be considerable ground for the belief that the effective outlawing of war and of armaments must come before there can be any extensive development of world law or world order rather than the other way around. Of course, as progress is made toward the elimination of war and of armaments, the need for the development of effective procedures for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means will be better appreciated and understood. Practical statesmen may then give as much

attention to the problem of the peaceful adjustment of differences as they now give to the problem of armed defense. States may even become conscious not only of their obligation under the Charter to refrain from the use of force except in the defense of the Charter, but their obligation under the Charter to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

In the long run, it is likely that justice will fare better in a world where neither nations nor individuals may take the law into their own hands and fight it out. There is much greater danger of the confusion of right and might in an armed world than in a disarmed world. In an armed world there must be arms to support and sustain the right. Every nation remembers with pride its efforts to support and sustain the right with its arms and fighting men. But there is no assurance that in an armed world the balance of armed strength will always be in the service of the right. Nor is there any assurance that in an armed world, armed power, even in the service of the right, may not come to have a corroding influence on men's ideas as to what is right and what is wrong. The power of righteousness is on the whole, over a fair stretch of time, more likely to prevail in a disarmed world than in an armed world.

Common Survival or Mutual Extinction

In an armed world we cannot safely rely on unarmed good will. But that does not mean that we wish an armed world where only armed power counts. As President Truman stated in his address on November 7, 1951:⁴

We are determined to win real peace—peace based on freedom and justice. We will do it the hard way if we must—by going forward, as we are doing now, to make the free world so strong that no would-be aggressor will dare to break the peace. But we will never give up trying for another way to peace—the way of reducing the armaments that make aggression possible.

In his first report to the NATO countries on April 2, 1952, General Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, also stated:⁵

Visible and within grasp we have the capability of building such military, economic, and moral strength as the Communist world would never dare to challenge. When that point is reached, the Iron Curtain rulers may finally be willing to participate seriously in disarmament negotiations. Then, we may see fulfilled the universal hope expressed in the United Nations Charter to reduce the "diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources."

It may be that other nations are not yet ready to beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks nor to learn war any more. And of course we dare not go unarmed in

⁴ BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1951, p. 803.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 579.

a world bristling with arms. An intolerant and strongly armed totalitarianism is not likely to respect unarmed good will. But even the most fanatical ideology is likely to prefer to live and let live if it becomes convinced that it must choose between common survival and mutual extinction. The increasingly total destructiveness of the new weapons of total war is making this choice more and more obviously inevitable. Even though the Soviet Union may not yet be prepared to engage in serious discussions on disarmament, we must be prepared for such discussions if and when the opportunity comes. Time and circumstances do cause men and nations to alter their attitudes. It is important that our people as well as the people of the Soviet Union understand what must be done if the world is to be relieved of the burdens and fears of armaments and the scourge of war.

If the effective outlawing of international war and of national armaments is too visionary and impractical an idea for our generation, it is not inconceivable that the wheel of history will whirl back and future generations will have to struggle again to outlaw private wars. Professor Einstein is reputed to have said that he did not know what weapons would be used in the next war, but he did know the weapons which would be used in the war after that, and they would be sticks and stones.

It is true that virtually all efforts in the past to reduce national armaments have failed. But there is much reason to suspect that the failures in the past were caused by the unwillingness of men and nations to go far enough—by the lack of vision, rather than by visionary ideas. We cannot disarm unless others are willing to disarm. We cannot lay bare our secrets unless others are willing to reveal theirs. But if we wish others to accept the gospel of peace under law in an open and disarmed world, we must be sure that we ourselves understand and are willing to accept that gospel. We must be willing to espouse and accept a program of arms reduction to such a point, in such a thorough fashion, and with such foolproof safeguards, that no nation is in a position to wage a successful war. We must be willing to espouse and accept a truly open world in which every human being can live free from the fear that others are secretly plotting the destruction of his hearth and home. We must be willing to espouse and accept a world in which all nations not only agree to refrain from the threat or use of force except in defense of the law but recognize that uncontrolled armaments themselves constitute an unlawful threat to the peace. If civilization is to continue, no nation can have a sovereign right to wage war or to menace the world with its arms.

The U.S. in the U.N.

a weekly feature, does not appear in this issue.

Conference on Agricultural and Cooperative Credit

[Released to the press April 28]

Delegates from 35 countries are expected to attend an international conference on agricultural and cooperative credit to begin at the University of California on August 4.

The conference will be conducted by the University of California, with the financial assistance of the Technical Cooperation Administration and the Mutual Security Agency. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the Farm Credit Administration, the Farmers Home Administration, and the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations of the Department of Agriculture are cooperating with the university in the preparation of the conference. Various private credit institutions, cooperatives, and voluntary organizations are planning to assist in giving the delegates a full picture of credit practices in the United States.

A 5-week session in Berkeley will be devoted to intensive study and exchange of information on the organization and functions of agricultural credit facilities and on desirable measures to improve the services of rural credit in Latin America, the Near East, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia. Emphasis throughout the conference will be on credit as a means of increasing farm production and income, which in turn will provide a basis for better farm living. Financing for land purchase, for production needs, and for the marketing and processing of farm products will be included. The place and importance of cooperative enterprise and the close ties between credit cooperatives and other types of cooperation makes it necessary and desirable to give attention to broader aspects of cooperation than are present in simple cooperative credit institutions.

Following the session at Berkeley, during which there will be several short field trips, the delegates will split up into smaller groups for a 3-week demonstration tour through various areas in the western and southern states to visit different types of credit institutions and to study the experiences on farms and cooperatives in the use of various types of credit facilities.

The last week of the conference, ending October 10, will be spent in Washington, where the delegates will have an opportunity for review and for discussion with agricultural credit and other officials.

About 80 delegates are expected. Of these, about 55 will be administrators and specialists responsible for agricultural credit policies and programs in these countries. The remainder will be students from these countries who are studying advanced agricultural subjects in American colleges and universities.

Last autumn, a World Land Tenure Conference was held at the University of Wisconsin, attended by delegates from most of these same countries.¹ This workshop, by providing an opportunity for discussion of views and experiences by both administrative and academic people from many countries, has already produced many tangible results in the form of improved land-tenure laws, new programs of land-tenure improvement, and vigorous interest in promoting landownership and better landlord-tenant relations through peaceful, legal means.

The delegates to the Land Tenure Conference urged that future international conferences be held on other and related aspects of agricultural development. They declared that priority should be given to further work in the field of agricultural and cooperative credit.

The University of California was chosen for this conference because of the wide range of experience in California with different types of financing and because of the unparalleled development in the state in agricultural, processing, and marketing cooperatives.

The program and plans for the conference have been worked out by the University's Committee on International Relations, under the chairmanship of John B. Condliffe, director of the Teaching Institute of Economics. Director of the conference will be Thomas C. Blaisdell, director of the Bureau of International Relations. The Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics and other departments of the University will cooperate in the conduct of the conference.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Iron and Steel Committee (ILO)

On May 5 the Department of State announced that the fourth session of the Iron and Steel Committee of the International Labor Organization (ILO) will convene at Geneva on May 5, 1952. The tripartite U. S. delegation to the meeting is as follows:

REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegates

Herman B. Byer, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor
Robert M. Weidenhammer, National Production Authority, Department of Commerce

¹For a statement by Secretary Acheson relative to this conference, also excerpts from an address made before the conference by Assistant Secretary Thorp, see BULLETIN of Oct. 22, 1951, p. 690.

Adviser

Robert M. Barnett, Economic Officer (Labor), American Legation, Bern; resident at Geneva

REPRESENTING THE EMPLOYERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegate

George T. Honda, Vice President, Weirton Steel Company, Weirton, W. Va.

Adviser

Grover C. Brown, Secretary, Industrial Relations Committee, American Iron and Steel Institute, New York

REPRESENTING THE WORKERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegates

Elmer F. Cope, International Representative, United States Steel Workers of America, Lewisburg, Ohio
Nathan E. Cowan, International Representative, United States Steel Workers of America, Washington, D. C.

Adviser

John Glasgow, Staff Representative, United States Steel Workers of America, Taylorville, Ill.

The agenda of the forthcoming session consists of the following items: (1) review of a general report, dealing particularly with (a) action taken in various countries in the light of the conclusions of previous sessions; (b) steps taken by the International Labor Office to follow up the studies and inquiries proposed by the Committee; and (c) recent events and developments in the iron and steel trades; (2) vocational training and promotion in the iron and steel industry; and (3) welfare services in the iron and steel industry.

Founded in 1945, the Iron and Steel Committee is one of eight industrial committees established by the Governing Body of the International Labor Office to implement the ILO objectives of improving international labor standards and promoting international cooperation in specific industries. The last (third) session of the Iron and Steel Committee was held at Geneva, November 22-December 2, 1949.

Cotton Advisory Committee

The Department of State on May 13 announced that, in response to an invitation received from the Government of Italy, the International Cotton Advisory Committee will hold its eleventh plenary meeting at Rome, May 17-31, 1952. The U.S. delegation to the meeting is as follows:

Chairman

Leslie A. Wheeler,
Collaborator, Office of the Secretary,
Department of Agriculture

Vice Chairman

Francis A. Linville,
Chief, Agricultural Products Staff,
Department of State

Advisers

Howard R. Cottam,
Counselor of Embassy,
American Embassy, Rome

Read P. Dunn, Jr.,
Foreign Trade Director,
National Cotton Council,
Washington, D.C.

Rene Lutz,
Office of International Trade,
Department of Commerce

Arthur W. Palmer,
Head, Cotton Division,
Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations,
Department of Agriculture

F. Marion Rhodes,
Director, Cotton Branch,
Production and Marketing Administration,
Department of Agriculture

Oscar Zaglits,
Head, Foreign Agricultural Trade and Policy Division,
Foreign Agricultural Relations,
Department of Agriculture

Secretary and Adviser

Eulalia L. Wall,
International Economist,
Agricultural Products Staff,
Department of State

The International Cotton Advisory Committee was established in accordance with a resolution approved at the International Cotton Meeting held at Washington, D.C., September 6-9, 1939, by the governments of 10 of the major cotton exporting countries of the world. At the fourth plenary meeting of the Committee, held at Washington in April 1945, provision was made for the expansion of its membership to include not only cotton exporting countries but countries substantially interested in the production, exportation, or importation of cotton. At present the Committee is comprised of 28 member governments of cotton exporting and importing countries, accounting together for more than 85 percent of international trade in cotton.

Following usual procedures, members will exchange statements on the cotton situations prevailing in their own countries and will examine the general economic position of cotton in the world as a whole. In the course of discussions the Committee expects to consider the impact on national economies of the excessive demand for cotton products in 1950 and early 1951 and the consequent readjustment in 1951-52.

Through a special group, the Committee has been reviewing the developments of the two seasons. It has studied the possibilities of ameliorating conditions of extreme surplus and shortage by international action and the suitability to cotton of various possible forms of an international cotton agreement. The problems involved will be discussed at the forthcoming meeting, and governments will have an opportunity to express their views on them.

The last (tenth) meeting of the International Cotton Advisory Committee was held at Lahore, Pakistan, February 1-9, 1951.

Current United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Economic and Social Council

The Problem of Statelessness. Information from states in pursuance of Economic and Social Council Resolution 352 (XII) on the problem of statelessness. E/2164, February 6, 1952. 10 pp. mimeo.

Implementation of Recommendations on Economic and Social Matters. Economic and Social Council Resolution 283 (X). Text of replies from governments of member states. E/2165/Add.25, February 4, 1952. 6 pp. mimeo.

Allegations Regarding Infringements of Trade Union Rights Received Under Council Resolution 277 (X). Observations of the Government of Japan on allegations regarding infringements of trade-union rights in that country. E/2175/Add.1, March 26, 1952. 54 pp. mimeo.

Narcotic Drugs. International Limitation of Opium Production. E/2186, March 14, 1952. 114 pp. mimeo.

Relief and Rehabilitation of Korea. Report of the Secretary-General. E/2197, April 7, 1952. 25 pp. mimeo.

Addendum Covering the Period January 1 to March 20, 1952 to the Progress Report of the Division of Narcotic Drugs. E/Cn.7/231/Add.1, April 8, 1952. 16 pp. mimeo.

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. Report of the Governing Body of the International Children's Centre. E/ICEF/187, March 15, 1952. 88 pp. mimeo.

Report of the Executive Director on Experience with UNICEF-Assisted Yaws Control Programs in Haiti, Indonesia and Thailand. E/ICEF/188, April 3, 1952. 44 pp. mimeo.

General Progress Report of the Executive Director. E/ICEF/190, April 5, 1952. 69 pp. mimeo.

Experience with UNICEF-Assisted Feeding Programs in Asia. E/ICEF/191, April 3, 1952. 11 pp. mimeo.

Allegations Regarding Infringements of Trade Union Rights Received Under Council Resolution 277 (X). Communication received from the National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards, San Francisco, Calif., USA. E/2154/Add. 39, April 10, 1952. 16 pp. mimeo.

Freedom of Information. Replies of Governments to the Inquiry Concerning the Future Work of the United Nations in the Field of Freedom of Information (Resolution 414 B 111 (XIII)). Belgium. E/2178/Add.4, April 9, 1952. 6 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

General Eisenhower's Views on Effects of Possible Cuts in Mutual Security Funds

On May 5, Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, sent a cable to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, requesting the latter's views as to the effect of possible cuts in mutual security legislation below the amount requested of the Congress by President Truman.

Following are the texts of Senator Connally's cable and of General Eisenhower's cabled reply of May 5, as released to the press by Senator Connally's office on May 8:¹

SENATOR CONNALLY'S CABLE OF MAY 5

Senate debate on mutual-security legislation starts today. As you know, Foreign Relations Committee, without objection, has reported bill making \$1,000,000,000 over-all cut in President's request, including reduction title I, military aid, from \$4,145,000,000 to approximately \$3,620,000,000, and reduction in title I, defense support, from approximately \$1,819,000,000 to approximately \$1,589,000,000. Some Members of Senate urging deeper cuts. In view of these facts would appreciate having your attitude particularly concerning effect further substantial reduction would have on development of necessary military build-up in Western Europe and on security of United States. I, of course, and all members of committee eager to keep cost of program as low as possible without impairing our structure for collective defense so painfully built up under North Atlantic Treaty. Believe Senate would attach great weight to your views with respect to probable effect proposed cuts would have on ability of our European allies to meet Lisbon goals and continue military build-up at desired rates after 1952. If you feel such cuts would materially retard necessary European

military build-up, would appreciate your views on resulting effect on United States military security in light of your evaluation of Soviet aggressive threat.

TOM CONNALLY,
*Chairman, Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations.*

GENERAL EISENHOWER'S REPLY

In response to your request, I furnish the following statement of views concerning the foreign assistance program as it applies to my command. You asked particularly for my views as to the amount proposed and the effects of possible cuts below that amount. This reply is essentially a summary of the conclusions presented to your committee by General Gruenther in March.

First, please permit me to draw attention to the fact that over the past several years I have publicly insisted on the importance of America's solvency to her own security. I am keenly aware that Congress has the onerous responsibility of weighing and balancing the obvious risks of attack against the equally obvious risks of ruinous spending.

As you know, my own headquarters does not compute the specific money figures for the various elements of the program, but we do recommend the composition of the military forces required and the essentials of expansion programs for developing collective security. In order to answer your request I must therefore make certain assumptions which cover matters outside my direct cognizance but which I nevertheless have every reason to believe are factual in their application to the program as actually prepared and submitted to the Congress.

Specifically, these assumptions are:

A. That the financial computations have been carefully and competently made on the basis of our military requirements.

¹ Reprinted from *Cong. Rec.* of May 12, 1952, p. 5098.

B. That strong efforts are being made to do this on an austerity basis, both as to design and quantity.

C. That we are passing through what must be regarded as an emergency period. The free world and particularly the United States could not afford, indefinitely, to provide the sums for military purposes that are now being allocated. As quickly as a satisfactory defensive posture has been established in our vital areas we must pass to a maintenance condition in which each cooperating nation will be largely responsible for its own forces.

D. That the Mutual Security Program as proposed to the American Congress has been adjusted to provide for maximum effort on the part of cooperating nations.

Proceeding from these assumptions, it is apparent that any cut in the program would inevitably tend to curtail or retard the build-up of forces. Manifest, in calculations of this scope and magnitude, moderate-sized cuts can be absorbed without critical damage. But substantial reductions in end-item aid would slow up the formation and impair the readiness of units.

Reductions in defense support would have a peculiarly adverse effect, since available production facilities in Europe could not be put to use for lack of a critical fraction of their raw materials and other requirements. This would mean, of course, that nations depending upon receipt of scheduled end items or materials could not make maximum use of available manpower, manufacturing facilities, and training installations.

While we here are not in position to compute in detail the effects of specific fund reductions, it is quite clear that in terms of impact on our military programs, an aggregate reduction of the order of a billion dollars would be heavily and seriously felt. Any cut materially greater than this would create such difficulties that a drastic revision of the whole program might well be indicated and might therefore endanger the proposed military build-up now visualized, and which I consider essential in the interest of United States security.

I believe the American approach must always be to weigh these questions in terms of the effects upon the security of the United States. At a time of such heavy costs as the United States is incurring it is more essential than ever that each dollar be made to count to the maximum. It is my understanding that our Mutual Security Program was adopted because of a conviction that there is no acceptable alternative. The development of collective security through cooperation is obviously more efficient and less costly than for any one country to attempt to achieve it alone.

There can be little question but that our policy of aiding free nations in their own defense has been producing a gradually improving stability on the international scene. The situation is better than a year ago and the outlook for peace has im-

proved markedly since the initial decision by the Congress more than two years ago to embark on a large-scale military-assistance program.

The degree of this progress is perhaps best reflected in the redoubled efforts now being exerted by the Iron Curtain world to weaken unity in the West and to block further constructive steps such as those relating to the European defense force and the integration of Germany into the Western European complex.

In the SHAPE annual report submitted about a month ago,² we reviewed progress achieved in the European region well into 1952. If we are to achieve comparable and greater progress here during the remainder of this year and in 1953, it is manifest that unflagging joint efforts are required, and that the programs of aid in military end items and defense support must be buttressed by sufficient appropriations to enable the recommended build-up to go forward.

My final observation is that America, in partnership with others, is participating in a program that has the ultimate aim of security and peace. Attainment of this goal remains necessary regardless of the exact speed of progress in any one fiscal year period.

My own belief is that this purpose will become more expensive if it is unnecessarily postponed, dragged out, and delayed. It seems to me to be in America's interest to attain as quickly as possible a satisfactory posture of defense in the free world so as to relieve us of the necessity of further build-up and place us substantially on a maintenance basis.

The foregoing statement is for such use, public or private, as you may deem desirable.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

Amending Section 32 (A) (2) of the Trading With the Enemy Act. H.Rept. 1723, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S.302] 3 pp.

Continuing the Effectiveness of Certain Emergency Statutory Provisions Until July 1, 1952. H.Rept. 1747, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H.J.Res. 423] 4 pp.

Permitting Free Entry of Articles Imported From Foreign Countries for the Purpose of Exhibition at the Washington State-Far East International Trade Fair, Seattle, Wash. H.Rept. 1810, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H.J.Res. 422] 2 pp.

Approving the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Which Was Adopted by the People of Puerto Rico on March 3, 1952. H.Rept. 1832, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H.J.Res. 430] 31 pp.

Report on Austria, Yugoslavia, Italy, Spain by the Special Study Mission to Germany and Certain Other Countries . . . pursuant to H.Res. 28. H.Rept. 1834, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 96 pp.

First Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program. Supplement. H.Doc. 371, Part 2, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 82 pp.

² BULLETIN of Apr. 14, 1952, p. 572.

Report on the Operations of the Department of State (Under Public Law 584). Message from the President of the United States . . . H.Doc. 410, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 81 pp.

Recommendations to Extend for 60 Days the Emergency Powers. Communication from the President of the United States . . . H.Doc. 416, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 3 pp.

Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Adopted by the People of Puerto Rico on March 3, 1952. H.Doc. 435, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 21 pp.

Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project. S.Rept. 1489, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S.J. Res. 277] 1 p.

Creating a Commission to Study Relations Between the United States and Other North Atlantic Nations. S.Rept. 1465, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. 2269] 10 pp.

Protocol Prolonging the International Agreement Regarding the Regulation of Production and Marketing of Sugar. Message from the President of the United States transmitting a copy of a protocol dated in London August 31, 1951. S. Exec. O, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 6 pp.

Protocol Supplementary to the Consular Convention Between the United States of America and Ireland. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the protocol. S. Exec. N, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 4 pp.

Agreement Between the United States and Canada for Promotion of Safety on the Great Lakes by Means of Radio. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the agreement. S. Exec. M, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 16 pp.

Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary Appropriations for 1953. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Eighty-second Congress, second session. [Department of State, Part I] 398 pp.

Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary Appropriations for 1953. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Eighty-second Congress, second session. [Department of State, Part II] 424 pp.

Tuna Imports. Hearings before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, second session on H. R. 5693, an act to amend the Tariff Act of 1930. February 4, 5, 6, and 7, 1952. 422 pp.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Commercial Treaty Program of the United States. Commercial Policy Series 141. Pub. 4515. 7 pp. 5¢.

A fact sheet explaining the general aim of the modern treaty.

Fight for Food. Economic Cooperation Series 31. Pub. 4534. 16 pp. Free.

Pamphlet illustrating Point Four's aerial methods toward permanent control of the desert locust hordes.

Council of Europe. European and British Commonwealth Series 33. Pub. 4492. 7 pp. 5¢.

Foreign affairs outline No. 26, giving the background, membership, and objective of the Council.

Pacific Security: Its New Foundations. Far Eastern Series 48. Pub. 4556. 8 pp. 5¢.

A background summary of the four treaties of mutual defense providing a foundation for security in the Pacific area.

Double Taxation, Taxes on Estates and Inheritances. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2358. Pub. 4484. 24 pp. 10¢.

Convention between the United States and Norway—Signed at Washington June 13, 1949; entered into force Dec. 11, 1951.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Schedule XX. Commercial Policy Series 142. Pub. 4521. 91 pp. Limited Distribution.

Annotated to show countries with which concessions were initially negotiated at Torquay in 1951.

The State Department's Loyalty Security Program. Department and Foreign Service Series 25. Pub. 4530. 13 pp., charts. 10¢.

This pamphlet deals with the human factor in security.

Guide to Technical Assistance Services of United States Voluntary Agencies Abroad. International Information and Cultural Series 21. Pub. 4422. 114 pp. Limited distribution.

A guide summarizing information on technical assistance projects of U. S. voluntary agencies in education, health, agriculture, social service, and industry, for the period 1949 to 1951, inclusive.

United Nations General Assembly: A Review of the Sixth Session. International Organization and Conference Series III, 78. Pub. 4566. 11 pp. 10¢.

A background summary dealing with the major problems of disarmament and collective security.

Germany—Industrial Controls. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2265. Pub. 4241. 19 pp. 10¢.

Agreement, with annexes, between the United States and the United Kingdom and France—Signed at Bonn-Petersberg Apr. 3, 1951; entered into force Apr. 3, 1951.

Air Transport Services. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2257. Pub. 4272. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and France—Signed at Paris Mar. 19, 1951; entered into force Mar. 19, 1951.

Defense of Iceland Pursuant to North Atlantic Treaty. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2266. Pub. 4294. 7 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Iceland—Signed at Reykjavik May 5, 1951; entered into force May 5, 1951.

Economic Cooperation with Portugal Under Public Law 472, 80th Congress, as amended. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2279. Pub. 4334. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Portugal amending agreement of Sept. 28, 1948, as amended—Signed at Lisbon May 17, 1951; entered into force May 17, 1951.

Parcel Post. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2294. Pub. 4354. 23 pp. 10¢.

Agreement and detailed regulations between the United States and the Netherlands West Indies—Signed at Washington May 17, 1951 and at Willemstad May 10, 1951; entered into force Feb. 1, 1951.

Disposal of United States Excess Property in Canada. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2298. Pub. 4364. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Canada—Signed at Ottawa Apr. 11 and 18, 1951; entered into force Apr. 18, 1951.

Joint Group on Emergency Supply Problems. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2301. Pub. 4366. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Brazil—Signed at Rio de Janeiro July 24, 1951; entered into force July 24, 1951.

Economic Cooperation with Thailand. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2304. Pub. 4370. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Thailand—Dated at Bangkok July 12 and 25, 1951; entered into force July 25, 1951.

Military Assistance—Constabulary Equipment for Indonesia. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2306. Pub. 4383. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Indonesia—Signed at Djakarta Aug. 15, 1950; entered into force Aug. 15, 1950.

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Appointment of Officers

Stanley Andrews as Administrator of Technical Cooperation, effective April 24.

James W. Riddleberger as Director of the Bureau of German Affairs, effective May 15.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on May 9 confirmed the nomination of Myron Melvin Cowen as Ambassador to Belgium.

The Senate on May 9 confirmed the nomination of Angier Biddle Duke as Ambassador to El Salvador.

The Senate on May 12 confirmed the nomination of Joseph C. Green as Minister to Jordan.

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A Strong Defense To Achieve Peace

*Address by the President*¹

It is a real pleasure for me to be here today and to join in celebrating the establishment of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point 150 years ago.

This Academy was started during Thomas Jefferson's first term as President. The United States at that time was relatively small and weak and surrounded by dangers. We had just fought a limited and undeclared war with France to protect the freedom of our commerce and shipping. We were engaged in fighting another limited and undeclared war with the Barbary pirates for the same purpose.

Jefferson, like Washington and Hamilton and other leaders of our young Republic, knew very well that a strong military establishment was vital to the preservation of American liberty. And these patriot leaders knew also that you cannot have effective military forces unless you have well-trained, well-prepared officers. They all knew how Washington had to struggle and experiment all through the Revolution to find officers who could take troops into battle and lead them to victory. That was why they wanted a military academy, as an essential part of a strong, permanent national defense organization.

But there was a great deal of opposition to starting a military academy in this country. It took 20 years of argument and persuasion after the Revolution was over before the Academy could be started. And it was finally started largely because Jefferson took the position that if the Congress didn't authorize a military academy, he would set one up himself.

The argument over establishing a military academy was part and parcel of the argument over whether the United States should have strong

national defenses. That argument has continued, of course, right down to the present day, and much of the debate after the Revolution has a very modern sound.

There were a lot of people in this country in 1800 who were afraid that setting up a military academy and an army and navy would make us belligerent and warlike. You can hear echoes of that point of view today in the debate over universal military training.

There were a lot of other people in 1800 who said that a strong national defense would cost too much; that we couldn't afford it; and we ought to find some magic formula for achieving security without having to pay for it. That point of view is not only echoed today—it is loudly shouted in the newspapers and the halls of Congress.

Fortunately, those arguments did not prevail against the hard-headed common sense of men like Jefferson. The Military Academy was set up; and this country has had occasion to be thankful many times since then that our early leaders had so much foresight.

Toward a World of Law and Order

The Military Academy has repaid this country many times over for every cent it has cost. We have learned from experience that, while it may be expensive to maintain a strong national defense, it is much more expensive not to have one. Time and again, we have allowed our Armed Forces to dwindle down to a fraction of what they should have been, and then we have had to pay enormously—in money and in lives—because of our lack of preparedness. And there are people right now who want us to relax and cut down on our defense program. They are just as wrong as they can be. We have got to pay the cost of preventing

¹ Made before the sesquicentennial convocation at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N. Y., on May 20 and released to the press by the White House on the same date.

a world war—or we will surely have to pay the immensely greater cost of fighting one.

The other fear of the early opponents of the Military Academy has also proved groundless. Our country has never become warlike or aggressive.

This is partly because our Constitution nailed down so firmly the principle of civilian control over the military. The most important means by which this was done was by providing in the Constitution that the President, who is the civilian head of the Government elected by the people, shall be the commander in chief of all the military forces. Many Presidents, including the present one, have demonstrated that those words in the Constitution mean what they say.

But, in addition to this, the spirit of our people has never been warlike. Our people came to this country to find peace and freedom. That is what we have always wanted. That is what we want now, and that is what our national policy is designed to preserve.

But there is a vast difference between being peaceful and being passive. We want to achieve peace. But we know we can't have it unless we are willing to stand up for our rights.

We know we can't have lasting peace unless we work actively and vigorously to bring about conditions of freedom and justice in the world. That is what we are trying to do. And we are having to do it in the face of a concerted campaign of threats and sabotage and outright aggression directed by the Soviet Union.

The policies of the Soviet Union are exactly the opposite of our own. We want to establish equality and justice and the rule of law among all nations. They want to establish domination and dictatorship and the rule of force over all countries. This makes our situation—the situation of all free nations—difficult and dangerous in the extreme. But I am firmly convinced that it does not necessarily mean world war.

The free countries can, by proper and adequate defense measures, make clear to the Kremlin that aggression would be doomed to failure.

And the free nations can, by economic and political means, build up their strength so as to be safe from Communist infiltration and subversion.

But strong and active as we may be, we cannot avoid risks and sacrifices. They are inherent in the situation and we cannot wish them out of existence. The course of events is not completely in our own control.

Events in Korea Leading to Negotiations

In Korea, we had no choice but to meet armed aggression with military force. If we had not met aggression head on, the U.N. Charter would have been reduced to a scrap of paper. If Communist aggression had been allowed to succeed in

Korea, the Communist conquest of all Asia would have been simply a matter of time. If the United Nations had failed, and Asia had fallen, we would have been well on the way to a disintegration of freedom in the whole world.

But that did not happen. The valor and sacrifice of U.S. fighting men—together with the forces of the Republic of Korea and contingents from 15 other countries—has beaten the aggressors back within their own territory. Our Army, led in large part by men trained here at West Point, has done a superb job. From the time our men were first sent into action in the gallant rear guard defense down to the Pusan perimeter—from then right up to the present time, the U.S. Army in Korea has been magnificent. And the men who have fought with them, from the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps, and from the armed forces of other free countries, have been just as brave and effective.

Last June, 11 months ago, the badly battered Communists offered to confer about a military armistice in Korea. We were willing to conclude such an armistice. We still are. We don't want any more fighting than is absolutely necessary. But we were not interested, and we are not interested now, in any armistice that involves selling out the principles we are fighting for.

Patiently and skillfully, General Ridgway and his negotiating team, headed by Admiral Joy, have worked to bring about an effective armistice. They have done a masterful job in the face of great provocation. They have met threats, and abuse, and outright lies, all with great self-control and an unyielding insistence on the essentials of a just and honorable armistice.

Gradually, the Communists have come to realize that we will not sacrifice our principles to obtain an armistice. We do not know whether they will finally agree on an honest and workable armistice. So far, they have agreed to some of the points that must be covered. They have agreed that the armistice line across Korea should be a defensible military line determined by the location of the opposing forces. They have agreed that no reinforcements shall be brought into Korea by either side during the armistice. They have agreed that an inspection commission shall observe the carrying out of the armistice terms—and are apparently willing to withdraw their request that the Soviet Union should be one of the inspecting nations.

Up to now, however, the Communists have not agreed on a fair and proper exchange of prisoners of war. The Communists have continued to insist that all the prisoners we have taken must be handed over to them—regardless of whether or not they are willing to be sent back behind the Iron Curtain, and regardless of what their fate would be if they were sent back.

It is perfectly clear that thousands and thousands of the prisoners we hold would violently resist being returned to the Communists because

they fear the slavery or death which would await them. It would be a betrayal of the ideals of freedom and justice for which we are fighting if we forced these men at bayonet point to return to their ex-masters. We won't do it. We won't buy an armistice by trafficking in human slavery.

We do not know whether the Communists will accept this position. We may not know for some time yet. Negotiations are continuing under General Clark's direction. We shall remain ready to reach honorable settlements by peaceful means. But we must also be alert and ready to meet treachery or a renewal of aggression if that should come.

During these months of armistice negotiations in Korea, the Communists have increased their military strength. They have more men there than they had a year ago, and many more tanks and planes.

But we have consolidated and increased our strength in Korea also. The morale of our men is high, and our units are well-trained, well-equipped and at a peak of combat efficiency. The troops of the Republic of Korea are far better trained and equipped than they were a year ago, and are capable of carrying a much larger share of the defense of their country.

The situation in Korea is still difficult and uncertain. Everybody should understand that. But everyone should also understand that the sacrifices of the U.N. Forces in Korea have brought tremendous gains toward a world of law and order.

The plain fact is that the Communists have utterly failed in their objectives in Korea.

The Communist aggression failed to shatter the United Nations. Instead, the Communist attack has made the United Nations stronger and more vigorous and has demonstrated that it can and will act to defend freedom in the world.

The Communists failed to win a cheap and easy victory in Korea. Instead, they have suffered more than a million casualties, have used up enormous amounts of war material—and they are back behind the line they started from.

The Communists failed to establish tyranny over the Republic of Korea. Instead, the Communist aggression has brought devastation to North Korea—a terrible warning to the other satellites in the Soviet Empire of the cost of aggression.

Furthermore, the Communists failed to break the will of free men in other countries. The attack on Korea was supposed to warn other countries that they had better yield to the demands of the Kremlin—or else. The Communist aggression did show the world that the Kremlin was ready and willing to try to extend its power by military conquest. But the effect of this was not to send the free countries into a panic of fear. Instead, they immediately stepped up their plans for building military forces, and began to get

together on concrete and definite defense arrangements.

As a result of Korea, the Kremlin knows that free men will stand up and fight against aggression. As a result of Korea, free men around the world know that if they stand up for what is right, they will not be deserted by the United Nations. And, as a result of Korea, the free countries are infinitely better prepared to defend themselves than they were 2 years ago.

Improvement in Defense Production

Our own defense production has risen very sharply. Our production of military supplies and equipment is more than three times what it was a year ago. For example, in January 1952, six times the dollar value of ammunition was delivered as was delivered in January 1951. In electronics and communication equipment, five times as much was delivered.

The production of one of our most important fighter planes was four times as much this spring as it was last spring. We now have several thousand tanks of a new model which is very much better than previous models. Our Navy has taken hundreds of ships out of mothballs and has a sound shipbuilding program under way.

An atomic artillery piece has been developed and tested and will have to be reckoned with in the future. The Navy is working on its first atomic powered submarine. Our over-all atomic production program is in excellent shape.

In all the vast and complicated field of combat vehicles and military weapons, the research and preparation of the last several years are paying off. The goods are being delivered to the hands of men who are ready to use them in defense of freedom—both in our own forces and among the many trusted friends that we have all over the world.

The improvement in defense production is not the only indication of an improved situation in the world.

Progress in World Defense System

In the Far East, Japan has rejoined the family of free and democratic nations. The Communist insurrection in the Philippines has been brought under control. In Indochina, the forces of France and the Associated States have succeeded in holding the Communists in check. The people of Indochina are making progress in the creation of national armies to defend their own independence. Countries like India and Pakistan and Indonesia are making real headway in creating the conditions of economic growth that must underlie solid and stable progress.

In Europe, great steps toward unity are being taken. The Schuman Plan and plans for the European Defense Community are moving for-

ward. We are working to reach final agreement on a new relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany. This will make it possible for Germany to take her place alongside the other independent countries of Europe as a full and equal member of the community of nations.

These are very remarkable developments. Countries like France, Germany, and Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg, with centuries of rivalry behind them, are now starting to work together. They are developing common economic and political institutions, and they are merging their military forces into one great defensive system.

No wonder the Soviets are trying to block this advance. No wonder the current Communist propaganda line is trying to persuade the countries of Western Europe that they should stay separate and weak, instead of joining together for strength. The Kremlin knows as well as anyone else that in union there is strength—and that a united Europe can frustrate the Kremlin's dearest wish of absorbing the European countries one by one into the Soviet Empire.

I don't think the people of Europe are going to be fooled by this Soviet propaganda. I believe the firm and concrete steps the Europeans have already taken, over the opposition of the Kremlin, are clear indications that they are not going to be stopped now. I think the Europeans are going to continue to move toward closer union—for they know that is the way of strength and progress for them and for the whole free world.

I have been speaking of the progress that is being made. But I don't want anyone to get the impression that there is any basis for relaxing or letting up. These signs of progress are not evidence that the battle for freedom is won—only that we are on the way to winning it. If we halt or falter now, we could ruin the whole structure of peace and freedom we have been so painfully building.

I have warned the Congress, on several occasions, that the financial support I have requested for our own defense effort and for the Mutual Security Program is absolutely necessary. Any substantial cuts in those items would have extremely serious effects. No one enjoys bearing the heavy costs of national security in these dangerous times, but we should never forget how much smaller they are than the costs of another world war.

Alert To Avert Another World War

No one should assume that the possibility of world war has become remote. The forces of the Soviet Empire are large, well-trained, and equipped with modern weapons including the atom bomb. The Kremlin's desire to dominate the world is obviously unchanged.

But I believe we are well on the way to preserving our freedom without paying the frightful cost

of world war. We are on the right track. We must go ahead.

If we are to succeed, we must have steady nerves and stout hearts. There is no easy way out, no quick solution. But we have with us the overwhelming support of the free countries, and the powerful moral forces of liberty and justice. We are using the strength God has given us in this great and wonderful Nation to win the struggle for peace and freedom throughout the world.

You young men here at West Point are called on to play a great part in the tremendous effort we are making. You are being trained for a career which, in these times especially, means service for the great good of your Nation and the welfare of mankind. Your opportunities are great because the task ahead of you is great.

We need—all of us—to draw on the wonderful tradition of resolution and courage which has been cherished for 150 years in the life of the cadets here at West Point.

President Urges Funds for U.S. Participation in Olympics

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS, by a joint resolution approved this day, the Congress has noted that "the XVth Olympic Games of the modern era will be held at Helsinki, Finland, from July 19 through August 3, 1952" and that "experiences afforded by the Olympic Games make a unique contribution to common understanding and mutual respect among all peoples"; and

WHEREAS the joint resolution declares further that "the United States Olympic Association, an organization not for pecuniary profit or gain, its activities being wholly supported by the public, is now making an appeal for the sum of \$850,000, necessary to equip, transport, feed, house, and present in competition over four hundred amateur athletes from all classes of our society and all parts of our country to represent the United States in the 1952 Olympic Games"; and

WHEREAS the joint resolution accordingly authorizes and requests the President to issue a proclamation "designating the seven-day period beginning May 18, 1952, as Olympic Week and urging all citizens of our country to contribute as generously as possible to insure that the United States will be fully and adequately represented in the XVth Olympic Games";

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the seven days beginning Sunday, May 18, 1952, as Olympic Week, and I urge our people to respond with generosity to the appeal of the United States Olympic Association for funds with which to defray the expenses incident to the participation of our athletes in this classic international competition.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this sixteenth day of May in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-two, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-sixth.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

¹ No. 2976 (17 Fed. Reg. 4607).

Germany: Today and Tomorrow

PART II

by Henry J. Kellermann

John J. McCloy approached his responsibilities as U.S. High Commissioner for Germany with statesmanship and vision. In carrying out this Government's directive for introducing democracy to Germany, he applied four basic principles:

First, democracy is a way of life, not just another governmental system. In the earlier days of the Occupation, democracy had been taught from the top down. From now on, it would also have to be built up from the grass roots. This meant, first of all, that democracy had to start at home: in the family, in the community council, in the town meeting. It also meant that it had to start with the young: in the kindergarten, in the school, in child-guidance clinics, and in youth organizations.

Second, democracy is a cooperative exercise; it requires the responsible participation of *all* citizens. Until 1949 democracy in Germany had been often suspected as an American "hand-me-down." Now, the German people were needed to bring their dreams, their skills, and their labor to bear on the development of a system that they could proudly call their own. According to the Long-Range Policy Statement of 1946,⁷ "The reconstruction of the cultural life of Germany must be in large measure the work of the Germans themselves. . . ." Unless German participation was enlisted, the democratic institutions set up in earlier days might not withstand the first waves of reaction which were bound to come.

⁷ *Germany 1947-1949*, p. 541.

This article is based on an address which Mr. Kellermann, Director of the Office of German Public Affairs, made at Philadelphia on May 5 before the Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation, which this year observes the centennial of Carl Schurz' arrival in the United States from Germany in 1852. Schurz subsequently served as U.S. Minister to Spain, as a general in the Union Army, as U.S. Senator from Missouri, and as Secretary of the Interior under President Hayes.

Part I of the article appeared in the *Bulletin* of May 26, p. 807.

Third, democracy must have native partisans. Some of our early emissaries to Germany had started their mission on the premise that Germany was an ideological wilderness and that every citizen was a potential convert. They overlooked the fact that Germany had known democracy before, although it was true that democracy in Germany had been the tradition of a minority which went down in defeat. But nonetheless, Germany had had her Ferdinand Freiligrath, her Rudolph Virchow, her Hugo Preuss, and her Carl Schurz. It was their tragedy not merely that they were disowned by their fellow citizens but that they never found the support of fellow democrats outside Germany. Again I find myself in complete agreement with George Kennan who, in his book *American Diplomacy*, points out with irresistible logic that one of our basic mistakes *vis-à-vis* Germany was perhaps not so much our reluctance to

resist nazism more energetically once it had achieved supremacy, but our indolence in face of conditions which made Hitler's rise possible. Had we in the 1920's given more encouragement and support, both moral and material, to those forces in Germany on whose existence and influence depended the growth and the very life of democracy, history might have taken a different turn. Consequently, our policy of reconstruction in Germany, in order to be enduring, had to have focus as well as vision. Strategy, as well as economy, demanded that our efforts be well aimed and designed to help specifically those groups, organizations, and institutions which had demonstrated their devotion to democratic ideals and practices and to the common cause of the Western democracies.

Fourth, democracy is not secured without sacrifice. This Nation has always been ready in the hour of need to shield its freedom with the lives of its citizens. It would have seemed paradoxical in the extreme if history should record that in Germany we had been willing to sacrifice human blood in defense of democracy but had been reluctant to spend dollars to make certain that this sacrifice would not be in vain. The task of insuring our victory in Germany required charity, daring, imagination, and a sense of historical perspective. Our effort had to be big, not niggardly.

"The Long Arm of U.S. Policy"

The job was assigned to Hicog's Office of Public Affairs. Public affairs, until then, had involved a multitude of scattered activities, including the information program with its radio, press, and motion-picture branches, and the education and exchange program. It now became "the long arm of U.S. policy in Germany." The program was enlarged to more than double the size contemplated by Military Government; in many respects it was tripled and quadrupled. The budget for the fiscal year 1950 was raised to 15½ million dollars and more than 100 million deutschemarks.

The number of exchangees proposed by Military Government for 1949 had totaled 300 students and 199 leaders and specialists; the High Commissioner increased the number to 722 students and 1,966 leaders and specialists. What is more important, the selection of these exchangees was refined to give maximum attention to categories considered vital in the light of our policy objectives. The staff of the Office of Public Affairs

was strengthened numerically, through the inclusion of close to 200 resident officers who were to carry the message of the program to the remotest hamlet, as well as qualitatively, through the recruitment of outstanding American citizens in many walks of life who, in view of their past experience at strategic posts, could be expected to make a real contribution to the program. What is still more important, the number of the regular staff was increased by experts and specialists from all over the United States who went to Germany to assist the High Commissioner and the Germans with the solution of urgent problems in many fields of civic activities. In addition, hundreds of schools, colleges, and public and private agencies, and thousands of individuals in the United States have offered to Germans hospitality, training, and advice. Many volunteers have gone to Germany to supplement the efforts of the Government.

As a result, the Public Affairs Program has become one of the greatest citizens' cooperatives ever organized in the field of international relations, and at the same time one of the most rewarding experiments in human relations.

We have not always had a perfect score. There were no precedents to guide us in setting up this unique program; much had to be done by trial and error. As we move into the fourth year of operation, we are still at the experimental stage in some respects, and we are refining our approaches in others. Yet some achievements stand out in bold relief. Outstanding among these is the exchange program which has brought to the United States more than 6,000 Germans, including Government officials, teachers, journalists, labor leaders, specialists of all kinds, but above all youth. By October 1951, 1,050 teen-agers, 1,250 university students, 775 trainees, and 375 youth leaders had come to the United States. Their experiences in the United States will, we hope, help insure peace and friendship between the coming generations of our two countries.

Our information centers and branches, with their libraries, discussion groups, public forums, and exhibits, have become known as "the windows to the West" and welcome more than 1 million visitors each month. Our workshops for youth leaders have been attended by 30,000 young people to date. With the help of American experts, 200 new textbooks have been written and distributed in 43 million copies.

One of the most important experiments has been the so-called Special Projects Program, also known as the "McCloy Fund," which is a unique plan designed to help Germans help themselves. Essentially, its purpose is to stimulate German interest in and contribution to the establishment of institutions which will further the growth of democratic processes in Germany. It has been a medium of true American-German partnership on behalf of common objectives. To date, 473 projects, including the construction and furnishing of institutions in the fields of education, community organization, youth activities, public health, and welfare, have been financed out of these funds; the High Commissioner has allocated roughly 53½ million deutschmarks which have been matched by a German contribution of 50 million deutschmarks. In addition, grants-in-aid have been given to needy and deserving institutions which are considered vital for purposes of political and cultural reorientation.

Supplementing these long-range activities are information programs designed to acquaint the German people with developments of national and international importance and to explain U.S. policies. These operations include our radio station RIAS in Berlin, our newspaper *Die Neue Zeitung*, our news service *Amerika Dienst*, our magazine *Der Monat*, and our film, book, and pamphlet program.

Measuring the Result

What has been the result of these efforts?

Let us remember that in our attempts to help bring about certain changes in German society, we have been dealing with an extremely delicate object: the human mind. It would be naive to expect that whatever therapy we devised could have an effect overnight or even within a few years. Final results may not become evident within the lifetime of our generation. Yet there are indications that our labor has not been wasted. Some are entirely intangible, others are more concrete.

First of all, then, is the Public Affairs Program itself appreciated by Germans? The answer must be an unqualified "yes." During a recent debate in the Bundestag, for instance, speakers for all major parties praised the exchange program as one of the most constructive and progressive projects the United States has ever undertaken in Germany. They pointed out that the program has

proved to be "an effective way gradually to transform the unproductive relationship of victor and vanquished into a partnership of equality." I had the great personal satisfaction, in a private session with some of the most prominent leaders of all major parties, to see this appreciation extended to all major areas of the program and to hear German leaders ask for a continuation and, if possible, an expansion of at least some of the activities in the years to come.

When Germans recently heard of impending moves to close some of our information centers, we received letters of protest from Germans of all walks of life imploring us to maintain these institutions which had served "as a bridge of understanding between our countries" and were "never more desperately needed than now." One writer said:

Military superiority is, alas, an absolute necessity with things being what they are today. But any number of divisions would be standing in empty space, were they not backed by sufficient moral resistance. In order to maintain and strengthen that resistance . . . the America Houses should be maintained as one of the most important contributing factors.

On February 22, 1952, a new information center opened at Essen. Minister President Arnold of North Rhine Westphalia, one of the main speakers, exemplifies the intelligent European's growing understanding of American culture and of America's role in world affairs. In the course of his address he said:

I should like to express the thanks of the Land North-Rhine Westphalia for the generous gift of the American people and to extend greetings to a nation which in recent years has proved that no sacrifice is too great in the cause of freedom all over the world.

Apart from its more tangible effects, the Public Affairs Program undoubtedly has fostered German understanding of the United States and has cleared away many of the misconceptions and suspicions inherited from the days of Nazi propaganda; it has also remedied prejudices due to plain ignorance. Above all, it has contributed immeasurably to the improvement of German-American relations.

Evidence of good feelings between Germans and Americans is increasing steadily—a trend confirmed by public-opinion surveys. When Germans were asked whether they felt relations between the German people and the Occupation Powers had deteriorated, in view of recent critical statements in the press, an insignificant minority responded in the affirmative; the vast majority said, "No." In fact, more than a fourth of the

respondents in all of Western Germany and more than a third in the U.S. zone felt that relations had improved. An even greater proportion claimed that relations between the German Government and the Occupying Powers are better today than ever before. Fifty-five percent of all people in Western Germany and 60 percent in the U.S. zone knew the name of the U.S. High Commissioner, and of those Germans who knew his position, two-thirds asserted that his administration had benefitted Western Germany.

Views on European Union

More significant are results of surveys which show German response to some of the policies advocated by the Western Allies in Germany, specifically to the integration of Germany into the community of democratic nations in Europe. It appears that this policy, more than any other, has found its mark and has kindled, above all among the young, genuine enthusiasm for international cooperation. In a recent poll, 7 out of 10 persons in Western Germany agreed that European union is a good idea; moreover, about half of the respondents declared that they would approve the transfer of basic national rights to a proposed government of the United States of Europe, were it to be established; finally, one-third of these people felt that Germany should join the "United States of Europe" at once—that is, not wait until Germany is reunited.

Those are some of the intangible results of our efforts. Others are more concrete. Above all, there is today in Germany a ground swell of interest in civic affairs never witnessed heretofore. It is manifest not only in the existence of an alert democratic press and radio, but also in the growing number of citizens' groups concerned with international and particularly inter-European relations, with human and civil rights, with inter-faith relations, with public education, with welfare, with mental health, and with community betterment. Some of these efforts are reflected in the establishment of permanent institutions under German, binational, and multinational auspices, such as neighborhood houses, youth centers, child-guidance clinics, and Nation-wide associations concerned with various aspects of civic endeavor. Plans are on foot for a national conference on human rights this fall, the first of its kind in Germany, which may prove one of the

most important manifestations of democratic thinking in Germany.

In the field of education, progress has been made toward equalization of educational opportunities, for instance through free tuition and free textbooks in several Laender. The period of the common school program is being extended to reduce the ill effects of Germany's traditional school organization, which generally denied students of low-income groups the educational opportunities offered children of well-to-do families. Standards of requirements for teacher training have been raised; modern school buildings and furnishings have replaced some of the dusty dungeons of earlier days; schools are being used increasingly for community services; more emphasis is being placed on civic education; teacher organizations are springing up everywhere.

Some changes have been made in the field of higher education, but they are not quite so conspicuous or numerous as in other areas. A fine example of militant academic freedom has been set by the institutions of higher learning in Berlin, above all by the Free University; the Institute of Social Research has been reestablished at Frankfurt, and an Institute for Educational Research created; American Institutes have been founded at several German universities. One of the most remarkable developments has been the election of two American citizens of German descent to serve as presidents of two German universities—an unprecedented step in German academic history.

This, then, is the Germany of today—a country hard on the border which separates freedom from servitude; a country which itself is half-free and half-slave; a country which today is occupied, divided, and with unsettled status.

Germany's Future

What will Germany be tomorrow? Will she be free, unified, and integrated with the rest of the free world? We shall do well to remember that freedom, reunification, and integration on German terms have been the very motives of two holocausts in recent history. Will history repeat itself once more? Will Germany again renounce her common heritage with the West, disown her Carl Schurz, and fight against her kin? Or will Germany join the free nations of the West and throw her support to the cause of democracy?

Those who have followed developments in Germany closely over the past 3 years know that in

principle Germany's decision has been made. Spokesmen for the Government and representatives of the opposition have declared firmly that Germany is part of the West by history, culture, and basic beliefs. The German Bundestag has ratified the Schuman Plan by a substantial majority; it has approved in principle German participation in the European Defense Community.

These are encouraging developments. It is reassuring to know that agreement exists between us and Germany on the principles which are to guide our future union. It attests to the foresight and good will of the German Government and its legislature that both have gone on record with a public endorsement of these principles. But let us be quite frank about it: professions of unity are not enough unless they lead to conclusive action. The time for such action is now.

The position of the U.S. Government and of its Western Allies is unequivocal and specific. We welcome the return of a free and democratic Germany to full membership in the community of Western nations; we favor close integration of Germany with the European defense effort; and we desire Germany's participation in those political and economic arrangements which are designed to insure the unity of the European nations and the freedom and welfare of their citizens.⁸

The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France have given formal expression to their wish to see Germany take her empty chair in the council of nations. The contractual agreements with the Government of the Federal Republic will in effect restore to it full authority over external and internal affairs. Those restrictions which will be retained are not intended to discriminate against Germany or to reflect on her eligibility for full sovereignty in principle. They result chiefly from the fact that Germany is divided and that, as we know, Eastern Germany is under the political and military control of a power which has used aggression and threats of aggression as instruments of foreign policy. The Federal Republic does not have the power to withstand such pressure without the support of the Western Powers.

Nothing would please us more than to extend the benefits of a full and lasting peace treaty to

⁸ For a statement by Secretary Acheson on U.S. views regarding the integration of Germany into the European community, see BULLETIN of Apr. 7, 1952, p. 530. For an article on postwar efforts to unify Germany, see *ibid.*, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 563.

all Germans, including those smarting under Communist control. The efforts of this Government over the last 7 years have been aimed at a fair and realistic settlement of all problems blocking the way to German unification and peace. We have not succeeded, because of the intransigence of the fourth of the powers. Under the circumstances, we shall have to be satisfied, at least for the time being, with an arrangement which will extend the borders of peace as far east as possible, hoping for the day when the rest of Germany will be free to join through peaceful orderly democratic processes.

In the meantime, the contractual agreements will afford the Federal Republic of Germany the status of equality which she desires and needs to discharge the responsibilities of partnership in the Western World. With the attainment of this status, the Federal Republic will assume the rights and obligations which fall upon any member of this community, including the obligation of defending the European commonwealth against any act of aggression. This is the substance of a special agreement between Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

With the conclusion of these agreements, the period of Occupation of Germany comes to an end and the integration of Germany becomes a reality. It will be the beginning of a new era in European history and international relations which, we hope, will witness the realization of the century-old dream of a Europe not divided against itself but united in the common pursuit of the best interests of its own peoples and those of all of the Western World.

Unfortunately, Germany's new status will not terminate the division of Germany for the time being. The record of the U.S. Government on the issue of German unity is clear. We have consistently pursued and urged the acceptance of a course of action which, if adopted, would insure reunification of East and West Germany under conditions of freedom. The Soviet Union has agreed to none of our proposals. The question might well be raised whether the Government of the Soviet Union ever seriously intended to support German unification on *any* conditions except her own. As authoritative sources have recently revealed, it was the Soviet Union which insisted on dismemberment of Germany since the days of Tehran. It was the Soviet Union which pointed out that there would always be a strong urge on

the part of Germans to unite, and therefore the whole purpose of any international organization must be to neutralize this tendency by applying economic and other measures including, if necessary, force.

German unity is the fondest hope of the German people and a rock-bottom postulate of German foreign policy. The Federal Government is pledged to its realization, but it is the people of Eastern Germany to whom reunification with the West means more than anything else. Tragic isolation and despair blight the life of nearly 20 million of these people. Whoever has talked to Germans from the Soviet zone and has listened to their stories of daily privations will know what freedom means to them. To hear these people pray, "Lord, liberate us," is an experience which nobody could forget. To them we say that the U.S. Government, in alliance with the other Western nations, will not abandon its efforts to restore to these people, by peaceful means, the same rights and liberties which their fellow citizens in the West enjoy today.

Implementing the Contractual Agreements

In the coming years, it will be the task of the U.S. Government, in concert with the German Government and the other signatory powers, to see that the agreements will be implemented so as to insure maximum benefit to all participating nations. This process will require an appropriate adaptation of policies and procedures and, above all, a new spirit in our relations with Germany—a spirit based on cooperation and reciprocity. This spirit does not apply merely to politics and economics; it applies also to the field of cultural relations. This Government is now negotiating a Cultural Convention with the Federal Republic of Germany. Its chief purposes are to encourage and facilitate citizen participation in endeavors furthering international cultural cooperation; to develop and increase the means of communication between the American and the German people; and to sponsor undertakings which will further freedom of communication, freedom of expression, freedom of learning, and freedom of teaching.

What is more, the Cultural Convention is intended to encourage and facilitate the initiation of joint projects designed to promote the principles which the contracting parties are pledged to support. The Governments, however, will not be the

only executive agents of the convention; rather is it the purpose of the convention to stimulate and foster direct contact between citizens' groups of both countries in behalf of programs which will supplement the efforts of their Governments in strategic areas.

I can think of a special assignment which this Government has found difficult to perform adequately in the past, chiefly because of insufficient funds and facilities. I am referring to the kind of program typified by the Cultural Festival in Berlin in September 1951.⁹ At that time the United States in noble competition with Great Britain, France, and Germany presented to the Berliners some of the finest talents in the fields of theater, music, and dance, as well as an exhibition of outstanding American paintings and drawings. The success was overwhelming. For a full month, Berlin became once more the center of world attention and the cultural hub of Germany which it had been in happier days.

The festival helped significantly to boost the morale of the Berliners. Equally important, it netted the United States handsome dividends in the form of inspired comments of acclaim throughout Germany. We are faced today with an all-out drive by the Soviet Union to discredit the cultural achievements of the Western World and to establish itself as the protagonist and protector of civilization. To make their point stick, Soviet agitators never tire of professing a fictitious identity of beliefs and affinities with those of the countries to which they direct their appeal. Venerated symbols of Western culture become the cherished idols of Communist devotion. During the Communist Youth Festival in Berlin last August,¹⁰ I saw posters with the portraits of Goethe, Lessing, and Heine carried through the streets alongside those of Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky. Furthermore, the Soviet Government is sending its best artists and its best motion pictures to international cultural festivals and exhibits throughout Europe. Quite often these artists compete with second-grade talents from Western countries. The result is not only that the awards go to the Soviet Union but also that the audience is left with the impression of Western inferiority and poverty *vis-à-vis* the quality of Soviet performance. The Soviet "cul-

⁹ For an article on the Berlin Festival, see *ibid.*, Aug. 20, 1951, p. 292.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Sept. 10, 1951, p. 407 and Sept. 24, 1951, p. 483.

tural offensive," as it has been referred to, presents a real challenge to the free artists of the Western World.¹¹ It is a challenge which must and can best be answered by the voluntary concerted effort of private citizens. What is needed is leadership to enlist and organize the participation of the best talents throughout the Western World, including the United States, in an effort to demonstrate to all and sundry the mighty cultural potential which the United States harbors and sometimes seems to hoard within its borders.

Our Investment in Germany

My purpose has been to show that we have made a long-range investment in Germany which we hope will result in true partnership and lasting peace. It would be presumptuous to claim that we have achieved all that we set out to do. But we can say with pride and with gratitude that we had the good fortune of great leadership as personified in John J. McCloy, the unstinting devotion of his able staff, and the generous support of forward-looking citizens in this country. Our common effort and our hopes for the future can be reduced to one simple formula: to help Germany become a place where the democrats of today will not be the exiles of tomorrow. The day, I hope, will come when we may ask the German people, "Where is your Carl Schurz of today?" And the German people will respond: "He is *our* Secretary of the Interior, *our* legislator, *our* Ambassador, *our* public orator and columnist, and the great model for *our* children. We are proud to have him and we want to keep him."

On that day our investment in Germany will have been redeemed.

West Germany on the Threshold Of Sovereignty

by John J. McCloy
*U.S. High Commissioner for Germany*¹

There are a few points I would like to discuss because decisions of great importance for our future are about to be made. It is essential that the German people fully understand them.

¹¹ For statements on this subject by former Assistant Secretary Barrett and by Assistant Secretary Sargeant, see *ibid.*, Dec. 3, 1951, p. 903, and Apr. 7, 1952, p. 535.

¹ Excerpts from an address made at the dedication of a school at Bernkastel on the Moselle on May 10 and released to the press by Hicoo on the same date.

First, I would like to say a few words about the contractual arrangements and the European Defense Community. It is important for all of us, particularly for every German, to see the entire picture. We are engaged in taking three great steps at the same time: We are liquidating a war; we are making peace; and we are concluding a great alliance.

Liquidation of the war is inescapable. It is essential if we are to have a platform upon which to build our alliance of peace. Liquidation means that the German people will be expected to meet certain obligations, to carry certain burdens, and to observe certain limitations that result from the terrible war which, under Hitler's rule, was waged for almost 6 years against the world. Liquidation of this war requires the recognition by Germans of certain principles which will not be given up.

Keep in mind also that the war imposed tremendous burdens on all nations. Today, France, Britain, and the United States, to mention only three countries, are carrying, and will continue to carry, crushing burdens as the aftermath of that war. Moreover the establishment of a partnership to maintain the peace will mean new burdens and obligations for all Western nations. For my own country, the commitments being made in the contractual agreements are unprecedented in our history. In the weeks ahead Germans must look at the agreements as a whole and not only at those provisions which cover obligations the Federal Republic will assume. The commitment to stand together is mutual and in our mutual interest.

The governments and public opinion in the Western countries have come a long way since 1945 in extending friendship to the German people. They have given the German people vital support in the rebuilding of this country. They honestly wish to see the Federal Republic associated with them in equal partnership. The agreements we are soon to sign are solid proof of our desire for peaceful alliance.

In the face of the Communist threat, I believe the people of the Federal Republic know that their personal liberties and peace would be jeopardized if they did not join in partnership with the West. They recognize that in partnership there is give and take, there are burdens and rewards. In our peaceful alliance, Germany will not dominate or be dominated. We must all work together. Above all, the German people know, I am sure, that in the partnership of the European-Atlantic community there is the best chance of security, liberty, prosperity—and the reunification of the German people.

Now may I say a few words about German reunification and the exchange of notes that is presently going on.²

² For texts of the Soviet note of Mar. 10 on German unification and the U.S. reply of Mar. 25, see BULLETIN of Apr. 7, 1952, p. 530; for texts of the Soviet note of Apr. 9 and the U.S. reply of May 13, see *ibid.*, May 26, 1952, p. 517.

We have had many deep disappointments in our relations with the Soviet Union since 1945. The 19 million Germans in the East zone of Germany and in East Berlin have had their own bitter experience of life under Soviet control. All of us know—if we look at Communist aggression in Korea, if we observe the armistice negotiations there, if we consider the conferences on German unification at the Palais Rose—that dealing with the Communists is difficult, time consuming, and frustrating. That is why in the present exchange of notes we are not prepared to play the role of Alice in Wonderland. We want firm evidence, firm facts. We have all suffered too much—Germans included—to jeopardize the progress we have made.

I am certain that in the forthcoming reply to the last Soviet note we will do everything possible to explore honest moves in the direction of German unity.

What I shall now say will not be included in any note. The Soviets would demonstrate much more sincerity, if, instead of spreading their so-called peace and unity propaganda, they would do something or other along the following lines:

Immediately release all German prisoners of war from Soviet camps.

Immediately release all political prisoners from the jails of the East zone.

Permit the free and unlimited circulation of West Berlin, West German, and other newspapers and magazines in the East sector and East zone of Germany.

If the Soviets are sincere about unification they will free all innocent German men and women from their places of detention. Certainly they should not object to the free exchange of published material between both parts of Germany now throttled by their policy of censorship and control. German unification would be nearer if the citizens of Dresden, Leipzig, and all parts of the Soviet zone of Germany could read without any fear or punishment the newspapers of West Berlin, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Munich, and Hamburg.

Before I close I want to say a few words to the young people here. Our participation in the building of this *Berufsschule* [vocational school] is an indication of the faith we have in the youth of this country. It has been a deep satisfaction to me that the United States has been able to aid in the building of hundreds of projects for youth in Germany—youth centers, student dormitories, teacher-training institutes, and many others.

We have one idea only—to help free boys and girls become citizens of Europe, citizens of the world.

In the coming weeks the agreements we are to sign will be an act of faith—faith in a free Europe and a free world. All of us, particularly the youth, now have the opportunity to transform this faith into living reality.

U.S. Policy on Trade Restrictions

Text of U.S. Note

[Released to the press May 12]

The Department of State on May 11 handed to the British Embassy the following reply to the aide-mémoire which the British Embassy delivered to the Department of State on April 10, 1952, and later published on April 18:¹

The British Embassy's aide-mémoire of April 9, 1952, expressing concern at the number of applications presented to the United States Tariff Commission for action under Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 has been given careful study in the Department of State.

It is true that in recent months there has been an increase in the number of investigations ordered by the Tariff Commission in response to applications from United States industry. Furthermore, it is recognized that several of these investigations relate to products of importance in the export trade of the United Kingdom and other countries which have made serious efforts to increase their dollar earnings by sales to the United States, and which are concerned lest these efforts be frustrated.

The Department of State has always taken the position that modifications of duty concessions should only be made in cases of genuinely serious injury or threat of injury resulting from trade commitments. The Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom are in complete accord in their insistence that the obligations in Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade should be scrupulously observed, and that Article XIX should not be invoked merely because a concession results in more vigorous competition from imports.

Furthermore, it is the opinion of the Department of State that in cases where modifications of duties are made as a result of escape clause investigations such modifications should be kept under constant review to insure their remaining in force for only such time and to such extent as is necessary to prevent or remedy the injury to domestic industry. Accordingly, a system providing for the periodic investigation and report by the Tariff Commission on all escape clause actions is in the process of being established.

The attitude of the United States Government on the basic principle of lowering barriers to international trade remains unchanged, and any tendency to deviate from that principle, wherever it may arise, is the subject of concern to the Department of State. Cooperative action among all free nations to reduce and minimize trade barriers between us is essential if we are to provide a strong economic basis for our mutual security and progress.

¹ For text of the British note and a statement by Secretary Acheson, see BULLETIN of May 12, 1952, p. 737.

Some Foreign Policy Crossroads

by Francis H. Russell

Director of the Office of Public Affairs¹

We are confronted these days with some especially crucial questions of foreign policy.

As we face into them, let us make note that we have in a special sense been strengthened by our trials of the past few years. Do not all of us today feel closer than ever to that company of patriots who have struggled for freedom before us? Does not Jefferson's statement: "I have sworn upon the altar of God eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man" have a more acute meaning than it had before? Is not Washington more real because we are more deeply engaged than ever in trying to keep aloft that "standard to which the wise and the good may repair"?

We are finding that every person today—literally every person—is being forced to answer the question "How much does freedom mean to me?"—to answer it in concrete terms of our willingness to pay the necessary taxes, in terms of deprivations of various kinds, in terms of military training, in terms of fighting and dying.

And especially we are having to answer it in terms of hard, straight, and responsible thinking, because we know that what results from this thinking will determine the shape of things to come for a long, long time.

U.S. Attitude Toward World Leadership

What are these present-day questions?

The first is this. What attitude do we take toward the role of world leadership that has been thrust upon us? That has to be answered first, before anything else.

Why?

¹ Address made before the International Association of Machinists at St. Louis, Mo., on May 24 and released to the press on the same date.

This is not a leadership that this country obtained by grabbing for it. Never in history has leadership—world leadership—been thrust upon a more reluctant people. After World War II we were weary of war—tired to death of everything that pertained to war. Our men overseas wanted to come home and get out of uniform. We wanted our factories back in peacetime production. Many of us wanted to wipe the dust of the world off our feet.

We found that was a mood that could not last. For one thing there was a candidate for the role, a candidate that was active but unacceptable. The men in the Kremlin were entirely willing to assume the responsibility. There was no reluctance there. The Iron Curtain had already closed down on a sizeable portion of the world's surface. We saw, and the world saw, that Russian "leadership" had become a living nightmare to hundreds of millions.

So the United States entered upon its task. The job would have been relatively simple if we could have adopted the Russian pattern of "leadership," if we could have *forced* unity upon the free world. But then it would not have been the *free world*. We do not want puppets. We want allies in a common purpose.

This kind of leadership is something entirely new in the world. There is no precedent in history to which we can turn for procedures. There have been plenty of world empires. The great British historian, Toynbee, if I remember correctly, names twenty-one. But they were empires. Their rulers did not lead. They controlled. The Russians do that. Their "friends" are satellites, cogs in the Communist machine. Neither the peoples nor their governments have a voice in the operation of that machine.

What we are doing is to help in building a new

world society based upon respect for the integrity and independence of all nations with cooperation as its basic principle. Whether we succeed will decide whether the present free world order goes down in history as the twenty-second in some future Toynbee's list of deceased civilizations—inadequate to the demands of the age—or as the beginning of a stable world structure.

This leadership on our part was first expressed in our support of the United Nations. It had the hearty approval of practically the entire citizenry of the United States. The Senate voted 89 to 2 in favor of ratification of the Charter. Approval cut across party lines and included individuals and groups active in both national and international affairs.

By and large this support continues. But there has been some weakening.

Proposals To Restrict Treaty Making

For instance, there is a resolution now before the Senate, Senate Joint Resolution 130, which proposes to amend the provision of the Constitution relating to the making of treaties and executive agreements. Section I of this proposed amendment provides in part that "no treaty . . . shall be made respecting the rights of citizens of the United States protected by this Constitution. . . ." This would prevent this country from taking part in any international agreement designed to extend the human rights which we enjoy in this country to other parts of the world.

Section II of the proposed amendment provides in part that "no treaty . . . shall vest in any international organization . . . any of the legislative, executive or judicial powers (of our Federal Government)." This would raise serious question about our ability to proceed with our allies under NATO, designed to strengthen the security of the North Atlantic area against aggression.

Section III provides in part that "no treaty . . . shall alter . . . the laws of the United States or the Constitution or laws of the several states unless . . . Congress shall so provide by act or joint resolution." This means in effect that every treaty will have to go through a new laborious and double process in order to become effective. The Senate would have to give its advice and consent by two-thirds majority and then both Houses would have to pass implementing legislation.

Section IV provides in part that "executive agreements shall not be made in lieu of treaties." This provision would in practice prevent the executive branch of the Government from effectively carrying on foreign relations. A large number of exchanges of notes with foreign powers constitute an executive agreement.

The principal sponsor of this resolution has declared that "the paramount issue of our time is whether or not the sovereignty and the Constitution of the United States shall be preserved." He

expressed concern that the United Nations might interfere with that sovereignty and supersede the Constitution.

I think he thoroughly misunderstands the United Nations and our commitments under the U.N. Charter. A decision of the U.S. Supreme Court (*Asakura v. the City of Seattle*) in 1923 made it clear that the Constitution of the United States is supreme over a treaty. The U.N. Charter is a treaty. If a U.N. commitment should be made that violated the Constitution, it would be null and void. So that cannot be a reason for changing the Constitution.

I do not propose to discuss the resolution in detail. My chief concern with it this evening is the implication that the United Nations, somehow, is a threat to the individual liberty of citizens of the United States, that we have "lost something" under the U.N. Charter, when in fact we have gained immeasurably.

The attack on the Covenant on Human Rights, now being drafted in the United Nations, is another example of what I have been talking about.

As presently drafted, not only are the articles on civil and political rights in the Covenant consistent with the Constitution of the United States, but the Bill of Rights in the Constitution is one of the primary documents from which both the idea and the substance of the Covenant stem.

We have to remember that our Bill of Rights assures to the people of the United States rights almost unknown to hundreds of millions of other human beings. We accept them as fundamentals of our way of life. To others they are only promises of what they would like—of which they have dreamed.

Last week I was in Williamsburg, Va., when an exhibit of famous documents relating to human rights was opened to the public. As I stood in front of the exhibit of George Mason's draft of the Virginia Bill of Rights, a woman in front of me turned away, visibly weeping. She was a refugee from an Iron Curtain country, and she said to me, almost angrily: "Yon Americans, you do not appreciate what you have." I replied, "Oh, I think we do." She said, "No. You do not cry."

When we attack the proposed Covenant on Human Rights, it looks to others very much as though we, with our human rights so well advanced, were taking a dog-in-the-manger attitude—that we are not willing to help other peoples share them.

This new attitude toward the United Nations is dangerous. It could well wreck our effort to find some way other than war to settle the world's problems.

U.N. Efforts in Korea Justified

Closely related to these questions is what our attitude is, and shall be, toward measures to put down Communist aggression. The invasion of

the Republic of Korea in 1950 was more than an attack on a small country; it was a defiance of the United Nations. For the first time in history aggression was met by the combined efforts of loyal members of an international organization representing the world community.

The free world has paid a high price in Korea. But had that action not been taken the price might well have been civilization itself.

There are many of us who remember the desperate attempts of the late Henry Stimson, then the U.S. Secretary of State, to bring the moral pressures of the world to bear upon the aggressor in Manchuria. Later, the Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, standing alone before the General Assembly of the League of Nations, begged in vain for aid to defend his homeland.

Both Stimson and the Ethiopian Emperor warned the world that in the unchecked aggression, then loose in the world, more than the fate of just the countries immediately concerned was involved. But the world, back in the thirties, turned deaf ears upon the warning. With success, the appetites of the aggressors grew. Manchuria and Ethiopia led to the Rhineland, Munich, Poland, and Pearl Harbor.

Had the United Nations not acted in Korea, the security of the non-Communist Far East would have been seriously jeopardized. For example, the failure of the United Nations to meet the challenge in Korea might well have encouraged a similar aggression against Indochina. Indochina is the gateway to Indonesia, Thailand, Burma, and Malaya. If the Communists had taken over these they would have outflanked India and Pakistan.

Had the United Nations not acted, Japan would be in grave danger today. And Japan is the third greatest industrial area of the world.

The men of the Kremlin knew very well what their objectives were in Korea. A secret intelligence report on a speech made by a Red army officer to his troops just before the invasion has been made public.

The Red officer said:

In order to undertake the long-awaited world revolution we must first unify Asia. Java, Indochina, Malaya, India, Tibet, Thailand, the Philippines, and Japan are our ultimate targets.

The United States' role in the defense of freedom in Korea was shown clearly by the same officer, for in continuing his talk he said:

The United States is the only obstacle in our road. We must crush the United States.

Those are words every American should take into consideration when he thinks about Korea.

A veteran of the Korean conflict, Capt. James Jabara, ace jet pilot, was greeted by a reporter from his home town of Wichita, Kans. The reporter asked him: "Why are we fighting in Korea, Captain?" Jabara answered: "So we won't have to fight in Wichita."

That is the answer to "why Korea."

Proof of Success for Free World

I suppose we might have expected that there would be a few among us who would react to the present world situation by becoming hysterical. And sure enough there are those who, for instance, are crying: "The free world is losing the Cold War at the rate of a hundred million people a year." It must have been just such men Tom Paine was talking about when he said: "It is the business of little minds to shrink. I love the man that can smile in trouble," and referred to such panics as "the touchstones of sincerity and hypocrisy, which sift out the hidden thoughts of men, and hold them up in public to the world."

What do these people mean by this statement, "The free world is losing the Cold War at the rate of a hundred million people a year"? We have heard it over the radio and seen it in magazines and newspaper reports of speeches. It has become a kind of slogan.

The free world hasn't lost a hundred million people this year. The free world didn't lose a hundred million people last year. It didn't lose a hundred million people in 1950. In fact, we gained several hundred thousand, those who could no longer stand life under a police regime and came streaming over to the free world across what the Kremlin was trying to make into an Iron Curtain.

What these hysterical people refer to, I suppose, are two developments. In 1946-47 the Kremlin imposed Communist regimes on the countries in Eastern Europe which it had occupied during the war and which it still occupied or surrounded. The second development was the victory of the Communist forces over the Republic of China in spite of tremendous amounts of aid given to that Government by the United States. In both of these cases the development could have been prevented only by sending in American officers, American soldiers, American planes, and, in the case of China at least, by an American domination of the country to an extent that would have built up fierce resentments not only there but in other countries now on our side—and would have involved us in a war whose dimensions would be many times that of Korea.

They were tragic developments—make no mistake about it—but when in the long struggle for freedom has the course ever been without its set-backs?

Let us remember, those who are for freedom, that while these set-backs were being incurred we have been having some victories.

One of the Iron Curtain countries, Yugoslavia, has made the break.

Other countries in the free world, such as India and Pakistan, are becoming more wary of communism. The fact is that the population of the free world is today twice that of the Communist world including China. Europe, a powerhouse

of freedom second only to the United States, is strong and getting stronger.

Perhaps the best index of our success, the best index of the strength of the free world relative to the Soviet world in terms of their productive capacity either for war or for peace, are the figures on steel production. The estimated steel production in metric tons for the entire world last year was 206 million tons. Of that production, 163 million, or three-fourths of the world's production, was in countries of the free world. Ninety-five million, or slightly less than one-half was in the United States. Fifty-eight million, or a little more than one-fourth, was in Western Europe.

Only 38 million, or approximately one-fifth, is produced by all the Communist countries put together, including the Soviet Union.

The steel production of China, incidentally, is only one tenth of a million tons, or 1/2,000 of the world's production. Japan with its production of 6½ million tons is on the side of the free world.

But then it is asked, "Assuming we have been making headway, do we have what it takes to maintain this leadership?" Take an editorial that appeared a few days ago in the *Omaha World-Herald*. It quotes Senator Saltonstall:

Suppose that we give you 60 billions for fiscal '53 and then 60 billions for fiscal '54 and, let's assume 60 billions for '55. Where do we come out? Where do we stand at that point with respect to our foreign policy?

And the *World-Herald* goes on:

Airplanes, the latest jet-powered models, both fighters and bombers, will be flowing out of the factories. . . . Atom bombs will be turned out at a frightening rate. . . . Other weapons and ordnance will be piling up. . . . Then what to do? . . . The questions are . . . real and urgent. For the truth is that there is just one classical historical way in which nations dispose of their store of weapons—and that is in war against other nations. Almost always in the past, the very act of getting ready for war has led to war. . . . Even if the United States should gain the advantage by the year 1955, would that fact be translated automatically into world serenity? A defense program which will cost the people at least 60 billion dollars a year should have an aim, a goal.

Those are real questions, and the American people ought to be clear about the answers.

We are living in a time when the free world must have armaments, stupendous amounts of them, if it is to hold back a conspiratorial world power that is prepared to use military might to accomplish its goal of world domination. Second only to that threat is the danger the *World-Herald* refers to, that too many people will become impatient, will become unnerved, will become reckless.

The Principles of Cooperation and Reciprocity

Can the people of the free world—and the decision will rest here in the United States to a greater degree than anywhere else—can the people of the free world carry the tremendous burden of being

militarily strong and still regard that military strength only as a protection for doing something that is even more important—the constant pushing forward of the cause of freedom accompanied by a vigorous campaign of peace?

There is no single answer to this. We have to answer it every day.

For instance, we talk to our friends and allies about the necessity of their cooperating. If our words are to carry meaning, we are going to have to proceed on the principle of cooperation ourselves.

We have been, of course. Under the Mutual Security Program we are helping with both military and economic aid. We are sharing generously both our skills and resources.

But there is more to it than that. Our allies are no more anxious to be continually in the position of receiving gifts than we are to be continually making them. They want, as far and as fast as possible, to stand on their own.

We have got to let them do it. What I am talking about here, of course, is international trade.

Let us take Japan by way of example. Here is a country now on its own. It is being brought back into the family of free nations on a basis of equality. It wants to earn its way as a member of the world community. It has the human resources of energy and skill to do it. But if we, and the other free nations, shut our doors to Japanese products, Japan simply will not be able to do it. Her people must eat. They must have shelter and clothing. All three cost money. And if they can't sell, they can't buy. Inability to earn the resources necessary for self-support through trade with the free nations will inevitably increase the lure of potential trade elsewhere. And both Communist China and Russia are very eager to trade with Japan. They want not only her products but a close relationship with her people. And they want, most of all, to prove to her, and to the other Asiatic nations, that the cooperation the United States talks about stops at our own frontiers.

It was not a coincidence that a so-called Economic Conference was staged at Moscow in April. We cannot blink the fact that the Conference had propaganda results.

I am not talking about flooding American markets with foreign goods. Our gross national product is over 325 billion dollars per year. It has increased 100 billion dollars in the last 5 years. The best that foreign suppliers could do would be only a very small percentage of that. But what are small percentages to us are often matters of life or death to the other countries.

There is no quick and easy answer to this problem, but in approaching it we need to bear in mind that every time we take action to restrict the imports of some specific commodity, we do much more than affect a limited and special situation. We create fear in the hearts of all those who are

endeavoring to sell in the American market and who must sell if they are to earn dollars to buy our goods. What may seem to be a small, unimportant action can have serious consequences when measured against the total picture. We create grave uncertainty about the prospects of creating a healthy world economy. We undermine our leadership not only in the economic field but across the board.

But the final answer to the Omaha *World-Herald's* question lies in the fact that goods are not all we have to export. What we have learned in the 176 years of our existence as a Nation is, in the last analysis, our greatest export.

We are not just anti-Communist. We are affirmativists. We are resisting communism because it is bent on tearing down our work. We have been engaged, in our life as a Nation, in bringing into existence a set of principles which are today, no less than when Lincoln spoke, the "best hope of earth." They underlie our daily pattern of living, our unmatched economy, and our Government.

We believe, as George Mason of Virginia put it, that of all the forms of government "that is best which is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness" and that the blessings of liberty can be preserved to any people only "by frequent recurrence" to these fundamental principles.

But these principles are as broad as humanity itself. They derive from the experience of the ages, from man's growing knowledge of himself, and from spiritual insights.

Their characteristic is a concern for human happiness based on human rights and a belief in the possibility of progress, if enough people desire it. From them flows our faith in a pluralistic society over a monolithic totalitarianism, and our belief in the separation of powers in government; public schools, academic freedom, and a free press; the separation of church and state with equal freedom of all religions; free enterprise, with a special concern for the preservation of small businesses; and a strong labor-union movement to deal equally with our strong and flourishing business organizations.

We cannot, of course, impose this revolution on other people. It was a part of the revolution of the free mind which held that it is through the inquiring mind that we come upon the eternal truths. Our revolution was a revolt against the imposing of beliefs on any people. And to *impose* a free mind upon anyone is a contradiction in terms.

Our revolution remains, in the long run, the supreme attraction. Precisely because of its derivations, it holds up the goal toward which all men move. That is the real answer to the question whether we can make our present effort with confidence in the outcome.

It is, in part, an act of faith; but it is a faith that Americans have long held and not in vain.

Special Significance of World Trade Week

Press Conference Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press May 21]

We are celebrating World Trade Week. This year, at a time when the free world is joined in a gigantic effort to build a common defense against aggression, World Trade Week takes on a special significance.

To build the defensive strength of the free nations, each is contributing its resources and its strength. As its contribution, the United States has undertaken to expand its own defenses and is aiding other countries so that they may be better able to make a larger contribution from their own resources.

Increased international trade plays a key role in this program. It permits each nation to make its best contribution by utilizing its resources, plants, and manpower in the most economic manner. By permitting nations to sell to other nations of the free world the products which each is best able to produce, international trade adds to the economic strength upon which our common defense is based.

All of us as taxpayers are aware of the costs of our aid programs. However, that aid can be cut down if friendly foreign nations can earn their dollars by selling their products to us. As opportunities increase for our friends and allies to earn the dollars they need to buy the products they require for the common defense, their need for financial aid from the United States will decline. Our best course is to insure that these countries are not hampered in their efforts to sell us the things they produce best.

As long as our exports exceed our imports by such large sums as they have for the last 33 years—totaling over 80 billion dollars—foreign countries will not be able to pay for the American goods they need.

We have three choices:

The United States can cut its exports, which would have a serious effect on the U.S. economy and create unemployment.

We can continue indefinitely to make gifts of dollars, which means the United States will never be paid for its exports and the American taxpayer will make up the difference.

Or we can allow the nations of the free world who need American products for our joint defense to sell us their products and so help earn the dollars they need to pay us. This is by far the best solution.

In the collective interests of the free world and the interests of the United States, it becomes obvious that we need a forward-looking trade policy designed to achieve genuine prosperity for ourselves and other free nations.

The Voice of America at the Water's Edge

by *Wilson Compton*

*Administrator, U.S. International Information Administration*¹

IN OCTOBER 1948, just before the last national election, an eminent American who knew what he was talking about spoke quietly and proudly of American unity. This is what he said:

"The important thing to celebrate tonight is the fact that . . . as the result of constructive collaboration, we have produced to a remarkable extent a united unpartisan voice for America at the water's edge . . . We have learned to speak as the United States, and not as the disunited States."

These are the words of the late Senator from Michigan, Arthur H. Vandenberg. We must restore the significance of those words and fortify them in our action as well as in our thinking. Perhaps as much as any other American statesman, Senator Vandenberg was responsible for political bipartisanship in United States foreign policy. His was a vital influence, also, in the alignment of what he called the nonpartisan support of the American people behind the United States course of action in the world.

"This unity," Senator Vandenberg declared, "is the equivalent of many an armed division upon the land, many a flight of eagles in the sky, and many a fleet of ships upon the sea in terms of national security."

A Nonpartisan Approach to World Affairs

Our fundamental foreign policy, after all, is not complicated unless we make it so. It has developed gradually as we have grown from the simple beginnings of a little Republic on a new continent to the elaborate mesh of international relations of a mighty Nation in a world united physically but desperately divided ideologically. Our underlying foreign policy has not much changed with our frequent political changes at home. It may fairly be called an American policy. It is at the point at which we must apply that policy to the complicated, fast-changing local conditions throughout a world in ferment that our greatest difficulties arise.

Our nonpartisan approach to world affairs has been possible, in general, because the people of the United States have understood the need of conveying to the world and to all its peoples the idea of a united America—united in purpose, united in action, and, especially, united in spirit.

With this nonpartisan approach to world affairs, the United States has successfully engaged in many major international undertakings on behalf of freedom and security in all parts of the world. Among the milestones in the recent course of these events have been the ratification of the Charter of the United Nations, the Treaty of Rio, aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, Point Four, the

¹ Address made before the Atlantic Union Committee at Washington on May 21. Also printed as Department of State publication 4609.

North Atlantic Treaty, and the Pacific security treaties. We have undertaken these measures in the interest of our own security and for the protection of those elsewhere upon whose security also depends our own. These undertakings would not have been possible without American unity.

The Smith-Mundt Act, the basic legislation for our overseas information service, also was initiated with nonpartisan support of Americans, regardless of religion, political creed, or racial origin. In carrying overseas the Campaign of Truth, the voices of millions of the American people speak the truth to the world. It is not the voice of any group, any class, any special interest. Its voice speaks from the principles expressed in the Bill of Rights, interpreted today in the way we live, think, and work and, if necessary, fight. It is a reflection of what we are as a Nation and of what in a world at peace we hope to be.

A World-Wide Investment in Ideas

If we want peace and if we expect to attain peace, we must make an investment in ideas and that investment, I believe, must be world-wide. It must eventually be a greater investment than as a Nation we are prepared to make now.

This is not a sole responsibility of government. It is a responsibility and an opportunity shared by all Americans who are interested in what happens to their children and their grandchildren. I happen to be the Administrator of our Government's principal undertaking in this world-wide "war of ideas," the United States International Information Administration. It shares these responsibilities with other agencies of the Government. But it is the only one which has for these purposes a world-wide organization and undertakes these activities world-wide. We are concerned, of course, in the effectiveness of our own services. We are equally concerned in encouraging the similar undertakings of American private agencies and of American citizens generally—who seek mutual understanding among nations and among peoples, who seek peace with freedom.

Historically the "Voice of America" has been expressed largely through normal trade and commerce, travel and ordinary communications. These channels have been interrupted, retarded,

or even choked by wars and "cold wars." Some now have been virtually closed, such as the road to giant China which, after a few decades of seeing the sun, seems to be turning to a new "dark age." We should seek the restoration of these normal "voices" of America, which, over the years of our national life, have established the United States and the American people in a place high in the understanding, respect, and confidence of other peoples throughout the world, including millions who, today, either willingly or unwillingly, are governed by rulers hostile to our way of life, who seek its destruction.

The Struggle for Men's Minds

This is a day of decisions—big decisions. One of the biggest decisions facing the free world today is whether collectively we are able to make and willing to make the effort needed to win the contest for men's minds—a decision which may largely determine whether the "big truth" or the "big lie" will prevail. The outcome of this struggle may well mean ultimately the difference between world peace and world war. Can the free peoples of the world win with ideas a peace which can never be won with armed might alone? It can if we do our part. We can do our part if we are able to speak with a Voice united at the water's edge.

This will not be done unless we keep on trying and unless we are willing to support, as well as to criticize, the only agencies we have through which we may even keep on trying. There is no reason to believe that we are losing the contest for men's minds. Also there is no reason to say that we are winning it. This is not a battle, but a war, even though a "cold" war. It will last a long time. It may last indefinitely.

May we for a moment consider the objectives of our International Information and Educational Exchange Program and the tools with which it works within the free world. A basic premise of American foreign policy is to build unity and strength among the free peoples sufficient to deter aggression and, if necessary, to defeat it. The information program is concerned with the ideological base of this movement for unity and strength; with the ideas and purposes which we and the other free nations hold in common. It is seeking to strengthen the morale and the spiritual ties between ourselves and like-

minded peoples. It is seeking to convert attitudes of neutralism where they exist among free peoples into a spirit of determination. There is a vast difference between opinion and conviction; between wishing and determination. Among freedom-loving peoples, who have been numbed by years of frustration and fear, we are seeking to strengthen their conviction and to fortify their determination. Determination is a product of the mind, not of the factory. This is a big job. It is not the job of America alone. We are big. But we are not that big.

We must, of course, seek the political and military cooperation of other free governments. We are doing so. We must seek also the understanding, respect, and confidence of their peoples. Our Voice of America, therefore, in its expression overseas stresses the interests which we have in common. It seeks to present an honest view of an honest America, to express our national interest in knowing and in understanding other peoples; to keep other peoples alert to the menace of international communism; and to strengthen the confidence of other nations that America stands shoulder to shoulder with them in the mutual struggle for a better and safer world. In a word the Voice of America represents American aspirations. If, as a Nation, we do not aspire, we shall eventually wither.

The "Tools" of the Program

What are the weapons available to us collectively in this struggle for men's minds? Insofar as we choose to speak through agencies of our Government, our principal means are those of the United States International Information Administration through the use of radio, motion pictures, the press, publications, overseas information centers, and the widely publicized exchange of persons.

Our radio broadcasts, commonly known as the Voice of America, now are carrying our message overseas in 46 languages. It reaches nearly 100 countries. It operates around the clock, and its potential audience is numbered in the tens of millions daily.

Our international press and publications service, including our daily *Wireless Bulletin*, reaches more than 100,000,000 readers. Our motion pictures, produced in 40 different lan-

guages, tell an American story to an annual gross audience of over 400,000,000 persons. These are effective principally in areas where most people cannot read.

Other countries are learning about the United States and its ways also through our information centers located in more than 150 strategic localities overseas, where they work closely with local editors, radio commentators, and community leaders generally.

In the past year nearly 8,000 students, teachers, professors, and leaders came to this country from abroad or went overseas on United States Government-sponsored grants. Many thousands more were sponsored through private agencies. We are now emphasizing the exchange of leaders who are in a position to be molders of opinion—journalists, labor leaders, government officials—who, if they wish, can spread the truth among their own peoples when they return to their homes. There is no more effective answer to the "big lie" than to expose it first-hand. Is there a genuine interest in these exchanges of persons? Recently in a single city of India there were available 60 of these grants for study in America, and for these 60 there were 22,000 qualified applicants.

Effectiveness of the Program

These are valuable tools. We are only beginning to use them. Today the American people generally regard the Voice of America as an interesting experiment toward peace. But they do not know much about it. Some are dubious. Some are enthusiastic. Some think it is not a proper function of government in a free society. Others think it is indispensable unless we wish to abandon the "big truth" and leave the war of ideas throughout the world to the mercy of the "big lie." Some think it is all right in principle but that it cannot be effective in practice. Some think it is relatively unimportant; others that it is more important than battleships, bombs, and guns. I believe that the International Information and Exchange of Persons Program, if it is patiently developed, may eventually make the difference between world peace and world war. But its success depends as much upon public understanding of it and interest in it here at home as upon the effectiveness of its efforts overseas.

Since the Voice of America is beamed entirely overseas and mostly in foreign languages, it is rare that anyone in the United States ever hears it. This is almost equally true of its International Press Service, which goes to nearly 10,000 newspapers abroad, and to its mobile Motion-Picture Service, which is one of its most effective means of reaching illiterate populations with a message of hope and encouragement from America. The part of this program most visible here at home, in fact the only one, is the exchange of persons which annually brings here thousands of teachers, students, and leaders from overseas.

This program needs criticism, informed criticism. Also, it needs support, informed support. It needs the understanding of patriot groups, such as your own, which, in other ways, are seeking the keys to peace. One of the issues on which particularly we need public understanding is in the growing contest between the "big truth" and the "big lie." Recent attempted gigantic swindles of the people of the world, such as the immoral propaganda of the alleged use of germ warfare in Korea by United Nations forces and, within the past fortnight, the twisted interpretation of the unhappy events concerning the outbreaks in the Kojedo prison camp in South Korea, have more than ever sharpened the menace of the "big lie."

I believe firmly in the policy so strongly asserted by Senator Vandenberg that our political disagreements should stop at the water's edge, that if we have severe issues over policies, as we do have, we should fight them out and settle them at home and not debate them abroad. Just as firmly do I believe that America's voice overseas should always be, as always it has been, the voice of truth. The United States of America, since the beginning of the Republic, has made a world-wide imprint as a Christian

Nation with a moral sense, composed of honorable people, whose word is good, who value their freedom, their right, and their chance to choose, who wish to be good neighbors, who would like to help other people to the same opportunities which they seek for themselves, who want peace. It would be wholly out of character for us to use the immoral propaganda techniques of international communism. We would lose even if we won, and we would be defrauding our grandchildren of their greatest heritage. Theodore Roosevelt in another period of turmoil said: "Speak plainly, speak softly, and carry a big stick." The Voice of America will never be the voice of Americans unless it is the voice of truth.

The Secretary of State, in a public address on the "Strategy of Freedom,"² spoke of the elements of our national foreign policy by which we seek to avoid war and to secure peace. He stated that these elements constitute a "national policy and not a party policy."

"It is right and proper," said he "that there should be differences of opinion among us about the execution of [our national] policy, and about questions of emphasis, priorities, application and administration. No one has a monopoly of wisdom; and the vigor and vitality of a democratic society derive from free discussion and debate and the consent which flows from understanding. However vigorous our debates may be, it should be made clear to all that our country is united in its determination to hew to the Strategy of Freedom which is our national policy."

With equal emphasis, his concluding words may be applied to our actions today at the water's edge:

"The nation's peril is our challenge. The united will of the people must be our answer."

² BULLETIN of Dec. 18, 1950, p. 962.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings¹

Adjourned During May 1952

UN (United Nations):

Economic and Social Council:

Narcotic Drugs Commission: 7th Session	New York	Apr. 15-May 14
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Restrictive Business Practices: 2d Meeting.	New York	Apr. 28-May 10

Social Commission: 8th Session	New York	May 12-30
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Trusteeship Council:

Standing Committee on Administrative Unions	New York	May 5-10
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Committee on General Procedures	New York	May 5-10
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Standing Committee on Petitions	New York	May 5-10
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International Wheat Council: 8th Session	London	Apr. 17-May 9
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ILO (International Labor Organization):

Metal Trades Committee: 4th Session	Geneva	Apr. 21-May 3
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Iron and Steel Committee: 4th Session	Geneva	May 5-17
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Governing Body: 119th Session	Geneva	May 26-31
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ITU (International Telecommunication Union):

Administrative Council: 7th Session	Geneva	Apr. 21-May 17
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CCIR International Radio Consultative Committee:

Study Group V	Stockholm	May 15-25
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Study Group VI	Stockholm	May 15-27
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Study Group XI	Stockholm	May 20-28
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Cannes International Film Festival	Cannes	Apr. 23-May 10
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South Pacific Commission: 9th Session	Nouméa	Apr. 28-May 7
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6th International Hydrographic Conference	Monaco	Apr. 29-May 9
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NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization):

Petroleum Planning Committee, Meeting of Working Group	Paris	May 1-12
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Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 4th Meeting	Washington	May 13-15
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Petroleum Planning Committee: 2d Meeting	Paris	May 19-21
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FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):

Poplar Commission, International, 6th Session	Rome	May 26-28
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Working Party on Fertilizers	Bandung, Indonesia	May 5-10
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Rice Breeders Working Party	Bandung, Indonesia	May 5-10
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Meeting on Fisheries Statistics	Copenhagen	May 26-31
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International Rice Commission: 3d Session	Bandung, Indonesia	May 12-16
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Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law	Brussels	May 2-10
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WHO (World Health Organization): 5th Assembly	Geneva	May 5-23
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International Rubber Study Group: 9th Meeting	Ottawa	May 5-9
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Caribbean Commission: 14th Meeting	Guadeloupe	May 6-11
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International Symposium on Problems of Desert Research	Jerusalem	May 7-14
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Sample Fairs	Valencia	May 10-30
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ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):

Council: 16th Session	Montreal	May 13-23
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Air Navigation Commission: 10th Session	Montreal	May 13-23
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South Pacific Commission: Fisheries Conference	Nouméa	May 14-23*
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International Cotton Advisory Committee: 11th Session	Rome	May 17-31
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In Session as of May 31, 1952

International Materials Conference	Washington	Feb. 26, 1951
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Four Power Conference on Swiss-Allied Accord	Bern	Mar. 5, 1951
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West Point Sesquicentennial	West Point	January-
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International Conference on German Debts	London	Feb. 28-
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International Exhibition of Drawings and Engravings	Lugano, Switzerland	Apr. 10-
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UN (United Nations):

Economic and Social Council:

Human Rights Commission: 8th Session	New York	Apr. 14-
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14th Session of Council	New York	May 20-
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International Court of Justice	The Hague	May 26-
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¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, May 22, 1952. Asterisks indicate tentative dates.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

In Session as of May 31, 1952—Continued

13th Congress of the Universal Postal Union	Brussels	May 14-
Paris International Trade Exhibition	Paris	May 17-
Icao (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Standing Committee on Aircraft Performance: 2d Meeting . . .	Copenhagen	May 19-
Annual Assembly: 6th	Montreal	May 27-
Unesco (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):		
Executive Board: 30th Session	Paris	May 24-
Wmo (World Meteorological Organization):		
Regional Association for Europe: 1st Session	Zürich	May 26-
9th International Congress of Agricultural Industries	Rome	May 27-
International Conference on Large Electric High Tension Systems: 14th Session	Paris	May 28-
Who (World Health Organization):		
Executive Board: 10th Session	Geneva	May 29-

Scheduled June 1-August 31, 1952

International Convention for Protection of Industrial Property . . .	Vienna	June 2-
Fao (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Meeting of Committee on Commodity Problems	Rome	June 3-
Council: 15th Session	Rome	June 9-
Latin American Forestry Commission: 4th Session	Buenos Aires	June 16-
Meeting of Working Party on Torrent Control and Protection of Avalanches	Nice	June 28-
Fao-Caribbean Commission: 2d Regional Conference on Home Economics and Education in Nutrition	Port-of-Spain	June 30-
Un (United Nations):		
Trusteeship Council: 11th Session	New York	June 3-
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 2d Meeting of Working Party on Small Scale Industries and Handicrafts Marketing	Bangkok	July 28-
Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: 3d Session	New York	Aug. 14-
Ad Hoc Commission on Prisoners of War: 3d Session	Geneva	Aug. 25-
4th Meeting of the International Whaling Commission	London	June 3-
International Meeting of Tonnage Measurement Experts	The Hague	June 4-
Ilo (International Labor Organization):		
35th Session of the International Labor Conference	Geneva	June 4-
21st Session of the International Criminal Police Commission	Stockholm	June 9-
Picmme (Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe):		
3d Session	Washington	June 10-
Annual Meeting of the Directing Council of the American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood	Montevideo	June 13-
26th Art Biennial	Venice	June 14-
Committee on Highway Programming and Planning	Washington	June 23-
International Philatelic Exhibition	Utrecht	June 28-
Icao (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
4th Special Meeting of Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Services Committee (European/Mediterranean Region)	Paris	June 30-
Aeronautical Information Services Division Meeting	Montreal	Aug. 19-
2d Meeting of the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries	St. Andrews, New Brunswick	June 30-
15th International Conference on Public Education	Geneva	July 7-
2d International Congress of Physiology and Pathology of Animal Reproduction and Artificial Insemination	Copenhagen	July 7-
6th International Congress for Animal Husbandry	Copenhagen	July 9-
Unesco (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):		
Seminar on Workers' Education (International Center for Adult Education)	Paris	July 12-
International Conference on Copyright	Geneva	Aug. 18-
Wmo (World Meteorological Organization):		
Meeting of Commission for Maritime Meteorology	London	July 14-
International Conference on Soil Fertility	Dublin	July 21-
18th International Red Cross Conference	Toronto	July 23-
Pan American Institute of Geography and History:		
3d Consultation on Geography	Washington	July 25-
Inter-American Seminar on Vocational Education	University of Maryland, College Park, Md.	Aug. 2-
2d International Congress on Analytical Chemistry	Oxford, England	Aug. 4-
13th International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art	Venice	Aug. 8-
8th General Assembly of the International Geographical Union	Washington	Aug. 8-

Scheduled June 1–August 31, 1952—Continued

10th General Assembly of the International Radio Scientific Union	Sydney, Australia	Aug. 11–
8th International Conference of Agricultural Economists	East Lansing, Mich	Aug. 15–
6th International Edinburgh Film Festival	Edinburgh	Aug. 17–
6th International Grassland Congress	Pennsylvania State College, Pa.	Aug. 17–
4th International Congress of Onomastic Sciences	Uppsala, Sweden	Aug. 18–
2d General Assembly of the International Union of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics.	Istanbul	Aug. 25–
8th General Assembly of the Inter-American Commission of Women	Rio de Janeiro	July or August
International Sugar Council	London	July or August

The International Mathematical Union and Its Work

REPORT OF THE FIRST SESSION HELD AT ROME, MARCH 6–8, 1952

by Marshall H. Stone

The new International Mathematical Union held its first General Assembly at Rome, March 6–8, 1952. The Assembly planned its activities up to the time of its next meeting, to be held in the Netherlands in 1954 in connection with the next International Congress of Mathematicians. The Assembly also elected officers of the Union, as follows: President, M. H. Stone (U.S.); First Vice President, E. Borel (France); Second Vice President, E. Kamke (Federal Republic of Germany); Secretary, E. Bompiani (Italy); and elected members of the Executive Committee, W. V. D. Hodge (U.K.), S. Iyanaga (Japan), and B. Jessen (Denmark).

The following 22 countries are now members of the Union: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia. With the exception of Argentina, Canada, Cuba, and Pakistan, all these countries were represented at the Rome meeting. An application from Sweden for membership in the Union is now pending. The General Assembly was attended also by observers from Poland and Portugal. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Council of Scientific Unions sent representatives who participated in the work of the Assembly.

The function of the International Mathematical

Union is to promote international cooperation and activities which favor the development of mathematics. The valuable work done by national mathematical organizations (such as the American Mathematical Society, the Mathematical Association of America, the Institute of Mathematical Statistics, the Association for Symbolic Logic, and the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, to name the principal American mathematical organizations) needs to be supplemented and coordinated by an international organization in which common problems can be discussed and attacked for the common benefit. Among such problems are the facilitation of international travel by mathematicians (student mathematicians included) for scientific purposes; the organization of general and special scientific meetings of an international character, like the International Congress of Mathematicians (which has been held, except for interruptions due to World Wars I and II, at intervals of approximately 4 years since 1893); the solution of financial and technical difficulties obstructing the prompt publication and universal dissemination of mathematical discoveries and ideas; and the many problems arising from the need for teaching more mathematics to more young people in a world where science and technology are accelerating the already rapid changes in our old ways of life.

The Union will accept the adherence of any country which is mathematically active and which applies for membership in one of the five groups

described in the statutes. The Union, moreover, will continue to urge the adherence of all mathematically active countries which are not yet members. It is also very encouraging that, as the U.S. delegation to the recent General Assembly has reported, the work of the Union has begun in a cordial spirit, permitting the Union to combine the best features of the various related proposals put forward in the debate on its program.

In the experience of mathematicians, personal associations through correspondence and at individual or group meetings are most fruitful for the development of mathematics. The discussion of current research and the exchange of ideas about mathematical problems under independent study by a number of different investigators are stimulating and helpful to a very significant degree. The Union believes that it can augment the opportunities for fruitful associations by publishing both a world directory of active mathematicians and a regular bulletin covering the news of current mathematical publications, international mathematical meetings, and individual travel by mathematicians. A committee is making plans for these publications.

Work of the International Commission

One of the most significant tasks to be undertaken by the Union will be the continuation and expansion of the work begun a number of years ago by the International Commission of Mathematical Instruction. This Commission proposed to the General Assembly that it be reconstituted as a Committee of the Union. At the Rome meeting the Assembly acted favorably on this proposal, and the Committee is now being organized. The problems of instruction which await consideration by the Committee are of wide variety. For example, the coming decades will see the establishment of systems of mass education in many countries where schooling has in the past been restricted to a fortunate few. The place of mathematical instruction in these new educational systems must be determined with attention to the requirements of the modern industrial society, which is displacing the older agricultural forms of social organization throughout the world.

If democracy is to have any meaning in a complex industrial society, the people must know enough of mathematics to grasp the essentials of social security programs, taxation, crop controls, wage and price controls, and other features of governmental relations to the individual citizen which involve mathematical concepts and techniques. At the same time many trades and industrial activities demand mathematical skills above the level of mere mathematical literacy, and failure to provide for the acquisition of those skills within the system of mass education means the denial of opportunity to many a young man or woman starting out in life.

The problem of determining the place of mathematics cannot be divorced from technical considerations concerning teaching methods. If we judge by the results, we must find it difficult to escape from the conclusion that our attempts to teach mathematics as part of a program of mass education have so far been, to put it bluntly, a colossal failure, traceable to our ignorance and complacency in respect to the art of teaching.

No less important than elementary mathematical instruction is the training of young scientists, including mathematicians, in the various branches of mathematics basic to scientific understanding and research. The student of man and his behavior, whether individual or social, stands increasingly in need of mathematical tools and the ability to use them. Thus, the problem of higher instruction in mathematics has to be examined in the light of the social scientist's needs quite as much as those of the natural scientist and engineer. The Committee on Mathematical Instruction can perform a valuable service by stressing the importance of this problem, as well as by stimulating the study of teaching methods and the preparation of teaching materials, particularly textbooks.

Role of Mathematics in our Society

Whatever the Union may be able to do on behalf of progress in mathematics affects interests far wider than the obvious ones of the mathematical profession itself, because mathematics plays a vital role in the growth of our industrial civilization. Indeed, the capacity for national growth and development can be gauged rather accurately by the quality and extent of the national activity in mathematics. Advances in mathematical research are essential to advances in pure science, and hence to advances in technology.

Although the International Mathematical Union already has more than a score of member countries, its resources are limited and it must commence its work on a modest scale. By keeping the initial outlays at a minimum, the Union will be able to build up a small reserve fund, essential to its financial security. The Union hopes that the nature of its work may inspire the good will and the generosity of individuals and organizations both within and without the mathematical profession. It believes that some of its activities would be of interest to UNESCO—particularly that part of the work of the Committee on Mathematical Instruction which deals with mathematical literacy and secondary mathematics teaching.

In each country which adheres to the Union, a National Committee for Mathematics has been formed as the adhering organization for that country. In the United States the National Committee is a committee of the Division of Mathematics of the National Research Council, the adhering organization for the United States being the National Academy of Sciences-National Research

Council. These National Committees for Mathematics will give continuing attention to relations between the Union and the adhering organizations. They can actively promote the work of the Union both by interpreting it to the people of their respective countries and by soliciting support for it from both governmental and private agencies. Above all, they can contribute strength to the Union by maintaining close contacts be-

tween the Union and the members of the mathematical profession in the various adhering countries.

• *Mr. Stone, author of the above article, is chairman of the Department of Mathematics at the University of Chicago. Mr. Stone was chairman of the U.S. delegation to the March session of IMU.*

U.S. Denies Holding "Cartel" Position on Control of Atomic Energy

*by Ambassador Benjamin V. Cohen
Deputy U. S. Representative to the United Nations¹*

Now because Mr. Malik has spoken in such misleading terms about the U.N. plan, without holding that it is sacrosanct, I am forced to explain some of the facts about the plan which Mr. Malik constantly misrepresents.²

The term "ownership" as used in the U.N. plan for the control of atomic energy does not contemplate any supermonopoly on a commercial basis. It has nothing to do with private profits. It does not contemplate strict control by U.S. capitalists.

It does contemplate a multilateral plan, an international plan. If such an international plan can be branded as an American-controlled scheme, I am forced to repeat what I have asked Mr. Malik before: Is there any form of international control, that is not subject to the Soviet veto, which will not be branded when it suits the Soviet purpose, as American controlled rather than international controlled?

If we cannot agree on a multilateral international control plan without veto, then any effective international control is excluded. Whether it is the U.N. plan or any other plan, we believe that we must agree on an independent international

control, but if we are going to agree on it, it must not be subject to veto and it must not be branded in advance as a plan controlled by American mechanical majority.

The sole object of the United States in relation to atomic energy is to insure prohibition, in practice, of atomic weapons and to insure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

All that Mr. Malik says about our avoiding the prohibition of atomic weapons is a misrepresentation. Our concern is to find effective means; not a prohibiting on paper but eliminating of atomic weapons in practice.

As to the safeguards necessary to assure such a result, we do not care whether they are described as "ownership" or as "control." The important point is that we have those safeguards.

Safeguards in the Field of Atomic Energy

Let us review briefly the safeguards, avoiding the use of the controversial word "ownership." They are all set up in the second report of the Atomic Energy Commission, part of which I am paraphrasing. They were discussed in detail in the United Nations in 1947 and 1948. Sufficient time has elapsed so that I think it would be profitable to everyone if we review those principles and the reasons for them.

The central fact to remember is that large-scale development of atomic energy automatically and inevitably results in the production of nuclear fuel. Such fuel can be used in weapons with

¹ Excerpts from a statement made before Committee I of the Disarmament Commission on May 14 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

² Yakov Malik is the Soviet representative on the Disarmament Commission.

For text of the General Assembly's resolution on atomic energy control, as adopted Nov. 4, 1948, see BULLETIN of Nov. 14, 1948, p. 606.

a relatively small effort and requiring small installations. For this reason, the broad purposes of safeguards in the field of atomic energy was in the interest of international security to prevent nuclear fuel in dangerous quantities being accumulated or seized by any nation.

The international control agency created to insure this general objective and to insure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only would have the following four specific objectives under the U.N. plan.

1. To give the international control agency the means of preventing preparations for atomic warfare.
2. To lessen the possibility of one nation, or group of nations, achieving potential supremacy in the field of atomic energy.
3. To give warning to complying nations of any breach of the treaty.
4. To dispel suspicions and false accusations.

The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission determined that in order for the control agency to accomplish these objectives it must have a measure of control over source material, nuclear fuels, and dangerous facilities which it frequently described as ownership by the international agency. The meaning of that word agency, as used by the Atomic Energy Commission, can briefly be described as follows, paraphrasing the second report of the Commission:

The studies of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission established the necessity for international control and allocation of the quantities of uranium and thorium which are to be separated from their place in nature, the time and place of the further processing and purification of source materials, and the size, use, and disposition of working stocks and stocks in transit. Without such comprehensive international control of the flow of source materials from the first point where they are capable of being diverted, there would be serious risk of the diversion of source material or of the accumulation of stocks with a view to subsequent dispersion or seizure.

The basic policies and provisions governing the exercise of this international control and direction must be specified in the treaty or convention and implemented by the international agency to administer these controls effectively. The international agency, acting as trustee for all the signatory nations jointly in accordance with the policies set forth in the treaty or convention, must be given indisputable control of the source materials promptly after their separation from their natural deposits. International security requires that there be no doubt that within the terms of the treaty or convention the right of decision in regard to the disposition of this material must lie with the international agency. Therefore, no nation or person has any right in any circumstances to dispose of or to possess these materials or facilities.

Authority of the U. N. Atomic Energy Commission

It will be seen that the agency's authority with respect to source materials or nuclear fuels includes the exclusive right to move or lease the material, the right to use and produce energy from them, and the same rights for all production formed from them. No disposition of material can be made without the permission of the agency.

It is proposed that the agency should acquire for a price to be agreed the source material from the time it is removed from the place of deposit in nature or, in the case of source material containing other constituents, from the time those constituents had been extracted. The agency will not be permitted to sell these materials but could lease them for authorized uses.

Likewise, the agency's authority with respect to dangerous facilities includes the right of the agency to make decisions regarding their allocation, construction, and operation within the terms of the treaty or convention. The useful and non-dangerous production of these plants would be made available to the nations under fair and equitable arrangements. The location and type within a nation will be decided by agreement with the nation concerned.

The agency's authority over facilities within a nation includes the right of possession, operation, and disposition subject to the terms of the treaty or convention. The agency could not sell dangerous facilities. The agency's authority over a power plant would not include the right to shut down a plant at will. It does include responsibility to operate facilities in such a way as to not endanger health and the responsibility for any damage.

While vesting ownership in the agency in the sense of a trust exercised on behalf of the signatory states jointly in order that the agency should have the final right of decision in regard to the disposition of source materials, nuclear fuels, and the operation of dangerous facilities, it was also realized that the nations could not be expected to give unlimited discretionary powers to the international agency. The plan, therefore, set out in detail the provisions which are to govern the location, mining production, distribution, and use of source material and nuclear fuel, as well as dangerous facilities. It would then be the duty and responsibility of the international agency to implement these provisions in accordance with the terms of the treaty.

I wish to emphasize that under this U.N. plan the powers, rights, and functions of both the international control agency and of the signatory nations are spelled out in great detail. The agency is, under the provisions of the treaty establishing international control, in fact, the servant and not the master of the signatory nations. These provisions are very carefully spelled out in the U.N.

plan. No nation is asked to buy a pig in a poke or to submit itself to any American cartel.

It was recognized that the treaty or convention which would put such a system into effect cannot cover all the situations that might arise between the signatory states and the agency. However, whatever legal issues might arise in this connection, nations cannot have any proprietary rights or rights to decision arising therefrom over source materials, nuclear fuels, or dangerous facilities located within their territory. Such restrictions are not in order to give private profits to any cartel. Such restrictions are intended to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons.

The agency would also have certain authority with respect to the detection of secret activities and with respect to research which are intimately linked in the functions that have been described.

Prevention and Detection of Secret Activities

With regard to the prevention and detection of secret activities, the essential thing is that all activities and facilities in the field of atomic energy must either be managed or licensed by the agency. Once this is provided, then the agency in the detection of clandestine activities need not be concerned with the motives of those carrying on unauthorized activities in this field, for it is the very existence of such activities that is illegal.

With regard to research, the agency should have positive research and development responsibility in order to remain in the forefront of atomic knowledge so as to render the agency more effective in promoting the beneficial use of atomic energy and in eliminating its destructive ones.

In this statement I have paraphrased some of the functions of the international agency concerned with atomic energy as set forth in the U.N. plan. I am assured by those with technical competence that in order to insure the elimination of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, the international agency should have the authority set forth in the plan, and no less authority.

It makes no difference to my government, however, whether authority of this nature is described as "ownership" or as "control." It is the authority itself, and not the words describing it with which we are concerned. We are concerned with the elimination of atomic weapons and therefore with the creation of a system which will produce that result.

Soviets Asked To Present Realistic Proposals

It was the view of the United Nations that the proposals made by the Soviet Union in 1947 would not produce that result. When the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union in the past General Assembly stated that the Soviet Union had new and

additional proposals,³ we welcomed his initiative. We are waiting to receive those proposals. To date, however, we have received nothing that goes beyond the inadequate proposals of 1947 or, if the new proposals are intended to go beyond that, we have not been given the information necessary to enable us to see that fact. Indeed, we are uncertain whether the Soviet Union is advocating even the unsatisfactory measure of international control which it proposed in 1947. In fact, it is not clear to us that the Soviet Union may not have retreated from those proposals in that it now maintains that the international control organ is not entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of states in the exercise of its functions.

We must, therefore, again ask the Soviet representative these all important questions: What authority in addition to those enumerated in the Soviet proposal of 1947 would be granted to the international agency under their new suggestions? What safeguards, if any, does the Soviet Union propose beyond those set forth in the 1947 proposal? We would deeply appreciate answers to those questions.

It is no good for the Soviet representative to go on saying that all will be well if we simply take a decision in principle on prohibition and the establishment of a control system. Perhaps he will recall the old Russian proverb: "If you tell a man long enough he is a pig, he will begin to grunt."

As I have said, the control system proposed by the Soviet Union so far as it has been explained to us is inadequate and not acceptable, but if there are additional facts that we have not been enlightened on, we will consider them with an open mind. Our desire is to find an effective system.

Even if the Soviet proposals provided an adequate system, even if we were to all agree on precisely what the control system should be, then the question remains, what would be the practical effect of taking a decision in principle on prohibition? The Soviet representative says that the prohibition would not go into effect until the control system went into effect. If that is the case, why does the Soviet Union want a decision, an immediate decision in principle on prohibition now?

It would seem more sensible and realistic to work out the details of a control system which would put into effective operation the system and would really prohibit the atomic bomb. That would be something more than a promise or a decision in principle. That would be the real elimination of atomic weapons. If we could agree on that, we could all work together in using atomic energy for the betterment of mankind.

What we need here in order to make progress is some indication from the Soviet representative

³ For text of a press conference statement by Secretary Acheson on the "new" Soviet disarmament proposal, together with the text of that proposal, see *ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1952, p. 126.

that his Government is prepared to agree and to discuss sensible and realistic proposals.

We still await the answers to the questions put to the Soviet representative by several of our colleagues here in previous sessions and at this session. The Soviet representative has still not explained precisely how his Government visualized the process of inspection on a continuing basis. He has not explained precisely what his Government means by saying that this inspection, although on a continuing basis, should not interfere in the domestic affairs of states. He has not explained how an inspection system alone will suffice to insure that atomic weapons will be effectively prohibited.

I know that we have translation difficulties.

The English word "control" has connotations in Russian different from what it means to us. Perhaps our discussion would go more profitably if we left aside these difficult words for a time and talked in specific terms of operation—what would be done; who would do it; and how it would be done.

I can assure the Soviet representative that if he is able to make specific and detailed proposals in these terms, my Government will examine them with great care and with an open mind. We do not really care so much about what words are used. What we care about is establishing an international system which will make sure that weapons of mass destruction are not used, that great armies no longer threaten the peace.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Fourteenth Session of ECOSOC

On May 20 the Department of State announced that Isador Lubin, U.S. representative on the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (Ecosoc), will attend the fourteenth session of the Council, which will convene on May 20 at U.N. Headquarters, New York. Mr. Lubin and the deputy U.S. representative on the Economic and Social Council, Walter M. Kotschnig, Director, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, will be assisted by the following other members of the U.S. delegation:

Advisers

Robert E. Asher, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Department of State
Kathleen Bell, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
Katherine G. Heath, Office of International Relations, Federal Security Agency
Frances Kernohan, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
Joseph C. McCaskill, Director, Division of International Activities, Department of the Interior
Forrest Murden, United States Mission to the United Nations, New York
Walter Salant, Council of Economic Advisers, Executive Office of the President
William J. Stibray, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State
Virginia C. Westfall, Division of International Administration, Department of State
Ayrnes Joy Wickens, Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor

Ad Hoc Advisers

Herbert Block, Division of Research for U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, Department of State

Joseph D. Coppock, Adviser, Office of Economic Defense Trade Policy, Department of State
Eleanor E. Dennison, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
James F. Green, Deputy Director, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Press Officer

Gilbert W. Stewart, United States Mission to the United Nations, New York

Administrative Assistant

Marie Florence Rodgers, United States Mission to the United Nations, New York

The Economic and Social Council is responsible for making or initiating studies and reports concerning international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters; for the promotion of respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms; and for making recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly of the United Nations, to the members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned.

Among the 46 items on the provisional agenda for the fourteenth session of the Council are consideration of the world economic situation; programs of technical assistance; methods of financing the economic development of underdeveloped countries; international cooperation on water control and utilization; development of arid lands; social activities; freedom of information; prevention of discrimination to minorities; refugees and stateless persons; narcotic drugs; critical shortage of insecticides for public-health purposes; relief and rehabilitation of Korea; applications of nongovernmental organizations for

consultative status; and coordination of the work of the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

The Council will also review the reports of all of its functional and regional commissions, as well as the reports of a number of the specialized agencies, including the International Labor Organization, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Telecommunication Union, and World Health Organization.

The Economic and Social Council is composed of one representative from each of the 18 member states, six countries being elected each year by the General Assembly to serve for a period of 3 years. The member states at the present time are Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay.

The thirteenth session of the Economic and Social Council was held at Geneva, July 30–September 21, 1951, and at Paris, December 18–21, 1951.

Planning Board for Ocean Shipping

On May 12 the Department of State announced that the U.S. delegation to the fourth session of the North Atlantic Planning Board for Ocean Shipping, which convenes on that date at Washington, D.C., is as follows:

United States Representative

Huntington T. Morse, Special Assistant to the Administrator, Maritime Administration, Department of Commerce

Alternate United States Representative

John W. Mann, Attaché, American Embassy, London

Advisers

Charles M. Clark, Jr., Consultant to the Chairman of the Munitions Board, Department of Defense

Lester M. Haddad, Management Engineer, Defense Management Committee, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense

Serge Koushnareff, Deputy Director, Transport and Communications Division, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce

Charles H. McGuire, Director, National Shipping Authority, Department of Commerce

Lehman P. Nickell, Shipping Policy Staff, Department of State

Capt. Herman E. Schieke, U.S.N., Joint Military Transportation Committee Member, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense

James W. Swihart, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State

The Planning Board, composed of all countries which are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, was established by the fourth session of the North Atlantic Treaty Council in furtherance of article 9 of the treaty. The Board reports to the Council and works in close cooperation with other bodies of the treaty organization in all matters relating to merchant shipping in defense planning.

Current United Nations Documents A Selected Bibliography¹

Economic and Social Council

Report of the Universal Postal Union. E/2179, February 27, 1952. 77 pp. mimeo.

Narcotic Drugs. International Limitation of Opium Production. E/2186/Add.1, April 9, 1952. 5 pp. mimeo.

Report of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. E/2195, April 7, 1952. 26 pp. mimeo.

Report of the World Meteorological Organization. E/2196, April 7, 1952. 38 pp. mimeo.

World Conference on Population. Report by the Secretary-General. E/2199, April 9, 1952. 18 pp. mimeo.

Non-Governmental Organizations. Report of the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations. Applications and Re-Applications for Consultative Status. E/2201, April 24, 1952. 7 pp. mimeo.

Co-ordination of the Work of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. Eleventh Report of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination to the Economic and Social Council. E/2203, April 14, 1952. 27 pp. mimeo.

Communications Concerning Human Rights. Note by the Secretary-General. E/2206, April 14, 1952. 7 pp. mimeo.

Inter-Agency Agreements and Agreements Between Agencies and Other Inter-Governmental Organizations. Draft Agreement Between the Organization of American States and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. E/2210, April 21, 1952. 6 pp. mimeo.

Amendments of the Rules of Procedure of the Council. Memorandum by the Secretary-General. E/2212, April 25, 1952. 12 pp. mimeo.

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. Annexes to the Report of the Governing Body. E/ICEF/187/Add.1, March 15, 1952. 54 pp. mimeo. Also General Progress Report of the Executive Director. E/ICEF/190/Add.1, April 22, 1952. 5 pp. mimeo.

Also Statement by Mr. Keeny, Director of UNICEF Asia Regional Office, Bangkok, to Programme Committee, United Nations Headquarters, April 19, 1952. E/ICEF/194, April 19, 1952. 8 pp. mimeo.

Also Statement by Mr. Egger, Paris Office. Development of UNICEF Assistance to Countries in Africa. E/ICEF/195, April 21, 1952. 6 pp. mimeo.

Also Report of the Board of Auditors to the General Assembly on the Audits of the Accounts of the Fund for the year ended December 31, 1951. E/ICEF/196, April 22, 1952. 9 pp. mimeo.

The Problem of Statelessness. Information transmitted by States in pursuance of Economic and Social Council resolution 352 (XII) relating to the problem of statelessness. E/2164/Add.22, April 21, 1952. 5 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an *Official Records* series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

The United States in the United Nations

[May 16–May 29, 1952]

General Assembly

Collective Measures Committee (CMC)—On May 15 the Committee approved the report of its subcommittee on the future program of work of the CMC. The subcommittee was instructed to draft two letters to member states: One, requesting suggestions and ideas as to topics which warrant further study in 1952; the second, requesting information regarding the implementation of recommendations contained in General Assembly Resolution 503 (VI) of January 12, 1952.

At the CMC meeting, the chairman, Joao Carlos Muniz (Brazil), stated that the first report of the Committee, which was submitted to the sixth General Assembly, represented

an invaluable first step forward in the field of collective security under the Charter, inasmuch as it constituted a study, an analysis, an exploration of collective means of defense and coordinated action by nations determined to defend the purposes and principles of the Charter and resolved not to recognize the use of force or threat of force as a valid means for the prosecution of political objectives.

The Collective Measures Committee also established two subcommittees, one for the consideration of economic and financial measures, and one on military measures.

Economic and Social Council

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)—The Council began its 12-week fourteenth session at United Nations Headquarters on May 20 and elected S. Amjad Ali (Pakistan) as President for 1952. By a vote of 14–4 (Soviet bloc, Sweden)–0, the Council adopted the United States proposal to adjourn debate for the session on the Soviet motion to unseat the Chinese National representative.

After consideration and adoption of the agenda, the Council decided to transmit, without discussion, the item on "Allegations regarding infringements of trade union rights" relating to countries which are members of the International Labor Organization (ILO) to that Organization. Only allegations relating to countries not members of ILO will be discussed by the Council. All recommendations of the Non-Governmental Committee on applications for consultative status with the Council, excepting two organizations, were approved. Three separate resolutions were adopted

in which the Council stated it had no objections to the applications of Spain, Nepal, and Libya for membership in UNESCO.

The narcotic drugs agenda item was discussed, including the reports of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and of the Permanent Central Opium Board. A joint Belgium-Egypt-France-U.S. resolution calling for the convening of an international conference to prepare and adopt a protocol on the limitation of opium production was adopted by a vote of 13–3 (Soviet bloc)–2 (Pakistan, U.K.). An amended Belgium-French-U.S. resolution urging governments of opium and coca-leaf producing countries to take effective measures immediately to prevent such production from entering the illicit market was adopted by a vote of 17–0–1 (Iran).

The Council completed discussion of the report of the sixth session of the Commission on the Status of Women and adopted, *inter alia*, the amended draft Convention on Political Rights of Women by a vote of 11–0–6 (Canada, Egypt, Soviet bloc, U.K.); a resolution on equal pay for equal work (11 (U.S.)–0–6); and a resolution calling for annual meetings of the Commission.

Commission on Human Rights—With the adoption of the following additional articles, the Commission completed action on the articles to be included in the draft Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:

1. An article proposed by the United States which recognizes the right of everyone: (a) To take part in cultural life; (b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications. . . ." The vote was 14–0–3 (Soviet bloc).

2. An article on the right of everyone to adequate food, clothing, and housing was approved 14–0–4 (Soviet bloc, U.K.).

3. An article calling for free compulsory primary education was adopted by a vote of 12–5 (U.S., Australia, Belgium, Sweden, U.K.)–1 (India).

4. An article, adopted unanimously, recognizing the right of everyone to an "adequate standard of living and the continuous improvement of living conditions."

5. An article "recognizing the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health" was approved 15–0–3 (Poland, U.S.S.R., U.K.).

6. An article on the protection of mothers and children was adopted, 15-0-3 (Australia, Sweden, U.K.).

7. An article "to ensure the free exercise of the right of everyone to form and join local, national and international trade unions of his choice for the protection of his economic and social interests" was adopted by a vote of 12-2 (Uruguay, Chile)-4 Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia.

8. An article to "ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in this Covenant" was approved 10-3 (U.S., Sweden, U.K.)-5 (Australia, Belgium, China, France, India).

9. A French-Chilean draft article on the non-abridgement of existing rights and freedoms was adopted by a vote of 13-0-5 (Australia, U.K., Soviet bloc).

10. The last article, "general limitations clause," was adopted by a vote of 10-6 (Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Chile)-2 (Egypt, Pakistan).

Social Commission—The Commission, during its 3-week session, *inter alia*, took the following action:

1. It unanimously approved the 12 conclusions and recommendations on the needs of children deprived of a normal home life, on the aid that should be provided by governments and other agencies, and on United Nations readiness to help develop the necessary services.

2. The Commission adopted a resolution calling for further development of child-welfare programs both by governments and by the United Nations.

3. It adopted a resolution requesting the Secretary-General to continue to emphasize the advisory social-welfare services and to "carry out the program in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 418(V) and with due observance to the comments and points of view expressed by the Social Commission at its eighth session."

4. A resolution was approved calling for the simplification of formalities and reduction of costs for migrants.

5. It adopted a resolution recommending that the Economic and Social Council and the Secretary-General explore the problems concerned in financing, housing and community development from external sources, with particular attention to the needs of low-income groups, underdeveloped areas, and countries whose housing facilities have deteriorated owing to war destruction.

6. It adopted a 5-principle resolution on in-service training of social welfare personnel, recommending that "training for social welfare should take as many forms as are appropriate to the needs of the people of the various countries."

7. A resolution was adopted on the rehabilitation of the physically handicapped stating, in part, that all appropriate steps should be taken . . . to intensify and expand the giving of direct assistance to the

governments of under-developed countries in order to help them to assess their problems and work out a realistic program in the field of rehabilitation including a program for the prevention of blindness and the welfare of the blind. . . .

8. The Commission took note of the 420-page "Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation" and recommended

that such a report should be drawn up every four years, and that a document relating to international and governmental programs of technical assistance in social development should also be prepared quadrennially by the Secretariat, two years after each report on the social situation has appeared. . . .

Security Council

Disarmament Commission—On May 28 the United States, United Kingdom, and France submitted a working paper on the Numerical Limitations of All Armed Forces. The paper proposes:

. . . that the maximum ceilings for the U.S.S.R., the United States and China should be the same and fixed at, say, between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 and the maximum ceilings for the United Kingdom and France should be the same and fixed at, say, between 700,000 and 800,000.

For all other states having substantial armed forces there should be agreed maximum ceilings fixed in relation to the ceilings agreed upon for the Five Powers. Such ceilings should be fixed with a view to avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security in any area of the world and thus reducing the danger of war. The ceilings would normally be less than one percent of the population. Moreover, they should be less than current levels except in very special circumstances.

Sir Gladwyn Jebb (U.K.), in introducing these proposals, observed that they were much more drastic and far superior to the Soviet plan for a one-third reduction of the armed forces of the great powers; they provided for fixed ceilings which were in balance.

In his statement, Benjamin V. Cohen (U.S.) pointed out that

The proposals which the French, the British and the American delegations have submitted to the Commission deal with one of the essential parts—and in some ways the most important part—of a comprehensive disarmament program. Our proposals are flexible, they are not intended to be final or exhaustive. The reductions for the United States and, we assume, for the U.S.S.R. and China would be well over 50 percent.

. . . Limiting the numbers of permitted armed forces is only a part of our task. We must also limit the types and quantities of armaments which should be allowed to support permitted armed forces. . . .

Mr. Cohen also noted:

Of course, the proposed reductions in armed forces depends upon the settlement of the Korean conflict and some progress towards the establishment of peaceful conditions throughout the world.

The Commission approved (11-1) (U.S.S.R.) its first report to the Security Council and the General Assembly, which includes the above proposals.

Status of Lend-Lease Negotiations with U.S.S.R.

*Following is the text of a letter from Senator William F. Knowland of California to Secretary Acheson concerning vessels loaned by the United States to the Soviet Union under the Lend-Lease Act and the Master Lend-Lease Agreement, and of the reply sent by Jack K. McFall, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations:*¹

APRIL 10, 1952.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: During World War II the United States Government made available to the U.S.S.R. several ships under the provision of the lend-lease law.

Would you advise me of the number of ships by type, that were made available and their approximate value. I would also like to know the number of ships which have been returned to the custody of the United States by Russia, indicating their type and original value. Could you also advise me what steps this country has taken in order to repossess those ships which have not been returned to us.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND.

APRIL 24, 1952.

MY DEAR SENATOR KNOWLAND: Reference is made to your letter of April 10, requesting information concerning vessels transferred to the Government of the U.S.S.R. under lend-lease and the efforts of this Government to obtain their return, and to Mr. Katz' acknowledgment of your letter by telephone on April 14.

During World War II, the Government of the

United States transferred to the Government of the U.S.S.R. under lend-lease 121 merchant vessels, 585 naval craft, and 29 small Army watercraft. These vessels were procured from appropriations made to the Maritime Commission, the Navy Department, and the War Department, respectively. Of the merchant vessels, 21 were returned and 4 were lost prior to the end of the war, and 9 other vessels were returned after the end of the war. A total of 30 naval craft have been returned, all after the end of the war, and 1 naval vessel has been certified as lost. None of the Army watercraft have been returned. The attached tables show the number of vessels transferred to the Government of the U.S.S.R. and those returned, by types, as well as the approximate cost of the vessels to the Government of the United States at the time of transfer.

From the outset of the lend-lease settlement negotiations with the Government of the U.S.S.R., which began in April 1947, the Department has constantly reminded the Government of the U.S.S.R. of its obligations under article V of the master lend-lease agreement of June 11, 1942, to return to the United States lend-lease articles determined by the President to be of use to the United States. The return of 3 icebreakers was requested in July 1946 and the return of 28 frigates was requested in January 1948. On October 7, 1948, the demand for the return of these vessels under article V was reiterated and, in addition, the return of 186 other naval craft was demanded. The designated vessels were those considered at that time to be of immediate importance to the United States. The Government of the United States had previously stated its willingness to discuss the sale to the Government of the U.S.S.R. of the remaining naval craft, provided there was a prompt and satisfactory over-all lend-lease settlement.

¹ Printed from *Cong. Rec.* of May 7, 1952, p. 4961.

TABLE I.—*Information on merchant vessels transferred to the U. S. S. R. under lend-lease*

Type	Transferred	Value ¹	Returned prior to VJ-day	Value ¹	Lost prior to VJ-day	Value ¹	In Soviet custody on VJ-day	Value ¹	Returned subsequent to VJ-day	Value ¹	Presently in Soviet custody	Value ¹
War-built Liberty ships, dry cargo-----	38	65, 686	1	1, 729	1	1, 729	36	62, 229	0	-----	36	62, 229
Liberty tankers-----	3	5, 186	0	-----	0	-----	3	5, 186	3	5, 186	0	-----
T-2 tankers-----	5	16, 000	0	-----	0	-----	5	16, 000	² 5	16, 000	0	-----
War-built tugs-----	2	1, 235	0	-----	0	-----	2	1, 235	0	-----	2	1, 235
Prewar-built ships, dry cargo-----	60	28, 728	10	5, 329	2	1, 915	48	21, 983	³ 1	500	47	21, 483
Prewar-built tankers-----	12	8, 946	10	7, 295	1	788	1	863	0	-----	1	863
Prewar-built tug-----	1	140	0	-----	0	-----	1	140	0	-----	1	140
Total-----	121	125, 921	21	14, 353	4	4, 432	96	107, 636	9	21, 686	87	85, 940

¹ Cost to the U. S. Government at time of acquisition (\$000).² 1 broken in half; both halves salvaged and returned to the United States.³ Returned to the United States and transferred to Italy from which country originally seized by the United States in World War II.

After further delays, the Government of the U.S.S.R. in August 1949 finally appointed naval experts to discuss the details of return of the 3 icebreakers and 28 frigates, as well as the disposition of the remaining naval craft. On September 27, 1949, an agreement was signed concerning the dates and procedures for the return of 3 icebreakers and 27 frigates, 1 frigate having been certified by the Government of the U.S.S.R. as lost.

It had been the understanding of the Department that the Soviet naval experts had been appointed to discuss the return of all 217 naval vessels demanded on October 7, 1948, as well as the disposition of remaining naval vessels, and immediately following the agreement on the icebreakers and frigates the Soviet representatives were asked to continue discussions. However, without any prior indication to the Department of State, the Soviet naval experts suddenly departed for the U.S.S.R.

In accordance with the agreement of September 27, 1949, the Government of the U.S.S.R. returned the 27 frigates and 1 icebreaker, in the fall of 1949. The 2 remaining icebreakers, however, were not returned until December 1951, the Government of the U.S.S.R. claiming that they were caught in the Arctic ice for some 2 years.

As regards the merchant vessels, the Government of the United States on December 11, 1947, requested the return of one dry cargo vessel, three Liberty tankers and four T-2 tankers. These vessels were returned by the Government of the U.S.S.R. in March 1948. One additional tanker broke in half, however, both halves were salvaged and were returned to the United States. The Government of the United States agreed to transfer title to the remaining vessels to the Gov-

ernment of the U.S.S.R. on agreed terms provided there was a prompt and satisfactory over-all lend-lease settlement.

On January 27, 1951, at a meeting between representatives of the Government of the United States and the Government of the U.S.S.R., Ambassador John C. Wiley, on instruction from the President, demanded the immediate return of all naval and merchant vessels, and Army watercraft. This demand was formally confirmed on February 7, 1951, by a note from the Secretary of State to Mr. Panyushkin, the Soviet Ambassador.² As of possible interest to you I am attaching a copy of this note as well as copies of the notes of the Government of the U.S.S.R. of March 21³ and August 21, 1951,⁴ and the notes of this Government of April 6,⁵ July 2,⁶ 1951, and January 7, 1952.⁷

As will be seen, the replies of the Government of the U.S.S.R. were completely unsatisfactory. The note of the Government of the United States of January 7, accordingly, requests the Government of the U.S.S.R. immediately either to make arrangements for the return of all the lend-lease vessels or agree to submit the problem to the International Court of Justice for adjudication.

It is the intention of the Department to continue to press vigorously for the return from the U.S.S.R. of all the lend-lease vessels.

Sincerely yours,

JACK K. McFALL,
Assistant Secretary
(For the Secretary of State).

² BULLETIN of Feb. 19, 1951, p. 302.³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 23, 1951, p. 647.⁴ *Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1952, p. 87.⁵ *Ibid.*, Apr. 23, 1951, p. 646.⁶ *Ibid.*, July 23, 1951, p. 145.⁷ *Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1952, p. 86.

TABLE II.—*Information on Naval and Army watercraft transferred to the U. S. S. R. under lend-lease*

	Transferred	Value ¹	Returned	Value ¹
NAVAL VESSELS				
Icebreakers.....	3	19, 203	3	19, 203
Frigates.....	28	11, 115	² 27	11, 113
Large minesweepers.....	34	72, 511	0	-----
Minesweepers.....	43	34, 152	0	-----
Large sub chasers.....	78	35, 088	0	-----
Small sub chasers.....	62	7, 418	0	-----
Torpedo boats.....	205	53, 807	0	-----
Landing craft:				
Infantry.....	30	12, 360	0	-----
Tank.....	17	2, 765	0	-----
Vehicle.....	2	21	0	-----
Support.....	2	34	0	-----
Mechanized.....	54	1, 700	0	-----
Floating repair ships.....	4	2, 504	0	-----
River tugs.....	15	19, 000	0	-----
Pontoon barges.....	6	719	0	-----
Motor launch.....	1	11	0	-----
Plane personnel boat.....	1	3	0	-----
Total.....	585	272, 411	30	30, 316
	Transferred	Value ³	Returned	Value ³
ARMY WATERCRAFT				
Tankers.....	9	5, 520	0	-----
Freight vessel.....	1	767	0	-----
Machine shop barges.....	2	412	0	-----
Crane barges.....	17	3, 057	0	-----
Total.....	29	9, 756	0	-----

¹ Lend-lease invoice value (\$000).

² 1 certified as lost.

³ Cost to the U. S. Government at point of transfer (\$000).

Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation

*Statement by Harold F. Linder,
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs* ¹

The treaties with Colombia, Greece, Israel, Ethiopia, and Denmark ² which are now before you bring to nine the number of treaties of this general type which have been signed on behalf

¹ Statement made before a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 9 and released to the press on the same date.

² The treaty with Colombia was signed at Washington on Apr. 26, 1951; with Greece, at Athens on Aug. 3; with Israel, at Washington on Aug. 23; with Ethiopia, at Addis Ababa on Sept. 7, and with Denmark, at Copenhagen on Oct. 1. The supplementary agreement with Italy was signed at Washington on Sept. 26, 1951; for text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1951, p. 568.

of the United States since the war. You will recall that the first two treaties of this series, those with China and Italy, were considered by the Committee in 1948 and those with Uruguay and Ireland 2 years later, and that these treaties were approved by the Senate. The treaty with Italy has now been supplemented by an agreement, also before you, designed to bring it abreast of developments reflected in the more recent ones.

While there are differences among these nine treaties, fundamentally they are alike. Those with Colombia, Denmark, and Israel follow closely the treaty with Uruguay, which in turn was a restated form of the one with Italy. The treaty with Greece is also based on the Uruguay model, but with changes in matters of form. The treaty with Ethiopia is a specially adapted version of the document negotiated with the other countries, involving considerable abridgment of the usual provisions and the addition of articles on diplomatic and consular officers no longer usual in this type of treaty. All these treaties also reflect differences of varying extent in matters of detail, both as a result of new or improved provisions which have been developed from time to time by the Department of State with counsel from other agencies and as a result of the adjustments that inevitably occur during the give and take of negotiation. For example, the basic establishment provisions have been extensively restated in the treaty with Israel, additional provisions on shipping are included in the Greek treaty, and a provision regarding the use of the term "coffee" has been added to the treaty with Colombia. But the general objectives remain the same and, with the departures that may be noted in the case of Ethiopia, all the treaties go about realizing these objectives in essentially the same way.

The more notable differences in the several instruments now before you, both as among themselves and as compared with those previously approved by the Senate, are summarized in the report of the Secretary of State attached in each case to the President's message of transmittal. I want to submit now, for the convenience of the Committee, copies of a tabular comparison which indicates in greater detail the similarities and differences of these instruments on a provision-by-provision basis.³ In my remarks I shall not attempt to repeat or elaborate on that information, leaving the discussion of details to be guided by such questions the Committee may have. To assist in providing specific information about particular provisions, I have with me officers of the Department who have been immediately responsible for the technical aspects of these documents.

The commercial treaty program is the oldest continuing economic program of our Government. It dates back to the beginnings of our national independence and has been kept up, with minor interruptions, ever since. As a rule the first treaty

³ Not printed here.

concluded with a foreign country has tended to be a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation, which sets the framework in which our economic relations can be conducted on a stable basis for the future. The instrument aims at establishing the rule of law in our everyday relations with the country concerned, at protecting our citizens and their property in the foreign country, at promoting our trade, and at reducing discriminations against our shipping. An idea of the enduring character of these treaties may be gained from the fact that the treaty with Denmark now before you is to replace one negotiated with that country in 1826, and the treaty with Colombia will take the place of one signed in 1846.

While this is a traditional program with a history of over a century and a half, its modern phase dates from the years immediately after the First World War. At that time, a broadened and revitalized program devoted particularly to the expansion of our foreign trade was developed under the direction of Secretary Charles Evans Hughes. Negotiations were carried on extensively until the outbreak of World War II, resulting in the conclusion of treaties with 12 countries.

While the current program is a continuation of that instituted under Secretary Hughes, remaining similar in fundamentals to what has gone before, the present program reflects new emphasis occasioned by problems which have taken on increased importance in recent years. The consular provisions have been detached in the interest of more effective treatment of such subject matter. The form and content of the draft has been expanded and revamped, and the pace of negotiation has accelerated. In this connection it may be noted that in the first 6 years after the end of World War I three treaties were concluded. In the same length of time after World War II nine have been signed. Although the commitments contained in the current treaties tend to be more far-reaching, the general international climate is less sympathetic to the free enterprise premises on which these treaties are based. Moreover, as you well recognize, governments all over the world are constantly preoccupied with pressing and critical problems, which is not exactly an atmosphere conducive to negotiations of agreements of the type now before you.

Perhaps the most important respect in which the current documents differ from those of the 20's and 30's is in the greatly increased emphasis on the encouragement of American private investment abroad, by the expansion and strengthening of provisions relating to the protection of the investor and his interests. This development, of course, reflects the process of continuous adjustment to the needs and conditions of the era in which the negotiation takes place. The United States came out of the war with a greatly expanded industrial machine and, alone among the major nations of the world, with a surplus of private

capital available for export. To encourage the investment of this capital in the production of goods and services abroad was a matter of importance to our domestic economy and to economic development and world prosperity generally. Apart from these purely economic considerations, moreover, foreign investment can strengthen the common defense and promote the prevalence of ideas of individual liberty and individual initiative under law.

The basic aim of these new provisions has been to safeguard the investor against the nonbusiness hazards of foreign operations, an objective emphasized by the Congress in the Act for International Development of 1950. There is no intent here, of course, to shield the investor from the economic risks to which venture capital is subject, a matter which cannot and should not be reached through international agreement. However, there are grave hazards of a nonbusiness nature which have become characteristic in overseas business operations since the war. They assume many forms: inequitable tax statutes, confiscatory expropriation laws, rigid employment controls, special favors to state-owned businesses, drastic exchange restrictions, and other discriminations against foreign capital. Taken together, they can be a formidable obstacle to the American investor, for they impair from the very start the prospect of fair competition and a reasonable profit. Yet these hazards are not infrequently legal rather than economic, and they can be checked to a substantial extent by documents which establish mutually agreed standards of treatment for the citizens and enterprises of one country within the territories of the other.

Perhaps the most striking advance of the postwar treaties over earlier ones is the cognizance taken of the widespread use of the corporate form of business organization in present day economic affairs. In those antedating World War II, American corporations were specifically assured only small protection against possible discriminatory treatment in foreign countries. In the postwar treaties, however, corporations are accorded essentially the same rights as individuals in such vital matters as the right to do business, taxation on a nondiscriminatory basis, the acquisition and enjoyment of real and personal property, and the application of exchange controls. Furthermore, the citizens and corporations of one country are given substantial rights in connection with forming local subsidiaries under the corporation laws of the other country and controlling and managing the affairs of such local companies. The legal reason inhibiting a more extensive provision for corporations in earlier treaties (namely, the reserved rights of the States as to the admission of foreign corporations) has been solved in the current treaties by a formula which equates the alien corporation to other out-of-State corporations, rather than to the State's own corporations, for

purposes of "national treatment" in the United States.

Another significant feature of the postwar treaties of interest to the prospective investor is the body of provisions which deals with problems arising from the state ownership of economic enterprise. There is a growing tendency abroad for the real competitor of private business to be the government itself. The Department of State has, accordingly, endeavored to work out provisions designed to reduce the hazards of unfair competition from state-controlled businesses. These clauses provide most-favored-nation treatment in the conduct of state trading operations and in the awarding of government contracts and concessions. They also establish broadened rules governing the carrying out of nationalization programs. There are also newly developed provisions, found first in the 1948 treaty with Italy, to assure American private business concerns which must compete with foreign state-owned concerns the same economic favors that the latter received from their government, and to assure that state-owned commercial enterprises of the one country engaging in business in the other country will not be immune from taxation, suit, or other normal liabilities by reason of their public character.

Another important development in the post-World War II treaties is the provision on exchange controls. The formulation of such a provision poses difficulties. Many foreign countries have a genuine need to protect their limited foreign-exchange reserves in order to insure that the highest priority needs of their economy are met. At the same time, there is a real need for liberal provisions on withdrawals of earnings that will afford a proper protection to investors. We have sought to achieve a fair balance between the two factors.

In addition to the innovations introduced to better the climate for investment, substantial improvements have been introduced in provisions of longer standing. The rules on expropriation of property have been worked out in more detail; more explicit assurances have been formulated on basic personal freedoms and protection for the individual; and clauses have been added on freedom of communication and of reporting. Provisions on commercial arbitration and the employment of technical personnel have been added, and traditional provisions for nondiscriminatory treatment of shipping have been strengthened.

The continuing process of revamping of the standard provisions has benefited these treaties as a whole, both as to content and language. What we hope constantly to achieve is stronger articles, fewer exceptions, and above all, a document which can give the American citizen who goes abroad, whether for business, pleasure, livelihood, or study, a firm and clear body of rights and privileges.

So far I have spoken mainly about the rights these treaties assure and the protection they give to American citizens and businesses in foreign countries. However, these instruments are not one-sided. They are drawn up in mutual terms, in keeping with their character as freely negotiated instruments between friendly sovereign equals. Rights assured to Americans in foreign countries are assured in equivalent measure to foreigners in this country. In undertaking treaty commitments that would formally confirm to foreigners a substantial body of rights in the United States, the Department of State has exercised great care to frame provisions that would be in conformity with Federal law. The exception is that article VII of the supplementary agreement with Italy provides for the development of arrangements, not provided for by Federal statute, regarding totalization of social security benefits.

Furthermore, where the subject matter covers fields in which the States have a paramount interest, such as the formation and regulation of corporations and the ownership of property, the treaty provisions have been worked out with the same careful regard for the States' prerogatives and policies that has traditionally characterized agreements of this type.

These documents are concerned primarily with legal conditions and with the effect such conditions may have on economic activities carried on across international boundaries. Although they are comprehensive documents, they are not able to remove all legal impediments to investment, owing both to the inherent nature of such a treaty and the complexity of present-day economic affairs. While these treaties are concerned with everyday matters, they are not exclusively economic in nature or purpose; they are also, and perhaps above all, treaties of friendship. Their objectives are the normal objectives of friendship between nations; to protect the foreigner, to maintain good order in everyday affairs, to encourage mutually beneficial relations, and to strengthen the rule of law in the dealings of one nation with another. They are practical expressions of good faith and good neighborliness as much as they are legal contracts. Their worth rests as much on their equity and reasonableness as on the number and scope of the privileges they specify; and their spirit, which goes beyond the limits and wording of the treaties themselves, is in every way as important as the letter of the undertakings they actually make.

The Department of State for many reasons regards these treaties as an important element in promoting our national interests and building a stronger economy within the free world through the traditional American means of private enterprise, and it is most gratified that your Committee is finding time from a very crowded calendar to give them its study and attention.

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and navigation 881

American Principles

- A strong defense to achieve peace (Truman) . . . 847
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Disarmament Commission

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Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 19-24, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

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Germany Becomes Partner in Western Community

CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS WITH U.S., U.K., AND FRANCE SIGNED AT BONN

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON

[Released to the press May 26]

Agreements bringing to an end the Allied Occupation of the Federal Republic of Germany were signed at Bonn on May 26 by Secretary Acheson, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden of the United Kingdom, Foreign Minister Robert Schuman of France, and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of the Federal Republic. Following is the text of a statement made by Secretary Acheson at the signing ceremony:

The agreements that have been signed today are of great importance for each of the four countries represented here. The Federal Republic is attaining the independence in foreign affairs and authority in domestic matters which befit a free state. The United Kingdom, France, and the United States, together with the other free nations, are welcoming a new partner in their great effort to establish peace and security in the world.

Let us take a moment to examine what these agreements mean and what they are intended to accomplish.

The relations which follow from these agreements are fundamentally such as exist between countries closely associated in peace and friendship. When the agreements enter into effect, the Occupation will come to its formal close, and the Federal Government will deal with other governments on a normal basis. The U.S. Government is convinced that the agreements are just because problems arising from the war must be settled, and it is right to settle them in this fashion. The purpose of the agreements is to bring the Occupation to an end and this will be their effect.

There are still certain powers reserved to the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. But the important thing to remember about these powers is that they are not retained for any reasons which have to do with the Federal Republic

alone. They are related to other factors entirely—to the necessity for the presence in Germany of troops whose mission is the defense of German peace and freedom and of peace and freedom throughout the free world, and to the unhappy fact that Germany is still a divided country. When these conditions no longer exist, the powers retained to deal with them will be withdrawn.

It is a matter of great regret and concern to the American Government that the task of restoring Germany as a whole is not completed. I feel deeply the absence on this occasion of those who might have represented the people of that part of Germany which is still under Soviet occupation. It would have been a more joyful occasion if they had been permitted to join us.

One of the great aims of the Western World, one of the great themes of its culture, and one of the great achievements of its people, has been freedom. Political and social freedom of the individual, freedom of his conscience and speech, have been what the West holds most dear. Since the end of the war the Three Powers have consistently worked to establish freedom throughout Germany, and their efforts have been met with invaluable cooperation on the part of the people of Western Germany and Berlin. Together, we have succeeded in bringing freedom to the greater part of Germany, but until freedom can be extended to the entire country, and until all Germans—East and West—are reunited in freedom, the goal will not have been reached.

I can assure you of my Government's continued determination to press steadily toward this goal until the unity of Germany in freedom has become a reality.

In anticipation of the day when these agreements will have been accepted by the legislative bodies of our countries and will enter into effect, I wish to congratulate the Federal Republic on its new place among nations of the world. We have difficult problems ahead, and we can solve them only by working together. We are glad to have

a new partner in this great cause. On behalf of the President of the United States and the American people, I welcome the Federal Republic on its return to the community of nations.

SUMMARIES OF CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS¹

The following is based on material released to the press at Bonn on May 26 by the Allied High Commission:

I. The Meaning of the Contractual Agreements

The effect of the Contractual Agreements is to include the Federal Republic in the community of free nations as an equal partner.

The convention on relations and the related conventions aim to liquidate a situation which arose out of the war and the Occupation. In addition, they regulate the stationing in the Federal Republic of substantial foreign forces to assist in the common defense. It has consequently been necessary not only to establish broad principles, but to make provisions of a detailed character, such as normally appear in peace treaties and military conventions.

In considering the Contractual Agreements as a whole, it should be borne in mind that they have had to take into account an unprecedented situation.

In the first place, as long as there is no agreement between the Three Powers and the Soviet Union, the unity of Germany cannot be realized nor can all-German problems be settled. Hence the problem has posed itself of according to the Federal Republic full authority over its external and internal affairs while preserving the means of negotiating German unity and of maintaining rights of the Three Powers in Berlin. Subject to the realization of these aims, the Three Powers have no desire to infringe German sovereignty or German equality of rights.

Secondly, an unusual situation has been created by the need to station in time of peace a very large number of troops for defense purposes in a foreign country. The presence of troops of the Three Powers in Germany is vital to the defense of Germany. This naturally imposes a burden on Germany, although already it is bringing an important economic advantage in the shape of the expenditure of foreign currency, a factor which with the passage of time will play an increasingly important role. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the despatch of these troops abroad imposes a severe military and financial burden on the other Western Powers, who have committed very important military and air forces to this theatre. In order to fulfill their role, these troops and air forces must be operational. They must have facilities for training, they must be provided with lines of communication, and their essential military requirements must be met; furthermore, they must have the assurance of the requisite liberty of action if need arises. Otherwise Germany cannot be defended and these troops will be exposed to unnecessary hazards unacceptable to their Governments. The problem has been to reconcile the preservation of the rights of the Federal Republic and its citizens with the legitimate operational requirements of the foreign defense forces.

Thirdly, in view of the fact that a general peace treaty cannot now be concluded, the agreements take the unprecedented step of liquidating the war and the controls of the Occupation regime before conclusion of a final peace settlement. Hence the appearance of a number of provisions which would normally have been included in a peace

treaty. The liquidation of a long and bitterly contested war is not a simple matter, but the provisions have been designed to meet to the minimum acceptable extent the principal aims of the Allies while at the same time imposing the least possible burden on the structure and economic stability of the Federal Republic.

Because of the special status of the city, the Contractual Agreements do not apply to Berlin. However, in consonance with their new relationship to the Federal Republic, the Three Powers have published a declaration that they will grant the Berlin authorities the maximum liberty compatible with the city's special situation.

II. Summary of the Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany and the Documents Annexed to It

The convention on relations is the political agreement establishing the basic principles which will henceforth govern the new relationship between the Three Powers and the German Federal Republic.

The convention comprises a preamble and 11 articles only. Its provisions have three major effects: the Federal Republic is granted the widest authority over its internal and external affairs, the rights retained by the Three Powers are defined, and the objectives of a common policy are set out.

Freedom for the Federal Republic

The granting of freedom to the Federal Republic is achieved in the following way:

The Occupation Statute is repealed;

The Allied High Commission and the *Land* commissions are abolished;

Henceforth the Three Powers will conduct their relations with the Federal Republic through ambassadors; The foreign armed forces stationed in the Federal territory are no longer Occupation forces, their sole mission now being to secure the defense of the free world.

The Federal Republic, released from all control, will thus be able, on its own responsibility, to develop its democratic and Federal institutions within the framework of its basic law.

Limited Rights for the Three Powers

Because of the current international situation, the existing division of Germany, and the present impossibility of concluding a peace treaty, the Three Powers must necessarily retain certain rights relating to the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the protection of their security in Berlin, and in Germany as a whole. The convention places obligations on each party to preserve these rights. Thus, while the Federal Republic must abstain from any action prejudicing these rights and agrees to facilitate their exercise by the Three Powers, the latter, in return, undertake to consult the Federal Republic in respect of their implementation. Likewise, although the Three Powers have the power, in certain circumstances endangering the security of the forces, to declare a state of emergency over all or part of the Federal territory, they can do so only if the Federal Republic and the European Defense Community (Edo) are unable to meet the emergency. In such circumstances they will utilize to the greatest possible extent the assistance of the Federal Government and the other German authorities. Furthermore, the measures they may take during this exceptional period are restricted to the minimum necessary to restore the situation. As regards Berlin, the Federal Republic promises to furnish its utmost cooperation for the political, cultural, economic, and financial reconstruction of the city.

¹For text of the German Contractual Agreements, together with text of the treaty establishing the European Defense Community, see 82d Cong., 2d sess., Executives Q and R, June 2, 1952.

The new status of the Federal Republic fits into the framework of a common policy, the objectives and implications of which are made clear in the convention. The immediate objective is to integrate the Federal Republic, on a basis of equality, in the European community now being shaped, which is itself a part of the community of free nations. The Federal Republic agrees to conduct its affairs in conformity with the principles stated in the Charter of the United Nations and the objectives defined by the Statute of the Council of Europe, asserts its intention to become a member of the international organizations of the free world, and freely undertakes to participate in the European Defense Community.

A second objective is the reunification by peaceful means of a fully free Germany. Thus, the four signatory states are resolved that the peace settlement for the whole of Germany shall be freely negotiated by all the parties; they also agree that a unified Germany shall enjoy the rights and be bound by the obligations conferred and imposed upon the Federal Republic by the new agreements and treaties contributing to the creation of an integrated European community.

Revision Clause

The Convention on Relations contains an important revision clause which also applies to all the related conventions. Under this clause, the terms of the conventions shall be reviewed at the request of one of the four states in the event of German unification, the creation of a European federation, or any other occurrence which the four states jointly recognize to be of fundamental significance. The parties will then open negotiations with a view to modifying the conventions to the extent necessary to take into account the changes that have occurred in the situation.

A. SUMMARY OF THE DECLARATION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON MATERIAL AID TO BERLIN AND THREE POWER LETTER TO FEDERAL CHANCELLOR

Under the provisions of the convention on relations, the Federal Republic undertakes to provide continued material aid to Berlin. Because of Berlin's importance as a part of the free world and in view of the ties connecting the Federal Republic with Berlin, the Federal Republic desires to strengthen Berlin in all fields, particularly as regards improving the productive capacity and level of employment in Berlin. The declaration specifies the forms of aid which the Federal Republic will continue to extend to Berlin, including:

1. Financial aid to insure the maintenance of a balanced budget;
2. Equitable treatment in allocation of material in short supply;
3. A fair share in external aid received by the Federal Republic;
4. Assistance in developing foreign trade, as well as such favored treatment in trade matters as circumstances warrant;
5. Maintenance of an adequate money supply of deutschmarks (West) and of adequate stockpiles of supplies for emergencies;
6. Maintenance and improvement of trade and of communications and transport facilities between Berlin and the Federal Republic;
7. Inclusion of Berlin in international agreements concluded by the Federal Republic, wherever this is possible.

A letter sent to the Federal Chancellor by the three High Commissioners on behalf of their Governments expresses the desire of the Three Powers to assist in strengthening the bonds between the Federal Republic and Berlin, insofar as the present situation permits.

The letter states that the Three Powers are conscious of the need for Federal aid to Berlin and of the desirability that Berlin and the Federal Republic adopt similar policies. In view of this, the Three Powers assure the Federal authorities that they will exercise their rights in Berlin in such a way as to facilitate federal aid to Berlin, to permit representation of Berlin and of the Berlin population outside Berlin, and to encourage the adoption of similar policies in Berlin and the Federal Republic. In regard to the adoption of similar policies, the Three Powers will have no objection if Berlin adopts, in accordance with an appropriate procedure, the same legislation as that of the Federal Republic.

B. SUMMARY OF THE CHARTER OF THE ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL

The arbitration tribunal's composition and machinery are described in the charter annexed to the convention. All the provisions concerning this court are designed to secure absolute equality of treatment between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic. The tribunal is composed of nine members to be selected from the highest ranking judges and of the most eminent jurists. Three members will be appointed by the Federal Republic; each of the Three Powers will appoint one member, and the three others, called neutral members, will be appointed by agreement between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic. They must not be nationals of any of the four signatory states. These nine members will elect a neutral member president whose term of office is two years.

The tribunal will sit either in plenary session or in chambers of three members. Decisions are taken by majority vote. The tribunal must always be composed of an uneven number of members, including an equal number of the members appointed by the Three Powers and of those appointed by the Federal Republic. On the same principle, the chambers will be composed of one of the members appointed by the Three Powers, one appointed by the Federal Republic, and one neutral member.

The permanent seat of the tribunal will be within the Federal territory; the location will be fixed by subsequent administrative agreement.

The tribunal has jurisdiction over all disputes between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic arising from the application of the various conventions, which the parties have been unable to settle by negotiation. The only disputes excluded from its jurisdiction are those connected with the exercise of the special rights in regard to Berlin, all-German matters, and the stationing of troops, which are retained by the Three Powers. The tribunal will also resolve problems concerning the competence of certain judicial or administrative authorities provided for in the conventions. Only the Governments of the four signatory states may be parties before the tribunal. In rendering its decisions, the tribunal will apply the generally accepted rules of international law governing the interpretation of treaties.

The powers of the tribunal are very extensive. It may order a party that has taken legislative or administrative measures in the Federal territory inconsistent with the conventions to deprive such measures of effect or annul them if the party concerned fails to carry out the tribunal's decision. It may annul judicial decisions enforceable in the Federal territory if they violate the basic principles of the conventions. In general, if the unsuccessful party fails to take the steps called for by the tribunal's judgment, it may authorize the other party to take appropriate measures to remedy the situation in compliance with the judgment. It also has the power, before deciding on the merits of a case, to order such measures to preserve the status quo as it deems necessary. Its judgments are final and not subject to appeal.

The charter also establishes the rules for proceedings before the tribunal. Proceedings will consist of a written

part and an oral part and will closely follow the form of those before the International Court of Justice.

In addition to its judicial functions, the tribunal may, at the joint request of the Governments of the Federal Republic and of the Three Powers, issue advisory opinions on the correct application of the conventions.

III. Summary of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and the Occupation

Many of these matters are covered only provisionally. Their settlement at this time was impossible because the Three Powers had no mandate to negotiate for or to bind the many other countries which were at war with Germany and which would naturally be entitled to participate in a final settlement. The Three Powers have acted so as not to prejudice the position of such countries at a final settlement.

Four Categories

The subjects dealt with in this convention fall into four main categories: First, questions which are normally handled in a peace treaty; second, questions which, although not normally found in a peace treaty, would, because of the particular situation obtaining in Germany, inevitably have been covered if one had been signed at this time (e. g. restitution to and compensation for victims of Nazi persecution); third, provisions for the orderly handover to the Federal Republic of important responsibilities and functions hitherto exercised by the Three Powers, such as civil aviation; fourth, of lesser importance, the provision, for a brief transitional period, of facilities for the Embassies of the Three Powers and their staffs, in order to ease acute accommodation difficulties.

Chapter 1—Position of Allied Legislation and Agreements

The main purpose of chapter 1 is to lay down principles governing rights and obligations flowing from Allied action during the occupational period. With this end in view, provisions are made for the continued validity of Allied legislation, subject to a right of the German authorities to amend it, repeal it, or deprive it of effect. This right is limited only where its exercise would prejudice the rights of the Three Powers under the convention on relations or where the contracting parties have otherwise agreed for some particular reason. There are also provisions for the continued validity of international agreements concluded by the Allied authorities on behalf of their respective zones, and of acts done within Germany by them.

Provision is made for the winding up of Occupation courts having criminal and civil jurisdictions, and for the continued validity of their judgments.

An important article deals with war criminals. The Three Powers had planned to hand over custody to the Federal Republic in the same way as was done in Japan. In addition, it was planned to set up a mixed board, with equal Allied and German participation, to consider the termination or reduction of sentence of the war criminals. Because of constitutional difficulties on the German side, custody could not be handed over to the Federal Republic now. The mixed board is to be set up and will begin work as soon as possible after entry into force of the convention. It will be seen that most of the provisions of chapter 1 are such as would normally be handled in a peace treaty.

Chapter 2—Deconcentration and Decartelization

The aim of this chapter is to insure effective decartelization legislation, deconcentration of the coal, iron and steel, and film industries, deconcentration of I. G. Farben in-

dustries, deconcentration of the Grossbanken, and the protection of persons who have taken advantage of Allied legislation which is now disappearing to establish themselves in a trade or profession but who do not have the qualifications which German law may in the future impose.

Much of the work in these fields is already complete. For example, 24 of the 28 contemplated new unit steel companies have already been formed. The Federal Government has many times declared its support for the program of deconcentration to destroy excessive concentrations of economic power.

Provisions of this sort are not normally found in a peace treaty. The necessity for them in the case of Germany arises from the fact that the excessive concentrations of economic power which formerly existed directly contributed to the growth and aggressive power of the Nazi regime.

Chapter 3—Restitution Inside Germany

The machinery for restituting identifiable property to victims of Nazi persecution, which has been established under Allied legislation, is preserved, but the existing Allied courts of appeal are replaced by a mixed court having equal German and Allied membership, and neutral members.

Chapter 4—Compensation for Victims of Nazi Persecution

The existing German machinery for compensating victims of Nazi persecution who have suffered the loss of unidentifiable property, imprisonment, or damage to life or limb, is preserved, and provision is made for its supplementation.

Chapter 5—Restitution Outside Germany

Chapter 5 deals with the restitution of property removed from other countries during the war by German occupation forces. In practice, much property which was readily identifiable has been returned already under Allied procedures. But there is a residual problem which is to be met by the establishment of a German agency to handle governmental claims, and of a procedure before the ordinary German courts for handling individuals' claims.

Chapter 6—Reparations and Former German Assets Abroad

The essence of the provisional solution found for the reparation problem is the preservation of the status quo pending a final settlement by the peace treaty between Germany and her former enemies or by earlier agreements. The maintenance in force of Control Council Law No. 5 (insofar as not already deprived of effect) and A. H. C. Law No. 63 was agreed upon. These laws regulate questions of title to property taken by way of reparation, and their disappearance without suitable replacement would have involved serious legal complication.

In respect to former German assets abroad, the Three Powers have wide responsibilities under International agreement, notably the agreement on reparations concluded with 13 other countries in Paris on January 14, 1946. Their responsibilities precluded the Three Powers from agreeing to an unlimited right of the Federal Republic to negotiate with other countries concerning foreign assets, but agreement was nevertheless reached permitting broad powers of negotiation.

Chapter 7—Status of Displaced Persons and Refugees

Provisions are made for a proper status for homeless foreigners and the admission and distribution of non-German political refugees. These are not normal peace-treaty provisions, but the situation existing in Germany after the last war, in this respect as in many others, was also not a normal one.

Chapter 8—German Determination To Settle Prewar External Debts

The question of Germany's prewar external debts has been under consideration for a year by the Debt Commission in London, on which the Federal Republic, the Three Powers, and other creditor nations of Germany are represented. In chapter 8, the Federal Republic reaffirms its determination to reach a settlement of these debts and agrees to take no action which could prejudice it, notably in the field of foreign exchange control.

Chapter 9

Waiver of Claims: A waiver by the defeated country, on behalf of itself and of its nationals, of all claims arising out of the war or out of any subsequent occupation period against former enemies or occupiers is another normal peace-treaty point. Such a waiver, subject to confirmation at a peace settlement, is given in chapter 9. In the course of the London Debt Conference, the Three Powers have notified the German representative that they are ready, if a general settlement of German external debts is reached, to forego more than two thousand million dollars worth of debt owed to them by the Federal Republic for postwar economic assistance to Germany.

Liquidation of JEIA: The chapter also provides that the Federal Republic will indemnify the Three Powers in respect of claims arising out of the operations of the former Joint Export-Import Agency. This agency was set up by the Three Powers to rehabilitate the foreign trade of Western Germany and has made an important contribution to the recovery of the German economy. An agreement, confirmed in this chapter, has already been concluded between the Federal Government and the Allied High Commission for the transfer to the Federal Republic of the assets of JEIA which are of substantial amount.

Chapter 10—Restoration of Foreign Property Rights

Chapter 10, referred to as the foreign interests chapter, provides to the greatest extent possible for the restoration of property rights and interests in the Federal territory to Germany's former enemies and their nationals wherever these rights were affected by the war. This principle is normal in peace treaties. To this end some legislation has had to be maintained in force. The more important of this legislation provides for the enjoyment now by United Nations patent holders of rights which, but for the war, they would have enjoyed earlier; for the regulation, pending a settlement of Germany's debts in London, of the position of certain foreign creditors; and for the prevention of hardship to foreigners in the incidence of agrarian reform legislation.

Partial Exemption from Lastenausgleich for U.N. Nationals: There are provisions of a normal peace treaty character for the exemption of U.N. nationals and their property from special levies or taxes designed to meet Germany's war burdens. In the case of the levies under the proposed *Lastenausgleich* [equalization of burdens] law, only a partial exemption is given because that law is intended partly to meet charges arising out of the war, and partly to deal with social inequalities in Germany. Thus U.N. nationals will be exempted from payment under the *Lastenausgleich* in the first 6 years out of 30, 3 of these 6 years being already past. Victims of Nazi persecution who are not U.N. nationals will get the 6-year exemption on the first DM 150,000 of property restituted to them, while German corporations controlled by U.N. nationals will enjoy the 6-year exemption, in proportion to the shareholding, if the U.N. shareholding is 85 percent or more.

Arbitral Commission: The contracting parties have followed peace treaty precedent by establishing an arbitral commission whose purpose will be to settle any disputes which may arise under the external restitution and foreign interests chapters of the convention. The commission has three members appointed by the Three

Powers, three by the Federal Republic, and three neutral members.

Chapter 11—Facilities for the Embassies

Provision is made for the continued enjoyment by the Three Powers of the use by their Embassies of certain buildings and other property now occupied by them. The Federal Government has agreed to their continued use because it wished to insure that the serious lack of accommodation in Germany generally, and in Bonn in particular, should not make impossible the establishment of British, French, and U. S. Embassies.

Chapter 12—Full German Control Over Civil Aviation

Provision is made for the assumption of full control over civil aviation by the Federal Republic. The chapter also contains an undertaking by the Three Powers to provide technical services to the Federal Republic on request during the initial period.

IV. Summary of the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and Their Members in the Federal Republic

This convention regulates the status of foreign forces which are to be stationed in the territory of the Federal Republic as a contribution to the common defense of Europe and of the free world. It covers all rights and obligations of the foreign forces, except for those set forth in the convention on relations (article II).

In basic purpose and content, this convention is similar to the normal convention on the stationing of troops which is concluded between sovereign states when one stations troops in the territory of another. Such an agreement provides for methods of identification of members of the forces, jurisdiction arrangements, measures enabling the forces to enforce their own discipline, arrangements for the crossing of frontiers by the forces, and related problems. (Analogous intergovernmental agreements have been drawn up to regulate the activities of the U.S. Air Force in Britain, the U.S. Forces in their Caribbean bases in British territory, and are also found in the NATO agreement about the stationing of forces by one participating country in the territory of another.)

Outside these fundamental similarities, the case of the Federal Republic is exceptional. For obvious geographical and political reasons, the Federal Republic is regarded as a forward, exposed, strategic area. It follows that the troops to be stationed in its territory will be abnormally numerous and diverse, and that they will be deployed in peacetime in positions, which, in certain eventualities, might early become the scene of military operations. Some special provisions have, therefore, had to be incorporated in the convention which do not appear in similar agreements. These provisions affect the sovereignty of the Federal Republic only in the same way as any freely negotiated treaty limits the freedom of action of the contracting states.

The convention is composed of 50 articles, divided into four groups:

- Part 1: General Provisions
- Part 2: Jurisdiction
- Part 3: Administration and Support
- Part 4: Transitional and Final Provisions

Supplementing these articles are two annexes relating to offenses against security and to radio frequencies. Following are summaries of some of the articles:

Forces To Consider German Interests

In an article applicable to the whole convention, the forces undertake, in utilizing the rights and immunities accorded to them, to give due consideration to German interests, taking into account particularly the capacity of

the German economy and the essential domestic and export requirements of the Federal Republic and West Berlin.

Logistic Support

Important provisions in part 3 cover the mechanics of day-to-day relations between the Federal Government and the foreign forces. To meet the defense needs of the forces, the Federal Republic will satisfy their requirements in accommodation, goods, materials and services, labor, public services, transport services, and communications. A joint supply board, made up of representatives of the Federal Republic and those of the Three Powers concerned, will be established. The Board will draw up agreed periodical programs for procurement of goods, materials, and services in the Federal territory, either directly by the authorities of the power concerned or by the German authorities. These programs, which will not include minor procurements, can be exceeded by an agreed margin. They will receive such preferential treatment as is necessary for the satisfactory fulfillment of the defense mission of the forces and can reasonably be reconciled with the essential civilian and defense needs of the Federal Republic. Goods purchased from funds provided by the Federal Republic may not be moved from the Federal territory, except those required for military purposes for the support of the forces, or military equipment which military units normally carry with them on moving.

Accommodation

The accommodation requirements of the forces will be fulfilled within the framework of agreed programs, and German law will form one basis of any requisitioning, which will be carried out by the German authorities, while the Three Powers will retain accommodation and property under their control at the effective date of the convention, privately owned accommodation and movable property now in use by the forces will be released as soon as the Federal authorities have provided acceptable alternatives. The forces will continually review their needs to keep accommodation requirements to the essential minimum. Special attention will be paid to the return of accommodation to private persons.

Privately owned dwellings will be released if they are not used by the forces for a period of 6 months. Requisitioned movable property will normally be released at the same time as the accommodation in which it is held, or earlier if no longer required by the forces. The German authorities will be consulted if new construction programs for the forces are necessary. Building projects financed from German defense contribution funds will in general be carried out by the German building authorities in conformity with German law and regulations.

German Labor Protected

Labor employed by the forces (normally through the German authorities) for defense needs will in general be subject to German labor law. German employees will be subject to all the obligations arising from membership of the Federal Republic in the European Defense Community. Their duties with the forces will be of a non-combatant character. To insure their full military effectiveness, the forces may continue to employ civilian service units composed of Germans for a maximum of 2 years after the effective date of the convention. Before the end of this period, an examination of this arrangement will be made to find the best method of replacing these units while avoiding a reduction of the strength and effectiveness of the forces. For the protection of their interests employees of the forces may set up works councils whose task will be to make suggestions and to present grievances or complaints to the appropriate authorities of the forces. Grievances unresolved after the works councils have been heard by these authorities will be the subject of discussion between the authorities on both sides.

Freedom of Movement

For military purposes the forces will have unrestricted freedom of movement in the Federal territory, except where the convention states otherwise, but deviations from the German traffic code will be allowed only in cases of military necessity. In view of the crowded conditions which may be expected to arise in the air space over the Federal territory, the Federal Republic and the Three Powers will form a standing commission to coordinate civil and military air activities. Arrangements for maneuvers, which the forces must, of course, be permitted to conduct in the Federal territory, will be made in consultation with the German authorities.

Observance of German Law

Provisions in part 2 operate on the principle that the members of the forces are obliged to observe German law, except where otherwise agreed, as is customary under a convention on the stationing of forces; troops will face military courts for criminal offenses, but German Courts will have jurisdiction over them in noncriminal proceedings. Members of the forces will, for example, thereby be liable to legal action for any future failure to maintain their children by German mothers. The authorities of the forces will give all possible assistance in enforcing judgments of German Courts and authorities in non-criminal proceedings. Arrest and search of troops will be the responsibility of the forces, except in cases of emergency, and then the offenders will be handed over by the German police to the forces. Private vehicles used by members of the forces must be insured in accordance with German law.

Security of the Forces

No Allied courts will have jurisdiction over Germans. In the provisions designed to safeguard the security of the forces, primary reliance is placed on the authority of the Federal Republic. However, since existing German law does not contain provisions completely covering the security of the forces, it has been agreed to amend the penal code to afford them the necessary protection in this field (annex A). The relevant provisions will be enforced by German Courts. In the same context, article 4 of part 1 foresees full cooperation between the German authorities and those of the forces to safeguard the security of the Federal Republic, the Three Powers, their forces stationed in Federal territory and their members and property. Cooperation will extend to the collection, exchange, and protection of the security of all pertinent information.

Taxation and Customs

Immunities accorded to the forces are based on a normal principle in international relations that one government does not tax another. Clearly, the Federal Republic would not wish to derive profits from the presence of the forces in its territory. Safeguards against violations by the forces and their members of the fiscal, customs, and import/export regulations of the Federal Republic are embedded in a series of specific and severe provisions. Setting out from the principle that the forces shall in general be subject to German customs legislation, they cover inter-alia cooperation between German customs officials and the forces, inspection at border crossing points, rationed goods supplied to the troops and legal action against offenders.

Radio Frequencies

Annex B will bring operation of the radio communications and broadcasting stations of the forces into conformity with prevailing international agreements and will establish a frequency committee with equal representation (and including a representative of the Epc), under rotating chairmanship. The committee will concern itself with the allocation and coordination of frequencies and

other technical matters relating to the radio stations of the forces.

Reference to Arbitration Tribunal

All disputes between the Federal Government and the Three Powers which arise out of this convention may be submitted to the arbitration tribunal, except (1) where the convention provides for other arbitral machinery (e. g. in the case of extraditions), and (2) where its provisions exclude arbitration (e. g. in regard to certain actions which may be necessary in advance of a grave emergency).

Relationship to EDC and Review

This convention and the EDC treaty will in no way prejudice each other. Any conflicts between their respective provisions will be settled between the contracting parties to both treaties.

Review of this convention may take place at the request of one of the signatories when 2 years have elapsed after its effective date.

Other Provisions

In addition to the main provisions, the convention contains a number of articles on connected matters, among them the following:

The forces undertake to apply public health and safety standards at least equal to those in the appropriate German regulations. (Article 21).

Fullest cooperation between the German authorities and the forces will be the rule on all questions affecting health and sanitation. (Article 30).

It is agreed, with due constitutional safeguards, that in proceedings before courts of the Federal Republic or the forces, disclosure will not be permitted of German state or official secrets nor of any information which might prejudice the security of the forces, except with the consent of the authorities concerned. (Article 15).

The forces have agreed to relinquish their present requisitioned hunting and fishing rights one month after this convention comes into force. However, the Federal Government will assist the forces in obtaining hunting and fishing facilities for recreational purposes. Members of the forces will conform to German seasonal laws, use the services of licensed hunters and pay regulation fees. In return for fishing privileges the forces will assume a fair share of the restocking programs of the respective *Lacander* authorities.

V. Summary of the Finance Convention

The convention:

States the obligations of the German Federal Republic to make a continuing contribution to Western defense comparable to the contributions of other participants;

Establishes the availability, until June 30, 1952, (end of NATO fiscal year), of a portion of that contribution to assist in meeting the costs of foreign forces in the Federal Republic;

Governs the use of that portion of the German contribution;

Specifies facilities and services to be made available without charge to the foreign forces;

Provides for a mutual waiver of damage claims between each of the governments of the Three Powers and the Federal Government and establishes procedures for settling private claims for damage arising from the activities of the foreign forces;

Establishes a basis for payment for accommodation, goods, and services provided for the foreign forces;

Provides for the possible establishment of a joint capital construction budget to cover construction requirements for both German EDC contingents and foreign forces;

Provides for the gradual transition of the French, Belgian, and Luxembourg forces in the Federal Republic to the status of European Defense Community forces.

Level of Contribution

The Federal Republic agrees to make an annual contribution to Western defense comparable to that of other Western countries on the basis of NATO criteria.² This will be done by making a financial contribution to the European Defense Community and by assisting in the support of foreign forces stationed in the Federal Republic other than EDC forces.

From the effective date on the Contractual Agreements until June 30, 1953, this contribution shall be at the rate of DM 850 million per month. After that date, the contribution will be determined under the same principles and procedures and by use of the same NATO criteria which apply to the defense expenditures of other countries participating in Western defense.

Division of the Contribution

For the first 6 months after the effective date of the Contractual Agreements, an average share of DM 551 million of the sum of DM 850 million will be used to assist in the support of foreign forces stationed in the Federal Republic. For the next three months, an average of DM 319 million will be used for such support.

The division of the contribution between German EDC contingents and foreign forces reflects the build-up of German EDC contingents by an increase in the share for these contingents. The division of the contribution has been made in such a way as to meet the increasing requirements of the German contingents in accordance with a build-up schedule determined by SHAPE.

The question of what portion of the German financial contribution to be made after June 30, 1953, will be used to assist in the support of non-EDC forces in Germany is left to be settled in later negotiations.

Division of the share allotted to foreign forces before June 30, 1953, will be made by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, after consultation with the Federal Government. This sum will neither be an obligation of EDC nor be subject to its control.

Use of Funds

The Three Powers undertake to hold defense expenditures from DM support funds to the minimum compatible with military efficiency and to utilize the funds efficiently and economically.

Free Facilities and Services

The Federal Republic agrees that the foreign forces shall enjoy without charge a number of services such as use of German public agencies, roads and bridges, police, public health and fire protection. Military aircraft may use free of charge the civil airfields owned by the Federal Republic. These arrangements are similar to those applied by all NATO member countries.

Where, however, services are of a special character, payments may be agreed upon.

²For the recommendations of the NATO Temporary Council Committee regarding German defense expenditures, see BULLETIN of Mar. 17, 1952, p. 423.

Damage Claims

Each of the Three Powers and the Federal Republic waive claims for damage to governmental property caused by persons in the service of the other.

German agencies and agencies of the forces of the Three Powers will cooperate in a jointly agreed procedure for handling private damage claims against the forces arising after the entry into force of the convention. Claims against the Allied forces arising before the entry into force of the convention are to be settled by the Federal Republic.

Payments for Accommodation, Goods, and Services

The convention provides that the foreign forces will pay the prevailing prices, rates, and rentals in the Federal Republic. However, in those cases where any military users, such as Epc contingents, receive deductions or price benefits, those deductions or benefits are to be granted to all of the foreign forces.

In some special fields, such as labor, requisitioning, transport and communications, rates will be determined by agreement between the Federal Government and the foreign forces or by Federal legislation.

Receipts From Disposal of Property

The convention establishes procedures for the disposal of property no longer needed by the forces. In general, receipts from the disposal of property purchases with funds from occupations cost budgets will accrue to the Federal Government.

Procedural Provisions

A joint Three Power German coordinating committee is established to assist in settling any difficulties arising in the implementation of the convention.

Review of the terms of the convention may be initiated by any signatory.

Subsidiary administrative agreements may be concluded to implement the convention.

Transitional Provisions

To allow for the transition in status of French, Belgian, and Luxembourg forces stationed in the Federal Republic to the status of Epc forces, the convention provides that these forces shall have the same status as other foreign forces until June 30, 1953 (end of NATO year).

VI. Summary of Letters Forming Part of the Contractual Agreements

1. Control Council Legislation

A letter from the three Foreign Ministers to the Federal Chancellor says that, in accordance with article 2 of the convention on relations which specifies their rights in relation to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, they will require certain control council legislation not to be deprived of effect in the Federal territory. A letter from the Federal Chancellor to the Foreign Ministers states the opinion of the Federal Government that the control council legislation mentioned above are internal matters of the control council and cannot be the subject of German legislative authority.

2. Taxes on Successor Organizations

In an exchange of letters with the Foreign Ministers, the Chancellor confirms that the Federal Government will settle all claims for taxes or levies imposed by *Laender* or local authorities on successor organizations and trust corporations set up to represent claimants for internal restitution.

3. Validity of International Agreements

An exchange of letters between the High Commissioners and the Federal Chancellor concerns the continuing appli-

cability and validity of international agreements concluded on behalf of the three Western zones by the Occupation authorities. With the High Commissioners' letter is a list of these treaties and agreements.

A reply from the Federal Chancellor recognizes the continuing validity of these treaties and the Federal Republic's obligation to implement them.

4. Status of the Saar

In this connection, the Chancellor declares and the High Commissioners confirm the agreement of their Governments that the inclusion in the list of certain treaties and agreements referring to the Saar does not constitute recognition by the Federal Republic of the present status of the Saar.

5. Exercise of Reserved Rights

A letter to the Federal Chancellor from the three High Commissioners on behalf of their Governments emphasizes that the exercise by the Three Powers of their rights concerning Germany as a whole does not adversely affect the relations established by the conventions generally. Further, the exercise of these rights does not permit the Three Powers to derogate from their undertakings.

6. Radio Frequencies

Letters from the Federal Chancellor to each of the High Commissioners confirm that the Federal Republic will apply the principles of the International Telecommunications Convention of 1947 so as to avoid harmful interference with the radio services or communications of the Three Powers which operate on frequencies allotted under the agreement of Copenhagen of 1948.

7. Private Prewar Obligations

A letter from the Federal Chancellor to the three High Commissioners invites them to inform their Governments that the Federal Government is prepared to negotiate a multilateral agreement with other governments for the settlement of questions regarding private prewar obligations and contracts and acquired rights. The Federal Government considers that in the field of insurance and reinsurance bilateral discussions with other governments are appropriate.

VII. Special Arrangements for the Entry Into Force of Parts of the Contractual Agreements

During the discussions leading up to signature of the conventions, the Federal Chancellor raised the question whether some provisions of the conventions might be put into effect before the time provided for in the conventions themselves.

The three Foreign Ministers have informed the Chancellor, in a letter published with the conventions, that when the conventions have been ratified by all the parties to them, the three Governments will be prepared, if there is any undue delay on the part of other Powers in ratifying the Epc treaty, to hold a meeting with the Federal Government to consider and to determine whether arrangements may be made to put some of the provisions contained in the conventions into effect prior to the entry into force of the conventions.

DECLARATION ON BERLIN ISSUED BY ALLIED KOMMANDATURA

The Allied Kommandatura in Berlin on May 26 issued a declaration on Berlin which is to replace the statement of principles governing the relationship between the Allied Kommandatura and Greater Berlin of May 14, 1949.²

² For text of the 1949 Statement, see *Germany 1947-1949: The Story in Documents*, Department of State publication 3556, p. 324.

The declaration is to take effect on the effective date of the Contractual Agreements. It is not a part of the agreements, but, taking into consideration the new relationship to be established between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic, it grants to the Berlin authorities the maximum liberty compatible with the special situation of Berlin.

Rights in respect to Berlin are listed in the convention on general relations among those rights retained by the Three Powers. The Three Powers must retain supreme authority in Berlin because international agreements to which they are parties require it.

They cannot relinquish this authority without jeopardizing their right to be in Berlin, a right which is clearly in the interests of free Berlin, the Federal Republic, and the Three Powers alike.

The declaration makes clear, however, that the Three Powers will exercise their authority so as to cause the least possible interference with the Berlin authorities. The Allied Kommandatura will raise no objection to the adoption by Berlin under an appropriate procedure of the same legislation as that of the Federal Republic, provided the adoption of such legislation does not affect the responsibilities of the Three Powers in Berlin. Moreover, in a number of fields covered in the Federal Republic by provisions of the Contractual Arrangements, Allied authorities in Berlin will in future intervene only to an extent consistent with the principles of the Contractual Arrangements or with Allied legislation in Berlin. These fields include restitution, reparations, decartelization, deconcentration, foreign interests, displaced persons and refugees, and prisoners sentenced by Allied courts.

Treaty Establishing European Defense Community Signed

The Foreign Ministers of six European nations—Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—signed the treaty establishing the European Defense Community on May 27 at Paris.¹ This treaty creates a defense force consisting of contingents which member states will put at the disposition of the community. It provides that aggression against any of the member states will be considered aggression against them all.

A protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT), signed on the same occasion, extends to members of the European Defense Community (EDC) the assurances that the member states of NAT will consider an attack on the European territory of any of the EDC states, or on any of their forces when in the area described in Article VI (2) of NAT, as an attack against all the Parties to NAT, and that they will take action accordingly within the meaning of Article V of NAT, i. e., each will take such action as it deems necessary. Secretary Acheson signed the protocol on behalf of the United States. A Declaration emphasizing the concern of the United States, the United Kingdom and France with the integrity of the EDC as now constituted was signed by Secretary Acheson, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman.

Following are Secretary Acheson's statement at the signing of the protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty, the text of the protocol, and the text of the U.S.-U.K.-French Declaration.

¹ See footnote 1, p. 888.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON

[Released to the press May 28]

I wish to express my profound conviction that what we have witnessed today may well prove to be one of the most important and most far reaching events of our lifetime.

The full significance of the events that have taken place here today can be best appraised by the statesmen and the people of Europe, whose imagination and vision conceived the idea of the European Defense Community, and who have worked so tirelessly and devotedly to make this concept a living entity.

We have seen the beginning of the realization of an ancient dream—the unity of the free peoples of Western Europe. I believe the continuation and completion of this movement toward unity will offer the richest of rewards to the people of Europe and to free human beings everywhere.

The principal immediate purpose of the European Defense Community is to give the peoples of Europe more adequate protection against the threat of aggression. In this sense it is a part of a broader effort undertaken by the entire North Atlantic community to create the defensive strength we need to assure peace and security to ourselves and to our children. All of us realize the importance of this undertaking, because without adequate defensive strength there is little hope that we can achieve the other good things of life that we are seeking.

It is for this reason that we have labored and sacrificed—that we have temporarily given up many things that we want and need. But, however vital defense may be at this time, the true meaning of the European Defense Community extends far beyond the field of defense.

It is a part of a many-threaded pattern of ideas and actions which is changing the entire fabric of European society. Together with the Schuman Plan and other steps toward European integration, the European Defense Community foreshadows enormous political, social, and economic benefits which will be felt by every European citizen. The events we have witnessed are full of meaning for individual men and women.

Sooner or later, directly or indirectly, the movement toward a new Europe will make itself felt in a greater fulfillment of human wants and aspirations.

From the point of view of the individual, these actions will translate themselves into a more plentiful supply of food to eat, of clothes to wear, and of houses to live in.

The widening horizons of existence will make more secure the conditions under which one may speak his thoughts without fear, worship God after his own manner, and freely select the men who govern him. Here is the setting in which full advantage may be gained from the cultural wealth which religion, education, art, and science have made available to mankind. And here, finally, are the conditions that will enable this generation to create a heritage for the next that will be full of promise and hope.

In unity, the people of our age can find greatly increased opportunities for doing all these things. By burying political rivalries and fears they can devote their political and social efforts more completely to the promotion of justice and human well-being. By combining their physical and spiritual assets they can achieve and maintain the strength which, in the modern world, offers the only assurance of peace and progress.

While the principal benefits of the movement toward unity will rightly accrue to the European peoples concerned, my own country and many other countries will be profoundly affected.

American interests are directly involved in the creation, growth, and survival of the European Defense Community.

Our concern goes deeper than the program of collective security in which we are engaged. It is founded upon the basic, immutable realities of modern international life—upon the enduring interests which the people of Europe share with the people of North America. We know that neither people can be assured of peace, security, or prosperity unless the other is peaceful, safe, and prosperous.

We know that closer bonds among the nations of Europe will help immeasurably to strengthen the bonds which hold together the entire Atlantic

community, and to enhance the cooperation of human beings everywhere.

I believe we are standing on the threshold of a new Europe and a new world. I believe that the farsighted statesmen of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands have laid the foundations for a new period of democratic growth which will shelter the development of individual liberty, social justice, and economic progress for generations to come.

[Released to the press May 27]

PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949.

Being satisfied that the creation of the European Defense Community set up under the Treaty signed at Paris on May 27, 1952, will strengthen the North Atlantic Community and the integrated defense of the North Atlantic area, and promote the closer association of the countries of Western Europe, and

Considering that the parties to the treaty setting up the European Defense Community have signed a protocol, which will enter into force at the same time as the present protocol, giving to the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty guarantees equivalent to the guarantees contained in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty,

Agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

An armed attack

(i) on the territory of any member of the European Defense Community in Europe or in the area described in Article 6 (i) of the North Atlantic Treaty, or

(ii) on the forces, vessels or aircraft of the European Defense Community when in the area described in Article 6 (ii) of the said Treaty, shall be considered an attack against all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, within the meaning of Article 5 of the said Treaty, and Article 5 shall apply accordingly.

The expression "member of the European Defense Community" in paragraph (i) of this Article means any of the following states which is a member of the European Defense Community, namely Belgium, France, German Federal Republic, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

ARTICLE II

The present Protocol shall enter into force as soon as each of the Parties has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance, and the Council of European Defense Community has notified the North Atlantic Council of the entry into force of the Treaty setting up the European Defense Community. The Government of the United States of America shall inform all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each such notification and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

ARTICLE III

This Protocol shall remain in force for so long as the North Atlantic Treaty and the Treaty signed at Paris on May 27, 1952 setting up the European Defense Community remain in force, and the parties to the latter treaty continue to give in respect of themselves and the European Defense Forces guarantees to the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty equivalent to the guarantees contained in the present Protocol.

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and of all the Parties to the Treaty establishing the European Defense Community.

In witness whereof, the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol. (Representatives of the 14 NAT countries).

Done at Paris the 27th day of May 1952.

TRIPARTITE DECLARATION

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and France have signed conventions with the German Federal Republic which will establish a new relationship with that country. These conventions, as well as the treaties for a European Defense Community and a European coal and steel community, of which France is a signatory, provide a new basis for uniting Europe and for the realization of Germany's partnership in the European community. They are designed to prevent the resurgence of former tensions and conflicts among the free nations of Europe and any future revival of aggressive militarism. They make possible the removal of the special restraints hitherto imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany and permit its participation as an equal partner in Western defense.

These conventions and treaties respond to the desire to provide by united efforts for the prosperity and security of Western Europe. The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom consider that the establishment and development of these institutions of the European community correspond to their own basic interests and will therefore lend them every possible co-operation and support.

Moreover, Western defense is a common enterprise in which the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom are already partners through membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

These bonds are now strengthened by the system of reciprocal guarantees agreed to between the member states of the European Defense Community, between these member states and the United Kingdom and also between these member states and the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

For these various reasons, including the fact that these new guarantees will apply to the states concerned only as members of one or the other of these organizations, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have an abiding interest, as has the Government of France, in the effectiveness of the treaty creating the European Defense Community and in the strength and integrity of that community. Accordingly, if any action from whatever quarter threatens the integrity or unity of the community, the two Governments will regard this as a threat to their own security. They will act in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Moreover, they have each expressed their resolve to station such forces on the continent of Europe, including the Federal Republic of Germany, as they deem necessary and appropriate to contribute to the joint defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area, having regard to their obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty, their interest in the integrity of the European Defense Community, and their special responsibilities in Germany.

The security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the Three Powers there are regarded by the Three Powers as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present international situa-

tion. Accordingly they will maintain armed forces within the territory of Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it. They therefore reaffirm that they will treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves.

These new security guarantees supersede the assurances contained in the declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the United States, and France at New York on September 19, 1950.

Loan to Belgium To Expand Imports From the United States

On May 21 the directors of the Export-Import Bank at Washington announced the successful completion of a loan of 50 million dollars to the Kingdom of Belgium.

On that date, thirty-four U.S. commercial banks purchased at par, through the National Bank of Belgium, promissory notes unconditionally endorsed by the National Bank of Belgium in the amount of 45 million dollars. The balance of 5 million dollars was taken by the Export-Import Bank in compliance with the conditions of the offer to the commercial banks.

This transaction put into effect an agreement entered into between the Export-Import Bank at Washington and the Kingdom of Belgium on May 6, 1952, extending the 50 million dollar credit with the condition that participation in it by commercial banks and trust companies in the United States would be permitted. This participation is unqualified and without recourse on the Export-Import Bank.

The loan was closed at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York City on May 21. Those present included Baron Silvercruys, the Ambassador of Belgium to the United States, Thomas Basyin, of the National Bank of Belgium, and Jacques de Thier, Consul General of Belgium in New York, together with representatives of the attached list of U.S. banks.¹

The notes bear interest at the rate of four percent per annum, and payments are to be made semiannually beginning June 15, 1953, and ending December 15, 1957.

The loan was sought by the Belgian Government to permit the expansion of imports of materials and equipment from the United States.

Although the amount of commercial bank participation was 45 million dollars, Herbert E. Gaston, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank, said that subscriptions offered through the Federal Reserve Banks by commercial banks throughout the United States had been greatly in excess of this sum, so that a radical scaling down of allotments was necessary.

¹ Not printed here.

Trade Expansion: A Vital Element In Achievement of World Peace

by Harold F. Linder

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs¹

My job in the State Department is to work on the economic aspects of our foreign policy. Let me first point out that the economic elements of our foreign policy are intimately interwoven with our political and security objectives. We are engaged in a profound and demanding struggle to build and deepen the strength of the free world. The implacable enmity of the Kremlin toward human freedom and liberty, toward the way of life we and our friends hold dear, cannot be met by words alone. Deeds count. To build our common defense, to build security for the future, to build genuine economic and social progress—these are the aims of this Nation and our free-world partners.

These are tasks that cannot be accomplished overnight. There is no wonder drug or magic formula that can speed our common defense. Nor is there a single policy we can follow. To achieve the decent world we believe in and in which we can be secure requires patient, concerted effort on the political, military, economic, social, and psychological fronts. Our vigorous leadership must be accompanied by staying power and a willingness consistently to see the job through. This road has no short cuts.

The interrelationship between the various aspects of our foreign policy is self-evident to you. It is in this context that I want to discuss one important aspect of our policy—the expansion of trade. We have learned in our own national experience in this country that the absence of barriers to trade between the various States and increased productivity have made a major con-

tribution to our own national prosperity and well-being.

Prosperity in Texas is dependent both on national and international markets for Texas-produced goods. And Texas, in turn, by buying the products of other States of the Union and other nations makes it possible for trade to flourish.

Before I arrived in Dallas I spent some time looking into the interests of Texas in international trade. The facts reveal that your prosperity depends importantly on your participation in world commerce. Let's look at your imports from other countries for a moment. Practically every important industry in Texas is dependent on imports for at least some of its essential raw materials. Your tin smelter at Texas City, your oil field and oil refining machinery, tractors and farm machinery, electrical machinery, transportation equipment, fabricated metal products—all these and other industries could not operate without foreign raw materials.

Prosperity Depends on World Commerce

You have a broad interest in exports. As a Nation, our export of agricultural commodities was valued at more than 2.7 billion dollars in 1949. Estimates show that Texas exports of such commodities have been running well over 300 million dollars a year in recent years. How important our exports are to American farmers is clear when you realize that one out of every three bales of cotton picked, nearly one out of every two pounds of rice harvested, one out of every two bushels of wheat we grow is sold abroad. Here in Texas that export trade affects a great many people. About half your farms grow cotton, for example, and about a third produce grains.

¹Address made before a joint meeting of the Dallas Council on World Affairs, the Dallas Chamber of Commerce, and the Export-Import Club at Dallas, Tex., in observance of World Trade Week, on May 23 and released to the press on the same date.

I could present you with a great many more statistics, all of which would reinforce the self-evident point I have been making: that Texas is important in our international trade and that this international trade is important to Texas.

What is true of Texas is true of the Nation as a whole. Today we are an exporting Nation. It is hard for many of us to get used to the idea that large sectors of our economy rely on export trade to provide the margin that means the difference between profit and loss. Not only have our agricultural commodities moved heavily into export, as I have just pointed out, but our manufacturing industries likewise have large foreign markets. Such American-manufactured goods as machine tools, motor cars, plastics, carbon black, and many others—all move extensively into foreign markets. Most U.S. producers, whether on farms or in factories, have an interest one way or another in the export market.

Our overseas economic interests are not confined to trade. Today the United States is the largest creditor Nation in the world. Private investors hold foreign securities. Many of our corporations have foreign branches or subsidiaries and the Federal Government itself is a large foreign creditor. U.S. private capital invested directly abroad in enterprises wholly or partially American-owned increased last year to a point exceeding 14 billion dollars. Foreign obligations to agencies of the U.S. Government as of today exceed 10 billion dollars. These investments and obligations not only bear interest but the principal amounts must be repaid to us at varying dates in the future. And a creditor can only be a successful creditor when the debtor is able to meet his obligations on time and in full.

Added to all this we have large domestic investments in our American merchant marine, in banks from coast to coast that service our foreign trade, in insurance companies which provide coverage for our cargoes, and in American industries producing goods going into foreign commerce. The stake of the United States in world trade, it is quite evident, has grown to a point where it represents a very essential part of our country's business and economic life. In 1951 our total exports and imports amounted to some 26 billion dollars with an additional 9 billion dollars accruing from shipping, services, and similar items. International trade represents important business for American labor, agriculture, industry, and finance.

Since 1919 our exports have exceeded our imports by some 80 billion dollars. Last year alone we sent abroad 4 billion dollars more in goods than we received in goods. Looking at the statistics, some people might say, "Isn't that just fine! Since business looks so favorable to us, let's increase our exports. Let's sell more abroad." But that's where we come up against an economic fact of life that cannot be ignored. We expect foreign pur-

chasers who buy our goods to pay for them in dollars or in gold. We are not willing, ordinarily, to accept pesos, escudos, francs, lira, or any other foreign currencies in payment, many of which—because of the world dollar shortage—are not freely convertible into dollars. This poses a basic question: How can other countries obtain the dollars they need to purchase the American products they want to buy, and—more important from the viewpoint of our own self-interest—which we want to sell?

Over the last three decades other nations haven't been able to earn needed dollars by the sale of goods to us. In the past we have kept the accounts balanced in a variety of ways. In addition to imports, we have bought foreign securities, we have accepted gold, we have given foreign aid, and we have spent dollars abroad as tourists. For the future, however, some of these courses are no longer available to balance the accounts. Many countries have run out of their gold and their credit. Foreign aid cannot go on forever. And countries want to "pay their own way." As a result, it seems to me we face three policy alternatives: first, we can reduce our exports to meet our present level of imports and can accept default on payments on loans we have made; or second, we can meet the "dollar gap" by making grants to other nations from public funds; or third, we can take our payment for goods we sell and loans and investments we make, in the form of imports of goods and services.

To my mind, this alternative is the only acceptable solution.

Expansionism vs. Restrictionism

Those of you who recall the period of the 1930's prior to the adoption of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act can appreciate why I support the third alternative. Successive tariff acts had raised U.S. tariff rates so high that this market was virtually closed to many foreign products without regard to the interests of other countries, of American producers for export, of American consumers, and of the Nation as a whole. On the international front the early thirties represented a period of cutthroat trade warfare in which high and rising tariffs, quotas, exchange controls, discriminations, and every conceivable device of waging trade warfare, were put into effect. Everybody suffered, and nobody benefited. Since 1934, when Secretary of State Cordell Hull proposed and Congress enacted the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program, American policy has been devoted to expansion of trade and opposed to trade restrictions.

After the war, we and the other nations recognized that any return to conditions of the early thirties would undermine and destroy the cooperation on which the strength of the free world and

peace could be built. Of course, it was recognized that you couldn't get rid of all existing restrictions overnight—nor, on the other hand, could you permit restrictionism to be the dominant theme in the international trade policy of the free nations. Expansionism—not restrictionism—is the key to national and international economic progress and prosperity.

Accordingly, we focused our efforts on achieving several important economic objectives. First, we recognized that it was important to get the economic machinery of nations going again. This effort we assisted through grants and loans of public funds. Second, we recognized that if production were to be effectively increased, it was absolutely essential to reduce the restrictions on and barriers to trade between nations. So in 1947 we joined in negotiating the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, to which 34 nations are parties. The purpose of this important agreement was to provide for orderly and effective reduction of trade barriers by nations and to provide a forum in which the nations could work out cooperatively solutions to questions in dispute.

One basic tenet of our thinking on expanding trade is to reduce red tape and Government interference as much as possible. As a businessman, and as an official of our Government, I believe that this is vitally important. I would like to point out that the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program is based on this premise: that by the elimination of barriers to trade, a climate is established in which free enterprise, initiative, and competition in international trade can flourish.

In the abnormal years of the last decade, there has been an increased demand for American production abroad. The war and its aftermath likewise meant that many countries who traditionally sold in the American market were not in a position to produce goods for export. In brief, the result has been the great expansion of our export market, which I mentioned earlier, and a kind of automatic protection for domestic producers from foreign goods selling in the American market.

It is against this background that the growing demand for restrictionism in the United States poses very grave questions. Our aid programs have rested on the assumption that eventually free nations in the world, receiving aid, would become self-sustaining. These countries have assumed that, as they rebuilt their economic strength and were in a position to export, the United States would not interpose obstacles to their selling enough in the American market to earn the dollars they need to support themselves. Moreover our constant pressure to increase productivity, to help nations get on a pay-as-you-go basis and to encourage the practice of free-enterprise principles has had increasing influence. Consequently, other countries view with alarm the indications of increasing American unwillingness to accept imports. Ten nations, for example, have protested

section 104 of the Defense Production Act, which requires the Secretary of Agriculture to restrict or prohibit imports of certain fats and oils, rice and rice products, peanuts, cheese, and certain other dairy products.

Protection Demands Increase

The increasing number of requests for escape-clause action under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program which have been brought before the U.S. Tariff Commission, and talk about the urgent need for "protecting the American producer" cause grave concern. Applications for escape-clause action cover such varied items as wood screws, tobacco pipe bowls, glacé cherries, woodwind musical instruments and parts, spring clothespins, dried figs, estrogenic compound, and so on. Every industry has the right and privilege of seeking protection. But I believe that the decision on whether or not we should accede to the requests of these industries should be based upon consideration of the national interests of the United States. The question is whether we will, in effect, adopt a program of restricting imports whenever they begin to increase even slightly. If we do this, and other countries follow the same pattern, as they are more than likely to do, then trade expansion is a dead duck.

Indicative of the concern of friendly countries about this trend is the note this Government received from the British Government in April.² In the note the British Government indicated their concern that if they were unable to earn the dollars they need to buy products required for the joint defense effort, through selling goods in the American market, there might be serious repercussions on the ability of the British to support the level of defense which the United States has urged.

If the joint defense effort is to be strong enough to stem Communist pressure, it must be built on a solid foundation of strong, independent nations acting together. This requires cooperative action and strong leadership. However when inconsistencies show up in our own policies, our leadership is weakened. We cannot throw up trade barriers here while at the same time we urge the development of a close economic and political partnership in the North Atlantic community. To other free countries that kind of inconsistency just doesn't make sense. It undermines the basis on which our position of leadership rests by raising fundamental doubts in the minds of other free peoples as to our sense of responsibility and the nature of our goals.

Take Europe for example. We have sought in Western Europe to encourage increased productivity, secure the best utilization of resources, and

² BULLETIN of May 12, 1952, p. 737.

to see the skilled manpower of these countries employed most effectively. And if productivity were the measure, and rearmament necessities had not intervened, it would be fair to say that we and our friends had been very successful. Should the United States, which has led in urging the building of a strong unified economic, political, and military effort among the nations of the free world revert to a restrictive trade policy, Europeans would be convinced that, rather than take the measures we are urging, they themselves should increase restrictions on trade.

Trade Problems of Other Countries

To pursue a policy of restrictionism in international trade among the free nations would be like driving backward into the confusion and trade conflict of the thirties, which we abandoned because it almost destroyed us and our friends. Surely we have learned from this bitter experience that trade expansionism is the path forward toward genuine economic strength and well-being.

Restrictionism in free-world trade imperils a number of our fundamental objectives. Take for instance our program of controls over trade with the Soviet bloc. As part of the free-world's defense system, the free-world nations since 1949 have cooperated in embargoing or restricting such trade with the Soviet bloc as would contribute to building up its military potential.

This has not been an easy step for Western Europe. Historically, the industrial nations of Western Europe have traded extensively with Eastern Europe. Some depend to a significant degree on this trade, particularly for important quantities of food, fuel, and lumber. Besides raw materials, these nations also need markets for the goods they produce, which are not of primary strategic importance.

In the case of Norway, the Soviet bloc represents a market for about 80 percent of her exports of salted and frozen herring. In 1951, Italy's rayon exports to the Soviet bloc exceeded 4 million dollars, or 8 percent of her total rayon shipments abroad. If the United States increases restrictions on the flow of imports into our own country, pressures will be increased on Western European countries to trade with the Soviet bloc. In a recent note to the U.S. Government, the Italian Government observed that the imposition by us of restrictive trade measures (and I quote) :

... plays directly into the hands of that vocal minority of opinion which is swayed by Communist propaganda in Europe. As it is known, the Communists noisily press their line that the Marshall Plan and other aid programs are not really meant to bring about the economic emancipation of Western Europe but to perpetuate their dependence on American bounty, and that American aid programs are calculated to find additional outlets for domestic production, while barring the door to foreign products. The result is that a state of confusion and

doubt is generated in the minds of some people—which is sedulously exploited by the Communist minority for its own ends . . .

Or take the case of Japan, which has been co-operating on security controls on trade with Communist China. The pressure for renewing traditional trade with China is strong. If alternative markets are not available, it will grow stronger. By restricting Japan's exports to our own markets, we would make the situation more difficult. Pressures might also be created for U.S. dollar aid to offset the loss of dollars which Japan is now earning through selling her products to the U.S. consumer.

The Soviet ballyhoo at the Moscow Economic Conference in April tried to create confusion in the minds of the peoples of the free world by alleging that the Soviet bloc was interested in expanding its trade with the free world. The fact is, of course, that the long-run aim of the Soviet Union is and always has been to increase its self-sufficiency. For the Soviet bloc, trade is simply another weapon in the Cold War with the free world. The Kremlin-dominated Soviet bloc never has been willing to cooperate in any of the free-world's efforts genuinely to reduce restrictions on trade and to expand it.

If you are convinced, as I am, that the strength of the free world is essential to our survival; if you are convinced, as I am, that countries, like individuals, like to stand on their own feet; if you believe, as I do, that expanding production and expanding trade are essential elements of economic progress and prosperity, then I think you will agree with me that our trade policy is of major importance. I would like you to think again about the choice we face in our policy :

(1) cutting exports and accepting defaults on payments of loans; (2) meeting the trade deficit with money from the U.S. public treasury—our pockets; or (3) receiving payment for our goods in the form of imports of goods and services.

Our domestic and our foreign policy cannot be dissociated. At home we have practiced the doctrine of expanding production and expanding trade. We must continue to practice this policy in our international dealings. We are interested in maintaining markets for our goods. Part and parcel of this problem of marketing our goods abroad will be our willingness to permit foreign nations to earn dollars honestly and economically by allowing unhampered trade with us. Thus we will clearly demonstrate that we ourselves are prepared to practice what we preach. We will convince the free world by our deeds as well as our words, that expanded trade and lowering of restrictions on trade is a vital element in our common defense and our common achievement of world peace.

² *Ibid.*, Apr. 28, 1952, p. 661.

Soviet Restrictions in Germany Protested

Texts of U.S. Notes

On May 30 the Acting U.S. High Commissioner for Germany sent two notes to Gen. Vassily I. Chuikov, chairman of the Soviet Control Commission in Germany. Identical notes were sent by the High Commissioners of the United Kingdom and France. Texts of the U.S. notes follow:

[Printed from telegraphic text]

I

DEAR GENERAL CHUIKOV:

I am compelled to draw your attention to a series of obstructive measures which have been taken in the past few days in the Soviet zone of Germany and in the Soviet sector of Berlin.

The railway zone-crossings at Hof and Horrenberg have been closed arbitrarily, the first to passenger traffic, and the second to all traffic.

Traffic has been interrupted on the Pressig-Rotenkirchen-Tettau rail connection which crosses the territory of the Soviet zone for a short distance.

Under various pretexts and by arbitrary unilateral action, the road crossings at Vacha, Arenshausen, and Oebisfelde were closed on May 24, and those at Bergen and Ellrich were closed on May 25. No alternative crossings have been provided in any of these cases.

Thus one-half of the highway connections between the Western zones and the Soviet zone have been closed. Telegraph and telephone communications between the Western sectors of Berlin and the Soviet zone or sector, between Berlin and the Western zones, and between the Soviet zone and the Western zones have been completely interrupted or abnormally reduced. As a result the United States Military Mission in Potsdam has been deprived of telephone connections with the Western sectors of Berlin.

An ordinance published on 26 May by the German authorities of the Soviet zone contains in its preamble false and insulting allegations directed against the "Western powers." Measures are moreover being taken to establish a prohibited area of several kilometers and a cleared area along the demarcation line so as to isolate completely the Soviet zone from the Western zone.

In certain cases the cleared area even encroaches on the demarcation line. Moreover, German authorities of the Soviet zone appear to have announced their intention of modifying unilaterally the conditions which, under quadripartite agreements, govern inter-zonal travel.

I protest vigorously against these actions, which are manifestly contrary to the interests of the

whole German population. They are hardly likely to facilitate the reunification of Germany which, nevertheless, the Soviet Government professes to be a primary objective. Furthermore, they are in direct contradiction with the spirit and the letter of agreements concluded during the last seven years between the occupying powers. I therefore request you to give the necessary instructions to have these measures rescinded.

Very truly yours,

SAMUEL REBER

II

MY DEAR GENERAL CHUIKOV:

On May 8, 1952, United States military vehicles containing United States military personnel were refused permission by the Soviet authorities at Babelsberg to go along the autobahn to Helmstedt. The following day a British military vehicle, containing British military personnel, was also refused clearance by the Soviet authorities at Babelsberg. Until May 16 the Soviet authorities persisted in refusing clearance to British and United States military patrols. On May 27, after patrols had passed for ten days without interference, restrictions were again arbitrarily imposed by the Soviet authorities on the movement of British and United States patrols along the autobahn at Babelsberg and these have not yet been lifted. Such actions cannot be justified under existing agreements and usages.

The right of free access of United States, United Kingdom and French military forces to Berlin, over the autobahn as well as by other means of communication, flows from the rights of the United States, United Kingdom and France as occupying powers in Berlin and is beyond challenge.

I therefore request you to instruct your subordinates to desist from any further interference with the right of free access by these military police units, which are integral elements of United States and United Kingdom military forces, to the autobahn in question.

Very truly yours,

SAMUEL REBER

French Cotton Credit

The Directors of the Export-Import Bank on May 12 announced the authorization of a credit of 45 million dollars to Groupement d'Importation et de Repartition du Coton (an association of French cotton importers) subject to guaranty by a consortium of French banks headed by Lazard Frères of Paris. The transactions will be conducted through U.S. commercial banks.

Complaints Concerning High Water Levels in Lake Ontario

INVESTIGATION BY CANADIAN OFFICIALS

[Released to the press May 13]

The Department of State announced on May 13 that the American Embassy at Ottawa had received a note dated May 8, 1952, from the Canadian Department of External Affairs, stating that the Canadian Government was prepared to concur in a reference to the International Joint Commission—United States and Canada, on the matter of high-water levels in accordance with the request contained in the Embassy's note of March 7, 1952.

Many complaints were received by the Department of State last September from residents along the south shore of Lake Ontario regarding damage being caused to their property by the high level of water in Lake Ontario. Some of the complainants considered that the Gut Dam constructed in the St. Lawrence River by the Canadian Government in 1903-04 and the diversion of the waters of the Long Lac and Ogoki Rivers from Hudson Bay into Lake Superior constituted important elements in causing the high water in Lake Ontario.

In a note dated October 19, 1951,¹ the Department of State, through the American Embassy at Ottawa, presented these complaints to the Canadian Government and asked that an investigation be conducted regarding these complaints. On October 25, 1951, the Canadian Department of External Affairs replied that such an investigation would be made by Canadian officials.¹

The results of this investigation were set forth in a note dated February 27, 1952,¹ from the Canadian Department of External Affairs in which the following excerpts from the report of the investigation respecting the effects of the Gut Dam on this situation were set forth:

Location. The Gut Dam is located in the St. Lawrence River about 7 miles below Prescott and extends across the channel between Galop Island and Adams Island.

Purpose. The Dam was built in order to: "shut off a side or cross current in the Galop Rapids and thereby render that channel safer for the passage of vessels. A

secondary object is to raise the water in the upper entrance of the Galop Canal."

Effect of Dam on Flow Distribution. Prior to the construction of the Gut Dam 54.3% of the total flow of the River at times of mean flow passed north of Galop Island, 12,000 cubic feet per second of which passed through the channel between Galop and Adams Islands. At the present time 52% of the flow passes down the North channel.

Effect of Dam on Water Levels. Closure of the Galop-Adams Island Channel has resulted in a raise in water level of 0.50 feet (6 inches) in the water level at mean stage at the upper entrance to the Galop Canal and 0.45 feet (5½ inches) at mean stage on Lake Ontario (Oswego, N. Y.)

The maximum daily mean water level recorded at the upper entrance to the Galop Canal since the Dam was built was elevation 246.69 feet (July 30, 1947). This level was exceeded during 234 days between 1858, the earliest year of record, and 1900, with a maximum recorded elevation of 247.38 (May 22, 1862).

The maximum monthly mean level recorded at the upper entrance to the Galop Canal since the Dam was built was elevation 246.34 (July 1947). This mean level was exceeded during 16 months during the period 1858 to 1900, with a maximum monthly mean of 246.84 in May 1862.

During the period of low levels occurring in 1934, '35 and '36 the depth available for navigation in the St. Lawrence Canals was governed by the depth on the upper sill of Lock 24 and reached a minimum of 11.8 feet on November 26, 1934. If the Gut Dam had not been in place the depth of water on the upper sill of Lock 27 (the upper entrance lock of the Galop Canal) would have been the governing depth on the St. Lawrence Canals and would have fallen to a minimum of 11.7 feet on November 20, 1934. Of greater importance than the decrease in the available depth is the increase in the number of days during the low water period on which the full 14-foot depth would not have been available—from 386 occurrences under present conditions to 785 occurrences with the Gut Dam removed.

Effect of Dam on Currents. At the present time certain vessels navigate upstream past Iroquois and enter the Galop Canal at Lock 28. If the Gut Dam were removed the velocities at mean stage at the lower entrance to Lock 28 would be increased by approximately 5%. Whether this is a serious matter or not could only be determined by consultation with the pilots in charge of these vessels.

As a result, the conclusion was reached that the effect of the Gut Dam on the level of Lake Ontario was to raise the level 5½ inches at mean stage, and during periods of high water such as

¹ Not printed here.

occurred in May 1951, was to raise the level $7\frac{3}{4}$ inches.

With respect to the effect of other diversions on the level of Lake Ontario and the net effect of these diversions and of the Gut Dam, the report of the Canadian officials reached the following conclusions:

The quantity of water diverted from the Hudson Bay Drainage Area into the Great Lakes Basin via the Long Lac and Ogoki River diversions varies from time to time. To date it has been assumed that on the average the total amount added to the Great Lakes Drainage Basin will be 5,000 c. f. s. The effect of this additional water on the level of Lake Ontario at times of mean flow is 0.25 feet (3 inches).

The amount of water diverted from the Great Lakes Drainage Basin via the Chicago Drainage Canal is now regulated by a decree of the Supreme Court of the United States, dated April 21, 1930, and is limited to an annual average of 1,500 c. f. s. in addition to domestic pumpage. This latter amount can be taken at about 1,800 c. f. s. The effect of the total diversion of 3,300 c. f. s. on the water level of Lake Ontario at times of mean flow is 0.16 feet (2 inches).

The net effect of the Gut Dam, the Long Lac and Ogoki diversions and the Chicago diversion on the water level of Lake Ontario at times of mean flow is as shown below:

Works	Amount of Diversion c. f. s.	Effect on W. L. on Lake Ontario
Gut Dam		0.45 feet
Long Lac & Ogoki Diversions	5,000	0.25 feet
Chicago Diversion	3,300	0.16 feet
		0.54 feet (6½ inches)

The net effect of all these works at periods of high water level is then stated to be as follows:

Effect of Gut Dam	$7\frac{3}{4}$ inches
Effect of Ogoki and Long Lac (5,000 c. f. s.)	3 inches
Effect of Chicago Diversion (3,200 c. f. s.)	2 inches
Net effect	$8\frac{3}{4}$ inches

The report recommended that the most effective way of dealing with the problem was by the construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power project in the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River, as it would provide for the regulation of outflow and level of Lake Ontario at the proposed dams and power houses.

As the Canadian note of February 27, 1952, concluded with the statement that further consideration would be required respecting the suggestion of the U.S. Government that the question of the levels of the Great Lakes be referred to the International Joint Commission for study and recommendations, the Embassy in its note of March 7, 1952, referred to several bills pending in Congress with respect to waters of the Great Lakes and formally requested "that the Government of Canada join with the Government of the United States in referring the question of the high-water level of Lake Ontario to the International Joint Commission for study and for recommendation of the appropriate remedial measures"—the exact terms

of such a reference to be drafted later if Canada agreed in principle to such a reference.

The International Joint Commission-United States and Canada, was established pursuant to provisions of the Boundary Waters Treaty of January 11, 1909, and consists of three United States and three Canadian members. It has assisted both Governments since its establishment in the settlement of difficult problems relating to boundary waters.

CANADIAN NOTE OF MAY 8

The Secretary of State for External Affairs presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the United States of America and has the honour to refer to the Embassy's note no. 99 of October 19, 1951, the reply of the Department of External Affairs, No. X-51, of February 27, and to the Embassy's note No. 222 of March 7, with regard to the suggestion that the question of the high-water level of Lake Ontario be referred to the International Joint Commission for study and for recommendation of the appropriate remedial measures.

As indicated in the Department's reply under reference, the construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power project in the International Section of the St. Lawrence River will provide for the regulation of the outflow and level of Lake Ontario and this is considered to be the most effective way of dealing with the problem. After many years of study of the hydrology of the Great Lakes system as a whole and the hydraulics of the St. Lawrence River in particular, a method of regulation has been designed and accepted by the engineering officials of both countries in planning the implementation of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Agreement of 1941. Moreover, article VIII(D) of the 1941 agreement on the St. Lawrence Project provides that the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Commission, to be set up under the terms of that agreement, shall report upon the desirability of works for compensation and regulation in the Great Lakes system.

On the other hand, in order to avoid any further delay, the President of the United States has already agreed to cooperate with the Canadian Government in referring the St. Lawrence project immediately to the International Joint Commission for approval on the understanding that the deep waterway will be constructed by Canada alone. With the exception of the location of the waterway, plans for this alternative development, including the control features and the method of regulation on which the plans are based, are the same as those developed for the implementation of the 1941 Agreement.

The Canadian Government is prepared to deal with this matter as quickly as possible under either of the two alternative arrangements already agreed upon. The Government of Canada is also

prepared to concur in the suggested reference to the International Joint Commission on the matter of high-water levels, on the understanding that the reference will be drafted in such a manner that the Commission will not delay consideration of the St. Lawrence project, which it has been agreed to refer to the Commission immediately, and so that approval of the St. Lawrence project will not be delayed by the consideration of the reference on the matter of high water levels.

U.S. NOTE OF MARCH 7

[Printed from telegraphic text]

No. 222

The Ambassador of the United States of America presents his compliments to His Excellency the Secretary of State for External Affairs and has the honor to refer to paragraph 7 of His Excellency's Note No. X-51 of February 27, 1952, in regard to the high-water level of Lake Ontario in which it is stated that the question of a reference to the International Joint Commission for study and recommendation will require further consideration by the Canadian Government.

It has been orally indicated to the Department of State that a primary factor in the reluctance of the Canadian Government to make a reference concerning the level of water in Lake Ontario has been the feeling that such a reference might prejudice an expeditious consideration of a reference to the St. Lawrence project. It is the opinion of the U.S. Government on the other hand that the making of such a reference concerning the level of water in Lake Ontario would not necessarily delay the consideration of a reference on the St. Lawrence project, but instead might expedite its disposition since the information which could be obtained by the International Joint Commission under the Lake Ontario reference would supplement information required in connection with any subsequent St. Lawrence reference. It has, moreover, been the practice of the Government concerned to request the Commission, upon appropriate occasions, to give priority to urgent questions such as, for example, the effect upon the spawning grounds of the blue-back salmon in the Okanagan River of the construction of the flood control structures which Canadian authorities propose to erect in that river. Consequently, the communications from each Government to the chairman of each of the sections of the Commission transmitting a reference on the St. Lawrence Power project could appropriately ask that the Commission give it consideration on a priority basis with respect to any other reference pending before the Commission. There is no reason to doubt that such a request would result in immediate consideration by the Commission of a St. Lawrence reference.

In view, therefore, of the foregoing considerations and the provisions of several bills pending

in the Congress with respect to waters of the Great Lakes, and with reference to his earlier oral representations on the subject, the Ambassador has the honor to request formally that the Government of Canada join with the Government of the United States in referring the question of the high-water level of Lake Ontario to the International Joint Commission for study and for recommendation of the appropriate remedial measures. The exact terms of such a reference can be drafted later if the Canadian Government agrees in principle to such reference.

Radio Equipment Convention Enters Into Force With Canada

[Released to the press May 15]

On May 15, 1952, Secretary Acheson and Hume Wrong, Canadian Ambassador at Washington, exchanged the instruments of ratification with respect to the convention between the United States and Canada, signed at Ottawa on February 8, 1951, relating to the operation by citizens of either country of certain radio equipment or stations in the other country.¹ By this act the convention was brought into force.

The convention is designed to eliminate certain difficulties which have arisen in recent years by reason of the fact that the citizens of each country who operate certain types of radio equipment in that country have been precluded by the laws of the other country from operating similar equipment in such other country.

Three classes of persons will derive direct benefit from the provisions of the convention. Pilots who are qualified as radio operators in one of the countries will be permitted to operate the transmitters installed in civilian aircraft of the other country's registry. Operators of certain mobile radio transmitters installed in vehicles used for public service or for commercial purposes in border areas, and individuals who have radio telephone installations in their cars, will be able to obtain permission to use such equipment while in the territory of the other country. Amateur wireless operators will be permitted, subject to certain conditions, to use their wireless sets while visiting the other country.

The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent on April 1, 1952, to the ratification of the convention. The President ratified the convention on April 7, 1952.

It is provided in the convention that it shall remain in force for a period of 5 years from the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification and, subject to the right of either Government to give a 6-month written notice of termination, indefinitely after that period.

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 19, 1951, p. 302.

Opportunities for Foreign Study Under Fulbright Act

[Released to the press May 26]

Opportunities will be available for more than 1,300 Americans to undertake graduate study, teaching, or research abroad during the 1953-54 academic year, the International Information Administration of the Department of State announced on May 26. A comparable number of opportunities will be available for foreign nationals to come to the United States for similar purposes. These awards, authorized by the Fulbright Act, are offered under the educational exchange program which is designed to further mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries.

The countries in which these opportunities exist are Austria, Australia, Belgium, Burma, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, India, Iraq, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United Kingdom.

Persons wishing to apply should send their inquiries to the following agencies:

For graduate study: Students currently enrolled in American colleges or universities should apply to the Fulbright advisers on their campuses. Completed applications must be returned to these advisers by October 31, 1952. Other candidates should apply directly to the Institute of International Education, One East 67th St., New York 21, N.Y. Completed applications must be returned to that office by October 31, 1952, except for Australia and New Zealand, which must be returned by October 15.

For university teaching, or advanced research: to the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, 2101 Constitution Ave., NW., Washington 25, D.C. Completed applications must be returned by October 15, 1952, for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Iraq, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom. The competition for other countries has already closed.

For teaching in American secondary schools abroad: to the American Council on Education, 1785 Massachusetts Ave., NW., Washington 6, D.C.

For teaching in national secondary schools abroad: to the Office of Education, Federal Security Agency, Washington 25, D.C. Completed applications must be returned by October 15, 1952, for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Iraq, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom. The competition for other countries has already closed.

Grants are normally made for one academic year and are renewable only in exceptional cases. Grants to Americans usually include round-trip transportation, tuition or a stipend, a living allow-

ance, and a small amount for necessary books and equipment. Grants to foreign nationals include round-trip transportation only, and their expenses in the United States must be met from other sources. All grants under the act are made in foreign currencies.

Agricultural-Mechanical College To Be Established in Ethiopia

The Department of State announced on May 16 that the United States and Ethiopia have concluded an agreement providing for the establishment and operation of a college of agriculture and mechanical arts in Ethiopia by the Technical Cooperation Administration.

The Point Four program agreement was signed May 15 at Addis Ababa by U.S. Ambassador J. Rives Childs and Foreign Minister Aklilou Habtewold of Ethiopia. Present at the signing was Marcus J. Gordon, who was recently appointed to direct the U.S. program of technical cooperation in Ethiopia to be developed under the General Point Four Agreement between the two Governments signed on June 14, 1951.¹

Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College of Stillwater, Okla., will assume the responsibility of assisting the Government of Ethiopia in establishing and operating the college under an agreement with the Technical Cooperation Administration.

The college, which in many respects will be similar to a typical American land-grant college, will undertake projects designed to further the economic development of the country. This will include a country-wide agricultural extension service and agricultural experiment stations.

Under the terms of the agreement signed May 15, the initial contribution of the United States will be \$400,000 to help finance the costs of the college buildings and plant in addition to providing the basic staff of technicians required to organize the college program. The U.S. contribution of \$400,000 will be matched by the Ethiopian Government in Ethiopian currency to finance the local currency costs of the college program. The Ethiopian Government will also provide the necessary lands and local personnel.

The possibility of establishing an agricultural and mechanical arts college adapted to the needs of Ethiopia was first discussed in 1950 when the late Henry G. Bennett, then President of Oklahoma A. and M., served as an agricultural adviser to Emperor Haile Selassie. Plans were further discussed when Mr. Bennett visited Ethiopia in July of 1951 as Administrator of the Technical Cooperation Administration of the Department of State.

¹ BULLETIN of July 2, 1951, p. 18.

U.S., U.K., France Submit Proposals for Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces

STATEMENT BY BENJAMIN V. COHEN¹

I should like to explain the reasons which have prompted the United States delegation to join with the British and French delegations in the presentation of a working paper containing proposals for setting over-all numerical ceilings on all armed forces. The proposals in our view are significant and far reaching. It is our belief and hope that these proposals can help this United Nations Disarmament Commission to work out a comprehensive program which will lift the burden and fear of armaments from the peoples of all countries and materially reduce the danger of war.

We are under no illusions as to the difficulties which confront us. The historic record of humanity's struggle for disarmament gives little encouragement. Certainly no one who has followed the debates in this Commission can expect quick or easy agreement.

Our ideological and political differences are great, and our fears and suspicions perhaps even greater. Tensions have not been relaxed by the unleashing of the Cold War in this Commission at its first meeting here in New York, despite the efforts of most of us to pitch the discussions on a wholly different basis. We cannot be unmindful of the impression gaining currency that we are not seriously discussing disarmament but are only engaging on a propaganda struggle to cast the blame for armaments on one side or the other.

But despite these discouragements there are impelling reasons why we should proceed with our work.

Despite our differences and antagonisms we have an overwhelming common interest in the preservation of world peace. The total destructiveness of modern warfare threatens the survival of our common civilization without regard to our

political, economic, social, religious, or ideological differences. As it becomes increasingly clear that there is no choice between common survival and mutual extinction, there may be reason to hope that the instinct of self-preservation will yet prevail over the fatalistic acceptance of the inevitability of armed conflict.

Let there be no misunderstanding. Limiting the numbers of permitted armed forces is only a part of our task. We must also limit the types and quantities of armaments which should be allowed to support permitted armed forces. But it is important to know the numerical ceilings for the armed forces that we are aiming to achieve in order to determine the types and quantities of armaments that would be appropriate to support them. When we have determined the forces and arms which should be allowed, we must see to it that the forces and arms which are not permitted are prohibited and eliminated. And, of course, we assume that we are going to prohibit and eliminate all weapons adaptable to mass destruction in accordance with the General Assembly resolution. If we can even tentatively agree on the ceilings for permitted armed forces, it should greatly facilitate agreement in reducing and restricting the quantities and types of permitted armaments.

If we are agreed that the present levels of armed strength should be reduced, we should make an honest beginning, starting with the most powerful states, to bring about the substantial and balanced reductions at which we are aiming. Let us not talk of a fourth or a third or a half reduction without knowing the levels from which we start or the levels at which we end. Let us say what we mean and mean what we say.

Numerical Ceilings Proposed

Our tripartite working paper suggests fixed numerical ceilings on the armed forces of the United States, the U.S.S.R., China, the United Kingdom, and France. It proposes maximum ceilings for the

¹ Made in the U.N. Disarmament Commission on May 28 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date. Ambassador Cohen is deputy U.S. representative to the United Nations.

United States, the U.S.S.R., and China of between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000. It proposes maximum ceilings for the United Kingdom and France of between 700,000 and 800,000. The reductions proposed are substantial and balanced. They seek to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace among the Great Powers or with other states and thus to reduce the danger of war. The reductions for the United States and, we assume, for the U.S.S.R. and China would be well over 50 percent.

The tripartite working paper also suggests that there should be agreed maximum ceilings for all other states having substantial armed forces which should be fixed in relation to the ceilings agreed upon for the Five Powers. The ceilings would be fixed in these cases also with a view to avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security in any area of the world and thus reducing the danger of war. It is contemplated that the ceilings would normally be less than one percent of the population and would normally be less than the current levels.

Many of the present difficulties both in Europe and in Asia spring from an imbalance of armed strength which causes some nations to feel that they live only by leave or grace of their more powerful and none too friendly neighbors. If a balanced reduction of arms is to reduce both the fear and danger of aggression, it must take into account the balance of armed strength of the most powerful states not only in relation to one another but also in relation to their neighbors.

The only certain way to avoid total war which involves the use of weapons adaptable to mass destruction is to eliminate war as a means of settling disputes between nations. The goal of disarmament must be not to regulate the armaments used in war but to prevent war by reducing the likelihood or possibility of successful aggression. When men fight to kill, it is not easy to restrain the length to which they will go to kill. That is why President Roosevelt defined the Fourth Freedom, freedom from fear, in world terms to mean

... a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.

It is certainly anomalous that states which have solemnly undertaken under the Charter of the United Nations to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force except in defense of the Charter should maintain huge and onerous armaments. President Truman in his address on November 7, 1951, made it clear that this situation does not exist by the free choice of the U. S. Government. He stated:

We are determined to win real peace—peace based on freedom and justice. We will do it the hard way if we must—by going forward, as we are doing now, to make

the free world so strong that no would-be aggressor will dare to break the peace. But we will never give up trying for another way to peace—the way of reducing the armaments that make aggression possible.

An effective disarmament program should give content and meaning to the solemn undertakings of states not to resort to war as an instrument of national policy. An effective disarmament program must be conceived with a determination to strengthen the peace. It means nothing if it is a mere haggling process to reduce the cost of preparing for war or to draft regulations about the sort of armaments to be used in the next war. As Salvador de Madariaga stated in commenting on the failure of disarmament negotiations before the last war: "Aggression or defence are not in the weapons but in the heart and brain of the combatant." (Madariaga, *The World's Design*, London, 1938, p. 51.)

The proposals which the French, the British, and the American delegations have submitted to the Commission deal with one of the essential parts, and in some ways the most important part, of a comprehensive disarmament program. Our proposals are flexible, they are not intended to be final or exhaustive. They should provide a basis for discussion. We hope that as a result of the exchange of views they may be improved.

A nation's armed forces are not the only measures of its armed strength. The other elements of armed strength must be considered in the development of any comprehensive disarmament program. But aggressors are not likely to go to war without the armed forces which are necessary to insure the successful accomplishment of their aggressive purposes. All armaments depend upon manpower and their effectiveness, in varying degrees, is affected by the armed forces available to use them. A substantial and balanced reduction of armed forces should greatly lessen the likelihood and fear of war.

The tripartite working paper is not introduced as a propaganda trick or as a mere paper declaration. It is intended to give us a basis for starting serious work on the proposed limitations. Our work should include the relationship of this proposal to other components of the program for regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments and the elimination of weapons adaptable to mass destruction. The work should, of course, lead to the treaty or treaties required under paragraph 3 of the General Assembly resolution of January 11, 1952, which, it is contemplated, would include all the essential components of a comprehensive program. The treaty or treaties would have to provide adequate safeguards throughout the process of reduction to insure that the limitations are put into effect and observed as agreed and that violations can be promptly detected. Adequate provision would have to be made to insure that all kinds of armed forces are embraced within the limitations,

including paramilitary and security forces. Provision would have to be made to insure that the limitations are not circumvented through the building up of large forces of trained reserves or militarily trained police. The system of limitations would have to be accepted by all states, whether or not members of the United Nations, whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system. Provision would have to be made for carrying through the reductions in a manner and in accordance with a time schedule prescribed by the international control organ so that the reductions could be completed within the shortest time feasible after their commencement. The agreed ceilings should be made subject to review at stated intervals, and further numerical limitations would be contemplated as substantial progress is achieved toward the easing of international tensions.

This is an important point. We do not believe that agreed ceilings should necessarily be fixed indefinitely. One of the errors which the United States, the United Kingdom, and France wish to avoid is the error of assuming that the *status quo* should be permanent. Changing factors may require changed maximum ceilings. Thus in the future further numerical limitations of permitted armed forces would be contemplated as substantial progress is achieved toward the easing of international tensions, and the agreed ceilings could be subject to periodic review to see whether they were appropriate at the time of such review.

We reiterate our hope that agreement on numerical limitations on all armed forces will facilitate agreement on other phases of the program. As we progress in our work, we should be able to tie together the related components of a comprehensive disarmament program.

Of course, the proposed reductions in armed forces depends upon the settlement of the Korean conflict and some progress toward the establishment of peaceful conditions throughout the world. Before our disarmament treaties are concluded all states concerned will have to accept seriously their obligations under the Charter not to use force or the threat of force as an instrument of national policy and to settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered.

Relationship to International Tensions

The relationship of international tensions and ceilings on armed forces is clear. What is the basic purpose of setting maximum levels for all armed forces? It is to avoid disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security anywhere in the world and thus help minimize the danger of war. We believe, and I speak for the Three Powers, that one of the most fundamental reasons for the international tensions

which exist in the world today is the imbalance of power in various areas. This imbalance can be remedied, it seems to me, in either of two ways. One way is to build up the strength of the free world to match or, if necessary, to surpass the strength of the Soviet bloc, and that is what the free nations are now doing out of the sheer necessity of survival. We have had ample warning of what happens when free governments are weak and imperialistic and aggrandizing powers are both strong and rapacious.

The other way, which the United States, the United Kingdom, and France infinitely prefer, is for all states with substantial military power to limit their armed forces and armaments to levels such that they avoid this disequilibrium of power by reduction instead of production. Setting numerical limitations on armed forces is one of the most important steps in the direction of the second solution for the present imbalance of power. The Three Powers will never cease trying to achieve this solution of reducing all armed forces and all armaments, hoping that the time will come when all states, most important the Soviet Union, will recognize the vital necessity for agreeing on fair and balanced reductions to achieve an honest disarmament program.

What I have said about avoiding disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security points up the relationship between disarmament and settlement of current major political issues. Disarmament proposals cannot be considered in isolation, apart from these major international tensions existing in the world. There is an obvious connection between the solution of current major political issues, the reduction of tensions, and the limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments. Consequently, concurrently with coming into effect of a disarmament program, these principal political issues between the Great Powers should be settled. The United States is not placing preconditions in the day of disarmament. We are merely recognizing the facts of international political life.

But the important thing is that we get started on our work. Progress in our work may in itself be a means of easing international tension. The General Assembly asked us to consider from the outset plans for the disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments. We have submitted a comprehensive working paper on that subject.

The Soviet representative suggested that we should first agree on basic principles regarding reduction in armed forces and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. To meet this point of view we have submitted a paper containing six essential principles for a comprehensive disarmament program. This paper makes it clear that it is our intention to reduce armed forces and armaments to a point that no state will be in a condition of armed preparedness to start a war.

We have by no means ignored the important problem of atomic energy. Within a year after the discovery of the practical application of atomic energy for war purposes, the United States presented a constructive plan for the control of atomic energy to insure its use for peaceful purposes only. The plan commended itself to most of the members of the United Nations. If it is not perfect, let us consider concretely how we can improve it. Negative criticisms when unaccompanied by concrete or understandable alternatives get us nowhere.

We now, with our British and French colleagues, submit a proposal calling for limiting the armed forces of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China to a ceiling of not more than 1,500,000 and possibly not more than 1,000,000, calling for limiting the armed forces of Britain and France down to a ceiling between 700,000 and 800,000, and calling for comparable reductions and ceilings on the armed forces of all other countries.

No nation has anything to fear from a decision to accept these proposals. Every nation stands to gain from them peace and increased security. Let us prove now by our wisdom, by our vision, and by our labor that we can banish fear and render war impossible. Let us release the energies and resources which are now spent on armaments to build a friendly world of expanding freedom and human well-being.

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Dated May 28, 1952

WORKING PAPER SETTING FORTH PROPOSALS FOR FIXING NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF ALL ARMED FORCES

The delegations of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which sponsored the resolution of the General Assembly establishing the Disarmament Commission, are today submitting the attached working proposals for the determination of over-all numerical limitations on all armed forces.

In fixing numerical limitations on the armed forces of States a number of factors, demographic, geographic, political and economic, have to be considered. The Charter responsibilities of States and the need of balanced power-relationships among States must also be taken into account. There is no one automatic formula which can inflexibly be applied in all cases. The objective must be to reduce the possibility and the fear of successful aggression and to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security.

The proposals suggest that there should be fixed numerical ceilings for China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. A ceiling between 1 million and 1.5 million is suggested for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and China, while a ceiling between 700,000 and 800,000 is suggested for the United Kingdom and France.

The proposals call for agreed maximum ceilings for all other States having substantial armed forces to be fixed in relation to the ceilings agreed upon for the Five Powers. Such ceilings should be fixed with a view to avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to inter-

national peace and security in any area of the world, thus reducing the danger of war. The ceilings would normally be less than one per cent of the population and should be less than current levels, except in very special circumstances.

The proposals envisage substantial and balanced reductions in armed forces. Agreement on such reductions should greatly lessen the likelihood and the fear of successful aggression and should facilitate agreement on other essential parts of a comprehensive disarmament programme, including the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction and the effective international control of atomic energy to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

Working Paper Setting Forth Proposals for Fixing Numerical Limitation of all Armed Forces, Submitted by the Representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States

A. Introduction

1. Paragraph 3 of the General Assembly Resolution of January 11, 1952²

"Directs the Disarmament Commission to prepare proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty (or treaties) for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only."

2. Paragraph 6 of the Resolution

"Directs the Commission, in working out plans for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments;

(a) To determine how overall limits and restrictions on all armed forces and all armaments can be calculated and fixed;

(b) To consider methods according to which States can agree by negotiation among themselves, under the auspices of the Commission, concerning the determination of the overall limits and restrictions referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above and the allocation within their respective national military establishments of the permitted national armed forces and armaments."

3. The present working paper presents a plan for the determination of overall numerical limitations on the size of the armed forces of states. Obviously some overall limitations on the size of the armed forces of states are an essential part of any comprehensive plan for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments. The working paper is not intended to exclude, but to facilitate the development of other essential components which must be included in what the preamble of the General Assembly Resolution refers to as "comprehensive and co-ordinated plans, under international control, for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes" including "safeguards that will ensure the compliance of all . . . nations [whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system]." Proposals have already been submitted on certain other essential components, i. e., the control of atomic energy and disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments. By submitting this working paper and focusing attention on another component we hope to facilitate progress toward an agreed comprehensive program.

² BULLETIN of Mar. 31, 1952, p. 507.

B. Standards for Determining Numerical Limitations of All Armed Forces

4. In fixing numerical limitations on the armed forces of states a number of factors, demographic, geographic, political and economic, have to be considered. The Charter responsibilities of states and the need of balanced power-relationships among states must also be taken into account. There is no one automatic formula which can inflexibly be applied in all cases. The objective must be to reduce the possibility and the fear of successful aggression and to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security.

5. The following working formula is suggested as a basis of discussion.

a. There should be fixed numerical ceilings for China, France, the USSR, the UK, and the U.S. which should be worked out with a view to avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security among themselves or with other states and thus reducing the danger of war. It is tentatively suggested that the maximum ceilings for the USSR, the US and China should be the same and fixed at, say, between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 and the maximum ceilings for the United Kingdom and France should be the same and fixed at, say, between 700,000 and 800,000.

b. For all other states having substantial armed forces there should be agreed maximum ceilings fixed in relation to the ceilings agreed upon for the Five Powers. Such ceilings should be fixed with a view to avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security in any area of the world and thus reducing the danger of war. The ceilings would normally be less than one percent of the population. Moreover, they should be less than current levels except in very special circumstances.

C. Significance of Overall Numerical Limitations

6. While a nation's armed forces are not the only measure of its armed strength, and other elements of armed strength will have to be considered in any comprehensive program for the balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, nevertheless a numerical limitation on armed forces is a major element in any such program for the following reasons:

a. All armaments programs depend upon manpower and therefore must to a greater or less degree be affected by limitations on permitted armed forces.

b. A substantial reduction of armed forces as here suggested in itself would tend to reduce the likelihood of successful aggression.

c. Agreement on a substantial and balanced reduction of armed forces minimizing the likelihood and fear of successful aggression should greatly facilitate agreement reducing and restricting the armaments supporting these armed forces.

D. Implementation of Proposals for Numerical Limitations of All Armed Forces

7. In determining the numbers of the armed forces, all kinds of armed forces, including para-military and security forces must be included.

8. Adequate provision must be made to insure that the maximum limitation on armed forces is not circumvented through building up large forces of trained reserves or militarily trained police.

9. This system must be accepted by all states, whether or not Members of the United Nations, whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system.

10. There should be adequate safeguards throughout the process of reduction to ensure that limitations are put into effect and observed as agreed and that violations can be promptly detected.

11. The implementation of the reductions should be closely related to progress in connection with other phases of the program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, such as the control of atomic energy and the system of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification.

12. The reduction should be carried through in a manner and in accordance with a time schedule prescribed by the international control organ and should be completed within the shortest feasible time after its commencement.

13. In the future, further numerical limitation of permitted armed forces would be contemplated as substantial progress is achieved toward the easing of international tensions, and the agreed ceilings would be subject to review at stated intervals.

14. The proposed limitations—including their relationship to other components of the program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments and the elimination of weapons adaptable to mass destruction—should be comprehended within the treaty or treaties required under Paragraph 3 of the General Assembly Resolution of January 11, 1952.

U.S. Position on Germ Warfare

Statement by Benjamin V. Cohen¹

In view of Mr. Malik's statement reiterating past statements that the United States was trying to divert the work of the Commission from any consideration of the regulation of bacteriological warfare, I am obliged to clarify the position of the United States on this subject. Mr. Malik has sought again to convey the impression that, because we do not view with enthusiasm his proposal to have the nations of the world adopt pious declarations about "prohibiting" the use of gas and bacteriological warfare, we are opposed to any prohibition on the use of gas and bacteriological warfare.

I will not discuss the evident falsity of the charge against the U.N. Command in Korea, for this is not the forum for such matters. However, I would like to set forth briefly the elements of our position on bacteriological warfare.

First of all, just what was this 1925 protocol about which we hear so much from Mr. Malik and the Communist press? It was a protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare. Mr. Malik conveys the impression that the Soviet Union supports the protocol and the United States rejects it. Let us look at the record.

The Soviet Union signed and later ratified the protocol, but with the reservation that it ceased to be binding with reference to states whose armed forces or whose allies failed to respect it. The United States signed but did not ratify the protocol. For various reasons, some of which were

¹ Made in the Disarmament Commission on May 27 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

not connected with the substance of the protocol, the U.S. Senate did not consider the document to be the best way of meeting the principal concern of the protocol, which was the problem of gas warfare. The U.S. attitude on the use of this type of warfare, however, is best evidenced by our record in World War II. The record is that the United States did not use this type of warfare, although it was probably the precautionary preparations of the United States in this field that deterred Hitler from resorting to this type of warfare.

During the period between the two great wars, however, there were some who thought that states could place trust in paper pledges of certain other states. Bitter experience has taught us that such pledges by some states are valueless.

"Paper Pledge" Obsolete

In 1947, following our experiences with the paper pledges of certain states, President Truman withdrew the protocol from the Senate, for it was evident that the paper pledge approach had become obsolete. There had been too many incidents of treaty violations which have been concealed under the covering technique of the big lie. If there is to be disarmament, it must be universal. It would be sheer lunacy for the free world to start disarming in exchange for mere paper promises without safeguards. Those who make false charges concerning the use of bacteriological warfare can just as easily make false promises not to use bacteriological warfare.

The obsolescence of the paper pledge approach to bacteriological warfare is best illustrated by considering the limited nature of the promise made by the Soviet Union in the 1925 protocol and the recent Soviet propaganda charges about bacteriological warfare. The Soviet Union did not agree to stop manufacturing weapons for gas warfare or bacteriological warfare. The Soviet Union did not even promise not to use gas warfare and bacteriological warfare; it merely promised, in effect, not to use such weapons first. With the Soviet practice of accusing others of what they themselves plan to do, we fear that they would have no qualms about making a false accusation and immediately thereafter launching a bacteriological warfare attack. What protection do they offer us against such a maneuver? The importance of the limited nature of the 1925 promise is brought into tragic and ominous focus by the present situation: If every member of the United Nations were to sign the 1925 protocol this morning, this afternoon the Soviet Union, having already hurled the lie about U.N. use of bacteriological warfare in Korea, would be free, under its own reservation to the protocol, to use such warfare against any U.N. member. It is obvious that there is no security at all in an arrangement such as this.

Much has been said of late about U.S. research in the field of bacteriological warfare. Since we follow a policy of openness, we make no effort to conceal such matters. In a world where some nations cover all their activities with the cloak of secrecy, research is the only means by which nations can devise defenses against the sudden use of bacteriological warfare by possible aggressors.

I have in my hand, for example, an official U.S. Government booklet, *What You Should Know About Biological Warfare*, published by the Federal Civil Defense Administration and offered for sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office at a price of 10 cents, which explains the nature of these weapons in simple terms and advises the American people on how to defend themselves in the event of a bacteriological attack.

Certainly it is true that at least all Great Powers are capable of launching bacteriological warfare attacks. This is not a recent development. The Soviet Union years ago proclaimed its ability to strike with bacteriological weapons. For example, on February 22, 1938, Marshal Voroshilov then Commissar of Defense, said:

Ten years ago or more the Soviet Union signed a convention abolishing the use of poison gas and bacteriological weapons. To that we still adhere but if our enemies use such methods against us I tell you we are prepared and fully prepared to use them also and to use them against aggressors on their own soil.

It is this basic fact, the ability of nations to launch bacteriological warfare attacks, that the United States and other nations are trying to rectify. We want to eliminate such weapons. Only after this is accomplished can the people of the world have some feeling of security.

Need for Foolproof Arms Reduction System

The important problem facing the world is not a 27-year old protocol, which under modern conditions and in the light of the practices of some states has become obsolete. The important question is what nations today, in 1952, are willing to do to bring about a foolproof system of arms reduction that will include the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet Union has so far been unwilling to agree to the international control of atomic energy and the establishment of an effective system of limitation, regulation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments. In order to deflect attention from their refusal even to make a serious effort to reach agreement on such a program, Soviet leaders have concocted a scheme to focus attention on the 1925 protocol, which, as we have seen, offers no security.

What is the true solution to our problem? What would bring a greater sense of security to the world? It is the establishment of a system to eliminate the possibility of bacteriological warfare by eliminating bacteriological weapons.

That is what the United States wants to bring about. This cannot be done, however, by a paper pledge. It can be done as a part of a general program of regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments. Bacteriological weapons can be eliminated only if certain states are willing, as the United States is willing, to establish an effective system of safeguards. The technical safeguards connected with bacteriological warfare would differ from those of atomic energy and also from those in connection with other types of nonatomic weapons in that different materials and techniques would be involved.

The first and all-important safeguard against bacteriological warfare, however, is an open world, a world where no state could develop the military strength necessary for aggression without other states having ample warning and the opportunity to protect themselves. Other feasible safeguards, such as industrial, would be desirable and can be developed.

So long as the present situation prevails, however, we must continue to be prepared to defend ourselves.

Not paper pledges to refrain from being the first to use certain weapons but elimination of those weapons through a foolproof disarmament program—that is what the world desperately needs today. That is what the United States is ready to effect. And if the Soviet Union were prepared to cooperate, it could be effected. We hope that the Soviet Union will reverse its position and cooperate with us in working out a comprehensive, effective, and balanced disarmament program.

Working Party To Study World Rubber Supply

[Released to the press May 12]

The following communiqué was released by the International Rubber Study Group on May 9:

1. The ninth meeting of the International Rubber Study Group held in Ottawa under the chairmanship of A. F. W. Plumptre, head of the Canadian delegation, ended on May 9. The vice chairmen were M. C. Lakshnakara Kashemsanta, head of the Thai delegation, and Dr. R. Blankenfeld, head of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany.

2. The meeting was attended by delegations of Australia, Belgium, British Colonial and dependent territories, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Netherlands, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States of America, and Vietnam, and by observers from the United Nations, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the

Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the Organization of American States, and the International Rubber Development Committee.

3. Very full information concerning the policies and problems of member governments was exchanged. A number of short-term and long-term problems of special concern to member governments, to the producing and manufacturing industries, and to the rubber trade were discussed and where necessary these will be further considered by the governments and other parties concerned.

4. The group noted that many of its members were greatly concerned about the uncertainties of rubber production, consumption and price and, because of considerable variety of opinion as to the best method of attempting to solve these problems, the group resolved to pursue the matter by establishing a working party with the following terms of reference:

To consider whether measures designed to prevent burdensome surpluses or serious shortages of rubber are necessary and practicable; to prepare drafts of any agreements required to implement such measures; and to report back to the study group as soon as possible.

It was agreed that membership of the working party should be open to all members of the group who wish to be represented on it.

5. The group examined the world statistical position and made estimates for natural and synthetic rubber production and consumption during 1952. It was estimated that the world production of natural rubber would be around 1,690,000 long tons, while production of synthetic in member countries would be around 910,000 long tons. In regard to consumption it was estimated that the world might consume, i. e., turn into manufactured goods, 1,450,000 long tons of natural rubber and approximately 875,000 long tons of synthetic rubber, apart from the synthetic rubber produced in nonmember countries. The balance of estimated production over estimated consumption of both natural and synthetic rubber was expected to be absorbed into governmental and commercial stocks.

6. The group also considered the world statistical position of natural rubber latex, and estimated that world production in 1952 might be about 85,000 long tons (dry rubber content) while consumption might be in the neighborhood of 90,000 long tons (dry rubber content). It is estimated that stocks are sufficient to cover the difference between consumption and production for 1952. The figures for natural rubber latex production and consumption are included in the estimates given for world production and consumption of natural rubber.

7. The group also noted that the rubber reclaiming capacity in member countries had risen by about 100,000 long tons since 1945.

8. The group continued its policy of examining problems concerning the expansion of world

consumption of rubber. It considered that the development and improvement of highway systems in all countries were the most effective means of encouraging the increased use of vehicles with an attendant enhanced rubber consumption.

It also considered that the progress made in regard to the use of rubber in the construction of roads since the last meeting had been very satisfactory. Demonstration roads had been laid in many parts of the world totaling several hundred miles in length.

9. The group examined a number of problems relating to the packing, shipping and marketing of natural rubber. The need for improvement in packing and quality was stressed and, while it was agreed that the type samples which are now ready should stand, it seemed desirable to extend the range by adding two new types.

It was also agreed that the experience gained in 1952 should be carefully reviewed and a report thereon submitted to the group in 1953.

The group also reviewed developments in the supply of technically classified natural rubber and noted that some 8,000 tons had been provided during 1951 from Cambodia, Vietnam, and Malaya.

10. Belgium, British Colonial and independent territories, Ceylon, France, Indonesia, Liberia, the Netherlands, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America will be the members of the management committee for the coming year.

11. The group welcomed the invitation of the Danish Government to hold its next meeting in Copenhagen at a date to be decided later.

Table No. 1: Estimated natural rubber production in 1952

<i>Territory</i>	<i>(In thousand long tons)</i>
Malaya	550
Indonesia	675
Ceylon	105
Vietnam and Cambodia	60
Thailand	100
British Borneo	60
Burma	10
Liberia	36
British Africa	20
Belgian Africa	18
French Africa	4
Other countries	52
Total	1,690

Table No. 2: Estimated synthetic rubber production in 1952

<i>Territory</i>	<i>(In thousand long tons)</i>
United States.	*825
Canada	*79
Germany.	6
Total	910

*Figures for GRS cold rubber are inclusive of oil content.

Table No. 3: Estimated natural and synthetic rubber consumption in 1952

<i>Territory</i>	<i>Natural</i>	<i>Synthetic*</i>	<i>Total</i>
United States.	465	790	1,255
United Kingdom	210	4	214
Belgium	15	1	16
Denmark	6	(**)	6
France	124	13	137
Federal Republic of Germany	88	12	100
Italy.	38	8	46
Netherlands	15	1	16
Australia	39	(**)	39
Canada	39	35	74
Japan	55	2	57
Other countries	356	9	365
Total	1,450	875	2,325

*Excluding Russian produced synthetic rubber.

**A small amount of synthetic rubber is expected to be used.

Improved Position of Dissolving Wood Pulp

The Pulp-Paper Committee of the International Materials Conference on May 13 announced that its member governments have unanimously accepted its recommendation that no allocation of dissolving wood pulp be made at this time. The Committee, however, is to keep short-term dissolving wood-pulp supply problems under review and to recommend allocations or other action if necessary.

Dissolving wood pulp is a basic raw material in the manufacture of synthetic fibers and plastics which have many defense applications such as rayon for clothing, high tenacity cords for tires, and plastic substitutes for metals.

The Committee's decision follows a report that the 1952 dissolving wood pulp situation in the free world indicates total production of approximately 2,263,000 metric tons and total requirements of approximately 2,230,000 metric tons, thus showing supply and demand well in balance.

This report, based largely on reporting countries, own estimates of requirements and production, confirms 1951 indications of a trend toward an easier supply position in 1952. Previous studies of the Committee had indicated an approximate deficit of 10 percent for the year 1951, but no recommendations for assistance were made at that time because the effect of other factors on wood pulp demand could not be fully assessed.

An important factor in the improved position is the increased production of supplying countries. The Committee estimates that production in 1952 will be approximately 10 percent larger than in the previous year.

The 1952 consumption requirements of leading consuming countries show moderate increases over last year. Moreover, in arriving at a balance between supply and demand for 1952, a substantial

increase in free-world stocks during this year was taken into account.

Fifteen nations are represented on the Pulp-Paper Committee. They are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Communiqués Regarding Korea To the Security Council

The Headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations numbers: S/2592, April 9; S/2594, April 10; S/2601, April 14; S/2602, April 14; S/2603, April 15; S/2604, April 16; S/2606, April 17; S/2607, April 18; S/2609, April 21; S/2610, April 22; S/2612, April 23; S/2613, April 24; S/2614, April 25; S/2622, May 2; S/2623, May 5; S/2626, May 7; S/2628, May 9.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Conference on Large Electric High Tension Systems

The Department of State on May 27 announced that the fourteenth session of the International Conference on Large Electric High Tension Systems (CIGRE) will convene at Paris on May 28. The U.S. delegation to this Conference is as follows:

Chairman

Carl H. Giroux, Special Assistant to the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army

Vice Chairman

Frederic Attwood, Chairman, U.S. National Committee of CIGRE, 50 Church Street, New York

Delegates

Francis L. Adams, Chief, Bureau of Power, Federal Power Commission

Edward P. Eardley, Chief Engineer, Water and Power Operations, Office of the Secretary, Department of the Interior

L. N. McClellan, Chief Engineer, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior, Denver, Colo.

Sol E. Schultz, Chief Engineer; Acting Assistant Administrator, Bonneville Power Administration, Department of the Interior, Portland, Oreg.

The International Conference on Large Electric High Tension Systems was founded in March 1921 under the aegis of the International Electrotechnical Commission. The Conference is a nongovernmental organization composed of 1,650 permanent members from 35 countries and 2,000 corresponding members from various parts of the world. The

purpose of the Conference is to promote the exchange of technical information on the production and transmission of high tension electric currents. The last (thirteenth) session of the Conference, held at Paris, June 29–July 8, 1950, was attended by over 1,235 engineers, scientists, and technicians from 42 countries and territories.

The work of the forthcoming Conference will be divided into four sections, which will consider the following subjects: (1) generation, transformation, and cutting of current; (2) construction, insulation, and maintenance of overhead and underground lines; (3) operation, protection, and interconnection of networks; and (4) power transmission over 220 kv.

Arrangements have been made for a number of post-Conference tours which will enable the participants who so desire to visit various water power and generating plants in France and Sweden.

International Whaling Commission

The Department of State announced on May 28 that the fourth annual meeting of the International Whaling Commission will convene at London on June 3, 1952. The U.S. delegation to the meeting is as follows:

U.S. Commissioner

Arthur Remington Kellogg, Director, United States National Museum

Deputy U.S. Commissioner

John Laurence Kask, Chief, Office of Foreign Activities, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior

Adviser

William Kling, Second Secretary, American Embassy, London

The International Whaling Commission was established pursuant to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, which was signed at Washington, D.C. on December 2, 1946, and entered into force on November 10, 1948. The United States is one of 17 contracting governments comprising the membership of this Commission. The Commission is charged with responsibility, within the framework of the convention, for safeguarding the whale stocks of the world. Within strictly defined limits, the Commission may amend the schedule, an integral part of the convention, by adopting regulations designating protected species, fixing closed seasons and waters, limiting total catches and the sizes of whales taken, defining standards for measurement of whales, and establishing requirements for statistical and other records.

The fourth annual meeting will be concerned with such matters as possible amendments to the schedule of the convention; action taken by contracting governments to promulgate certain laws and regulations concerning whaling in conformity with the provisions of the convention; invitations

extended to the Governments of Honduras and Portugal to adhere to the International Whaling Convention; and the budget for the Commission for the fiscal year beginning June 1, 1952.

The last (third) annual meeting of the International Whaling Commission was held at Cape-town, Union of South Africa, July 23-27, 1951.

Sixth Session of ICAO

On May 27 the Department of State announced that the sixth session of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) will convene at Montreal, on May 27. The U.S. delegation to this Assembly is as follows:

Delegates

J. Paul Barringer, Acting Director, Office of Transport and Communications, Department of State; *Chairman*
Paul A. Smith, U.S. Representative on the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization; *Vice Chairman*

Members

David M. French, Division of International Administration, Department of State
Alfred Hand, Assistant to Deputy Administrator for Program Planning, Civil Aeronautics Administration
Edmund H. Kellogg, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
Joan H. Stacy, Aviation Policy Staff, Department of State

The International Civil Aviation Organization was established under the Convention on International Civil Aviation concluded at Chicago on December 7, 1944. ICAO, a specialized agency of the United Nations, came into being on April 4, 1947, following ratification of the convention by the twenty-sixth State. The convention received the advice and consent of the Senate on July 25, 1946, and was ratified on August 6, 1946.

Fifty-seven contracting states comprise the membership of the Organization, which functions through an Assembly, a Council, an Air Navigation Commission, an Air Transport Committee, a Legal Committee, a Secretariat, and a number of technical divisions and such *ad hoc* technical and regional meetings as are determined essential. The last (fifth) session of the Assembly was held at Montreal, June 5-18, 1951.

The agenda for the sixth session of the Assembly is of limited scope and is devoted principally to consideration of items relating to budgetary, fiscal, and administrative problems of ICAO. Specific agenda items include the following: review of expenditures and approval of accounts for 1951; the 1953 budget; report on arrangements to settle contributions in arrears; suspension of voting power of contracting states failing to discharge their financial obligations to the Organization; apportionment of expenses of ICAO among contracting states; adoption of standing rules of procedure for future sessions of the Assembly; and reports by various commissions and committees of the Assembly and action thereon.

Current United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Trusteeship Council

- Conditions in the Trust Territory of Western Samoa. Working Paper prepared by the Secretariat. T/L.231, February 25, 1952. 30 pp. mimeo.
- Land Utilization in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Memorandum submitted by the Government of the United States of America. T/AC.36/L.33, January 8, 1952. 9 pp. mimeo.
- Situation in the Trust Territories of the Pacific. Observations of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on the Reports for 1950-1951 on the Trust Territories of Western Samoa, New Guinea, Nauru and the Pacific Islands. Letter Dated 22 February from the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. T/962, February 27, 1952. 24 pp. mimeo.
- Conditions in the Trust Territory of New Guinea. Working Paper prepared by the Secretariat. T/L.242, March 4, 1952. 51 pp. mimeo.
- Conditions in the Trust Territory of New Guinea. Working paper prepared by the Secretariat. T/L.242/Corr.1, March 28, 1952. 5 pp. mimeo.
- Conditions in the Trust Territory of New Guinea. Report of the Drafting Committee. T/L.252, March 28, 1952. 7 pp. mimeo.
- Conditions in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Report of the Drafting Committee. T/L.253, March 28, 1952. 33 pp. mimeo.
- Conditions in the Trust Territory of Western Samoa Under New Zealand Administration. Summary of the observations made by individual members of the Council during the general discussion and of the comments of the special representative of the Administering Authority. T/L.261, March 31, 1952. 14 pp. mimeo.
- Conditions in the Trust Territory of Nauru. T/L.262, March 31, 1952. 7 pp. mimeo.
- Conditions in the Trust Territory of New Guinea. T/L.263, March 31, 1952. 15 pp. mimeo.
- Conditions in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Under the Administration of the United States of America. T/L.264, April 1, 1952. 11 pp. mimeo.
- Examination of Petitions. Somaliland Under Italian Administration. T/975, April 7, 1952. 34 pp. mimeo.
- Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa (1951) on Tanganyika (T/946, T/946/Corr.1). T/977, April 8, 1952. 37 pp. mimeo.
- Suggested Outline for Report on Rural Economic Development of Trust Territories. Working paper submitted by the Delegation of the United States of America. T/AC.36/L.44, April 15, 1952. 5 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

The United States in the United Nations

[May 30–June 5, 1952]

Security Council

Disarmament Commission—The United States-French-United Kingdom proposals for determining over-all numerical limitations on all armed forces was further discussed at the Disarmament Commission meeting on June 3. Mr. Malik (U.S.S.R.) stated that the Soviet Union's attitude toward these proposals would depend on whether they provided for a decision on the reduction of armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. He questioned whether the tripartite plan meant to include air and naval forces and said that the Soviet Union could not agree to discuss the proposals without the participation of the representatives of the Communist People's Republic of China. He also remarked that it should be assumed that a Disarmament Commission decision would be a "decision" and not just a recommendation to a conference to go into details. In closing, he indicated that the U.S.S.R. reserved the right to ask additional questions of a substantive nature before it could make a definite reply, as he was not satisfied with the present clarifications of the sponsors.

Sir Gladwyn Jebb (U.K.) replied to Mr. Malik's questions. He stated that the sponsors could not accept the Soviet thesis that a decision to reduce armed forces and prohibit atomic weapons would have to precede the elaboration of a disarmament plan as Mr. Malik seemed to indicate in his first question. He pointed out that the Commission had to prepare a plan covering the whole disarmament problem. The tripartite proposals dealt with a very important element of such a plan, and agreement on the reductions proposed should greatly lessen the likelihood and the fear of successful aggression and should facilitate agreement on other essential parts of a comprehensive disarmament program, including the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction and the effective international control of atomic energy to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. The Commission would then be in a position to take a decision to make recommendations to a conference of all states, in accordance with General Assembly resolution of January 11, 1952, for

a draft treaty or treaties which would deal with all aspects of disarmament. The conference would be able to take a comprehensive decision that the treaty or treaties should be accepted and should go into effect.

Sir Gladwyn also pointed out that the term "China" was used to indicate the country and not the government. It was evident that the proposed ceiling would apply to all Chinese armed forces in China. He referred to the differences of opinion on what government represented China, and said it would be premature to consider what countries or authorities not represented on the Disarmament Commission should be consulted at a later stage. However, this should not preclude consideration of the tripartite proposals any more than it had precluded discussion of the Soviet proposals referring to China.

Mr. Moch (France) endorsed the views expressed by Sir Gladwyn Jebb and noted that Mr. Malik insisted on darkening the issues even when given clear answers. The sponsors of the tripartite proposals agreed that the plan was only a part of the whole. It was clear that France and all the other governments would not be contented with the reduction of armed forces if it was not accompanied by the prohibition of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. He also stated that naval and air forces were included in the tripartite plan.

Mr. Cohen (U.S.) stated he was in full accord with the replies made by the representatives of France and the United Kingdom and quoted from his statement made at the previous meeting to make it clear that limiting the size of permitted armed forces was only part of the task. The Commission's work should include the relationship of the Three Power proposals to other components of a comprehensive program.

Ambassador T. F. Tsiang (China) criticized the Three Power plan since, he said, it might cause consequences contrary to the purposes of the sponsors. The Chinese people alone could decide what political and economic regime there would be in China in the future, and not the Commission.

Economic and Social Council

ECOSOC—The Council devoted the greater part of 4 days, May 26–June 2, to the discussion of

items 6 and 7—"International Cooperation on Water Control and Utilization" and "Development of Arid Lands." It discussed the two reports prepared by the Secretary-General on (1) the work being done by the specialized agencies and other international organizations engaged in the broad field of water control and utilization, and (2) practical measures adopted for the study of the problems of arid zones and on the technical and financial means employed by the specialized agencies for this purpose. Isador Lubin, United States representative, predicted that "these reports will constitute milestones on the road to effective international cooperation in the development of the world's water resources and open vast new possibilities for improved standards of living in many parts of the world." He introduced a draft resolution calling upon the United Nations to assume leadership in the promotion of joint planning for international cooperation on water control and utilization. This resolution, as amended and sponsored jointly by Belgium, Canada, France, the Philippines, and the United States, was adopted 15-0-3 (Soviet bloc).

The Council, June 2, began general debate of the annual agenda item on "The World Economic Situation," with special consideration of the Secretariat report on "World Economic Report, 1950-51." Statements were made by the representatives of Belgium, Cuba, France, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sweden, and the United Kingdom in which the need was stressed for international measures of one kind or another to maintain world economic stability. They urged that efforts be concentrated on aid to underdeveloped areas, relaxation of trade restrictions, and bolstering financial reserves in non-dollar areas, especially by expansion of imports into the United States.

Mr. Lubin (U.S.) stated that "The economy of the free world has adjusted to the heavy burdens of defense with far fewer adverse consequences during the transition period than most people deemed possible." Despite the United States defense effort, assistance to underdeveloped countries had been increased and such aid would continue to be a cardinal point in the United States foreign policy. He also noted that since the middle of 1951 United States imports have again resumed their upward trend. In summing up, he said,

The people of the United States are determined to maintain high levels of demand and to continue to trade their products on a large scale with the people of other peace-loving countries. They are determined to have an expanding economy, not only at home but also abroad. They know that only an expanding economy can provide reasonable over-all stability and individual economic security within a framework of genuine democracy and freedom.

Commission on Human Rights.—The Commission, as of May 26, began consideration of the 18 draft articles for inclusion in the Covenant

on Civil and Political Rights. The following draft articles were considered and approved:

The U.S.S.R. draft article, together with amendments proposed by Chile, United States, and Yugoslavia, stating that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of life and that everyone's right to life shall be protected by law, was approved by a vote of 11 (U.S.)-4-3.

An article was approved, 14 (U.S.)-0-4, insuring that

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation involving risk, where such is not required by his state of physical or mental health.

Two articles were adopted prohibiting, respectively, arbitrary arrest or detention and imprisonment for debt.

The other articles approved included (1) freedom of movement of an individual legally within the territory of a State; (2) prevention of unlawful expulsion of an alien from a State where he has taken asylum; (3) the right of freedom of thought, religion, and conscience; and (4) the right of freedom of opinion, expression, and information. This last article, which was adopted by a vote of 12 (U.S.)-3 (Soviet bloc)-3 (U.K., Yugoslavia, Egypt), states, in part,

Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression, this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. The exercise of the rights provided for in the foregoing paragraph carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions; but these shall be such only as are provided by law and are necessary. . . .

Trusteeship Council

The Council opened its eleventh session at United Nations Headquarters on June 3. Awni Khalidy (Iraq) was elected president and William O. Forsyth (Australia), vice president. The United States motion to postpone consideration of the Soviet proposal regarding Chinese representation was approved 11-1 (U.S.S.R.)-9.

Among the items to be considered in the 16-point agenda are (1) annual reports of the administering authorities on the political, economic, social, and educational conditions in each of the seven trust territories in Africa; (2) petitions from the peoples in these trust territories; (3) reports of several committees, including the Standing Committee on Administrative Unions and the Committee on Rural Economic Development of Trust Territories; and (4) reports of the Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories in East Africa.

Department Policy on Issuance of Passports

[Released to the press May 24]

The Department of State has been asked what authority the Secretary of State has in regard to the issuance of passports and what the Department's policy is in regard to the denial of passports. The following information is provided in answer to these questions:

1. The Secretary of State has discretionary authority in the issuance of passports, both as a power inherent in the exercise of the Presidential authority to conduct foreign relations and as a matter of statutory law.

2. Various Secretaries of State have exercised the right to refuse passports or withdraw passports already issued. Various courts and attorneys general of the United States have rendered opinions in which the discretionary authority of the Secretary of State in the issuance of passports has been recognized. In an opinion of August 29, 1901, the Attorney General stated:

Substantial reasons exist for the use by Congress of the word "may" in connection with authority to issue passports. Circumstances are conceivable which would make it most inexpedient for the public interests for this country to grant a passport to a citizen of the United States. For example, if one of the criminal class, an avowed anarchist for instance, were to make such application, the public interests might require that his application be denied.

Without expressing any opinion as to whether a passport should be granted to Ng Faun, I advise you that it may, in your discretion, be granted or withheld.

In the case of *Perkins v. Elg*, 307 U. S. 325 (1939), the Supreme Court, after holding that the Secretary of State should be included in a decree declaring the plaintiff to be a natural-born citizen of the United States, had the following to say:

The decree in that sense would in no way interfere with the exercise of the Secretary's discretion with respect to the issue of a passport but would simply preclude the denial of a passport on the ground that Miss Elg had lost her American citizenship.

3. For many years the Department has refused passports to persons for many reasons. For example, passports are denied when evidence in the Department's files shows that the applicant for the passport is a fugitive from justice or mentally ill or likely to become a public charge abroad, et cetera.

4. For many years the Department has also refused passports to persons when it had in its files clear evidence that they had, on previous trips abroad, engaged in political activities in foreign countries.

5. The Department reexamined its policy respecting the issue of passports to Communists and persons believed to be Communists and subversives after both the judicial and legislative

branches of the Government had made certain findings concerning the Communist movement in the United States. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in upholding the conviction of the 11 leading Communists in New York, found that the conspiracy in which they were participants was a "clear and present danger to the United States." The Congress of the United States, in the Internal Security Act of 1950, made these findings: That there exists a world-wide Communist revolutionary movement, the purpose of which is by treachery, deceit, espionage, and sabotage to establish a Communist totalitarian dictatorship in countries throughout the world; that, due to the world-wide scope of the movement, the travel of Communist members, representatives, and agents from country to country is a prerequisite for the carrying on of activities to further the purpose of this revolutionary movement; and that individuals in the United States, by participating in this movement, in effect, repudiate their allegiance to the United States and transfer their allegiance to the foreign country which controls the Communist movement.

It was decided that, in view of the findings by the court and the Congress, it would be inappropriate and inconsistent for the Department to issue a passport to a person if information in its files gave reason to believe that he is knowingly a member of a Communist organization or that his conduct abroad is likely to be contrary to the best interests of the United States. This policy has been followed since February 1951, and, in view of the national emergency proclaimed by President Truman and the conditions existing in various areas of the world, it is believed that it should be closely adhered to.

6. A passport certifies to foreign governments not only the citizenship and identity of the bearer, but requests them to permit him safely and freely to pass and, in case of need, to give all lawful aid and protection. Possession of the passport indicates the right of the bearer to receive the protection and good offices of American diplomatic and consular officers abroad. The right to receive the protection of this Government is correlative with the obligation to give undivided allegiance to the United States. A person whose activities, either at home or abroad, promote the interests of a foreign country or a political faction therein to the detriment of the United States or of friendly foreign countries should not be the bearer of an American passport.

7. Passports are refused only on the basis of very clear and definite reports from the investigative and security offices of this Department and of other Government departments and agencies and from foreign governments containing well-authenticated information concerning past and present activities and associations of the applicant. The decision not to issue a passport or to withdraw a passport already issued does not repre-

sent the judgment of the Passport Division alone, but is reached after consultation by responsible officers of the Passport Division with security officers, and political and administrative officers of the Department. This group varies according to the area or areas in which the applicant desires to travel. The decision is therefore the decision of the Department.

8. Any applicant who has been refused a passport has every right and is given every opportunity to request further consideration of his case and may present any evidence or information which he may wish to have considered. The particularity with which he may be informed of the contents of the reports in the Department's file depends, of course, upon the source and classification of such reports, but it is usually possible to inform him in a general way of the nature of the evidence and the information upon which he has been refused a passport. Any new evidence or in-

formation which the applicant may submit is referred to the officers who first examined the case for evaluation and expression of opinion as to whether a passport may be issued. The Department cannot violate the confidential character of passport files by making public any information contained therein.

9. The Secretary of State has the authority to establish any administrative procedures respecting passports which he may deem appropriate. These procedures are under constant review and a continuing effort is made to see that they are fair and efficient. There is a board in the Passport Division for questions of loss of nationality. The consultations between officers of the Passport Division and officers of other divisions of the Department and with the Foreign Service abroad, in effect, constitute in a given case a most fair and comprehensive board of review action in the denial of a passport in the interests of the United States.

Continued Support Urged for Refugee Resettlement

*by Under Secretary Bruce*¹

Over the past several years, and particularly since the end of the war, the Congress has shown a keen awareness of the problems of refugees, displaced persons, and escapees. American leadership and financial support in the field of international action for the relief and resettlement of refugees has been continuously active since 1938. The record is one of which we can all be proud. It is in the finest tradition of the American people.

Our efforts have been directed along three lines: (1) care for refugees and assistance in their resettlement; (2) providing haven in this country for some refugees; and (3) assistance in the problems created by the existence of surplus populations in certain Western European countries.

Concerning care and resettlement of refugees, the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees

(IGCR) was organized in August 1938 as a result of the conference convened at Evian on the initiative of President Roosevelt. The objective of the Committee was to find new homes for some 700,000 refugees who were forced to leave Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia as a result of the persecutions of the Nazi regime. The Committee, in the first instance, was composed solely of immigrant-receiving countries, but later, in 1943, its membership was expanded to include 36 of the allied and neutral countries. In its prewar activities, the Committee endeavored to find new places of resettlement for the refugees from Central Europe, and during 1944 and 1945 collaborated very closely with the U.S. War Refugee Board in securing the escape of refugees from Hitler-dominated Europe.

From 1945 to 1947, the activities of the Committee were intensified in stimulating the resettlement of refugees out of Europe. The U.S. Government contributed approximately 2½ million dollars to the Committee's expenditures and shared all operating expenditures on a 50-50 basis with the United Kingdom. In the spring of 1947

¹Excerpts from a statement made before the Subcommittee on Immigration of the House Judiciary Committee on May 22 and released to the press on the same date. For a message from the President to the Congress on Mar. 24 requesting legislation to aid refugees, see BULLETIN of Apr. 7, 1952, p. 551.

the Committee was responsible for the movement of the first boatload of refugees from Germany to Paraguay. The Committee ceased operations on June 30, 1947.

Review of U.S. Leadership in Relief Activities

The U.S. Government took the leadership in organizing the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in September and October 1943 and contributed slightly more than 70 percent of its total expenditures. From the very beginning, a Displaced Persons Division was established in UNRRA which assumed responsibility, with the Allied Occupation authorities, for the housing and the administration of camps holding 8½ million refugees and displaced persons found in Central Europe at the end of the war. Approximately 7½ million of these were repatriated by the Allied Occupation authorities and UNRRA before the termination of UNRRA's operations on June 30, 1947.

The United States assumed leadership in the organization of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) during 1946 and 1947. IRO on July 1, 1947, assumed responsibility for the care and maintenance, and repatriation and resettlement of 1½ million refugees and displaced persons in Europe transferred to it by UNRRA and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. In its 4½ years of service, IRO registered 1,619,008 refugees, arranged for the resettlement overseas of 1,057,955 in 48 countries and repatriated 72,834 to their 35 countries of origin. The Organization also provided for the continuing care in hospitals, institutions, or elsewhere, for 31,740 persons, including dependents, who were unable for reasons of age, illness, or physical defect to earn their own livelihood. Eighteen governments and a number of voluntary agencies, mostly American, collaborated in this effort. The Organization raised and spent 430 million dollars of which the United States contributed \$237,116,355. IRO discontinued operations on January 31, 1952.

Anticipating the eventual termination of IRO, the United States participated within the United Nations during 1949 and 1950 in the establishment of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the primary function of which is to extend protection to refugees in their new countries of residence until they acquire citizenship.

The activities of the United States in the refugee field have not, of course, been limited to Europe. In 1948 the United States took the leadership in the U.N. General Assembly in establishing the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and was instrumental in establishing in 1949 the successor agency, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. With respect to the Far East, the United States has also taken the leadership within the United Nations to establish the United Nations Korean Reconstruc-

tion Agency. Thus the United States has been active on a world-wide basis to assist in caring for refugees.

Concerning the second field of our efforts, the United States has admitted to our own shores large numbers of refugees. In December 1945, President Truman directed the competent Federal agencies to take full advantage of existing immigration laws to grant admission to the United States of refugees from Germany and Austria. Some 42,000 were admitted to the United States under this directive by June 30, 1947.

The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 provided for the admission of 205,000 refugees who had arrived in Germany, Austria, and Italy prior to December 22, 1945. The amended Displaced Persons Act of 1948 went into effect on June 16, 1950, and extended the benefits of the act to those who had arrived in those countries prior to January 1, 1949. The authorization for visa issuance under the act was increased from 205,000 to 341,000. In addition, the admission of 5,000 nonquota war orphans and 54,744 German expellees was authorized. To date, 323,942 refugees have entered the United States under sections 2 and 3 of the act, and 27,096 German refugees under section 12, totaling 351,038. Visas may be issued to German refugees until June 30, 1952, and it is anticipated that all visas authorized for them will be issued well before that date.

In the third field—overpopulation—Congress and the Department have recognized the problems created by the existence of surplus populations in Europe. Not only has Western Europe been burdened with thousands of refugees whose welfare is of concern to us, but in many areas, particularly those which have traditionally been sources of migrants, there developed severe population pressures. This condition, particularly when combined with a refugee problem of significant proportions, has made more difficult the progress toward political and economic stability in Europe.

The Congress has already authorized two programs to relieve the present European situation. With respect to the problem of overpopulation, the Belgian Government, at the request of the U.S. Government, convened a Conference on Migration at Brussels in November and December 1951. Twenty-seven governments attended. Sixteen governments supported a resolution which was adopted establishing the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee on the Movement of Migrants from Europe. The Committee now has a membership of 19 governments and has held two sessions.² It has adopted a budget of 41 million dollars and proposes to move 137,000 migrants,

² For a report on the Conference on Migration and on the first session of the Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe, see *ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1952, p. 169; a report on the second session of the Committee appeared *ibid.*, Apr. 21, 1952, p. 638.

including refugees, out of Europe in the calendar year 1952. The United States will make a direct contribution of 10 million dollars to the Committee. Included in the Mutual Security Bill presently under consideration by the Congress is a request for 10 million dollars to cover the U.S. contribution to the Migration Committee for its second year of operation. The migrants and refugees concerned will be transported to Canada, the United States, Venezuela, Brazil, Australia, and New Zealand on ships transferred to the Committee by Iro on its termination. Over 32,000 persons were moved by the Committee in the first 3 months of operation.

With respect to escapees, section 101 (a) (1) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 authorized the use of Title I funds for any selected persons who have escaped from certain Communist-controlled or Communist-dominated countries or areas of Europe. On March 22, of this year, the President, acting under this authority, authorized a \$4,300,000 program to assist certain refugees who have escaped from behind the Iron Curtain.³

These persons have been granted asylum in the countries bordering the Iron Curtain, notably Western Germany, Austria, Trieste, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, whose governments are now carrying the main responsibility for provision of food and shelter. Assistance in this has also been extended by private voluntary organizations. The escapee program will supplement—but in no sense supersede—these efforts. The program is designed (1) to improve standards of care and maintenance for those who have risked their lives in the hope of finding freedom in the West and (2) to aid in the permanent resettlement of these persons, either locally or overseas, to permit them to reestablish their lives in the free-world community. The Department of State has accepted responsibility for carrying out this program, and action is now proceeding rapidly to commence program operations.

Reduction of Surplus Populations

H. R. 7376 constitutes the next logical step in the continuing efforts on the part of the United States to assist refugees and to reduce surplus populations.

The pressure of surplus population in Western Europe persists in Italy, Western Germany, the Netherlands, and Greece. This problem is intensified by the continued inflow of refugees from the Eastern European countries under Soviet domination. The possibility of assimilating the excess which now exists in Western Europe at a tolerable level of living and advantageous level of productivity is very remote since, even with the rearmament effort, foreseeable employment and resettlement

opportunities are inadequate. Continued emigration on a larger scale than that obtained since the war has been and should further be encouraged as one means of relieving this pressure. It cannot, in our view, be the primary means. The major emphasis must be upon economic improvement within the particular countries and within the European area as a whole. However, overseas emigration is an important factor in any solution of the problem.

The interest of the United States in a solution of overpopulation problems in Europe is substantial, due to the economic burden and the social and political tensions arising from overpopulation. The continued burden of nonproductive people in these countries presents serious handicaps to the successful realization of our primary effort to establish security in Europe. These handicaps constitute a weakness behind the military strength being developed in Western Europe. They are likewise a threat to the economic and political stability upon which a successful military defense must depend.

Within the past 2 years the United States has repeatedly expressed its concern with the problem of overpopulation in certain Western European countries. The British, French, and United States Foreign Ministers in a declaration at London on May 13, 1950, recognized "that the excess of population from which several countries of Western Europe are suffering is one of the most important elements in the difficulties and disequilibrium of the world," and in November 1950 they adopted the report of the conference of experts on migration held at Paris in July and August of that year.

The importance of this problem to European defense and stability has been fully recognized by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, particularly in resolutions and reports adopted by the ninth session of the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon. The report of the Temporary Council Committee, which was adopted by the Council at Lisbon, emphasized the importance of manpower problems in relation to political as well as economic stability in Western Europe. While noting the possibilities for a certain measure of relief through increased defense production, the report urged the need for a substantial increase in emigration, especially from Italy, for adequate alleviation of the problem. The Committee on the North Atlantic Community, in a report also adopted by the Council, reviewed the manpower situation and drew the conclusion that increased emigration from certain countries is essential to European stability. Representatives of the United States shared in the preparation of these analyses and in the decision to adopt the resulting reports taken by the Council at Lisbon.

Since overpopulation in Western Europe represents a threat to the political and economic security of that area, it has a direct and important effect

³ For the President's notification to the Congress of this authorization, see *ibid.*, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 602.

upon the security and welfare of the United States. Especially in Italy and Western Germany, the problem of overpopulation in its present acute form arises from special circumstances. An emergency international effort, in which the United States shares, to relieve population pressure would serve to reestablish a manageable situation in which the natural increase in population could be absorbed either through domestic integration or normal emigration. It is within that framework that the proposals of H. R. 7376 provide an opportunity for the United States to make a further tangible and effective contribution.

Extending Aid to Iron Curtain Refugees

To the problems of overpopulation has been added the burden created by the presence in Western Europe of approximately 16,000 refugees from communism. These are people who have lost their homes, their property, and often their families. They have a deep hatred for communism; they know from experience what it means. They have a deep love of freedom, having been so long without it.

They have fled from the Baltic countries, from Czechoslovakia and Poland, from Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, and the Soviet Union. They have escaped, but they have not yet found complete freedom—freedom to work and to become useful citizens. It is this opportunity which they now seek.

Due to the conditions under which the refugees must flee their homes, they arrive in Western Europe destitute and are at once faced with the necessity either to fight for a meager existence in a strange land, which already is burdened with surplus population of its own, or to accept gratuitous care with the attendant demeaning of self-respect. If we should leave them to shift for themselves in the already overburdened economies of Germany, Austria, Italy, Trieste, Greece, and Turkey, they will become disillusioned as to what Western democracy really means.

We are helping these refugees. Through the escapee program we will supplement their care

and maintenance and help them to emigrate elsewhere. Because few of them can enter the United States under our present laws, we must rely largely on Australia, Canada, and other governments to accept them. The number of persons who can be moved to these countries is limited. If we are not to be charged with neglect of these enemies of communism, it is essential that we offer to some of them the opportunity to begin life anew in our country.

If these refugees remain in the countries bordering the Iron Curtain, they add to the economic difficulties of these countries already suffering from surplus population and war-weakened economies. This is an element of weakness in areas whose strength is of vital importance to the United States.

It should also be mentioned that we have certain needs ourselves that these refugees can fill. We need information as to what actually happens behind the Iron Curtain so that we may bend our efforts in the proper directions. These needs the refugees are best qualified to fill. We can use their experiences under the terror regime to inform other lands of what existence under communism really means. If utilized and given the opportunity to find the freedom they seek, the refugees could contribute materially to the welfare and security of the United States. If ignored, they could only be a barrier to the accomplishment of our objectives.

We must continue our program of supplementary care given these refugees by the countries which border the Iron Curtain. We must help to feed, clothe, and house them adequately. We must see that they are given the training necessary to enable them to find work and a place in the North Atlantic Community. But these are largely interim measures which are necessary to maintain hope and spirit while they await the opportunity to move onward to new homes. If our policy of resistance to communism is not to appear illusory, it is important that we allow a goodly number of these people who have so well demonstrated their resistance to communism to find the freedom they seek in America.

A Report on the Far East

by General Matthew B. Ridgway¹

MR. PRESIDENT, MR. SPEAKER, DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS: To be here, before the Members of the Congress of my country, is the greatest honor. To the Senate and the House of Representatives from whence came the invitation, and to the President, who gave his sanction, I express my profound and respectful thanks. Absorbed as you are with a multitude of problems, domestic and foreign, I hesitate to trespass upon your crowded hours. However, having just returned to this country, after nearly a year and a half in the Far East, the last 13 months of which I served there as commander in chief, I feel you would wish me to report briefly on major problems encountered there, and to touch on a few of those matters which seem to me to be of substantial importance in our relations with the peoples of that region.

In outline, the matters I shall cover will be three: the conduct of military operations in Korea, the armistice negotiations, and our relations with the Japanese Government and its people. The first two pertain primarily to the military missions assigned me; the third, to my responsibilities as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, in which role, acting of course under the policy directives of superior authorities, I had over-all responsibility for all acts of the Japanese Government, as well as for the relations of all Americans and Allied personnel in Japan, both military and civilian, with the Japanese people.

I shall first discuss the conduct of military operations in Korea from Christmas of 1950, the day of my arrival in the Far East, to date.

¹ Address made before a joint session of the Congress on May 22; printed from *Cong. Rec.* of the same date, p. 5850. General Ridgway, former Commander in Chief of the U.N. Command for Korea and Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Japan, was in Washington for conferences preparatory to his assumption on May 30 of the post of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in replacement of Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Assuming command of the Eighth Army on December 26, 1950, I found but three of its seven United States divisions, and these badly depleted in strength, in the combat zone.

Three of the other four had been only recently evacuated from the Hungnam area and of these only the First Marine Division was again ashore in the southern tip of the peninsula. The Third and Seventh Divisions were still aboard ship, while the Second Division was reorganizing and re-equipping as a result of its severe battle losses in the far north.

On a 135-mile front only two of these were on the line of contact, the third in blocking position to the rear. The remainder of this extended front was covered by the Republic of Korea Army, one British, and one Turkish regiment. The Korean divisions were likewise at reduced strength in men and equipment, each with an exceedingly meager artillery component, and all still suffering from the grievous blows they had sustained in the preceding 6 months.

Little time was granted before the first major hostile offensive struck. That time was used for personal visits to all corps and division commanders in their own battle sectors, in order to obtain on the ground, as is possible in no other way, a personal estimate of the character and competence of the commanders and of the problems and conditions confronting them. Based on those visits, decision was made that in the event of major hostile attack, the Army would delay in successive positions. With the instant cooperation of President Rhee, tens of thousands of indigenous laborers were put to work digging trenches and gun emplacements north of Seoul, South Korea's capital.

On New Year's Eve the major hostile attack was launched. It came shortly after dark on that winter evening, with its main effort a converging attack straight south—objective Seoul. By the afternoon of January 3 the situation of our troops

on the north bank of the partly frozen Han, with its few bridges within range of enemy guns, became precarious and withdrawal to a secondary delaying position was directed. The withdrawal and establishment of the secondary line south of the Han was accomplished with only light losses in personnel and equipment.

The hostile follow-up was unaggressive, and within a few days the Army was realigned intact on its new position. Intelligence had earlier reported an unconfirmed mass of 174,000 Chinese troops within easy striking distance in the west alone, excluding the North Korean forces to the east. To check on this intelligence, aggressive reconnaissance was begun at once and steadily increased in strength.

Based on the combat intelligence so secured, the Eighth Army, with all of its United Nations and Republic of Korea contingents, was launched on January 25, 1951, into a slow, thoroughly coordinated offensive, so designed as to preclude large scale enemy penetrations and the bypassing of substantial enemy forces which might have been a menace to the Army in its then weakened condition. The results of this general offensive action are a matter of historical record. In February and March of 1951 we repulsed two strong hostile counterthrusts, inflicting far heavier losses upon the enemy than we ourselves suffered.

I wish I could pay proper tribute to the magnificent conduct of United Nations troops throughout these operations. It is difficult to single out any one unit or the forces of any one nation, but to illustrate, I shall speak briefly of the Twenty-third United States Infantry Regiment, Col. Paul L. Freeman, commanding, with the French battalion and the normal components of artillery, engineer, and medical personnel from the United States Second Infantry Division. These troops in early February of 1951 sustained two of the severest attacks experienced during the entire Korean campaign. Twice isolated far in advance of the general battle line, twice completely surrounded in near zero weather, they repelled repeated assaults by day and night by vastly superior numbers of Chinese infantry. They were finally relieved by an armored column from the United States First Cavalry Division in as daring and dramatic an operation as the war provided.

I personally visited these magnificent men during both operations and personally directed the attack of the relieving armored column which finally broke through and contributed to the utter and final rout of the enemy forces. I want to record here my conviction that these American fighting men with their French comrades-in-arms measured up in every way to the battle conduct of the finest troops America or France has produced throughout their national existence.

By late March a year ago the Eighth Army knew it had control of the situation. With few checks and with scrupulous concern for the con-

serving of every possible United Nations life, the Eighth Army, with its magnificent naval and air support, moved steadily forward until by mid-April it stood again, with fighting heart, on or north of the thirty-eighth parallel almost entirely across the peninsula, imbued with unshakeable belief in its ability to destroy the enemy whenever and wherever met.

In no way could its splendid spirit have been better displayed than in the next succeeding 6 weeks, when under the conspicuous battlefield leadership of General Van Fleet, the Eighth Army met, checked, and destroyed two more major enemy attacks. Both of these had gained considerable ground and had penetrated deeply into United Nations territory. Subsequently, the entire Army, again with magnificent support of the air and sea arms, passed to the counteroffensive and continued its advance until by November last it stood approximately where now it stands—proud, defiant, and confident of its capability for accomplishing any mission it might be assigned.

In a scant 18 months, beginning with that early July day in 1950, when those first few immortal riflemen and airmen saw the Communist aggressors over their gun and bomb sights, the Eighth Army, comprising our own forces and those of the Republic of Korea, the British Commonwealth, Turkey, Greece, India, France, Ethiopia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the Philippines, Thailand, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Colombia, and Italy, has left a record of fidelity, valor, and cooperation unsurpassed in all military history.

The Armistice Negotiations

I pass now to the second of my three topics, the armistice negotiations.

For more than 10 months, a group of men, representative of the United Nations Command, and individually and collectively of as high-principled integrity, fidelity, courage, and vision as any group assembled for any similar purpose anywhere, anytime, have sought with full faith and loyalty to achieve an honorable armistice in accordance with the instructions of competent authority. That they have so far been unsuccessful is no slightest mark of failure, but rather, in my opinion, a monumental tribute to their strict adherence to United Nations' concepts of human dignity and human rights and to their efforts in the cause of peace. As the military arm of a great democracy, where that arm is completely, and under all conditions and circumstances, wholly subordinate and responsive to civil authority, they have served well.

Day after day, week after week, month after month, these splendid American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, with their colleagues of the Republic of Korea, acting on behalf of the United Nations, have striven with logic and reason, with

patience and restraint, and above all with principle and truth, to overcome the blind hatred, the vituperative venom, the vicious falsehoods, deliberately employed, which are all inseparable elements of the technique of Communist negotiations.

I am constrained at this point to refer again to the officially propagated allegations of Communist leaders that the United Nations command in Korea has employed both germ and gas warfare. I wish to reiterate what I have repeatedly stated publicly, that these allegations are false in their entirety; that no element of the United Nations command has employed either germ or gas warfare in any form at any time.

In the whole black record of false propaganda, these charges should stand out as a monumental warning to the American people and the free world—a warning as menacing and as urgent as a forest fire bearing down upon a wooden village. The extent to which Communist leaders have gone in fabricating, disseminating, and persistently pursuing these false charges should impress upon the brains of those who yet fail or refuse to see the purpose of communism, the deadly danger with which it confronts us and the free world.

Today there rests in the Communist hands a logical, reasonable, and honorable proposal for the settlement on equitable terms of the three remaining major unresolved issues—airfield construction, the Communist proposal for membership of the Soviet Union on the neutral nations supervisory commission, and the Communist demands for forcible repatriation of prisoners of war.

The United Nations command delegation, under Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, that sterling American who has presided over it with such distinction through these 10 months, still stands ready to remove by explanation and clarification, any honest doubts or misunderstandings of the meaning of this proposal which the opposing delegation may harbor. It does not intend to bargain on those issues, the logic of which and the reasons for which have been repeatedly and exhaustively debated.

Acceptance or rejection, cessation or continuance of hostilities in Korea, is now the responsibility of the Communist leaders.

U.S. Relations with Japan

My third and final topic pertains to our relations with Japan.

This relation is of incalculable value and importance to this Nation. Whether Japan grows in strength and resilience sufficient to withstand the impact of the inevitable blows of accidental and deliberate origin, or whether it declines in strength until circumstances or hostile powers succeed in effect in abrogating it, only history will tell. But if I may be pardoned expressing before this

august body a personal conviction in a field of responsibility which was formerly mine, I would say the continuance, in fact that an ever-strengthening of the bonds which today make of America and Japan mutually understanding, mutually respecting, and cooperative friends, confident each of the support of the other—I would say, gentlemen, that the attainment and retention for the indefinite future of such a relationship is of vital importance to the national welfare of both nations and to the peace of the world. The Japanese are a proud, sensitive, diligent, and homogeneous people. They have given much to world culture. They have achieved much with little in a brief time. They are capable of far greater contributions within the society of free nations.

In Japan where the basic essentials of life—food, shelter, clothing, and fuel—are in chronic short supply; where past mistakes, which no one recognizes better than do the Japanese as both tragic and lamentable; these people face obstacles in number and magnitude which might make the stoutest hearts quail, but theirs do not. With vision, with resolution, with courage, and with high principle, they propose to build a new Japan, to set before their people a picture of their goal, and to choose a path to take them there. They are asking no charity, but understanding, and the minimum reasonable help which will permit them to reassume in self-respecting dignity the responsibilities which sovereignty, now restored to them by the Japanese peace treaty, confers upon them as their own inherent right.

In this presentation I must express other convictions which to me have the stature of mountains viewed from the plain.

Underlying all major problems is Japan's vital need for the creation of a healthy and viable economy. Her present standard of living should be raised. Were it to be depressed, resulting conditions could have potentially grave consequences, for us as well as for them. The nourishing of her population, its employment in gainful occupation, its relations with neighbors both friendly and hostile, its ability to control the small but ever-dangerous Communist threat within her shores, all affect directly the extent to which she can stabilize a basic economy essential to her continued existence as a free and independent nation. In simple sequence, she must have access to raw materials which her industry can convert into products which she can sell in markets in which she must give and receive fair treatment in order to gain the foreign exchange to buy and import the food, fuel, and cloth she herself cannot produce.

The complexity of each of these problems will tax the best in intellect and integrity. That we can find mutually acceptable solutions to these problems is with me a matter of faith. I am convinced we can. I am convinced that if responsible,

reasonable men will meet and sit down with a common purpose of finding a common solution, that the Creator of the world will endow their efforts with success. I am convinced that in no other way can success be achieved.

Included among these many problems are ones of singular political difficulty for the present, or any other, Japanese Government. Her military power having been destroyed, her merchant marine, vital to an island people, having been drastically reduced in tonnage, her constitutional limitations against maintaining ground, sea, and air forces now having rendered her incapable of preserving unaided the independence recently restored to her, any government in Japan, the present included, is vulnerable to a degree to all manner of attack by both well- and ill-intentioned opposition.

Despite all this, the overwhelming attitude of the Japanese people toward us today is one of gratitude for the past, of hopefulness for sympathetic consideration in the future, and of very great friendliness.

The unfortunate occurrences on the 1st of May last were reported with accuracy and objectivity from the scene. I believe, however, they received a misleading interpretation in the United States.

Throughout Japan as a whole, that day passed in a generally quiet and orderly manner. The few disorders which occurred, other than in Tokyo, were relatively minor in character. Had they occurred in the United States, they would have excited little or no comment.

The disorders in Tokyo were of a different character. They bore the unmistakable stamp of deliberate Communist design, the target of which would, of course, have been America and all the principles for which she stands. Such was the case. It was marked, however, and I believe the facts will sustain this opinion, by an absolute minimum either of antiforeignism or anti-Americanism. The individual Americans who suffered bodily injury or indignity and the foreign property damaged or destroyed, the latter almost exclusively limited to a few automobiles, happened to be among or in the direct path of the rioting demonstrators. The results could have happened anywhere, and they have, on other occasions, even in our own land.

It would be a grave injustice to both Japanese and Americans to accord to this incident an exaggerated importance. That it revealed to the Japanese people the character and objective of Communist designs is a beneficial byproduct. The overwhelming majority of responsible Japanese opinion has already repudiated these acts in no unmistakable terms. The Japanese Government is alive to the Communist threat and resolved adequately to control it. The full influence of the

Emperor, the Prime Minister, and of all responsible members of the present government will be employed to solve this problem in a manner to bring this situation under adequate control with the least practicable delay, and to keep it there.

In short, the Japanese are at our side. Their gaze is lifted to see the same objective we see. They are presently walking with us. Whether they continue or not is a responsibility which rests rather more on us in the immediate future than on them, for our strength is superior, our resources immeasurably greater, and ours is the role of leadership.

In all these great problems, which though lightly touched upon, have such profound significance for us and the future of our country, we can, I think we must, look for strength to solve them upon that greatest reservoir of America's strength—faith in principle and trust in God. If we draw upon this reservoir with resolution and courage, it will meet all our needs.

I have been greatly privileged to have had the responsibilities which I recently relinquished. I shortly assume new ones. With full reliance on this same reservoir, and on the cooperation of all those engaged in our great crusade for peace and security, I approach our tasks with confidence higher than ever.

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The Bonn Agreements and the European Defense Treaty

A REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

*Address by Secretary Acheson*¹

Before me as we talk tonight is a stack of documents about eight inches high. These are the agreements that were signed at Bonn and Paris last week.²

These agreements touch the lives of every one of us. They represent the birth of a new Germany, a new Europe, and a new period in history. They were created to strengthen the cause of peace. Pray God that they will succeed in that purpose.

European statesmen of deep patriotism and broad vision brought wisdom and largeness of spirit to our work. I saw and heard them around our conference table last week. Men whose people, only a few years ago, were locked in the most desperate struggle were freely working together to end the causes of these old conflicts.

For many months they have been patiently working in hard, often heart-breaking negotiation, to harmonize the interests of all their people to meet the new dangers of the present and the future.

Many times in history, victors have sought to impose a settlement by force and have failed.

The striking thing about these two meetings in the capital cities of the two countries who have fought each other so bitterly in the past—France and Germany—was the free agreement of all upon measures that looked toward the future, and not toward the past. . . .

What do these documents do? What do they mean to us? They boil down to three major actions.

One ends the Occupation of the German Republic and returns Germany to the community of free nations as an equal member.

The second creates a European army, in which

Germany joins, to be part of the North Atlantic army.

The third extends the guaranties of help against an armed attack to all the European army countries from all the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries, in return for similar guaranties running the other way.

Each one of these actions is dependent upon the other two. Together they enlarge and strengthen the structure of peace which shelters and protects every one of us. . . .

German Contractual Agreements

Suppose we look first at the agreements relating especially to Germany. This is what they will do. The Occupation in all of Germany not occupied by the Soviet Union will end. The sole exception to this is Berlin, where the situation requires us to maintain our full rights as an Occupation power.

The three Western Powers and the German Republic reaffirm their abiding purpose to bring about a free and united Germany. In doing so, both the interests of this united Germany and of the parties to this agreement are protected.

The Federal Republic will control its domestic and external affairs. Limited and specific exceptions to this relate to the fact that Germany is divided and faces dangers with which it cannot deal alone. So the foreign armed forces stationed in the Federal territory will cease to be Occupation forces. Joined by German contingents in the European army, they will safeguard the freedom and security of Germany and the Western World.

The German Federal Republic, in carrying on its internal affairs, will maintain the democratic rights of individuals and the Federal institutions already provided for in its constitution. In its foreign relations, it agrees to abide by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which

¹Made over radio and television at Washington on June 2 and released to the press on the same date.

²For a summary of the German contractual agreements, see BULLETIN of June 9, 1952, p. 888.

renounce aggression and the use or threat of force save in defense.

The German Government will carry out a number of programs already well advanced, such as breaking up cartels, compensating victims of Nazi persecution, caring for displaced persons and refugees, and many other matters.

Finally, Germany will contribute to and participate in its own defense and the defense of Western Europe as an equal partner in the European army. There will not be a national German army. . . .

European Defense Treaty

This brings us to the second major historic action of last week.

Six nations—France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg—have signed a treaty for the creation of a European Defense Community. I believe you will hear these initials—Edc—many times in the coming months.

All the troops of these six nations—except those required for duty outside of Europe—will be under a common command, wearing the uniform of a European army. The soldiers of each nation will be formed into units of approximately division size. These will be combined with similar divisions of other nations into European army units of corps strength. Only at the corps level will the troops have the air support, the supply support—and, generally, what soldiers call the logistic support—to permit them to operate as self-sufficient units.

This will provide a safeguard against the troops of any one nation being pulled out and used independently. For the national divisions will not be able to operate independently.

The European Defense Community will be closely related to NATO. The European army will serve under General Ridgway as Supreme Commander, alongside American and British forces, and the forces of other North Atlantic Treaty countries which are not members of Edc.

But the European Defense Community is more than the European army. Not only will there be a common military budget and common purchase, production, and supply arrangements, but also a number of common political institutions in the defense field—a Council of Ministers, an Assembly, a Court of Justice, and a nine-man executive group with power above and beyond national power.

Moreover, the treaty provides that the Assembly shall within 6 months propose a development of the present structure so that it may fit in as one element of a federal union in Europe. The proposal is to be promptly considered by a European conference.

This is what makes the European Defense Community not only a great present achievement but

A Tribute to High Commissioner McCloy

Press Conference Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press June 4]

Mr. McCloy, our High Commissioner in Germany, returned yesterday to testify before congressional committees. At this time I wish to pay tribute to him for his great achievement in the successful conclusion of the contractual agreements signed at Bonn. For many months he carried on personally the arduous negotiations which led to the agreements. His role in the development of the Schuman Plan, the European Defense Community, and of the Bonn conventions has been outstanding. He has shown vision and courage, and he has given the German people an excellent example of democratic integrity and statesmanship.

the foundation for still greater achievement. Surely, to provide the means by which the old rivalry between France and Germany can be replaced by united effort for a common end would be in itself a great step forward. But the European Defense Community, together with the Schuman Plan, opens the practical way toward still broader economic and political unity in Europe. . . .

North Atlantic Treaty Protocol

The third important action of last week was the signing of an amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty.³ This extends to the Federal Republic of Germany, as a part of the European Defense Community, the same assurances as apply to areas covered by the North Atlantic Treaty. The German Republic, along with the other members of the Edc, has accepted corresponding obligations in return.

Now the safety of this whole area has been of deep concern to us for a long time. Every American knows that a strong, free, and independent Europe as our partner and ally is of vital interest to us. The President and the Congress have stressed this time and time again. It is a goal upon which all of us regardless of party are agreed. So there must be no misunderstanding about how we would regard any act which would affect the integrity or existence of this Community.

The President stressed this point, in his message transmitting these documents to the Senate earlier today.⁴

"It is evident," the President said, "that the United States has acquired a very great stake in the maintenance of the institutions and relationships thus established and would consider any act which would affect their integrity or existence as a

³ For text of Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty, see *ibid.*, p. 896.

⁴ See p. 947.

matter of fundamental concern to its own interests and security."

The British and French Governments joined with us in a declaration signed at Paris which makes the same point—⁵ that these three Governments will regard as a threat to their own security any action, from whatever quarter, which threatens the integrity or unity of the European Defense Community. They have each expressed the resolve to station forces, as they deem necessary and appropriate, on the continent of Europe, including the territory of the German Republic.

As to Berlin, the Three Powers made it absolutely clear that they would maintain armed forces there as long as their responsibilities require it. They reaffirmed—and I quote the words of the declaration—"that they will treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves. . . ."

Absence of "Secret" Commitments

The documents forwarded by the President to the Senate today state all the engagements we have entered into in these negotiations. We have given no "secret" or undisclosed commitments or guarantees. Let me make that clear. Our whole purpose has been to give unmistakable and public notice of our intentions. The arrangements we have entered into threaten no one. They are wholly peaceful in purpose. They constitute an alliance for peace.

Despite this, the Soviet Union has continued to stage in Berlin and along the borders of its zone a series of intimidating gestures. We shall meet these, and such other actions as may occur in the future, with quiet determination and steadiness. These actions of the Soviet Union shall not succeed in their purpose, which is to deflect or delay the continued progress of the European Defense Community. The very extravagance of Soviet propaganda in recent days is an impressive tribute to the extent of this progress.

The treaties signed last week set an important goal for the free nations. The achievement of this goal will depend upon prompt ratification by parliaments and wholehearted support by the people of all the countries concerned.

And nowhere will this be more important than in the United States. We know that the strengthening of the free nations is essential to our security as well as to theirs and that without our support it could not be done.

The prompt consideration and ratification of these measures by the Senate and the strong support of the American people for these historic developments will send a message of encouragement to all our allies.

In the year 1952, as in every year, our national security must be placed above all personal and

party interests. The success of our leadership in the world will be profoundly affected by the soberness and resolution with which we approach our programs of defense and of mutual security.

Generations of statesmen have vainly tried to achieve what was recorded in the actions at Bonn and Paris last week. These actions are not only historic for Europe but of importance to the entire world.

These agreements upon principles and institutions, welding together free peoples for their defense and well-being, greatly advance the purposes to which all our efforts since the end of the war have been directed.

The blueprints have been drawn; the foundations have been laid. The work of preparation and organization is over. The hour is at hand for affirmation and action.

Assistant Secretary General for Defense Production of NATO

The Department of State on June 4 released to the press the text of an announcement issued at Paris on that day by Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Vice Chairman of the North Atlantic Council. Following is text of the announcement:

David Luke Hopkins, American business executive, has been appointed Assistant Secretary General for Defense Production in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Lord Ismay, Secretary General and Vice Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, announced today.

Mr. Hopkins is expected to assume his new post by the end of June. In the absence of an Assistant Secretary General for Defense Production, the production activities of NATO's international secretariat have been directed temporarily by William L. Batt, Minister for Economic Affairs in the American Embassy at London and former senior U.S. representative on the old NATO Defense Production Board. Mr. Batt will continue to serve NATO until Mr. Hopkins assumes his post.

The appointment of Mr. Hopkins completes Lord Ismay's trio of assistant secretaries general. The appointments of Sergio Fenoaltea of Italy for political affairs, and of René Sergent of France for economic affairs, were announced on May 10.

CORRECTION

In the BULLETIN of May 5, page 688, the following line should be inserted beneath the heading "A Proclamation" in box at top of the page: "Released to the press by the White House April 28." Footnote 2 should be omitted.

⁵ For text of this tripartite declaration, see BULLETIN of June 9, 1952, p. 897.

The World's Awakening Peoples and Their Demand for Human Betterment

by Isador Lubin

*U.S. Representative in the U.N. Economic and Social Council*¹

I am going to talk to you today in terms of revolution.

Don't be alarmed—at least, not yet. The revolution that I'm going to talk about has been going on for over 300 years. It is the revolution in human affairs that has resulted from the consistent application of free inquiry and free enterprise to natural and to human problems. It is the revolution by way of science and technology, a revolution that has changed and will continue to change the basic fabric of our lives. The most spectacular result of this revolution is the conviction of our generation that nature, yes, even human nature, is, in the larger part, controllable; that neither poverty nor disease are inevitable; that fatalism is an outmoded ethic; and that life, liberty, and the achievement of happiness are within the reach of all.

In the twentieth century two powerful forces have merged that have put brakes on this revolution, forces that have attempted to use it for purposes other than bettering the lot of mankind. One of these counterrevolutionary forces was fascism, which is still trying to raise its head in certain areas. The other is present-day communism—especially the Soviet imperialist type. But, despite these, the continuing revolution goes on. It goes on in our own country. It goes on in Western Europe. Within recent decades, it has vastly affected the lives of people in the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.

It is upon the effect of this revolution on these underdeveloped countries and peoples that I want to draw your attention today.

A few weeks ago the United Nations published the first report in history on the social conditions prevailing over the globe. It is over 400 pages in

length.² Some of it is technical, but much of it is very readable.

And may I read just one short extract from that report.

To an extent which might have seemed inconceivable even fifty years ago, there has come increasing recognition that 2,400,000,000 people have somehow to contrive to live together, and share together the resources of the earth; that the general impoverishment of any area is a matter of concern to all areas; and that the technical experience and knowledge acquired in rapidly changing industrialized societies have somehow to be made available to those communities that are less advanced and less well-equipped.

The report quoted from a distinguished historian to the effect that in the broad sweep the twentieth century will be chiefly remembered in future centuries not as an age of political conflicts or technical inventions but as an age in which human society dared to think of the welfare of the whole human race as a practicable objective.

This objective of over-all human welfare is not only a practical objective. It is also a vitally necessary one. As the report continues:

Simultaneous with the growth of an international ethic of mutual aid, there has spread among impoverished peoples of the world an awareness—heightened by modern communications and movements of men—that higher standards of living not only exist for others but are possible for themselves. Fatalistic resignation to poverty and disease is giving way to the demand for a better life. The demand is groping and uncertain in direction, charged with conflicting emotions regarding the old and the new, but it is nonetheless a force that is establishing an irreversible trend in history.

And there we have the nub of our problem. People everywhere, and especially in the underdeveloped countries, no longer accept hunger, disease, and misery with fatalism or despair. They demand that their conditions be improved.

Thus the revolution which has affected us for over 300 years is now changing them. It is a

¹ Address made before the National Conference of Social Work at Chicago, on May 29 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on June 4.

² "Preliminary Report on World Social Situation," U.N. doc. E/CN.5/267, dated May 12, 1952.

revolution that has brought hope and a greater degree of good will between peoples than has ever existed before. But it has also brought problems, formidable problems.

As the Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, has noted, these problems are of as great importance and perhaps of even more continuing importance than the current conflict that is raging between the Soviet Union and the free world. Upon their adequate solution hangs the possibility of peace not only in this century but in the next.

Now what are the problems that arise out of the impact of what we have called the continuing revolution upon the people of the underdeveloped countries? There is, in the first place, the appalling conditions under which most of these people live. There is, secondly, the false but glittering promises held out to them by Soviet agents. And, thirdly, there are the explosive forces of nationalism, often accompanied by memories of cruel racial discrimination, which also feed into Soviet hands.

The Life-and-Death Matter of Food

Let's take a look at the first problem. One of the primary results of the continuing revolution is, of course, demographic. As the U.N. report states, the population of the world has now grown to some 2 billion 400 million persons. It is growing at a rate that exceeds 1 percent per year. The new population amounts annually to from 26 million to 32 million. This is about equal to the population of Spain. It is considered likely that the peak of acceleration which has been going on for two decades now has been reached. But even at the present rate of growth the population problems are immense.

Associated with this population problem is one that is equally dangerous, that is, the wide disparity in the conditions of life among these nearly 2½ billion persons. Half the population of the world lives in Asia, but they receive only 11 percent of the world income. In North America, which contains about 10 percent of the population, the people earn nearly 45 percent of the world's income. Africa has 8 percent of the population and 3 percent of the income; the remainder of the world—Europe, the Soviet Union, and Oceania—has 25 percent of the population and 40 percent of the income. And the tragic fact is that these disparities are widening rather than narrowing.

Sixty percent of the world's population depends on agriculture for a livelihood, but in underdeveloped countries the percentage ranges up to 80 percent. In many instances these farmers are crowded to the point where the so-called rural population is packed into what virtually constitutes an endless village. In Japan despite the enlightened land-reform program initiated there under the American Occupation an average of 698

persons live on every square kilometer of cultivated land. In Egypt 500 persons live on each square kilometer in the Nile Valley. On the island of Java in Indonesia the density is 360 persons. The comparable figure for the United States is 21 persons.

In such circumstances life is bitter and hostile, and, where it is not bitter and hostile, when press and radio bring new concepts and new ambitions to these teeming millions, such conditions become the breeding ground for violent revolution of which the Soviets are the prime exponents in the present age. But of this more later.

The first and most important problem which confronts these people is the life-and-death matter of food. And to compound this problem is the fact that restoration of destruction, both in Europe and Asia, caused by World War II still has not been fully completed. This damage was not only to the land. Livestock and machinery were destroyed and carried off, buildings burned, storage capacity destroyed, processing plants ripped up, and the skills of the people diverted. In Asia production of rice, which constitutes 70 percent of the food in that area, still is 21½ percent below prewar levels. In contrast the population is up 10 percent. Europe with the aid of the Marshall Plan and, more recently, of Mutual Security funds has shown the best come-back. Still despite increased output in the United States and Canada, food production per person the world over is today less than it was before the war.

So we have three items on the negative side of the balance; namely, enormously increasing population; dangerous diversities among conditions of life; and, despite all the improvements that have been brought to bear, dangerous underproduction of food.

Hand in hand with these goes a more positive item; namely, world-wide improvement in health. Modern methods of medicine and the treatment of disease have contributed to a lowering of death rates, which in some instances, Puerto Rico, for example, have dropped as much as 50 percent in a relatively few years. The discovery of DDT and similar chemicals has made it possible to eliminate malaria from Italy, Brazil, and Ceylon. These are actual accomplishments. Yet 300 million persons still continue to suffer from malaria, and, of these, 3 millions die annually. The discovery of penicillin has enabled attacks on other mass diseases. Yaws, which once was rampant over most of the land area between the two tropics, now can be stamped out at a modest cost per person.

Developments such as these have the effect of increasing total population. But, and this is the hopeful side, these developments can at the same time be a factor in increasing the food supply. A farmer free of malaria is better able physically to attend his crops.

I have mentioned merely the principal aspects

of the broad panorama of how the world lives. I have not mentioned the very severe shortage of housing, a shortage which contributes to such basic ills of society as disease, delinquency, and other maladjustments. It is estimated that the world housing deficiency amounts to 180 million dwelling units.

Nor have I mentioned other special problems that still confront many countries as a result of the war. In Yugoslavia, for example, 600,000 out of 6,000,000 children, that is to say, one out of ten, have lost one or both parents.

Nor have I mentioned the refugees who have fled or been driven from their homes—by the Nazis before and during the war, and later by the Soviets and their satellites.

The facts that I have sketched, however, both the positive and the negative, are the source of a world-wide development upon which I touched earlier. This development might be termed the revival of hope and the demand for human betterment among the poorest people in the world. This demand for betterment—a direct result of the continuing revolution—marks the destruction of fatalism among these people. Individuals whose ancestors accepted poverty and early death as inevitable have now become conscious of the fact that there are in existence new tools and new skills to combat their misery. Progressively they are becoming aware that with the developments of modern science and modern know-how, and with their own inherent skills and ingenuity, their conditions can be made to improve.

To me, the mere statement of these facts is sufficient evidence that the American people cannot go on blithely unaware of them. For in this demand by the underdeveloped peoples for higher standards of living there lies a great challenge and also a great peril for the United States and the free world generally.

Perils for the U.S. and the Free World

Let us look at these perils. The first, I think, is familiar to all of us. It comes from the attempt by the Soviet Union to persuade these awakening peoples that only under communism can their hopes for human betterment be achieved. "Land for the landless," the Communists cry. To suffering peasants, landless and burdened with debt, this cry is greeted sympathetically. For how are these peasants to know the falsity of these Soviet promises? That Communist-style land reform leads not to the individual homestead and freedom, but to collectivization and forced labor? And the Communists have other slogans, all of them hand-tailored to area requirements, and all of them attractive to the awakening peoples of the world.

Prof. A. S. Bokhari, Pakistan's permanent rep-

resentative to the United Nations, recently told a group of students that "A hungry man will choose four sandwiches instead of four freedoms." In saying this, Professor Bokhari oversimplifies a very complex problem. Still it points to a truth which needs to be dramatized. Arguments dealing with individual freedom do not directly improve the peasant's conditions of life. If he, or anyone else, be he a teacher, or even a social worker, is to be immunized against the promises of Communist propaganda, the free governments of the world must have an action program in which these people can see with their own eyes that their lot is improving.

That is the first problem: How to immunize these hundreds of millions of people against the glittering promises that are daily made to them—promises that lead, not to individual dignity and spiritual freedom, but, as the Chinese and East European peoples are now discovering, to slave camps and regimentation.

But above and beyond the Communist problem there lies a danger that I think too few of us have considered. For even if the Soviets were to collapse tomorrow, the problems that confront people of the underdeveloped countries would not disappear. And even if Soviet totalitarianism came to an end, the wretchedness that prevails in so many parts of the world, if allowed to continue, could result in a series of new ideologies that in the light of the next century might make the totalitarianisms of this century seem pale.

These are the two perils that confront us, one from the Communists and the other from ideologies to come. But in the very nature of these perils there are opportunities. For from the revolution that has brought us these perils there has also come the insight and the demand that free governments collaborate with each other in the solution of these problems. We have the tools with which to do this. We need only intensify their use.

But unless we in the United States appreciate the need for such intensive use in its fullest meaning, and act accordingly, it is clear that the revolution I have described will take courses which are inimical, and even disastrous, to the one we ourselves in large part initiated.

The tools, methods, and resources to prevent this are primarily those already available in the underdeveloped countries themselves. Their accelerated use depends less on the expenditure of billions of dollars than on employing the billions of hands which are now unemployed or wastefully employed. Their accelerated use depends on our ability to stimulate in these peoples the spirit of unfettered inquiry and independent enterprise which has helped us so much in the solution of our own problems. We must help give them confidence in their own ability to help themselves. By

our faith in the ability, ingenuity, and dignity of the individual, we have built and are continuing to build for ourselves, a strong and humane society. With our help, others can do the same.

This is a formidable problem, of course. But, on balance, it is much less formidable than the problem we will face if the Soviets succeed in absorbing these peoples; or, indeed, than the problems we would ultimately face if some other and equally vicious ideology were to supplant the Soviet brand.

Fostering Individual and Social Growth

The problem is particularly formidable because the art of helping people in a way that strengthens rather than weakens their ability to help themselves is not readily learned. It is much easier to do things for people than to show them how to do things for themselves—to hand them bread rather than to help them arrive at a stage where they can raise their own wheat and make their own flour. However, in the process of assisting people to improve their conditions of living, it is often possible that a single person can be a leavening influence for an entire community. For example, he can stimulate people to define for themselves what problems most concern them. He can arouse hopes that those problems are soluble. And, when people are ready to act, he can put them in touch with the specialized facilities or services that will help toward a successful outcome.

The sort of person to which I refer might be considered, to use a social-welfare term, "a community organizer," or perhaps a more accurate term would be "a community consultant." But, whatever the term, he should be a person who has the ability and skills—agricultural, educational, public health, and social welfare—to foster individual and social growth and to work with organizations and groups.

And it is here, if I may say so, that you, as experts in social welfare, come in. In the years to come, what has been called the revolution of rising expectations among the people of the underdeveloped countries will have an important effect on your own profession. By this I mean that to cope with the mass problems of a humanity, numbering in the billions, requires a revolution, both in our social-welfare methods and in our social-welfare training programs. Nowhere on earth are social-welfare techniques so far advanced as in the United States. Our case workers reach to the heart of the family, to the individual, to the particular mental or physical illnesses with which a family may be afflicted. They seek and find the intimate, personal causes of maladjustment and of poverty. We are a rich and highly developed nation. We can afford these things.

But in dealing with the underdeveloped masses of humanity, these methods will not work. The man or the woman who goes to India, or Iraq, or Brazil, or Burma finds he has no time for painstaking personal investigations. He must become a general practitioner in social welfare. He must literally roll up his sleeves and pitch in. He must himself demonstrate how to dig a sewer or how to bathe a baby. His every move must count toward the objective of improving the health or the housing or the literacy of an entire village or an entire region.

The problems of these areas are immense. The world has neither the skilled manpower nor the money to send specialists in psychiatry, in juvenile delinquency, in health and sanitation to teach large numbers of people in underdeveloped areas to approach their problems in the way we do ours. That sort of thing may be possible 50 years from now. It is not possible today.

What is required today is what I have called general social-welfare practitioners. The individual worker who can adapt himself to strange surroundings in a strange country, who can sense the needs of the community and awaken the interest and energy of the inhabitants to a sustained effort in their own behalf, that kind of person is the one who is most needed in the fight against the misery that is so widespread.

In appraising these problems, and your relation to it, you must reread your own history; you must take yourself back over half a century, to the days of Jane Addams at Hull House, right here in Chicago. You must go back to Lillian Wald at the Henry Street Settlement House in New York, and Robert Woods at South End House in Boston. I ask you to recall their methods, along with those of the other founders and early general practitioners of community welfare. These old-timers among the pioneers of your profession went to work as though they were moving into a disaster area. They saw the immense need, and they pitched into the job with the aim of accomplishing as much as possible, as soon as possible. Intelligence and simple ingenuity were their tools, together with their belief that, if given a chance, men and women of many different varieties can accomplish wonders for their own good.

The same spirit and unlimited resourcefulness were required of social workers in the first operating agency of the United Nations; namely, UNRRA, when they had to deal with the miseries of millions of refugees and displaced persons.

A similar challenge is presented to American social workers and schools of social work today, a challenge presented to us by our own sense of humanity and by the sufferings and needs of uncounted millions of people.

But beyond that, there is the fact that unless we do something about these people, and do it quickly

and efficiently, they may succumb to temptations and ideologies that will be a threat to our own way of life.

Thus we are faced not with a single but rather a double challenge to our intelligence and good will. With all our strength, we must help in the

task of resisting oppression—from whatever source. And, with all our strength, we must help emancipate men and women from the bondage of hunger, disease, and ignorance. Both are vital. Success in one will contribute to success in the other.

Memorial Day at Antietam Battlefield

by Carlisle H. Humelsine

Deputy Under Secretary for Administration¹

This is a solemn day, in a solemn time, at a solemn spot. Probably like many of you here today, I grew up not far away, in my case in Hagerstown, and in the course of the years I have come here many times.

As a boy, I was deeply awed by the accounts of the terrible battle which took place on this ground 90 years ago—September 17, 1862—the bloodiest day in the whole War Between the States.

Terrible as that day was, and terrible as the succeeding years of that war were, it can still teach us a lesson which can hearten and strengthen us in the struggle in which we are engaged today. Here at Antietam, men were fighting for a difference of principle. Each side believed its cause was just in the eyes of the Lord, and each side fought gallantly and fiercely for what it conceived to be liberty and the right of the individual to choose his own form of government.

History has proved which side was right. And the lesson we have learned is this: While brave men may fight over an interpretation of principle, once that fight has been decided honorably the wounds of war heal cleanly.

We, today, know you can compromise on an interpretation, but we know equally well you cannot compromise on principles. We are not a warlike people, and we are willing to go to great lengths to avoid that horror which is war, and particularly that unimaginable horror which is modern war. But we are resolutely prepared to face this catastrophe rather than abandon the great twin bases of freedom and justice upon which our country and our whole way of life have been built. War is hell, but it is still a hell preferable to that vacant

purgatory of the heart and mind over which the evil spirit of communism presides.

Peace To Guarantee Freedom Against Aggression

The struggle today is not over a difference of principle. It is a struggle between men who believe in God and Right, and men who deny God, deny His teachings and who worship only the inhuman and atheistic ideal of power for power's sake.

On this Memorial Day commemorating "old, unhappy, far-off things and battles long ago," it is sad indeed that we cannot gather together only to pay tribute to the warriors who helped make peace possible. Instead, we must remind ourselves that once more we are engaged in battle, and while it is not yet a total war, it will, only through resoluteness and courage, not become one.

We have that courage, and we have that resolution. We know our enemy; we know that there is no wickedness of which he is not capable. We know, too, that the one thing he fears and respects is strength. George Washington said long ago that "to be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace." Peace is what we are striving for with all our might, but peace doesn't just happen. Nor is peace merely the absence of global war. The kind of peace we want is not the peace of a garrison state; it is not a "peace at any price," bought by surrender of our beliefs and liberties. We want a peace in which free men and nations are guaranteed freedom against aggression. We can only achieve that peace if we and our allies, the freedom-loving nations of the world, are collectively so strong that

¹ Address made at Antietam Battlefield, Md., on May 30.

the Communists will realize that aggression will bring down upon them total destruction.

We are building that strength through our other alliances with the free nations of the earth. I say to you with the most heartfelt conviction that we cannot go it alone in building up the strength that we need.

Importance of Collective Action

We are following the advice of George Washington by seeking to preserve peace through strength. We are building the collective strength of the free nations, because we know that the way to peace today lies in collective action.

Under the United Nations, we have joined with other governments to build a North Atlantic defense system. In the Pacific we have negotiated security pacts with Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, as well as with Japan. We are cooperating closely with neighbors in the Western Hemisphere under the Organization of American States.

In Korea we have joined arms with other members of the United Nations to stop aggression. We had to do it to stop the Communists in their

tracks, and we did it in the fervent hope of preventing World War III. The aggressors have learned a bitter lesson, and the tangle with American strength and power in Korea is teaching the Communist a lesson he will long remember.

Regardless of how much the Korean situation looks like a frustrating stalemate—even as Antietam was frustrating to Lincoln—it is well to remember that we have shown the world that we still have in us the metal of those brave and gallant wearers of the blue and gray whose memory we commemorate today. We have demonstrated morally, economically, and militarily that we do not have to and will not bow down to the atheist Caesars (and I do mean Stalin and company) whose goal is world enslavement.

We have strength and the will and ability to create that even greater strength which is the only deterrent to the Communist nightmare of world domination. Our convictions are sound, and we have unlimited faith in our free way of life.

In closing, I can only say that I believe every one of the brave, true men whose memory we honor today would have said to us: "Confront the atheist challenge with God's will and a well-stocked arsenal."

Korea and the Explosion of a Communist Delusion

by John J. Muccio
*Ambassador to Korea*¹

In these venerable halls, following the First World War, we hopefully debated Wilson's fourteen points, "making the world safe for democracy," and the League of Nations. Following graduation, I went direct from here to the Department of State. There I saw the Washington Naval Treaty and the Nine Power treaty come into being under the wise and experienced guidance of Secretary Hughes. As a consequence of those great events, my generation went forth absolutely convinced that there was too much organized intelligence in the world to permit the outbreak of another world war.

This conviction, however, soon faltered. During my 2 years in Germany from 1924 to 1926, there were already visible the first signs of the totalitarian blight which was to descend on that

country. Not long afterward, in February 1932, I saw modern military might smash into Shanghai, obliterating alike military defenders and civilians in its way. President Barbour visited Shanghai just at that time, and we both toured the scenes of destruction—shocked at the bloody footprints of brute force loose in this "enlightened" era. Ostrichlike, most people failed to understand and face up to the tragic sequence of events that followed—the Rhineland, Ethiopia, Sudetenland, and Munich—leading finally to the Second World War.

Once faced with the reality of war, however, we put forth a magnificent effort and obliterated Axis totalitarianism. But with our victory we disarmed, under popular pressure, and returned to the hope that an era of international peace had been achieved. But the Soviet Union did not disarm, did not carry out its wartime commitments, and increasingly menaced the free world.

¹ Address made at Brown University, Providence, R. I., on May 30 and released to the press on the same date.

Under these increasing signs of Soviet aggressiveness some of us began to have misgivings, and farsighted leaders warned us all of the danger. President Truman in 1947 warned us of the threat to Greece and Turkey, and Congress responded by enacting aid programs which saved Greece from chaos and bolstered Turkey against Soviet pressure. In 1947 and 1948 Congress again responded to the request of the President and provided aid to help strengthen the free world economically in such efforts as the Marshall Plan. And in 1948 and 1949 Congress readily responded to another call and started providing for the restoration of some of the military power that had been allowed to wither after 1945. However, it was not until naked aggression in faraway Korea brutally shook us that we, as well as the free world, became fully aware of the threat before us. Once more, when the chips were really down, we rallied in time to stop the aggressors.

Some people had the impression that whenever communism and democracy tangled, communism inevitably won. Korea has exploded that delusion for good. The free world has administered two resounding defeats to communism in Korea since 1945.

The first victory is little known to the world. From 1945 to 1950, the Communists extended themselves to the utmost to undermine the democratic nation that was developing in South Korea. The Communists failed. The South Koreans won that struggle in every sphere; political, economic, and ideological. After failure to subvert the Republic of Korea, the Communists decided to resort to open armed aggression.

This led to our second—or military—victory. Some timid souls feel uncertain of this victory. They do not consider knocking aggressors back beyond their starting line to be victory. They say there is no victory because our troops are still in Korea and we are still negotiating for an armistice. They do not realize that our military purpose has been perfectly accomplished in Korea in a conflict that will be a milestone in man's long struggle for enduring peace. I shall come back to this point later.

Background for Korean Question

For the moment I should like to deal with the mistaken impression that the United States has no policy in Korea. Korea has probably been more discussed in the past 10 years than any other world problem except Germany. The Korean question was first raised at Cairo in 1943. It was discussed at Potsdam in 1945 and still later that year at Moscow. It was one of the first problems to be laid before the National Security Council. It has been discussed at each General Assembly of the United Nations since 1947; in the first two meetings the United States position was ably advanced by one of the principal exponents of bi-

partisanship in foreign affairs, John Foster Dulles. Congress has debated and appropriated funds annually since 1945 for the bolstering of the infant Republic of Korea. Before and since the outbreak of hostilities, numerous congressional parties have visited Korea. In December 1949 alone, there were five congressional groups, one of which included our grand fellow alumnus, Senator Green. There is no area in foreign affairs where our policies have been so thoroughly discussed in public. At the MacArthur hearings last year, our every past act, present decision, and future intention was aired for the benefit of the American public—and our enemies as well. Any man has a right to say he does not agree with our policy, but certainly no one is justified in saying that the United States has no policy in Korea or that it is not known.

I should like to go back a bit, before outlining briefly the first victory over communism in Korea, and recall to you that Korea in the eighties and nineties was victimized in a power struggle involving China, Japan, and Russia. At that time the younger generation of Koreans was struggling against a corrupt, inefficient, decadent monarchy. Japan took over, and from 1905 to 1945 used all her talents to deKoreanize Korea. The Korean people had hardly been exposed to modern thought, education, scientific and technical advances until 1945. The Japanese denied Koreans any administrative or managerial part in government, education, finance, industry, or mining. Under the Japanese, a good proportion of the Koreans had never set foot in any school. As a result, when the Japanese hierarchy was removed in 1945, the Koreans had few leaders, few up-to-date standards, or an adequate way of life that they could fall back upon. All this is by way of background for my subsequent remarks.

The First Victory

Our early postwar policy in Korea was to reach an understanding with the U.S.S.R. (which occupied the northern half of Korea), set up a provisional government and let the people work out their own destiny, with the benefit of U.S. aid. In 1947, when it was clear that no progress could be made in negotiations with the Soviets, we submitted the Korean problem to the United Nations. As a result, free elections observed by U.N. representatives were held throughout South Korea (the Soviets had rejected such elections in North Korea); the Republic of Korea was founded under the auspices of the United Nations; and the United States undertook a program of limited aid to enable Korea to develop a viable national economy and a security force sufficient to maintain internal stability and deter aggression.

By June 1950 the Koreans in the Republic were not only producing enough food for themselves but, in addition, they were able to export 100,000

tons of rice. Industrial production, mining, and transportation showed steady increases. Schools were constantly being opened. Educational standards gradually improved. But the new Government faced many problems. From the start the internal struggle for power between the executive and the legislature was intense. However, it was and still is subject to public debate. Korea had not yet attained New York or London standards of journalism, but the press was able to criticize the Government and the assembly and bring the people's attention to bear upon unsatisfactory developments, particularly unwarranted police activities. Foreign correspondents were ever present to keep the world informed. From 1947 on, there has also been a U.N. commission to observe the development of democratic process. In other words, the Korean Republic was not born full-grown. However, a workable form of modern democratic government with the classic checks and balances was being molded out of the crucible of events as they affected Korean character and capabilities. I consider this a phenomenal record of progress in such a short time, when one is mindful of the fact that the Communists were doing their best throughout this entire period to disrupt life in the young Republic.

The Second Victory

Now about the second—and better known—victory. The Communists shocked the world with their brazen aggression the morning of June 25, 1950. They were confident of a quick, easy conquest. Everything was in their favor—surprise, knowledge of the inexperience of the forces in the south, their own proficiency bolstered by units battle-hardened in the Chinese Communist armies and trained in World War II by the Soviets. They expected to capture the Government at Seoul in the first few days and accomplish by force what they had failed to accomplish by cunning and guile.

Again they were foiled. The outmatched Republic of Korea Army fought tenaciously. The Korean people remained loyal. There was not a single important act of sabotage during the whole period of the initial onslaught or the Pusan perimeter days; and no Korean Army unit deserted to the enemy. Need we better proof of the antipathy of the South Koreans toward communism?

By their magnificent resistance, the forces of the Republic of Korea gave us time to bring our forces into action. President Truman boldly responded to the call of the United Nations by committing American air and sea, and later, land forces. I am sure that all Americans were proud of this courageous decision to stand up to aggression. Fifty-three nations of the free world had voted for the U.N. resolution and 46 of them contributed materially. Soon land, sea, and air

forces from 16 free nations were welded into one of the most magnificent collective fighting forces the world has ever seen.

There appears to be apprehension in some quarters that the Communists are about to make a much greater effort in Korea. I am absolutely convinced that they threw in everything they were able to at the time of their onslaughts of April and May 1951. Under General Ridgway, the gallant U.N. Army smashed the first; under General Van Fleet, the second. Exploding the myth of Chinese Communist military invincibility was the greatest single blow that has been struck at the vauntings of world communism.

I am not implying that the global struggle has been won, but I am emphasizing that we have stopped them on one battlefield that they chose themselves. We have prevented their overrunning us. We have bought time and the opportunity to increase our carelessly depleted strength. Now it is up to us to use that time intelligently and courageously, to build upon the gains we have made in Korea, and to make the free world's bulwark against Communist imperialism impregnable.

There probably has never been a more cruel or more destructive conflict. I do feel, however, that never has our standard been raised for any more righteous or worthwhile cause.

It was not a choice between fighting in Korea in 1950, or never fighting at all. If we had not resisted aggression in Korea in 1950, we might well have been fighting much closer home and on a much broader front today.

Korea was a postwar Pearl Harbor that aroused and awakened the free world to the true nature and temper of Communist imperialism. It brought forth the real vitality of the United Nations and put to the test its basic principle of collective security. It has thrown the Communists' timetable off balance and given them plenty of cause to question their dogma of Communist invincibility.

Korea proved to all countries of the world threatened by aggression that, if they resisted, they could look to the United Nations for support. If we had let the Republic of Korea go down, no other country in the world could have had any assurance that it, too, might not be sacrificed to the aggressors. All over the world, governments might have considered it wise to come to terms with Communist imperialism. Instead, the free nations of the world can say as a result of Korea: "Aggression against one of us is aggression against all of us."

A Model for Asian Peoples

I have already referred to the successful rehabilitation program carried out by the Republic of Korea with our assistance from 1948 to 1950, before the Communist aggression. As a result of

the successful repelling of that aggression, we can look forward to the reinstitution of that rehabilitation program, so tragically interrupted. The U.N. General Assembly has now charged this task to the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA). I am confident that with cooperation between UNKRA and the Republic of Korea, that country can become a model to other Asian peoples, a place to convince Communists and "doubting Thomases" that democracy is a vital force that can and does do more for man than any other system of government.

One of the great benefits to the free world deriving from Korea is the time gained to have our Point Four, the STEM (Special Technical and Economic Mission), the Colombo Plan, and the U.N. Technical Aid Programs take effect throughout Asia. In this century, scientific progress has brought us to the point where mankind for the first time can wipe poverty and human misery off the face of the earth. The Communists have neither the means nor the will to do this. We have not only the means but also the will, and as a result of the Korean action we are proving to the Asian people who their true friends are. As a result of Korea the Asian peoples have gained time to work out, with our assistance, their own national destinies. Our aid programs link scientific progress with political freedom. Scientific progress and political freedom, working together, can open such a future as mankind has never imagined. If that future is ever realized, the successful U.N. action in Korea will have proven a milestone on the way.

The United States has played a vital role in Korea in the past 7 years. I, for one, am proud of that role. From the time Korea was first liberated from the Japanese, the efforts of the U.S. Government have been directed toward bringing about a free, independent, and peaceful Korea. These efforts have been rendered ineffective by the refusal of the Kremlin to cooperate first with the United States, and then with the United Nations. The peace was broken by Communist aggression. It could be restored even now if there were any genuine desire on the part of the Communists to restore it. Whether or not peace is restored is now dependent entirely on them. In the meantime, with the military success won by the U.N. Forces in Korea, we are in a position, as General Van

Fleet said recently, to outfight or outsit the Communists.

Many years for a signed and sealed document that would assure peace between the Communist and the free world. In the present state of affairs, hoping for this kind of peace settlement is wishful thinking. It is similar to the lad who feels that with his diploma he will have no further need to study or work to succeed in life, or the man who thinks he can live happily ever after by the simple act of putting a ring on a girl's finger.

I am just as sorry as you are that these things are not so. We have learned from bitter experience what it takes to overcome the obstacles in our way.

I have been reviewing for you some of the high points of that experience, trying to set them in true perspective so that we know more surely the path we must follow in the future. Having repelled aggression in Korea, we know now that when forces such as Communist aggressive imperialism are loose in the world, it is suicidal folly to drop one's guard, to disarm before potential aggressors. If we had learned nothing else from our experience in Korea, the free world's struggle there would have been worthwhile. But we have accomplished and learned much more. The fact that I stand here and address you without the probability being greater now than in 1950 that the world will once more be plunged into total war is the reason why I say to you in all confidence and hope that free men everywhere have been successful in Korea.

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The Headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers: S/2615, April 28; S/2618, April 29; S/2620, April 30; S/2621, May 1; S/2625, May 6; S/2627, May 9; S/2630, May 12; S/2632, May 14; S/2634, May 14; S/2635, May 16; S/2636, May 19; S/2637, May 15; S/2639, May 20; S/2640, May 21; S/2641, May 22; S/2643, May 23; S/2644, May 26.

U.S.-Korean Economic Coordination Agreement

[Released to the press May 24]

An agreement on economic coordination between the Republic of Korea and the United States, acting as Unified Command under the resolutions of the United Nations, was signed on May 24, 1952, at Pusan, Korea. Clarence E. Meyer, appointed by the President to head the mission that negotiated the agreement, signed on behalf of the United States. Accompanying the agreement was a note to the Republic of Korea, which set forth the manner in which the United States will reimburse the Republic of Korea for local currency drawn for military expenditures of U.S. Forces.

The purpose of the agreement is to provide the framework for an effective joint effort of the Unified Command and the Republic of Korea to create economic conditions which will assist the military effort, which has been threatened by the current inflation. Under the agreement a combined Economic Board will be established which will be the main organ for developing joint measures necessary for economic stabilization.

The United States in its capacity as Unified Command will continue to provide basic relief supplies to Korea to the extent available, while the Republic of Korea will take the internal measures necessary to stabilization. The agreement provides for the effective use of foreign exchange resulting from the reimbursement for the local currency used to support the military effort and resulting from exports from Korea.

The agreement is subject to appropriate modification or termination as responsibilities of the Command are assumed by the U.N. Korean Reconstruction Agency.

Under the note, the United States will pay to the Republic of Korea in the near future approximately 35 million dollars, as payment for local currency used by U.S. Forces in Korea since the first of this year. The Korean Government has agreed that the money will be used to import essential commodities into Korea to serve the needs of the Korean people, which will exercise a counterinflationary effect. In addition, the United

States will pay the Republic of Korea on a monthly basis for local currency sold to troops and, so long as the present situation prevails, will pay 4 million dollars per month on account for local currency used for *bona fide* military requirements. Final payments will be subject to later negotiation, and the payments on account will be contingent upon reasonable efforts on the part of the Republic of Korea to achieve economic and financial stability in accordance with the provisions of the agreement on economic coordination. Settlement for local currency used by U.S. Forces for military requirements prior to the first of this year is indefinitely postponed.

Following is the unofficial text of the agreement:

WHEREAS by the aggression of Communist forces the Republic of Korea became in need of assistance from the United Nations;

AND WHEREAS the United Nations by the resolution of the Security Council of June 27, 1950, recommended that members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area;

AND WHEREAS the United Nations by the resolution of the Security Council of July 7, 1950, recommended that members furnishing military forces and other assistance to the Republic of Korea make such forces and other assistance available to a Unified Command under the United States;

AND WHEREAS the United Nations, by the resolution of the Security Council of July 31, 1950, requested the United Command to exercise responsibility for determining the requirements for the relief and support of the civilian population of Korea and for establishing in the field the procedures for providing such relief and support;

AND WHEREAS it became necessary to carry out collective action against aggression on Korean soil;

AND WHEREAS pursuant to the July 7, 1950 Resolution of the Security Council the Unified Command has designated the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to exercise command responsibilities in Korea;

AND WHEREAS the Unified Command has already furnished and is furnishing substantial assistance to the Republic of Korea;

AND WHEREAS it is desirable to coordinate economic matters between the Unified Command and the Republic of Korea, in order to insure effective support of the military forces of the United Nations Command, to relieve the hardships of the people of Korea, and to establish and maintain a stable economy in the Republic of Korea; all

without infringing upon the sovereign rights of the Republic of Korea;

Therefore, the Republic of Korea and the United States of America acting pursuant to the resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations of July 7, 1950 and July 31, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Unified Command) have entered into this agreement in terms as set forth below:

ARTICLE 1

Board

1. There shall be established a combined economic board, hereafter referred to as the Board.

2. The Board shall be composed of one representative from the Republic of Korea and one representative of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC). Before appointing its representative each party shall ascertain that such appointment is agreeable to the other party. The Board shall establish such subordinate organization as may be necessary to perform its functions and shall determine its own procedures. It shall meet regularly at an appropriate location in the Republic of Korea.

3. The primary function of the Board shall be to promote effective economic coordination between the Republic of Korea and the Unified Command. The Board shall be the principal means for consultation between the parties on economic matters and shall make appropriate and timely recommendations to the parties concerning the implementation of this agreement. Such recommendations shall be made only upon mutual agreement of both representatives.

The Board shall be a coordinating and advisory body; it shall not be an operating body.

4. The Board and the parties hereto will be guided by the following general principles:

A. The Board will consider all economic aspects of the Unified Command programs for assistance to the Republic of Korea and all pertinent aspects of the economy and programs of the Republic of Korea, in order that each of the Board's recommendations may be a part of a consistent overall program designed to provide maximum support to the military effort of the Republic of Korea, and develop a stable Korean economy.

B. It is an objective of the parties to increase the capabilities of the Republic of Korea for economic self-support so far as is possible within the limits of attainable resources and consistent with the attainment of fiscal and monetary stability.

C. Successful conduct of military operations against the aggression of the Communists is the primary consideration of the parties. Accordingly the Command prerogatives of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, are recognized, and the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, shall continue to retain all authority deemed necessary by him for the successful conduct of such operations and the authority to withdraw and to distribute supplies and services furnished under this agreement in order to meet emergencies arising during the course of military operations or in the execution of civil assistance programs. On the other hand, the prerogatives of the Government of the Republic of Korea are recognized, and the Government of the Republic of Korea shall continue to retain all the authority of a sovereign and independent state.

5. The Board shall make recommendations necessary to insure (A) that the expenses of the Board, and the expenses (i. e., local currency (won) expenses and expenses paid from assistance funds) of all operating agencies established by the Unified Command or the Republic of Korea to carry out assistance programs under this agreement, shall be kept to the minimum amounts reasonably necessary, and (B) that personnel, funds, equipment, supplies and services provided for assistance purposes are not diverted to other purposes.

ARTICLE 2

The Unified Command

The Unified Command undertakes:

1. To support the recommendations of the Board to the extent of the resources made available to the Unified Command.

2. To require the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to designate his representative on the Board and to furnish to the Board such personnel and other necessary administrative support from the United Nations Command as the Board may recommend.

3. To furnish to the Board timely information on all civil assistance programs of the Unified Command and on the status of such programs.

4. Within the limitations of the resources made available by governments or organizations to the Unified Command, to assist the Republic of Korea in providing for the basic necessities of food, clothing, and shelter for the population of Korea; for measures to prevent epidemics, disease, and unrest, and for projects which will yield early results in the indigenous production of necessities. Such measures and projects may include the reconstruction and replacement of facilities necessary for relief and support of the civilian population.

5. To ascertain, in consultation with the appropriate authorities of the Government of the Republic of Korea, the requirements for equipment, supplies, and services for assisting the Republic of Korea.

6. To provide for the procurement and shipment of equipment, supplies, and other assistance furnished by the Unified Command; to supervise the distribution and utilization of this assistance; and to administer such assistance in accordance with the above cited resolutions of the United Nations.

7. To consult with and to utilize the services of the appropriate authorities of the Government of the Republic of Korea, to the greatest extent feasible, in drawing up and implementing plans and programs for assisting the Republic of Korea, including the employment of Korean personnel and the procurement, allocation, distribution and sale of equipment, supplies and services.

8. To carry out the Unified Command program of assistance to the Republic of Korea in such a way as to facilitate the conduct of military operations, relieve hardship, and contribute to the stabilization of the Korean economy.

9. To make available in Korea to authorized representatives of the Government of the Republic of Korea appropriate documents relating to the civil assistance programs of the Unified Command.

ARTICLE 3

Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea undertakes:

1. To support the recommendations of the Board.

2. To designate the representative of the Republic of Korea on the Board and to furnish to the Board such personnel and other necessary administrative support from the Republic of Korea as the Board may recommend.

3. To furnish to the Board timely information on the economy of Korea and on those activities and plans of the Government of the Republic of Korea pertinent to the functions of the Board.

4. While continuing those measures which the Government of the Republic of Korea has endeavored heretofore to make effective, to take further measures to combat inflation, hoarding, and harmful speculative activities; to apply sound, comprehensive, and adequate budgetary, fiscal and monetary policies, including maximum collecting of revenue; to maintain adequate controls over the extension of public and private credits; to provide requisite and feasible pricing, rationing and allocation controls; to promote wage and price stability; to make most efficient use of all foreign exchange resources; to maximize the anti-inflationary effect that can be derived from

relief and other imported essential commodities through effective programming, distribution and sales; to provide the maximum efficiency in utilization of available productive facilities; and to maximize production for export.

5. With reference to assistance furnished under this agreement:

A. To provide operating agencies which will develop and execute, in consultation with operative agencies of the United Nations Command, programs relating to requirements, allocations, distribution, sale, use and accounting for equipment, supplies and services furnished under this agreement; to submit to the Board budget estimates of the expenses of such Republic of Korea agencies; to include such estimates in the national budget; to defray those expenses from the resources available to the Government of the Republic of Korea including, where the Board so recommends, such funds as may be made available under clause 7 D (2) of this article; and to insure that such expenses are kept at a minimum. It is intended that such expenses will be defrayed from the general account revenues of the Republic of Korea when the economy of the Republic of Korea so permits.

B. To permit the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to exercise such control over assistance furnished hereunder as may be necessary to enable him to exercise his responsibilities under the above cited resolutions of the United Nations.

C. To achieve maximum sales consistent with relief needs and to be guided by the recommendations of the Board in determining what equipment, supplies and services are to be distributed free of charge and what are to be sold.

D. To require Republic of Korea agencies handling equipment and supplies furnished under this agreement to make and maintain such records and reports as the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations and/or the Board may consider to be necessary in order to show the import, distribution, sale and utilization of such equipment and supplies.

E. To impose import duties or charges or internal taxes or charges on goods and services furnished by the United Nations Command only as recommended by the Board.

F. To permit and to assist the authorized representatives of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, freely to inspect the distribution and use of equipment, supplies, for services provided under this agreement, including all storage and distribution facilities and all pertinent records.

G. To insure (1) that the people of Korea are informed of the sources and purposes of contributions of funds, equipment, supplies, and services and (2) that all equipment and supplies (and the containers thereof) made available by the United Nations Command to the civilian economy of the Republic of Korea, to the extent practicable, as determined by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, are marked, stamped, branded, or labeled in a conspicuous place as legibly, indelibly, and permanently as the nature of such equipment and supplies will permit and in such manner as to indicate to the people of the Republic of Korea the sources and purposes of such supplies.

6. With reference to the assistance furnished under this agreement which is to be distributed free of charge for the relief of the people of Korea, to insure that the special needs of refugees and other distressed groups of the population are alleviated without discrimination through appropriate public welfare programs.

7. With reference to assistance furnished under this agreement which is to be sold:

A. To sell equipment and supplies at prices recommended by the Board, such prices to be those designed to yield the maximum feasible proceeds.

B. To sell equipment and supplies furnished under

this agreement for cash, unless otherwise recommended by the Board. If the Board should recommend that any such equipment and supplies may be sold to intermediate parties or ultimate user on a credit basis, the amount and duration of such credit shall be no more liberal than those recommended by the Board.

C. To establish and maintain a special account in the Bank of Korea to which will be transferred the balance now in the "special United Nations aid goods deposit account" at the Bank of Korea and to which will be deposited the gross won proceeds of sales of all equipment and supplies (1) furnished under this agreement or (2) locally procured by expenditure of won funds previously deposited.

D. To use the special account established in C above to the maximum extent possible as a stabilizing device and as an offset to harmful monetary expansion. To this end withdrawals from this account shall be made only upon the recommendation of the Board, only for the following purposes, and only in the following order of priority:

(1) For defraying reasonable local currency costs involved in carrying out the responsibilities of the Unified Command for relief and support of the civilian population of Korea, provided, however, that such local currency expenses shall not include won advances to the United Nations Command for its *bona fide* military expenses or for sale to personnel of the United Nations Command.

(2) For defraying such proportion of the reasonable operating expenses of operating agencies of the Government of the Republic of Korea provided under Clause 5 (A) above as may be recommended by the Board.

(3) The balance remaining in this special account, after withdrawals for the above purposes have been made and after provision has been made for an operating reserve, shall periodically upon the recommendation of the Board be applied against any then existing indebtedness of the Government of the Republic of Korea to the Bank of Korea or to any other financial institution organized under the laws of the Republic of Korea.

8. To prevent the export from the Republic of Korea of any of the equipment or supplies furnished by the Unified Command or any items of the same or similar character produced locally or otherwise procured, except upon the recommendation of the Board.

9. To make prudent use of its foreign exchange and foreign credit resources and to utilize these resources to the extent necessary first toward stabilization (by prompt importation into Korea of salable essential commodities) and then toward revitalization and reconstruction of the economy of Korea. The use of such foreign exchange and foreign credit resources shall be controlled or coordinated as follows:

A. All foreign exchange (both public and private) of the Republic of Korea accruing hereafter from indigenous exports, visible and invisible, except as described in B below, shall be controlled solely by the government of the Republic of Korea.

B. All foreign exchange (both public and private, and from whatever source acquired) now held by the Republic of Korea and that foreign exchange which, subsequent to the effective date of this agreement, is derived by the Republic of Korea from any settlement for advances of Korean currency to the United Nations Command shall be used only as recommended by the Board.

C. All foreign exchange described in A and B above shall be coordinated by the board, in order to integrate the use made of such foreign exchange with the imports included in the Unified Command assistance programs.

10. In order properly to adapt the assistance programs of the Unified Command to the needs of the economy of Korea, and in order to coordinate imports under those programs with imports purchased with foreign exchange,

to support the recommendations of the board in the making of periodic plans for the import and export of commodities and to use such plans as a basis for the issuance of export and import licenses.

11. In order to make most effective use of the foreign exchange resources of the Government of the Republic of Korea in stabilizing the Korean economy:

A. To maximize the won proceeds from the sale of such exchange or from the sale of imports derived from such exchange.

B. To apply such proceeds first against any existing overdrafts of The Government of The Republic of Korea upon the Bank of Korea, except as otherwise recommended by the board.

C. To hold or spend the balance of such won proceeds with due regard to the effect of such action on the total money supply.

12. To provide logistic support to the armed forces of The Republic of Korea to the maximum extent feasible and to furnish to The United Nations Command timely information concerning the details of this support in order to permit coordinated budgetary planning.

13. To grant to individuals and agencies of The Unified Command, except Korean nationals, such privileges, immunities, and facilities as are necessary for the fulfillment of their function within the Republic of Korea under the above cited resolutions of The United Nations, or as have been heretofore granted by agreement, arrangement or understanding or as may be agreed upon formally or informally hereafter by the parties or their agencies.

14. To insure that funds, equipment, supplies and services provided by The Unified Command or derived therefrom shall not be subject to garnishment, attachment, seizure, or other legal process by any persons, firm, agency, corporation, organization or government, except upon recommendation of the board.

ARTICLE 4

Transfer

1. The parties recognize that all or any portion of the responsibilities of The Unified Command may be assumed from time to time by another agency or agencies of The United Nations. Prior to such transfer, the parties shall consult together concerning any modification in this agreement which may be required thereby.

2. It is the current expectation of the parties that The United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), established by resolution of the General Assembly of The United Nations of December 1, 1950, will assume responsibility for all United Nations relief and rehabilitation activities for Korea at the termination of a period of 180 days following the cessation of hostilities in Korea, as determined by The Unified Command, unless it is determined by The Unified Command, in consultation with the Agent General of The United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, that military operations do not so permit at that time, or unless an earlier transfer of responsibility is agreed upon.

ARTICLE 5

Existing Agreements

This agreement does not supersede in whole or in part any existing agreement between the parties hereto.

ARTICLE 6

Registration, Effective Date, and Termination

1. This agreement shall be registered with the Secretary General of the United Nations in compliance with the provisions of article 102 of the charter of the United Nations.

2. This agreement shall enter into operation and effect

immediately upon signature hereto. This agreement shall remain in force so long as The Unified Command continues in existence and retains responsibilities hereunder, unless earlier terminated by agreement between the parties.

DONE in duplicate in the English and Korean languages, at Pusan, Korea, on this 24th day of May, 1952. The English and Korean texts shall have equal force, but in case of divergence, the English text shall prevail.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective representatives, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed the present agreement.

Concessions Suspended on Hungarian Imports

[Released to the press June 5]

The President on June 5 notified the Department of the Treasury that on and after July 5, 1952, U.S. concessions made in trade agreements will be suspended with regard to imports from Hungary.

This action was taken in accordance with section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, which provides, in part, that "As soon as practicable, the President shall take such action as is necessary to suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of any reduction in any rate of duty, or binding of any existing customs or excise treatment, or other concessions contained in any trade agreement . . . to imports from any nation or area dominated or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement."

A treaty of friendship, commerce, and consular rights between the United States and Hungary, signed on June 24, 1925, contained most-favored-nation provisions in custom matters. This treaty is subject to termination, under its own terms, on one year's notice by either party. On July 5, 1951, the Department delivered to the Hungarian representative in Washington a note requesting modification of the treaty by termination of article VII, which provides for most-favored-nation treatment or, in the event agreement could not be reached on this point, termination of the treaty as a whole. Announcement of the giving of this note was made by the State Department on July 6, 1951.¹

The President's modification today, relating to imports from Hungary, is the most recent in a series of steps which have been taken since the enactment last year of the Trade Agreements Extension Act. Acting under section 5 of that Act on August 1, 1951, the President signed a proclamation ordering the suspension of trade-agreement concessions from Communist-dominated countries. Under the terms of the proclamation, the President was to notify the Secretary of the Treasury separately regarding the coun-

¹ BULLETIN of July 16, 1951, p. 95.

tries specifically affected by the order. On the same date, the President, acting in accordance with the terms of the proclamation, notified the Treasury of the suspension as of August 31, 1951, of trade-agreement concessions on imports from various specified countries.²

Notifications with respect to certain other Communist-dominated countries have been issued from time to time upon the termination of U.S. commitments to such countries. On September 17, 1951, the President notified the Treasury of the suspension, effective October 17, 1951, of trade-

² *Ibid.*, Aug. 20, 1951, p. 290.

agreement concessions on imports from Bulgaria.³ On October 2, 1951, he notified the Treasury of the suspension, effective November 1, 1951, of trade-agreement concessions on imports from Czechoslovakia.⁴ On November 20, 1951, he notified the Treasury of the suspension, effective January 5, 1952, of trade-agreement concessions on imports from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Poland, and areas under Polish administration or control.⁵

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 1, 1951, p. 550.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Oct. 15, 1951, p. 621.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Dec. 3, 1951, p. 913.

Senate Receives German Contractual Agreements and North Atlantic Treaty Protocol

PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL¹

I transmit herewith for the consideration of the Senate a copy of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed by the United Kingdom, the French Republic, the United States, and the Federal Republic of Germany at Bonn on May 26, 1952, to which is annexed the Charter of the Arbitration Tribunal. I also transmit a copy of a protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty covering security guarantees to the members of the European Defense Community by the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Paris on May 27, 1952. I request the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of these two documents.²

In addition, I transmit for the information of the Senate a number of related documents, including a report made to me by the Secretary of State;³ three additional Conventions with the Federal Republic of Germany related to the main Convention; the Treaty Constituting the European Defense Community; a declaration made by the United States, the United Kingdom and the French Governments at the time of the signing of this Treaty;⁴ and the Treaty Constituting the European Coal-and-Steel Community.

Together these documents constitute a great

¹ S. Executives Q and R, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 1.

² For a summary of the German contractual agreements and text of the North Atlantic Treaty Protocol, see BULLETIN of June 9, 1952, pp. 888 and 896.

³ *Infra.*

⁴ For text of the declaration, see *ibid.*, p. 897.

forward stride toward strengthening peace and freedom in the world. They are all concerned directly with Europe, but they have world-wide significance.

Three main purposes will be accomplished by these documents:

First, they will restore the Federal Republic of Germany to a status which will enable it to play a full and honorable part in the family of nations.

Second, they will create a common defense organization for six European countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, and associate that common defense organization with the North Atlantic Treaty. This will greatly strengthen the defense of Europe and the free world against any aggression.

Third, they will constitute additional major steps toward unity among the countries of Western Europe—which is so important for peace and progress in that area.

These purposes are all interrelated, and they all serve the common objective of the free nations to create conditions of peace, based on freedom and justice, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

It has been a major objective of the United States to help bring about an independent, democratic, and united Germany, and to conclude a treaty of peace with such a Germany. That is still our policy, and will continue to be. Unfortunately, as all the world knows, the Soviet Union,

while professing a desire for German unification, has by its actions and policies prevented unification and the creation of a free all-German Government with which a treaty of peace could be negotiated.

Under these circumstances, the United States, France and Great Britain, four years ago, gave the people in Western Germany the chance to create their own democratic Government. They worked out their own constitution, and since September 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany has taken an increasing responsibility for governing the three-fourths of the German people who are free from Soviet control. During this time, the German Government has demonstrated that it is democratic and responsive to the will of the free people of Germany, and that it is able and ready to take its place in the community of free nations and to do its share toward building peaceful and cooperative relationships with other free countries.

Over the last three years, there has been a continuing process of relaxing occupation controls on the one hand and increasing the scope of the German Federal Government's responsibilities on the other. Last October, the United States and many other countries concerned ended the technical state of war which had existed with Germany.⁵ In these ways, we have gradually been moving away from the original relationship of conqueror and conquered, and moving toward the relationship of equality which we expect to find among free men everywhere.

Now we are taking another major step in this direction. By the Convention on Relations between the Federal Republic and the United States, France, and Great Britain, we are restoring to the free German people control over their domestic and external affairs, subject only to certain limited exceptions made necessary by the present international situation. These exceptions relate to the stationing and security of Allied forces in Germany, to Berlin, and to questions of unification, a peace settlement, and other matters concerning Germany as a whole. When the new Convention goes into effect, the Occupation Statute will be repealed, the Allied High Commission will be abolished, and relations between the Federal Republic and other countries will be placed on the customary diplomatic basis.

But the Convention on Relations was not, and could not be, prepared as an isolated document, because it does not meet the full problem confronting the free people of Germany and those of other free countries. In order to provide for the security of the Federal Republic, and to ensure against any revival of militarism, arrangements were worked out under which the Federal Republic is joining in establishing the European

Defense Community—the common defense organization of six continental European countries. As a member of this Community, the Federal Republic will be able to make a vital contribution to the common defense of Western Europe without the creation of a national German military establishment. The European Defense Community, with a common budget and common procurement of military equipment, common uniforms and common training, is a very remarkable advance, representing as it does a voluntary merging of national power into a common structure of defense.

As an additional vital safeguard for peace and freedom in Europe, the German Federal Republic, as a member of the European Defense Community, is joining in reciprocal commitments between the members of that Community and the members of the North Atlantic Treaty organization. The protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty extends the application of the guarantee of mutual assistance expressed in Article 5 of the Treaty by providing that an attack on the territory of any member of the European Defense Community, including the German Federal Republic, or on the Community's forces, shall be considered an attack against all the parties to the Treaty. A reciprocal guarantee is extended to the North Atlantic Treaty partners by the members of the Community in a protocol to the Treaty Constituting the European Defense Community.

Thus, these various documents constitute an integrated whole. The United States is a party only to the Convention on Relations (and the related Conventions) and to the protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty, but the Treaty Constituting the European Defense Community is an essential factor in the new relationship which the Conventions establish. It is expressly provided that the Conventions with the Federal Republic, the Treaty Constituting the European Defense Community, and the protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty will come into force simultaneously, thus assuring the complete interrelationship of all of them. The participation of the Federal Republic in the European Coal-and-Steel Community (the Schuman Plan) and the European Defense Community, and the resultant transfer to European agencies of authority over the basic industries of the participating countries and over military activities are the strongest safeguards for the future security of Western Europe. The successful creation of these European institutions makes possible the removal of special restraints which have heretofore been imposed on the Federal Republic and thereby enables the latter to participate in Western defense on a basis of equality.

Thus, while not a party, the United States has a direct and abiding interest in the success and effectiveness of the Treaty Constituting the European Defense Community and in the continuing

⁵ For text of the President's Proclamation ending the state of war with Germany, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1951, p. 769.

existence of this Community as constituted. By virtue of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States has demonstrated its lasting interest and binding ties with the Atlantic and European communities of nations. By its adherence to the Treaty Constituting the European Defense Community and the Convention on Relations, the Federal Republic has linked its future with that of the Community and of the participating countries. It is therefore evident that the United States has acquired a very great stake in the maintenance of the institutions and relationships thus established and would consider any act which would affect their integrity or existence as a matter of fundamental concern to its own interests and security. I stress this point in order to make clear the relationship between the Conventions, the Treaty Constituting the European Defense Community, and the North Atlantic Treaty, and between the parties to these various agreements.

The documents I am transmitting to the Senate today are real and significant steps forward toward peace and security in Europe and the whole free world. These actions threaten no one; their only targets are fear and poverty. They will allow almost 50 million free German people to take a further great stride toward independence and self-government, and to join with their neighbors in self-defense. These moves are clearly in the direction of a just and lasting peace; only those with aggressive intent could have any objection to them.

The actions represented by these documents will not, of course, wipe out the basic conflicts of policies which underlie the current tense international situation. But they will, when ratified by the various countries concerned, bring about a fundamental change in the relationships between the free people of Germany and their friends in the free countries of the world. Under this new relationship we will all be able to work together more fully and more effectively to combine our strength not only to deter aggression, but also to bring about the economic and social progress, and the more harmonious and friendly international relations, to which all free men aspire.

I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Convention on Relations and to the protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty transmitted herewith, and give its advice and consent to their ratification in order that this great contribution to the strength and unity of the free world can become a reality.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 2, 1952.

June 16, 1952

LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY ACHESON^a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 31, 1952.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House:

I have the honor to submit to you, with a view to the transmission thereof to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, the convention on relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952, to which is annexed the Charter of the Arbitration Tribunal. I further submit, also with a view to the transmission thereof to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, a protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty signed at Paris on May 27, 1952.

There are transmitted also three technical agreements, referred to as the "related conventions" and texts of letters exchanged in connection therewith. They were also signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952. These include the convention on the settlement of matters arising out of the war and the occupation, the convention on the rights and obligations of foreign forces and their members in the Federal Republic of Germany, and the finance convention. There are further transmitted the treaty constituting the European Defense Community, signed at Paris on May 27, 1952; a declaration made by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France at the time of the signing of the treaty constituting the European Defense Community; and finally the treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community, signed at Paris on April 18, 1951. It is recommended that these six documents be submitted to the Senate for its information.

Since the beginning of the occupation the United States, the United Kingdom, and France have worked toward the rehabilitation of Germany and the restoration of the country as a whole. The Soviet Union would not agree, however, to any terms for unifying Germany in conditions of freedom. The three Western Powers therefore approved the establishment, in the major part of Germany which was free from Soviet occupation, of a democratic government responsive to the will of the German people. This Government came into being with the creation of the Federal

^a Reprinted from S. Executives Q and R, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 5. Enclosed with Mr. Acheson's letter were convention on relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany; protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty; convention on the settlement of matters arising out of the war and the occupation; convention on the rights and obligations of foreign forces and their members in the Federal Republic of Germany (including agreement on tax treatment of the forces and their members); finance convention; texts of letters exchanged; treaty constituting the European Defense Community; declaration; treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community.

Republic of Germany on September 21, 1949. An important step toward the establishment of normal relations between the Federal Republic and the free western nations has recently been taken by the United States and some 35 other countries through termination of the state of war with Germany. On the part of the United States this was brought about in conformity with the joint resolution of Congress approved by the President on October 19, 1951 (Public Law 181, 82d Cong., 1st sess.). It has not been possible to conclude a treaty of peace because of the Soviet attitude referred to above which has made it impossible so far to bring about the unification of Germany and the establishment of an all-German government which would be an essential participant in the negotiations of a peace treaty. However, the effect of the conventions will be to advance as far as possible in the direction of normal relations with Germany by terminating the occupation of Western Germany and establishing the independence of the Federal Republic, subject only to certain powers which will continue to be held by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France as they have been since the end of the war. The reason for keeping these powers is to enable the three Governments to deal with the issues arising from the continued division of Germany and the present state of international relations. The powers relate to the stationing and security of Allied forces in Germany (including the right to proclaim a state of emergency in certain extreme circumstances and to take action thereunder), to Berlin, and to Germany as a whole (including questions of unification and a peace settlement). The powers are to be held in reserve for special use, and are not intended for exercise in ordinary German affairs, either domestic or foreign. Accordingly, the occupation statute will be repealed, the Allied High Commission abolished, and relations between the Federal Republic and other countries placed on the customary diplomatic basis.

These and other broad provisions are in the convention on relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany. The related conventions deal with matters of a more technical nature. The convention on the settlement of matters arising out of the war and the occupation contains the necessary temporary provisions for bringing to a conclusion existing Allied programs in the Federal Republic; it commits the Germans to recognize rights and obligations already created by the acts of the three Allied Powers and the occupation authorities, and to recognize and protect foreign property interests. The convention on rights and obligations of the foreign forces makes provision for the personal status of the members of the Allied forces stationed in Germany (other than those of the European Defense Community) and their dependents, for their immunities and exemptions from Ger-

man jurisdiction, and for the logistic requirements of the forces upon the German economy. The finance convention establishes the amount of the German financial contribution to the common defense. The major categories of costs to which the German financial contribution will be applied are (1) the Federal Republic's share of the costs of the European Defense Community, including the costs of raising German contingents and the costs of maintaining troops of the community in Germany, and (2) the costs of maintaining other troops (principally United States and British) in Germany. In addition, a relatively small portion of the contribution will be applied to miscellaneous costs classified as defense expenditures which will be paid through the German national and state budgets rather than through the budget of the European Defense Community.

For the settlement of disputes arising from these conventions which cannot be disposed of by diplomatic negotiation, or for which other means of settlement are not specifically provided in the conventions, an arbitration tribunal will be created in accordance with the charter annexed to the convention on relations. This body, on which there will be arbiters of American, British, French, German, and other nationality, will have the power to issue judgments binding upon the four Governments, but only within the territory of the Federal Republic. It may declare acts of those Governments to be null insofar as they apply in the Federal Republic, and it may also set aside judicial decisions applicable in the Federal territory, except those of Allied courts martial and other service tribunals.

The conventions do not constitute a final peace settlement, for they deal only with a portion of Germany, albeit the major portion. They do, however, constitute an attempt to dispose of as many of the outstanding issues as can be settled in the present circumstances, and they are intended to constitute the basis of Allied-German relations until a peace settlement can be concluded. In the event of the unification of Germany, it is specified in the convention on relations that all the conventions will be binding upon the government of the unified country, but that any party may request their review and that they may be modified by agreement among the parties.

The convention on relations has to do with one aspect of the partnership between the Federal Republic and the free western nations; it creates for the Federal Republic a status enabling it to become a partner. An equally important aspect is the contribution which the Federal Republic is to make, in its capacity as a partner; this is expressed, partly in the finance convention, but primarily in the treaty constituting the European Defense Community.

This treaty, signed by France, the Federal Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, is primarily designed to strengthen the

common defense and safeguard the peace. Following close on the heels of the treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community, it represents another far-reaching step toward the consolidation of the free nations of Western Europe, including the German Federal Republic. It makes possible a German military contribution to the common defense without the creation of a national German military establishment. The member states agree to merge their armed forces under common supranational institutions and to place the European defense forces thus created at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. In order to strengthen the community, the United States and British Governments assert in the enclosed tripartite declaration that if any action from whatever quarter threatens the integrity or unity of the community, the two Governments will regard this as a threat to their own security and they will act in accordance with article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This declaration also clarifies the status of the various security guaranties which have been given by the three Governments. In addition it states specifically that they will maintain armed forces in Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it, and that they will treat any attack against Berlin (which is not included within the territory of the European Defense Community) from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves.

It has been recognized by all concerned that the relationship between the European Defense Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization must be particularly close, since both institutions exist for the same purpose of defending the free world. Five members of the community are also parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and are therefore protected by the guaranty of mutual assistance expressed in article 5 of the treaty. The Federal Republic, however, is not a party to the North Atlantic Treaty, so it could claim no protection under this guaranty, even though its defense contribution is expected to surpass that of many other countries. Similarly, the forces of the community might also lack the protection of the guaranty in the event of an attack, since, being no longer national forces, they are not forces of a party to the treaty. In order to give the benefits of the guaranty to the Federal Republic and to the forces of the European Defense Community, the present protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty was devised.

The protocol has been signed for the United States and the other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. It extends the application of the guaranty of mutual assistance expressed in article 5 of the treaty to the Federal Republic and to the forces of the community by providing specifically that an attack on the territory of any member of the community, or on the community's forces shall be considered an attack against all the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. A reciprocal guar-

anty, in similar terms, is extended to all the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty by the members of the community in a protocol to the treaty constituting the European Defense Community. This means that the United States, as a party to the North Atlantic Treaty, will receive a guaranty from the Federal Republic, as a member of the community.

In view of the great importance which the convention on relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany (including its annexed charter) and the protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty have for the maintenance of peace and security in Europe, it is hoped that they will be given early and favorable consideration by the Senate.

Respectfully submitted.

DEAN ACHESON.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

- Convention With Canada Relating to Operation of Certain Radio Equipment or Stations. S. Exec. Rept. 3, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany Executive C, Eighty-second Congress, first session] 3 pp.
- Certain Cases in Which the Attorney General Has Suspended Deportation. S. Rept. 1291, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 68] 2 pp.
- Certain Cases in Which the Attorney General Has Suspended Deportation. S. Rept. 1290, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 67] 2 pp.
- Protocol Prolonging the International Agreement Regarding the Regulation of Production and the Marketing of Sugar. S. Exec. Rept. 7, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 2 pp.
- Consular Conventions With Ireland and With Great Britain. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on Exec. P (81st Cong., 2d sess.), Exec. N (82d Cong., 2d sess.) and Exec. O (82d Cong., 1st sess.). Eighty-second Congress, Second Session. Accompanied by Appendix With Hearings. S. Exec. Rept. 8, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 14 pp.
- Highway Convention With the Republic of Panama. S. Exec. Rept. 10, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany Exec. W, 81st Cong., 2d sess.] 5 pp.
- Protocol Modifying the Convention of July 6, 1890, Concerning Creation of an International Union for Publication of Customs Tariffs. Message from the President of the United States. S. Exec. P, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 11 pp.
- St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82d Cong., 2d sess. on S. J. Res. 27 and S. J. Res. 111. Feb. 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29, 1952. 872 pp.
- Philippines Ships Sales Bill. Hearing before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U.S. Senate, 82d Cong., 2d sess. on S. 2514. Feb. 28, 1952. 57 pp.
- Mutual Security Act Extension. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 82d Cong., 2d sess. on H. R. 7005, to amend the Mutual Security Act of 1951, and for other purposes. Mar. 13, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, Apr. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 1952. 1136 pp.
- Discriminatory Acts of Foreign Governments Affecting Our Merchant Marine. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine and Maritime Matters of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U.S. Senate, 82d Cong., 2d sess. Apr. 4, 1952. 106 pp.

Senate Resolutions Proposing Restrictions on Treaty-Making Powers

MEMORANDUM BY THE PRESIDENT ¹

SUBJECT: *S. J. Res. 122—"to impose limitations with regard to executive agreements"—and S. J. Res. 130—"proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relative to the making of treaties and making of executive agreements."*

The two Senate joint resolutions referred to above have been called to my attention. These resolutions concern matters which directly affect the activities and responsibilities of almost every department and agency of the executive branch.

A sub-committee of the Senate Committee on Judiciary began hearings on S. J. Res. 130 on May 21. I am advised that the executive departments and agencies have not been invited to appear before the committee or to present their views concerning the resolution. In a matter of such fundamental importance it is vital that the Congress know the views of the executive branch. Accordingly, I request the head of each department and agency to examine the effects which these joint resolutions would have on matters coming under the jurisdiction of his department or agency and to prepare an official statement of views concerning them. I also request the head of each department and agency to ask the Committee promptly for an opportunity to appear and testify at the earliest practicable date.

The White House staff will cooperate in any way that may be desired in this matter.

Any agency which believes that it is not affected directly enough by the resolutions to warrant presentation of its views with respect to them, is requested to send me, at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than one week from the receipt of this memorandum, its reasons for not seeking to testify.

The importance of the issues raised cannot be overestimated. The constitutional amendment proposed in S. J. Res. 130 is not routine, and it is

not limited in its effect to the imposition of restraints upon the President or agencies of the executive branch. This proposed amendment and the provisions of S. J. Res. 122 vitally affect the powers of the Federal Government as a whole and have a bearing on the welfare of every State and every person in our country. Action by the Congress on either of these resolutions should not be taken without the fullest consideration and debate.

The executive branch has a responsibility to see to it that it does not default on its responsibilities as a part of the Federal structure which was created by all of the States at the time our Constitution was adopted.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

STATEMENT BY ACTING SECRETARY BRUCE ²

I should first like to express my appreciation for this opportunity to give you the views of the State Department with regard to Senate Joint Resolution 130. This proposal to amend the Constitution with respect to the treaty power of the Federal Government concerns every agency of the Government which operates in the foreign field. It concerns our armed forces whose operations and status abroad depend upon international treaties and agreements. It concerns our Mutual Security Agency, our Department of Commerce, and even our Post Office. But, of course, it concerns the Department of State most of all.

Mr. Chairman, the Department has already written the subcommittee that we think that an amendment to the Constitution, such as proposed in Senate Joint Resolution 130, would not serve the best interests of the citizens or the Government of the United States.

This proposed amendment would alter the basic structure of this Government as established by the Constitution. It is contrary to the basic theory of separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the U.S. Government. It would seriously curtail the treaty-making

¹ Sent to all heads of executive departments and agencies on May 23 and released to the press by the White House on the same date.

² Made before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Judiciary on May 27 and released to the press on the same date.

ing authority of the United States and prevent this Government from entering into many treaties which are beneficial and necessary to the interests of the United States and its citizens. It would so seriously interfere with the historic and funda-

mental functions of the Executive and the Senate in the field of foreign affairs that it would jeopardize the influence of the United States in the world today.

Any proposal to amend the U.S. Constitution is,

Texts of Resolutions

S. J. RES. 122

[Introduced January 21]

To impose limitations with regard to Executive agreements.

Whereas a treaty or an Executive agreement may be abrogated or superseded by a subsequent Act of Congress; and

Whereas the right of Congress to set aside or vacate a treaty was recognized early by the Supreme Court; and

Whereas Executive agreements entered into by the President other than those limited specifically under certain circumstances to the exercise of his diplomatic powers also may be vacated by inconsistent legislation enacted by the Congress; and

Whereas there is a present tendency to use Executive agreements rather than submit the international undertaking to the Senate in accordance with the constitutional requirements; and

Whereas agreements requiring secrecy should be submitted to the Senate as treaties in accordance with the constitutional requirements; and

Whereas other agreements to be binding should be published; and

Whereas it is not only desirable but necessary that certain powers and duties of the Congress with regard to agreements and treaties be specifically exercised in a manner which will give notice to persons and nations entering into agreements with the United States and will thereby prevent future disputes: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all Executive or other agreements entered into by the President with foreign governments or officials thereof, other than treaties submitted to the Senate in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution, shall be subject to the following reservations and limitations:

(1) They shall be of no force or effect either as laws or as authorizations until and unless they shall have been published in full in the Federal Register;

(2) They shall be subject to such legislative action as the Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional powers, shall deem necessary or desirable; and

(3) They shall be deemed to terminate not later than six months after the end of the term of the President during whose tenure they were negotiated, unless extended by proclamation of the succeeding President.

SEC. 2. Hereafter agreements or compacts entered into by the President with foreign governments or officials thereof requiring secrecy shall be submitted to the Congress as treaties in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution, otherwise they shall be of no force or effect except as personal undertakings of the President.

S. J. RES. 130

[Introduced February 7]

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relative to the making of treaties and executive agreements.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States:

"ARTICLE —

"SECTION 1. No treaty or executive agreement shall be made respecting the rights of citizens of the United States protected by this Constitution, or abridging or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

"SEC. 2. No treaty or executive agreement shall vest in any international organization or in any foreign power any of the legislative, executive, or judicial powers vested by this Constitution in the Congress, the President, and in the courts of the United States, respectively.

"SEC. 3. No treaty or executive agreement shall alter or abridge the laws of the United States or the Constitution or laws of the several States unless, and then only to the extent that, Congress shall so provide by Act or joint resolution.

"SEC. 4. Executive agreements shall not be made in lieu of treaties.

"Executive agreements shall, if not sooner terminated, expire automatically one year after the end of the term of office for which the President making the agreement shall have been elected, but the Congress may, at the request of any President, extend for the duration of the term of such President the life of any such agreement made or extended during the next preceding Presidential term.

"The President shall publish all executive agreements except that those which in his judgment require secrecy shall be submitted to appropriate committees of the Congress in lieu of publication.

"SEC. 5. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

"SEC. 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission."

of course, a very serious matter. The greatness of the United States today, the strongest and freest country in the world, is the living proof of the greatness of our Constitution and of the wisdom and foresight of the statesmen who wrote this magnificent instrument. I think, therefore, when we propose today to change any part of this instrument, which was so carefully worked out in Philadelphia in 1787, we should look back to see why they wrote that part as they did.

Alexander Hamilton explained quite fully in *The Federalist* (No. LXXV) why the treaty-making authority was conferred jointly upon the President and the Senate. This was a great exception to the general rule of the Constitution that the executive and the legislative branches of government exercise separate and independent powers. But Hamilton pointed out that the power to make treaties is neither an executive nor a legislative power. He said that the objects of the treaty power

... are *contracts* with foreign nations, which have the force of law, but derive it from the obligations of good faith. They are not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, but agreements between sovereign and sovereign. The power in question seems therefore to form a distinct department, and to belong, properly, neither to the legislative nor to the executive. The qualities elsewhere detailed as indispensable, in the management of foreign negotiations, point out the executive as the most fit agent in these transactions; while the vast importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a portion of the legislative body in the office of making them.

(Hamilton was opposed, however, to giving the House of Representatives a share in the treaty-making power on the ground that that body was too large and variable in character.)

Fundamental Nature of the Treaty Power

I most respectfully urge the subcommittee, in studying this proposal, to keep in mind the fundamental nature of the treaty power as so clearly expressed by Hamilton. The power of the U.S. Government to enter into treaties in its dealings with other governments is to this Nation what the capacity to enter into contracts is to a private individual in his business dealings with other individuals. If we are going to do business with other countries, we have to be able to make treaties. As Jay remarked, you cannot expect other nations to do business with us unless they get something out of the bargain. In considering any changes in the treaty power of the United States, we must be awfully careful that we do not "hamstring" ourselves so that we cannot make the "contracts" with other countries which we ought to make in the best interests of the United States and of American citizens. As Justice Sutherland has pointed out:

Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect

of our own citizens . . . ; and operations of the nation in such territory must be governed by treaties, international understandings and compacts, and the principles of international law. *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation et al.*, 299 U. S. 304, 318 (1936)

We are particularly concerned about this because under article I, section 10 of the Constitution, the several states of the union are expressly forbidden to "enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation." If the treaty power of the Federal Government is unduly restricted, therefore, the United States will be in a position where nobody will be able to do business for it in its international relations. I shall shortly point out, in connection with specific parts of this proposal, that, as now drafted, it would appear to prohibit us from making treaties which are not only beneficial but necessary to the best interests of the United States and its citizens.

Before taking up specific points, however, I want to say that we are very much disturbed by the underlying assumptions of this proposal. It assumes, first, that the President and the Senate acting together as the treaty-making authority of the United States are going to abuse the treaty power. Thus, in introducing this resolution of February 7, 1952, Senator Bricker described as a "constitutional loophole" the fact that:

By a ruthless exercise of the treaty-making power a President, with the support of two-thirds of the Senators present and voting, could revolutionize the relationship between the American people and their government as prescribed by the Constitution. (*Cong. Rec.*, p. 921)

Later on in the same debate Senator Bricker stated:

By misuse of the treaty power it is possible for the President and the Senate to transfer to Washington all the powers reserved to the States by the tenth amendment. I do not see how any such abuse can be prevented. (*Ibid.*, p. 925)

This proposal thus is based upon fundamental distrust of the intelligence and integrity of both the President and the United States Senate. In addition, it is based upon distrust of our courts, as Senator Bricker also implied in introducing this resolution that he did not trust our courts to protect the constitutional liberties of American citizens. If the situation is indeed this bad, that the President and the Senate will conspire to alienate the traditional liberties of American citizens and the courts will supinely acquiesce in this, I am afraid that the enactment of a constitutional amendment will not help matters much.

We are obliged to disagree with the basic assumptions upon which Senator Bricker has made his proposal. We believe that the record shows that the representatives of this Government in international negotiations are constantly aware of the requirements of our constitutional system not only with respect to guaranties of individual rights but also with respect to the basic structure of our Federal-State form of government.

In the second place, while I would not presume to speak to this subcommittee about the Senate, I do not think that the record of the Senate warrants the distrust shown in it by the proposed amendment. Section 4 of the proposed amendment deals with the problem of executive agreements and will be dealt with separately. With the exception of this section there is no safeguard in the entire proposed amendment which cannot be inserted by the action of the Senate in dealing with proposed treaties submitted to it for ratification. If the Senate thinks that a treaty would have a bad effect on our constitutional system, it can refuse to give its advice and consent to it. If it feels that certain provisions of a treaty are bad, it can condition its advice and consent upon the attachment of a reservation which eliminates the harmful effect. If it feels that there is a doubtful question of interpretation, it can clear the matter up by conditioning its advice and consent upon the attachment of an understanding, which can settle the matter for once and for all. All of these things can be done, if it should ever become necessary, at the time a treaty is before the Senate. It is not necessary to impose on our constitutional system an artificial rigidity which may be harmful in carrying out the foreign relations of this country.

The way in which it may be harmful can best be determined by an analysis of the proposal section by section.

Section 1 of the Resolution

Section 1 of the proposed amendment provides:

No treaty or executive agreement shall be made respecting the rights of citizens of the United States protected by this Constitution, or abridging or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

The first difficulty is caused by the phrase "respecting the rights of citizens of the United States protected by this Constitution . . ." The rights of citizens of the United States protected by the Constitution include not only the traditional rights of free speech, free press, and so forth but also economic rights, such as the right to engage in a business or profession and to own property. The vague word "respecting" leaves the proposed amendment open to the interpretation that it is meant to cover treaties dealing with the exercise of these rights anywhere, not merely with their exercise in the United States by citizens of the United States. As an example of the effect which this would have, let us look at article I of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Italy which entered into force in 1949. Paragraph 2 of article I provides that the nationals of either state shall, within the territories of the other state, be permitted, without interference, to exercise in conformity with the applicable laws and regulations, the following rights and privileges upon terms no less favor-

able than those now or hereafter accorded to nationals of the other state:

(a) to engage in commerce, manufacturing, processing, financial, scientific, educational, religious, philanthropic, and professional activities except the practice of law;

(b) to acquire, own, erect or lease, and occupy appropriate buildings and to lease appropriate lands, for residential, commercial, manufacturing, processing, financial, professional, scientific, educational, religious, philanthropic and mortuary purposes;

I would say that the above treaty certainly is one "respecting the rights of citizens of the United States protected by the Constitution," although it was intended to aid our citizens in carrying on foreign trade and commercial activities in Italy. As section 1 of the proposed amendment is drafted, we could not enter into treaties of this character. The subcommittee will recall that a somewhat similar treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation came into force in 1950 between the United States and Ireland. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee now has before it for consideration similar treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation with Colombia, Denmark, and Greece.⁸ These treaties are all intended to replace very old treaties of friendship and commerce with these countries, all concluded over a hundred years ago, so as to modernize the basis upon which our citizens abroad and receive protection of their persons and property abroad. Section 1 of the proposed amendment would prohibit this sort of treaty.

I realize that arguments can be made that the proposed amendment should be interpreted in a more limited fashion. It might be argued that its prohibition would apply only if a proposed treaty dealt with the rights of citizens of the United States to be exercised by them in the United States. On this assumption the proposed amendment would still have an adverse effect on our foreign relations. It would make the United States unable to participate in many humanitarian treaties. For example, the International Slavery Convention of 1926 would not be possible under this amendment.

A Question of Principle

I think it is also clear that the effect of the proposed amendment would be to make impossible the participation by the United States in treaties such as the Genocide Convention by the Covenant on Human Rights. I do not think it is necessary at this time to go into the details of these treaties. What is before this Committee is a question of principle. This question is whether the United States should be barred by constitutional prohibition from entering into treaties with other countries by which all of them agree to maintain

⁸ For testimony regarding these treaties, see BULLETIN of June 2, 1952, p. 881.

certain minimum standards of individual liberty. I believe that if this country were prohibited by constitutional mandate from entering into any such treaties, we must reckon with the obvious fact that the United States would have lost its standing in the forum of world politics to attack the despotism of the Kremlin—whether in relation to the barbarous Soviet treatment of minorities, satellite persecution of religious leaders, or the attempted total suppression by Communist regimes of the liberties of whole peoples.

Civil liberties form the most precious part of our national heritage. Our country and citizens will always be alert to defend them. We must also consider the effects of suppression of liberties in other countries. That the status of individual rights in any country is a matter of deep international concern is attested by the common views of a large number of distinguished Americans, expressed in a 1944 statement entitled "The International Law of the Future." The group included such men as John W. Davis, John Foster Dulles, Justice Jackson, and Dean Roscoe Pound. In this statement, the following was among a set of draft principles for the future international law:

Each State has a legal duty to see that the conditions prevailing within its own territory do not menace international peace and order, and to this end it must treat its own population in a way which will not violate the dictates of humanity and justice or shock the conscience of mankind.

The comment on this principle said:

A State cannot be free to permit conditions to prevail within its own territory which menace international peace and order, and it cannot be free to treat any part of its population in such a way as to produce that menace. Living as a good neighbor in a Community of States, it may be called upon to place its own house in order. "The right of self-determination," as the President of the United States of America has declared, "does not carry with it the right of any government to commit wholesale murder or the right to make slaves of its own people."

Our concern with international peace and security is one of the reasons why the United States must remain concerned with the fate of human freedom elsewhere in the world. It is not the only reason. This country has had a tradition and world-wide reputation of support for the rights of the individual, of championing the cause of the oppressed whoever and wherever they may be. This moral element has been a strong source of the leadership in world affairs which the United States has enjoyed in the twentieth century.

The people of our country have been rightly outraged by the deeds of Soviet-dominated regimes, such as the false trials and imprisonment of European leaders like Cardinal Mindszenty, not to mention the cases of such American citizens as Robert Vogeler and William Oatis. Can we raise our voice effectively against wanton deprivations of human rights in other countries if we

are unwilling to enter into international engagements designed to protect the rights of individuals everywhere? The constitutional amendment proposed in Senate Joint Resolution 130 would cut off this arm of our national policy.

The United States must not be inhibited, by constitutional prohibition, from meeting the Soviet Union on equal terms in the war of ideas. We cannot afford to be hamstrung by innovations in the Constitution which would make it impossible for this country to cope effectively with the demands that world politics make upon us today. It would be too dangerous to bind our hands with novel rigidities in the constitutional provisions concerning foreign affairs. The Constitution of 1787 affords a flexibility for the requirements of national policy that has never been needed more.

I am aware that some of the proponents of the proposed amendment have agreed that the clause "respecting the rights of citizens of the United States protected by this Constitution" might perhaps be eliminated. This would limit the section to provide that no treaty or executive agreement shall be made abridging or prohibiting the free exercise of rights of citizens of the United States protected by this Constitution. In this connection attention has been directed to an alternative amendment recommended by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association which reads as follows:

A provision of a treaty which conflicts with any provision of this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect. A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation by Congress which it could enact under its delegated powers in the absence of such treaty.

I think it advisable to consider this in conjunction with section 3 of the proposed constitutional amendment which reads as follows:

No treaty or executive agreement shall alter or abridge the laws of the United States of the Constitution or laws of the several States unless, and then only to the extent that, Congress shall so provide by act or joint resolution.

Three Legal Issues

These various provisions have been stated together for the purposes of completeness because they have a close relation to each other. It is, however, necessary to point out that these various proposals contain three separate and distinct legal issues. The first of these is the extent to which the Federal Government may properly enter into treaty relations concerning a subject which is not within the delegated powers of the Federal Government in the absence of such treaty. The second is whether a treaty can abridge or prevent the free exercise of a right guaranteed to a citizen by the Constitution of the United States. The third is the extent to which a treaty should be the law of the land, immediately upon its coming into effect, without further action by Federal or State legislatures. It is particularly important, for

the purposes of clarity, to analyze closely the relationship between the first and second questions of law, since they may appear to overlap when the claim is made that citizens of the United States have a constitutional right not to be subjected to Federal regulation in a field which is not within the ordinary jurisdiction of the Federal Government in the absence of a treaty.

Let us look at the first question. Article II, section 2, of the Constitution provides that the President:

shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.

Article VI of the Constitution provides that:

... all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.*

It has been universally held by the Supreme Court that the Federal Government has the power to enter into and carry out treaties relating to matters of international concern regardless of whether the subject matter of these treaties would have been within the delegated powers of the Federal Government in the absence of such a treaty. The case usually cited for this principle is *Missouri v. Holland*, 252 U.S. 416, decided by the Supreme Court in April 1920. The principle, however, goes back to the very foundation of the Republic. One of the earliest treaties which the United States entered into was the treaty of 1783 terminating the Revolutionary War. That treaty provided, among other things, that: "It is agreed that creditors, on either side, shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value, in sterling money, of all *bona fide* debts, heretofore contracted." The effect of the treaty was attacked by a Virginia debtor who had paid his debt to the Commonwealth of Virginia as provided by State law. The treaty was upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of *Ware v. Hylton*, 3 Dall. 199 (1796). Similar provisions were inserted in the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation concluded with Great Britain in 1794.

Throughout its history the United States has entered into many treaties on the same constitutional basis. For example, treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation contained reciprocal guaranties with respect to real property rights of the respective nationals in each other's countries, especially in connection with the right to inherit and dispose of property and the proceeds thereof. Treaties also provided for the reciprocal right of aliens in this country and Americans abroad to engage in trade and related activities, manufacturing and professional activities. They have provided for national treatment as to taxation and for the exemption of consular officers of other

*For an article by Denys P. Myers on the drafting of article VI, see BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1952, p. 371.

nations from taxation. They have provided for the regulation of migratory birds and other wildlife and have provided for the regulation of fisheries. I shall not take the time of the subcommittee to take up these treaties in detail but instead place in the record a memorandum listing a number of such treaties and summarizing their provisions.

In a vast number of these cases the commitments made by the United States deal with matters which, in the absence of treaties, are subject to the jurisdiction of the several states. Yet the United States had to make these commitments for the United States as a whole if it wished to obtain similar rights for its own citizens abroad. The authority of the United States to make these commitments has been upheld. To change this constitutional doctrine, maintained since the early days of the Republic, would substantially weaken the authority of the Government to carry out its foreign relations. If it were changed, the ability of the United States to cope with so important a problem as that of narcotics control, for example, would be gravely impaired.

The United States became a party to the Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs in 1932 after President Hoover and Secretary Stimson urged that it be ratified not only because of the humanitarian aspects but because of the benefits to the United States. This convention provides not only for the regulation of international traffic in narcotic drugs but also for regulation of the internal manufacture of such drugs in each contracting State. Thus, in the United States, we now regulate strictly the exports and imports of narcotic drugs and we also limit the manufacture of drugs through Federal license and careful periodic inspection of plants, inventories, and records by Federal narcotics agents. In 1950 we also became party to the protocol of November 19, 1948, to the 1931 convention, which protocol was designed to bring the manufacture and distribution of the new synthetic drugs under this control system.

It is not necessary to emphasize the gravity of the social problem of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs in the United States. The daily newspapers headline that. Here is an international problem of first magnitude. We know that the United States is the object of the illicit international traffic in narcotics. We have reported to the United Nations this year that the principal sources of illicit raw opium in the United States are India, Turkey, Iran, and Mexico. Heroin has been coming in illegally from Italy, although following the action of Italian authorities in curtailing the manufacture of heroin there has been a noticeable lessening of available supplies of illicit heroin. Most of the illicit marijuana seized here came from Mexico and was confiscated on the Mexican border and the Pacific coast. The

Mexican authorities are endeavoring to stamp out the illicit production of marijuana. Clearly, however, we cannot expect other governments to cooperate in this international effort to suppress illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs if we do not take similar measures with our own citizens.

The constitutionality of measures we took to enforce this convention was challenged in *Stutz v. Bureau of Narcotics*, 56 F. Supp. 810 (N. D. Calif. 1944). There the court refused to enjoin the Federal authorities from seizing and destroying a privately owned crop of poppies which had been grown without Federal license. The Federal authorities were acting under the Opium Poppy Control Act of 1942 (21 U. S. C. § 188), which the Congress had enacted "to discharge more effectively the obligations of the United States under the International Opium Convention of 1912, and the Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs of 1931." Had the act been held beyond the Federal power, as it might be under section 3 of the proposed constitutional amendment and as it probably would have been under the Bar Association proposal since the act went outside the field of interstate and foreign commerce, the United States would be powerless to give effect to a treaty like the narcotics convention.

Abridgment or Prevention of Citizen's Rights

Let us turn now to the second question, whether the treaty power can abridge or prevent the free exercise of a right guaranteed a citizen of the United States by the Constitution of the United States. As was noted earlier this question must be carefully distinguished from the question we have just finished discussing as it is possible to state it in a way which confuses the two. In *Stutz v. Bureau of Narcotics*, 56 F. Supp. 810, the owner of the opium poppies claimed that the seizure of the crop by Federal authorities under a Federal statute was unconstitutional under the tenth amendment. This argument was answered by the court solely on the grounds that the United States, under the treaty power, could carry out the treaties in this field. So to that extent it could be claimed that the owner of the opium poppies was deprived of a constitutional right by a treaty. But I do not believe that this is the type of constitutional right which should be protected because it is not a right guaranteed to the individual as such.

It would appear to be in quite a different category from the various rights which grow from the specific prohibition in the Constitution of certain types of government action. The court in upholding the treaty power has been careful to make this distinction. A good example is *Asakura v. Seattle*, 265 U. S. 332, decided by the Supreme Court in 1924. That case involved a treaty with Japan which provided that the citizens of the high con-

tracting parties should have the right to reside in the territory of the other,

... to carry on trade, ... to own or lease and occupy ... shops, ... to lease land for ... commercial purposes, and generally to do anything incident to or necessary for trade upon the same terms as native citizens or subjects, submitting themselves to the laws and regulations there established, and shall receive ... the most constant protection ... for their ... property.

The city of Seattle passed an ordinance which provided that no person should enter the business of pawnbrokery without a license and that a license should not be issued unless the applicant was a citizen of the United States. The court held that the ordinance was invalid under the treaty. The opinion was written for a unanimous court by Justice Butler, who stated as follows:

The treaty-making power of the United States is not limited by any express provision of the Constitution, and, though it does not extend "so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids," it does extend to all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and other nations. *Geofroy v. Riggs*, 133 U. S. 258, 266, 267; *In re Ross*, 140 U. S. 453, 463; *Missouri v. Holland*, 252 U. S. 416.

The statement that the treaty power does not extend "so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids" first made in 1890 by Justice Field in *Geofroy v. Riggs*, 133 U. S. 258, has never been retracted by the court. Certainly this principle, together with care on the part of the Executive and the additional safeguard of a watchful Senate, would seem to provide a satisfactory answer to the second question and make a constitutional amendment unnecessary.

How a Treaty Becomes the Law of the Land

The third and final question is whether a treaty should become the law of the land without a subsequent action by the Congress. Article 3 of the constitutional amendment proposed by Senate Joint Resolution 130 is directed solely to this point. In Justice Story's book on the Constitution, he set forth the reasons for the rule in our Constitution. He said:

In regard to treaties, there is equal reason why they should be held, when made, to be the supreme law of the land. It is to be considered that treaties constitute solemn compacts of binding obligation among nations; and unless they are scrupulously obeyed and enforced, no foreign nation would consent to negotiate with us; or if it did, any want of strict fidelity on our part in the discharge of the treaty stipulations would be visited by reprisals or war. It is, therefore, indispensable that they should have the obligation and force of a law, that they may be executed by the judicial power, and be obeyed like other laws.

See II Story's commentaries on the Constitution (fifth edition), paragraph 1838.

The rule so well stated by Justice Story, of course, is based on the assumption that the treaty in question was intended to become operative without any further action by the parties. Chief Jus-

tice Marshall laid down the rule in *Foster v. Neilson*, 2 Peters 253 that:

... when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.

A great deal has been said about the case of *Sei Fujii v. The State of California*, where an intermediate State court held that the United Nations Charter invalidated the California Alien Land Law. Some appeared to fear that this case showed that the courts could no longer be trusted to follow the rule which had been law since Chief Justice Marshall's decision.

You have all probably learned by now that on April 17, 1952, the Supreme Court of California reversed the lower court in this case and ruled that the United Nations Charter did not invalidate the California land law.⁵ Since so much has been said about this case and since this decision is an important precedent in connection with treaties, I should like to read to you several short excerpts from the opinion of Chief Justice Gibson of California:

The provisions in the Charter pledging cooperation in promoting observance of fundamental freedoms lack the mandatory quality and definiteness which would indicate an intent to create justiciable rights in private persons immediately upon ratification. Instead, they are framed as a promise of future action by the member nations. Secretary of State Stettinius, Chairman of the United States delegation at the San Francisco Conference where the Charter was drafted, stated in his report to President Truman that Article 56 "pledges the various countries to cooperate with the organization by joint and separate action in the achievement of the economic and social objectives of the organization without infringing upon their rights to order their national affairs according to their own best ability, in their own way, and in accordance with their own political and economic institutions and processes."

The humane and enlightened objectives of the United Nations Charter are, of course, entitled to respectful consideration by the courts and legislatures of every member nation, since that document expresses the universal desire of thinking men for peace and for equality of rights and opportunities. The Charter represents a moral commitment of foremost importance, and we must not permit the spirit of our pledge to be compromised or disparaged in either our domestic or foreign affairs. We are satisfied, however, that the Charter provisions relied on by plaintiff were not intended to supersede existing domestic legislation, and we cannot hold that they operate to invalidate the alien land law.

In short, the California Supreme Court has confirmed the views of the Senate, as indicated by Senator Bricker, to the effect that the Charter was not intended to "supersede a large body of federal or state legislation."

I particularly wanted to call your attention to these excerpts from the court's opinion because of

the reference therein to the report which Secretary Stettinius made. That report made it clear that the U.S. representatives, in negotiating the United Nations Charter, had no intention of using the treaty power to change our basic political and social institutions.

I am aware that it has been argued that the United States is alone in having a constitutional system under which treaties can become automatically the supreme law of the land. This statement appears to me to be quite misleading. I would like to submit for the record an analysis of the constitutional provisions of other countries dealing with this subject. This survey shows that while in most countries participation by the legislature is required to apply a treaty which conflicts with existing law, this action is almost universally taken as part of the same action by which the treaty is ratified. This is generally by simple majority. The more important of these countries have parliamentary systems under which only a majority vote in the lower house is significant.

Section 3 of Senate Joint Resolution 130 would require two separate and specific actions in order to redeem the pledge made by a treaty which required the altering or abridging of State or Federal law. No other country in the world, so far as careful study of the laws and practices of other countries reveals, is required by its constitution or constitutional practices to follow such a double procedure.

We do not believe that the reasons advanced for the proposed amendment outweigh the reasons set forth by Justice Story. When the United States ratifies a treaty it assumes an international obligation. If the treaty is one intended to be self-executing, it should go into effect immediately upon ratification. The United States should not adopt a constitutional procedure which would require it immediately to reconsider whether it could live up to the obligation it had assumed.

Section 2 of the Resolution

Let us turn now to section 2 of the proposed constitutional amendment. It provides:

No treaty or executive agreement shall vest in any international organization or in any foreign power any of the legislative, executive, or judicial powers vested by this Constitution in the Congress, the President, and in the courts of the United States, respectively.

The implications of this proposed section are indeed unclear. One possibility is that the section has been proposed because the Constitution as it stands today permits the transfer by treaty of legislative, executive, or judicial powers of the United States to an international organization or foreign power. Such a conclusion would certainly be extraordinary. The executive branch of the Government has never proceeded on the basis of

⁵ BULLETIN of May 12, 1952, p. 744.

such an assumption in conducting our foreign affairs. The United States has never entered into any treaty or executive agreement purporting to vest the legislative, executive, or judicial powers under the Constitution of the Congress, the President, or the courts of the United States in any foreign power or international organization, and it is not intended to enter into any such treaty or agreement.

It may be, therefore, that the proposed section 2 in Senate Joint Resolution 130 would not bring about any change in the Constitution and would not accomplish anything. Thus it may be a proposal simply to insert surplusage.

On the other hand, it may be that the proposed section 2 is aimed to strike at proposals for international treaties or agreements of a type not involving transfer of constitutional powers of government from the United States but which have been criticized on the ground of engaging the United States in excessive participation in world affairs today. For example, section 2 may conceivably be directed at such an international undertaking as the Baruch proposals for the international control of atomic energy. These proposals, which have been approved by a great majority of the United Nations—aside from the Soviet bloc—include provision for an international authority to own and manage atomic production facilities. If the proposed constitutional amendment is designed to render constitutionally impossible an effective international control of atomic energy under the Baruch proposals, for purposes of world security and the development of peaceful applications of atomic energy, obviously the amendment is not acceptable.

Another example that comes to my mind is the proposal advanced recently by John Foster Dulles for an international striking force to guard against Soviet aggression. Under Mr. Dulles' proposal there would be continuous U.N. observation of certain frontiers to determine the occurrence of armed aggression; when such aggression occurred, the striking force would be used instantly against the aggressor, by common consent given in advance by constitutional and U.N. processes. Thus, under this plan, if armed attack occurred, the armed forces of the United States and of other participating countries would automatically be committed to all-out military action against the aggressor. While a proposal such as this may be open to some very serious objections, I do not think we ought to guard against such possible dangers simply by writing an amendment into the Constitution. Indeed, I do not think any constitutional amendment which would prohibit such a plan should be adopted because of the increased sense of security which it would give to potential aggressors concerning the national attitude and policy of the greatest free country in the world.

The Question of Executive Agreements

So far, Mr. Chairman, I have directed my comments chiefly to the treaty-power aspect of Senate Joint Resolution 130. With respect to "executive agreements," I understand that the sponsors of this resolution had in mind the type of agreement that the President makes without securing the prior or subsequent approval of the Congress. As this resolution now reads it could well be construed to include executive agreements which have received the prior or subsequent approval of the Congress. Section 4 reads:

Executive agreements shall not be made in lieu of treaties.

Executive agreements shall, if not sooner terminated, expire automatically one year after the end of the term of office, for which the President making the agreement shall have been elected, but the Congress may, at the request of any President, extend for the duration of the term of such President the life of any such agreement made or extended during the next preceding Presidential term.

The President shall publish all executive agreements except that those which in his judgment require secrecy shall be submitted to appropriate committees of the Congress in lieu of publication.

Mr. Chairman, the Department of State prepared several studies on the subject of executive agreements which we submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with respect to Senate Joint Resolution 122, and copies of these studies have been submitted to this subcommittee. The information contained in them serves to place the question of executive agreements in proper perspective. I should like to summarize it now in the context of Senate Joint Resolution 130.

Obviously, if Congress adopts a resolution authorizing the President to enter into a certain international agreement or if the President negotiates an agreement which expressly is to be submitted to Congress and to be made effective by congressional legislation, such an agreement, although called an "executive agreement" to distinguish it from a treaty, does and should have the same legal character and effectiveness as any other statute or public law of the United States. As a matter of record the great majority of international agreements other than treaties have included and continue to include one of these two forms of congressional participation. It may be of interest to illustrate the kinds of agreements so made by some examples. The following are illustrations of agreements made pursuant to prior authority given the President by legislation:

One hundred eleven (111) agreements governing technical aspects of commercial aviation have been made within the framework of the International Civil Aviation Convention, which is a treaty, and pursuant to certain statutes; 105 economic and technical agreements, including Point Four agreements, have been made under the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 and the Foreign Aid

Appropriation Act of 1949; and 25 mutual defense assistance agreements have been made under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951. The "Institute of Inter-American Affairs Act" has been the statutory basis for over 100 agreements setting up co-operative programs in the fields of health and sanitation, agriculture, development of productive resources, and education. Other examples are agreements in the fields of shipping, radio communications, taxation, the work of American military and technical missions abroad; and there are many others.

The second category of agreements which have come into effect through congressional action is that involving subsequent approval or implementation by legislation. Of particular importance within this category has been congressional approval of U.S. participation in the work of international organizations, such as the International Labor Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Health Organization. The U.N. trusteeship agreement under which the United States became administering power for the former Japanese-mandated islands in the Pacific was approved by the Congress before it entered into force.

There remains a portion of the total number of international agreements other than treaties which are in fact entered into and given effect by executive action alone. Of this portion a large percentage in turn are concerned with purely military arrangements incident to war or arising from the presence of American armed forces abroad. These include armistice agreements; understandings with certain countries at the end of the Second World War to the effect that U.S. forces were present in the other country with its permission; arrangements regarding jurisdiction over U.S. forces abroad, their movement and treatment, and aid to be given them by foreign countries; arrangements concerning our military occupation of enemy territory; and, in Korea, agreements arranging such matters as the use of a Swedish Red Cross field hospital and a Norwegian mobile surgical hospital. They also include certain types of purely executive agreements made by the President in his conduct of the foreign relations of the United States. One historic example, of course, was the settlement of the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. The various countries concerned signed a final

protocol at Peking in 1901. This protocol was not submitted to the Senate and it was not considered necessary that it should be.

The application of section 4 of the proposed amendment to this type of agreement would in our judgment be unwise. If the design of that section is to prohibit the President from exercising his historic constitutional powers to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and to act as commander in chief of the armed forces, it is apparent that a basic alteration in the structure of our Government is contemplated. It apparently would require the participation of the Congress in functions which the framers of the Constitution thought should be vested exclusively in the executive branch of the Government. If anything, conditions today require more urgently than ever that the President be in a position to employ his traditional powers. As a practical matter neither the Senate nor the Congress as a whole is set up and equipped to discharge this function with respect to the cases that would come before them as a result of the conduct of foreign relations.

Upon the basis of our analysis of Senate Joint Resolution 130, Mr. Chairman, I submit the following conclusions:

1. The assumption is unwarranted that the President, the Senate, and the courts will abuse the treaty power and alienate the constitutional liberties of American citizens. There is absolutely nothing in the record to support this assumption.

2. Senate Joint Resolution 130 as now drafted is unclear in several important respects. It would appear, however, to prevent many treaties which have been beneficial to the United States and to its citizens.

3. Senate Joint Resolution 130 also would appear to place serious handicaps upon the U.S. Government in the conduct of its foreign relations. It would appear to impose serious and unnecessary limitations upon the treaty-making authority, the President and the Senate, so that this Government would be unable to enter into beneficial and humanitarian treaties.

4. Finally, this resolution would alter the fundamental division of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, which is the basic structure of our constitutional system. It would burden the already overburdened legislative branch with historically and fundamentally executive functions while it seriously impairs the effectiveness of the executive in the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States.

Developments in Long-Range International Programs for Children

MEETINGS OF THE UNICEF PROGRAM COMMITTEE AND EXECUTIVE BOARD

by Katharine F. Lenroot

At New York meetings of the Program Committee of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) from April 14 to 17, and of the UNICEF Executive Board from April 22 to 24, marked progress was evident in the development of policies in which the U.S. Government and nongovernmental bodies have been vitally interested. This progress may be summarized under the following headings: (1) continued interest of other governments in contributions; (2) character and significance of programs; (3) extension of programs in underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Latin America, and cooperation, from the ground up, on the part of UNICEF, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the U.N. Department of Social Affairs; (4) response of countries receiving assistance; (5) consideration of ways in which the work of the Board and the Administration may be made more effective; and (6) interest on the part of Board members in exploring possible lines of development after 1953.

A target program and budget for the period July 1, 1952, to June 30, 1953, was adopted by the Board in the amount of \$20,000,000. Using all but \$1,535,000 of the inactive China allocation, and authorizing drawing upon that remainder for emergencies anywhere in the world, the Board allocated \$8,650,000 in hand for projects in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Europe, and for emergencies in any part of the world, and items connected with the fund's operations. At the close of the meetings there were no unallocated resources on hand.

1. *Continued interest of governments in contributions.* In his general progress report, the Executive Director noted that since the last meeting of the Board approximately \$3,000,000 had been received in new pledges and contributions and that 10 governments had given pledges to UNICEF for contributions in 1953. At the meeting of the Board further support was announced by representatives of four governments: India, \$252,000; Brazil, \$162,000; United Kingdom, \$140,000 included in the budget estimates presented to Parliament; and Chile, \$45,000 a year for each of 5 years and additional sums in Chilean pesos to be used for local administrative costs in connection with UNICEF-assisted programs and for the purchase of Chilean commodities for the fund's use elsewhere. These sums were additional, in each case, to amounts previously contributed or pledged. There was every evidence, obtained in personal conversations, of continuing interest in supporting the work of the fund.

2. *Character and significance of the program.* The fund continues to spend its resources primarily for supplies. Some resources are used for emergencies, such as provision of skimmed milk for Palestine refugee mothers and children through November 1952, when it is expected that UNRWA will assume full responsibility; food for children in the drought-stricken areas of Brazil; aid for children left homeless by the volcanic eruption and typhoons in the Philippines; and food for child famine victims in Madras. With these exceptions, all other UNICEF aid is now used for long-range maternal and child health and wel-

fare programs, including the training of personnel, looking to the building up of the countries' own services for children and mothers. For example, equipment and supplies are being provided for maternity and children's centers in rural areas; for training of midwives and other non-professional personnel for newly established rural centers; for mass campaigns against communicable diseases, such as yaws, tuberculosis, and malaria. Milk and other diet supplements are provided in connection with nutrition demonstrations and assistance in the development of milk conservation plants and other establishments producing supplies essential for carrying on these programs. Such help, while of immediate benefit to great numbers of mothers and children, serves the still larger purpose of helping countries build a foundation for health and welfare services.

Impressive reviews of the development of certain of these programs were presented to the Board, including progress in campaigns for the vaccination of children against tuberculosis; experience with UNICEF-assisted yaws control programs in Haiti, Indonesia, and Thailand; experience with UNICEF-assisted feeding programs in Asia; and long-range child-feeding programs in Central America.

Provision of milk for demonstration feeding programs in Asia is drawing to a close. The report of this activity states: "Perhaps the most important effect of the milk distribution scheme has been its focusing of attention on the importance of proper nutrition to the well-being of Asia's children." It points out that several governments, through their departments of health and national nutrition institutes, are investigating the possibilities of setting up child-feeding programs from local resources.

Requests for new projects for the Asia area include 27 percent of the amount asked for, for maternal and child-health work, including training programs, and 64 percent for campaigns against tuberculosis, yaws, and malaria.

Newly developed programs in Africa place emphasis on campaigns against malaria and the serious nutritional deficiencies which affect disastrously the health of many children. European programs are now confined to Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Yugoslavia, with continuing aid for a research and training center in Paris which is of international service. Only 2 percent of its trainees are French nationals. The development of child-feeding programs in Central America constitutes a striking demonstration of the linking together of scientific nutrition research, health education, and school feeding. In a number of Latin American countries, programs for the development of rural maternal and child-welfare centers, training personnel for maternal and child-welfare work, and campaigns against yaws and insect-borne diseases are being carried on.

3. *Extension of programs in underdeveloped areas, and cooperation of other U. N. agencies.* Of the \$5,752,000 allocated at the April meetings to countries, exclusive of emergency programs, over three-fourths was apportioned to (a) Asia, \$2,207,000; (b) Africa, \$1,000,000; (c) Latin America, \$938,000; and (d) Eastern Mediterranean countries, \$637,000. Corresponding figures for the target program and budget, adopted for the period July 1, 1952, to June 30, 1953, are: Asia, \$5,630,000; Africa, \$1,710,000; Eastern Mediterranean, \$1,850,000; Latin America, \$750,000; or a total of \$9,940,000 out of \$12,400,000 estimated for future country programs. Newly developed programs for Africa, for example, are reaching the Belgian Congo, Ruanda-Urundi, and certain parts of French Equatorial Africa. For the entire continent it is reported that only 50 percent of the children born reach, on the average, an age of 15 years. Mortality rates that have been examined for limited areas are from 200 to 300 per 1,000 live births.

Great progress has been made in basic planning with governments participated in by the several U. N. agencies concerned, in consultations and clearances between agencies, and in the participation of representatives of the specialized agencies at meetings of the Program Committee and the Board. Excerpts from staff reports presented to the Executive Board illustrate certain of these points:

It is important that UNICEF should not think of its assistance except as a part of the governments' developing program for children and that our plans be carefully coordinated not only to avoid overlapping with other sources of aid but also to assure that the total aid from all sources really builds a soundly developing national program. The best answer that has been found to the problem of doing this has been the series of coordination committees at the country level, brought together under the chairmanship of the Ministries of Health. New committees of this kind have recently been formed in Indonesia and India, and a chain of committees is now at work in every country in the Asia area, receiving considerable medical aid from other foreign sources as well as UNICEF.

We have also been materially helped in our field planning by Regional Conferences in which experience from various countries could be brought together for appraisal by those in charge of the work, with the assistance of expert consultants. . . .

Notable progress has been made in team work between UNICEF and WHO in the area. In operating present programs and in planning new ones, the governments now have the assistance of about 85 WHO program personnel. The new projects which are being presented to this committee represent more nearly than ever before the joint planning of governments, WHO, and UNICEF.

—Spurgeon Keeny, Director of UNICEF Asia Regional Offices, Bangkok.

The role of the Institute of Nutrition for Central America and Panama (INCAP) has been referred to. . . . The Director of the Institute is a staff member, of WHO/PASB (World Health Organization Pan American Sanitary Bureau). The Fao has seconded a nutritionist to the Institute.

As has been noted, the Director of the Institute made the initial visits to the countries together with the UNICEF

representative to advise on the development of plans of operations.

The closest cooperation has been maintained between INCAP and UNICEF. INCAP field teams in the member countries have based some of their work around UNICEF-assisted feeding programs in selected schools.

The change which has come about in a relatively short period of time in awareness of nutrition problems, understanding of the basic principles involved, recruitment of competent personnel, and the development of realistic programs is one which would have required temerity to predict several years ago. The necessary groundwork for long-range planning and the development of permanent nutrition programs has now been laid.

—Report on UNICEF Assistance for Long-Range Child Feeding Programs in Central America, E/ICEF 186 13 March 1952.

UNICEF's relationship to WHO is particularly close. WHO provides the technical assistance, UNICEF the necessary supplies and equipment.

UNICEF also maintains close relationship at the country level with bilateral assistance programs, notably through the Mutual Security Agency and the Colombo Plan. The help made available through these agencies, chiefly related to economic development, is taken into account by UNICEF and the specialized agencies in planning with governments.

4. *Response of countries receiving assistance.* The response of governments to the opportunities offered by UNICEF and cooperating U.N. agencies has been outstanding, not only in terms of money and supplies but in terms of personal interest and dedication to the objectives of a program to advance the health and well-being of children. Governments have made heavy local expenditures to provide the necessary buildings for new projects. A notable example of widespread response is reported for Central America, where the countries made careful plans for the initiation of the demonstration child-feeding programs. Through the work of health educators, inspectors of public schools, special committees, municipal authorities, religious organizations, school health authorities, and parent-teacher associations, a significant campaign to get the programs going was carried on throughout Central America. With progressively decreasing imports of dried milk, the governments will be able to continue the feeding programs from their own resources. This will necessitate positive action to continue the development of indigenous milk supplies and to extend the cultivation and distribution of vegetables rich in proper protein. Progress has been made along these lines and the determination of the governments to continue is evident throughout Central America.

5. *Consideration of ways in which the work of the Board and the Administration may be made more effective.* In his general progress report the Executive Director outlined certain trends in the development of the work of UNICEF, and the reports of regional directors included valuable

forecasts of the main developments which could be expected in next year's programs. The Board deliberated certain points of policy, for example, policy with regard to assistance in training midwives and other nonprofessional personnel for work in rural areas. Important contributions to the deliberations of the Program Committee and the Executive Board were made by representatives of WHO, FAO, and the U.N. Department of Social Affairs. Action was taken to accord consultative status to nongovernmental organizations interested in children and recognized by the Economic and Social Council.

At the close of the meetings of the Executive Board, the representative of the United Kingdom made specific suggestions concerning ways in which the meetings of the Program Committee and the Board could be more closely synchronized and made more effective. These suggestions, with a slight modification by the representative of the United States, were adopted for the meetings to be held next fall.

Outstanding matters on the agenda of the Executive Board were the report of the UNICEF/WHO Joint Committee on Health Policy, which met April 9–11, inclusive, and the reports by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, prepared at the request of the Social Commission, on "An Integrated Program for Meeting the Needs of Children" and "Extension of Measures Relating to Maternity, Infant and Child Care."

The reports of the Secretary-General include a summary of discussions and recommendations made by the Working Group on Long-Range Activities for Children, created on the request of the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) and composed of technical officers of the United Nations, UNICEF, and of the specialized agencies. The terms of reference of the Working Group are as follows:

(1) to consult periodically on the continuing needs of children and international measures desirable to assist governments in meeting them, including the activities of the United Nations and all the specialized agencies concerned with promoting the health, welfare, and education of children;

(2) to advise the Administrative Committee on Coordination on the development of a coordinated program to meet these needs, so that ACC may be in a position to make effective recommendations to the Economic and Social Council, the General Assembly and the governing bodies of the various agencies concerned, as called for in the various resolutions of these bodies on this matter.

Based on its work, the Administrative Committee on Coordination came to the following conclusion.

Child welfare is in fact so broad and many-sided a subject that it cannot be effectively tackled on an inter-

national basis unless the United Nations, including UNICEF and all the specialized agencies concerned, combine their efforts and together work out and apply an integrated program.

Accordingly the Social Commission may desire to

(a) encourage governments

(i) to assess what is being done for children within their borders with a view to formulating and carrying out a national plan for comprehensive child welfare services and to determine the type of international assistance required, this study and plan of action being applicable also to the needs of neighboring countries, and

(ii) to examine the need for additional auxiliary workers, their functions, recruitment, training and use, and effective ways of increasing their numbers as soon as possible; and

(b) recognize continued collaboration of the United Nations, including UNICEF and the specialized agencies, as being indispensable to the further development of the many phases of an integrated program to meet the needs of children.

6. *Interest in exploring possible lines of development after 1953.* Under the resolution of December 1950, the General Assembly in 1953 will "again consider the future of the Fund . . . with the object of continuing the Fund on a permanent basis." Although there was no discussion of this

subject at the April meetings of the Board and its committees, personal discussions with a number of members of the Board indicated (1) very general interest in continuing international work for children; (2) recognition of the necessity of some modification of the terms of reference and structure of UNICEF, including the dropping of the word "emergency" from the title; (3) interest in further exploration of the relation between special work for children and the technical-assistance program; and (4) conviction that while the closest relationships with specialized agencies must be maintained in a children's program, work for children, because of its scope and importance, could not appropriately be submerged under any single agency. The way is clear for consultations between now and the meetings of the Board in the fall and in January 1953 that will help to clarify these matters.

• *Miss Lenroot, author of the above article, is U.S. Representative on the Executive Board of UNICEF. She is the former Chief of the Children's Bureau of the Federal Security Agency.*

U. S. Delegations to International Conferences

Committee on Commodity Problems (FAO)

The Department of State announced on May 29 that the nineteenth meeting of the Committee on Commodity Problems of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) will convene at FAO Headquarters, Rome, on June 3, 1952. The U.S. delegation to this meeting is as follows:

U.S. Representative

Robert B. Schwenger, Chief, Regional Investigations Branch, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

Advisers

Howard R. Cottam, Counselor of Embassy, Rome
Francis Linville, Chief, Agricultural Products Staff, Department of State
F. Marion Rhodes, Director, Office of Requirements and Allocations, Production and Marketing Administration, Department of Agriculture

The agenda for the nineteenth meeting includes consideration of the following items: Review of the world agricultural commodity situation, with special reference to such commodities as wheat,

rice, cocoa, fish, fats and oils; international commodity stabilization techniques; impediments to world trade in food and agricultural products; trade in fruit and vegetables; stimulation of the consumption of milk and dairy products; and preparation of a report to the Council of the FAO.

The Committee on Commodity Problems was established by the fifth session of the Conference of the FAO (Washington, D.C., November 21-December 6, 1949). Its last (eighteenth) session was held at Rome, February 18-22, 1952.

U.N. Trusteeship Council

On June 2 the Department of State announced that the eleventh session of the U.N. Trusteeship Council will convene at New York, on June 3, 1952. The U.S. delegation to this session is as follows:

Acting U. S. Representative

Benjamin Gerig, Director, Office of Dependent Area Affairs

Advisers

William I. Cargo, Office of Dependent Area Affairs
William B. Edmondson, Office of Dependent Area Affairs
James R. Fowler, Office of Dependent Area Affairs
Vernon D. McKay, Office of Dependent Area Affairs
Curtis C. Strong, Office of Dependent Area Affairs

The Trusteeship Council, one of the principal organs of the United Nations, was established in December 1946 to assist in carrying out the functions of the United Nations with respect to the International Trusteeship System established by the Charter. At the present time there are 11 trust territories—7 in Africa ((Tanganyika under British administration; Ruanda Urundi under Belgian administration; Somaliland under Italian administration; Cameroons under British administration; Cameroons under French administration; Togoland under British administration; and Togoland under French administration) and four in the Pacific area (Western Samoa under New Zealand administration; Nauru and New Guinea under Australian administration; and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands administered by the United States). The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is a strategic area administered by the United States pursuant to the trusteeship agreement between the United States and the Security Council of the United Nations.

Membership on the Trusteeship Council is evenly divided between six states which administer trust territories (Australia, Belgium, France, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States) and six states which do not (China, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Iraq, Thailand, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). Italy, the administering authority for the trust territory of Somaliland, but not as yet a member of the United Nations, participates without vote in the work of the Council.

At the forthcoming session, the Trusteeship Council will devote considerable attention to the examination of 356 petitions concerning conditions in the trust territories, as well as the annual reports on the seven trust territories in Africa. Other agenda items include consideration of reports of several committees of the Council (including the Standing Committee on Administrative Unions, the Committee on Rural Economic Development of Trust Territories, and the Committee on Participation of Indigenous Inhabitants of Trust Territories in the Work of the Trusteeship Council); educational and social advancement in the trust territories; reports prepared by the U.N. Visiting Mission to trust territories in East Africa; and arrangements for a mission to make a periodic visit to trust territories in West Africa.

The last (tenth) session of the Trusteeship Council was held at New York, February 27–April 1, 1952.

THE DEPARTMENT

New Branch Office of IIA To Open at Chicago

[Released to the press May 31]

In order to secure greater cooperation with the U.S. overseas information program by midwestern business and private organizations and individuals, the Department of State will open a new office on June 2 at the Post Office building in Chicago.

A branch of the State Department's Private Enterprise Cooperation Staff, the new unit will be in the charge of George J. Hummel, veteran New York newspaperman and former advertising executive.

In announcing the opening of the new office, Wilson Compton, head of the International Information Administration (IIA) said, "the purpose of this office is to encourage American private agencies to take a more active part in the 'war of ideas' now going on in the world."

"Freedom is everybody's business and so is the defense of freedom," Mr. Compton said. "We want suggestions and ideas from every American who is willing to help in this program. There are few industries, schools, clubs, or other organizations too small to participate," he added.

In pointing out the reasons for the selection of Chicago for the new office, Mr. Compton emphasized the importance of the North Central States in world trade. Other branch offices are in New York and San Francisco.

The Private Enterprise Cooperation Staff was created 4 years ago by authority of Congress to stimulate active interest and participation in the "Campaign of Truth" among private groups. These include private agencies, business firms, nonprofit organizations, and individuals who can either independently carry out a project to supplement the Campaign of Truth or assist in various phases of its program. Some 500 private organizations are currently cooperating with IIA.

Appointment of Officers

Haywood P. Martin as Assistant Administrator for Management of the Technical Cooperation Administration.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Exchange of Official Publications. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2311. Pub. 4390. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Pakistan—Signed at Karachi Apr. 25 and May 23, 1951; entered into force May 23, 1951.

Inter-American Highway. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2318. Pub. 4410. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and El Salvador—Signed at Washington Feb. 19 and Mar. 19, 1951; entered into force Mar. 19, 1951.

Economic Cooperation With Belgium Under Public Law 472, 80th Congress, as Amended. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2334. Pub. 4101. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Belgium amending agreement of July 2, 1948, as amended—Signed at Brussels Sept. 10, 1951; entered into force Sept. 10, 1951.

Part II, Sixth Release, U.S. Treaty Developments

[Released to the press May 19]

The Department of State made available to the public on May 19 part II of the sixth release of *United States Treaty Developments*.¹ This publication is a documented looseleaf reference service periodically providing basic and current information on international agreements entered into by the United States.

The material issued today is comprised entirely of pages of revised information to make current as of December 31, 1950, the annotations on all of the 1,274 agreements included to date in *United States Treaty Developments*.

Among the many agreements with respect to which recent developments have been noted in the current release are such multilaterals as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago, 1944), the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and of the International Monetary Fund, the International Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation (Chicago, 1944), the Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, the agreements establishing the constitutions of FAO, UNESCO, WHO, and ILO, the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (1946), the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance ("Rio Pact"), the International Telecommunication Convention and Radio Regulations (Atlantic City, 1947), the convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air ("Warsaw Convention", 1929), the convention for limiting the manufacture of narcotic drugs (Geneva, 1913), the agreement regarding the regulation of production and marketing of sugar (London, 1937), the International Wheat Agreement (1949), the North Atlantic Treaty, and others, as well as numerous important bilateral agreements between the United States and 50 other countries relating to a wide range of subjects.

A revised comprehensive index of 235 pages, by countries and subject, is also provided with part

II of the sixth release of *United States Treaty Developments*. Certain pages of the numerical list of the series prints of treaties and agreements, which constitutes appendix II of the publication, have also been revised so as to extend the list to include Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2228.

The seventh release of *United States Treaty Developments*, the issuance of which is being expedited so as to make it available in the near future, will also be comprised of two parts: Part I will contain annotations on agreements not previously included in the publication; part II will contain information regarding all actions and developments during 1951 (including the annotation of extending, amending, or supplementing agreements) with respect to the agreements included in the publication as of December 31, 1951.

United States Treaty Developments is compiled by the Treaty Staff, Office of the Legal Adviser. Inquiries with respect to the content or compilation of the publication may be referred to Miss Ruth Blezarde or Miss Nell Gordon, Department of State, extension 3812.

Part II of the sixth release (\$2.50), as well as prior releases, may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 31–June 6, 1952

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The Department of State bulletin

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June 23, 1952

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.

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Senate Begins Consideration of German Contractual Agreements and North Atlantic Treaty Protocol

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON¹

Two documents are before the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. One of these is the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, to which is annexed the Charter of the Arbitration Tribunal.²

The other is a protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty.³ A number of other documents have also been transmitted by the President for the information of the Senate, to fill out the series of related actions, of which these two are a part. These include three additional conventions with the Federal Republic, which will implement various aspects of the main convention before you;⁴ the treaty constituting the European Defense Community (Edc); a declaration by the United States, together with the British and the French, at the time of the signing of this treaty;⁵ and the Schuman Plan treaty for a European coal and steel community.

Taken together, these measures make it possible to strengthen the defenses of Western Europe, and to include Germany as a participant in, and as a contributor to, those defense arrangements.

The first document before you for advice and consent to ratification has to do with ending the Occupation of the German Republic and returning Germany to the community of free nations as an equal member.

Germany has been occupied for almost 7 years. In that time we have sought to assist the Germans in developing democratic institutions and institutions of self-government in the towns and cities, in states, and in the Federal Government. We have sought, and I think successfully, to conduct an enlightened Occupation that looked toward

peaceful and harmonious relations in the future.

But at some point in any occupation, the law of diminishing returns must inevitably come into play. It had become clear to us that the Germans who were not living under Soviet occupation had made considerable progress toward democratic self-rule, and that a prolonged extension of the Occupation would have a negative and stultifying effect on the very democratic processes we were doing our utmost to induce.

More than a year of negotiation has gone into the preparation of the arrangements now before you. On our side, the negotiations have been carried forward largely by John J. McCloy, our High Commissioner in Germany, who deserves the gratitude of his countrymen for the statesmanship and vision he has brought to bear on this task. Mr. McCloy is here with me today and is prepared to put himself at your disposal for a detailed discussion of any aspects of these arrangements.

On the German side these conventions were freely negotiated. They are not imposed arrangements. They have been painstakingly and voluntarily worked out to provide for the best interests of all parties and for our common interest in peace.

It has not been possible to conclude a treaty of peace with Germany because the Soviet Union has refused to agree to any terms for unifying Germany in conditions of freedom.

The convention before you will, however, establish approximately normal relations with the largest part of Germany. These agreements put an end to the Occupation in all of Germany not occupied by the Soviet Union. This does not apply to Berlin, where the special situation requires us to maintain our full rights as an Occupation power.

The independence of the Federal Republic of Germany is established by these agreements, subject only to certain reservations made necessary by the present state of international relations. These reservations concern the stationing and security of Allied forces in Germany, including the right to proclaim a state of emergency in certain extreme circumstances, and to matters deal-

¹ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 10 and released to the press on the same date.

² For summary of this convention and its annex, see BULLETIN of June 9, 1952, p. 888.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 896.

⁴ For summaries of these additional conventions, see *ibid.*, pp. 890-894.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 897.

ing with the ultimate unification of Germany and a peace settlement for Germany as a whole.

It remains our purpose to help bring about a free and united Germany, and nothing in the present arrangements will serve as a bar to the fulfillment of this aim.

The freedom and equality which the Federal Republic will enjoy under the contractual conventions are not all that could be provided or that would be desirable if it were possible to conclude a peace treaty with a unified Germany. But the new status which the Federal Republic will enjoy will grant her the greatest autonomy that is possible under present international conditions. Specifically, the Occupation regime will be terminated. This means that the Occupation Statute will be repealed, the High Commissioner's and Land Commissioners' Offices will be abolished, Allied Occupation Troops in Germany will become troops for the common defense, Western Germany will regain control of her domestic and foreign affairs, and normal diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic and the Three Powers will be established.

This convention on relations with the Federal Republic was not, and could not be, prepared as an isolated document, because it does not by itself meet the full problem confronting the free people of Germany and those of other free countries. In order to provide for the security of the Federal Republic, and to enable free Germany to participate in its own defense, without recreating those military institutions and traditions that have endangered all Europe in the past, arrangements have been worked out under which the Federal Republic is joining in a European Defense Community—the common defense organization of six continental European countries.

These include, in addition to the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

As a member of this community, the Federal Republic will be able to make a vital contribution to the common defense of Western Europe without the creation of a national German military establishment. The European Defense Community, with a common budget and common procurement of military equipment, common uniforms, and common training, is a very remarkable advance. It represents a voluntary merging of national power into a common structure of defense.

The principal immediate purpose of the European Defense Community is to give the people of Europe more adequate protection against the threat of aggression. In this sense, it is part of a broader effort undertaken by the entire North Atlantic community to create the defensive strength we need to assure peace and security.

The European Army created under these arrangements will serve under General Ridgway as Supreme Commander, alongside American and British forces and the forces of other North At-

lantic Treaty countries which are not members of the European Defense Community.

Five members of the new European Defense Community are also members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but the Federal Republic is not. We have therefore joined with the other members of NATO in signing a protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty which is the other document requiring ratification. This protocol extends the guarantee of mutual assistance expressed in article V of the treaty⁶ to the Federal Republic and to the forces of the community, by providing specifically that an attack on the territory of any member of the community, or on the community's forces, shall be considered an attack against all the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Federal Republic will join with the other members of the European Defense Community in extending a reciprocal guarantee to the members to NATO.

Because of this necessarily close relationship, it is evident that the United States, while not a party to the European Defense Community, has a direct and abiding interest in the success and effectiveness of these arrangements.

These arrangements bear upon the defense of Western Europe and the whole Atlantic community, which the President and the Congress have clearly indicated on many occasions is of vital interest to the security of the United States.

There must be no misunderstanding in any quarter about how we would regard any act which would affect the integrity or unity of the European Defense Community.

For this reason, we have joined with the Governments of Britain and France in a declaration which makes it clear that we would regard any such act as a threat to our own security, and that we would act in accordance with article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty.⁷

That article requires the parties to consult whenever any party so requests on the basis that

⁶ Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty reads as follows:

"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."

⁷ Article IV reads as follows:

"The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened."

the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of them is threatened.

This committee, in its report on the North Atlantic Treaty, underlined the fact that such consultation could be requested only when the element of threat was present, and that the consultation would take place under circumstances of great gravity.

The President, in his message of transmittal of these documents,⁸ stressed the great stake which the United States has acquired in the maintenance of the institutions and relationships now being established. He has emphasized that the United States would consider any act which affects the integrity or existence of the European Defense Community as a matter of concern to its own interests and security.

By their declaration, the Three Powers have given public notice of the fact that any action against the integrity or unity of the European Defense Community would be a threat against their own security, and as such, a proper matter for consultation.

Such a threat would be not only a matter of common concern but of individual concern to the countries involved. In this atmosphere they would meet together to consider the exact nature of the threat, its immediacy and its seriousness. The parties would then consider, subject to the constitutional requirements of each country, how best to concert their efforts in order to take the common action necessary to ward off the threatened danger.

In the Three Power Declaration, we have also expressed the determination previously affirmed by the Senate to station forces, as necessary and appropriate, on the Continent of Europe, including the territory of the German Republic.

Basically, this declaration, like all the other documents before you, expresses an awareness of realities imposed upon us by modern history—that common danger creates a common interest and requires common action.

I will not take your time at this point with a discussion of any further details of these arrangements. David Bruce, Under Secretary of State, who has an intimate familiarity with the arrangements for the European Defense Community, will be at your disposal to discuss any aspects of these arrangements of interest to you.

I wish to express only one further point: That is, the great importance of early ratification of these two documents by the United States. Taken together, these agreements greatly advance all that we have been trying to do since the end of the war, to build strength and unity among the free nations.

Prompt ratification by the United States will most certainly have the effect of encouraging all those nations who look to the United States for

leadership. I am confident that prompt and affirmative action by the United States on these matters will be followed by similar action on the part of our Allies.

STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY BRUCE⁹

"The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on Guarantees given by the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty to the Members of the EDC" is one of the documents which the President has transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. It is set forth on page 23 of the printed documents before the Committee.¹⁰

The essential concept of this document is to cover the EDC and its forces, vessels, and aircraft with a North Atlantic Treaty guaranty in the event of armed attack within the meaning of article V of the North Atlantic Treaty and in return to receive from the European Defense Community an equivalent guaranty to NATO members.

Obviously the new aspect here is a recognition that the German Federal Republic is an essential element of the European Defense Community and therefore should receive the same rights as the other EDC countries and in return should give to NATO the same assurances required of the other EDC members. The preamble to the protocol before you expressly recognizes that the European Defense Community will strengthen the defense of the North Atlantic area.

This committee is fully familiar with the geographic scope of article V of the North Atlantic Treaty as defined in article VI thereof.¹¹ You recently considered this anew in connection with the Greece-Turkey protocol.¹² The protocol before you now extends article VI to cover the territory of the German Federal Republic and the German contingents of EDC in the area covered by article VI as established by the Greece-Turkey protocol.

The protocol you are considering is expressly contingent on reciprocity. It will remain effective only so long as the parties to EDC grant equivalent guaranties to the parties of the North Atlantic Treaty as are extended to EDC countries

⁹ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 10 and released to the press on the same date.

¹⁰ S. Executives Q and R, 82d Cong., 2d sess., June 2, 1952.

¹¹ Article VI of the North Atlantic Treaty reads as follows:

"For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties."

¹² BULLETIN of Oct. 22, 1951, p. 651.

⁸ BULLETIN of June 16, 1952, p. 947.

by this protocol, and for so long as both the Edc Treaty and the NAT remain in force.

The protocol by which the Edc nations will extend guaranties to the NATO nations has been presented to you for information and appears on page 228 of the published documents before this committee.

This protocol says that Edc nations have the same obligations with respect to an armed attack on the territory of any party of the North Atlantic Treaty in the area covered by article VI (1) of the North Atlantic Treaty, or upon the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any NATO nation in the territory covered by article VI (2) of the North Atlantic Treaty as the obligations assumed by the NATO nations by the protocol under consideration. In effect, Germany has assumed the obligations of article V of the treaty with respect to NATO nations. Of course this protocol cannot run longer than the term of the North Atlantic Treaty itself and would likewise terminate if Edc were to be dissolved. This is clearly and expressly set forth in article III of the treaty.

Although the Edc protocol is not yet effective, article II of the NATO protocol expressly provides that the protocol before you for action at this time does not become effective until the Edc protocol is effective.

I do not believe I need to enlarge before this committee on the obligations created by this protocol. It is subject to all of the interpretation, definitions, and limitations governing article V of the North Atlantic Treaty with which this committee is so familiar.

We have all considered the North Atlantic Treaty one of our stoniest bulwarks against aggression and one of the greatest deterrents to aggression. Therein it serves the cause of peace. This protocol is intended to serve the cause of peace by recognizing the role of Edc as an organ for collective security integrated with NATO.

STATEMENT BY HIGH COMMISSIONER McCLOY¹³

I would like to present to you the reasons that in my opinion justify approval by the Senate of the agreements signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952, between the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany.

These agreements are the natural consequence of two facts: (1) since 1945 Western Germany has made steady and substantial progress toward democratic government, and (2) the integration

of the Federal Republic with the Western Nations is essential to the peace, freedom, and security of the free peoples. I believe that this bold but calculated policy of partnership with Germany will widen the horizon on a new, constructive era in the history of Europe and of the Atlantic world.

The signing of the agreements at Bonn and of the European Defense Treaty at Paris was an act of historic importance. Up to now the people of this country have not had an opportunity to appreciate the full significance of these events. They mark not only an immediate turning point in post-war history. They begin a movement that may profoundly influence future history.

Seven years ago Germany was a physical, economic, and moral ruin. In and around Germany the deepest hatreds and the most tragic sorrows of our civilization had concentrated. Germany was potentially an open target for nihilism, for the revival of nazism, for communism. There was danger that 67,000,000 people in the strategic center of Europe might be harnessed to forces seeking the destruction of free government throughout the world.

In 1945 the Western Allies hoped that the Soviet Union would join them in the task of reconstruction of Germany on democratic foundations. It soon became apparent that the Soviets were seeking the complete domination of Germany on a totalitarian basis. With these Soviet intentions in mind, the Western Powers decided that at least in their zones of occupation and in the Western Sector of Berlin they would attempt to help the German people construct a democratic, peaceful society. This has been done.

Obviously, the Federal Republic is not yet a full-fledged democracy. It is only 3 years old. There are still clear traces of Nazi evils in Germany. There are men and women in the business and professional life of Germany who were once active Nazis. In one or two localities in the Federal Republic 10 percent of the people have voted for neo-Nazi platforms and leaders. There is also a Communist threat in Germany, though the Communist vote as such is less than 5 percent of the total vote and the party in the Federal Republic is one of the weakest in Europe. As long as such extremist groups exist, as long as certain traditionalist forces try to bar progress, there is danger, and danger should not be minimized.

The compelling fact, however, in the Federal Republic is that a great majority of the German people solidly support the parliamentary system of government and that democratic institutions and thought are growing in all parts of Germany. Moreover, as German integration with the West develops and a closer association with the free peoples of the West comes about, the extremist groups will lose much, if not all, of the minority following they now have.

¹³ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 12 and released to the press on the same date. Mr. McCloy returned to Washington on June 3 for the purpose of testifying before congressional committees considering the German Agreements, the Edc Treaty, and the North Atlantic Treaty protocol.

Promising Developments in Germany

Politically, a stable constitutional form of government is developing in the Federal Republic. From the local, county, and state up to the national level, firmly established representative governing bodies are in control. The German Bundestag, a freely elected parliament, carries on its business in freedom, without fear or suppression. Its debates are generally on a high level. The Bundestag has many achievements: It has passed the Schuman Plan and it has developed a whole system of progressive social legislation. Although, unfortunately, the Social Democrats, who are in opposition to the Government of Chancellor Adenauer, oppose many policies that advance the cause of peace and European integration, one must recognize that this party is firmly anti-Communist and pro-democratic.

Economically, the advances made by the Federal Republic are amazing. Stimulated by the aid of the United States the industrious German people have made large advances in repairing the devastation of war. The great cities of Western Germany, such as Frankfort, Stuttgart, Munich, Hamburg, and Düsseldorf, are being rebuilt. Production in the Federal Republic is over 140 percent of 1936. Exports are now beyond \$4,000,000,000 a year and the dollar gap has been closing. While Germany, like other European countries, will certainly require some economic aid in order to make its full contribution to defense, economic aid has been on a diminishing scale as recovery proceeds.

In the day to day life of the nation there are promising developments. Citizens of all ages and groups are participating increasingly in community and national activities.

The youth of the Federal Republic are showing healthy attitudes. They are not eager to parade about in brown, red, or blue shirts. They do not want to march or to be in uniform any more than young Americans. I am certain, however, that in defense of their own freedom young Germans will perform their duty well and, if their present mood holds, they will do so without the fanfare and the slogans of the past.

German youth is patriotic, but not nationalistic. A large number of young Germans is European-minded. Those young people are seeking the wider horizons of the European-Atlantic community and they must not be disappointed in their search.

The women of Germany are playing a larger role than ever before. Women comprise more than half of the German electorate and among them are some of the bravest spirits in Germany. Women are forming many organizations and groups. They are speaking up on local and national issues. They serve as valuable members of city councils and state legislatures. Thirty-seven women sit in the German Parliament.

One thousand newspapers and the decentralized radio stations of the Federal Republic are free and speak out freely and actively on all issues. The Association of German Trade Unions, with more than 5,000,000 members, is in democratic hands.

These developments in German life do not appear to be sufficiently dramatic for headlines but they are responsible for the fact that after vigorous debate on all issues, after the political crises and controversies which are at least as natural in Germany as they are in this country, the Federal Republic has been taking the steps that associate it with the free peoples of the European-Atlantic community.

Soviet Campaign of Terror and Conquest

There is one massive threat to this peaceful, progressive development in Germany. It comes from the Kremlin. The Communists are now engaged in a mighty campaign to prevent German ratification of the agreements and German participation in the growing European community.

The Communists are alternating blandishments of peace with threats of war to achieve their aims in Germany. Soviet propaganda uses all techniques and weapons. Soviet-controlled radio stations pour out threats and promises 24 hours each day. Soviet-controlled presses turn out millions of copies of newspapers, pamphlets, and books aimed at the German people. Communist films with poisonous propaganda aimed chiefly at the United States are widely distributed. You should see some of them to appreciate their violence. Messages from the Kremlin, maneuvers of the Soviet Army, youth demonstrations, street riots, proclamations of the Communist puppet government of East Germany are all tied into this mighty effort.

Few men and women who have not lived or worked in Germany nor maintained close contact with German developments can have any concept of the strength of Communist propaganda directed toward Germany or of the organization and infiltration tactics of the Communists. Only those who have to contend with it every day, repel it, and take the offensive against it can fully comprehend the imagination, energy, and the determination which go into this Soviet psychological campaign against the Federal Republic and the United States.

The Soviet propaganda campaign against the Federal Republic is not the only Communist threat and warning to the Germans and to the other free peoples. There are other moves in the Soviet plan of domination. In West Berlin the Soviets are re-commencing their harassing tactics; in the East zone of Germany the Soviets are building up the so-called "Volkspolizei—" People's Police—and the "Bereitschaften—" shock troops. This entire campaign of terror and conquest is directed against the 50,000,000 people of West

Germany and West Berlin. It is inconceivable that the free Germans could withstand the impact of these blows if the Western nations did not stand at their side.

What I have said will make clear, I hope, why agreements with the Federal Republic are necessary. First, the people of Western Germany have shown their maturity and earned their right to the freedom which the new agreements provide. Secondly, the agreements strengthen the movement towards the integration of the European-Atlantic community. Thirdly, it is both impossible and undesirable to try to keep Germany under occupation. Occupied peoples cannot be free peoples. Occupied peoples do not make lasting partners. In the interest of democracy, in the interest of European integration, in the interest of building up the defensive strength of the free world, these agreements are vital.

There is another reason for these agreements. It is unthinkable that the German people, a vigorous, active people, can remain neutral between the Communist-dominated world and the free world. They are not the type of people who stand aside. Moreover, postwar history has taught us that the Communists take over states which cannot protect themselves. The idea of a neutral, unarmed Germany is appealing but it bears no relationship to reality. Such a Germany would inevitably fall under Soviet control. Its resources and manpower would be geared to the Communist machine directed against the free peoples.

The leaders of the Federal Republic and a majority of the German people know that such neutrality would be a phantom and that it would quickly lead to slavery.

The negotiations which were carried on in Bonn and in Paris took full cognizance of all these factors and forces. The negotiations were successful because all parties to the conventions recognized the urgent need for agreement.

In Bonn, I was the responsible U.S. representative at the negotiations. I am happy to state that on all sides, British, French, and German, the negotiations were carried on in a friendly, though serious manner. We had to liquidate a tragic venture and solve many complex problems. Yet we were all determined to avoid the aftermath of previous peace conferences when the victor set forth the terms and the vanquished signed. Certain programs and policies started by the Western Powers after the war were recognized by the Germans as necessary to the development of a progressive German community. Provision had to be made for them as well as for the continued stationing of large non-German forces in the Federal Republic.

There were crises, there were long hours of debate over important political, financial, and defense problems. There were compromises. All in all, however, the nations at the conference

table had a great vision before them—the vision of a united, strong, freedom-loving, and freedom-defending European and Atlantic community. The agreements signed at Bonn, and at Paris, were born of reason and hope. They were not dictated by revenge or resentment. Throughout our meetings the sustained statesmanship and determination of the German Chancellor were great contributions to the success of the negotiations.

The President has already submitted for the consideration of the Senate a copy of the Convention on Relations between the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, with an annex containing the Charter of the Arbitration Tribunal. Other documents signed at Bonn which are in the nature of implementing or administrative agreements have been transmitted for your information. Also you have summaries of all documents.

Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany

I shall now cover briefly the most important points in the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic and the main provisions of the Charter of the Arbitration Tribunal.

This convention is the political agreement establishing the basic principles which will govern the new relationships with the Federal Republic. It grants the Federal Republic widest authority over its internal and external affairs; it defines the rights retained by the Three Powers; it sets forth the objectives of a common policy for all. The granting of freedom to the Federal Republic is achieved in the following way:

- The Occupation Statute is repealed;
- The Allied High Commission and the Land Commissions are abolished;
- Henceforth the Three Powers will conduct their relations with the Federal Republic through ambassadors;
- The foreign armed forces stationed in the Federal territory are no longer occupation forces, their sole mission now being to secure the defense of the free world;
- The Federal Republic, released from all control, will thus be able, on its own responsibility, to develop its democratic and federal institutions within the framework of its basic law.

The rights retained by the Allies derive from the fact that Germany is divided and that it is impossible, in the current international situation, to conclude a peace treaty. The rights retained by the Three Powers relate to (1) the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the protection of their security; (2) Berlin; and (3) questions relating to Germany as a whole, including the problems of unification and the peace settlement.

The convention places obligations on each party to preserve these rights. Thus, while the Federal Republic must abstain from any action prejudicing these rights and agrees to facilitate their exercise by the Three Powers, the latter, in return, undertake to consult the Federal Republic in respect of their implementation.

Likewise, although the Three Powers have the power, in certain circumstances endangering the security of the forces, to declare a state of emergency over all or part of the Federal territory, they can do so only if the Federal Republic and EDC are unable to meet the emergency. In such circumstances they will utilize to the greatest possible extent the assistance of the Federal Government and the other German authorities. Furthermore, the measures they may take during this exceptional period are restricted to the minimum necessary to restore the situation.

As regards Berlin, the Federal Republic promises to furnish its utmost cooperation for the political, cultural, economic, and financial reconstruction of the city.

The convention clarifies the new status of the Federal Republic and it outlines the framework of a common policy. The immediate objective is to integrate the Federal Republic, on the basis of equality, in the European community now being shaped, which is itself a part of the community of free nations. This is why the Federal Republic agrees to conduct its affairs in conformity with the principles stated in the Charter of the United Nations and with the objectives defined by the Statute of the Council of Europe; asserts its intention to become a member of the international organizations of the free world; and freely undertakes to participate in the European Defense Community.

A second objective is the reunification by peaceful means of a free Germany. Thus, the four signatory states are resolved that the peace settlement for the whole of Germany shall be freely negotiated by all the parties; they also agree that they will extend to a unified Germany the rights conferred on the Federal Republic by the new agreements and treaties contributing to the creation of an integrated European community upon the assumption by such a unified Germany of the obligations of the Federal Republic under those agreements and treaties.

The Convention on Relations contains an important revision clause which also applies to all the related conventions. Under this clause, the terms of the conventions shall be reviewed at the request of one of the four states in the event of German unification, the creation of a European federation or any other occurrence which the four states jointly recognize to be of fundamental significance. The parties will then open negotiations with a view to modifying the conventions to the extent necessary to take into account the changes that have occurred in the situation.

Summary of the Charter of the Arbitration Tribunal

The Convention on Relations creates an arbitration tribunal which is particularly characteristic of the new contractual relationship between Germany and the Allies. The composition and machinery of the Tribunal are set out in a charter annexed to the convention. The Tribunal is designed to secure and maintain actual equality of treatment between the Three Allied Powers and the Federal Republic. The Tribunal will be composed of nine members, three from the Federal Republic, one each from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, and three other "neutral members" appointed by agreement between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic.

The Tribunal has jurisdiction over all disputes arising between the Allies and the Germans over application of the contractual agreements which the parties have been unable to settle by negotiation. The only disputes excluded are those connected with the special Allied rights regarding Berlin, all-German matters, and the stationing and security of Allied troops in Germany. The powers of the Tribunal are extensive and its judgments are final.

In general, the subsidiary conventions are detailed agreements which carry out the termination of the Occupation which is the basic purpose of the general convention. We are adopting the precedent set in the Japanese treaty whereby the administrative agreements are treated as executive agreements.

Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and Occupation

This convention is concerned with the liquidation in an orderly fashion of the Occupation. Much of this convention will cease to have meaning when the Germans fulfill certain obligations which they take under it. It governs the status of Allied legislation in relation to German law. It provides for the carrying out of certain Allied policies as yet uncompleted, and the temporary availability of property for ambassadorial use under the new status.

Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and Their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany

These arrangements include matters of jurisdiction, capacity of the forces to enforce their own discipline, administration, and support—their freedom from taxation and their cooperation with German authorities in the matter of customs laws and regulations.

Financial Convention

This agreement, in the main, implements the decision of Germany to make a financial contribu-

tion to the defense of Europe in accordance with the informal determination of the so-called three wise men as to her capacity. It also specifies those facilities and services which are to be given the forces free of charge in Germany, and the basis for payment of others. It regulates the matter and method of fixing and paying damages, public and private, for the future.

The Bonn agreements, the Schuman Plan, the European Defense Treaty are parts of a whole. Together they can comprise one of the greatest achievements in modern statesmanship. A few years ago it would have seemed fantastic to believe that the steel and coal industries of France, Germany, and of the other Western European countries would come under one authority. The idea of a common European defense force was remote; partnership between France and Germany unthinkable. Though barriers are still in the way, despite the crises that are bound to arise, the great start has been made.

In a year or so the young people of Western Europe—French, Germans, Belgians, Netherlands, Italians, and others—will be trained according to the same standards; they will be commanded by officers going through the same schools; they may be wearing the same uniform and marching under the same banner. Political institutions on a European-wide basis must necessarily follow.

Here is a vista for Europe, for the Atlantic community, and the world. The submersion of inter-European rivalries, the lowering of European barriers is of deep significance. It will put the free peoples of the West in a better position to take care of their own needs and make them stronger in the defense of their own freedom. As Europe grows stronger in the defense of freedom, we shall all grow stronger. And though our partnership must become tighter, Europe's need for our resources will gradually diminish.

Such are the great goals. The German statesmen, as well as the others sitting around the Bonn and Paris tables, were convinced of the need to reach out for these objectives. There was no attempt by the Western Allies to purchase German support and no such attempt would have been successful. The decision of the Germans to enter the community was a decision based on their own political philosophy and on their own estimate of Germany's best interests.

Moreover, and it is most essential to emphasize this fact, the agreements signed at Bonn and Paris are not a threat to anybody. They are completely defensive in character. They are deliberately designed to assure that no nation can leave the community to start an aggressive adventure of its own. It would not have the supplies, the equipment, or the support system to make such an attempt. Nor is the organization as a whole capable of aggressive action. By their nature the agreements signed at Bonn and Paris are peaceful, but they are de-

signed to guarantee that totalitarian aggressors will not be able to overrun and dominate the free peoples of Europe and of the Western World. These agreements are provocative only in the sense that it is provoking to close the door in front of an intruder. Once established, the new European community, in association with the Atlantic community, would be in firm position to approach a long-range settlement of our difficulties with the Russians.

The question now arises whether or not the German Bundestag will ratify the agreements. A great ratification debate has been going on in the Federal Republic for some time. This debate is being carried on in the shadow of Soviet threats. It is affected by the understandable desire of the German people for unification of their country and the fear of taking steps that would make the present split of the country permanent.

The Adenauer Cabinet has recommended ratification. The center parties that form the coalition government are in favor of ratification, though not all members of the coalition are pleased with all provisions of all the agreements. The major opposition comes from the strong Social Democratic party which is using every device to try to defeat ratification and in its opposition frequently finds itself aligned with the Communist and Neo-Nazi fringe parties which are also opposed to the agreements.

The Chancellor, I am advised, is seeking ratification this summer. The decision will be made by a free Bundestag which in turn will be affected by a free German public opinion. It is my belief that unless some unforeseen development occurs the Bundestag will ratify the agreements. They cannot come into effect, however, until they have been ratified by all countries involved in the Bonn agreements and in the European Defense Community. I hope that such ratification will take place by autumn. It is obvious that the Soviet will take advantage of any delays in this country or in Germany and France to try to prevent ratification. For that reason speed is important.

With ratification we shall no longer be in occupation in Germany. All troops stationed in the Federal Republic will be defense troops. The French, British, Americans, Belgians, Germans and others will be partners in the common defense. This will require considerable readjustment in methods and attitudes, but such a development is already under way.

How soon German contingents in the European army can be formed depends on the speed of ratification. Should ratification by all countries concerned take place by November it is likely that the first German contingents will be in uniform in 1953.

Final Questions

Final questions arise in connection with the agreements. Will the Germans be reliable? Will

they carry out these conventions? Can they be trusted?

First, some question has developed over the attitude of the Social Democratic opposition toward the agreements. There is, as I have said, strong opposition from certain quarters to the agreements. There is reason to believe, however, that even if the Socialists were to come into power as a result of the elections in the summer of 1953, they would not repudiate agreements entered into by a freely elected government and approved by a freely elected parliament. In my judgment there are too many true democrats in the Socialist party to support such a position. The Neo-Nazis would have no hesitation in trying to tear up agreements but not the Social Democrats. I have no doubt that the Socialists would attempt revision, but I should doubt that they would try repudiation.

Second, there is the question of the general trustworthiness of the German people and their leaders. Inside Germany the basic attachment to the democratic order, the recognition that Germany's fate is tied to that of the free peoples, the fear of Communist domination of Western Germany combine to give a positive answer to the question. In my opinion the Germans will be trustworthy if they attain equal partnership within the European-Atlantic community, if the other nations take all possible peaceful measures to bring about the unification of Germany on a basis of freedom. I believe the Germans will be prepared to share the burdens as well as to accept the rewards of partnership.

Seen in perspective these agreements are historic. They incorporate the fundamental aspirations of mankind—to live in unity, peace, and freedom. The rival nations of Europe are giving up some of their sovereignty in order to achieve union. They have drawn up the conventions which will enable them to sit together, work together, defend together, live together.

The United States can take pride in the role it has played in recent years to help bring together the peoples of Europe. Our contributions and our participation have been crucial. In our own interests we must continue, I believe, to be associated in this great joint endeavor.

The agreements at Bonn and Paris were a major defeat for the Communists. They are a victory for the free people of Europe and those who want to be free.

Reparations Clause of German Contractual Agreements

[Released to the press June 11]

The United States and the United Kingdom Governments declare that they have not asserted, and do not intend to assert, any claim for repara-

tions out of current production. They have consistently opposed and intend to oppose the exaction of such reparations by any other power.

The French Government takes note of the situation of fact and therefore associates itself with article 1 of chapter VI of the Convention on Settlement of Matters Arising Out of Foreign Occupation.¹

Missions Raised to Embassy Rank

Vietnam

The Governments of the United States and of Vietnam announced June 6 the establishment of a Vietnamese Embassy at Washington and the elevation of the American Legation at Saigon to the rank of Embassy. This diplomatic development, designed to strengthen the ties between the young state of Vietnam and the United States, will become effective as soon as the Vietnamese Ambassador Designate, Tran Van Kha, has presented his credentials to the President of the United States, and the American Ambassador Designate, Donald R. Heath, currently American Minister to the Associated States, has received confirmation of his new appointment by the U.S. Senate.

Thus, further formal recognition is given to the progress achieved in the past 3 years during which Vietnam has taken its place among the independent nations of the free world. A member of the French Union, of which Cambodia and Laos, the other two Associated States, are also a part, Vietnam has assumed its full responsibilities as an active participant in the struggle to maintain freedom against Communist aggression.

Cambodia

On the same date the Governments of the United States and of Cambodia announced officially the elevation to Embassy status of their respective diplomatic missions at Washington and Phnom Penh. This diplomatic development symbolizes the strengthening of the ties between the two Governments and will become effective as soon as the Cambodian Ambassador Designate, Nong Kimny, has presented his credentials as Ambassador to the President of the United States and as soon as the American Ambassador Designate, Mr. Heath, has had his nomination confirmed by the U.S. Senate. A member of the French Union, Cambodia is a constitutional monarchy under the young and progressive King Norodom Sihanouk.

¹ For text of chapter VI of the convention, see Senate Executives Q and R, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 59. For a summary of this chapter, see BULLETIN of June 9, 1952, p. S90.

Who Are Our New Immigrants?

*by Frank L. Auerbach*¹

You have asked me to discuss with you the topic: "Who Are Our New Immigrants?" This is a particularly pertinent problem for the National Council on Naturalization and Citizenship and the council's member organizations. Since you all are concerned with the integration of the immigrant into the American community, it is, of course, essential for you to have the very best understanding of who the immigrants are you want to help, not only as individuals but as a group, and where your services will most be needed.

I should like to examine with you today two questions which have an important bearing on the broad subject "Who Are Our New Immigrants?" I should like to examine whether we can anticipate from which countries our immigrants are likely to come in the near future, and further, whether the regional distribution of our immigrants in the United States has been influenced in the past and will be influenced in the future by the operation of our immigration laws.

Of course, it is impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy who our new immigrants will be. But we get some indication of our future immigration under the regular immigration laws if we examine data collected by the Visa Division of the Department of State on the number of persons who have registered for immigration under oversubscribed quotas with the various American consular offices abroad.

The most recent available compilation shows that on November 1, 1951, 773,465 aliens were registered with American consulates as intending immigrants under oversubscribed quotas. Of these 773,465 aliens, 13,760 are classified as qualified immigrants, that is aliens who had already been examined by American consular officers and were ready for visa issuance except for the availability of quota numbers. By far the largest number,

759,705, are listed as unqualified immigrants, that is, they have not been examined yet by American consular officers but have signified their interest in coming to this country as immigrants by submitting registration forms.

Quota Nationalities

Let us examine these intending immigrants by their quota nationality, that is the quota to which they are chargeable under existing laws. By far the largest group of these prospective immigrants, 262,680, are chargeable to the German quota. The next largest group, 138,125, are chargeable to the Polish quota; 36,866 to the quota of the Netherlands; 29,692 to the quota of Rumania; 28,999 to the quota of Yugoslavia; 24,201 to the quota of Italy; and 22,352 to the quota of Austria. Aliens registered on other quota waiting lists are all below the 20,000 mark for each quota nationality.

These figures must be evaluated with care. Many of those registered, it must be expected, will never come to this country; some may have registered on a sudden impulse and may have long since given up their plan to come to this country; others may be discouraged by long waiting periods; and still others may not be able to meet the requirements of our immigration laws. In evaluating the significance of these quota waiting lists in relation to our future immigration, we must, of course, also take into account the annual quotas established for these various countries. Even if all the 262,680 aliens registered for immigration to the United States under the German quota would wait until their turn is reached and if they all could meet the requirements of our immigration laws, it would take much more than 10 years for them to come to this country. The German quota is 25,957 annually. Portions of the annual quota will be absorbed by immigrants with first and second preference-quota status. Immigration from other countries will be curtailed for years to come by the so-called "mortgaging" of these quotas under the Displaced Persons Act of

¹ Excerpts from an address made before the National Council of Naturalization and Citizenship, National Council of Social Work, at Chicago, Ill., on May 27 and released to the press on the same date. Mr. Auerbach is a foreign affairs officer in the Visa Division.

1948, as amended. If you take, for example, Poland with an annual quota of 6,524, you have to realize that through the admission of displaced persons 25 percent of this quota is already used until the fiscal year of 1954, and 50 percent of it is used from the year 1954 to the year 2,000.

Volume of Future Immigration

The extent to which the volume of future immigration will be affected by the admission of displaced persons is shown by the following data which list the annual quota of each country and the fiscal year through which annual quotas have in part been absorbed—25 percent through 1954 and 50 percent through the year as indicated—by visas issued to displaced persons:

Country	Annual Quota	Year
Albania.....	100	1956
Austria.....	1, 413	1955
Bulgaria.....	100	1963
China.....	100	1964
Czechoslovakia.....	2, 874	1958
Danzig.....	100	1962
Estonia.....	116	2146
Germany.....	25, 957	1953
Greece.....	310	2013
Hungary.....	869	1989
Iran.....	100	1956
Latvia.....	236	2274
Lithuania.....	386	2090
Poland.....	6, 524	2000
Rumania.....	291	2019
Trieste.....	100	1958
Turkey.....	226	1964
U.S.S.R.....	2, 798	1980
Yugoslavia.....	938	2114

The significance of the data which I have given you, however, is not to predict the waiting period for immigrants under any given quota, but rather to show under which quotas we have heavy registrations and thus can anticipate a full use of these quotas for years to come.

You have to consider another aspect and that is that immigrants chargeable to open quotas do not appear on the State Department's list of aliens registered as intending immigrants under over-subscribed quotas. The immigration from some of these countries is not negligible. From Great Britain—with an annual quota of 65,721—131,592 aliens have entered the United States as immigrants during the last 10 years; and from Ireland—with an annual quota of 17,853—25,377 have come during the same period. From the nonquota countries of the Western Hemisphere, some 300,000 immigrants have come between 1941 and 1950. In other words, we see that we may anticipate a continued pressure on our quotas from the countries of central and southern Europe, a moderate immigration from countries with open quotas, and a significant number of immigrants coming as nonquota immigrants from the Americas.

Regional Concentration of Immigrants

Many studies have been made on the cultural and ethnic background of immigrants who have come to the United States, their occupations, age, and sex composition, and their place of settlement. Little, if any, attention has been given, however, to the question of the extent to which the operation of the existing immigration laws is responsible for the concentration of our immigrants in a very few States of this country. New York, California, Texas, Michigan, New Jersey, and Massachusetts have always been the States with the largest alien population. According to data prepared by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, of the 2,260,984 aliens who submitted annual address reports in January 1951, 24 percent lived in New York State, 14 percent in California, 7 percent in Texas, 6 percent in Massachusetts, and 5 percent in New Jersey and Michigan. All other States had a registered alien population of one percent or less with the exception of Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Florida, Arizona, and Washington, which had between one and five percent aliens. Mr. Mackey, the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, told you at your recent annual meeting at New York that of recently naturalized aliens three-fifths lived in just four States: New York, Massachusetts, Michigan, and California. Fifty-nine percent resided in large cities of 100,000 inhabitants or more. Twenty-seven percent resided in urban areas with populations of 25,000 to 100,000.

Let me now examine whether this continued regional concentration of our immigrants is at least in part due to the operations of our immigration laws. There are three important provisions in our immigration laws which, I believe, tend to perpetuate the geographical trend of our immigrant settlement.

Pertinent Provisions of Immigration Laws

The first important provision, a very sound and commendable one which, however, encourages the geographical concentration of immigrants, is based on the principle of reuniting families. This principle has found its expression particularly in those provisions of our immigration laws which give nonquota status to children and wives of American citizens and to husbands of American citizens, by marriage, before January 1, 1948, and preference-quota status to parents of American citizens, husbands of American citizens, by marriage, since January 1, 1948, and to children and wives of permanent resident aliens. We must realize that if a sufficiently large demand exists from these preference-quota categories, the entire quota of a country may be absorbed by these preference groups. The only group of immigrants which enjoys a quota preference without

belonging to the relative groups are skilled agriculturists in quotas of over three hundred; but as you know, there has been in recent years little demand for preference status by qualified agriculturists.

Thus, we see that, particularly in countries with small quotas, the entire quota in a given year may consist of fireside relatives of American citizens and permanent resident aliens. It is not surprising that these immigrants will move in with their families in this country and so further increase the urban trend in immigration settlement.

There are two other important provisions in our immigration laws which, I believe, tend to concentrate new immigrants in the areas of existing settlements of foreign-born. First of all, our immigration laws require an immigrant to prove that he is not likely to become a public charge. In most cases, aliens prove this by submitting affidavits of support with which you all are very much familiar. American consular officers normally will accept such affidavits of support as evidence only if the affiant can show that he has some legal or convincing moral obligation to support the prospective immigrant. Thus, this affiant will usually be a relative or a very close friend. Again, it is likely that the new immigrant, once he comes to this country, will move in with his affiant, or at least will move into the same community in which his affiant lives since he expects, as a rule, help from the affiant in making a start in this country.

The contract-labor clause of our immigration laws is the third provision which, in my opinion, at least indirectly, prevents a wider geographical distribution of our new immigrants. As you know, this law, with some exceptions, makes an alien inadmissible if a job involving predominantly manual labor is promised to him in this country. Thus, employment opportunities in this country which may exist away from the traditional areas of immigrant settlement, under existing law, cannot be offered to our new immigrants before their arrival and first settlement in this country.

Departures From General Trend

Due to special legislation, two significant departures from this general trend which I just described have taken place in recent years. The first is the wartime legislation facilitating the immigration of war brides of American soldiers. This group of new immigrants, who are now rapidly becoming our new citizens, has spread throughout the country more widely than any other group of immigrants in recent years. This obviously is due to the fact that our soldiers who married abroad have come from all parts of the country and thus took their brides back home to practically all the States of the Union.

The other important departure from the tradi-

tional trend of immigrant settlement is the settlement of displaced persons who have come under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended. Although no final statistics are available at this time, preliminary data indicate that these immigrants spread more widely throughout the country than other immigrants who have come under our regular immigration laws. You will remember that in the case of these displaced persons, the three provisions of our law which I believe are at least in part responsible for the continued pattern of our immigrant settlement, as a rule, did not apply. They were not only exempt from the contract-labor law but they were required to have assurances of employment, housing, and against becoming a public charge. These assurances took the place of the affidavit of support, so that the sponsors of these displaced persons, in most instances, were prospective employers, and not necessarily relatives or close friends. And finally the admission of these displaced persons was not predicated on nonquota or preference-quota status on the basis of relationship.

What can we learn from this experience for the future? Immigration under existing law, I believe, will continue to follow the same pattern, geographically speaking, as past immigration has followed. Should, however, any of the now pending omnibus immigration bills be enacted, we may see a significant change in this pattern, a change which potentially could be of great importance to your future work.

All omnibus immigration bills introduced in Congress during the second session of the Eighty-second Congress, contain identical provisions which would give a preference of 50 percent of each quota "to qualified quota immigrants whose services are determined by the Attorney General to be needed urgently in the United States because of the high education, technical training, specialized experience, or exceptional ability of such immigrants and to be substantially beneficial prospectively to the national economy, cultural interests, or welfare of the United States," and to the spouses and children of these skilled aliens. As I said before, this provision is identically provided in the House-passed Walter Omnibus Bill, H. R. 5678; the McCarran Bill, S. 2550; and in the so-called Humphrey-Lehman Bill, S. 2842. Aliens qualified for these preferences will be attracted to come to this country by employment, not by relationship. Their skills may be needed in any part of our country whether there may or may not be a large foreign-born population. Whatever is left in the omnibus bills of the contract-labor law, and very little is left of it, does not apply to these skilled aliens who are entitled to a 50 percent quota preference. This provision of the omnibus bills will open the doors of our country to new seed immigrants, persons who do not come attracted by family ties but come on the merit of their skills and their usefulness to

our country. Questions have been raised during the consideration of the omnibus bills whether they would be prohibitive of new seed immigration. I believe these fears were not only unfounded but it seems that the proposed legislation would permit much more new seed immigration than our immigration laws do now.

I have no doubt that sooner or later a provision providing for this so-called selective immigration of aliens needed in this country will become law. Such legislation, it appears, will bring immigrants to many communities which never have had experience with newcomers and which are thus not prepared to assist them with the manifold problems of integration and adjustment. The organizations you represent which have accumulated years of valuable experience in this field of immigrant adjustment will then be called upon either to expand their activities or to share their experience with family service and other community organizations throughout the country.

I am particularly glad that I have had the privilege to lay this problem before you today, a problem which, I know, will challenge the imagination of all of us and which you will tackle as successfully as you have tackled similar problems in the past.

Japanese Ambassador Araki Presents Letter of Credence

[Released to the press June 12]

Text of Ambassador's Remarks

MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to present to you the Letter of Credence which accredits me as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the Government of the United States of America.

I feel great responsibility for my appointment as the first Japanese Ambassador to the United States since her restoration of sovereignty and independence, and regaining of an honorable place among the family of nations. I take it as a great honor and privilege to represent Japan in a country which proved, with untiring efforts and farsighted leadership, to be the prime mover of events that had brought this status to my country.

On this occasion I wish to assure you, Mr. President, that I shall do my utmost to create ever deeper and friendlier relations between our two countries in full cooperation with the United States which is not only a leading country among those having the common causes of peace, justice, and freedom, but happens to be Japan's neighbor facing the same ocean.

In concluding may I avail myself of this opportunity, on behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Government of Japan, and the people of Japan, to extend to you, Mr. President, their sincere wishes for your well-being and for the

continued happiness and prosperity of the Government and the people of the United States of America.

Text of the President's Reply

MR. AMBASSADOR: I am happy to accept your Letter of Credence as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the United States.

The coming into force of the Treaty of Peace has brought to our two countries the opportunity to re-establish and to strengthen the close and friendly relationships of neighbor peoples. I welcome Japan's resumption of an honorable place among the family of nations and am glad of the part which the United States has been able to play in bringing this about.

Just as our causes are common—peace, justice, freedom—so must be the endeavor to achieve their fulfillment. On the basis of common purpose and the principles of democracy to which our two countries adhere, we can proceed to solve the problems which confront us.

Japan re-enters the family of nations at a time when aggression and the threat of aggression prevail. I am confident that Japan and the United States, in concert with the other nations of the free world, will be able to meet these dangers with courage, determination, and understanding.

I would appreciate it if you would extend to the Emperor my cordial wishes for his continued well-being, and to the Government and people of Japan my sincere desire for their progressive happiness and prosperity.

Letters of Credence

Brazil

The newly appointed Ambassador of Brazil, Walther Moreira Salles, presented his credentials to the President on June 12. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and for the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 460 of June 12.

Thailand

The newly appointed Ambassador of Thailand, Phot Sarasin, presented his credentials to the President on June 12. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and for the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 459 of June 12.

U. S. Recognizes New Bolivian Government

[Released to the press June 2]

The U.S. Chargé d'Affaires, Thomas J. Malady, at La Paz on June 2 informed the Foreign Minister of Bolivia, Walter Guevara Arce, of the recognition by the U.S. Government of the new Government in Bolivia.

Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments

Following is the text of a letter addressed to Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman by the Department's Acting Legal Adviser, Jack B. Tate:

MAY 19, 1952.

MY DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL:

The Department of State has for some time had under consideration the question whether the practice of the Government in granting immunity from suit to foreign governments made parties defendant in the courts of the United States without their consent should not be changed. The Department has now reached the conclusion that such immunity should no longer be granted in certain types of cases. In view of the obvious interest of your Department in this matter I should like to point out briefly some of the facts which influenced the Department's decision.

A study of the law of sovereign immunity reveals the existence of two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory of sovereign immunity, a sovereign cannot, without his consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts (*jure imperii*) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (*jure gestionis*). There is agreement by proponents of both theories, supported by practice, that sovereign immunity should not be claimed or granted in actions with respect to real property (diplomatic and perhaps consular property excepted) or with respect to the disposition of the property of a deceased person even though a foreign sovereign is the beneficiary.

The classical or virtually absolute theory of sovereign immunity has generally been followed by the courts of the United States, the British Commonwealth, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, and probably Poland.

The decisions of the courts of Brazil, Chile, China, Hungary, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, and Portugal may be deemed to support the clas-

sical theory of immunity if one or at most two old decisions anterior to the development of the restrictive theory may be considered sufficient on which to base a conclusion.

The position of the Netherlands, Sweden, and Argentina is less clear since although immunity has been granted in recent cases coming before the courts of those countries, the facts were such that immunity would have been granted under either the absolute or restrictive theory. However, constant references by the courts of these three countries to the distinction between public and private acts of the state, even though the distinction was not involved in the result of the case, may indicate an intention to leave the way open for a possible application of the restrictive theory of immunity if and when the occasion presents itself.

A trend to the restrictive theory is already evident in the Netherlands where the lower courts have started to apply that theory following a Supreme Court decision to the effect that immunity would have been applicable in the case under consideration under either theory.

The German courts, after a period of hesitation at the end of the nineteenth century have held to the classical theory, but it should be noted that the refusal of the Supreme Court in 1921 to yield to pressure by the lower courts for the newer theory was based on the view that that theory had not yet developed sufficiently to justify a change. In view of the growth of the restrictive theory since that time the German courts might take a different view today.

The newer or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity has always been supported by the courts of Belgium and Italy. It was adopted in turn by the courts of Egypt and of Switzerland. In addition, the courts of France, Austria, and Greece, which were traditionally supporters of the classical theory, reversed their position in the 20's to embrace the restrictive theory. Rumania, Peru, and possibly Denmark also appear to follow this theory.

Furthermore, it should be observed that in most of the countries still following the classical theory there is a school of influential writers favoring

the restrictive theory and the views of writers, at least in civil law countries, are a major factor in the development of the law. Moreover, the leanings of the lower courts in civil law countries are more significant in shaping the law than they are in common law countries where the rule of precedent prevails and the trend in these lower courts is to the restrictive theory.

Of related interest to this question is the fact that ten of the thirteen countries which have been classified above as supporters of the classical theory have ratified the Brussels Convention of 1926 under which immunity for government owned merchant vessels is waived. In addition the United States, which is not a party to the Convention, some years ago announced and has since followed, a policy of not claiming immunity for its public owned or operated merchant vessels. Keeping in mind the importance played by cases involving public vessels in the field of sovereign immunity, it is thus noteworthy that these ten countries (Brazil, Chile, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden) and the United States have already relinquished by treaty or in practice an important part of the immunity which they claim under the classical theory.

It is thus evident that with the possible exception of the United Kingdom little support has been found except on the part of the Soviet Union and its satellites for continued full acceptance of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity. There are evidences that British authorities are aware of its deficiencies and ready for a change. The reasons which obviously motivate state trading countries in adhering to the theory with perhaps increasing rigidity are most persuasive that the United States should change its policy. Furthermore, the granting of sovereign immunity to foreign governments in the courts of the United States is most inconsistent with the action of the Government of the United States in subjecting itself to suit in these same courts in both contract and tort and with its long established policy of not claiming immunity in foreign jurisdictions for its merchant vessels. Finally, the Department feels that the widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing business with them to have their rights determined in the courts. For these reasons it will hereafter be the Department's policy to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the consideration of re-

quests of foreign governments for a grant of sovereign immunity.

It is realized that a shift in policy by the executive cannot control the courts but it is felt that the courts are less likely to allow a plea of sovereign immunity where the executive has declined to do so. There have been indications that at least some Justices of the Supreme Court feel that in this matter courts should follow the branch of the Government charged with responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations.

In order that your Department, which is charged with representing the interests of the Government before the courts, may be adequately informed it will be the Department's practice to advise you of all requests by foreign governments for the grant of immunity from suit and of the Department's action thereon.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

JACK B. TATE
Acting Legal Adviser

U.S., Mexico Extend Migrant Labor Agreement

[Released to the press June 12]

The United States and Mexico exchanged diplomatic notes on June 12 extending the Migrant Labor Agreement of August 11, 1951. The agreement, which was due to expire on June 30, 1952, has been extended for a period of time not beyond December 31, 1953, unless terminated sooner by not less than 30 days' notice in writing by either of the two countries.

The Migrant Labor Agreement of 1951 was negotiated pursuant to Public Law 78 of the Eighty-second Congress which authorized the Secretary of Labor to recruit agricultural workers from Mexico in order to assist in the harvesting of crops in the United States.

In extending the present agreement, certain important amendments and additions have been made which are consistent with the interests of both countries. (Copies of the Migrant Labor Agreement of 1951, as amended, are available in the Department of Labor press room.)

Advancement of Good Will Throughout the World

by Perle Mesta
Minister to Luxembourg¹

Luxembourg is just a small country; but it is an important country.

It is, for one thing, the seventh greatest steel-producing country in the world. In this industrial age, steel is always important. Today, in the free world's struggle to maintain its freedom, it is all-important.

A lot of people will tell you that Europeans do not like Americans. Don't you believe it. Some may not, of course, but the people—the great masses—do.

The ones that do not make a great deal of noise. We hear that noise. We are too apt to judge all Europe by it.

We can't, however, ignore these noisemakers. The unity of all the free peoples is, today, our only hope of preserving our freedom. That unity must be real and solid.

We can depend upon our friends. We must do something about the others.

The leaders of the Soviets take care of opposition very effectively. They liquidate it. They kill, torture the leaders. The lesser peoples are sent off to die in slave-labor camps. We can't do that. We would not if we could. Our way is to change un-friends into friends.

Advertising U. S. to the Rest of the World

The first step, as I see it, is to find out why these people do not like us. Recently, I picked up a book which dealt with this problem. It was *Is Anybody Listening?* by William Whyte, Jr., one of the editors of *Fortune*. No doubt you have seen it.

Mr. Whyte devotes a chapter in his book to a

¹Excerpts from an address made before the forty-eighth annual convention of the Advertising Federation of America at New York on June 8 and released to the press on the same date.

discussion of why America is not popular with some Europeans.

He feels it is our fault. He says, for one thing, that we Americans have done a poor job of "selling" ourselves—advertising ourselves—to the rest of the world.

He says in his book that one day it might very well be written that the free world destroyed itself because of a myth. It would not be the Big Lie of the Russians; only fools believe that. It would be something more—the myth that for all our bathtubs and our cars and our skyscrapers, we were without moral purpose; that we are all money and no spirit; that we are, in short, a country without a soul.

I disagree with Mr. Whyte when he brushes off the Big Lie of the Russian Communists. That Big Lie is important. I'll come back to it later.

But he is very right when he speaks of this myth that we are a country without a soul. That myth exists. It does us much harm.

Mr. Whyte thinks—and again he is very right—that we have failed in making the moral basis of our national philosophy clear to the world.

He finds this inexcusable. We know better ourselves. But we have never bothered enough to make other peoples understand. We even paint ourselves very frequently as material-minded.

But that, you and I both know, isn't all of America.

Recently, I picked up another book. A travel book by an American writer. The author devoted two or three chapters to French plumbing and just two lines to Notre Dame Cathedral. And a line and a half of that was a lament over the lack of central heating in Notre Dame.

I know, of course, that hundreds of travel books do full justice to Notre Dame. Thousands and thousands have done justice to its beauty, its grandeur. I don't think for a moment that the writer, himself, failed to appreciate Notre Dame.

He had eyes; I assume a heart. No, it was just that he was sold on this picture of a material-minded America. He thought his fellow Americans would not understand how he felt. He assumed that his book would sell better on those chapters on plumbing.

Let us go back to that Big Lie of the Russian Communists. Mr. Whyte rather brushed it off. I can't. Some of their lies, yes. But the Russian Communists are very clever with their Big Lies. And it isn't just fools who swallow them.

The Communists, for example, make much of the charge that Americans are military-minded. That we are heading the world straight for World War III.

War is a living memory to the Europeans. Twice within the lifetime of many of them they have suffered the horrors of war. Their cities still bear the scars of World War I. They are just emerging from the rubble of World War II. They have known the shame and the terror of occupation. The Russian Communists rub in every tragic memory. They point to the military buildup in the United States. To our efforts to help other nations to arm.

We know it is for defense. The Europeans know, too, but they have their moments of doubt. They forget how rapidly in 1945 we demobilized our armies. Remember—"get the boys out of uniform"—"sell the war supplies"—"get back to peacetime production"!

All of us felt that way in 1945. And we did it. We know now we made a mistake. We were sincere in our determination to put war out of our minds. And we are still hoping and working for an everlasting peace.

Many Europeans understand exactly what we are doing. We must make the purpose of the defense program crystal clear. A recent Danish visitor writing for his magazine had this to say:

In America almost every uniformed person looks like a disguised civilian. Is there any better guarantee that the Americans do not threaten a troubled world with an aggressive war, than just this helplessness to convince you of their military vanity?

The same Dane felt we were remiss in not giving other peoples a better picture of our home life. He wrote:

And what was the question asked by other Danes after my return to my own country? Is there any home life in the United States? Are they not running around all the time, afraid of not earning money, or spending it in fancy, crazy ways?

This particular visitor traveled all over the United States. He made a point of seeing something of our home life for himself. He was enchanted with it.

We need to give the world a picture of this America. How?

Well, you all know something of the Voice of America program and that today it is being broadcast in some 46 languages. Radio Free Europe

and the Armed Forces Network are also doing a magnificent job of bringing true facts to the people.

State Department press materials with straight and honest news, periodicals, and pamphlets are available to millions of readers.

Last year, our Government films, covering every aspect of American life, business, education, recreation, home life, etc., gave their audiences throughout the world a better understanding of the American way of life. In the past year nearly eight thousand students, teachers, professors, and civic leaders came to this country from abroad under the educational exchange program. Six thousand of these came to the United States and returned or will return to tell America's story to the home folks.

The response to these programs has been very good. It will be increasingly better as stories of what has been seen, heard, and read are spread. But the Voice of America is more than just the State Department. It is all of us. It is our businessmen, newspapers, magazines, the films Hollywood sends overseas. It is our tourists abroad. It is you, the advertising people of America. Think of this sometimes when you are writing your ads. You are selling your goods. You are, also, selling America. Those ads of yours are read abroad. You can't imagine how eagerly. The people love them.

I would like to see the advertising people participate more fully in both the Government's programs and those of private organizations. You can bring a knowledge of "selling" to these programs that would be of inestimable value.

You know people. Use that knowledge in putting these programs over. You say "how?" There are many ways.

There is, for example, the educational exchange program. I think we could do a lot more than we do with these "exchanges." They are our best salesmen when they return. We should make sure that they see the real America. That they understand the meaning behind all these cars of ours, our bathtubs, telephones, et cetera. You advertising people should put your minds to that problem.

There are dozens of ways in which you could help.

Selective Literature Needed

Mr. Whyte was greatly disturbed over the lack of information overseas on American literature. I, personally, have been distressed over some of our books most widely read. *The Grapes of Wrath* is not a true picture of American life today and yet it is one book that can be found almost invariably in the bookstores of Paris, London, Rome, and Berlin.

I have often thought of what I would think of America if I were a European and *The Grapes*

of *Wrath* were the only story of American life I found available. Even John Steinbeck in an interview in Spain not too long ago said he would not have written *The Grapes of Wrath* today.

The Russians, you may be sure, are not missing any opportunities of getting their books into Europe—and certain ones of ours.

USE libraries springing up at our posts everywhere are helping to ease this lack of American literature abroad.

It would be wonderful if you advertising people could inspire American publishers to fill the bookstores of Europe with books that present a full view of American life.

I should like to see American private enterprise providing funds for textbooks and other equipment for schools in areas where formal education is still new for the masses. We must make every effort to counter the Soviet Big Lie for they have poured slanted texts into schools wherever the opportunity arose.

I should like to see something done about the type of films Hollywood sends to Europe. We produce good pictures. You rarely see them, however, along the boulevards.

These are a few of the spots where I think advertising people can be useful.

We cannot depend, however, upon just telling the other peoples of the world what nice people we are. It is 10 percent what we do. We talk an awful lot about cooperation between the free peoples. We ask them to cooperate with us. And at the same time we raise barriers against the only hope of making free-world unity work. I am talking, of course, of the increasing tendency to shut out foreign goods from our markets.

Prosperity Dependent on International Trade

We talk about the beauties of free enterprise. And then we put shackles on theirs. This is hurting us overseas. And I don't think it is doing us any good at home.

I am not going to put my finger on any particular products. You know what they are.

Luxembourg has not been particularly hurt by the "shut-outs." But Luxembourg is hurt when its neighbors suffer. It is a part of Europe. Its prosperity depends upon the prosperity of the whole.

In this country we are too apt to think of international trade as a matter of concern only to the traders themselves. We fail to see its part in the complete picture.

I am not talking about flooding American markets with foreign goods. But what is a small percentage to us is often of tremendous importance to other countries.

This growing tendency in America to close the doors to imports is having a most unhappy repercussion abroad. It is also a situation which the Soviets are quick to exploit. It has created fear in the hearts of all those who are working to build a solid economic foundation to the political and military unity of the free world. It is difficult for a European manufacturer who is having an increasingly hard time selling his products in the United States to resist offers made by Soviets—and many haven't.

I honestly do not believe, for example, that the American housewives buy less American cheese because, occasionally, they like to pick up a half pound or so of Swiss, Dutch, or Italian cheese. They like a variety. The American way to meet this situation would be to increase our over-all cheese appetite. I said I would not mention any particular products. I apologize for bringing in cheese. But it is a good example of what I mean.

The objective of what we Americans are trying to do in the world is clear. We want peace. We want social and economic progress as a basis for that peace—the only possible basis if that peace is to endure.

I suggest that you advertisers can influence American thinking greatly. Look what you have done with—well, I could name a dozen products. You have done a marvelous job in improving the American way of life—in adding to our enjoyment of life.

You can make an equally substantial contribution to the big job before us now.

CORRECTION

In the BULLETIN of May 26, 1952, p. 816, the subsection entitled "Recent Significant Developments" should begin at the top of page 814.

A Review of World Economic Events and Defense Adjustment Problems

by Isador Lubin

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More than a year has passed since the Council, at its twelfth session, last undertook a full-scale review of the world economic situation. When we met in February 1951, the vast defense effort was still in the early stages. It was painfully evident that large amounts of the free world's resources would have to be diverted to rearmament. But all of us who represented free peoples agreed that there was no other answer to the challenge of aggression.

The theme of the Santiago session centered around the question: What effect will the defense effort have on economic development?

In the debates of the Council, representatives of the underdeveloped countries expressed the fear that economic development would be neglected during the emergency period. They predicted that capital goods would not be available. Rising prices, they said, would reduce the purchasing power of their earnings and reserves before the supply situation would be eased and equipment would once more be obtainable. The requirements of defense, they contended, would dry up the sources of grants and loans from abroad.

Other fears were expressed by the representatives of the industrialized countries on this Council. They saw in the stepped-up defense effort the danger of raw material shortages, curtailment of civilian production, inadequate supplies of consumer goods, new balance of payment difficulties, and renewed inflation.

I believe it would be useful to review world economic events since the Santiago meeting in the light of the genuine concerns expressed at that time.

Broadly speaking, the task of governments in the economic field, during the interval, has been to

maintain or adopt policies that would increase production while holding inflation in check. Not all countries have been equally successful in their efforts. Their collective record, however, is impressive. It provides, I believe, a basis for facing the future with more confidence than most Council members were able to muster a year ago.

The economy of the free world has adjusted to the heavy burdens of defense with far fewer adverse consequences during the transition period than most people deemed possible. The free world, through an outpouring of production, has not only been able to provide large amounts of defense materials but has also been able to increase the supply of goods available to the civilian economy. As the Secretary-General points out in his comprehensive report on the world economic situation, more goods were produced by the world as a whole in 1951 than in any previous year in history. Improvements occurred in both the developed and the underdeveloped countries. The greatest improvements, however, took place in the countries which had already achieved the highest levels of production.

Hand in hand with this expanded production went an increase in the supplies of capital goods to the underdeveloped countries. The Secretary-General's World Economic Report tells us that:

The fears of the underdeveloped countries that they would be unable to procure capital goods from industrialized countries because of the demands of rearmament programs did not materialize during 1951. There were instances of supply difficulties and of a lengthening of delivery periods, but not of such a scale as to reduce imports. Imports of capital goods by underdeveloped countries were, in fact, substantially larger in 1951 than in 1950.

And may I refer particularly to what appears to me to be a highly significant aspect of the capital goods situation in 1951, as brought out by the Secretary-General's report? He states that imports

¹ Statement made before the Council on June 3 and released to the press by the U. S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

of goods of this type "could have been even higher, but for the fact that some underdeveloped countries were not prepared with enough development projects to enable them to absorb more capital goods."

Balance of International Transactions

At Santiago, also, the underdeveloped countries expressed the fear that rises in the prices of their own exports would soon be outstripped by even larger increases in the prices of their imports. But thanks in part to price controls applied by countries such as the United States, the fact is that in 1951 the underdeveloped countries were able to finance a substantially larger quantity of imports from all sources than in 1950. At the same time, they were able to increase their foreign exchange reserves enough to more than maintain the purchasing power of those reserves.

With regard to financial assistance to underdeveloped countries, those of you who were at Santiago may recall the question raised by one of the most respected delegates, the representative of India, who wondered whether the policy of positive assistance to economic development abroad would not demand heavier sacrifices from the people of the industrial nations, and particularly the people of the United States, than they would be prepared to make. This was a sincere and perfectly reasonable question. The answer is found in the events of the past 14 months. The records show that in 1951, notwithstanding the heavy burdens of defense, an increasing volume of grants and loans has been made available to the underdeveloped parts of the world. The Colombo Plan has been unfolding in Southeast Asia through the cooperative efforts of the members of the British Commonwealth and other friendly governments. The generous Norwegian people have recently established a public fund for aiding underdeveloped countries. U.S. assistance has been continued on an increasing scale.

As to fears of the industrialized countries that shortages of raw materials would cripple production and that civilian standards of living would consequently deteriorate, what do the facts reveal? With the exception of coal and steel in the European area, material shortages have proved to be less of a handicap to production than was anticipated. According to the most recent *Quarterly Bulletin* of the Economic Commission for Europe, the European industrial production index was 12 percent higher in 1951 than in 1950.

Meanwhile, the terms of trade, which had turned sharply against the countries of Western Europe, have tended to improve. This has been particularly true since the middle of 1951. To that extent the problem of balancing their international transactions has eased. It must be noted, however, that during this same period, the United Kingdom and France experienced in-

creased deficits in their trade balances—as distinct from their terms of trade.

I have merely made a very brief contrast of the fears as expressed at our twelfth session with what has actually happened. In the light of developments in World War II, these fears were understandable. The experience of 1951, as revealed by the excellent report of the Secretariat, shows, however, that the situation in this period of building for defense is so different that lessons of World War II have not, to any large extent, been relevant.

There are still problems of great urgency before us. It is our duty at these meetings to appraise them as best we can. To that task I now turn.

It remains as true now, as it was at our twelfth session, that the world economic situation is dominated by the world political situation. Long strides have been taken toward strengthening the defenses of the free world against aggression. But international relations continue tense. We need only to mention the fighting against the U. N. Forces in Korea, the fighting in Indochina, Burma, and Malaya. Yugoslavia is still threatened. No agreement has been possible on a treaty to end the Occupation of Austria. Tension mounts in Berlin. Military preparations continue to burden both the free countries and the totalitarian countries.

Until certain governments join in a program of disarmament and peaceful economic cooperation within the spirit and framework of the Charter, men and women who value their freedom, nations which value their independence, have no alternative but to continue to shoulder the unwelcome burden of building up their strength to deter and, if necessary, to resist and defeat further aggression and subversion.

Since Korea, as I have already said, increased production has provided not only expanding amounts of defense materials but also increased supplies of civilian goods in the countries of the free world. This increased production, along with anti-inflationary measures, has largely eliminated the scare buying which had been pushing prices upward. As a result, the general price level in most countries has been fairly stable in recent months and the prospects for keeping inflation under control are brighter.

The Inflation Danger

This does not mean, however, that the danger of inflation has disappeared. The free world still faces a period of expanding defense activities. This will involve a steady growth in government demand for goods and services which would otherwise be available to the civilian economy. With the peak of the defense effort still before us, the factors making for inflation will continue to be present in many countries.

In these circumstances, constant watchfulness

will be necessary if we are to maintain economic stability. But mere watchfulness in itself will not be enough. If we are to contain these pressures, we must be prepared to keep in effect or to put quickly into effect anti-inflationary programs.

In contrast with the general expansion of the world economy during 1951 has been the emergence of pockets of unemployment and of excess capacity in certain sectors. One of these is textiles, in which there has been a world-wide recession since the latter part of 1951.

This recession is in part a reaction from the speculative excesses and the accumulation of inventories which followed the outbreak of the Korean war, and in part a reflection of overcapacity in terms of effective world demand.

Capacity to produce cotton goods has been expanded in recent years both in the large industrialized countries and in a number of underdeveloped countries as well. Production increased especially rapidly in 1950 and early 1951 as a result of expectations of greatly expanded demand after Korea. In this period, output of textiles exceeded prewar levels in most countries except Czechoslovakia and some of the nations of the Far East. The first consequence of this rather sharp increase, so well described in the World Economic Report and the Economic Survey of Europe in 1951, was accumulation of stocks in the face of smaller demand than had been anticipated. Next followed cuts in production, with consequent unemployment. Currently, prices of fibers and fabrics are down to lower levels, and demand has shown a tendency to increase a bit. There are evidences that the momentum of the decline of the last 8 months may have spent itself.

But we must not overlook the fact that there are persistent and fundamental problems facing the textile industries. The development of synthetic fibers is bringing a technological revolution which will affect cotton producers and wool growers all over the world. To the extent that these fibers may require new types of spindles and looms, and to the extent that they may outwear natural fibers and reduce the replacement demand, they will affect the manufacturers and sellers of textiles and the workers in their plants.

In order to use textile manufacturing capacity, ways must be found to reduce costs through improved productivity and efficiency so that the vast potential markets where incomes are low may be tapped. These markets are not only in Asia and the Far East, where less cotton per capita is used now than before the war, but in industrialized countries as well. We must reinforce our efforts to raise the purchasing power of the people of these areas, through improved productivity of the items they are best equipped to produce, so that they will be able to buy more textiles and other things they need.

I think you will all agree that the time has come when the countries of the world must re-

assess their real potentialities as textile producers. We should certainly examine alternative uses of capital and labor before devoting them to uneconomic textile facilities.

The Food Situation

While the world as a whole appears to have been devoting increasing effort to the production of textiles, it has failed to devote sufficient attention to expanding food output to nourish its growing population. This is indeed ironical.

The current food and nutrition problem is discussed in extremely illuminating fashion in the report of the Secretary-General entitled "The World Social Situation." It shows that the per capita output of food for the world as a whole in 1951, 6 years after the close of World War II, remained below the prewar level. In all except a few countries, the calorie intake is below the nutritional standard set by the Food and Agriculture Organization. In India it is 25 percent below that level.

Yet in many countries, manpower is moving out of agriculture while the productivity of those who remain in agriculture fails to increase. Agriculture in Eastern Europe, traditionally a major exporter of grain and foodstuffs, is likewise lagging. The Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) economic survey for 1951 pierces the blackout of economic information from that area to reveal that "the substantial rise in the output of certain industrial crops in some Eastern European countries does not vitiate the conclusion that Eastern European agricultural production is still well below prewar."

When we consider the social costs of lagging food production—and the prospect of rising food prices which accompany short supplies—it is clear that nothing in the economic and social field is more urgent than increasing the world's food supply.

Moreover, world food supplies can be increased. This means for one thing the utilization of all possible means to reclaim land for arable uses. But even where the additional land reclaimable for this purpose is limited, the possibilities of stepping up yields on the land that is already in use are very great. One could cite many examples of rapid increases in agricultural production in very short periods of time and over large areas in many parts of the world.

In my own country, between the prewar years and 1950, while we were increasing our industrial output by 76 percent, food production also rose, by 40 percent. This rise in farm output involved a very small increase in land under cultivation. It took place during a period when the number of people working on farms was declining. The agricultural output per worker increased about 65 percent.

Nor were these increases entirely attributable

to the use of modern machinery. Other factors have been the use of new hybrid strains of seed, improved fertilizers, and new weed and insect sprays.

There is convincing evidence that with relatively little capital, but with a diligent application of the techniques and practices already well known, the world could within a short space of years produce an adequate food supply. It has often been said that to replace the sickle with the scythe, the flail with the most primitive thresher, the wooden plow with the steel plow, the wooden hoe with the steel hoe, would mean the difference between famine and plenty. The various technical-assistance programs, United Nations and bilateral, are already making important contributions in this direction. The really great contributions, however, will come from the farmers of the world themselves, as they make increasing use of the constantly growing wealth of scientific knowledge. By bringing this knowledge and these techniques to farmers, through schools and extension work, and by carrying forward broad land-reform programs, governments can play a decisive part in the betterment of the world food situation.

The Food and Agriculture Organization, at its 1951 Conference, passed some emphatic resolutions on this subject. The Conference placed on record its belief that in the years immediately ahead, it is reasonable to hope for a well-balanced increase in world production of basic foods and other essential agricultural products that will exceed the rate of population growth by 1 to 2 percent per annum. This, the Conference said, "is the minimum necessary to achieve some improvement in nutritional standards." It recommended "that all member countries should cooperate in the effort to achieve this over-all objective by preparing and carrying forward agricultural development plans suited to their own circumstances and conditions, covering the next five years, and designed to provide and contribute to the achievement of this objective."

The goal is an adequate diet for everyone. Surely it is a modest enough goal, even with a rising world population. Is it unreasonable to ask that every country speed its efforts to attain it?

Future of U.S. Economy

Thus far, I have discussed economic developments during the immediate past and the prospects for the future in global terms. In the remainder of my statement, I should like to address myself to a discussion of the current and prospective position of the U.S. economy, particularly as it affects the situation of the world as a whole.

In the United States, the past 15 months have been characterized by a sustained high level of economic activity, a subsiding of the severe inflationary pressures which followed the outbreak of

the war in Korea, and considerable stability in the price level.

Expanded production in the heavy industries was offset by declines in activity in the consumer goods industries, with the result that, since last spring, industrial production and employment, taken as a whole, have fluctuated within a narrow range at near-record levels. Unemployment has been especially small, varying seasonally under 2 million or less than 3 percent of the labor force.

In the civilian sector, food production has remained stable and at high levels, but output of textiles and apparel, leather and shoes, and, more recently, household equipment and other consumer durable goods, has declined, partly as a reaction from the unusually large production in the last half of 1950, and partly from smaller-than-expected civilian demand. As demand fell off, prices of these goods also came down.

Some unemployment followed in the soft-goods lines. Steps were then taken to alleviate the situation by placing Government defense contracts in localities affected. Aside from this there has been little unemployment, except briefly, in some of the metal-using civilian industries where world-wide shortages of critical materials and necessary allocations to defense industries brought cuts in production and some unemployment in 1951. In Detroit, for example, unemployment was estimated last winter at about 100,000. By this spring, however, the situation had greatly improved and unemployment had fallen below 70,000. It is still declining.

Thus, at the present moment, this phase of downward readjustment appears to be about over in the United States. It can be said that we have taken this period of realignment of the economy for defense production in our stride, and, by and large, it has been accomplished with remarkably few dislocations of the economy.

The comparative stability in the general level of prices in the United States within the last year is in contrast to the marked increases in the first 8 months after Korea. As compared with a rise of 16 percent in the first 8 months after Korea, wholesale prices as a whole declined 4 percent from March 1951 to April of 1952. Retail prices for consumers' goods and services, which typically lag behind industrial prices, have remained relatively stable. During the past year, they rose by only 2 percent, as compared with a rise of 8 percent in the previous 8 months.

Various factors contributed to this general abatement of inflationary pressures. As I have already noted, there were ample stocks in the hands of business and consumers. This fact, plus a confidence that goods would continue to be available at controlled prices, led to a decrease in consumer and business buying, and a rise in the savings of the population. At the same time, due to expanded industrial capacity, the supply of certain scarce materials such as steel has been in-

creased. Beyond this, there were the various governmental actions—allocation and production controls, price and wage controls, selective credit controls, and general credit measures—all of which contributed to stabilizing the situation. Simultaneously, very substantial increases in taxes absorbed large amounts of purchasing power. Thus, a combination of factors—the behavior of business and private consumers as well as effective governmental policies—have played a part in keeping inflationary pressures under control.

This does not in any sense mean that we in the United States need no longer be concerned over the course of our price level during the immediate future. A change in any of the factors I have just mentioned could lead to a renewal of inflationary pressures. For one thing, the prospect of a deficit of some magnitude in the Federal budget due to further increases in defense expenditures may lead to a net expansion in demand. It is because of this, as well as of other possibilities, that the U.S. Government retains on a stand-by basis certain anti-inflationary controls that have been suspended because they are not needed at the moment.

Some of the forces that led to the reduction in inflationary pressures in the United States also affected our economic relations with the rest of the world. They have had a special bearing upon the course of our imports and exports.

U.S. Imports and Exports

The movement in the quantity of U.S. imports generally does not depart for very long from the trends in domestic production. With the attack on South Korea and our decision to expand our defenses came a marked increase in our imports, part of it representing speculative buying. As compared with the year preceding Korea, the first quarter of 1951 shows an increase of physical imports of 27 percent. The fact of the matter is that our imports outran the expansion of our domestic output. These imports were one of the factors in the inventory accumulations that I have already referred to.

Then followed a drop in import demand. The decline was sharp. As compared to the index for the first quarter of 1951, imports in the third quarter were down to 101, the level of late 1949.

As this sharp decline was taking place, it appeared ominous to many observers. Events, however, have shown that it was temporary. Since the middle of 1951, imports have again resumed their upward trend. In the fourth quarter of 1951 they were above the third quarter. The record for the first 3 months of 1952 is still better, with the index of physical volume back to 17 percent above the pre-Korean level and within 10 points of the post-Korean high.

Our production of goods and services should continue to expand. Since our inventories of imported materials were drawn down during 1951,

we have reason to expect that with expanded production there will come a further increase in our demand for imports.

Just as the accumulation of inventories had had an effect on the level of our imports, so did our increase in the output of certain scarce materials, such as steel, have an effect upon our ability to supply capital goods to the underdeveloped countries.

Despite the fact that our supplies were not sufficient to meet all of our domestic needs, the value of U.S. exports of the major categories of capital goods to the underdeveloped countries in the last 6 months of 1951 was over 51 percent higher than in the 6 months before the attack on South Korea. The dollar value increased from 690 million dollars to 1,013 million dollars. Nor was the bulk of this expansion accounted for by increased prices. It was for the most part the result of a larger physical quantity of exports. The 51-percent rise in dollar values of these goods was accompanied by a rise of only 12 percent in U.S. export prices of what we call "finished manufactures," which is the index that best measures changes in the cost of developmental goods.

Despite the fears that were expressed at our twelfth session, every major underdeveloped area of the free world—Africa, Asia, and Latin America—received more capital goods from the United States in 1951 than it did not only before Korea but in 1950. Under the heading "capital goods," I include electrical machinery, turbines, construction machinery, machine tools, agricultural implements, trucks, and other similar developmental goods.

During the last half of 1951, the value of such goods shipped to Latin America increased by 64 percent as compared with the first 6 months of the preceding year. Our shipments to Africa were 34 percent greater in value. Notwithstanding the fact that we have cut off our exports to Communist China, in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 500 of May 18, 1951, and those to Hong Kong have been greatly reduced, our exports of capital goods to the countries in Asia as a whole were at a rate 26 percent higher in value than before Korea.

I should like to point out, also, that the latest figures available, those for January and February of the current year, show that, with the exception of Latin America, this trend has been continuing.

The great bulk of these goods received by the underdeveloped countries were paid for by their exports. Part of them, however, were financed by grants and loans made available by the American people. Through their government alone in the fiscal year 1951, such grants and loans totaled 690 million dollars. This was an increase of 170 million dollars over the year before. While these amounts are not as large as some had hoped, they are not negligible sums. Effectively used, grants and loans of this magnitude—they have averaged more than half a billion per annum during the

past 3 years—can have a real impact on economic development.

In brief, the dire predictions made by Council delegates at the twelfth Ecosoc session proved untrue as far as the United States is concerned. The United States has not allowed the economic development of underdeveloped areas to become a casualty of the defense program. Our exports of developmental goods have increased, not declined. The prices of such goods have been stabilized, they have not soared upward. Grant and loan assistance has not been curtailed but has been augmented so that underdeveloped countries can import more than their current earnings permit.

Deterioration of U.S. Terms of Trade

These events, incidentally, have occurred during a period when the U.S. terms of trade were deteriorating. As the report of the Secretary-General shows on page 19 of chapter 4, the index of our terms of trade during the last half of 1951 was 14 percent worse than in the 6 months before Korea. This means, in effect, that every dollar we received for our exports was able to buy only 86 percent as much in imports as formerly.

These figures relate to the total trade of the United States with the rest of the world. The Secretary-General's report does not break them down by geographic areas. But the available data on raw material prices show that for 1950 and a part of 1951 the underdeveloped countries as a group derived great benefit from the deteriorating terms of trade of the United States. The prices of our imported raw materials as a whole—and a large part of them came from these countries—were 60 percent higher in the last half of 1951 than in the base period used in the Secretary-General's report. In contrast, as I have already stated, the average price of finished manufactures exported from the United States rose by 12 percent.

I am aware, of course, that the prices of certain of the products exported by the underdeveloped countries, especially rubber, tin, wool, and jute, have recently fallen substantially from their speculative post-Korean peaks. It appears, nevertheless, that the underdeveloped countries' terms of trade still remain more favorable than before Korea.

Future Production and Employment

Turning now from the past to the future, I should like to discuss a matter which I know is of concern not only to the members of this Council but also to many Americans here at home. I refer to the prospect for maintaining high levels of production and employment in the United States after defense expenditures level off to the rates required for continuing national security.

Let me say at the outset that the Government

of the United States is acutely aware not only of the domestic but also of the international impact of changes in the level of our economic activity. We know that fluctuations which may have a minor impact in this country may have more important effects in other parts of the world.

You will recall, I am sure, that in the years immediately following World War II, the adjustment of the American economy to a peacetime basis was remarkably smooth, to the surprise of many people—and, I might remind you again, the disappointment of some others—who had forecast substantial unemployment. Now, the question is asked, inside as well as outside the United States, whether we can make the adjustment to a reduced level of defense expenditures as smoothly as we made the adjustment to the reduction of war expenditures after World War II.

As one looks at the two situations he becomes aware of major differences between them. Some of the differences will tend to make the coming problem more difficult. Some will make it less so.

The first factor which may make the problem more difficult is that the backlog of deferred needs for both consumers' and producers' goods is likely to be much smaller than it was after World War II. During the war, production of a great variety of consumers' goods for civilian purposes was prohibited. Many durable goods were worn out, new demands went unsatisfied, and inventories were depleted. In contrast, restrictions in the current defense period have been less extensive and have been in effect for a shorter time. Consequently, the backlog of deferred demand will be substantially smaller.

The second factor in this same connection is that, even though the total dollar volume of liquid assets in the hands of consumers and of business is higher now than it was at the end of the war, the purchasing power of these assets, due to price increases, will not be as great as it was at that time. Moreover, the gold and dollar reserves of some of the major trading nations are substantially lower now than they were then and their purchasing power is smaller.

Third, our employment problem will be of a different nature. At the end of World War II, many people who had patriotically entered the labor force had no desire to remain after the fighting ceased. In contrast, when defense spending declines, it is probable that most of those no longer needed in defense activities will want other work.

But these three factors constitute only one side of the picture. There are very powerful considerations on the other side.

Favorable Factors

Among these favorable considerations, the most striking difference between the World War II situation and the one that we expect to face after defense expenditures reach their peak is that the

reduction in defense expenditures will be only a fraction of the cut that was made after World War II. In terms of 1951 prices, defense expenditures in 1946 were 119 billion dollars less than in 1944. This decline should be compared with a probable annual reduction of from 15 to 25 billion dollars, in terms of 1951 prices, when we shift from the peak of the expansion phase of the present defense program to the maintenance level. The decline in expenditures, in other words, will be at most one-fifth as big as the World War II cut.

The relative importance of these cuts, in terms of their effect upon the national income, becomes evident when we note their relationship to the national gross product. The 119-billion-dollar curtailment of spending was related to a full employment gross national product of about 275 billion dollars in 1951 prices. The probable cut of from 15 to 25 billion dollars should be related to a current prospective full employment gross national product of about 350 billion dollars.

A second important difference simplifying the adjustment is the fact that after World War II, the size of the Armed Forces was reduced by 10 million during a 2-year period. The total strength of our Armed Forces at the peak of the present defense program will be only 3.7 million. This obviously makes impossible any reduction as drastic as that which occurred at the end of the war. We regret that the international political situation does not at this moment appear to permit any significant reduction in the size of our Armed Forces. We trust, however, that the proposals now being considered in the Disarmament Commission will soon make possible a radical reduction in this burden.

These comparisons give a basis for concluding that the coming adjustment problem should be much smaller than the one we handled successfully after World War II. Moreover, there are other factors in this situation which lead us to believe that we are in a much better position to deal with adjustment problems than we have been in the past.

The Structure of U.S. Economy

Fundamental changes have been taking place in the structure of our economy, changes that we think have permanently moved up our level of demand to new heights. Among the most important of these modifications has been a radical change in what our consumers regard as a normal standard of living. Amenities like electricity in rural areas—a rarity 20 years ago—are now widely available and regarded as essential. We have added approximately 20 million new consumers to our economy. There is an increased demand for new construction as a result of the dispersion of dwellings and business from the centers of our great cities to the suburbs. Of particular importance is the fact that income in the

United States is more evenly distributed. We have a much stronger organization of labor with the result that the position of workers in our society is more secure and their purchasing power more stable. These structural changes will, in themselves, assure a level of effective demand sufficient to maintain high levels of production of consumers' goods.

In addition to the increased demand for consumers' goods, there are many urgent public needs which stem from some of these same structural changes. As a result of the growth in population and the geographical shift in population, the need for certain public projects has been increasing. Construction of this type has been curtailed by defense restrictions and will have to be resumed at the first opportunity.

Moreover, the restrictions made necessary by the defense program have also prevented the satisfaction of normal private demand in some areas of the economy. Residential construction has been limited. The same is true of certain types of private business construction, as well as of equipment which uses steel, copper, aluminum, the metals which have been in short supply and the uses of which have been restricted. Expenditures for these purposes can be expected to increase when restrictions are removed. While such expenditures are not likely to be as great as after World War II, they will not be negligible.

Weight must also be given to the effect of the successful operation of our economy in the past 6 years upon the psychology of the American private investors. The manner in which our economy has operated has been progressively altering their outlook. More and more, they are focusing their attention on the requirements of an economy operating at expanding levels and are discarding the concept of a limited market.

This inclination of American investors to base their plans upon an expectation of long-term growth has a solid foundation, not only in the structural changes in the economy that I have already mentioned but also in other changes that make for greater stability than we had before the war. There are now in existence certain devices which automatically come into play as stabilizing factors, should economic conditions change. For example, the coverage of our social security program has been extended and the benefits have been increased. Our tax structure provides a better cushion against recessionary forces. Agricultural incomes are protected against sudden and severe declines through a system of farm price supports. Bank deposit insurance has been increased to \$10,000 for every covered depositor. Through Federal guaranties of mortgages, we have better safeguarded the savings which more than half of the American families have invested in the homes they live in.

We are not in a position to evaluate all of these considerations quantitatively. Therefore, we can-

not say at this time to what extent these structural and stabilizing factors would moderate a possible downward swing in U.S. economic activity. However, if it should prove necessary, there are a variety of measures available to the Government to counteract recessionary tendencies. I shall only mention a few of these measures.

First, the removal of any direct restrictions which may then exist on business investment and consumer and mortgage credit.

Second, the traditional easing of general credit and banking policy. In this connection, the provision of additional Government-guaranteed mortgage credit at moderate rates could serve as a stimulus to the construction industry in the event that stimulation were needed.

Third, taxes are at very high levels. As a result, the possibilities of freeing purchasing power by tax reductions are very great.

Fourth, public-works construction can be accelerated. There is general agreement among the American people that we must expand our efforts to prevent national disasters such as we have recently suffered from floods in the Missouri Valley.

Summary

In summary, then, the weight of the evidence leads to the conclusion that the coming adjustment problem will be much smaller than the one we handled successfully after World War II. There is no denying that there will be a problem. But there should be no reason for alarm about our ability to meet it. We have the tools for coping with any necessary readjustment when we have reached the peak of our defense expenditures.

The people of the United States are determined to maintain high levels of demand and to continue to trade their products on a large scale with the people of other peace-loving countries. They are determined to have an expanding economy, not only at home but also abroad. They know that only an expanding economy can provide reasonable over-all stability and individual economic security within a framework of genuine democracy and freedom.

That is why the development of underdeveloped countries will continue to be a cardinal point in our foreign policy. As President Truman said in his State of the Union message last January: ² "There is nothing of greater importance in all our foreign policy. There is nothing that shows more clearly what we stand for and what we want to achieve." "What we can do now," said the President on another recent occasion, "is sharply limited by the cost of maintaining defenses to prevent aggression and war. If that cost could be reduced—if the burden of armaments could be lessened, new energies and resources would be lib-

erated for greatly enlarged programs of reconstruction and development."

Mr. President and members of the Council, the American people will lend every effort to speed the day when the threat of aggression will have subsided and men and women everywhere shall be able to devote all of their energies and resources to raising their standards of living and to the full realization of their rich potentialities.

Committee for the Movement of Migrants From Europe

[Released to the press June 2]

The United States will act as host for the third session of the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe at Washington on June 10, 1952. All meetings will be held in the Department's International Conference Suite at 1778 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW. The Committee will have as main items of business the election of a director for the organization, a review of operations to date, and consideration of the program for the remainder of 1952. The United States proposes to nominate former Ambassador Hugh Gibson for the post of director. Mr. Gibson, in the U.S. diplomatic service from 1908 to 1938, has represented the United States on numerous international bodies and served as U.S. Ambassador to Belgium in 1927-33 and 1937-38, and as Ambassador to Brazil, 1933-37. Mr. Gibson recently terminated a business connection with Doubleday and Company of New York.

The United States took the initiative in October 1951 in inviting the Belgian Government to convene a Conference on Migration at Brussels in November 1951 to consider a U.S. proposal for international migration. At the Conference, 16 governments established the new Committee and adopted plans to move 116,000 persons who would not otherwise be moved out of Europe in 1952, under an over-all budget of \$36,954,000. The Committee established headquarters at Geneva, and began operations on February 1, 1952. In the period February 1-April 30, 1952, 32,000 migrants and refugees were moved overseas under the auspices of the new organization.

The action of the United States in proposing a migration conference carried out the intent of the Congress expressed in title I of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 which made \$10,000,000 available to facilitate the movement of surplus manpower from Europe to other countries where such manpower could be utilized as proposed in the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended. It has been estimated that some 750,000 persons whose services could not be used in Europe should mi-

² BULLETIN of Jan. 21, 1952, p. 79.

grate annually for the next 5 years in order to achieve further economic balance and stability in Europe. It has been further estimated that approximately 350,000 persons are leaving Europe annually. The new Committee proposes to move those persons who would not otherwise be moved without some form of organized international assistance.

An important factor in the decision to establish the Committee was the pending termination in late 1951 of the International Refugee Organization (Iro) which had moved over a million refugees out of Europe during its existence. Upon its termination, 10 ships already recon-verted for this type of movement, at substantial expense to international funds, would be relinquished and diverted to other transport purposes. After thoroughly exploring the question, the Committee reached the conclusion that the former Iro ships would be required to accomplish the purposed additional movement of migrants and refugees.

After the first session of the Committee, which immediately followed the Conference on Migration at Brussels, the Committee met at Geneva in February for further consideration of its program. As a result of encouraging developments which occurred between the two sessions, the Committee felt justified in increasing the quota of persons to be moved during 1952 to 137,000 and its budget to \$41,350,660. The budget is divided into two parts, administrative and operational. Contributions to the administrative expenditures of \$2,359,060 are obligatory upon member governments in accordance with an agreed percentage scale. Contributions to the operational expenditures are voluntary. The U.S. contribution for the calendar year 1952 is \$10,000,000. The costs of transport for a substantial number of the persons to be moved will be reimbursed to the Committee, other movements will be partially reimbursed, and the balance of movement will take place at the expense of the Committee's funds. All the costs of processing migrants are borne by the emigration countries and the costs of receiving them by receiving countries. The costs of processing and reception borne by governments directly will be credited to the respective governments as contribution to the budget of the Committee.

At the present time, 19 governments are members of the Committee and it is expected that other governments will join shortly. The member governments include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Israel, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Paraguay, Switzerland, the United States, and Venezuela.

The projected movement of 137,000 persons during 1952 represents the emigration of 67,000 persons from Germany, 35,000 from Italy and Trieste, 16,000 from Austria, 15,000 from the

Netherlands, and 4,000 from Greece. The Committee's program envisages the settlement of 40,000 of these emigrants in Canada, 25,000 in Australia, 31,000 in Latin America, and 3,000 in New Zealand. The United States will receive 38,000 persons, mostly ethnic Germans, entering under provisions of the U. S. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended.

On June 9 the Department of State announced that the U.S. delegation to the third session of the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe, will be as follows:

U.S. Representative

George L. Warren, Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Department of State

Alternate U.S. Representatives

Pat McCarran, U.S. Senate

Francis E. Walter, U.S. House of Representatives

Meeting of Tonnage Measurement Experts

[Released to the press June 4]

An international meeting of tonnage measurement experts convened at The Hague, Netherlands, on June 4. The U.S. Government is represented by an observer delegate, Henry E. Sweet, chief of the Division of Marine Administration, Bureau of Customs, under whose immediate supervision the ship-measurement laws and regulations of the United States are administered. Mr. Sweet's alternate is John W. Mann, an attaché at the American Embassy at London, who was formerly on the Shipping Policy Staff of the Department of State and who headed the U.S. observer delegations to the three previous conferences of this series.

The United States, although not a party to the Oslo convention of 1947 on ship-measurement rules, which provides for biennial meetings of experts, recognizes the advantages to be derived from international uniformity in the tonnage measurement of ships in terms of safety; of the methods of determining charges for port facilities, harbor dues, and canal tolls; and of efficiency and simplicity in ship design and construction. The United States has therefore sent technical observers to the previous measurement conferences held at Oslo in 1947 and 1948 and at Stockholm in 1950. The experts at the above-mentioned meeting will study in detail a number of highly technical questions concerning the application and interpretation of existing rules and regulations under the Oslo convention.

Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

FORTIETH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD FEBRUARY 16-29, 1952¹

U.N. doc. S/2619
Transmitted April 29, 1952

I herewith submit report number 40 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-29 February, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués numbers 1176-1189 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Discussions continued at the staff officer level on agenda item three although little progress was made. The Communists refused to accept the six port of entry complexes on each side, proposed by the United Nations Command, as areas in which the neutral nations inspection teams are to operate. Furthermore, the Communists were adamant in their insistence on having the Soviet Union participate in the neutral nation inspection teams. On 21 February the senior United Nations Command staff officer made the following statement: "Your side has said many times that we have no reason and cannot give any reason for objecting to the nomination of the Soviet Union as one of the neutral nations. We have carefully considered these statements made by you. The United Nations Command does have reasons for rejecting the Soviet Union as one of the nations to participate in the supervisory commission. The reasons are clear, cogent and irrefutable. I should like to point out, however, that neither side is obligated to state reasons for the acceptance or rejection of any particular nation. The principle simply and clearly states that both sides agree to invite neutral nations acceptable to both sides. The acceptability or non-acceptability of any given nation, therefore, is a unilateral matter beyond the purview of these discussions. In the furtherance of understanding, however, and so that our position may be unmistakably clear to you, we will give our reasons for stating, unequivocally, that the Soviet Union is not acceptable to our side. The United Nations Command holds that it is in the interest of all concerned that members of the supervisory commission should be drawn from those nations not in close

proximity to Korea and without a record of past participation in the Korean question. This is not the introduction of a new principle. It is our rightful and unilateral application of logic to the problem of selecting nations acceptable to both sides. I repeat, the Soviet Union is not acceptable to our side."

On 25 February in a further sincere effort to break the deadlock on this issue, the United Nations Command representatives proposed that the number of neutral nations from each side be reduced to four, namely, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Communists have rejected this proposal so far.

After receiving from the Communists a proposed new text for armistice agenda item four, dealing with prisoners of war, the United Nations Command delegation made a careful study of its provisions in an effort to insure that the areas of agreement could be expanded to the maximum. It was pointed out forcefully to the Communist representatives that the United Nations Command approach was made in the light of earnestness and sincerity and that our sole objective was the securing of a just and honourable arrangement by which our prisoners could be exchanged with despatch. The proposed draft submitted by the Communists showed mutual agreement on many clauses and only minor differences on others, but the stand which they took on the subject of voluntary repatriation was entirely unacceptable. On 20 February, after many differences in wording and phraseology had been resolved, the Communists presented a revised wording of their initial proposal, but retained the intent of forced repatriation to which we strongly objected.

On 22 February the United Nations Command submitted a complete draft of armistice wording on item four which reflected all changes to date. The Communists maintained their insistent opposition to voluntary repatriation and on the basis that the subjects were closely allied, rejected the proposals for parole and a sixty-day time limit in which to exchange prisoners, despite the fact that they had previously concurred in the principle.

The inconsistency of the Communist stand was clearly defined in a carefully prepared presentation in which the United Nations Command reminded the Communists that last December they explained away the fact that they had only a few thousand prisoners by saying that some captured personnel were released at the front shortly after capture, while others, if they so desired, were allowed to join the Communist Forces. By this act the Communists applied the principle of voluntary repatriation and took great credit for such action as an indication of how sin-

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U. S. representative in the Security Council, on Apr. 29. Texts of the 30th, 31st, and 32d reports appear in the BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; the 33d report, *ibid.*, Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395; the 34th report, *ibid.*, Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430; the 35th report, *ibid.*, Mar. 31, 1952, p. 512; the 36th and 37th reports, *ibid.*, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 594; the 38th report, *ibid.*, May 5, 1952, p. 715; and the 39th report, *ibid.*, May 19, 1952, p. 788.

cerely they adopted humanitarian policies. The proposal submitted by the United Nations Command that prisoners of war should be able to choose the side to which they wished to go and should not be subjected to the barbarous treatment of delivery by force was identical with the principle the Communists claim they have previously applied on their side. Further, in order to insure that the implementation of release policies proposed by United Nations Command was to be carried out in detail, the Communists would have their own Red Cross representative at our prisoner of war camps as well as at the point of exchange.

Continued protracted discussion indicated only that the Communist delegation refused to adopt any realistic approach to this basic, fundamental principle as supported by the United Nations Command. Having accomplished all that could be done at the staff officer level, and having successfully removed many areas of disagreement, the United Nations Command agreed to move discussions from staff officer level and on 29 February the sub-delegation for item four was reconvened, with the one remaining issue of voluntary repatriation to be resolved.

A riot believed to have been Communist planned and led, among Korean civilian internees in a compound on the island of Koje-Do on 18 February was put down by United Nations Command security troops who, in the course of their duties, had been suddenly attacked by over 1,500 inmates of the compound. The remaining 3,500 inmates did not join in the disturbances. Order was restored only after severe fighting. One American soldier and sixty-nine inmates were killed. One American soldier was injured, twenty-two suffered minor hurts and 142 inmates were wounded. No prisoners of war were involved.

The clash followed entrance of the troops into the compound at 0530. Their mission was to maintain order while United Nations personnel interviewed the internees to determine which individuals desired transfer to other compounds. Interviews were to be accomplished privately to encourage free expression of desires. Any internees requesting transfer would be moved to non-Communist compounds. It was evident that Red compound leaders were determined and prepared to block this procedure. Weapons known to have been used against the troops in the demonstration, which obviously had been planned and organized, include steel pickets, spiked wooden clubs, barbed wire flails, blackjacks, metal tentpole spines, iron pipes, rocks and knives.

The United Nations Command ordered an official investigation immediately. The situation was brought under control and peace restored. Unrest had not spread to other compounds. The senior delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross, stationed in Japan, was notified promptly. He dispatched two of his assistants immediately to Koje-Do for an independent investigation.

As was expected, the Communists attempted to use this incident to bolster their stand on forced repatriation, claiming that the United Nations Command had been responsible for the uprising and that the participants were only demonstrating their desire to return to Communist control. The United Nations Command delegation replied calmly and factually, pointing out the absurdity of the Communists' comments and emphasizing that this incident was an internal affair of no interest to the Communists. The civilian internees in United Nations Command custody are not military personnel belonging to the Communist side. They are Nationals of the Republic of Korea. The United Nations Command position is fully sanctioned by the Laws of Nations. The Communists have no authority, sanction or precedent in international law to support their stand that this matter did concern them.

On the question of joint Red Cross Teams to assist in the prisoners of war exchange, agreement with the Communists on the composition of such teams was obtained on 19 February. This agreement provides for three teams composed of equal membership from the National

Red Cross Societies of both sides. One team would operate in North Korea with a total membership of sixty-three from each side. A second team would operate in South Korea with the same number. The third team consisting of twenty members would perform its duties in the demilitarized zone.

To insure that the United Nations Command is prepared to implement the agreement on the Red Cross Teams, immediate steps were taken to contact, through the American Red Cross, the National Red Cross Societies to be invited to send representatives. Denmark was included in this group because of the urgent need for medical doctors on each team. These Red Cross doctors are readily available on the Danish Hospital ship "Jntlandia".

In addition, relief supplies for United Nations Command prisoners of war furnished by the American and British Red Cross Societies and now stored in Japan, are being carefully checked and readied for immediate use. If needed, supplemental food packages and medical kits will be supplied by the United States Army. All these supplies can be airshipped to Korea on short notice in case of an armistice agreement.

The International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, indicated agreement with the plan for the Red Cross Societies of both sides to assist in the exchange of prisoners of war in Korea.

In plenary session of 16 February 1952, the Communist delegation made the following statement in presenting their new proposal for agenda item five:

"In order to reach speedily a fair and reasonable settlement on agenda item five, recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides, our side, the delegation of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers, now submits a revised draft of the principle.

"The revised draft of the principle proposed by the delegation of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers on agenda item five, recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides, is as follows:

"In order to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three months, after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, et cetera.

"On 17 February 1952 the United Nations Command delegation accepted the Communist proposal on agenda item five with the following statement:

"We have carefully considered your revision of the principle proposed by you as the solution of item five of the agenda. In order to give you concrete evidence of the sincerity of the United Nations Command delegation and to eliminate entirely any pretexts for further delay on your part in reaching agreement on unresolved issues in items three and four, the United Nations Command delegation accepts your proposal of 16 February as the solution of this item of the agenda, subject to the following remarks:

"So that there may be no question regarding the understanding of the United Nations Command delegation as to the meaning of your proposal, we deem it advisable to make certain explanations at this time. First, we desire to point out that this recommendation will be made by the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, to the United Nations as well as to the Republic of Korea. Second, in accepting the term Foreign Forces, we are doing so on the basis for your statement that this term means non-Korean Forces. And third, we wish it clearly understood that we do not construe the word et cetera to relate to matters outside of Korea."

In reply, on 19 February 1952, the senior Communist delegate said the following:

"The draft of the principles submitted by our side on the item five of the agenda is very clear in itself. There can be no misunderstanding whatsoever. By the governments of the countries concerned on both sides in our draft of principles is naturally meant the governments of the countries concerned on the side of the Korean Peoples Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteers and the governments of the countries concerned on the side of the United Nations Command. By Foreign Forces in our draft of principles is naturally meant non-Korean Forces. And the meaning of questions, et cetera in our draft of principles is also very clear. It neither binds the forthcoming political conference to the discussion of certain specific questions nor excludes the possibility of the discussion of other questions by this political conference."

The Communists then proposed to turn over the work of drafting the details of the articles in the fifth item of the agenda to Staff Officers. The senior United Nations Command delegate then stated: "We have already told you that we don't consider that your draft proposal requires rewriting. We have accepted it as you drafted it for inclusion in the armistice agreement. We agree to recess with the understanding that item five is to be turned over to the Staff Officers to complete any necessary mechanical details. Our Staff Officers will not be authorized to change the agreed wording." To date the Communists have not asked for a Staff Officer's meeting on this agenda item.

Despite frequent periods of unfavourable winter weather, a United Nations Command carrier force operating in the Sea of Japan continued to direct its major effort against the enemy's supply routes. Attention was again centered on the vulnerable East coast rail network north and south of Wonsan where bridges, by-passes, locomotives and rail cars, as well as the rail lines themselves, were brought under attack.

In the Yellow Sea, United Nations Command carriers continued air operations on the West coast of Korea, supporting the blockade and providing air-spot and cover for surface units on anti-invasion stations in support of the friendly held islands.

Shore-based aircraft participated in all phases of the United Nations Command Air operations except air to air combat, with the major effort being placed on interdiction and close support missions in that order of priority.

Patrol aircraft operated day and night in all sea areas adjacent to Korea and Japan, providing reconnaissance and shipping surveillance as well as regular weather flights.

The appearance of an increased number of enemy sampans and small craft, attempting to run the tight coastal blockade, furnished lucrative targets for bombardment by United Nations Command ships and planes. During the week of 18-24 February, 175 of these craft were sunk or damaged. Contributing heavily to this total was an enemy attempt to invade a friendly-held island. This assault was shattered by a combination of Naval gunfire and alert beach fighting, and the invasion force, estimated at approximately 300 men, was routed with heavy personnel losses.

Surface vessels continued to support the United Nations Command operations by bombarding suitable targets along the East coast. 16 February marked the first anniversary of the siege of Wonsan which has seriously disrupted the flow of Communist traffic through this vital hub. Fire support vessels conducted fire missions for United Nations Command ground forces, utilizing air spot and directions from the forces supported, to destroy the enemy's forward installations and to inflict heavy personnel casualties. Further north, the targets included harbor facilities, industrial areas, and lines of communications. Daylight travel along the coastal routes was effectively impeded and night travel was subjected to indirect interdiction fire.

Enemy shore batteries on both coasts intensified their fire against United Nations Command blockading ships. Counter battery fire silenced many of the enemy's guns, destroyed or damaged several ammunition and supply

dumps, and caused many personnel casualties. The enemy's fire resulted in damage to two United Nations Command ships and injuries to eleven crew members. Temporary repairs, where necessary, permitted the ships to return to action.

Although severe icing conditions were experienced along portions of the West coast, surface units maintained their anti-invasion patrols, and illuminated and fired on enemy positions on the mainland. When enemy activity indicated a potential danger of attack on friendly islands, surface units fired on the enemy and dispersed his boat and troop concentrations.

Minesweepers swept the important sea lanes on both coasts for all types of mines and made check sweeps of previously cleared areas despite heavy seas, low visibility, and rain and snow. Blockading surface units provided prompt counter-battery and suppression fire on several occasions when enemy shore batteries took the minesweepers under fire, thus preventing damage or casualties to United Nations Command forces.

Naval auxiliary, Military Sea Transport Service and merchant vessels under contract provided logistic support for all components of the United Nations Command forces in Japan and Korea.

United Nations Command Air Forces continued their full scale air operations throughout the Central and North-west sectors of North Korea. Day counter-air sweeps, day and night interdiction of the main Communist supply routes, and airlift of high priority supplies accounted for the greater part of the sorties flown in support of the Korean operations. The continued inactivity of the enemy forces on the ground and in the air over the line of contact again resulted in reduced requirement for air defense and close air support sorties.

The weather was affected by the normal seasonal north to south fluctuation of the polar front, accompanied by the normal west to east flow of low pressure cells across Korea. This resulted in intermittent bad weather throughout the area which caused a decline in the sortie rates and greatly increased the problem of location and destruction of targets on the ground.

Jet fighters of the Communist Air Defence system were consistently more active than during any previous period. No fundamental changes in their tactics were observed however. MIG-15's, usually flying in large formations, were seen over North Korea on all but three days. It is estimated that an aggregate of 1,900 MIG-15 sorties were observed, and that of this number, 200 engaged in combat with United Nations Command aircraft. These air to air encounters resulted in the loss to the enemy of twelve aircraft destroyed and twelve damaged, while the United Nations Command suffered no losses and only one aircraft damaged. Typical of the increased enemy air activity was the sighting of 389 MIGs by United Nations Command pilots on 19 February. This represented a new high in the daily sightings of enemy aircraft.

The principal targets for United Nations Command fighter bombers and night flying light bombers were enemy supply installations, rail lines, rolling stock and motor vehicle traffic. These operations were successful in hampering the movement of supplies and personnel by the enemy, especially along the western and central rail lines from Sonchon and Kanggye south to the battle area. In view of the increased enemy air activity, it was necessary to provide a combat air patrol of F-86 for the fighter bombers. These operations were so well co-ordinated that no United Nations Command fighter bombers were lost to enemy air activity.

United Nations Command medium bombers continued in support of the Korean operations. The main targets for these missions continued to be the destruction of key railroad bridges, which the enemy labour forces repair with great rapidity. In addition, the B-29's performed close air support and leaflet missions each night as well as a number of reconnaissance missions.

The United Nations Command Forces operating in support of the Korean operations continued to require the

movement of high priority supplies and matériel by air. Combat cargo aircraft maintained their operations on a daily basis despite the adverse weather conditions encountered at their bases and en route. The movement of personnel again constituted a large portion of these operations, especially on East-bound flights which permitted the evacuation of combat casualties to hospitals in Japan.

The Communist air power based north of the Yalu River still constitutes a strong threat to the United Nations Command Air, Ground and Naval operations in Korea, but no major commitment of this force has yet been made. United Nations Command Forces and installations in friendly territory suffered no casualties or damage, although five unidentified aircraft were reported over friendly territory.

Minor clashes continued to typify the action along the Korean battle front as both sides maintained their defensive positions. Most of these small-scale engagements resulted from raids and patrols conducted by United Nations Command elements. Although these actions did not involve any major forces, they often culminated in sharp fire fights, usually involving numerically superior hostile defenders. With one exception, enemy-initiated action consisted of widely scattered and sporadic probing efforts utilizing units of squad and platoon strength. The most aggressive enemy action occurred on the central front where a six-day contest terminated with the enemy in possession of a disputed forward position. Enemy capabilities, troop dispositions, and front lines were unaltered during the period.

Except for stubborn resistance to United Nations Command raids and patrols, enemy activity on the western front was limited to small ineffective probes, usually during the hours of darkness. United Nations Command-conducted raids constituted the most noteworthy action. A United Nations Command raid of a position in the Punji area on 16 February encountered a successful hostile defence. A later raid in the same area on 20 February, however, caused the enemy to evacuate a forward position. Enemy elements in the Chudong area on 16 February and in the Mabang area on 20 February tenaciously retained their positions against the action of United Nations Command raiding elements. United Nations Command elements conducted raids against two hostile positions in the Sagimak area on 16 February. One of these terminated with a withdrawal of the small defending unit while the other resulted in the return of the United Nations Command elements.

Although local in nature, the severest conflict along the battle line took place in the Talcion area of the central front. The contest began on 14 February, when United Nations Command elements were forced to withdraw from an outpost position four and one-half miles southeast of Talcion as a result of two enemy attacks. The position was restored by immediate counteraction on 15 February. An enemy daylight attack against this same position on the following day was unsuccessful. Employing an increased strength of two companies supported by artillery and mortar fire, the enemy retook the position on 17 February. The following day United Nations Command Forces, in a day-long attack successfully drove the enemy back despite heavy resistance. On 19 February, however, the enemy again forced United Nations Command elements to relinquish the position. With the exception of this action, enemy aggressiveness on the central front consisted of a small number of ineffective probes. However, the enemy displayed his usual determination in defensive operations against United Nations Command patrols and raids. Of the raids conducted by United Nations Command elements in Tachon, Kumsong and Talcion areas, only one in the Tachon area, resulted in an enemy withdrawal.

There was no deviation from the pattern of numerous patrol contacts and small-scale enemy probes on the eastern front. The majority of such activity occurred in the Mulguji and Tupo area. In the former area United Nations Command elements were forced to relinquish two

outposts to small enemy units on 19 February. However, these positions were quickly retaken following strong artillery preparation. On 21 February versatile United Nations Command helicopters were employed to extricate and return a United Nations Command patrol which had been ambushed by hostile elements. As elsewhere, there were no significant changes in enemy troop dispositions on the eastern front.

The capabilities of hostile forces in Korea were not materially diminished during the period. Available information does not reveal any deficiencies which would adversely affect enemy military operations. Both the enemy forces and the United Nations Command forces are at a peak of combat effectiveness. Although occasional vague references to a future Communist offensive have been received, the majority of the indications fail to lend any credence to an early departure from the enemy's presently defensive attitude.

A major concern of United Nations Command leaflets and radio broadcasts was the reaffirmation of Korean unification as a cardinal objective of the United Nations. These media reviewed the long history of United Nations efforts to assist the Korean people in achieving this goal by peaceful means. Emphasis was placed on the unprincipled Communist obstruction of those efforts from 1945 on, and the similarity between these obstructions and the prolonged stalling of Communist delegates in the Armistice negotiations. The cost of these tactics, in terms of Korean lives and property, was continually stressed in leaflets and radio broadcasts to enemy soldiers and to civilian residents of areas now under enemy occupation.

A General Staff Section for civil affairs (G-5) has been activated in Headquarters, United Nations Command. The function of this section is the supervision and coordination of civil affairs activities in the United Nations Command. The primary mission concerns the United Nations Command programme for civil assistance and economic aid to Korea.

The conferences between representatives of the United Nations Command and the Republic of Korea on economic affairs were recessed from 18 February until early in March. Although some progress has been made in these discussions, the most difficult problems, involving financial matters and inflation, remain unsolved.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

International Labor Organization

The Department of State on June 5 announced that the U.S. delegation to the thirty-fifth session of the International Labor Conference which convened at Geneva on June 3, is as follows:

REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegates

Philip M. Kaiser, Assistant Secretary of Labor
James E. Murray, U.S. Senate

Alternate Delegates

Wayne Morse, U.S. Senate
Roy V. Peel, Director, Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce
Frances Perkins, Commissioner, U.S. Civil Service Commission

Coordinator

Arnold L. Zempel, Executive Director, Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor

Advisers

John J. Babé, Assistant Solicitor, Department of Labor
B. Harper Barnes, Assistant Solicitor, Department of Labor
Robert M. Barnett, Economic Officer (Labor), American Legation, Bern, Switzerland (Resident at Geneva)
Clara M. Beyer, Associate Director, Bureau of Labor Standards, Department of Labor
Frieda S. Miller, Director, Women's Bureau, Department of Labor
Otis E. Mulliken, Officer in Charge of United Nations Social Affairs, Department of State
Robert J. Myers, Chief Actuary, Social Security Administration, Federal Security Agency
Edward B. Persons, Chief, ILO Division, Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor

REPRESENTING THE EMPLOYERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegate

Charles P. McCormick, President, McCormick and Company, Inc., Baltimore, Md.

Advisers

William B. Barton, Director, Employer-Employee Relations, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C.
Leonard Calhoun, Harter and Calhoun, Washington, D.C.
Carroll E. French, Director, Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc., Rockefeller Center, New York, N.Y.
Paul C. Graham, President, Graham Brothers, Inc., Del Monte, Calif.
Donald Knowlton, Hill and Knowlton, Cleveland, Ohio
William L. McGrath, President, Williamson Heater Company, Cincinnati, Ohio
John V. Newman, Manager, Utt Development Company, Oxnard, Calif.
Charles E. Shaw, Director, Employee Relations Overseas, Standard Oil Company (N.J.), New York, N.Y.

REPRESENTING THE WORKERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegate

George P. Delaney, International Representative, A.F.L., Washington, D.C.

Advisers

Joseph D. Keenan, Secretary-Treasurer, Building Trades Department, A.F.L., Washington, D.C.
Thomas R. Owens, Legislative Representative, United Rubber Workers of America, C.I.O., Washington, D.C.
Paul K. Reed, International Representative, United Mine Workers of America, Washington, D.C.
George J. Richardson, Secretary-Treasurer, International Association of Fire-Fighters, A.F.L., Washington, D.C.
Frank Rosenblum, Secretary-Treasurer, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, New York, N.Y.
Michael Ross, Director, International Affairs Department, C.I.O., Washington, D.C.
Stanley Ruttenberg, Director, Education and Research, C.I.O., Washington, D.C.
James C. Turner, President and Business Manager, International Union of Operating Engineers, Washington, D.C.

Secretary of Delegation:

Walter W. Sohl, Division of International Conferences, Department of State

Administrative Secretary:

Mason A. LaSelle, Assistant Conference Attaché, American Legation, Bern, Switzerland, (Resident at Geneva)

The International Labor Conference, which convenes annually, is the legislative body of the Inter-

national Labor Organization (ILO), a specialized agency of the United Nations with a membership of 65 nations. The other principal ILO organs are the Governing Body, which is an executive council, and the International Labor Office, which provides the secretariat of the organization.

The ILO seeks through international action to improve labor conditions, raise living standards, and promote economic and social stability. In recent years, with strong U.S. support, the organization has extended its operational activities, including technical assistance and direct advice to governments and employers and workers' groups on labor and social matters.

In connection with proposed international regulations for the protection of workers in places of employment, the Conference will examine an office report which sets forth the relevant law and practices concerning industrial safety and health in the different countries and indicates the principal questions bearing on the proposed international regulations which require the Conference's attention.

The Conference will also discuss the possibility of establishing international standards for the regulation of the employment of young persons in underground work in coal mines, a question initially raised at the twenty-seventh (1945) session of the Conference and under study since that time by the ILO Office and Coal Mines Committee.

Other agenda items are the annual report of ILO's Director General, which affords an opportunity for the consideration of some general problems in the social field; the question of the revision in whole of the maternity protection convention of 1919; financial and budgetary problems; and reports on the application of ILO conventions and recommendations. The Conference will also resume discussion, undertaken initially at its June 1951 session, of questions relating to objectives and standards of social security, to holidays with pay in agriculture, and to cooperation between public authorities and employers' and workers' organizations.

Council of Food and Agriculture (FAO)

The Department of State on June 9 announced that the fifteenth session of the Council of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) will convene that day in the new FAO headquarters at Rome. The U.S. delegation is as follows:

U.S. Member

Knox T. Hutchinson,
Assistant Secretary of Agriculture

Alternate U.S. Member

Fred J. Rossiter, Associate Director, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

Advisers

Howard R. Cottam, Counselor, American Embassy, Rome
L. Wendell Hayes, Attaché for Fao Liaison, American Embassy, Rome
Francis A. Linville, Chief, Agricultural Products Staff, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State
Robert B. Schwenger, Chief, Regional Investigations Branch, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture
Robert C. Tetro, Agricultural Attaché, American Embassy, Rome

Adviser and Secretary

Thomas E. Street, Secretary, U.S.-Fao Interagency Committee, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

The Council, composed of representatives of 18 governments which are members of Fao, was established in 1947 by the Fao Conference to act for the Conference between its biennial sessions and to keep the world's food and agriculture situation, including national conditions and policies, under constant review.

This session of the Council will consider several questions of major significance, including a progress report on plans for increasing food and agriculture production, a program to which the United States attaches the greatest importance. The Council will also review reports on reform of agrarian structures, expanded technical-assistance programs, commodity problems, and locust control.

In aiding member governments in the development and further improvement, at the farm level, of the extension of advisory services for improving the productivity and standard of living of rural people, Fao is faced with very specific problems, including the most effective use of its limited funds and personnel and the coordination of its work in the field with similar work being done by other international organizations or by governments. Fao's minimum objective in this field is to keep production in each country increasing at a rate of 1 to 2 percent faster than population growth.

Fao proposes to continue its work on land tenure and agrarian reform through general studies, field studies of particular situations, regional seminars, and demonstration projects, as a basis for advice and assistance to member governments under the United Nations expanded technical-assistance program. The United States, believing that Fao's aid and assistance should be oriented toward enhancing desirable types and terms of tenure and toward the creation of opportunities for those working the land to achieve a better living through reasonable returns for their labors, has taken the lead in encouraging Fao and other U.N. agencies to take an interest in the program for reform of agrarian structures in its broadest sense.

During the past year, the U.N. General Assembly, and the U.N. Economic and Social Council

have all given consideration to the problem of dealing with emergency food shortages. One of the subjects for discussion by the Council will be Fao's potential role in meeting emergency famine situations.

According to a recent Fao report which the Council will review, the desert locust plague is rapidly spreading throughout the Near East, so that the agricultural productivity of the entire Near East, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and eventually all of northern Africa will be seriously threatened unless locust breeding is effectively controlled. The United States is working with countries in the Near East and with Fao through the Point Four Program in a coordinated attack on this destructive pest. Fao has recently promised, in addition, to provide technical aid and equipment in the amount of \$500,000 for a 2-year period for use in the region affected by this locust plague and is coordinating the efforts being made by all governments providing assistance for locust control in the region.

Other items on the agenda, in addition to the annual review of the world food and agriculture situation, are related to administration, finance, and procedure, including the form and content of reports submitted to Fao by member governments; a possible increase in the number of seats on the Council, since the membership of Fao has increased from 54 to 67; and the procedures for Council elections if new members are to be added.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

Authorizing the President of the United States to Proclaim Olympic Week. H. Rept. 1851, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. J. Res. 445] 2 pp.

Mutual Security Act of 1952. Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. R. 7005, A Bill to Amend the Mutual Security Act of 1951. H. Rept. 1922, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 108 pp.

Providing Transportation on Canadian Vessels Between Skagway, Alaska, and Other Points in Alaska, Between Haines, Alaska, and Other Points in Alaska, and Between Hyder, Alaska, and Other Points in Alaska, or the Continental United States, Either Directly or via a Foreign Port, or for any Part of the Transportation. H. Rept. 2000, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. 2721] 3 pp.

Amending Section 32 (A) (2) of the Trading With the Enemy Act. Conference Report. H. Rept. 2003, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. 302] 2 pp.

The Mutual Security Act of 1952. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 3086, A Bill to Amend the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and for Other Purposes. S. Rept. 1490, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 66 pp.

Permitting Free Entry of Articles Imported from Foreign Countries for the Purpose of Exhibition at the Washington State-Far East International Trade Fair, Seattle, Wash. S. Rept. 1497, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. J. Res. 422] 2 pp.

Imposition of Duties on Tuna Fish. S. Rept. 1515, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. R. 5693] 7 pp.

Authorizing the President of the United States to Proclaim Olympic Week. S. Rept. 1566, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. J. Res. 152] 2 pp.

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On the Threshold of a New Age

*Address by the President*¹

[Excerpts]

We are assembled here to lay the keel of a Navy submarine, the U. S. S. *Nautilus*. This ship will be something new in the world. She will be atomic-powered. Her engines will not burn oil or coal. The heat in her boilers will be created by the same force that heats the sun—the energy released by atomic fission, the breaking apart of the basic matter of the whole universe.

Think what this means.

Just 7 years ago next month, down in New Mexico, our scientists released the energy of the atom in a gigantic explosion of incredibly destructive force. The desert at Alamogordo was lighted for 70 miles, by a white light, brighter than the sun.

That was a terrible moment, and it was a wonderful moment too, for mankind. It was a terrible moment because it heralded a new weapon of war—a new weapon of destruction more nearly absolute than anything ever known to man before. It was a wonderful moment because it opened up for all men enormous possibilities of peaceful progress, of industrial development and economic growth and better lives for human beings everywhere.

In 1945 the whole world learned that the vast power of the atom could be put into a bomb. After the first shock and amazement, all men asked themselves: "What is this awful new force? Can it be used only to destroy men, or can it be harnessed to help them?"

For 7 years we have been working to find the answer. And now we have found it. This vessel is the forerunner of atomic-powered merchant ships and airplanes, of atomic power plants producing electricity for factories, farms, and homes.

The day that the propellers of this new submarine first bite into the water and drive her forward will be the most momentous day in the field

of atomic science since the first flash of light down in the desert 7 years ago.

Atomic Energy a Military Necessity

It is a paradox that most of our progress toward the peaceful application of atomic energy has come under the pressure of military necessity. We tackled the secret of the atom to build a bomb that could secure our military victory in World War II. We are building the first atomic engine to power this warship so she may help secure the seas against the danger of aggression.

We have no love for war. I hope and pray with all my heart that the day will never come again when we have to use the atomic bomb. I pray that this ship, the first atomic submarine, will never have an enemy to fight. I hope she will be tied up someday as an historic relic of a threat of war long passed.

I know that all Americans will join me in this. For we are a peaceful people, not a warlike people. We want peace and we work hard for peace. This is a great day for us, a day to celebrate—not because we are starting a new ship for war, but because we are making a great advance in the use of atomic energy for peace. We want atomic power to be a boon to all men everywhere, not an instrument for their destruction.

Today we stand on the threshold of a new age of power. In 10 short years, we have bridged the great gap between the first discovery of a new source of power and its peaceful use. Never before in history has mankind made such rapid strides. Between the first application of steam by Hero of Alexandria and the steam engine of James Watt lay almost two thousand years. Between Franklin's experiments with electricity and the first successful incandescent lamp there intervened almost a century and a half.

No man can foresee what breathtaking developments in atomic energy will take place in the next

¹ Made at the keel laying of the first atomic powered submarine, Groton, Conn., on June 14 and released to the press by the White House on the same date.

10 years. The power plant of the *Nautilus* may soon seem to us as crude and inefficient as the steamboat of Robert Fulton.

If we could but devote a full share of our energies to the peaceful development of the atom, it should soon be possible to bring this new source of power into daily use. Self-contained power plants, able to run almost indefinitely without refueling, and capable of being moved from place to place, would be within reach of our industry, our transportation systems, our cities, and our farms. Such a possibility would revolutionize the technological basis of our civilization. It could provide the answer to the crying need for sources of power in the underdeveloped areas of the world. It could mean industrial development for areas now held back because they have no supply of coal, or oil, or water power. It could set man free from servitude to geography and climate.

And such a development would bring other unforeseeable benefits along with it. The use of radioactive materials in the detection and treatment of disease has already shown startling results. Such materials have also been used in remarkable research experiments in the development of foods and fibers. All these advances are still in the primitive stages of exploration. Nobody knows what marvels lie ahead of us.

We stand on the threshold of a new age. But the question is: When shall we be allowed to enter it?

Building Defenses Toward Peace

These great developments depend on the creation of a free and peaceful world. So long as there is the threat of conquest and war, we must devote the greater part of our scientific resources and of our budget to defense. So long as there is a danger from atomic weapons, we must apply the greater part of our fissionable materials to atomic defenses. Before we can enter the atomic age, we must achieve peace.

That is our goal. That is what we are working for. That is why we have undertaken the great projects of collective defense, in the East and in the West. By building our defenses we are trying not only to make war impossible but to turn the tide toward peace through agreement.

Even as we build these defenses, we are seeking to find some way to reach peaceful settlement of the world's differences. We have offered a plan in the United Nations for effective international control over atomic energy and for outlawing atomic weapons. We want an end to atomic armaments—we want an end to every kind of armament—and we have never ceased to hope that the Soviet rulers might come to entertain the same desire and might join us in constructive measures for disarmament.

But this they have not done. They have shown no willingness to work out honest, fair solutions for the problems of the world. Instead, they have

sought to sow disruption and distrust among free countries; they have used threats and riots, bloodshed and outright aggression, in their attempt to expand their empire.

They have left us no choice except to look to our own defenses. They have made us understand that only great strength to offset their own can keep the peace. That is why the free countries of the world have banded together for greater strength. We are building strength for security. And this ship *Nautilus* is a part of that great effort. She is designed to patrol the seas and thus protect our land. She is an answer to the threat of aggression in the world.

Long-Term Investment in Security

We may have to live in a half-peace, half-war condition for a long time to come. We must lay our plans accordingly. If we are to maintain peace, we must be prepared to defeat aggression. And we must be prepared to make the long-term investment in national security that this requires.

But clearly this does not mean that we should pay attention only to military matters. Far from it. What we must do instead—what we are doing—is to make use of every opportunity we have to advance the arts of peace and respond to human needs.

That is why this ceremony here today holds great hope for the future. We are here, in a true sense, pioneering to bring the world new advances. We are, at one and the same time, fortifying the cause of free men everywhere against aggression and taking a long stride toward the day when man can reap the material benefits of the atom.

But think how much more we could do if we were able to devote all our atomic knowledge to peaceful purposes. If the attitude of the Kremlin should change, if the Soviet Union would cooperate in building a better world instead of standing in the way of all progress, think what vistas would open up. Think what could be done for the betterment of mankind with only a fraction of the money now going into military strength.

No wonder men look with bewilderment and dismay at the bitter stream of lies and threats that comes from Moscow. No wonder millions of men, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, look to the Kremlin and ask, "When will they let us have peace?"

For the people of the world know that men have within their reach today the means of a better life than they have ever had before. With the tools of modern science—of which the most marvelous can be this new thing, atomic energy—and with the ancient moral truths of religion and philosophy, mankind can build a world in which poverty, hunger, and war are banished once and for all.

This is the vision we should keep before us as we strive on toward peace, justice, and freedom for all men.

Conversations on Indochina

PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON

[Released to the press June 18]

As you are aware, M. Jean Letourneau, Minister of the Associated States for the French Government, has been spending the last few days in Washington exchanging views with representatives of various agencies of this Government. The Ambassadors of Cambodia and Vietnam have also participated in conversations with M. Letourneau and with our own representatives.

A communiqué covering the substance of the talks will be issued later today¹ and I will therefore not go into details now. Yet I would like to share with you the feeling of encouragement and confidence which M. Letourneau inspires. His thorough grasp of the situation and his constructive approach to the problems involved—military, political, and economic—have impressed us all.

As you know, the Communist aggression in Indochina has been going on for 6 years. It has been greatly stepped up because of assistance received from Communist China during the past 2 years. Yet, under French leadership, the threat to this part of the free world has been met with great courage and admirable resourcefulness. The military situation appears to be developing favorably. It has been good to hear from M. Letourneau of the part played in achieving this result by the considerable quantities of American arms and matériel which the magnificent fighting qualities of the French Union forces, including those of the Associated States, have justified us in devoting to this area of the struggle against Communist aggression. The effort to make of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia secure and prosperous members of the free world community has made great progress.

I have been particularly impressed by what M. Letourneau has told me of what is being done to enable the people of the three Associated States to play the constantly greater role in their own defense to which they rightly aspire. Much has

been accomplished toward the creation, training, and equipping of the national armies. Units of these armies have distinguished themselves in battle and are performing vital security functions in many parts of the country. They look forward with confidence and determination to assuming an increasing share of the burden of carrying on the struggle. Their effectiveness fully justifies the program of expansion to which the governments concerned are committed and underlines, I believe, the soundness of our own decision, subject of course to the availability of congressional appropriations, to render increasing assistance in building these armies. M. Letourneau described these programs in the course of his address before the overseas writers yesterday.

Favorable developments have not been confined to the fighting fronts and to the national armies. There are increasing evidences of the growing vitality of the Associated States in handling their political, financial, and economic affairs. M. Letourneau's account of the manner in which these new member States of the French Union are envisaging and meeting their responsibilities was heartening. I do not think it is generally realized to what extent these new states in fact control their own affairs. Only a limited number of services related to the necessities of the war remain temporarily in French hands.

We in the United States are aware of the vital importance of the struggle in Indochina to the cause of the free world. We have earmarked for Indochina economic and matériel aid to a considerable amount during the past 2 years. We are doing our best to activate deliveries. As you are aware the 150th ship bearing American arms and munitions to Indochina arrived in Saïgon within the last few weeks. We are now bearing a considerable portion of the total burden of the war in Indochina expressed in financial terms, although of course the entire combat burden is being carried by the French Union and the Associated States, with the latter assuming a constantly increasing share.

The Communists have made a most determined effort in Indochina. Their aggression has been checked and recent indications warrant the view

¹ *Infra.*

that the tide is now moving in our favor. Once again the policy of meeting aggression with force is paying off, and we can I believe be confident that as we carry out the plans upon which we have agreed we can anticipate continued favorable developments in the maintenance and consolidation of the free world bulwark in Indochina.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUÉ

[Released to the press June 18]

Mr. Jean Letourneau, Minister in the French Cabinet for the Associated States in Indochina, has just concluded a series of conversations with U.S. Government officials from the Department of State, Department of Defense, the Office of Director for Mutual Security, the Mutual Security Agency, and Department of the Treasury. The Ambassadors of Cambodia and Viet-Nam have also participated in these talks.

The principle which governed this frank and detailed exchange of views and information was the common recognition that the struggle in which the forces of the French Union and the Associated States are engaged against the forces of Communist aggression in Indochina is an integral part of the world-wide resistance by the Free Nations to Communist attempts at conquest and subversion. There was unanimous satisfaction over the vigorous and successful course of military operations, in spite of the continuous comfort and aid received by the Communist forces of the Viet-Minh from Communist China. The excellent performance of the Associated States' forces in battle was found to be a source of particular encouragement. Special tribute was paid to the 52,000 officers and men of the French Union and Associated States' armies who have been lost in this six years' struggle for freedom in Southeast Asia and to the 75,000 other casualties.

In this common struggle, however, history, strategic factors, as well as local and general resources require that the free countries concerned each assume primary responsibility for resistance in the specific areas where Communism has resorted to force of arms. Thus the United States assumes a large share of the burden in Korea while France has the primary role in Indochina. The partners, however, recognize the obligation to help each other in their areas of primary responsibility to the extent of their capabilities and within the limitations imposed by their global obligations as well as by the requirements in their own areas of special responsibility. It was agreed that success in this continuing struggle would entail an increase in the common effort and that the United States for its part will, therefore, within the limitations set by Congress, take steps to expand its aid to the French Union. It was further agreed that this increased assistance over and above pres-

ent U.S. aid for Indochina, which now approximates one third of the total cost of Indochina operations, would be especially devoted to assisting France in the building of the national armies of the Associated States.

Mr. Letourneau reviewed the facts which amply demonstrate the determination of the Associated States to pursue with increased energy the strengthening of their authority and integrity both against internal subversion and against external aggression.

In this connection Mr. Letourneau reminded the participants that the accords of 1949, which established the independence within the French Union of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, have been liberally interpreted and supplemented by other agreements, thus consolidating this independence. Mr. Letourneau pointed out that the governments of the Associated States now exercise full authority except that a strictly limited number of services related to the necessities of the war now in progress remain temporarily in French hands. In the course of the examination of the Far Eastern economic and trade situation, it was noted that the Governments of the Associated States are free to negotiate trade treaties and agreements of all kinds with their neighbors subject only to whatever special arrangements may be agreed between members of the French Union.

It was noted that these states have been recognized by thirty-three foreign governments.

The conversations reaffirmed the common determination of the participants to prosecute the defense of Indochina and their confidence in a free, peaceful and prosperous future for Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam.

Mr. Letourneau was received by the President, Mr. Acheson, and Mr. Foster, as Acting Secretary of Defense. Mr. John Allison, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, acted as Chairman of the U.S. Delegation participating in the conversations.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

The Katyn Forest Massacre. Hearings Before the Select Committee To Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, House of Representatives, 82d Cong., 2d sess. Mar. 13 and 14, 1952. 501 pp.

Civil Government for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. S. Rept. 1739, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 4 pp.

Continuing Authority for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. H. Rept. 2153, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 3 pp.

The Objectives of the United States Information Program. Reply to Questions Asked by the Honorable Pat McCarran in his Letter to the Secretary of State, September 13, 1951. S. doc. 143, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 78 pp.

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1952. H. Rept. 2132, 82d Cong., 2 sess. [To accompany H. R. 7340.] 8 pp.

Immigration and Nationality Act. H. Rept. 2096, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. R. 5678.] 129 pp.

Pakistan in the World Today

by *Aura M. Warren*
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Pakistan as a member of the world family means something special to me. For when I first served in Karachi over 30 years ago it was a quiet British-Indian city of some 350,000 people. When I returned in 1950 to serve a second tour of duty, I observed approximately the same number of buildings and homes and streets in the new capital of Pakistan. But it was no longer a quiet city; there was bustling activity. Karachi's population had trebled almost overnight, and the thousands of temporary dwellings huddled around the edges of the city represented the physical aspects of one of Pakistan's earliest and most burdensome social and economic problems—the floodlike influx of some seven million refugees at the time of partition. Pakistanis are rightly proud of the strides they have made since 1947 in overcoming this problem. It has meant permanently resettling families, finding employment for the breadwinners, and guarding against the outbreak of disease that so often accompanies phenomena of this sort. I mention this bit of history because it is illustrative of the tenacity with which the people of Pakistan pursue an objective once their aim is set. Here is a people single-mindedly dedicated to one purpose—the building of a new nation, their own country.

The refugee problem was, however, only one of the many to emerge from the rapid transfer of power in the subcontinent. Certainly one of the most urgent was that of assembling a civil service corps and organizing from top to bottom the administration of central and provincial governments. Then there were problems growing out of the economy of Pakistan, which inherited very few factories, power plants, and industrial facilities from British India. Its known mineral resources are not significant. Pakistan is an agricultural country with 80 percent of its population

living in villages and working on the land. The country's leaders recognized early the primary need for developing industries to convert the foods and fibers that it grows into consumer goods which otherwise must be imported at a considerable expenditure of much-needed foreign exchange.

Meanwhile, what has been the nature of the political system to emerge in Pakistan? That country's founders were schooled in democratic philosophy and they adhere to the parliamentary form of government as the most satisfactory instrument to represent the will of the people. A constitution now being drafted in Pakistan provides for a liberal type of government. However, the Pakistani people and their leaders realize that the mere apparatus of democratic government is not in itself a guaranty of freedom and democracy—that there must be a strong social and economic underpinning. It is a basic assumption in Pakistan that the alleviation of poverty, disease, and illiteracy must go hand in hand with the consolidation of political independence.

An Internationally Minded Nation

This, in a few broad strokes, is the setting against which Pakistan came into the family of nations. Though beset with domestic problems of the most complex nature, Pakistan has been internationally minded. Take a look at the record. It was admitted to membership in the United Nations on September 30, 1947. Within 2 years Pakistan was not only participating in a number of U.N. agencies—ILO, FAO, UNESCO, WHO, ICAO, UPU, ITU, ECAFE, UNSCOB, UNCURK—but it had achieved membership in the World Bank and the Far Eastern Commission. Within this same period, Pakistan signed the protocol of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and ratified the Convention on International Civil Aviation, formulated at Chicago in December 1944. Today, thanks in no small degree to its distinguished

¹ Address made before the Middle East Institute at Washington on June 16 and released to the press on the same date.

Foreign Minister, Sir Zafrulla Khan, Pakistan was a member of the Security Council.

What general position has Pakistan taken in U.N. councils? There is no doubt in my mind where Pakistan stands on issues which involve world morality and real—not illusory—peace and security. The Government promptly endorsed the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27, 1950, following the attack upon the Republic of Korea. Pakistan was a cosigner of the peace treaty with Japan at San Francisco in 1951. It has supported such U.N. resolutions as the one on "Essentials of Peace" of the Fourth General Assembly and the "Uniting For Peace" Resolution, which strengthened the power of the General Assembly to meet possible future aggression. These examples should suffice to show how Pakistan soon identified itself as a part of the free world.

It is not surprising that among the free nations dedicated to durable world peace there are differing viewpoints on ways and means of bringing order to the world, differing concepts of urgency, differing definitions of critical areas and issues. These differences may be rooted in history, or conditioned by culture, or influenced by considerations of regional associations. Perhaps all three of these factors, and others as well, motivate Pakistan to champion so vigorously the causes of Asian and Middle East nations and dependent territories. It maintains a constant interest in the advancement of colonial peoples and in the elimination of various forms of discrimination. I dare say political scientists will not find this to be an unnatural phenomenon. The relations of Pakistan with other Moslem nations, particularly those in the Middle East, are undoubtedly of special interest to this Institute. Let us consider them for a few minutes.

Organization of Moslem Countries

We begin with the fact that Pakistan came into existence so that the Moslem peoples of the subcontinent might build their own nation. To quote the Quad-i-Azam, Mohammed Ali Jinnah: "The idea was that we should have a State in which we could develop according to our own genius and culture and where principles of Islamic social justice could find free play. . . ." It was only natural that the new Moslem state should feel drawn toward other Moslem countries and begin to establish diplomatic relations and foster economic and cultural ties. These bilateral ties were soon followed by efforts toward closer association through multilateral organizations. Perhaps the two most prominent of these are the World Moslem Conference and the International Islamic Economic Organization, which were established on the initiative of Pakistan. Both of these bodies, which have permanent secretariats, are nongovernmental, though various government officials in Pakistan and the Middle East have taken an in-

terest in them. The purpose of the International Islamic Economic Organization, according to its constitution, is "to aid and stimulate the economic advancement of Moslem countries, so as to assist in raising their living standards and enhancing their national prosperity and well being. . . ." The aim of the World Moslem Conference is to develop a machinery of cooperation and communication among Moslem nations in political and cultural affairs. One of its objects is to unite the voice of Islamic nations on issues involving Moslem peoples. These organizations reflect Pakistan's consciousness as an Islamic state and its desire to associate with other Islamic states.

In a foreign policy statement on the floor of Parliament over a year ago, the Acting Foreign Minister made this declaration:

Not only have we sympathy with the cause of Islamic countries wherever such sympathy is called for, but we have tried in our humble way to bring together Islamic countries in some form of friendship if not alliance. . . . The Government has directly or indirectly supported all those moves which would bring Islamic countries nearer to each other. This is, in fact, one of the basic principles of our policy. It is something to which we are attaching the greatest importance. Islamic countries must be brought nearer to each other.

There is no question of leadership of this bloc or that. We do not aspire for leadership. We aspire for service.

Subsequently, the late Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, declared that "Pakistan came into existence . . . for the purpose of serving the world of Islam and mankind and demonstrating the soundness of Islamic principles."

Just recently we have seen efforts by the Pakistan Government to create a consultative organization of Moslem states within which the participants, many of them having similar political and economic problems, could jointly and periodically review developments and exchange views. Here is yet another attempt by Pakistan to translate a consciousness of common destiny and kinship into terms of practical politics. But what is the objective of these practical politics? In my opinion the foremost objective of Pakistan in encouraging the kind of organizations of which we have been speaking can be summed up in one short phrase: political and economic stability in the Middle East. Whether present organizations or ones that are only in the blueprint stage can provide the desired stability, only the future can tell. It must be a matter of trial and error. The important thing is the objective.

It has been suggested in some quarters that a pan-Islamic consultative organization of the kind envisaged by Pakistan's leaders might put the accent on "Islamic" rather than on the realities of political, economic, and social problems. I'm not sure that this suggestion is valid. At any rate it doesn't square with the observable tendency in Pakistan for substantial segments of the intellectual and political leadership to go about their business in the field of politics, economics and economic development, social welfare, and international co-

operation in a thoroughly pragmatic fashion. This is not to say that there are not those who would retreat into traditionalism and take the country with them. As a general historical proposition, followers of any given religion fall into either the liberal or conservative category (for lack of better labels) in terms of how they interpret and apply their doctrine to actualities. History shows that liberal elements are flexible and move with the times, yet clinging to the basic tenets of their doctrine. Conservative or reactionary elements are characteristically unimaginative and seem to resist every trend of the times. I think you will find that history records that on the whole those nations in which liberalism prevails more rapidly absorb innovations and show continuous progress. Those nations that are dominated by reactionaries only stagnate.

Aid From Point Four Projects

I believe that any nation which is so dedicated as Pakistan to the well-being of the individual can move in only one direction—forward. I can say that the basic objective of U.S. policy in Pakistan is to give what help it can to speed along that forward movement.

The principal instrument of that policy is the Point Four Program of technical and economic assistance. Pakistan and the United States entered into a Point Four general agreement in February 1951 which has since been amended in pursuance of the enactment of the Mutual Security Act of 1952. Various Point Four projects involving 10 million dollars, and at least an equivalent amount in Pakistani rupees, have been developed which concentrate upon basic problems of Pakistan's national economy. For example, the U.S.-Pakistan program is devoting 2.3 million dollars this year to the development of integrated and productive community life. Village demonstration projects will be organized in four different centers, each comprising 150 villages. American technicians trained in agriculture, health, education, and village industry will encourage village leaders and their people to discuss their problems and will give guidance for the solution of those problems. These projects include the training of Pakistani extension officers so that this whole program may be completely in the hands of Pakistan in as short a time as possible. Specifically, this program aims to increase food production by improving farming techniques and introducing improved seed and fertilizers, and to encourage village cooperation in attaining improved sanitation and marketing facilities. Next year it is planned to expand this program from 4 to 11 areas.

Still another project involves the spraying of insecticide in the fight against the locust, and the training of Pakistanis to do this work. This program originated in 1951, which was a bad locust year. Billions of these crop destroyers moved eastward from such widely separated places as Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia into Pakistan. Amer-

ican planes with spraying equipment manned by American technicians were dispatched to Pakistan where they immediately went to work. Again this year Pakistani and American locust-spraying crews are at work.

The technical training program under Point Four has been particularly bright. Pakistan was granted more training awards under Point Four in 1951 than any other single country that is a beneficiary of this program. Nearly 102 training awards were issued in 1951 under Point Four. In the same year 52 students, teachers, lecturers, and leaders in various fields of endeavor were given training awards under the Fulbright and Smith-Mundt programs.

Economic Development Program

Pakistan is receiving aid from various sources other than the U.S. Government. Specialized agencies of the United Nations are doing important work in technical assistance in that country. The World Bank made a loan a few months ago of 27 million dollars which will be used to improve the railway system of Pakistan. Just a few days ago another loan of 3 million dollars was made by the Bank for purchases of agricultural equipment. The Ford Foundation has set aside 1.6 million dollars to develop in Pakistan a polytechnic institute for boys and a domestic science school for girls.

Another important source of aid comes from Pakistan's sister members of the Commonwealth. Pakistan is a charter member of the Commonwealth Program for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia, popularly known as the Colombo Plan. Under this program Australia, for example, has given grant aid to Pakistan in the amount of 5 million dollars. These funds are expected to be used to acquire much-needed capital equipment. Canada has given aid in the amount of 10 million dollars. New Zealand has offered 1½ million dollars for irrigation work in arid Baluchistan.

A list of projects and programs for the economic development of Pakistan, however imposing it may appear on paper and in actual execution, is dwarfed by the tremendous necessities. One need only note that the average daily food consumption in Pakistan is 200 calories below the standard minimum levels for tropical areas, and the diet is not a well-balanced one. Textile consumption is about nine yards per person per year (the U.S. average is 145 yards). Most of the people in Pakistan have no electric current. The per capita power availability in that country is 1 percent of that in Japan. In the industrial field Pakistan is one of the most underdeveloped countries of the world. It processes very little of its jute and less than one-fifth of its cotton. There is no steel production and only about 300,000 tons of coal are mined annually. The country has only 2 miles of railroad line for each 200-square-mile area. It is plain to see, then, how dependent Pakistan is at this point, and will be for some time to come, upon imports

of a wide variety of capital goods. Yet the per capita level of imports of all kinds is very low, being equivalent to about six dollars per person annually. Therefore Pakistan's two fundamental economic goals are (1) the improvement of its indigenous food supply by increasing yields and bringing in new acreage, and (2) the accomplishment of primary development (such as power and transportation) to provide the foundation for basic industrialization.

These great tasks can be done; the goal of better living conditions can be reached. Pakistan has two primary resources to harness to the job ahead: its industrious men and women and its rich land. Scores of American visitors to Pakistan have come to me in the past 2 years in Karachi asking for confirmation of this common observation. "I have the feeling," they say, "that what I see in this new, sovereign country today—its problems, its difficulties, and its aspirations—is quite similar to what I could have seen in the United States in its early days of independence." My comment to them is to the effect that one pioneer can always recognize the spirit of another pioneer.

Faith, Unity, and Discipline

But men and women and land—even if the land is rich in topsoil and subsurface wealth—are not enough to do the job of building a strong and happy nation. There must be an admixture of some nonmaterial elements. Certainly the most important of these are the Quad-i-Azam's well-known triad: faith, unity, and discipline. I may not have them in the order that they were formulated by the first Governor General in the exhortation to his people, but it makes no real difference, for when any one of the corners of this triangle is weakened the whole structure loses strength.

Implicit in the quality of faith (if I may be pardoned for a moment of moralizing) is a strong element of patience. The latter is a cardinal virtue of the successful teacher, mediator, or diplomat, for example, and is essential to the general pursuit of statecraft. It requires discipline to restrain impatience. History reveals over and over again that the feeling of frustration—the price one often pays for discipline—is a very small fraction of the cost of impatience and impulsive action.

I labor this point because patience versus impulsiveness have often been conflicting forces in our own history, and I see them now in conflict in Pakistan. I realize that I have posed an apparent paradox, for patience is supposed to be one of the things for which the East has been traditionally famous and for the lack of which men of the East have often scolded men of the West—and still do. But I doubt that a paradox exists, because I doubt that people of the Orient are any more patient than any other peoples. The origin of this fallacy stems perhaps from an old semantic misconception by which the word "patience" was made to be synonymous, in this instance, with "spirit of resignation," or "fatalism," if you will.

But now we are living in another day. The industrial revolution has demonstrated to all the world that nature and its treasure can be mastered and productively employed. For the people of Pakistan, today, there is no resignation to some unknowable, unpredictable fate that may strike in the form of starvation, disease, or flood. On the contrary, there is vigorous dedication to do things with the material heritage of Pakistan so that the people may realize something better than precarious existence.

Time-Consuming Process of Transition

This returns me to my original observation that in this great urge toward development, the desire to move quickly is strong. One observes from time to time the impulse to skip over very necessary steps in the complicated process of economic development. It is not simple to jump from a predominantly agricultural and village economy to even moderate industrialization without a series of essential intervening developments. I mean, for example, the development of power, of communication and transportation facilities, the introduction of appropriate financial and fiscal policies, and, probably most important, the training of many categories of managers, technicians, and skilled labor, particularly artisans who work with their hands, such as carpenters, mechanics, welders, electricians, and so forth.

This has been a time-consuming process in all industrial economies. It will take time in all underdeveloped economies. The important thing is that a beginning has been made, and that haste be made slowly.

There is an even more important sense in which patience and forbearance must be exercised—that is in the matter of Pakistan's relations with India. Just as those two nations are in the pioneer days of their economic development, so is the whole world living in an early phase of pioneer world society. Men learned to live together for mutual security, first in tribes, then in city-states, then in nations. It is now for nations to learn to live together in the interests of world peace.

In speaking along this line some time ago with particular reference to U.S. foreign policy, the Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, cautioned that the road to peaceable coexistence is a very long one and a very hard one. To keep on this road, he went on to say, takes purpose, perseverance, sacrifice, and more than anything else, steady nerves.

Pakistan's relations with India have given rise to that country's most preoccupying problems in foreign affairs. The most complex one, of course, is the Kashmir issue, now almost 5 years old. Other issues involve Indus Basin water rights, the settlement of evacuee property claims in both countries, and the definition of certain financial obligations between the two countries arising out of partition arrangements.

As you know, the Kashmir issue is under the purview of the Security Council. Both Pakistan and India are committed to two interdependent resolutions of the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan, the main purposes of which, taken as a whole, were (1) the cease-fire and preservation of peace, and (2) the conduct of a plebiscite to determine the desires of the people of Kashmir with respect to accession to Pakistan or India. Failure thus far to achieve the latter objective has foundered on questions of demilitarization. Frank Graham, the present U.N. representative for India and Pakistan, formulated a 12-point program designed to accomplish demilitarization preparatory to the appointment of a plebiscite administrator. In his first report to the Security Council on October 15, 1951, the U.N. representative reported that the two Governments had accepted 4 of the 12 proposals. On December 19, 1951, in his second report, he reported that 4 more of the 12 proposals, or a total of 8, had been accepted by both Governments. Finally, in his recent report of April 22, he reported acceptance by Pakistan of the remaining 4 proposals. India has not yet accepted the remaining 4.

Mr. Graham is now engaged in conversations in New York with representatives of both countries in an effort to clear away the last remaining obstacles to the appointment of a plebiscite administrator. Pakistan's fervent desire to get ahead with this business is a matter of record. It has made numerous accommodations in negotiations to hasten the solution of this controversy. I earnestly pray that Mr. Graham can soon come up with a meeting of the minds, so that the people of Kashmir may be free to live peaceful and productive lives.

In conclusion, I am happy to report that there is a large fund of good will in Pakistan toward the United States. True, there are unfriendly elements among the extremists, largely on the left. But fortunately they are not many, though they are often active and never quiet. And it is true that occasionally our two countries do not see eye to eye on methods, but our ultimate goals are essentially the same.

By and large Pakistan and the United States continue to enjoy those close relations that were so eloquently described by the late Liaquat Ali Khan during his visit to the United States just 2 years ago, while he himself was so successfully bringing our two nations still closer together in mutual understanding.

It is my privilege and primary interest in Pakistan to build constructively on this foundation of understanding in close association with such dedicated leaders as His Excellency, the Governor General, and Prime Minister Nazimuddin, and to join hands with this democratic, Islamic nation in South Asia for the common good of both peoples, and ultimately of all free peoples.

Community Development Agreement With India

[Released to the press June 10]

The Governments of the United States and India have signed a technical cooperation program for community development in 16,500 villages in India with an estimated population of 12,000,000 people. The program is pursuant to the Point Four Program agreement between the two countries signed January 5, 1952. This new operational agreement provides for the largest cooperative development program ever undertaken by the Technical Cooperation Administration and a host country. It involves about 100 million dollars in funds. The contributions of the two Governments will be about 25 million dollars by the United States and the rupee equivalent of 76 million dollars by India. The U.S. contribution includes the funds to be spent for salaries, expenses, and equipment for 120 American technicians.

The central object of the program is to obtain the fullest development of the material and human resources of each area with particular emphasis on increased food production. It will be the first step in a program of intensive development which is expected, over a period of years, to embrace the entire country and demonstrate conclusively the interrelationship between the democratic approach and material benefits to the people. It covers approximately 55 different projects. Each project will include approximately 300 villages with a total population of 200,000 people and will cover about 150,000 acres of land. Each project area will be divided into three blocks for more efficient management, each block comprising 100 villages and 65,000 people. In areas where a full project is not considered feasible, one or two development blocks will be started.

The program is one of rural development. It includes irrigation, fertilizer application, agricultural extension, health measures, and education. However, 6 of the 55 projects will be of the composite type and will include, in addition to the above, activities in small- and medium-scale industries, township planning, and development.

The actual operation of the program will be in the hands of a Central Committee appointed by the Indian Government under the supervision of an administrator also named by the Government of India. Under the Central Committee there also will be state, district, and project committees. Each project will employ approximately 125 supervisors and village workers who will be responsible for its successful operation. The smaller blocks will have smaller staffs. This means that a total of approximately 8,000 Indian supervisors and workers will be employed.

The role of the U.S. technicians will be purely advisory. They will take no part in the actual

direction of operations but they will be available for advice at all levels to demonstrate modern practices in all phases of the vast program. They will continue, on a greatly increased plane, the "grass root teaching-by-doing" activities other American specialists have been so successfully carrying out in other districts of India.

The joint fund contributions of the two countries will be \$8,671,000 by the United States and 343,834,000 rupees—the equivalent of \$72,205,140—by India. However, these contributions do not constitute the total for each. The United States also will pay the salaries, expenses, and equipment for technicians and staff administration, calculated at \$1,890,000; about \$4,000,000 for fertilizer; about \$6,200,000 for steel to manufacture farm implements for farmers and one-man village shops; and \$4,302,500 for its share of the cost of 750 tube wells in the community projects, making a total of \$25,063,500.

The two countries have agreed that the \$8,671,000 to be contributed by the United States is the amount of payments to be made outside of India in U. S. dollars for the procurement of supplies, equipment, services, and other program materials and their transportation to India, exclusive of allotments from other operational agreements, and will be used by the Technical Cooperation Administration for making such payments. This sum will be expended pursuant to authorization and request by the representatives of the two Governments through the establishment of an irrevocable credit in this country, under which letters of credit will be issued to suppliers and procurement agencies approved by them.

In addition to the rupee equivalent of \$72,205,140 as its contribution to this project, India will also make available the equivalent of \$3,187,500 for its share of the tube well construction, \$925,000 for fertilizer to be used in the projects, and \$252,000 for steel, a total rupee equivalent of \$76,568,540.

The work of the community development projects will start immediately and will be completed within 3 years. Thereafter, the continuance of the community development in the areas covered by the projects will become the responsibility of the Government of India.

The plan will include at least one project in each of the 28 states of India. In agriculture and related matters, provisions are made for reclamation of available virgin and waste land; water for agriculture through irrigation canals, tube wells, surface wells, etc.; commercial fertilizers; quality seeds; improved agricultural techniques; veterinary aid; technical information, materials, bulletins, etc. on agriculture; dissemination of information through slides, films, radio broadcasts, and lectures; improved agricultural implements; improved marketing and credit facilities; breeding centers for animal husbandry; development of inland fisheries; home economics; fruit and vegetable cultivation; soil surveys and information;

encouragement of the use of natural and compost manures; and forest plantation.

Every effort will be made to improve the road system, to encourage mechanical road transport services, and to develop animal transport.

Free compulsory education, preferably of the basic type, is included. Provisions will be made for education in elementary and vocational schools as well as for adult education and library services.

The health phase of the program will include environmental sanitation and public-health measures, control of malaria and other debilitating diseases, provision of improved drinking water supplies, medical aid for the ailing, prenatal care, midwifery services, and provisions for generalized public-health service and education.

Training facilities will be set up for instruction in basic activities and vocations such as agriculture, extension assistance, artisans, supervisors, managerial personnel, health workers, and executive officers for the projects.

A social welfare organization will also be established to organize community entertainment, provide audio-visual aid for instruction and recreation, organize sports activities, organize village fairs, and start cooperative and self-help movements.

Stress will be placed on the activities mentioned but, in some of the blocks, encouragement will be given to small- and medium-scale industries to employ surplus labor, to supply local materials, and to produce for sale outside the district for cash income. Brick kilns and sawmills will be constructed to provide the necessary building materials for needs in the communities. Improved techniques for low-cost home building will be demonstrated.

Each development block will have a "mandi" unit—something like a shopping center in this country—but which will contain health centers, transport and tractor service centers, marketing and shipping centers, storage houses for agricultural produce, and veterinary services in addition to doctors, health visitors, midwives, and sanitary inspectors.

Specifically the role of the Technical Cooperation Administration will be to assist the community development program as follows:

The director for technical cooperation will serve as consultant to the Central Committee. There will be an adviser to the Indian administrator, designated by the country director. He will coordinate and expedite all TCA activities within the program. TCA specialists in agriculture, education, health, and other fields of community development will serve as advisers and consultants to their Indian counterparts. At the state level, services of TCA specialists will be made available as advisers and consultants to the extent requested by the states. They will work with their Indian counterparts and their services will be available at district and project levels as may be necessary to assist in carrying out the program.

Continuing and systematic evaluation of the program will be made by the Ford Foundation of America in close cooperation with the Planning Commission, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, and the U. S. Technical Cooperation Administration Staff. The Ford Foundation is co-operating with the Government of India in the operation of 25 training centers for village workers in community projects.

U.S., India Complete Plans for Development Projects

[Released to the press June 19]

Signing of the last of 11 agreements determining the final form of the Point Four Program of technical cooperation in India, toward which the United States is supplying 50 million dollars and India 86 million dollars in rupees, was announced June 19 by Stanley Andrews, Administrator of the Technical Cooperation Administration.

First emphasis is upon increasing India's food supply.

With the signing of these agreements the United States becomes a partner with India in the largest rural development program undertaken anywhere in the world. The United States will provide some of the technicians and supplies for a cooperative effort in increasing the agricultural production and the standard of living of 12,000,000 Indians in 16,500 villages. About 7,000 Indians will be trained, with the assistance of U.S. technicians, to bring simple but basic improvements in agriculture, health, and education to the Indian farmer. This community development program was specifically covered in one of the agreements signed but all other agreements also contribute directly or indirectly to this tremendous effort for increasing food production.

Two of the agreements signed will make U.S. assistance available in diminishing India's reliance on the erratic monsoon for the water that spells the difference between a plentiful harvest and starvation. Assistance provided under these agreements in drilling deep wells to make use of India's underground water supply and in developing large and small reservoirs to store the monsoon rains will make double cropping possible in several areas of India.

Another important need for farmers included under the community development program will be met by an agreement to import 55,000 long tons of steel principally for the manufacture of agricultural implements. This steel will be fashioned into simple tools by village blacksmiths and will enable the Indian farmer to use a steel-pointed plow for turning under the green-manure crops which are a vital part of the new techniques intro-

duced by U.S. and Indian agricultural extension agents.

A project in the field of marine fisheries will assist the Indians in developing this important source of protein supplement. Included in this project is a small expenditure for a dredge which alone can result in a yearly increase in the Indian fishing catch by over a million dollars. At the present time, Indian fishermen in many harbors are unable to fish one week every month since the tides are too low to enable them to leave their anchorage. Once the channels in these harbors have been deepened by the dredge, a 24-percent increase in fishing time and therefore in the catch should result.

The tube well project to develop ground-water resources embraces approximately 2,000 wells located in the Gangatis Plains in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, the Punjab, and Pepsu. About 750 will be placed in community development areas, adding greatly to their value. Each well will irrigate 500 acres.

Under a fertilizer agreement, 108,000 long tons of chemical fertilizer will be imported to India and sold to farmers at subsidized prices. This represents a potential production increase of 230,000 tons of food. It will serve to demonstrate to Indian farmers the benefits of fertilizers and will foster later domestic fertilizer production and consumption and provide a base for research. Fertilizer shipments to India will start in July.

A locust-control program, designed to combat serious Indian food loss from the recurrent locust invasions, covers technical assistance and equipment from the Tca regional pool of spraying aircraft, insecticide and other materials, technical personnel, and ground-control equipment including vehicles and sprayers. The active campaign in India runs from June through October. The Tca is supplying the 16 airplanes and 77 tons of aldrin in use in the present antilocust campaign under way in the menaced areas in the Middle East and South Asia.

Funds for river development will be devoted to the Hirakud Dam, one of three to be constructed for unified development of the Mahanadi River to irrigate 2,000,000 acres, develop 400,000 kilowatts of electric power and provide a 380-mile navigable waterway through Orissa to the Bay of Bengal.

A summary of projects and the U.S. dollar allocations are:

Community development,	\$8,671,000
Fertilizer imports,	\$10,650,000
Tube wells for irrigation,	\$13,700,000
Iron and steel imports for agricultural uses,	\$8,385,000
River development,	\$4,784,000
Fisheries,	\$2,462,000
Locust control,	\$230,000
Soil surveys,	\$200,000
Village worker training,	\$166,000
Forestry research and desert afforestation,	\$104,000
Malaria control,	\$648,000

The agreements were signed for their respec-

tive Governments by Clifford H. Willson, U.S. Director of Technical Cooperation for India, and P. C. Bhattacharyya, Joint Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Finance.

They implement an understanding entered into in January 1952, outlining the general nature of the undertaking.¹ There has been full participation of all Indian interests from the community level to the Central Government. Joint planning has been done by a Central Committee of the Indian Government and Mr. Willson with the aid of American technicians. The precise negotiations and reviews have been in progress since the over-all understanding was reached in January.

¹ The agreement was signed Jan. 5, 1952, at New Delhi between India and the United States, see BULLETIN of Jan. 14, 1952, p. 47.

Saudi Arabia Establishes Monetary Agency

The Department of State announced on June 13 that the first major Point Four project has just been completed in the Near East. Saudi Arabia has created the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency to administer the country's finances. Saudi Arabia was the first Arab country to sign a Point Four general agreement, January 17, 1951. Arthur Young, internationally known fiscal specialist, arrived in Jidda in July of last year to act as financial adviser to the Government of Saudi Arabia. After a careful study, Mr. Young recommended the establishment of a Monetary Agency to give the Government of Saudi Arabia the benefit of modern methods of handling revenues and expenditures. Such know-how was badly needed in the Arabian Kingdom because of the fifteen-fold increase in Government revenues during the last decade resulting largely from oil revenues.

The principal functions of the Monetary Agency, which was authorized by King Ibn Saud on April 20, 1952, and which is to have its main operating office in Jidda, will be to strengthen the currency of Saudi Arabia and to establish and fix its value in relation to foreign currency; and to aid the Ministry of Finance in centralizing the receipts and expenditures of the Government in accordance with the items of the authorized budget and in controlling payments so that all branches of the Government will abide by the budget.

George Albert Blowers of Pineville, Ky., who has wide experience in international finance and is a special adviser to the International Monetary Fund, has been nominated by the Minister of

Finance of Saudi Arabia to be the first Governor. He will leave for Jidda on June 20.¹

The Monetary Agency will be under the control of a Board of Directors, which will include the Governor, all of whom will be appointed by the King of Saudi Arabia on the nomination of the Minister of Finance.

The Monetary Agency will hold and operate any monetary reserve funds as separate funds earmarked for monetary purposes only, buy and sell for Government account gold and silver bullion, advise the Government on new coinage, handle the manufacture, shipment, and issue of all new coins, and regulate commercial banks, exchange dealers, and money changers as may be found appropriate.

Trade-Agreement Concessions With Tibet Suspended

[Released to the press June 13]

The President on June 13 notified the Department of the Treasury that after the close of business July 13, 1952, U. S. concessions made in trade agreements will be suspended with regard to imports from Tibet. The action was taken in accordance with section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 which provides, in part, that "As soon as practicable, the President shall take such action as is necessary to suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of any reduction in any rate of duty, or binding of any existing customs or excise treatment, or other concession contained in any trade agreement . . . to imports from any nation or area dominated or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement."

The President's notification relating to imports from Tibet is the most recent in a series of steps which have been taken since the enactment last year of section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act. On August 1, 1951, the President signed a proclamation ordering the suspension of trade-agreement concessions from Communist-dominated countries. Under the terms of the proclamation, the President was to notify the Secretary of the Treasury separately regarding the countries specifically affected by the order. On the same date, the President, acting in accordance with the terms of the proclamation, notified the Treasury of the suspension as of August 31, 1951, of trade-agreement concessions on imports from various specified countries.^{1a}

Notifications with respect to certain other Com-

¹ The Technical Cooperation Administration of the Department of State, which administers the Point Four Program, assisted in the selection of Mr. Blowers.

^{1a} BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1951, p. 291.

munist-dominated countries have been issued from time to time upon the termination of U. S. commitments to such countries. On September 17, 1951, the President notified the Treasury of the suspension, effective October 17, 1951, of trade-agreement concessions on imports from Bulgaria.² On October 2, 1951, he notified the Treasury of the suspension, effective November 1, 1951, of trade-agreement concessions on imports from Czechoslovakia.³ On November 20, 1951, he notified the Treasury of the suspension, effective January 5, 1952, of trade-agreement concessions on imports from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Poland, and areas under Polish administration or control.⁴ On June 5, 1952, he notified the Treasury of the suspension, effective July 5, 1952, of trade-agreement concessions on imports from Hungary.⁵

Since the United States has neither a trade agreement nor direct trade with Tibet, the President's notification is merely a routine administrative action taken in compliance with the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951.⁶

² *Ibid.*, Oct. 1, 1951, p. 550.

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 15, 1951, p. 621.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 3, 1951, p. 913.

⁵ *Ibid.*, June 16, 1952, p. 946.

⁶ For text of the President's notification to the Secretary of the Treasury, see 17 *Fed. Reg.* 5413.

Export-Import Bank Loans and Credit Authorizations

West German Purchase of U. S. Tobacco

The Export-Import Bank of Washington on June 6 announced authorization of a loan of 10 million dollars to Western Germany for the purchase of U.S. tobacco. The credit is to be made to the Bank Deutscher Laender.

It will carry an interest rate of 2¾ percent and is to be repaid in 15 months.

Brazilian Railroads

The Export-Import Bank on June 6 announced loans amounting to \$15,600,000 to two important Brazilian railroads.

One, in the amount of \$8,600,000, is to the Santos a Jundiá Railway, which operates 87 miles of mainline double-track railway from the port of Santos to São Paulo and Jundiá, 30 miles beyond São Paulo. The other loan, in the amount of \$7,000,000, is to the Paulista Railway, which operates 1,100 miles of mainline trackage from Jundiá into the heart of the State of São Paulo.

The two railways serve the most important industrial and commercial area of Brazil centering in the city of São Paulo and its seaport of Santos, as well as one of the most important agricultural sections of the country. The Santos a Jundiá Railway in 1950 moved inland about two-thirds of all of the tonnage landed at the port of

Santos. The two railways, together with the Central Railway, with which they interconnect at São Paulo, move approximately 40 percent of the total railway freight traffic of Brazil. The two together with the Central operate all of the broad-gauge railway mileage of Brazil.

The loans to the two railway companies were both recommended by the Joint Brazil-U.S. Economic Development Commission and are for Projects No. 1 and No. 2 of the Commission. The projects consist of the conversion of both railway systems from the use of outmoded hook and chain couplers and vacuum brakes to modern automatic couplers and air brakes. The loans will be used for the purchase in the United States of the brake and coupler material to be installed on the locomotives and rolling stock of the two railways and for the purchase also of a large number of new freight cars equipped with automatic couplers and brakes to replace old, lightweight cars not fit for conversion.

The loan to the Paulista includes \$3,000,000 for the mechanical equipment to be installed on existing cars and locomotives and approximately \$4,000,000 for the purchase of 605 new freight cars. The loan to the Santos a Jundiá includes \$2,600,000 for equipment to be installed on existing stock and \$6,000,000 for 1,100 new freight cars.

The conversion will improve the efficiency of operation of the two railroads, but even more importantly will make possible the free interchange of freight and passenger cars between the Santos a Jundiá, the Paulista, and the Central Railway of Brazil. The latter is now equipped with automatic couplers and brakes and, as a result, traffic has not been freely interchangeable between it and the other two railways. The completion of these two related and concurrent projects will solve one of the basic railway transport problems of Brazil.

The Joint Commission has also recommended, as its Project No. 3, a program of reequipment and improvement of the Central Railway of Brazil. Improvement in the operation of this railway constitutes one of the other basic transportation needs of Brazil. The Joint Commission's recommendation for a loan to the Central Railway for this purpose is under study by the International Bank.

The loans to both the Santos a Jundiá and the Paulista companies are to be repaid in 14 approximately equal semiannual installments beginning in mid-1955. Funds advanced under the credits will bear interest at the rate of 4 percent per annum in the case of the Santos a Jundiá, whose notes are to be unconditionally guaranteed by the Government of Brazil, and 4½ percent per annum in the case of the Paulista, whose notes will bear no Government guaranty.

Brazilian Electric Utility Companies

The Export-Import Bank of Washington announced on June 9 its authorization of a credit of

\$41,140,000 to seven electric utility operating companies in Brazil. The purpose of the credit is to finance, with minor exceptions, the purchase of U.S. materials, equipment, and services for an electric expansion program with a total cost equivalent to over \$98,000,000.

The seven companies are subsidiaries of the Brazilian Electric Power Company, which in turn is a subsidiary of the American and Foreign Power Company. The latter company is a U.S. company which owns a number of electric utility companies operating in Latin America. Its securities are widely held by private investors in the United States. In 1948 the Bank extended a credit of \$8,178,000 to the subsidiaries of the American and Foreign Power Company, in Brazil, including the companies which will be financed by the Bank by the present loan. The Bank also authorized a credit of \$12,000,000 in March 1951 for the Cuban Electric Company, also a subsidiary of the American and Foreign Power Company.

The Brazilian operating companies, together with other affiliated companies, are the second most important group of electric utility companies in Brazil and form the largest U.S. investment in that country. The Brazilian companies being financed under the Bank's credit are:

Companhia Paulista de Força e Luz, which supplies electric service to the north central portion of the State of São Paulo, a rich agricultural territory within this foremost industrial state of Brazil accounting for approximately one-half of the value of agricultural products in São Paulo. The industries served by Paulista are diversified and increasingly more important.

Companhia Força e Luz do Paraná, which supplies electric service to Curitiba, capital of the State of Paraná, as well as to three neighboring municipalities. Curitiba is the metropolis of the States of Paraná and Santa Catarina.

Companhia Brasileira de Força Elétrica, which supplies electric power to 15 communities in the State of Rio de Janeiro. These communities include Niterói, capital of the State, and Petropolis, the summer capital of Brazil.

Companhia Força e Luz de Minas Gerais, which furnishes electric power to Belo Horizonte, capital of the State of Minas Gerais, and three other communities in the same area.

Companhia Força e Luz Nordeste do Brasil, which supplies electric, transportation, and telephone service to Maceio, State of Alagoas, and Natal, State of Rio Grande do Norte. Maceio is the capital of Alagoas and primarily important as a commercial center. Natal is the largest city and port of the State of Rio Grande do Norte.

Companhia Energia Elétrica da Bahia, which furnishes electric service to 11 communities and telephone service to 26 communities in the State of Bahia. The largest

city served is Salvador, the fourth largest city in Brazil.

Companhia Central Brasileira de Força Elétrica, which operates in the area of Vitória, the capital of the State of Espírito Santo, which is also expanding.

The demand for power from industry, agriculturists, and other consumers in the areas served is constantly increasing. The present capacity of the companies is not sufficient to meet this demand and rationing of electric power has become necessary in many cases. The construction program will increase the generating capacity of the seven companies by approximately 175,000 kws in 1955 or 90 percent of their present capacity.

In recent years the demand for power in the areas served by these companies has been increasing rapidly primarily due to rapid industrial growth, including the processing of agricultural products. On account of the rapid growth in demand, rationing of electric power became necessary on a wide basis. In some cases, the supply of electric power has been so inadequate that it became necessary to curtail individual industries and to deny requests for services.

The construction program, to be financed in part by the Bank, includes generating plants, transmission lines, and distribution facilities. Approximately 65 percent of the generating plants will be hydroelectric, including an 80,000-kw project on the Rio Grande River in Minas Gerais.

The credits authorized by the Bank were recommended by the Joint Brazilian-U. S. Economic Development Commission.

The credit of \$41,140,000 will bear interest at the rate of 4½ percent per annum and is to be repaid in semiannual installments over a 20-year period beginning in 1956.

The borrowers have been financially successful but have been unable to obtain private financing, either in Brazil or in the United States, sufficient to meet the total costs of the construction program. Funds for the construction program not furnished by the Bank will be obtained from plowed-back earnings and in part by the sale of equity securities to the Brazilian public.

Herbert E. Gaston, chairman of the board of the Export-Import Bank, in announcing the credit, said:

The need for the additional power being financed is a result of the rapid growth of Brazil's economy. A sufficient supply of power is one of the basic requirements for the economic development of Brazil and the Export-Import Bank is very happy to aid Brazil in this important electric power development.

U.S. Policy on Fisheries and Territorial Waters

by William C. Herrington

U.S. interests, ranging widely from one extreme to the other, give a fair cross section of the world's problems with respect to territorial waters. In the days of power diplomacy a century or so ago, it might have been possible to adopt widely divergent policies in the various cases, each adapted to the particular problem involved. Today, U.S. policy is to foster international cooperation and agreement, and we have accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in controversial matters. The United States wishes to adopt and follow policies with respect to its territorial waters which it is prepared to recognize and accept when practiced by other nations.

The traditional policy of *mare liberum*, allowing all nations free use of the high-seas waters except for a 3-mile shore zone, has been followed by the United States and other countries which have developed world trade and high-seas fishery resources and has benefited both the United States and the world at large. It has encouraged development of commerce and of high-seas fisheries. If the doctrine of *mare clausum*, which flourished several centuries back, had survived to the present, it would have greatly hindered or prevented exploratory work which has yielded many nations valuable information concerning fishery resources and methods for their utilization off the coasts of the Americas, Asia, Africa, and elsewhere. Had this doctrine prevailed, the people of these continents would be much the poorer now.

We must accept the fact, however, that recent technological developments make it possible to extend intensive fishing operations to distant areas. These operations, if not controlled, can be intensive enough to decimate certain fish populations and reduce their sustained productivity to the detriment of mankind. New problems have been introduced which are not adequately met by the classical principles of *mare liberum*. The develop-

ment of these new problems does not mean that it is necessary to discard our traditional policies; it does mean that we must seek ways to retain their benefits while, at the same time, providing satisfactory solutions to newly created problems.

To discard and abandon traditional concepts of international law in favor of unilateral action and claims by each nation facing on the international sea would lead only to chaos. The U.S. policy, therefore, is to build upon the past in developing solutions to new problems by means of joint action with neighbor nations. The recent decision of the World Court in the fisheries case, *United Kingdom vs. Norway*, is not in conflict with this policy. The judgment of the Court does not affect the status of territorial sea delimitation, since it is concerned only with the definition of base lines. However, the majority of the Court in its comments on the case states as follows (p. 20, par. 5) :

The delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal state as expressed in municipal law.

In accordance with this concept, the U.S. Government has protested the unilateral action of governments which have extended their territorial waters without regard to the rights and interests of the United States and other nations.

Two Critical Problems

One of the most critical of the new problems concerns maintaining maximum productivity of stocks of fish now being administered by ourselves and others in the face of the threat imposed by the potential entry into these fisheries of far-ranging fishing fleets from other countries. These fisheries have been built up and maintained at a highly productive level only as a result of much money and effort expended for research by the United

States and other countries and by the imposition of drastic controls upon U.S. fishermen. Means must be found, within the framework of international law, to insure the continued effective operation of these conservation programs.

The second problem is that created when wide-ranging fleets of fishing boats from one country exploit the stocks of fish in the high-seas waters off the coasts of another with such intensity that the continued productivity of these resources is endangered. Not only does such exploitation threaten the continued productivity of the resource but it also gives rise to a psychological problem among people of one country who observe boats of another country operating on the high seas off their coasts. They themselves may be making little or no use of these stocks of fish, nevertheless, they sometimes develop a strong feeling that these fish are potential resources of special concern to their own country and that the future of the resource is endangered by the "foreign" fleet. Therefore, in spite of the fact that the stocks are part of an international resource whose extent, behavior, and method of capture would have been little known were it not for the operations of the "foreign" fleet, a popular clamor develops for government action to prevent or limit these operations.

The Government of the United States is fully aware of these critical problems and is developing principles and procedures, through agreements with other countries concerned, to take care of these problems and still maintain the benefits of the traditional policy of freedom of the seas.

The North Pacific Fisheries Convention

Encouraging progress has already been made in this direction. At the Tripartite Fisheries Conference attended by delegations from the Governments of Canada, Japan, and the United States at Tokyo, November 4–December 14, 1951, the United States proposed, and after extensive discussion and some modification the other countries accepted, certain principles bearing upon conservation programs.¹ Essentially these principles provide that when a country develops and makes full use of a stock of fish, conducts research to insure the most efficient conservation of this stock, and restrains its own fishermen in order to maintain maximum sustained productivity, other countries which are not participating in this fishery will agree to abstain from participation as long as such conservation programs exist.

The Government of the United States believes that by recognizing and accepting these principles,

the North Pacific Fisheries Convention will, to a large extent, safeguard major U.S. conservation programs of the North Pacific Coast without comprising traditional U.S. policy regarding territorial waters. General acceptance of these principles by other littoral nations can accomplish much toward safeguarding similar conservation programs elsewhere.

The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission

The problem concerning activities of the fishing fleets of one nation on the high seas off the coast of another also requires international cooperation and agreement. A good example of this problem is the activity of the U.S. tuna fleet operating off the coasts of Latin American countries. The United States cannot solve this problem alone. Even the straight sustained yield problem cannot be solved without the cooperation of other countries, for the fish spend part of their time in the territorial waters of these countries. Moreover, because of the psychological factors involved, people of the other countries are not likely to accept assurances of continued productivity of fish stocks or to cooperate in necessary conservation measures unless they have a part in the research program which developed pertinent conclusions and recommendations. The U.S. approach to this problem has been through the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, which was organized in 1950 for the purpose of cooperative study of the tuna resources of member nations to determine the fishery's effect on tuna stocks. If results indicate the need for conservation measures to maintain the productivity of these stocks, the Commission will recommend suitable regulatory measures to member governments.

At present, the United States is cooperating with the people of Costa Rica in this work. However, the Commission is open to other countries. The adherence of other nations concerned with Pacific tuna would make it possible to extend the benefits of this cooperative work to other areas which are or may be affected.

In the Gulf of Mexico, the principal problem concerns the shrimp fishery. This matter from time to time has created complications between the people and Governments of the United States and Mexico. It is hoped that some understanding may be developed which will take into account the rights and interests of nationals of the two countries.

In the North Atlantic area, fishery problems involving the United States, Canada, and other nations have been worked out in a spirit of friendship and cooperation. At present, the conservation problem is being considered by the newly established Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Commission. In the North Pacific, our problems with Canada have been competently handled through

¹ For a report of the Tripartite Fisheries Conference by Mr. Herrington, see BULLETIN of Mar. 3, 1952, p. 340. For text of the North Pacific Fisheries Convention, negotiated at this Conference, signed May 9, 1952, and corrigenda thereto, see *ibid.*, p. 343 and *ibid.*, May 26, 1952, p. 830.

the International Fisheries Commission and the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission, and through informal cooperation between our local and national governments.

The general situation in the field of international law respecting fisheries and territorial waters is now somewhat unsettled as a result of various claims and pressures arising since World War II. The policy of the United States is to work toward the stabilization of international law in this field in a manner which will further the interests of the United States and the world community through maintenance of freedom of the seas, giving due consideration to the need for encouraging and safeguarding programs designed to maintain maximum productivity of the world's fishery resources.

● *Mr. Herrington is special assistant for fisheries and wildlife to the Under Secretary. The above article is based on remarks made before the National Fisheries Institute Convention, Los Angeles, Calif., on Apr. 21.*

Latin American Fellowships

[Released to the press June 12]

Applications are now being accepted for fellowships in certain of the other American Republics for the academic year 1953-54 under terms of the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations, the Department of State announced on June 12.

The convention provides for an annual exchange of two graduate students between the United States and each of the signatory republics. The participating countries, in addition to the United States, are as follows: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela.

Application forms and further information regarding these awards may be obtained from the International Educational Programs Branch, U.S. Office of Education, Federal Security Agency, Washington 25, D. C. The competition for the academic year 1953-54 will remain open until December 1, 1952.

Travel expenses are paid by the U. S. Government with the host government paying tuition and a monthly maintenance allowance and, in some cases, a small sum for books and incidental expenses. Students will probably have to supple-

ment the maintenance allowance from other sources to meet cost-of-living expenses.

Applicants must be citizens of the United States and should have a bachelor's degree or its equivalent at the time of acceptance of the grant, and sufficient knowledge of the language of the country to carry on the proposed study, as well as satisfactory academic, professional, and personal qualifications. Candidates must be capable of carrying on independent research and, accordingly, are required to present a suitable plan of study or a research topic approved by their adviser or supervising professor if enrolled in an educational institution or by the Office of Education if not so enrolled. All other qualifications being equal, persons under 35 years of age and veterans are given preference.

A committee of U. S. educators will nominate a panel of five persons for presentation to each participating government. Final selection of two persons to study in each country will be made by the Government of the respective country. Since there are usually more candidates for the larger countries such as Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru, the chances are greater for inclusion on a panel for one of the other countries.

Schuman Plan Receives Final Ratification

Press Conference Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press June 18]

During the last week both the Belgian and Italian Parliaments have voted favorably on ratification of the Schuman Plan treaty. This means that action by the parliaments of the six nations concerned has now been completed and the governments of these countries can proceed to establish the institutions of the European Coal and Steel Community.

When these institutions are established, a vital segment of the European industrial system will be integrated, and the door will be opened to closer cooperation in many fields of economic activity. Taken together with the European Defense Community Treaty, now awaiting action by the parliaments of these same countries, the European Coal and Steel Community will provide a solid foundation for further progress toward the strength and unity which is so essential to lasting European security and prosperity.

Progress Toward Completion of Human Rights Covenants

The principal item on the agenda of the eighth session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, which met at New York from April 14 to June 13, was the preparation of international covenants on civil and political rights and on economic, social, and cultural rights. The General Assembly, at its sixth session last year, had directed the Commission to revise the draft covenant formulated previously and to divide it into two separate covenants. At the session concluded this month, the Commission adopted a number of basic articles for each covenant, although it did not complete the drafting of either.

Following are texts of two statements made by Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. representative on the Commission, on June 13—one to the press and another to the members of the Commission.

[Released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N.
June 13]

MRS. ROOSEVELT'S PRESS STATEMENT

In view of the fact that the Human Rights Commission was unable to complete at this session the work assigned to it by the General Assembly—by that I mean the drafting of two Covenants on Human Rights and measures of implementation—I thought that it might be useful for me to review the work of the session.¹

The most important development was the drafting of the substantive articles for the two Covenants—the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.

The “rights” in the latter Covenant are quite different rights from the civil and political rights which will go into a separate Covenant. They are of a character that cannot be brought into

being by the mere enactment and enforcement of legislation, as is the case with civil and political rights. They are described, therefore, in terms of goals and aspirations, and governments would agree to work toward these goals “progressively,” within their available resources and in their own ways. This is the meaning of article 1 which provides that a government would “take steps . . . to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights . . . by legislative as well as by other means.”

The preamble of this Covenant recognizes “the inherent dignity and . . . equal and inalienable rights” of individuals, and at the same time, expresses the realization that the individual has duties to other individuals and to the community. This is intended to make sure that this Covenant is not misconstrued as entitling everyone to a free ride through life at the expense of the government.

In its approach to the economic and social articles, as well as the civil and political articles, the U.S. delegation has been guided by our Constitution and by existing statutes and policies approved by the legislative and executive branches of the Federal Government. For example, in the

¹For a statement made by Mrs. Roosevelt during the sixth session of the U.N. General Assembly on the question of drafting separate covenants on civil and political rights and on economic, social, and cultural rights, see BULLETIN of Dec. 31, 1951, p. 1059. A related article appears on p. 1058 of the same issue.

drafting of the article on employment, the delegation has been guided by the policy declaration in the Employment Act of 1946. This law asserts that it is the "continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means consistent with its needs and obligations . . . to promote maximum employment, production and purchasing power."

The employment article in this context means the right of every individual to the opportunity to work for a living if he so desires. The steps to be taken by each government under this article would include "policies and techniques to achieve steady economic development and full and productive employment under conditions safeguarding fundamental political and economic freedoms to the individual."

Most of the other articles of the Economic, Social, and Cultural Covenant are phrased in such a way that governments could simply "recognize" the right to social security, for example, or to adequate food, clothing, and housing.

One exception to this is the article on trade-union rights which states that each government undertakes to insure the free exercise of "the right of everyone to form and join local, national and international trade unions of his choice for the protection of his economic and social interests."

One particular aspect of the right to education is under serious study by the delegation. This article provides, among other things, that it is understood that higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit and shall be made progressively free.

The substantive articles of the Civil and Political Covenant are phrased in much the same language as in previous drafts. These rights include the right to life, the prohibition of torture or cruel punishment, the prevention of slavery, freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, freedom of thought, religion, expression, assembly and association, and others.

Article 14, the article on freedom of expression around which there has been much public controversy, provides that "everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference" and "everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression" including "freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice."

The limitations of this freedom are confined to those necessary to prevent the application of the Covenant in such a manner as to require the repeal or modification of existing laws enacted for the protection of the public interest. For example, article 14 provides that restrictions on free expression must be only those imposed by law; and even in those instances they must be necessary, first, in respect of the rights or reputations of others (which includes our libel and slander stat-

utes), or, second, for the protection of the "national security or of public order, health or morals." The latter phrase is designed to permit restrictions such as censorship only when the national security demands it, as in the case of the military censorship now imposed in the Korean theatre. It is also designed to safeguard statutes which prohibit incitement to murder or violence, false advertising of adulterated foods and drugs, or obscene publications, for example.

In other words, the limitations are intended to apply only to the narrow field in which the Federal Constitution, as interpreted by the courts, permits restrictions on free speech and the press in the public interest.

To safeguard the rights and freedoms of the people of the United States under their Constitution and laws, and to prevent these limitations from ever permitting any dilution or diminution of our rights and freedoms, the United States has pressed for the inclusion in the Covenants of three special provisions. Two of these have already been adopted by the Commission. The third—the federal State article—the Commission had no time to consider.

The first of these provides that "the fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any contracting state pursuant to law, conventions, regulations or custom" shall not be curtailed on the pretext of any provision of the Covenant.

A second safeguarding provision makes it clear that neither Covenant will be self-executing upon ratification. In other words, any undertaking by the United States would not come about automatically upon ratification, but would follow only from legislative action, or in the case of the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, legislative or other appropriate action, both public and private.

Third, the United States along with India and Australia, has also proposed a "federal State article" which is designed to insure that the present balance of powers, as provided in our Federal Constitution, will not be disturbed by either Covenant. Our Constitution "delegates" certain powers to the Federal Government and then asserts that all other powers are "reserved" to the states. The "federal State article" insures that matters which now fall within state jurisdiction will remain with the states, and that Federal powers will not be increased by the Covenants.

The pertinent text is as follows:

This Covenant shall not operate so as to bring within the jurisdiction of the federal authority of a federal State . . . any of the matters referred to in this Covenant which independently of the Covenant, would not be within the jurisdiction of the federal authority.

The United States is not satisfied with the present text of the article on the self-determination of peoples. We strongly support, of course, the principle of self-determination of peoples. But paragraph 3 of the present draft deals with the disposition and control of natural resources

in an arbitrary way and is opposed by the United States. Changes also are needed in the first two paragraphs.

I only wish to add that the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the Covenants of Human Rights is part of an international effort designed to acquaint the world with the ideas of freedom and of the vital necessity for their preservation and extension. Such an effort is indispensable in this day when totalitarian concepts are being spread vigorously not only by Communists but also by the remnants of nazism and fascism. The U.N. campaign for the promotion of human rights must be continued and prosecuted successfully if our free way of life is to be preserved.

Neither of the Covenants as now drafted contains any provisions which depart from the American way of life in the direction of communism, socialism, syndicalism, or statism. When such provisions have been proposed, the United States has opposed them; every proposal by the Soviet Union and its satellites to write "statism" into the Covenant has been defeated. Should such proposals gain acceptance, the United States will not sign or ratify the Covenants. The objective of the United States, and I am sure of the majority of the Commission, is greater freedom, not the limitation of its exercise.

The draft covenants should be considered in this light. There is a long drafting job still ahead of us—in the Commission and in the General Assembly. It is important, therefore, that we remain open-minded about the various provisions and not make hard and fast judgments until they are in final form.

STATEMENT TO COMMISSION MEMBERS

During the past 9 weeks, while we have been attempting to accomplish, as speedily as possible, our highly technical task of drafting two Covenants on Human Rights, that technical task has been constantly retarded by the statements in which long illustrations were given which were attacks upon the United States and in which hours were consumed by the Soviet, Ukrainian, and Polish delegates. In these attacks alleged facts concerning conditions in my country were given.

Delegates of other countries have already said, and I agree, that political attacks take up too much time in the deliberations of this Commission, so I am merely setting the record straight on certain points and not making any attacks.

I have consistently tried to refrain from answering at length during the debate because I felt that the spider-and-fly technique was being used here, and we were actually being invited to reply so that further distorted pictures of conditions in the United States could be built up for the press in other countries and we would continue to waste more and more time of the Commission.

Certain delegations, however, publicly stated that the reason why we did not reply was because their distortions were true and that we therefore could not reply.

That, simply, is not true.

We can disprove, we can refute, and we can show up each and every attack made as a vicious and deliberate distortion of the truth.

Cases of Soviet Statistical Caricatures

First, you will recall that Mr. Kovalenko² tried to tell us, in an effort to be amusing, that it was legal in Alabama for a man to beat his wife with a 2-inch stick. He claimed that this illustrated the prevailing attitude toward women in my country. Now if Mr. Kovalenko's facts were true, the story would definitely not be amusing. But the story is so outrageously false that I believe the most amused people would be the people of Alabama where wife beating not only is not, but never has been, the practice. It is outlawed by the courts. And Mr. Kovalenko could have found that out for himself if he had taken the time or the trouble to check his facts himself.

The facts concerning my country are an open record—available to anyone who has sufficient intellectual honesty to check them before making accusations.

Let me quote, briefly, from the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama in the case of *Williams v. Williams*, which Mr. Kovalenko could have found reported in volume 194 of the *Southern Reporter*, page 507. The Alabama Supreme Court said:

This we would clearly announce, make known to all husbands who have such notions. Husband and wife are equal in the right to be free from personal violence from the other. He has no more lawful right to assault his wife than any other person.

At another point, Mr. Morosov³ stated that "one out of every four families in the United States lives in unsanitary conditions." That is another untruth. Here is the *true* story. Mr. Morosov arrived at this figure by incorrectly concluding that *all* of the 8,800,000 non-farm dwellings which our Bureau of the Census found to be deficient in some particular were unsanitary. This is not so, for the figure includes nearly 3,000,000 rural units whose only deficiency was that they lacked inside plumbing. What country in the world considers unsanitary all rural houses which do not have inside plumbing?

Looking at the housing picture in the United States in broad perspective, the American people as a whole enjoy what is undoubtedly the highest standard of housing in the world. Thus of 28,-

² V. P. Kovalenko, Ukrainian delegate on the Human Rights Commission.

³ P. D. Morosov, Soviet delegate on the Human Rights Commission.

100,000 urban families, 87 percent have private flush toilets, 84 percent have private baths, 96 percent have running water inside the structure, 86 percent have mechanical refrigerators, 99 percent have electricity, and 90 percent cook with fuel other than coal or wood such as gas, electricity, or petroleum. Even among the 8,500,000 rural non-farming families, 56 percent have flush toilets, 55 percent have private baths, 69 percent have piped running water inside the structure, 72 percent have mechanical refrigerators, 72 percent cook with fuel other than coal or wood, and 90 percent have electricity. This, I think, is in general a rather satisfactory state of affairs; but I cite the figures not in a spirit of braggadocio but because the representative of the Soviet Union, in his propagandistic attack upon the United States, would have you believe that many of our families live in unsanitary conditions. We have never denied that, despite our high level of housing, there is still room for improvement. Our goals are high, but let no one interpret that to mean that our present standard is low.

Again, the representative of the Ukraine, at our 269th meeting, said that:

United States Department of Commerce figures of December 1951, showed that 56.8 percent of American families had incomes of less than \$3,000 a year; that this was 25 percent less than the legally established minimum; that 39 percent were earning less than half the legally established minimum.

This statement is also untrue. The representative of the Ukraine was quoting from a preliminary report from the 1950 census. The full report, which is readily available to him, deals not with families alone, but with "families and unrelated individuals," in other words "households." It would show that 47.6 percent (not 56 percent) of such "households" had an income of \$3,000 or less. Of course, as he should have realized, since the income of "unrelated individuals" as a group is lower than the income for "families" only, it is not correct to say that this \$3,000 figure represents the dollar income figure for "families" alone. But one thing the representative of the Ukraine did not tell us, when he cited this report, was that the report itself explicitly states two things in qualifying the figure reported. The first qualification stated in the report was that the income figures reported were probably lower than the true income figures because the figures reported were generally based on memory rather than on records, with a natural tendency to forget minor or irregular sources of income. The second qualification stated in the report itself was that it included both urban and farm families and, as we know, farm families generally have lower money incomes than urban families. These two important qualifications were not given by the representative of the Ukraine. And also, if he had been more careful, he would not have said that there was a legally established minimum annual wage of \$4,000, for he would easily have been able to ascertain that the legally estab-

lished minimum pay is 75¢ per hour and that this does not work out to \$4,000 a year.

At our 280th meeting, the representative from Poland joined in and cited so-called "official statistics" showing that in December 1951 "women workers in New York State had earned on an average 39 percent less than men doing the same work." We were discussing at that time, you will recall, the provision about equal pay for equal work. But the representative from Poland forgot to tell us that he had done a little editing of the official figures. He had added some words. The official reports of the State of New York give a breakdown for January 1952, for all manufacturing, showing that the average weekly earnings of a production worker for December 1951 was \$77.61 for men and \$47.06 for women, or a differential of 39 percent. But what the representative from Poland failed to tell us at the time was that he had added to his statement the four words "doing the same work." Not only does the report not say that the men and women were doing the same work, but a simple reading of the report would disclose that since the figures cover all manufacturing, the lower figure for women would be due to the inclusion of numbers of women in lower-paying, lesser-skilled jobs, so that the men would be earning more because they were performing jobs of higher skills.

Another statement by Mr. Morosov that is equally distorting of the facts was made at our 268th meeting. He said then, you will recall, that in the United States the total unemployed, either completely or partially, approximated 6,500,000. What Mr. Morosov did to arrive at that figure was to juggle some unrelated figures until he got a total big enough to suit the propaganda statement he had set out to make. The annual average unemployed in the United States in 1951 was 1,900,000. But this figure was apparently too low to suit Mr. Morosov's purposes. So he took another figure—the figure for the persons who had a job but who were not at work. This amounted to 2½ million persons. Mr. Morosov added this 2½ million to the total unemployed, even though the report he was reading clearly stated these people had jobs. But Mr. Morosov apparently was looking for a really big figure. He saw that in 1951 we had 2 million people who had been employed from 1 to 14 hours a week—part-time workers such as students, housewives, retired people, and others. That did it! So, Mr. Morosov added all three figures together and got his 6½ million. And these he called the total unemployed figure. This is a magnificent example of the way the Soviet delegate quotes from "official sources" for propaganda purposes.

U. S. Budgetary Allocations for Education

Three days later, Mr. Morosov did it again. He stated that the article which we had proposed for article 1 of the Covenant on Economic, Social,

and Cultural Rights would "enable the United States to continue to allocate 75 percent of its budget to military needs and 1 percent to education." I did point out, at the time, that education costs were carried mostly in states and local budgets, but I do think it might be well for me to show how far wrong Mr. Morosov was again.

Now, what are the true facts about expenditures for education in my country? I should point out first that when we speak of "education" in my country, we mean schools and colleges and universities, and we do not mean vast expenditures on various forms of indoctrination and propaganda, under whatever name or guise.

Now, in the United States, educational expenditures in 1949, the latest year for which data are available, were 5.12 percent—not of total governmental expenditures—but 5.12 percent of the total disposable personal income of the entire nation. The total was \$9,551,541,000. Therefore, when Mr. Morosov cited the percentage of the Federal budget which is spent on education, the picture is not a true representation of educational effort in the United States. Mr. Morosov left out 99.3 percent of the total. That is quite a sizable omission, even for Mr. Morosov.

And just to show Mr. Morosov what these figures mean when translated into education for boys and girls, let me say to him that more than 98 percent of all children between the ages of 7 and 14 are now actually enrolled in American schools and that more than half of the boys and girls of my country complete at least a high school education. We have, however, set for ourselves even higher goals. We engage among ourselves in a goading self-analysis which helps us towards improvement. Thus, for the benefit of the representative from Poland—he completely misunderstands the situation when he quotes President Truman as to the need for greater improvements in education.

I should also correct the remarks made by two of these representatives about the U.S. social security system at our 284th meeting. First, the delegate from the Ukraine stated that "the conditions governing the social-insurance system in the United States were such that very few workers could derive any benefits from it." Mr. Morosov also remarked at the same meeting that "in the United States employers contributed very little to the financing of social insurance, the greater part being paid by the workers."

I do invite both of these gentlemen to study our social security system in all its many ramifications very much more honestly and carefully. Social insurance in the United States guarantees benefits to workers and their families as a matter of right. A worker may go into court to enforce that right. Eligibility for benefits in the event of unemployment or death is acquired soon after the worker takes his first covered job. Retirement benefits are normally built up over a longer period, except that workers already at an ad-

vanced age, when covered by the program, qualify within a very short period. Benefits under the various social-insurance programs are geared to past earnings, weighted to provide proportionately more for lower paid workers than for those with high earnings. They recognize family responsibilities through the provision of supplementary benefits for dependents.

Last year there were over 4,000,000 beneficiaries—that is, persons who had retired or their survivors—who were receiving benefits under our social-insurance program, with the average—I repeat, average—monthly benefit payment ranging up to \$93.

Mr. Morosov also said that the greater part of the cost of our social insurance is paid by the workers. That just is not true. Workers and their employers share equally in the costs of the national old-age and survivors insurance system and of the special retirement, survivor, and disability system for railroad workers. On the other hand, workmen's compensation programs are financed by employers alone. Unemployment insurance, too, is financed almost exclusively by employers. While there is no single pattern, this much is definitely true: for employers individually as well as in the aggregate, their share of the total cost is greater than that paid by the employees.

I regret exceedingly that the actions and the tactics of the delegates from the Soviet, the Ukraine, and Poland have forced me to take these few minutes to reply and set the record straight. No one regrets more than I do the loss of time entailed. I think what I have said in reply sufficiently shows that the statistical caricatures drawn here bear no resemblance whatever to truth and fact.

But there is a more serious problem at stake here. The consumption of so much time has seriously hampered the vital work of this Commission.

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(Continued on page 1031)

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Document Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

The Case Against Unilateral Disarmament

*Statement by Benjamin V. Cohen
U.S. Representative in U.N. Disarmament Commission*¹

Nothing has been so discouraging to the cause of disarmament as this morning's statement of the Soviet representative.

His statement is not a criticism of the tripartite proposal.² His statement is a restatement and, I am sorry to say, a misstatement of the tripartite proposal. Pursuant to a mischievous technique of deception, the position of the Three Powers is so distorted that the readers of the Communist press will never know what the real position of the Three Powers is. There are sufficient real differences between us. What is the purpose of fabricating and distorting our true positions?

Each of the statements and misrepresentations by the Soviet representative this morning have already been answered by different representatives of the Three Powers here to the satisfaction, I think, of any fair-minded critic. My statement this afternoon is very largely a restatement of things that I have said here before, in some instances more than once.

The Soviet attack on the tripartite statement is based on the fiction that the Three Powers propose that we only fix ceilings on the armed forces and nothing more. The Soviets do not deny, if I understand correctly, that in a comprehensive disarmament proposal you must fix the number of the armed forces. The Soviet Union has itself suggested a reduction of one-third in the armed forces of the Great Powers, but they apply tests to the Three Powers which they do not apply to themselves. They say what is not true, that the Three Power proposal is designed to exclude consideration of other essential elements of disarmament. Not only did I, as the representative of the United States, make clear in my speech last week that ceilings on the armed forces was only one element of a

comprehensive program—but that position is specifically stated in the proposals themselves.

The last paragraph of the introductory statement to the proposals reads:

The proposals envisage substantial and balanced reductions in armed forces. Agreement on such reductions should greatly lessen the likelihood and the fear of successful aggression and should facilitate agreement on other essential parts of a comprehensive disarmament programme, including the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction and the effective international control of atomic energy to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

And the final paragraph of the proposals themselves—paragraph 14—reads:

14. The proposed limitations—including their relationship to other components of the program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments and the elimination of weapons adaptable to mass destruction—should be comprehended within the treaty or treaties required under Paragraph 3 of the General Assembly resolution of January 11, 1952.

In my speech on May 28,³ I emphasized and reinforced these statements in our proposals with the following statement, which I quote:

Let there be no misunderstanding. Limiting the numbers of permitted armed forces is only a part of our task. We must also limit the types and quantities of armaments which should be allowed to support permitted armed forces. But it is important to know the numerical ceilings for the armed forces that we are aiming to achieve in order to determine the types and quantities of armaments that would be appropriate to support them. When we have determined the forces and arms which should be allowed, we must see to it that the forces and arms which are not permitted are prohibited and eliminated. And, of course, we assume that we are going to prohibit and eliminate all weapons adaptable to mass destruction in accordance with the General Assembly resolution. If we can even tentatively agree on the ceilings for permitted armed forces, it should greatly facilitate agreement in reducing and restricting the quantities and types of permitted armaments.

¹ Made before the Disarmament Commission on June 10 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

² BULLETIN of June 9, 1952, p. 910.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 907.

A little later on, I said in the same speech :

The tripartite working paper is not introduced as a propaganda trick or as a mere paper declaration. It is intended to give us a basis for starting serious work on the proposed limitations. Our work should include the relationship of this proposal to other components of the program for regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments and the elimination of weapons adaptable to mass destruction. The work should, of course, lead to the treaty or treaties required under paragraph 3 of the General Assembly resolution of January 11, 1952, which, it is contemplated, would include all the essential components of a comprehensive program. . . .

Components of U.S. Position

Our position has not been hastily contrived. It follows through the views expressed by the U.S. Secretary of State before the Political Committee of the General Assembly on November 20 last,⁴ and we have never departed from those views, which I quote:

Then there is a very important additional matter. I think the Commission, when it studies this matter, will discover that even though it evolves limitations on the number of people who go into the armed forces of each one of the countries sitting around this table—even though it evolves the limitation on the amount of the national product which goes into this field—there is still something left open. That something is: how this is used within the armed forces. There will always be ingenious people who will try to evade any kind of system. It has happened in the past and will happen in the future. Therefore, I believe it will be necessary to have limitations on the number of people, on the amount of material which each of us may put into our armed forces; and in addition there must be agreement on the nature of these armed forces. In other words, we cannot leave this to a system of chance in which a group of nations might get together and say: "Very well, we have agreed not to have more than so many men and so much material in our armed forces. How can we use this so we can be quite a menace to the rest of the world? Shall we do this by putting it all in long-range bombers? Or, all of it in a highly mobile armored outfit? Shall we put all of it into submarines?"

That should not be permitted. Therefore, when the limitations have been evolved, each nation should be required to submit what it proposes to do with it so that it is subject to international scrutiny. . . .

Our position, Mr. Chairman, is clear and no zeal to pervert it on the part of the Soviet Union can alter it.

In the first place, the ceilings on the armed forces which we propose are only one element of a comprehensive disarmament program.

In the second place, the ceilings which we propose extend to all armed forces, including air, sea, under-sea, land, and all other forces which are employed to propel armaments of any kind or nature. It covers the air forces, and the naval forces no less clearly, indeed, more clearly than does the Soviet proposal regarding a third reduction in the armed forces.

In the third place, the ceilings which we propose are not intended to exclude or to divert attention

from other essential components of a comprehensive disarmament program, which must as a minimum include:

(a) The reduction of armaments to types and quantities necessary and appropriate to support permitted armed forces and the exclusion and elimination of all other weapons and armaments.

(b) In particular it should cover the elimination of atomic weapons and the control of atomic energy to insure its use for peaceful purposes only and the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, including bacteriological.

(c) It should include adequate and effective safeguards to insure the observance of the agreements and the protection of complying states from the hazards of violations and evasions.

The assertion of the Soviet Union that the United States opposes the elimination of all weapons adaptable to mass destruction is untrue. The charge that we are against the elimination of atomic and germ warfare is not true. What we are opposed to are paper prohibitions which carry with them no safeguards. As I have repeatedly said, in our view disarmament without safeguards is a snare and a delusion, a cruel deception.

Soviet Paper Promises

We do not, Mr. Chairman, trust the paper promises of those who make false charges against us. The charges that the United Nations or the United States is engaged in germ warfare in Korea is a monstrous falsehood. We do not know what monstrous wrongs these monstrous falsehoods are designed to conceal.

We know not what is the cause of this hate mongering, this hate America campaign which comes from the Kremlin and is sadly reminiscent of Hitler's hate campaign against Czechoslovakia before Munich.

We do know that the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist authorities are unwilling to permit an impartial investigation of their unfounded charges by the International Red Cross, or by the World Health Organization, or by any other impartial international authority.

The sincere desire of the American Government and of the American people is to find a way not for unilateral disarmament, which would aid would-be aggressors, but for genuine universal disarmament which would insure peace to all people. This is and will remain our sincere desire, despite the unilateral and false charges of the Soviet Union. We are arming, not for aggression, but to deter aggression. We disarmed after the last war, while the Soviet Union retained its arms and gave aid to aggression in Korea. We do not propose to let that happen again. We do not intend to disarm unilaterally while the Soviet Union talks disarmament but spurns the honest consideration of any proposals to move toward balanced reduction in

⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 3, 1951, p. 879.

arms and toward peace. Our position has been stated by President Truman and that position has been grotesquely distorted and misrepresented by the Soviet spokesman. Let me quote our position as it was stated by President Truman on November 7, 1951,⁵ and that position remains unchanged:

. . . We are determined to win real peace—peace based on freedom and justice. We will do it the hard way if we must—by going forward, as we are doing now, to make the free world so strong that no would-be aggressor will dare to break the peace. But we will never give up trying for another way to peace—the way of reducing armaments that make aggression possible.

We invite a comparison of the position which the United States has taken in this Disarmament Commission with that taken by the Soviet Union.

Comparison Between U.S. and Soviet Views

In the first place, in accordance with the mandate issued by the General Assembly last year, we have prepared a working paper to provide a basis for the progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces and armaments including atomic and bacteriological.⁶ The Soviet representative refuses even to give serious consideration to this paper.

Secondly, we have submitted a paper on essential principles of disarmament.⁷ These principles call for the consideration of disarmament not as a means of regulating but of preventing war by making it inherently and constitutionally impossible. These principles call for an open and substantially disarmed world in which no state should be in a state of armed preparedness to start a war. These principles call for the balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments and for the elimination of mass armies and the elimination of all instruments of mass destruction which would, of course, include atomic and bacteriological weapons. These principles call for effective safeguards to insure that all phases of the disarmament program are carried out by all. And the Soviet Union has refused to give any serious consideration to these principles.

Thirdly, the United States, with France and the United Kingdom, has proposed that we tentatively agree on ceilings for the armed forces of all states as one important item in a comprehensive disarmament program. And the Soviet Union not only refuses to consider this proposal but blatantly misrepresents it.

The Soviet Government talks of reduction in the armed forces and in armaments, of the prohibition of atomic weapons, and even suggests its willingness to accept international control. It has at times raised our hopes, but when we put concrete questions to the Soviet representative, the

Soviet representative has refused to answer our questions concerning that control. I must confess, Mr. Chairman, that I cannot understand the Soviet dialectics. We must, according to that dialectic, adopt the magic principles presented by the Soviets, those and nothing more, and if we adopt those, then all other things will fall into place, all the difficult problems concerning disclosure, concerning control, concerning allocation, concerning other denominators and indices, all will fall into place.

But the Soviet representative will not discuss either our principles or our proposals. Our principles he finds vague and our concrete proposals are too detailed, they bog down, they are diversionary. There is only one way we must accept the Soviet dialectic, their major principles, or we can't move forward. From this I conclude regretfully that the Soviet representative prefers to talk about disarmament rather than to consider the concrete means by which disarmament can be achieved.

I am reluctantly driven to the conclusion that the Soviet representative prefers to regard this Commission as another forum in the Cold War rather than a forum for serious discussion of disarmament as a way to peace.

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⁶ *Ibid.*, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 586.

⁷ *Ibid.*, May 12, 1952, p. 752.

Answers to Soviet Distortions and Misrepresentations of U.S. Economy

REMARKS BY ISADOR LUBIN¹

Several delegations have raised important questions of economic development, of commodity arrangements, and of full employment. I shall have something to say about these matters when we get to certain other items on the agenda. The ideas of these delegations deserve serious consideration.

Other delegations—those of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and the speaker for the World Federation of Trade Unions—have made a large number of assertions, most of which do not deserve serious consideration. Nevertheless, I feel compelled to make a few brief remarks in order to correct some of the errors, misrepresentations, and distortions which have been placed in the record by these Soviet bloc representatives.

I have here a whole sheaf of notes for setting the record straight. But I am going to restrain myself from using many of them. Instead, I am circulating to members of the Council a memorandum² which exposes a number of these Soviet bloc statements for the misrepresentations and distortions which they are.

On the subject of unemployment, I can't resist calling to your attention the absurdity of the Soviet charge that there are 13 million people in the United States who are wholly or partially unemployed. For the correct figures, please refer to the memorandum I am circulating. The most casual look at the help-wanted section of any newspaper is enough to show the falsity of the U.S.S.R. figure. Had he but eyes willing to see, this would be apparent even to the Soviet delegate. For example, on Sunday, June 8, the *New York Times* carried 15 solid pages in fine type of help-wanted ads. I gladly present this copy to my Soviet colleague.

¹Made on June 11 before the Economic and Social Council and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date. Mr. Lubin is the U.S. representative in Ecosoc.

²*Infra*.

Trade Relations With Soviet Bloc

Mr. President, I feel I must speak out on another subject. This subject is trade relations between the countries of the Soviet orbit and the countries of the free world. On this there has been too much misrepresentation and distortion of the position of the United States to let it go without spoken comment.

For the past few years it has been necessary for the United States and other of the free countries to take necessary security measures with respect to trade with the Soviet Union and the countries it dominates. The reason behind this is well known. After World War II, it became clear that the Soviet Union was unwilling to cooperate with its wartime allies in their efforts to promote the economic recovery of Europe and the rest of the war-torn world. Instead of demobilizing its armed forces as did other countries, the Soviet Union maintained its military power and devoted its industrial resources largely to increased output of war materials. It concentrated on obtaining from the United States and other industrial countries the equipment and other materials necessary to increase its war potential. The Soviet Union, through its occupation forces in Eastern Europe, moved swiftly to consolidate its economic and political control of this area. In February 1948, the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia—a coup only made possible by the nearby presence of the Red armies—that Communist coup made the aggressive designs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as plain as day.

Of course, the people of other countries were all deeply disturbed over this. And in the face of such aggressive designs, it was necessary for the United States and the other free countries to look to their defenses. One measure was to develop a system of security controls over strategic exports to the Soviet bloc. The U.S. program was initiated in March 1948—one month after the true face of the Soviet policy was exposed in Czechoslovakia. Since then, the United States has not permitted the shipments of strategic goods to the

Soviet bloc. Other free countries have also put similar controls over such of their exports as would be important to the Soviet war potential. Such restrictions represent one part of the program by which we are strengthening ourselves to discourage—or, if necessary, to repel—aggression of the sort that occurred in Czechoslovakia and, more recently, in Korea.

This has been our policy since 1948. But, in executing it, the United States does not—I repeat, does not—oppose exports of nonstrategic goods to the Soviet bloc. As it happens, U.S. trade with the countries now Soviet satellites has never been large and our trade with the Soviet Union itself has amounted over a long period of years to about one percent of our total trade. This low percentage prevailed even before the Bolsheviks came into control in Russia and may be explained on purely economic grounds. However, the West European countries have had a substantial trade with the Soviet bloc countries for a long time. They obtain large supplies of timber, coal, and grain from Eastern Europe and in exchange they ship a wide variety of manufactured products.

Attempts—the latest at this very Council—have been made by Communist spokesmen to show that the United States has tried to prevent this European East-West trade in peaceful goods. The truth—as stated many times by official U.S. spokesmen, and a truth which I assert again—is that the United States is not opposed to such trade.

Gentlemen, we are all too familiar with the many tirades delivered here (i. e., at the United Nations) in recent years by representatives of the Soviet Union or its satellites on the subject of trade controls. To me, these exhibitions have served as some evidence of the effectiveness of our effort to stop the flow of strategic materials to them.

History of Soviet Trade Doctrine

In recent months, however, the Soviet bloc has given a new twist to these tirades. They now talk not only about the wickedness of our security trade controls—while, of course, maintaining rigid control over their own strategic exports. But they now talk about more than this. They now talk about the value—indeed, the necessity—of expanding international trade generally. Gentlemen, in listening to the honorable representative of the Soviet Union on Thursday, one might have been led to believe that the Soviets had now abandoned the self-sufficiency doctrine that has guided their conduct for over 30 years.

I think we are all familiar with this doctrine. It was set out by Lenin himself in his report on concessions at the 8th Congress of Soviets in December 1920. Said Lenin: “Restoration of trade relations is a means of making large purchases of machinery needed by us. . . . The sooner we have achieved this . . . the sooner will we be

economically independent from the capitalist countries.”

That was in 1920. In 1941 a prominent Soviet economist, Mishustin, spelled out the same principle in greater detail. He wrote (in “Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R.,” Moscow, 1941): “The main goal of Soviet import is to utilize foreign merchandise, and first of all machinery, for the speediest realization of the plans for socialist reconstruction, for the industrialization of the national economy, and for the technical and economic independence of the U.S.S.R. . . . The import of the U.S.S.R. is so organized that it aids the speediest liberation from import.”

That was in 1941. And, 5 years later, with the postwar creation of a Soviet sphere of influence, Moscow imposed this self-sufficient policy—a policy which, need I add, is the death of international trade—on the Soviet bloc as a whole. In its dealings with its East European satellites and with Communist China, Soviet policy has been to reorient their trade almost exclusively to itself. And, in its dealings with the free world, its policy has been to limit imports to goods essential for reindustrialization and rearmament.

This has continued to be the consistent policy of the Soviet and Soviet bloc leaders in recent years. It was again spelled out in a Czechoslovak directive issued in the spring of 1950. This provides as follows: (1) only absolute essentials are to be imported from capitalist countries and these only when adequate supplies cannot be found within the Soviet realm; (2) insofar as possible, payments are to be made through exports of nonessential goods; (3) to the extent that shipping is available, all imports are to be channeled through Polish ports and are to be carried in Soviet realm ships. So much for imports. Now, regarding exports: (1) nothing is to be delivered to capitalist countries which is required in the Soviet Union or the so-called Peoples’ Democracies; (2) no exports of strategic goods are permitted to capitalist countries; (3) the Peoples’ Democracies are to be granted priority in delivery of goods required for the rebuilding of their economy; (4) exports to capitalist countries are to be limited to nonessential goods insofar as possible; (5) deliveries of steel products to capitalist countries are to be reduced to a minimum; (6) shipping across West Germany and from West European ports is to be reduced to a minimum, and, whenever possible, Soviet Union or Peoples’ Democracies vessels are to be employed for overseas trade.

Mr. President, it is not because I think this history of Soviet trade doctrine is unknown to the members of this Council that I have gone into it in such detail. Instead, I have gone into it in order to focus attention on the appeal made by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia for an expansion of trade between the Soviet bloc countries and the free world. Does this, we must ask ourselves, mark a critical change in fundamental Soviet doctrine? Gentlemen, I

would rejoice if this were so. But, while we are waiting for some evidence of this—some concrete evidence—we might recall to ourselves the extent to date of Soviet cooperation on world trade problems. Did the Soviet Union vote for the calling of a U.N. world trade conference—the very purpose of which was to stimulate world trade in January 1946—at the first meeting of this very Council? No. Did the Soviet Union participate in the preparations for the Habana conference, or in the conference itself? No.

Did the Soviet Union participate in the negotiations for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade? No. Did the Soviet Union join the International Monetary Fund or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, both of which are instruments to further world trade? No. Did the Soviet Union accept the magnanimous and wholehearted offer of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to join in preparing a program for the economic recovery of production and trade in Europe in 1947? It did not. And the Soviet Union has not only failed to participate in these major projects of international cooperation. It has also tried its best to discredit them, to smear them, and to sabotage them at every opportunity.

Peace Talk Theory vs. Harassing Practices

So, we may ask, whence comes this sweet reasonableness, this talk about trade and peace? But, some may say, Soviet doctrine and Soviet behavior toward these various international organizations and programs do not reflect actual Soviet bloc practices in concrete transactions. Well, let's take a look at Soviet bloc trading practices. I won't refer to China. The manner in which British businessmen were treated in Communist China is known to all of you and their decision to quit that unfortunate country—a decision taken less than a month ago—is an ironic commentary on current Soviet trade pretensions. I might, however, refer you to the difficulties my own countrymen have experienced in trying to do business with Communist Czechoslovakia. We have heard a lot about the Soviet bloc countries wanting to trade with foreign businessmen. But how do the facts fit in with these claims? First, the property of American nationals in Czechoslovakia has been confiscated without compensation. Next, the Czechoslovak Government has persecuted and harassed American firms to such an extent that it is virtually impossible for them to do business in Czechoslovakia. Third, the Czechoslovak Government, as have all Soviet bloc governments, has declared it treasonable for its citizens to furnish the necessary information on trade which is essential to the conduct of commercial enterprise. Fourth, American charitable and welfare organizations have been forced to discontinue their work. And, finally, American citizens have been imprisoned without justification.

That is what can happen to individuals. It can also happen to nations. For individuals the cost can be too high financially. And for nations it can cost too much in independence.

Mr. President, I have recalled to you the facts of Soviet doctrine and practice in the international trade field. I ask you to examine the current Soviet pretensions in the light of their behavior. Plainly, Soviet doctrine and practice in this field, to say nothing of Soviet doctrine and practice in the political, information, and military fields, do not permit us to consider this recent talk of the Soviets as anything more than "just talk."

In saying this, I do not mean to imply that the United States—as other free nations—would not welcome *bona fide* action by the Soviet Union in joining the family of nations that practice as well as preach an expansion of international trade. The Government of the United States always welcomes opportunities to increase world trade, but not at the price of its national security or the security of other free nations. I might add that the Soviet Union would find the reception of its trade propaganda more favorable if other Soviet activities were consistent with it. As it is, this propaganda has fallen on skeptical ears because it is accompanied in some places by aggression and threats of aggression, and by the stimulation of subversion everywhere. It is in this area of misinformation and subversion and aggression that the Soviets must change their ways before credence can be given to their words. And, until they do change, we must continue to take with reservations their current talk about peace and trade.

Still, and even in the face of Soviet unwillingness to act like a good neighbor in the world community, it is the policy of the United States to promote and increase trade in peaceful goods. Let us hope that such a flow of goods will help keep open the lines of communication between the peoples of the free world and the peoples of the Soviet bloc, and let us hope, contribute to the rusting away of the Iron Curtain.

Gentlemen, we have heard it said that the United States fears peace. The reason alleged for this is that our defense program was started to keep Americans from a depression. The American economy after its brief readjustment in 1949, was operating in high gear before the Communist attack in Korea. This rearmament program has brought us many more problems than it has solutions of problems. It has brought us heavy taxes, higher prices, reduced profits, and extra strains of many kinds. We would be glad to be relieved of them.

The fact is that the United States fears neither peace nor war, though we cherish peace and we abhor war. We are confident of our ability to solve the problems of peace by the use of foresight and resolute action, just as we would solve the problems of war, if they were thrust upon us. As has been made evident, time and again, by the actions of the free nations of the world, the solu-

tion, within the framework and spirit of the U.N. Charter, of the problems raised by Soviet imperialism depends almost entirely on the Soviet Union. But, come what may, it is our determination to get on with the U.N. job of establishing for ourselves and our fellow human beings the higher living standards and the fuller lives that people everywhere insistently demand.

MEMORANDUM ON THE U. S. ECONOMIC SITUATION³

SUBJECT: *Supplementary Comments on World Economic Situation*

As I stated orally, there are a number of misrepresentations and distortions with respect to the United States in the statements on the world economic situation made by the delegates of the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the representative of the World Federation of Trade Unions. Rather than take up the meeting time of the Council in miscellaneous refutation, I am circulating this memorandum in order to set the record straight on some of the points.

This memorandum does not deal with the misrepresentations and distortions which the representatives of the Soviet bloc presented with respect to the economic situation within the Soviet bloc. A comparison of Soviet claims with the material set forth in Chapter 5 of the latest Economic Survey of Europe, prepared by the Economic Commission for Europe, will serve to correct many of these misrepresentations and distortions.

Unemployment in the United States

The Soviet representative gave us the fantastic impression that over thirteen million people in the United States are wholly or partially unemployed. The facts, as indicated in my statement, are that since last year there have been less than two million unemployed. In April and May of this year, there were only 1,600,000 people unemployed, or 2.6% of the working force.

The Soviet representative—as he did last year and the year before, built up his fantastic figure by including the considerable number of persons working part-time in the United States, most of whom, as I have told this Council on three previous occasions, work part-time *because they choose to do so*. These part-time workers include high school and college boys and girls who work after school, on Saturdays, housewives who can spare part of the week to earn some additional money, retired people who work only part-time. It is preposterous to call these people even partially unemployed.

Another group comprises those *with a job but not at work*. Over one third (36%) of these people were absent from work because of illness and another 20% because they were on vacations. Neither of these groups is even included in our totals of unemployment, nor are they in any other country that I know of.

New York Workers' Earnings in Relation to City Workers' Family Budget

The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that for a family of four persons \$4,083 was needed in order to live modestly but adequately in New York City in the autumn of 1951. This figure was correctly quoted by the representative of WFTU. Here the accuracy ends. In an endeavor to prove that family incomes were indecently low, she compared earnings of individual factory workers with this adequacy level for a 4-person family. This comparison is obviously inappropriate since many workers are

not factory workers and since, on the average, there is more than one wage-earner per family.

The true comparisons are as follows. Incomes of families of wage-earners and clerical workers in New York City averaged \$4,250 in 1951, as shown by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This is \$167 above the adequacy figure for a family of four. However, the average size of these families was 3.2 persons not 4, so their requirements are roughly 86% as great or \$3,500. Consequently the typical New York worker made \$750, or more than 20%, above the modest but adequate level.

Now, I do not want to imply that many families, especially families of four or five or more, living on lower-than-average pay, are not having a hard time making ends meet—what with higher taxes and the rise in consumer prices. I am sure that they are, particularly those whose wages or salaries have not been increased since 1950. But to say that typical American workers are not earning enough to live on, in the face of the rise in real wages which has occurred since the war, is patently false.

Housing Rents

The Soviet representative also stated that American families are poor because a very large proportion of their income must be spent on rent. The Representative of the Soviet Union said that American workers' families spent 25-40% of their incomes for housing. The correct figure for American workers living in large cities is about 12%. If you take into consideration not only rents, or their equivalent for home-owners, but also the cost of fuel, light, electricity, refrigeration, etc., the proportion of income spent on all aspects of housing was just under 20% in 1950. This figure of 20% comes from the latest surveys of the Bureau of Labor Statistics for 1950 and applies to the great cities of New York, Chicago, Philadelphia; to Pittsburgh, to such mid-Western cities as Kansas City, and on the Far West Coast, to Portland, Oregon, for example. The proportion of income spent on housing and home maintenance in the smaller cities of the U.S. is even less, ranging from a little over 15% to 20%.

It was also stated that rents have risen recently in the U.S. The figure used, I believe, was a rise of 20%. The facts are that rents rose by 4.5% from the spring of 1951 to the spring of 1952 in our large cities.

Housing Construction and Crowding

Extensive reference was also made by the Soviet representative to overcrowding, mortgages and a number of other fancied evils in the United States. Happily for us, our homes were not subjected to the bombing which devastated London, Rotterdam, and many of the cities and towns of the Soviet Union. Our housing situation is thus not really comparable with that in parts of Europe. Although we have been fortunate, we cannot allow our housing situation to be misrepresented.

Take three facts:

First, Crowding: As for Americans living in hovels, the Census of 1950 shows that only 5½% of our homes had more than 1½ persons per room—our standard for overcrowding. Less than 15% had more than one person per room. In 1951, only about 5% of all households contained married couples or parents and children sharing the living quarters of relatives.

In recent years the average Soviet urban dweller had slightly more than 3.5 square meters—about 38 square feet—of dwelling space. This compares with 54 to 65 square feet per inmate of Federal prisons in the United States.

Second, Home Mortgages: The representative of the USSR bemoaned the alleged fact that ¾ of our families were in debt for their homes. I assume that he is referring to the mortgages on their homes. The correct figure is not 67% but about 25% of all families. Evidently, the Soviet conception of a mortgage is that it is an instrument enabling "imperialist Shylock money lenders" to extract high interest rates and keep homeowners under their control with the constant threat of foreclosure. In the United States, the home mortgage is an eminently

³Submitted to members of Ecosoc on June 11 by the U.S. representative, Isador Lubin, and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

respectable way by which a man can acquire his own home and pay for it over a long period of time, instead of paying rent. We encourage home ownership in this country, and, as I said in my earlier remarks, there are various systems of government guarantees for home mortgages at moderate interest rates, devised both to make it easier for people to buy their homes and to insure the solvency of the institutions financing them!

For us, the fact that over half (53%) of American families in 1950 had title to their homes is a matter for congratulations, not condolences. Moreover, the bulk (61%) of the buyers of new homes in recent years (1949) are in the middle income group—\$3,000–\$5,000—in which the majority of American wage earners and salaried workers now fall.

Third, New Homes Built: It is quite true that in 1951 the number of new houses and apartments started in the U.S. was smaller than in 1950—which, by the way, was the all-time peak of building. The decline was the result of restrictions on scarce materials, as I indicated in my opening discussion. In view of the fact that American families *do* have homes in which to live—and quite good ones, by and large—we could well afford to curtail residential construction somewhat until supplies of materials improved—as they now have. But, lest anyone conjure up a picture of only a few thousand dwellings built in 1951, let me tell my colleague that, if he will study the figures, he will find that even in 1951 over 1,000,000 new dwelling units were started, secondly only to the all-time high of 1,400,000 in 1950. This year, home construction is running above last year.

Farm Ownership

It was stated that 50% of American farm lands are owned by large owners. It is true that 40% of the cropland, and 60% of all farmland, is in farms of over 500 acres. It is not true, however, that size of landholding is an adequate measure of the size of farm businesses. Cattle ranches in the arid West often have thousands of acres and yield modest incomes, while many small poultry or truck farms in suburban areas have only a few acres but yield very respectable incomes.

It is quite true that the proportion of large farms, over 500 acres, has been increasing and that tiny, uneconomical farms have been declining in number. This is in the interest of more economical units, suitable for mechanized farming. Sheep and cattle ranches of the West must be large to be profitable; chicken farms should be small—and are. A typical Iowa corn and hog farm is only 160 acres and is profitable.

As I said in my statement—and as the USSR Representative also stated—the number of families on farms in the U.S. is diminishing, but, as he did not go on to say, these farmers and their children *choose* to go to the cities and to seek industrial employment of their own free will; and, as he also failed to say, farm production has gone up 40% since before the war, with fewer people working our farms.

American farmers are not “impoverished.” Cash receipts from farm marketings in 1950 averaged \$5,400 *per farm* as compared with \$1,400 in 1940, a much greater rise than in costs of operation.

Gross farm income in 1951, at \$38.7 billion, was more than triple the 1940 total of \$10.9 billion. This crop year, 1952, is expected to see a record. Since Korea, farm costs have been increasing more rapidly than incomes, but net farm income in 1951 was still 17% over that of 1950 and 3½ times that of 1940.

Farmers' equities—the value of their land, buildings and other assets minus their mortgage and other liabilities—also tripled from 1940 to 1951. Farm assets were \$53,788 million in 1940, and liabilities were \$10,035 million. In contrast, assets were \$142,775 million in 1951 and liabilities were \$12,806 million.

Obviously, the American farmer is quite well off.

Corporate Earnings

The Soviet representative again tried to frighten the Council with the old hobgoblin—the “American monopolist.” I'm a little weary of listening to this exaggerated scare story of vast profits, allegedly at the expense of workers, of the public—indeed, of the whole world; of the stories about the “greedy few” who own these giants. So let's look at the record.

Profits of American corporations *are* large, in absolute amounts, and 1951 was a record year in dollar income *before* taxes. These profits, however, are based on a relatively small margin on each dollar of sales, and, in turn, on a large quantity of sales. Also, taxes have so increased that profits after taxes declined in 1951.

According to the official statistics of the Federal Trade Commission, American manufacturing corporations as a group in 1951 made a profit, after taxes, of 5.4 cents on every dollar of goods they sold.

Figures have been tossed around by the Representatives of the Soviet bloc in an attempt to show that our defense industries have been swelling their profits. Now, what is the true measure of the profits of a corporation or an individual? The answer, obviously, is the amount that they have left over after they have paid their expenses and their taxes, both in dollar terms and in relation to investment. The value of the goods sold by American corporations in 1950 was 17 percent greater than in 1951. What happened to their profits? After taxes, they were actually 12 percent *lower* than in 1950, when our defense program was just getting under way. The fact is that with the exception of oil all of the important industries upon which we primarily depend for the production of our principal defense needs show lower net profits for 1951 than for 1950. If I might cite but a few instances, the profits of the iron and steel industry were down by 10 percent; machinery, including electrical equipment, by 8 percent; and chemicals by 19 percent.

International Organization for Standardization

by Willard L. Thorp

*Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

There is no need for me to speak to you about how important the development of standards is to scientific and technical cooperation and to the more efficient production and distribution of commodities. Unless you believe this to be the case, you would not be here. I prefer to use this opportunity to remind you of the broader significance of your work—work which plays its part in the efforts being made by men of good will in many countries to try to resolve differences among peoples. It is all too easy to concentrate one's attention on the particular problem at hand and forget the larger purposes within which the specific project is a part.

¹ Excerpts from an address made before the General Assembly of the International Organization for Standardization at New York, N. Y., on June 19 and released to the press on the same date.

The competing characteristics of difference and uniformity run all through human endeavor in society. The ultimate expression of difference is chaos. The ultimate expression of uniformity is stagnation. The problem of society is to find ways and means which will encourage the process of change in order to achieve progress, while not creating intolerable disorder at the same time.

There are many historical reasons which explain the many differences which appear among nations—differences in language, currency, measurements, traditions, customs, and even philosophies. So long as we were detached from each other by great distances, great when measured in terms of time and convenience, most of these differences were relatively unimportant. The contacts among the different peoples were few and far between. However, in today's world, shrinking rapidly as the result of extraordinary improvements in communication and transportation, we have all been brought close together.

Elements in National Differences

In this much smaller world of ours, it was inevitable that national differences should become much more significant. They are more apparent. They exert more influence on our lives. They really matter. These differences can lead to mutual benefit when they lead to the enrichment of each other in the field of production, or science, or art, or ideas. But differences can also lead to confusion and misunderstanding and can create barriers to better understanding and to the full use of all our capabilities.

I am sure that people throughout the world recognize that restrictive nationalism, applied in the form of barriers, deprives them of the satisfaction of sharing their knowledge and the benefits of receiving it from others, not to mention its opposition to the economic benefits of expanded trade. Freedom is more productive than restriction. The great fertilizing ideas that have had a decisive influence on the life of mankind have come from men and women of many faiths and nations. The infinite number of short steps which total up to the great distance covered by scientific advance, both theoretical and applied, have been taken by thousands of imaginative explorers of the unknown in many countries. True national pride is that which recognizes its inheritance and wisely enriches it. The cooperative exchange of things and ideas is the path of greatest hope and progress for each participating nation.

Tradition and national pride are not the only forces which often make the work of all of us difficult. In addition, any given process or procedure usually is related to a substantial investment of one kind or another. For example, in the field of language, investment in libraries and education is involved; in production, machinery usually has

been constructed to meet certain specifications; in the field of labor, a special group of workers may have acquired certain special skills. Each such situation seeks its own protection, and any prospective change must take its special interest into account.

These are elements which may tend to preserve our differences, unduly, but we must not be discouraged. In our shrinking world, we are jointly embarked on an adventure in creation and progress. Today international organizations and institutions, both governmental and nongovernmental, have a constant task in dealing creatively and constructively with differences.

Elimination of Differences by Individual Effort

Common and unified standards like the international pharmacopeia produced by the World Health Organization have been established. I am sure that hundreds of lives have been saved by the development of common rules and practices at the various airports all over the world. Your own organization has real progress to report in the reduction of differences in your special field.

Elimination of unnecessary difference does not, of course, argue for a common sameness everywhere. What strikes me as important is the way in which some of the unnecessary differences that confuse and confound relations between peoples can be gradually whittled away and ultimately eliminated. There is general social benefit to all peoples when certain understandable standards are established, for example, in reference to raw material qualities, or to tensile strength and other qualities of yarn, or to thread count of textiles. There is great benefit from developing a common nomenclature, a common language of communication in reference to the standards which can be established. These benefits favor the interests of technical and engineering professional experts; they improve productivity; they extend the area of understandable communication; they benefit the consumer; and they make a contribution toward increased trade. I believe it behooves us all to look carefully at the differences in our lives and practices today and to differentiate between those which represent a valued and creative and constructive contribution and those whose elimination will lead to easier and more efficient and more friendly living.

There is a great similarity in the tremendous effort you are carrying on to eliminate the differences that stand in the way of technical and engineering progress and the efforts of nations today to develop common policies and joint international ways of doing things together. You who are statesmen on the engineering and technical front join hands with statesmen on other fronts to reduce the obstacles that divide, to strengthen the forces that unite, and to contribute to genuine economic and social progress.

The same deep spiritual and moral motives which inspire statesmen to concern themselves with the world's betterment guide you. Without an underlying conviction that the improved well-being of peoples is a goal to which every person should be dedicated, there would be little philosophical motivation for the work you are carrying on. Today, the important fact is that more and more men and women in every walk of life throughout the world are dedicating themselves to the goal in the international field of bettering our institutions, our practices, and our very living.

This goal will not be reached through the ef-

forts or inspiration of one or a dozen individuals. The problem of international relations and good will is too complex for that. It will be reached by the efforts of countless individuals, each doing his part directly and through such agencies as this, the International Organization for Standardization. May I express the hope and wish that this General Assembly meeting here in the United States of America will give added strength to your efforts. It is within your power to make a significant contribution not only to scientific and technical cooperation but also to mutual understanding and international cooperation among the peoples of the world.

Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

FORTY-FIRST REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD MARCH 1-15, 1952¹

U.N. doc. S/2629
Transmitted May 9, 1952

I herewith submit report number 41 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 March, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués numbers 1190-1204 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Although staff officers continued their meetings on agenda item 3, little substantive progress was made. Discussion centered on the number of ports of entry at which inspection teams are to be located, the authority of neutral nation inspection teams to inspect classified equipment, and the participation of the Soviet Union in inspection.

The Communists continued to press for five port of entry complexes as inspection areas; the United Nations Command representatives reiterated the requirement for six.

With respect to the functions and authority of the neutral nations supervisory commission, the Communists continued to object to the United Nations Command proposed clause "—but this shall not be construed as authorizing inspections or examinations of any secret designs or characteristics of any combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons or ammunitions." They stated that such restrictions would prevent proper and adequate inspection of replenishment material. The United Nations Command representatives pointed out that this clause constituted necessary and proper guidance for the inspection teams as to the scope of inspection required.

The participation of the Soviet Union in the neutral nations supervisory commission was again discussed at length. The United Nations Command representatives

again pointed out that the agreed principle six specifically provides that both sides agree to invite neutral nations acceptable to both sides. The United Nations Command representative challenged the Communists to show where in the record any other interpretation could be derived from the agreed principle (contained in United Nations Command report number 38).

At the meeting on 4 March 1952 the Communist representative said: "The attitude that you assume without giving any reason nor having any reason is apart from that of following the definitions of the neutral nations." The United Nations Command has repeatedly and clearly stated its position. Reasons for rejecting the Soviet Union have been furnished to the Communists as quoted in United Nations Command report number 40.

Bitter charges, vituperation and studied evasions characterized the Communist delegation's approach in discussions of the exchange of prisoners of war during the past two weeks. With the movement of talks from staff officer level to the reconvened sub-delegation on agenda item 4, there was hope that the Communists would recognize the desirability of coming to agreement on unresolved issues and expedite a sound and workable solution of the prisoner of war problem. Developments indicate clearly that they refuse even intelligent consideration of the United Nations Command proposals.

Realizing that final agreement was not in sight, the United Nations Command delegation again proposed that seriously sick and injured prisoners be exchanged immediately so as to provide each side an opportunity to assume responsibility for the care of its hospitalized personnel. The Communists refused, as they had done heretofore, with no reasonable basis for rejecting such a humanitarian proposal.

As a secondary measure, the United Nations Command proposed that arrangements be made for the early delivery of Red Cross comfort packages to prisoners of war. Not only was this suggestion arbitrarily refused, but the Communists based their rejection on the unfounded accusation that the United Nations Command was attempting to delay the conferences by introducing propaganda issues.

A proposal that the activation and utilization of joint Red Cross teams, previously agreed upon by both sides, be authorized now for immediate relief work in the pris-

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on May 9. Texts of the 30th, 31st, and 32d reports appear in the BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; the 33d report, *ibid.*, Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395; the 34th report, *ibid.*, Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430; the 35th report, *ibid.*, Mar. 31, 1952, p. 512; the 36th and 37th reports, *ibid.*, Apr. 14, 1952, pp. 594 and 597; the 38th report, *ibid.*, May 5, 1952, p. 715; the 39th report, *ibid.*, May 19, 1952, p. 788; and the 40th report, *ibid.*, June 23, 1952, p. 998.

oner of war camps while negotiations continued, met the same unyielding resistance from the Communist side.

Previously the Communists had agreed to exchange complete prisoner of war data on all persons taken into custody by each side, with the firm understanding that such exchange was to be bilateral and made at the same time. The United Nations Command delegation repeatedly made efforts to effect this exchange, reminding the Communists again and again of previous agreements and of the fact that some 50,000 United Nations Command prisoners, whom the Communists had admitted having captured but had not reported, were still to be accounted for. The Communists, by transparent artifice, have attempted to deny their previous agreement, and, by taking remarks from the official records and quoting them out of context, have made every effort to establish the responsibility of the United Nations Command to submit complete data without reciprocal information being received from them. The United Nations Command has, and will, categorically deny any obligation on its part to submit supplementary information on all the prisoners of war it has ever held without equivalent data on all United Nations Command prisoners of war ever in Communist custody.

Despite the Communists' claim that the majority of personnel whom they captured were released at the front and their often-repeated stand that all the prisoners they now hold have been reported, they have yet to offer any substantiating evidence to support the truth of their statements. Information which the United Nations Command has received from many sources indicates that, in September and October of 1950, there were many Republic of Korea Army personnel moved into Manchuria and, after a period of indoctrination, these troops were assigned to units of the North Korean Peoples Army. The Psychological Warfare Agency of the Communists, as late as 2 March 1952, broadcast a statement from an ex-Republic of Korea soldier who had been captured by the North Korean Peoples Army and given training as a member of the Communist forces. Facts such as these, admitted by the Communists themselves, disprove any statements they make claiming that captured personnel were released en masse.

As a continuation of its effort to secure every available piece of evidence on its missing prisoners, the United Nations Command submitted a list of 174 additional names of United States personnel missing in action on whom there is evidence indicating they were once prisoners of war. Thus far, 1,621 names of this category have been given the Communists with a request for an accounting of their disposition.

The United Nations Command, throughout these discussions, has maintained its previous stand that it will not forcibly repatriate any prisoners of war in its custody. It has been pointed out again and again to the Communists that the principle of no forced repatriation is the only basis upon which any logical, humane exchange can be made. The United Nations Command has made every effort to secure agreement on this point, and has explained clearly and concisely that its stand is bilateral, applied to all prisoners of both sides and accepts the premise that there may be in Communist custody some prisoners who may not desire to return to their former side. If so, the acceptance of no forced repatriation works to the advantage of both sides. Any other basis of exchange is totally unacceptable to the United Nations Command, and from a moral and political view, should be equally unacceptable to the Communists.

An initial report received from the United Nations Command prisoner of war camp at Kojedo indicated that an outbreak among North Korean prisoners of war had occurred on 13 March 1952. Pending a complete investigation a release was made to the press and the subject introduced at the agenda item 4 conference on 15 March as follows:

"Headquarters 2nd Logistical Command, Pusan, Korea, 15 March 1952.

"Twelve Communist prisoners of war are dead and

twenty six wounded as a result of an outbreak at 0930 Thursday morning, 13 March, at the United Nations prisoner of war camp, Kojedo Island. One American officer and one Republic of Korea civilian were injured. An investigation immediately ordered will disclose the full facts. So far as is presently known, the latest outbreak, the second within a month, occurred when a work party of co-operative prisoners of war, and a detachment of Republic of Korea troops under a Republic of Korea captain were suddenly stoned when passing an area containing a large number of unruly Communist prisoners. The guard company opened fire upon the attackers.

"Quiet has been restored and all prisoners are complying fully with the orders of the authorities. The International Red Cross has been informed and will make an independent investigation."

In answer to the request of the American Red Cross for assistance in the formulation of the Joint Red Cross teams to assist in the relief and exchange of prisoners of war, the National Societies of Great Britain, Canada, Australia, Philippines, and Turkey responded quickly. The remainder of the United Nations participating in the Korean conflict will undoubtedly be heard from soon. Meanwhile, concrete plans are being formulated for team operations and the packaging of medical and relief supplies.

The status of agenda item 5 remains unchanged. The United Nations Command delegation is still awaiting a request from the Communists for a meeting at the staff officer level to incorporate the agreed article, as quoted in United Nations Command report number 40, into the armistice agreement.

Utilizing his strongly prepared positions, which are constantly being improved, the enemy offered determined and usually effective resistance to the numerous United Nations Command raids and patrols.

Hostile forces limited their activities to sporadic and widely scattered probing efforts against United Nations Command forward positions during the hours of darkness. The largest unit thus employed by the enemy was a battalion. Although none of these small-unit actions were of major military significance they did serve to outline the disposition and attitude of forward enemy units. A noteworthy addition to enemy activity occurred on the Eastern front when hostile forces disseminated propaganda leaflets by air-bursting artillery and mortar shells. There was no diminution in the enemy's capabilities during the period. Enemy troop dispositions and front lines remained static.

Hostile contact on the Western front, as elsewhere, was inaugurated in the main by aggressive United Nations Command patrols and raids. In one such raid on 2 March, United Nations Command elements in Kigong area forced the withdrawal of a small enemy unit after a four-hour battle. Raids were also conducted in the Mabang and Sagimak areas, but the enemy forces successfully defended their positions. Enemy-initiated action on the Western front was limited to small exploratory attacks against United Nations Command forward positions during the hours of darkness. In four such actions United Nations Command elements made brief withdrawals from outpost positions, but these positions were immediately restored by prompt counter action.

Action of the Central and Eastern fronts resembled the pattern of activity of recent periods. The only exception occurred on 12 March when the enemy, in a momentary display of aggressiveness, launched an unsuccessful battalion strength attack against United Nations Command positions in the Tupo area.

Despite the approach of more favorable weather the enemy still shows no firm inclination of an early departure from his present defensive attitude, although the possibility of enemy offensive action during the spring has been suggested by several prisoners of war. Continuous United Nations Command alertness and surveillance, however, minimizes the enemy's opportunity to

attain significant tactical surprise in any major military operation in Korea.

Generally unfavourable weather over Northeastern Korea failed to interrupt the assaults of United Nations Command carrier aircraft against Communist supply routes in North Korea as jet and propeller-driven airplanes attacked enemy logistical facilities with an average of 107 sorties a day.

East coast rail lines in enemy territory bore the brunt of the carrier-launched attacks during the period. On 7 March the carrier planes set a new record for the number of rail cuts made in a single day's operation. In a special strike on 2 March a known headquarters and barracks area was attacked with excellent results.

In the Yellow Sea a United Nations Command aircraft carrier averaged forty-six sorties per day. The planes operated over the Chinnampo area and Hwanghae Province destroying and damaging enemy-occupied buildings. They also provided air cover and air spot for the blockading surface units and flew reconnaissance missions as far north as Yongu.

Patrol planes conducted daylight reconnaissance missions over the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and the Formosa Straits, as well as day and night shipping and weather reconnaissance missions for surface units.

At the east end of the bomb line United Nations Command fire-support vessels conducted fire missions for the United Nations Command units in contact with the enemy. Utilizing air spot as well as shore fire control parties, the heavy and light cruisers and their accompanying destroyers demolished many enemy bunkers and inflicted numerous personnel casualties.

The naval siege continued at Wonsan, Hungnam, and Songjin, with coastal patrols being conducted day and night from the bombline to Chongjin. Vessels on coastal patrols fired at key rail targets along the route. Enemy shipping and fishing activity was reduced to a minimum by the blockading surface units. Enemy shore batteries fired on friendly island installations and on shore fire control parties in Wonsan Harbor and on Yang Do, off the coast just north of Songjin. Accurate and effective counter battery fire was provided by the surface units in the area and a number of the enemy shore batteries were destroyed. Enemy coastal waters, boat basins, and suspected troop and boat concentrations were illuminated during the hours of darkness.

On the West coast, the United Nations Command surface units manned anti-invasion stations along the coast from Chinnampo to the Han River estuary, in support of the friendly islands north of the battle line. Near the close of the reporting period, the ice along the coast and around several of the islands started to melt, and it appeared that all areas would be free for unrestricted navigation in the near future. During hours of darkness enemy positions and invasion approaches were illuminated and suspected enemy activity taken under fire. Daylight firing into these positions started many fires and inflicted numerous troop casualties. Enemy shore batteries were active against friendly and neutral islands and the blockading ships.

The Minesweepers encountered sub-freezing weather, rough seas, and snow as they conducted day and night operations. Shore batteries fired on the sweepers at Wonsan, Hungnam, Songjin, and at several other places along the East coast. No hits were scored nor casualties inflicted on the friendly craft. The blockading vessels provided accurate and immediate counter battery fire in all instances.

A United Nations Command floating medical laboratory arrived at the island of Chodo for an investigation of a reported incident of typhus. The mission of the little ship is to identify the disease, determine the cause, and initiate measures against any recurrence.

Naval auxiliary, Military Sea Transportation Service, and Merchant vessels under contract provided logistic support for all components of the United Nations Command Forces in Japan and Korea.

United Nations Command Air Forces continued to conduct counter air, close combat air support and interdiction operations. Relatively good flying weather prevailed over Northwest Korea during most of the period with the result that destruction claims increased for most categories of targets.

United Nations Command Interceptor Aircraft again demonstrated their ability to gain temporary air superiority over the defending MIG-15 Interceptors. Northwest Korea from the Yalu River south to Pyongyang was the scene of air-to-air encounters involving 323 MIG's, of which twenty-three were shot down and twenty-one damaged. No United Nations Command aircraft were lost as a result of these engagements.

Night Intruder Operations of United Nations Command light bombers and night fighters were again directed at motor transport and railway traffic along the enemy's main supply routes. Bright moonlight during most of the period permitted trucks to drive without lights, thus making them difficult to locate and attack. Despite this handicap many motor vehicles were reported destroyed.

Attacks by medium bombers were also conducted during the hours of darkness. Their principal missions were attacks against rail bridges and rail focal points, close air support of United Nations Command ground forces, and distribution of leaflets to North Korean municipal areas.

During daylight hours jets with propeller-driven fighter bombers struck at a wide variety of targets in the ground battle areas and at enemy logistics lines throughout Northwest Korea.

The heaviest commitment of fighter bombers was against the enemy's northwest rail network and its associated rolling stock. Enemy antiaircraft and small arms fire continued to offer heavy opposition to these attacks and caused some damage and loss. Although high performance enemy interceptors frequently operated in the "rail cut" areas, the United Nations Command fighter bombers were well protected by friendly flights of interceptors which provided escort and cover and which succeeded in all instances in preventing the MIG's from attacking the fighter bombers.

Aerial reconnaissance revealed a 4,000-foot strip of serviceable sod area at Pyongyang Main Airfield and it was attacked by medium bombers on the night of 12 March. The status of other North Korean air bases remains virtually unchanged with very little activity noted.

The recent allegations of Communist propaganda agencies concerning the use of bacteriological weapons in Korea by the United Nations Command have been vigorously denied. These charges are evidently designed to conceal the Communists' inability to cope with the spread of the epidemics which occur annually throughout China and North Korea and to care properly for the many victims. These fabrications are being systematically exposed by publicizing the failure of the Communists to provide proper medical facilities in the afflicted areas.

There were no air attacks on United Nations Command ground installations by enemy aircraft.

During the first half of March, United Nations Command leaflets and radio broadcasts highlighted the observance of the 33rd anniversary of the Korean Declaration of Independence. Attention was focussed on the timely significance which this national occasion holds for all patriotic Koreans in their resistance against an alien Communist tyranny more absolute and more truthless than any known before. United Nations Command leaflets were widely disseminated in North Korea to bring encouragement to the millions of Koreans who have already suffered more than five years of slavery and oppression under the Communist yoke. The United Nations Command media reaffirmed United Nations support for the efforts of the Korean people, in the north as in the south, to halt Communist aggression and unify their nation. Korean soldiers, forced by the Communists to fight against their own people, were urged to abandon their traitorous leaders and cross over to the side of freedom.

The United States in the United Nations

[June 6–June 19, 1952]

Security Council

Mr. Malik (U.S.S.R.), President of the Council for the month of June, called a meeting on June 18 to consider two Soviet draft resolutions: (1) acceptance by all states of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 concerning bacteriological warfare, and (2) recommendation to the General Assembly for the admission of the 14 states whose applications are pending.

Discussion was held only on the first item. Ambassador Ernest A. Gross (U.S.) stated that the Soviet Union was using the Council as a new forum for its "campaign of lies." As for the ratification of the protocol, he pointed out, it was in full recognition of the problems of today that the President had withdrawn it from the U.S. Senate calendar in 1947, along with 18 other obsolete treaties. Among today's facts were the two U.S.S.R. reservations to the protocol. By the first, the Soviet Union left itself free to use poison gases or germ weapons against any state which for any reason has not ratified the protocol; and by the second, it "regards itself as free to use poison gases or germ warfare against any state which it decides to label an enemy and which it declares has used these weapons."

Ambassador Gross then stated that:

The Soviet government by charging the United Nations Command with the use of bacteriological weapons has set the stage for using these weapons itself if it should decide to declare that the states resisting aggression in Korea are its enemies. . . . The United States has never used germ warfare. . . . I am authorized to say on behalf of the Unified Command that the United States has not and is not using germ warfare of any kind in Korea.

Ambassador Gross recommended that this Soviet draft resolution be referred to the Disarmament Commission, which was the proper place to deal with the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

Economic and Social Council

Social Committee of ECOSOC—The Committee, June 4–10, considered the report of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information and of the Press. By a vote of 15–0–3 (Sov. bloc), the Committee adopted an amended France-Sweden-United States resolution requesting the Secretary-General to circulate the draft Code to national and international professional associations and information enterprises for such action as they may deem appropriate. These organiza-

tions are to be informed that, if they think it desirable, the United Nations might cooperate in organizing an international conference for the purpose of drawing up a Code of Ethics.

The Committee rejected, 4–9 (U.S.)–5, the resolution which would have had the Council appeal to the General Assembly to take the necessary action at its seventh session to open for signature the Convention on the International Transmission of News and the Right of Correction, and the Convention on Freedom of Information. Walter Kotschnig (U.S.) stated that the French proposal was full of dangers and threats to the free press because it would place the right of correction in the hands of the states. "The opening of such a Convention," he said, would "put governments right in the news business and would make anything that emanated from states more important than anything all the free press of the world could publish."

A resolution was adopted requesting the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the appropriate specialized agencies and nongovernmental organizations, to prepare for submission to the Council in 1953 a substantive report covering major contemporary problems and developments in the field of freedom of information.

The United States amendment to this resolution, which would have had the Council appoint a *rapporteur* for a trial period of one year to cooperate with the Secretary-General and the appropriate agencies, was rejected, 5–10–3. The Egyptian amendment, calling for the establishment of a Committee of three persons of great authority in the field of information and the press to investigate and consider what political and economic factors would be likely to constitute obstacles to freedom of information, was also rejected, 3–14–1.

Among the other resolutions adopted were: (1) recommendation that the General Assembly urge governments to give the widest possible dissemination to United Nations resolutions on the subject of freedom of information and the press; (2) the Council to invite the Secretary-General, in conjunction with UNESCO, to study ways and means to encourage and develop independent domestic information agencies in each country; and (3) postponement of debate for another year on questions relating to censorship, technical, and economic obstacles to the free flow of information and news, and so forth.

The Economic and Social Council considered the Committee's report, June 12–13, and approved the actions taken with the exception of the reso-

lution assigning to the Secretary-General the task of gathering information and reporting to the Council. The operative part of this resolution was revised, in accordance with an adopted (10-4-4) Belgium-French-United States amendment, calling for the appointment on a year's trial basis, and in a personal capacity, of a *rapporteur* to prepare this report in cooperation with the Secretary-General, the specialized agencies—particularly UNESCO—and the professional organizations concerned.

Commission on Human Rights—The Commission ended its eighth session on June 13 after completing the revision and adoption of the 18 articles for inclusion in the draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These articles dealt with (1) prohibition of slave labor; (2) right of a fair trial; (3) protection against *ex post facto* laws; (4) recognition before the law; (5) the right of peaceful assembly; (6) the right of free association, including the right to form and join trade unions; (7) equality before the law; (8) the right of derogations from states' obligations under this Covenant in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation, "provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion or social origin . . ."; and (9) prevention of the misuse of the Covenant for the destruction of human rights. The Commission had considered earlier articles for a draft Covenant on Social and Economic Rights.

The Commission also adopted, with slight amendments, a preamble for the draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which is similar to the one approved for the draft Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In this connection, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt stated:

The preamble of this Covenant recognizes "the inherent dignity and . . . equal and inalienable rights" of individuals, and at the same time expresses the realization that the individual has duties to other individuals and to the community. This is intended to make sure that this Covenant is not misconstrued as entitling everyone to a free ride through life at the expense of the government.

Certain legal clauses, such as the Federal-State article, as well as measures of implementation, remain to be considered. Mrs. Roosevelt introduced the joint Australia-India-United States "Federal-State" clause, which, she stated, is

to ensure that the constitutional balance between the powers delegated under the federal Constitution to our federal government in Washington, on the one hand, and the powers reserved to the states, on the other, are not altered by the proposed Human Rights Covenants. . . . Since the earliest United Nations discussion on the Covenants on Human Rights, which began four years ago, the United States has insisted that a "Federal-State" clause must be included and that in the absence of such a provision, acceptance by the United States would be extremely unlikely. The document now presented is a clearer redraft of previous proposals. It is designed to meet the problems of other "Federal States" as well as ours . . .

The Commission adopted a resolution requesting Council authorization to continue its work on the two Covenants at its ninth session next year in order that they may be submitted to Ecosoc and the General Assembly in 1953 for final action.

Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor—The three-member Committee, headed by Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar (India), is now holding its second session at United Nations Headquarters. On June 16 it began holding private hearings on allegations of forced labor in Czechoslovakia. In its reply to the Committee's questionnaire, the Czechoslovak Government stated that it rejected the United Nations study as illegal and an interference in "internal affairs." The United Nations Secretariat announced that Jan Papanek, former United Nations Czechoslovakia representative, submitted information complementary to the data submitted earlier by him, and concerned mainly the economic situation in that country before the change in Government in 1948, and thereafter. He stated that the two basic reasons why Czechoslovakia is resorting to forced labor are: (1) to supply cheap labor for the carrying out of the economic plans of the State; and (2) to eliminate all opposition to the present regime and "to liquidate democracy." He stated that there are 350,000 slave laborers in 247 Czechoslovak forced-labor camps.

At this session the Committee will privately hear and question the following 10 nongovernmental organizations: Association of Former Political Prisoners of Soviet Labor Camps, Council of Free Czechoslovakia, Estonian Consultative Panel, Hungarian National Committee, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, International League for the Rights of Man, Latvian Consultative Panel, Lithuanian Consultative Panel, National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc., and Rumanian National Committee. These organizations are authorized to have two witnesses testify on their first-hand experiences in slave-labor camps.

The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions will present evidence of extensive slave labor existing in Communist China.

The Committee will also review replies received to date from 27 countries which have answered the questionnaire sent all governments asking for information which would be helpful to its members in their study of laws and regulations relating to forced labor.

Two more sessions will be held, extending into early 1953, after which the Committee will submit a report to the Economic and Social Council and the Governing Body of the ILO.

World Conference on Population—The Economic and Social Council, June 10, approved an amended co-sponsored Philippine-United States resolution to hold a world population conference of experts in 1954, under United Nations auspices, devoted solely to the exchange of ideas and experiences on population matters.

THE DEPARTMENT

Time Magazine Article on Amerika

[Released to the press June 19]

The Department of State's International Information Administration on June 19 issued the following statement in answer to inquiries regarding an article concerning the Russian-language magazine *Amerika* appearing in the June 23, 1952, issue of *Time* magazine:

The International Information Administration does not regard the article appearing in the June 23, 1952, issue of *Time* magazine as reflecting a true and accurate picture of the situation with regard to the Russian-language magazine *Amerika* and other publications operations of the International Press Service.

The article not only includes several misstatements of fact but also gives the incorrect impression that the future of the magazine *Amerika* is related to the recent consolidation of all publications activities in Washington.

The facts are:

1. There is no connection between the recent consolidation of the Washington and New York publications operations in Washington and the future of the Russian-language magazine *Amerika*.

2. The Russian *Amerika* has been under review constantly since 1950 when the official Soviet distributor began reporting circulation decreases (below the 50,000 per issue ceiling agreed upon in 1946). This review is continuing.

3. The *Time* article appears to be based on statements made by former members of the New York publications operations. These employees deliberately distorted the facts and tried to create the impression that the consolidated publications operation in Washington is unable to carry on the editorial work formerly produced in New York. The publications operations of the International Press Service in Washington are actually being expanded by economies resulting from the elimination of duplication in the move of all publications operations to Washington. At least \$250,000 a year—almost the entire new annual cost of the Russian *Amerika*—will be saved through the consolidation. The only former New York product which is being discontinued is the Arabic-language magazine *Amerika* which has been produced quarterly in 57,000 copies. This magazine is being discontinued at the request of an overwhelming majority of USIS posts in the Middle East, and the savings are being transferred to the field for local production of publications.

4. *Time*'s statement that the New York publications operation was operated "thriftily" is not consistent with the facts. The New York opera-

tion was not efficiently managed, particularly in the use of free-lance writers and in the purchase of art work and illustrations. The reduction in the cost of producing *Amerika*, referred to in the *Time* article, resulted from careful Washington planning and budgeting and not from voluntary economies effected by the New York office.

5. The consolidation in Washington of publications operations belonging to the International Press Service involved only editorial personnel. This move was part of a major reorganization of the International Press Service which called for a general regionalization of all operations. It was not possible to continue the New York field office under the new organizational structure. The consolidation, which has been called for in budgets presented to the Congress for the past 3 years, does not affect the actual printing of the magazine *Amerika* which is being continued in New York.

6. It is not true that the Department or the International Information Administration has been or is giving what *Time* described as a "slow death" treatment to *Amerika*. Issue No. 54 of the magazine is now en route to Moscow; issue No. 55 is on the presses in New York; and copy for issue No. 56 has been sent to Moscow for processing. Material now is being gathered for issue No. 57. The Washington staff is fully capable of producing a Russian-language magazine equal or superior to the New York product, and at less cost.

7. The implication that the State Department has not protested the reduced circulation to the Soviet Government also is not consistent with the facts. Since the Soviets first began reducing circulation, a total of 12 official U.S. protests have been made.

8. Any decisions as to the future of the Russian *Amerika* will be made at the highest policy levels in the Department, and not, as the *Time* article implies, on the operating levels. The decision will be on the value of it to the information program and that alone.

9. Out of an authorized New York personnel ceiling of 96 employees, 84 positions were filled by full time and part time employees when the announcement of the consolidation in Washington was made last March 20. The consolidation enabled the International Press Service to eliminate 45 New York positions duplicating Washington positions, leaving 39 positions in Washington open for New York personnel. Twenty of the New York staff have been retained, both in Washington and in a small New York liaison staff. Most of the other 19 who elected not to remain with the International Press Service have been employed by the International Broadcast Service (Voice of America) in New York.

10. The above facts were made available by Department representatives to *Time* reporters in Washington prior to preparation of the *Time* article.

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